SPECIAL PROCEDURE | UP COLLEGE OF LAW | MEETING 5 REVISED E2014
Rule 78 – Letters Testamentary and Of Administration
A. Qualification
1. LIM V DIAZ-MILLAREZ (1966)
Case: CIRILO LIM, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. BASILISA DIAZ-
MILLAREZ, oppositor-appellee.
Ponente: Regala, J.
DOCTRINE: One is considered to be unsuitable for appointment
as administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. The
determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the
court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not
to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in
error.
QUICK FACTS: When Jose Millarez died, Lim, claiming to be his
nephew, filed a petition for appointment as judicial administrator.
Diaz-Millarez, claiming to be Jose’s wife, filed an opposition on the
ground that Lim has an adverse interest in the estate due to a civil
case between them declaring the right of Diaz-Millarez to ½ of the
estate. SC held that a person who has an adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate is not
suitable for appointment as administrator.
FACTS:
Nature:
CFI of Negros Occidental – Petition for appointment as judicial
administrator of the estate of Jose Millarez – filed by Cirilo Lim
CA – Appealed order of TC but CA certified case to SC because
there is no question of fact involved.
SC – Appealed order of TC
* An ordinary civil case is pending in the CA over the same
properties when the petition was filed.
Jose Millarez died intestate. Cirilo Lim (Lim), claiming to be Jose’s
nephew, filed with CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for his
appointment as judicial administrator of the estate of Jose. He
alleged that Jose left no relatives such as descendants,
ascendants or surviving spouse, except collaterals. Basilia Diaz-
Millarez (Diaz-Millarez), claiming to be a widow of Jose, filed an
opposition.
Diaz-Millarez’ Contention: She is the legitimate wife of Jose; Lim
has an adverse interest in the estate; and the properties of the
estate are the subject matter of litigation between her as plaintiff
and Lim as defendant in a civil case.
Lim’s Contention: Diaz-Millarez is not the legitimate wife of Jose
and that the civil case was already decided in favor of Lim by
TC and is now pending appeal in CA.
*In the ordinary civil case (pending in CA while petition for judicial
administrator was filed):
Nature: Ownership of properties belonging to Jose.
Facts: Diaz-Millarez sought to recover from Lim ½ of the
total amount of P22,000 allegedly delivered to him
by her and Jose on various occasions and to
declare her as owner of ½ of the profits and gains
derived therefrom.
Diaz-Millarez’ Contention: Jose and she used to live as husband
and wife for 23 years and as such she is entitled to
½ of the property held in common by them. Since
she contributed capital and labor to the tobacco
business in which she and Jose were engaged and
from which they gave P22,000 in cash to Lim, she
would be entitled to ½ of the capital and ½ of the
proceeds and profits derived from such capital.
Lim’s Contention: The money he received from Jose was handed
to one Tan Suaco for investment in the tobacco
business.
TC: In favor of Diaz-Millarez. Ordered Lim to make an accounting
of the P22,000 invested in the tobacco business to
be submitted to court.
CA: Affirmed TC. Remanded case to TC. TC to appoint a qualified
certified public accountant to examine the
documentary evidence and to determine how much
over and above the amount of P12,500 was
invested by Jose.
CFI of Negros Occidental – Expediente is dismissed. However,
upon the final termination of said civil case, the parties concerned
without prejudice can file another application for the judicial
administration of the property involved in this administration. This
expediente was filed way back on February 26, 1954 that is more
than 5 years and neither a special nor a regular administrator has
been appointed so that the dismissal of the expediente would not
be prejudicial to any of the parties interested in the same.
CA – certified the appeal to SC for the reason that
there is no question of fact involved.
ISSUE: WON Cirilo may be appointed as judicial administrator of
the estate of Jose.
DECISION: No. SC affirmed CA.
HELD: The claim of Diaz-Millarez is based on her declared right
to one-half of the estate of Jose. It cannot be denied that im, as a
relative of the deceased, has some interest adverse to that of Diaz-
Millarez. Shown to have some liabilities to Diaz-Millarez and to the
estate as a whole, Lim can not compatibly perform the duties of an
administrator. In this jurisdiction, one is considered to be
unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverse
interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in
the estate
Notes:
The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the
court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not
to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in
error.
2. MEDINA V CA (1973)
CASE: SERAFIN MEDINA and ROSALIA M. DEL CARMEN,
assisted by DOMINADOR DEL CARMEN, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBALES and BEDA
GONZALES, respondents.
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PONENTE. Teehankee, J.
DOCTRINE.
An administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed
where his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by
virtue of the equally established principle that an administrator is
a quasi trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties of the
estate, and who should be indifferent between the estate and
claimants of the property except to preserve it for due
administration, and who should be removed when his interest
conflicts with such right and duly.
One is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as
administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind of
hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
QUICK FACTS. Bitukang Manok property was sold by
Encarnacion, special administrator of the Agustin Medina’s estate,
to Rosalia Del Carmen which was opposed by Gonzales in his
personal capacity. CFI denied his opposition prompting Gonzales
to appeal the decision w/ the CA. In the meantime, Gonzales was
appointed as special administrator of the estate and in that
capacity seeks to interfere with the use of the Bitukang Manok
property allegedly in behalf of the estate when in fact he is
going against the official stand of the estate which upholds the
sale.
FACTS.
Nature.
CFI. Motion to revoke the order appointing Gonzales as special
administrator of the estate and petition to appoint Serafin Medina
as regular administrator of the estate.
CA. Action for certiorari with preliminary injunction
SC. Action for review of CA decision
On 6Mar70, CFI Judge Amores approved and confirmed the deed
of sale executed by the special administrator Encarnacion of the
―Bitukang Manok‖ property (which is part of the intestate estate of
the decedent Agustin Medina) in favor of petitioner Rosalia Del
Carmen, a daughter-heir of the decedent. Uldrico Medina and
assignee Beda Gonzales filed an opposition to the said order
alleging having interest over the estate and that certain heirs have
already sold their shares/interest over the estate in his/their favor.
The judge denied their opposition on the ground that Medina’s
interest is confined solely to his desire to partake of whatever
share he has over the estate while Gonzales interest was merely
subrogated to the interest of the assignor-heirs who have already
received more benefits from the estate prior to its distribution.
Gonzales appealed the decision of the CFI judge w/ regard to the
confirmation of the sale of the Bitukang Manok property in his
personal capacity (This case is still pending w/ the CA when this
case was decided). Subsequently, Gonzales was appointed not as
a regular administrator but as special administrator of the estate
replacing Atty. De Castro after posting a bond and tried to interfere
with the harvests of the Bitukang Manok property allegedly on
behalf of the estate.
Del Carmen filed an urgent motion to revoke the appointment of
Gonzales on the ground that Gonzales is now assuming
the inconsistent positions of administering the estate especially the
Bitukang Manok property and at the same time appealing from the
order approving the sale of that property for the purpose
of enabling himself to buy and acquire that property to the loss and
prejudice of the estate contrary to law.
CFI. Denied motion to revoke appointment and also rejected Del
Carmen’s motion to appoint Serafin Medina as regular
administrator, as heir and son and next of kin of the decedent, who
has no adverse interests in his favor and against the estate and is
a qualified and competent resident of Olongapo City.
CA. Denied petition finding the petition insufficient in substance to
merit due course and that 1) it is not disputed that the lower court
has jurisdiction to appoint Gonzales as special administrator and 2)
the lower court has already resolved the objections to Gonzales’
continuation as a special administrator.
ISSUE: WoN CA erred in affirming CFI’s decision to appoint
Gonzales as special administrator?
DECISION. Partly Yes! SC modified CFI/CA decision. CFI order
appointing Gonzales as special administrator, with regard to the
Bitukang Manok property, created a clear conflict of interest that
could cause grave damage and prejudice to the estate and subject
it to unnecessary suits.
HELD.
On the consideration of the specific and limited powers of special
administrators and that their appointment merely (being)
temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is duly
appointed, the Court has resolved to allow the appointment of
respondent Gonzales as special administrator to stand, insofar as
taking care of the other properties of the estate are concerned, to
the exclusion of the Bitukang Manok property already sold by the
estate to petitioner Rosalia del Carmen…and directed the lower
court to name a suitable person/entity who is competent and
qualified and doesnot suffer from any proscribed conflict of
interest, (and preferably upon the common agreement of the heirs,
to avoid any further bickerings) as regular administrator
Note:
As to the appointment of Atty. De Castro as special administrator,
replacing Encarnacion and prior to appointment of Gonzales,
considering that he was a clerk of court:
The Court does not look with favor on such practice of clerks of
court or other court employees being appointed as
administrators of estates of decedents pending settlement
before the probate court. The objectivity and impartiality of such
clerks of court or other employees so appointed as
administrators in discharging their regular functions may be
easily compromised by extraneous considerations.
3. MALOLES II V PHILLIPS (2000)
Doctrine
General rule: The Court shall respect the choice of the testator in
the institution of an executor of his will.
Exceptions: Appointed executor is
1) incompetent,
2) refuses the trust,
3) or fails to give bond, OR
4) the decedent dies intestate
Effect: Court will appoint another administrator  See Rule 78,
Sec. 6
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Quick Facts
The executrix, Phillips, whom the decedent chose in his will filed
for a motion for issuance of letters testamentary. The nephew,
Maloles, of the decedent, who had no compulsory heirs, filed a
motion for intervention with the court, saying he has a better right
as executor, being the nearest of kin and creditor of the decedent.
Facts
Cast of characters:
Dr. Arturo de Santos – testator, later on, decedenet
Pacita Phillips – respondent, executrix
Octavio Maloles – petitioner, nephew of decedent
Dr. de Santos had no compulsory heirs, and filed a petition for
probate of his will, which left everything to the Arturo de Santos
Foundation. He named Phillips as the executrix. RTC Makati
Branch 61 granted the probate after finding that there were no
oppositors and compulsory heirs.
A year later, Dr. de Santos died.
Octavio Maloles filed a motion for intervention claiming to be the
nearest of kin as nephew of decedent and saying that he 1) had a
better right to becoming executor, and 2) was a creditor of the
decedent. He prayed for issuance of letters of administration in his
name.
Meanwhile, Phillipes also filed a motion for issuance of letters
testamentary. Later, however, she withdrew her motion. RTC
Branch 61 granted. As for Maloles, he was required by Branch 61
to prove his claim that Branch 61 still had jurisdiction. As Maloles
filed his memorandum of authorities, Phillips, who earlier withdrew
her motion for the issuance of letters testamentary at Branch 61,
refilled a petition with Branch 65. Maloles opposed, saying that the
case at Branch 61 was still pending.
Branch 65: ordered transfer of the case to Branch 61
Branch 61: denied Maloles’ motion for intervention. Maloles goes
to CA.
CA: affirmed denial.
Branch 65: recalls his earlier decision to transfer said case, and
granted Maloles’ motion for intervention.
Issue
W/N Maloles, as creditor and nearest of kin of decedent, has a
right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by Phillips
Held: NO.
He has no right as a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator
instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the
Court to respect the desires of the testator. ―The choice of his
executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary
concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he
wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of
his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in
the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be
considered a curtailment of the right to dispose‖ (Ozaeta v.
Pecson, 1953). Only if the appointed executor is incompetent,
refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other
persons to administer the estate.20 None of these circumstances is
present in this case.
The following are also part of the ratio decidendi, but are not
related to the topic:
1) He is not a compulsory heir. It is a fundamental rule of
testamentary succession that one who has no
compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire
estate by will.
2) He is not an ―interested person1.‖ An "interested person"
is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as
a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not
merely incidental or contingent (Teotico v. Del Val Chan,
1965). Even if Maloles is the nearest of kin of decedent,
he cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a
fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one
who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of
his entire estate by will.
Minor issues:
1) W/N Branch 65 acquired jurisdiction over the case. YES.
1) After the allowance of the will, Branch 61, as the probate
court that granted probate of the will of decedent, had
nothing else to do except to issue a certificate of
allowance of the will. The settlement of estate belongs to
Branch 65, which Phillips chose as the venue for the
case. Although Rule 73 Sec. 1 applies insodar as the
venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De
Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of
the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of the testator after his death.
2) W/N Phillips is guilty of forum shopping in filing her case
at Branch 65 when she knows fully well that there was a
pending case with Branch 61. NO.
The petition for probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the
testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will.
Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings were
terminated. On the other hand, the petition for issuance
of letters testamentary was filed by private respondent,
as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the
purpose of securing authority from the Court to
administer the estate and put into effect the will of the
testator. The estate settlement proceedings commenced
by the filing of the petition terminates upon the
distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to
the persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity
between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed during
the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no
forum shopping.
1
Rule 79, §1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters
testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration.
— Any person interested in a will may state in writing
the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue
to the persons named therein as executors, or any of
them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall
pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition
may, at the same time, be filed for letters of
administration with the will annexed.
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4. REP. V MARCOS (2009)
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
DOCTRINE: Conviction of ―failure to file an income tax return‖ is
not a crime of moral turpitude. Hence, it cannot serve as a ground
for disqualification of an executor.
QUICK FACTS: The RTC issued an order granting letters
testamentary to Imelda and Bongbong Marcos as executors of the
last will and testament of the late Ferdinand Marcos. Republic
opposed, citing as ground the respondents’ incompetence. SC
affirmed RTC and held that the allegation of incompetence against
Imelda is baseless because she was acquitted in the cases filed
against her. As for Bongbong, his conviction on failure to file an
income tax return is not a crime of moral turpitude so it’s not
enough to make him an incompetent executor.
FACTS:
Nature:
TC: Probate of will
CA: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 (forwarded by
SC)
SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
On January 11, 1996, the RTC of Pasig City, finding the
Last Will and Testament of Ferdinand E. Marcos (FEM) to have
been duly executed in accordance with law, issued an
Order granting letters testamentary in solidum to Bongbong
Marcos and Imelda Marcos as executors of the last will and
testament of the late FEM.
Such grant is opposed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, on the following grounds: (1) want of integrity, and (2)
conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. This is based on
Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.2 Petitioner contends
that respondents have been convicted of a number of cases and,
hence, should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the
least, with questionable integrity.
TC - Granted letters testamentary to the Marcoses. There is
no evidence on record, oral or documentary, to substantiate and
support the said allegation.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Imelda filed her own motion for reconsideration on the ground that
the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence and
validity.
Both MRs were denied.
AC - Affirmed TC. Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 is a
wrong mode of appeal.
2
Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or
administrators. – No person is competent to serve as executor or
administrator who:
xxx
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of
trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or
want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of
an offense involving moral turpitude.
Petitioner contends that respondents, aside from being
incompetent due to their conviction in a number of cases, also
denied the existence of the will, and are, therefore, estopped from
claiming to be the rightful executors thereof. Petitioner further
claims that said actions clearly show that respondents lack the
competence and integrity
ISSUE:
WoN the Marcoses are incompetent to serve as executors of the
will of the late FEM
DECISION: NO. SC affirmed CA and ordered the RTC to issue
letters testamentary, in solidum, to Imelda and Bongbong Marcos.
HELD:
In Ozeata v. Pecson, the Court held that when a will has been
admitted to probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters
testamentary to the person named as executor upon his
application. The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of
a testator. The curtailment of this right may be considered as a
curtailment of the right to dispose.
In the case In re Erlanger’s Estate, it was held that the courts will
not name a better executor for the testator nor disqualify, by a
judicial veto, the widow or friend or other person selected in the
will, except upon strict proof of the statutory grounds of
incompetency.
In the case at bar, petitioner conveniently omits to state that the
two cases against Imelda have already been reversed by the SC.
Hence, the so-called "convictions" against her cannot serve as a
ground for her disqualification to serve as an executor.
On the other hand, the eight cases filed against Bongbong Marcos
involve four charges for violation of Section 45 (failure to file
income tax returns) and four charges for violation of Section 50
(non-payment of deficiency taxes). The CA already acquitted him
of all the four charges for the Section 50 violation. As for his
conviction of failure to file income tax returns, the CA only ordered
him to pay a fine. Said decision is also pending appeal.
Even assuming arguendo that his conviction is later on affirmed,
the same is still insufficient to disqualify him as the "failure to file an
income tax return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude. 3 The
reason for this is that the mere omission is already a violation
regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual.
With regard to the filing of an income tax return, the NIRC
considers three distinct violations: (1) a false return, (2) a
fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and (3) failure to file a
return. Applying the foregoing considerations to the case at bar,
the filing of a "fraudulent return with intent to evade tax" is a crime
involving moral turpitude as it entails willfulness and fraudulent
intent on the part of the individual. The same, however, cannot be
said for "failure to file a return" where the mere omission already
constitutes a violation. Thus, the SC held that even if the conviction
3
Moral turpitude is defined as "an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men,
or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."
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of Bongbong is affirmed, the same not being a crime involving
moral turpitude, cannot serve as a ground for his disqualification.
With regard to the issue of estoppel, SC held that respondents are
not stopped because they merely acted within their rights when
they put in issue legal grounds in opposing the probate
proceedings.
B. Procedure
1. IN RE TESTATE ESTATE OF MARGARITA DAVID (1956)
Case: In the matter of the testate estate of Margarita David.
CARLOS MORAN SISON, Judicial Administrator, Petitioner-
Appellee. NATIVIDAD SIDECO, ET AL., Claimants-Appellees, vs.
NARCISA F. DE TEODORO, heiress, Oppositor-Appellant.
Ponente: Endencia
DOCTRINE: The residuary funds in the hands of the heirs are
funds of the estate and the Court has jurisdiction over them and,
therefore, it could compel the heirs to deliver to the administrator of
this estate the necessary portion of such fund for the payment of
claims against the Estate.
QUICK FACTS: The CFI ordered the heiresses to deliver to the
administrator a portion of the residuary cash in their hands to pay
for a judgment claim against the Estate of the testator. One of the
heirs refused to deliver the cash claiming that the court has no
jurisdiction over it and the proper way to pay for the money claims
is to sell properties in the hands of the administrator and apply the
proceeds.
FACTS:
Estate of Margarita David (―David estate‖) –
Carlos Moran Sison – Administrator
2 Heirs – Priscilla de la Fuente-Sison and Narcisa de la
Fuente-Teodoro (appellant)
The Sideco claim – In GR# L-3846, SC ordered the Estate of
Margarita David to pay the claim of the Testate Estate of Crispulo
Sideco the sum of P17,010.43 + 6% pa interest from 11 Mar 1945
until fully paid.
To facilitate the payment of this claim, Priscilla Sison, delivered to
the David administrator P12,128.44 to cover the payment of her
one-half share in the claim. The other heiress, Narcisa, was
unwilling to do the same, contending that the Estate has real
properties which could be sold and with its proceeds pay the
Sideco claim.
On 23 Jan 1952, the David administrator filed a petition with the
lower court to compel Narcisa to deliver to him her share in the
payment of the Sideco claim.
While this is pending, the Sideco administrator filed a
case in CFI Manila for the David administrator to deliver
the Sideco claim.
CFI Manila – found that the amount of Sideco claim is residuary
cash within the David estate and directed the 2
heiresses to each deposit with the PNB their
respective ½-share of the claim.
Priscilla complied, but Narcisa filed an MR. MR was denied.
Narcissa appealed in SC.
Narcissa’s contention: It was the Administrator of the David
Estate, and not the heirs, that was ordered by the CFI to pay the
Sideco claim. Therefore, the proper way to effect such payment is
to sell the properties that are still in the hands of the administrator
and apply the proceeds.
ISSUE:
W/N the court has jurisdiction over the residuary cash in the hands
of the heiresses and therefore can order the same to be used to
pay for the claims against the Testate Estate of David. Y
DECISION: YES, THE COURT CAN ODER PAYMENT OF
CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE USING THE RESIDUARY
CASH IN THE HANDS OF THE HEIRS.
HELD:
We agree with the view of the lower court that the residuary funds
in the hands of the heiresses of this estate should be applied to the
payment of the Sideco claim, for it is more advantageous to use
that fund to pay the claim in question than selling the real
properties of the estate for that purpose. Besides, section 3 of Rule
89 of the Rules of Court provides:
―The personal estate of the deceased shall be first
chargeable with the payment of debts and
expenses; and if the personal estate is not sufficient for
that purpose, or its sale would redound to the detriment
of the participants in the estate, the whole of the real
estate, or so much thereof as is necessary, may be sold,
mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered for that purpose by
the executor or administrator, after obtaining the
authority of the court therefor.‖
And according to section 6 of Rule 89, the Court has authority to fix
the contributive shares of the devisees, legatees or heirs for the
payment of a claim if they have entered into possession of portions
of the estate before the debts and expenses thereof have been
settled and paid.
Appellant argues, however, that section 3 of Rule 89, Rules of
Court, is not applicable to the instant case on the ground that it
refers to the personal and real properties of the deceased which
are in the hands of the administrator, and not to the properties of
the estate which are already in the hands of the heiresses. This
contention is likewise untenable. The residuary funds in the hands
of the Appellant are funds of the estate and the Court has
jurisdiction over them and, therefore, it could compel
the Appellant to deliver to the administrator of this estate the
necessary portion of such fund for the payment of the Sideco
claim.
2. BALUYUT V PAÑO (1976)
Case: ALFREDO G. BALUYUT, petitioner, vs. HON. ERNANI
CRUZ PAÑO, ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT,
JOSE ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO, respondents.
Ponente: Aquino
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DOCTRINE:
A hearing must be conducted before the appointment of the
executor to ascertain his competency. Even the naming of an
executor in the will by the testator is not binding on the probate
court, and does not automatically entitle the named executor to the
issuance of letters testamentary. He must be able to prove his
qualifications, and those who question his competency must be
given opportunity to contest the appointment and present
evidence.
QUICK FACTS: The widow of the decedent was summarily
appointed administratrix despite protests from the decedent’s
nephew that the widow was mentally incompetent.
FACTS:
Nature:
TC. – Verified petition for letters of administration (CFI Quezon
City)
CA. - NA
SC. - Special civil action of certiorari to have the appointment set
aside
Sotero Baluyut died in 1975 and left an estate allegedly valued at
not less than 2M pesos. A few weeks later, his nephew, Alfredo
Baluyut, filed in CFI Quezon City a verified petition for letters of
administration. He alleged that Sotero was survived by his widow,
Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting as
administratrix. He surmised that Sotero had left a will, prayed that
he be appointed regular administrator and in the meantime special
administrator.
CFI decision (in bullet form so you can easily track the reversals):
 Feb. 24, 1975 – Court appointed Alfredo as special
administrator with a bond of 100K.
Opposition: Mrs. Baluyut alleged that she was unaware
that her husband had a will and that she was not
mentally incapable. She asked to be appointed
administrator.
 March 24, 1975 – Cancelled Alfredo’s appointment as
special administrator. The court also noted that it asked
Mrs. Baluyut a series of questions while she was on the
witness stand, and found that she was ―healthy and
mentally qualified.‖
Opposition: Alfredo moved for reconsideration.
 March 31, 1975 – Appointed Alfredo and Jose Espino as
special administrators.
Opposition: Mrs. Baluyut filed a verified amended
opposition asking that Espino, former governor of Nueva
Vizcaya and an alleged acknowledged natural child of
Sotero, be appointed administrator should she not be
named administratrix. She later filed an urgent motion
praying that she be appointed administratrix, arguing that
Alfred has no more interest in Sotero’s estate because
as a collateral relative, he was excluded by Espino and
other supposed descendants of Sotero who had
intervened. Alfredo opposed this urgent motion. He
alleged that Espino was not a natural child of Sotero, and
that Mrs. Baluyut had been declared incompetent by the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC, which her
sisters had instituted for guardianship of Mrs. Baluyut. At
the hearing of the urgent motion, the court merely
examined Mrs. Baluyut as follows:
Court: We want also to hear her testimony.
Atty. Salunat: We are now therefore presenting
the widow, your Honor, to take the witness
stand for examination by the court.
Court to witness: Can you testify in English? –
A. No, your Honor, Pampango.
Q. Ilocano? — A. No, your Honor.
Atty. Salunat: She can testify in Tagalog your
Honor, which comprehensible.
Court: You remember when you were born,
Mrs. Baluyut? — A. March 25, 1901.
Q. Where did you graduate? — Madres
Dominicas.
Q. When did you get married to Sec. Baluyut?
— A. I cannot remember the date but this was
in Lingayen.
Q. What church? — A. A Catholic.
Court: You want to ask more questions
Attorney?
Atty. Salunat: Just a few clarificatory questions,
your Honor.
Q. Do you know Gov. Espino? — A. Yes.
Q. Why do you know him? — A. Because he is
like a son to me.
Q. Do you know whether Gov. Espino has any
relationship with the late Don Sotero Baluyut?
— A. Yes, why not.
Q. Will you please tell us what is the
relationship if there is any? — A. He is his son,
sir.
Atty. Salunat: I think that would be all, your
Honor.
Court: Submitted?
Atty. Salunat: We will ask the Court to (be
allowed to) submit a rejoinder, your Honor.
 Nov. 27, 1975 – Terminated the appointments of Espino
and Alfredo as special administrators and appointed Mrs.
Baluyut as administratrix with a bond of 20K. The order
was based on the fact that as surviving spouse, she had
preferential right to be appointed as administratrix, that it
was convinced of her widow’s capacity, and that her
―sufficient understanding‖ justified her appointment.
Letters of administration were issued to her after she
posted the bond, and then she took her office.
Alfredo then filed a special civil action of certiorari in the SC to
have the appointment set aside.
Mrs. Baluyut: It is the probate court and not the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court that should decide the issue as to her
competency to act as administratrix. She alleged that the order
declaring her incompetent was issued in a blietzkrieg manner
because it was based on a report of Dr. Lapuz that was filed in
court just one day before the order was issued.
ISSUE: WoN the appointment of Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix
was proper.
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DECISION: No. Mrs. Baluyut’s appointment is set aside. The
probate court is ordered to conduct further proceedings in
consonance with the guidelines in this decision.
HELD:
1. While the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs.
Baluyut as surviving spouse enjoys preference in the
granting of letters of administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78,
Rules of Court), it does not follow that she should be
named administratrix without conducting a full-dress
hearing on her competency to discharge that trust.
Even the directive of the testator in his will designating
that a certain person should act as executor is not
binding on the probate court and does not
automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters
testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to
ascertain his fitness to act as executor. He might have
been fit to act as executor when the will was executed
but supervening circumstances might have rendered him
unfit for that position. A hearing is necessary to
determine the suitability of the person to be appointed
administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove
his qualifications and affording oppositors a chance
to contest the petition (Matute vs. Court of Appeals).
In this case, the probate court briefly and perfunctorily
interrogated Mrs. Baluyut in order to satisfy itself on her
mental capacity. The court did not give Alfredo a
chance to contest her qualifications. He had squarely
raised the issue as to her competency. The probate court
assumed that Alfredo had no interest in the decedent's
estate. As it turned out, he is one of the legatees named
in the decedent's alleged will.
Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is
imperative in the interest of the orderly administration of
justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's
fitness to act as executrix or administratrix. Persons
questioning her capacity should be given an
adequate opportunity to be heard and to present
evidence.
The lower court departed from the usual course of
probate procedure in summarily appointing Mrs. Baluyut
as administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo was not
an interested party. That irregularity became more
pronounced after Alfredo’s revelation that the decedent
had executed a will. He anticipated that development
when he articulated in his petition his belief that Sotero
Baluyut executed wills which should be delivered to the
court for probate.
2. It is necessary to convert the proceeding in the CFI into a
testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot
be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy (Art.
838, Civil Code; See. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court;
Guevara vs. Guevara). After the will is probated, the prior
letters of administration should be revoked and
proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of
administration under the will should be conducted (Sec.
1, Rule 82, Rules of Court; Cartajena vs. Lijauco and
Zaballa).
C. Order of Preference
1. CAPISTRANO V NADURATA (1922)
Ponente: Justice Romualdez
DOCTRINE: The court has the discretion court to select an
administrator of the estate of a deceased person. (Sec. 642,
subsec. 1, Code of Civil Procedure.).
The declaration of heirs is premature when made before the
proceeding has reached the stage when the estate is distributed,
which must come after the liquidation of the inheritance.
QUICK FACTS: Pedro de los Santos and Juan de los Santos
appealed to the Court which appointed Justo Buera as
administrator of the estate of Petra delos Santos and Leon
Nadurata intervened, claiming to be the widower of the deceased.
Court finds their claim spurious, confirms the appointment,
declares the applicants Guillerma Capistrano, et al., sole heirs and
orders the prosecution of certain persons for the crime of
falsification of public document and for perjury.
FACTS: Guillerma Capistrano moved for the appointment of Justo
Buera as administrator of the estate of the deceased Petra de los
Santos. The application was opposed by Pedro and Juan de los
Santos who claimed to be brothers of the deceased. Then Leon
Nadurata intervened, claiming to be the surviving spouse of the
deceased. Both claims were found to be falsehoods. Capistrano et
al were found to be the nearest relatives of Petra.
The lower court confirms the appointment, declares the applicants
Guillerma Capistrano, et al., sole heirs and orders the prosecution
of Nadurata et al for the crime of falsification of public document
and for perjury. The three appealed.
ISSUES:
WoN the court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it
overruled the objection to the appointment of Buera as
administrator? NO.
WoN the court’s declaration as to the sole owners of the estate of
Petra delos Santos was premature? YES.
DECISION: Except as regards the declaration of heirs, which,
while it is supported by the evidence, is premature, the ruling
appealed from is affirmed in other respects, with costs against the
appellants.
HELD: The selection of an administrator of the estate of a
deceased lies within the discretion of the court. As borne by the
evidence, the act of the lower court in overruling the objection of
the opponents and confirming the appointment as administrator of
the person proposed by the appellants is not only indicative of
sound discretion, but is right and just because Nadurata et al
attempted to pass themselves off as relatives of the late Petra
Delos Sanotos.
However, the declaration of heirs made by the lower court is
premature, although the evidence sufficiently shows who are
entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been
judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the
stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the
inheritance is liquidated (sec. 753, Code of Civil Procedure).
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2. AREVALO V BUSTAMANTE (1940)
Ponente: Bocobo, J
DOCTRINE: Failure to effect personal notification to legatees and
devisees will deprive the probate court of jurisdiction.
QUICK FACTS: Probate of the second will was allowed.
Allowance of the second will had the effect of revoking the earlier
will.
FACTS:
Rufina Arevalo, the testatrix executed two wills:
- One on 9 January 1936
- And another on 02 October 1937.
In the first will, Rufina specifically referred to seven parcels of land
of considerable value and to certain personal properties. Three of
these parcels of land and all the personal properties were given to
Amando Clemente. Another three to Ariston Bustamante. And the
seventh parcel was given to Petrona Arevalo and Carmen Papa.
In the second will, Rufina particularly referred to only five parcels of
land and certain personal properties. All of these properties were
given to Ariston Bustamante, as her universal heir. The second will
does not make mention of two of the three parcels given to
Amando Clemente under the first will.
CFI held that the second will was forged, and allowed the earlier
will.
The Supreme Court however decided otherwise. Forgery was not
given credence and the second will was allowed.
ISSUE: WON the second will has the effect of revoking the earlier
will.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes.
The Court in said:
1. In the second will names Ariston Bustamante her only
heir to all her property, both p ersonal and real, her words
in Spanish being: "Nombro como mi unico heredero,
Ariston Bustamante, de todas mis propiedades dejadas
ya mueble o inmueble." (Italics supplied.) It is true that in
enumerating her parcels of land, she did not specify her
interest in the two lots of the conjugal partnership. But
this omission must have been due either to an oversight
or to the belief that it was premature to name said two
parcels as the conjugal partnership was still being
liquidated. In either case, the testatrix must have
thought that her comprehensive words "mi unico
heredero de todas mis propiedades dejadas ya
mueble o inmueble" would be sufficient to cover all
her property, whether specially listed or not.
2. In the opening paragraph of the second will, the
following words appear: "hago constar a todos este mi
ultimo testamento y voluntad expresado en Castellano
lenguaje que conozco y poseo, y queriendo disponer de
mis bienes por virtud de este mi testamento." Though
she knew that she had made a first will, she
nevertheless said that the second will was her last
one. This would seem to signify that her last will,
cancelling her previously expressed wish, was to
make Ariston Bustamante her only heir. Furthermore,
when she said she wanted to dispose of her property by
means of the second will ("queriendo disponer de mis
bienes por virtud de este mi testamento"), it would
appear to be her intention that no property of hers should
be left undisposed of in the second will. This fact is
corroborated in the second clause wherein she names
Ariston Bustamante as her only heir to all her property
whether personal or real.
The Court further declared that ―It would be a dangerous precedent
to strain the interpretation of a will in order to effect what the court
believes to be an equitable division of the estate of a deceased
person. The only function of the courts in these cases is to carry
out the intention of the deceased as manifested in the will. Once
that intention has been determined through a careful reading of the
will or wills, and provided the law on legitimes has not been
violated, it is beyond the pale of judicial cognizance to inquire into
the fairness or unfairness of any devise or bequest.‖
Dissent:
Paras, J
―The first should be considered revoked only in so far as it is
inconsistent with the second will. As the second will was executed
only twenty-one months after the first, the testatrix, who has been
conclusively shown to be of sound mind at the time of the
execution of the later will, could not have forgotten that she owned
two other parcels of land, especially if they are of considerable
value.‖
Note:
On forgery:
CFI believed that there was forgery because of variation in the
signature of Rufina. It was said that with the genuine signature,
the terminal stroke of the capital "R" in "Rufina" is not joined with
the letter "u," while in Exhibit C such ending is united with the letter
"u" in the two marginal signatures. Although in the central
signature appearing on page 2, the two letters are separated. The
probate court believed that this difference between the marginal
and the central signatures is due to the fact that the forger first
used the check of "La Previsora" (Exhibit I) as the model in
falsifying the marginal signatures, but having been shown another
signature with the characteristic already mentioned — separation
of the two letters — he tried to imitate said peculiarity in making
central signature.
The Supreme Court said that careful scrutiny of all the questioned
and the standard signatures they are convinced that they have
been written by the same person because they show the same
general type, quality and characteristics, with natural variations.
Citing People vs. Bustos (45 Phil., 30):
―It is a first principle in writing that exact coincidence
between two signatures is absolute proof that one or the
other is a forgery. There must be some different before
authenticity reposes upon a general characteristics
resemblance, coupled with specific differences, such as
naturally result from the infinite variety of conditions
controlling the muscles of the writer at each separate
effort in forming his signature.‖
3. GABRIEL V CA (1992)
Ponente: Regalado, J.
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DOCTRINE: Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference
given to the surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by
the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of
administration for thirty (30) days after the decedent's death.
However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is not
sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the
estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify
the exclusion of the widow from the administration.
QUICK FACTS: Petitioners seek to nullify appointment of pvt
respondent as administrator of the decedent’s estate one of their
grounds is that the probate court violated the order of preference in
appointing the administrator of the estate.
FACTS:
Nature: Appeal by certiorari for the affirmance of the CA of an
order appointing private respondent as the administrator of the
decedent’s estate.
Facts
Domingo Gabriel died on August 6, 1987, 9 months later pvt
respondent (Roberto Dindo Gabriel) came forward alleging he is
the son of decedent and is capable of administering the estate.
Notice was given to heirs and creditors and hearings were held.
Eventually, on December 12, 1988, pvt respondent filed for
approval of his inventory and appraisal. On February 2, 1989, filed
their opposition to and moved for recall of pvt respondent’s letters
of administration. One of the issues raised was that petitioner
Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, should be preferred over
private respondent.
TC - Probate court denied the opposition stating that
petitioner offered no proof that she is the legitimate daughter and
they have not shown otherwise that pvt respondent is unworthy,
incapacitated or unsuitable as an administrator.
AC - Affirmed TC on the ground that the appointment of
an administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial
court which may not be interfered with unless abused
ISSUE:
WoN Probate court violated the order of preference in appointing
an administrator.
DECISION: Yes. The overall permissive tone of sec. 6(b) is not
sufficient to completely exclude the spouse and next of kin in
seeking appointment as administrator of the estate.
HELD:
In the appointment of the administrator, the principal consideration
reckoned with is the interest the estate of the one to be appointed
as administrator. Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind
this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy
and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential
motive to administer the estate correctly. In Sec. 6(b), the 30-day
period should the spouse or next of kin neglect to apply for letters
of administration is has a permissive tone ("may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors.") it does not exclude the next of
kin.
However the SC does not see any need to remove pvt respondent
as the administrator
SC - Modified CA. SC advised that petitioner be
appointed as co-administrator with pvt respondent.
SEPARATE OPINION: None
4. SILVERIO V CA (1999)
Ponente: Purisima
DOCTRINE: The determination of a person’s suitability for the
office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment.
QUICK FACTS: Beatriz died. After 3 years, one of her sons,
Edgardo, filed for Letters of Administration. Court granted the
petition. Beatriz’s husband and Edgardo’s stepfather Ricardo Sr.
opposed.
FACTS:
Nature: Petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of CA
denying the petition of Ricardo Sr. in the lower court to declare
void the appointment of Edgardo as Special Administrator, inter
alia.
TC. – RTC Makati
CA.
SC.
Facts:
TC - Beatriz died. Her property was in the
possession of one son, Ricardo Jr and no partition has been made.
After 3 years, one of her sons, Edgardo, filed for Letter of Admin.
The lower court granted the petition. Ricardo Sr. opposed. The
presentation of evidence was postponed many times because
Ricardo Sr. is living in Australia, has gone to US, is preparing to
assume office as Congressman of Bulacan, etc. the court deemed
these as waiver of rights so his petition/opposition was denied.
CA - Affirmed TC. Ricardo Sr. was barred by laches.
The rule is clear and unequivocal: It does not provide that the
surviving spouse takes precedence exclusive of and over all other
heirs of the deceased in the appointment of the administrator.
Chismis: Ricardo Sr. allegedly cheated on his wife by maintaining
an illicit affair with one Carmen Zuniga. While the admin/trustee of
the conjugal property, he bought 3 houses at Old Forbes, North
Forbes and Manila Bel Air and placed them in the name of his 3
illegitimate children. He used the conjugal property to invest in
California, USA, beyond the reach of his wife. And he was facing
charges of tax evasion (Ricardo Sr.: it was violation of the
Securities Act). Hence he is not capable of assuming the
administration of his wife’s estate. In addition, he was crony of
Pres. Marcos.
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Chismis, too: The value of the property in 1991 was P450M.
Edgardo and his lawyer Uy allegedly agreed to give the latter 33%
as attorney’s fee.
Fact: Edmundo, another son, filed a manifestation contesting the
appointment of Edgardo without his consent. He did not receive
notice through personal service (because the court resorted to
publication).
Ricardo Sr. argued that Edgardo does not have the power to sell
their conjugal property. It was accumulated through the effort of
Ricardo, Sr.
ISSUE: WoN the appointment of Edgardo as administrator is
proper.
DECISION: Yes. Affirmed CA.
HELD:
Intestate Estate of Uy-Coque: ―The determination of a person’s
suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in
the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of
appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on
appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was an
error.‖ xxx ―Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may
consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those
immediately interested in the estate.‖ Xxx
Esler vs. Tad-y: The probate court, in the exercise of its
discretion, may disregard the order of preference to the
administration, set forth in the Rules of Court. Hence xxx ―If the
administrator was appointed by the trial court for the estate in
accordance with Rule 79, section 6 of the Rules of Court, the trial
court had discretion to issue the letters of administration to any of
the persons mentioned in said section, and unless there has been
an abuse of discretion‖ xxx
Villamor vs. Court of Appeals: Xxx ―in case the persons who
have the preferential right to be appointed are not competent or
are unwilling to serve, administration may be granted to such other
person as the court may appoint.‖
En el intestado del finado Bustamante:―No es ciertamente
destitucion la que le hizo cesar en el cargo al apelante, porque
destitucion supone siempre correccion o castigo, sino revocacion
de la orden en virtud de la cual fue nombrado Administrador
judicical, por causa de incapacidad. Es que en esta jurisdiccion,
como ya se ha resuelto, el tener interes adverso a los de una
Testamentaria o un Intestado, o a los de aquellos que estan
interesados en ellos, es motivo suficiente de incapacidad para ser
nombrado Administrador judicial de cualquiera de los mismos. xxx‖
:D
De Gala v. Gonzales and Ona: ―The appointment of a special
administrator in a probate case lies in the sound discretion of the
court, and he may be removed without reference to section 653
(Rule 78) of the Code of Civil Procedure.‖
NOTES: CA is not vested with the power to order the special
administrator to sell real properties of the estate pending
determination of the validity of the regular administrator’s
appointment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules
of Court
5. IN RE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-
SUNTAY (2010)
Ponente: Nachura
DOCTRINE: The order of preference in Rule 78 section 6 is not
absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances
of each case. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.
QUICK FACTS: Beatriz died. After 3 years, one of her sons,
Edgardo, filed for Letters of Administration. Court granted the
petition. Beatriz’s husband and Edgardo’s stepfather Ricardo Sr.
opposed.
FACTS:
Nature: Petition for certiorari.
TC. – RTC Malolos.
Facts:
TC - Federico and Cristina, married, had a son,
Emilio I who predeceased them. Emilio I had 3 children with his
wife, namely: Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. The marriage of
Emilio I and his wife was eventually annulled. The 3 lived with their
mother at QC. Isabel is the respondent in this case.
After the annulment, and out of wedlock, Emilio I fathered 2 more
children with 2 separate women, namely: Emilio III and Nenita.
They were acknowledged by Emilio I as his natural children. Emilio
III is the petitioner in this case.
Though illegitimate children of Emilio I, Emilio III and Nenita were
brought by their grandparents Federico and Cristina. On the other
hand, Federico and Cristina were granted visitation right over his
grandchildren Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. Said right was
terminated upon the petition of Isabel articulating her sentiments
on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
After the death of Cristina, Federico adopted Emilio II and Nenita.
Cristina was predeceased by Federico and their grandchildren.
Two years after her death, Isabel filed for administration. Her claim
excluded Emilio III and Nenita as heirs. Federico opposed and
contended that being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is
capable of administering her estate and he should be the one
appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of
conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal
preference in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her family
had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty
(30) years.
He also nominated Emilio III as administrator in his behalf should
the court decide that he has a better right over Isabel. Emilio III
was appointed by the court ratiocinating that his appointment
would be in the best interest of Federico and Cristina; appointing
Isabel would be otherwise because their families are estranged. It
was also because Emilio III has enough experience and
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knowledge on real estate admin and in order to give order to give
effect to the order of preference mandated by law.
CA - Reversed TC. Emilio is an illegitimate child. His
appointment is subject to suspensive condition: appointment of
Federico who was not appointed because he died hence Emilio III
cannot assume administration. With regard to legitimate and
illegitimate next of kin, the legitimate one is favored. Further, an
illegitimate cannot inherit from the legitimate ascendant or
descendant of his parents. Besides, Isabel is as competent as
Emilio III.
ISSUE: W Emilio III or Isabel is better qualified to act as
administrator of Cristina’s estate.
DECISION: Reversed CA. CA erred in excluding Emilio III from
the administration of the decedent’s estate.
HELD:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is
to give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the
decedent, absent a valid and effective will;
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron
curtain bar rule, is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining
herein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina,
on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal
relationship of legitimate relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and
her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their
grandchild;
4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of
the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership
of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
5. Cristina’s properties forming part of her estate are still
commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her share
in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her death,
remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share
in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree
from Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate
father, Emilio I.
The order of preference in Rule 78 section 6 is not absolute for it
depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.
Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator
lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the
attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at
the least, a joint administration by both Isabel and Emilio III of
their grandmother’s Cristina’s, estate.
Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda.
de Damian: In the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice
and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, a situation which
obtains here.
Rule 79 – Opposing Issuance of Letters Testamentary;
Petition and Contest for Letter of Administration
A. Contents of Petition
B. Interested Party
1. ESPINOSA V BARRIOS(1940)
(NOTE: THIS CASE IS IN SPANISH TEXT. THIS DIGEST WAS
PREPARED WITH AID OF GOOGLE TRANSLATE. IT IS BEST
TO VALIDATE FACTS AND RULING FOR YOURSELVES.).
Case:
Ponente: J. Imperial.
DOCTRINE: Person seeking to recover property which was
subjected to partition by heirs, duly approved by Court, is not an
interested party in said proceeding and cannot hence ask for its
reopening.
QUICK FACTS: Salvacion Espinosa wanted to reopen probate
proceeding of Jagunap estate wherein heirs partitioned and
awarded amongst themselves property which was earlier duly
conveyed to Espinosa by the administrator of said estate.
FACTS:
Nature: Salvacion Espinosa filed for reopening of estate
proceedings of Jagunap
TC. – Denied motion for reopening of probate proceedings of
Jagunap estate. Not proper remedy. Not an interested party.
CA. Affirmed.
SC. Affirmed.
Facts: Flora, as admin of estate of Jagunap, signed ―barter‖
agreement with Cleto Espinosa wherein they swapped some
parcels of land. Flora submitted to court the agreement which was
approved. Espinosa took possession of land. He later died
intestate leaving Salvacion as heir.
Later, portion swapped by Flora was sold by heirs of Jagunap to
Javel. A project partition granting half of estate to Jagna and other
half to seven heirs was later on approved by Court. Upon MR of
one of heirs, car and swapped lot was included in partition and
Espinosa was deprived of possession of land.
To regain the title and possession lot, widow Salvacion Espinosa
(widow?) presented motion in the probate of Jagunap estate,
asking it to be reopened, and seeked to annul the sale made to
Javel as well as partition made by the heirs.
Court still denied motion. Court also denied the appeal announced
by the appellant for the reason that, as they had already decided,
was not party to the probate of Jagunap nor had direct and
material interest in it.
Salvacion argued on appeal that because of the swap with Jagna,
the cause of the appellant was legally approved by the court, her
relief is then the reopening of probate proceedings of Jagunap.
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ISSUE:
WoN Salvacion Espinosa is an interested party in Jagunap probate
proceeding.
DECISION: No.
HELD:
Salvacion is a stranger who has no direct or material interest in the
assets of Jagunap estate, has no right to intervene or appeal. To
enforce her right over land, she does not need to replace the
intestate nor be appointed as a special administrator in estate of
Jagunap. Remedy is not reopening of intestate proceeding of
Jagunap, but ordinary civil action for recovery of possession.
2. TRILLANA V CRISOSTOMO (1951)
PONENTE: FERIA, J.
DOCTRINE: In civil actions and special proceedings, unless
otherwise provided by law, the interest in order that a person may
be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so that he will be
materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's order,
decree or judgment: and not indirect or contingent.
QUICK FACTS: Deceased Damasa Crisostomo allegedly made
two wills. Appellants Crisostomo et. al. who are claiming to be the
deceased’s nephews and nieces assert they are interested parties
in the present case because they may inherit from the deceased’s
estate should the Court rule in a certain way.
FACTS:
The deceased, Damasa Crisostomo, allegedly made two wills: one
will was made on August 16, 1948 and the other will was executed
on October 19, 1948.Trillana, the administrator of the estate,
presented the subsequent will executed on October 19 for probate,
and was granted by the court. Crisostomo and others, claiming to
be nephews and nieces of the deceased, filed a petition for relief of
the judgment rendered by the probate court to disallow the
subsequent will and allow the former will executed on August 16,
alleging that the proceedings during the probate of the
subsequent will was attended by fraud.
Contention of the Appellants (Crisostomo et al):
Appellants argue that they are interested parties and therefore may
appeal in the present case, because in the event the will of
October 19 is disallowed and that of August 16 is allowed, and the
legacies in the latter are declared invalid or the legatees incapable
to inherit, the legacies will go to the appellants.
Contention of the Appellee (Trillana)
The will of August 16, 1948 was expressly and absolutely revoked
by the will of October 19, 1948, executed by the same executrix or
deceased. The probate of the subsequent will was not attended by
fraud and the appellants show no proof of the alleged fraud
committed in the probate of the subsequent will.
ISSUE:
Are the appellants parties in interest in the present case and
therefore entitled to appeal the decision of the lower court?
DECISION: NO
HELD:
The appellants are not considered as interested parties in the
probate proceedings of the will of the deceased Damasa
Crisostomo, and therefore, are not entitled to appeal the decision
of the lower court. In civil actions and special proceedings, unless
otherwise provided by law, the interest in order that a person may
be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so that he will be
materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's order,
decree or judgment: and not indirect or contingent.
The appellants in the present case merely allege in their petition
for relief that they are "nephews and nieces and therefore legal
heirs of the deceased Damasa Crisostomo," without specifying the
degree of relationship they had to the latter. They contend that if
the will made on October 19, 1949, be disallowed, they will inherit
the estate left by the testatrix. The interest claimed by the
appellants is purely contingent or dependent upon several
uncertain and future events to (1) The disallowance of the will of
October 19, 1948 (2) The allowance of the will of August 16, 1948,
and (3) invalidation of certain legacies left in said will of August 16, 1948.
NOTES:
Whether a revoked will must be included in the probate of the
subsequent will.
No, a revoked will may no longer be presented in the probate of
the subsequent will. If two wills are presented for allowance but
one of them was a revoked will, it cannot be included in the
probate of the latter subsequent will, because it would be a waste
of time to allow the revoked will if the subsequent revoking will is
allowed. The revoked will may be probated and allowed only if the
subsequent revoking will is disallowed.
3. DURAN V DURAN (1967) - Supra, Copied from last meeting’s
digest
Case: IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE PIO DURAN.
CIPRIANO DURAN and MIGUEL DURAN, petitioners-
appellants, vs. JOSEFINA B. DURAN, movant-oppositor
and appellee.
Ponente: Bengzon J.P, J.
DOCTRINE: (The assignment took place when no settlement
proceedings was pending.) Assigning heir cannot initiate a
settlement proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is
annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against him,
so that he is left without that "interest" in the estate required to
petite for settlement proceedings.
QUICK FACTS: Prior to settlement proceedings of the decedent’s
estate, one of the heirs executed a deed of assignment and
renunciation of his hereditary rights. Such heir subsequently filed a
petition for intestate proceedings and motion to be appointed as
administrator. CFI and SC dismissed petition because the heir is
no more an ―interested person‖ in the estate, by virtue of the deed
executed which is valid and effective between the parties.
FACTS:
Nature:
TC: Petition for intestate proceedings
CA: NA
SC:
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Pio Duran died without testament on February 28, 1961.
Among his alleged heirs are Josefina Duran, as surviving spouse;
several brothers and sisters; nephews and nieces.
Subsequent to his death, Cipriano Duran, one of the
surviving brothers, executed a public instrument assigning and
renouncing his hereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favor of
Josefina, for the consideration of P2,500.00. A year later, Cipriano
filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay a petition for intestate
proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate, and an ex parte motion to
be appointed special administrator.
Josefina filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that
Cipriano is not an "interested person" in the estate, in view of the
deed of transfer and renunciation; in the alternative, she asked to
be appointed administratrix. Cipriano alleged that Josefina was not
the decedent's wife. He contended that the deed of assignment
was procured thru fraud, with gross inadequacy of price and
vitiated by lesion.
Still later, another brother of the decedent, Miguel, filed a
petition to be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina moved to
strike out said petition as an improper attempt to intervene in the
case.
CFI Albay. Dismissed the petition of Cipriano for his lack of interest
in the estate. Said lack of interest was premised on the deed of
transfer executed by him. The court declared itself without power
to examine in said proceedings, collaterally, the alleged fraud,
inadequacy of price and lesion that would render it rescissible or
voidable. With Cipriano’s petition's dismissal, Miguel's petition to
be joined as co-petitioner was deemed without leg to stand on.
ISSUE: WoN Cipriano is an ―interested person‖ as provided in
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court
DECISION: NO. SC affirmed CFI Albay’s decision to dismiss
Cipriano’s petition for his lack of interest in the estate.
HELD: The assignment took place when no settlement proceeding
was pending. The properties subject matter of the assignment
were not under the jurisdiction of a settlement court. Allowing that
the assignment must be deemed a partition as between the
assignor and assignee, the same does not need court approval to
be effective as between the parties.
The case of In re Irene Santos is not applicable because
the situation in the Santos case involves an assignment between
co-heirs pendente lite, during the course of settlement
proceedings. Therefore, the settlement court had already acquired
jurisdiction over the properties during the assignment. As a result,
any assignment regarding the same had to be approved by said
court. And since the approval of the court is not deemed final until
the estate is closed, the assigning heir remains an interested
person in proceedings even after said approval.
Should it be contended that said partition was attended
with fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind
or to annul the same in an action for that purpose.
Miguel’s petition to "join petitioner Cipriano as co-
petitioner in the latter's petition‖ amounted to a petition to intervene
in the settlement proceedings. Since there was really no settlement
proceedings in the first place, the petition to intervene must be
denied.
Although Josefina prayed to be appointed administratrix, her doing
so did not amount to ratification of the petition for settlement under
the ruling in Eusebio v. Valmores since she did so merely by way
of an alternative prayer, should her motion to dismiss fail.
4. IN RE INTESTATE ESTATE OF IRENE SANTOS (1962)
Ponente: Paredes, J.
DOCTRINE: A co-heir is an indispensable party to special
proceedings to settle the intestate estate of the decedent.
QUICK FACTS: Adela Santos, one of the nieces of the decedent,
Irene Santos, filed a petition to nullify the deed of assignment she
supposedly executed in favour of her sister, during the pendency
of the petition for letters of administration filed by her uncle, Jose
Villegas. Villegas alleges that she no longer has legal interest in
the case by virtue of the deed of assignment and therefore must
not be allowed to ―intervene‖. The SC held that Adela was a proper
party to the case, not simply an intervenor, because in the first
place, she was an original party to the special proceedings.
FACTS:
Nature: Jose Villegas filed a petition for letters of administration in
the Rizal CFI; Adela filed a Manifestation in the same court to
allege that her consent to the assignment to her sister of her rights
to the estate of Irene Santos was obtained through fraud
TC. – Jose Villegas filed a petition for letters of administration of
his wife’s (Irene Santos) estate at the CFI of Rizal (Special
Proceeding 2100, hereinafter SP 2100). Adela Santos filed a
Manifestation in the same court to allege that her consent to the
assignment to her sister of her rights to the estate of Irene Santos
was obtained through fraud. She seeks to have copies of all the
pleadings filed by Villegas, delivered to her.
Adela Santos won, and the probate court ordered Jose Villegas to
furnish Adela Santos with all the pleadings he will be filing in court.
On motion for reconsideration, the vacation judge (I think this
refers to the judge who temporarily replaced the ―original‖ judge
who went on vacation) ruled for Jose Villegas.
Adela Santos contested this, and when the ―original‖ judge came
back, he set aside the order of the ―vacation‖ judge.
CA. N/A.
SC. Ruled for Adela Santos.
Facts: In PARAGRAPH form.
On November 11, 1954, Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her
only heirs her surviving spouse Jose D. Villegas and two nieces -
daughters of her deceased brother, Rizalina Santos Rivera and
Adela Santos Gutierrez.
Thereafter, Jose Villegas filed with the Rizal CFI, Pasay City
Branch, a petition for Letters of Administration (SP 2100), and was
appointed administrator of the estate.
In the petition, he named as intestate heirs, besides himself,
Rizalina Santos Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez.
On January 15, 1955, in SP 2100, an unverified manifestation
signed by Adela Gutierrez, accompanied by a public instrument
entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at Salinan", dated January 12, 1955,
was presented to the Probate Court. It stated that Adela Santos
was relinquishing all her rights to the estate of her deceased aunt,
Irene Santos.
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Subsequently, Adela Santos filed a Manifestation alleging that her
consent to the deed of assignment was obtained fraudulently. She
added that she was placing the above facts within the knowledge
of the Court so that no action may be taken giving value to the
alleged deed of assignment and in order that she (Adela) might be
notified of each and all pleadings or orders connected with the
proceedings. The administrator Jose Villegas and Rizalina Santos
filed exceptions and/or objections to the Manifestation, denying the
allegations of fraud, undue influence and the like.
TC - Ruled for Adela Santos. On MR, vacation
judge ruled for Jose Villegas. On MR filed by Adela Santos, the
presiding judge set aside the ruling of the vacation judge.
CA - N/A.
ISSUE: WON Adela Santos Gutierrez is still entitled to be
furnished with pleadings filed by the administrator (Jose Villegas)
in the probate proceedings and orders therein issue by the lower
court.
DECISION:
YES.
It cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos is an
indispensable party to the proceedings in question. Her interest in
the estate is not inchoate. It was established at the time of death
of Irene Santos on November 11, 1954. While it is true that she
executed a deed of assignment, it is also a fact that she asked the
same to be annulled. (In an action pending before the Rizal CFI,
Pasig Branch.)
Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping herself from the
probate proceedings and presenting therewith the supposed Deed
of Assignment, the record, nevertheless fails to show that action
thereon had been taken by the probate Court.
―Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction (Art. 1082, NCC).‖ No serious argument can be offered
to deny the co-heirship of appellee in the estate under probate.
The court that approved the partition of the estate and the
agreement in ratification thereof may annul both whenever, as it is
here alleged, the approval was obtained by deceit or fraud, and the
petition must be filed in the courts of the intestate proceedings, for
it is generally admitted that probate courts are authorized to vacate
any decree or judgment procured by fraud, not only while the
proceedings in the course of which it was issued are pending, but
even, as in this case, within a reasonable time thereafter.
The motion in question is not one of intervention, but solely a plea
to enforce a right and that is to receive pleadings and orders
related to the case. The use of the word "intervention" in the
manifestation and pleadings presented by Adela was resorted to
for want of another appropriate word. In effect, all she wanted to
convey was that she should participate or continue taking part in
the case for being an original party therein.
Intervention as contemplated by the Rules is a proceeding in a suit
or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make
himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by
the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of
plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the
act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit
pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a
person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, which
such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some
right or interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings
5. TAYAG V TAYAG-GALLOR (2008)
Case: VICTORIA C. TAYAG, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD A.
TAYAG-GALLOR, Respondent.
Ponente: Tinga, J.
QUICK FACTS: Felicidad, alleged illegitimate child of deceased
Ismael, who died intestate, filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration. Petitioner Victoria, spouse of Ismael
opposed and prayed for the dismissal on the ground that Felicidad
failed to state a cause of action.
FACTS:
Nature:
TC. – Petition for the issuance of letters of administration
CA. – Appeal by Victoria
SC. – Petition for certiorari by Victoria
Facts:
Felicidad filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
over the estate of Ismael Tayag who died intestate. She alleged
that she’s 1 of the 3 illegitimate children of Ismael. Victoria was the
spouse of Ismael. Ismael left 2 real properties both of which are in
the possession of Victoria and a motor vehicle which was sold
preparatory to the settlement. It was alleged that Victoria promised
to give each illegitimate child Php100k, but each only received half.
Felicidad further alleged that Victoria executed an affidavit stating
that the properties were paraphernal.
Victoria opposed the petition by claiming that the properties were
bought by her using her own money. She prayed for the dismissal
of the suit on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. She
avers that it is necessary to allege that Felicidad was
acknowledged and recognized as illegitimate child by Ismael.
Absent such allegation, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which can’t be brought after the death of the putative
father.
TC - DENIED MOTION TO DISMISS
CA - AFFIRMED
Allegation of being an illegitimate child suffices for a
cause of action
Victoriana appeals saying that Felicidad should not be allowed to
prove her filiation in the settlement
ISSUE: WON the petition sufficiently states a cause of action
considering that Felicidad merely alleged that she is an
illegitimate child, without stating she’d been acknowledged or
recognized as such
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DECISION: YES. PETITION DENIED. CA AFFIRMED.
HELD:
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration must
be filed by an interested person (Rule 79)
―interested person‖ as defined in Saguinsin v.
Lindayag
One who could be benefited by the
estate (i.e. heir)
One who has a claim against the
estate (i.e. creditor)
Interest must be material and direct
Where the right of the person filing is
dependent on a fact which has not been
established or can no longer be established,
such contingent interest does not make her an
interested party
Felicidad’s right to maintain the suit is dependent on
whether she is entitled to successional rights as an
illegitimate child. This may be established thorugh:
Voluntary recognition
Must be express (i.e. in a record,
final judgment, public instrument)
Needs no further court action  not
subject to the limitation that the
action for recognition be brought
during the lifetime of the putative
parent
Judicial or compulsory recognition
May be demanded by the illegitimate
child
Must be brought within the lifetime of
the presumed parents
Felicidad was not given the opportunity to present
evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily
recognized due to Victoria’s opposition
No way to determine if her petition is actually
one to compel recognition which had already
been foreclosed by the death of her father – or
whether she has a material and direct interest
to maintain the suit by reason of the
decedent’s voluntary acknowledgment or
recognition
Allegation that she is an illegitimate child suffices
A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the
truth of the facts alleged
Assuming she is an illegitimate child  her
interest in the estate would be material and
direct
C. Procedure
1. AVELINO V CA (2000)
Case: MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs COURT OF
APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO,
ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK
MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY
AVELINO, respondents.
Ponente: Quisumbing
DOCTRINE: A complete inventory of the estate may be done
during the partition proceedings, especially if the estate has no
debts; in such cases, an action for letters of administration may
appropriately be converted into an action for judicial partition.
Where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the
heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled
to submit to administration proceedings.
FACTS:
Nature: Petition by Socorro for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of her late father, Antonio Sr.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino (Socorro) is a daughter and
compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife
(and Socorro’s mother) private respondent Angelina Avelino.
Socorro’s other siblings join their mother as respondents.
Socorro filed a petition (at the RTC) for letters of administration
(Oct. 24, 1991) of the estate of her father who died 18 months
since the filing. On Dec. 3, 1992, Angelina and the other siblings
opposed by filing a motion to convert the judicial proceedings to an
action for judicial partition, which Socorro in turn, duly opposed.
RTC: (ruled in favor of the mother and the siblings) Since Socorro
is the only heir not amenable to the partition, the same was
granted. MR by Socorro was denied.
CA: (appeal thru Rule 65) Affirmed RTC. MR was also denied.
Socorro’s arguments in her appeal to the SC:
No partition of the estate since no determination has yet been
made of the character and extent of Antonio’s estate; cited
Arcilles v. Montejo, where SC held that when the existence of
the decedent’s property is still at issue, administration
proceedings are the proper mode of resolving the same.
Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for
issuance of administration letters to an action for judicial
partition.
ISSUE: WoN CA gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial
court’s finding that partition was proper.
DECISION: No, affirmed CA and RTC.
HELD:
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an
executor in his will or the executor is incompetent, or refuses
the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of
Court, then the decedent's estate will be judicially administered
and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator
in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78; the exceptions
to this are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and
properties of the deceased at the moment of the latter's
death; when a person dies without leaving pending obligations,
his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial
administration, nor apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the court
A complete inventory of the estate may be done during the
partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts;
the CA and the lower court committed no reversible error in
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converting petitioner's action for letters of administration into
an action for judicial partition; where the more expeditious
remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or
the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to
administration proceedings
Rule 80 – Special Administrator
A. Necessity for, and qualification of, a special administrator
1. VDA. DE ROXAS V PECSON (1948)
Case: NATIVIDAD I. VDA. DE ROXAS, petitioner, vs.
POTENCIANO PECSON, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan,
MARIA ROXAS and PEDRO ROXAS,respondents.
Ponente: Feria, J.
Doctrine: Only one special administrator may be appointed to
administer temporarily the estate because a special administrator
is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of
the general administrator. When there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of will, or from any other cause, the
court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take
charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing
the delay are decided and executors or administrators thereupon
appointed.
Quickfacts: Pablo Roxas died and was survived by his widow
Natividad, a 9 year old adulterous child and his siblings Maria and
Pedro. The 2 siblings filed intestate proceedings and the
appointment of Maria as administrator but this was dismissed
when Natividad filed a petition for probate of an alleged will of her
deceased husband where ½ of the estate was given to her and the
other ½ to deceased’s child and for Natividad’s appointment as
executrix. Natividad was appointed as special administrator. After
denial of will to probate, TC appointed Natividad as special
administrator with respect to the conjugal estate and appointed
Maria as special co-administratrix with respect to the exclusive
property of the deceased.
Nature:
TC. First, intestate proceedings and appointment of Maria as
administrator, but this was dismissed when Natividad filed petition
for probate of an alleged will of Pablo.
SC. Petition for certiorari filed against Judge of CFI of Bulacan
Pablo Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan and was survived
by his widow Natividad, his 9 year old adulterous child and his 2
siblings Maria and Pedro. On Aug. 3, 1946, Maria and Pedro filed
a petition an intestate estate proceedings and for the
administration of the deceased's estate in the CFI of Bulacan,
where Maria was appointed special administratrix upon an ex-
parte petition.
On Aug. 10, 1946, Natividad, widow of Pablo, filed a petition for the
probate of an alleged will of her deceased husband with the same
court and for her appointment as executrix of his estate designated
in said will. In said will, the deceased bequeathed ½ of his estate
to his widow Natividad and ½ to decedent’s adulterous 9 year old
child Reynaldo Roxas. Upon agreement of both parties, the
intestate proceeding was dismissed. Maria and Pedro opposed the
probate of the will.
On Sept. 10, 1946 Natividad was appointed special administratrix
over the objection of Maria and Pedro, who sought Maria’s
appointment as such. On Oct. 21, 1946, Maria and Pedro filed a
MR of the TC’s order appointing Natividad as special administratrix
with prayer that Maria be appointed as special co-administratrix,
which motion was not acted upon.
TC: denied the probate of the will on the ground that the attesting
witnesses did not sign their names in the presence of the testator.
Natividad’s appeal on this is now pending.
On Dec. 29, 1947, Maria and Pedro renewed their petition for the
appointment of Maria as special administratrix or special co-
administratrix.
TC: On May 5, 1948, appointed Natividad as special administratrix
with respect to all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and
Maria as special administratrix of all capital or exclusive properties
of the deceased.
Thus, Natividad filed the present petition for certiorari on the
ground that respondent judge acted in excess of the court's
jurisdiction in appointing 2 special co-administrators of the estate
of the deceased.
ISSUE: WON TC was correct in appointing Natividad as special
administrator
HELD: Yes. It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the
prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of
administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory
provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator
under section 653 of Act 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply
to the selection or removal of special administrator.4 As the law
does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and
the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion
which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason,
justice or equity. There is nothing wrong in that respondent judge,
in exercising his discretion and appointing Natividad as special
administratrix, had taken into consideration the beneficial interest
of Natividad in the estate of the decedent and her being
designated in the will as executrix thereof.
ISSUE: WON TC is correct in appointing 2 special administrators
HELD: No. According to sec. 25, Rule 75, "when the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the
debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse." That is the reason why, according to sec 4,
Rule 78, the "letters testamentary, or letters of administration with
the will annexed, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines," and sec 6, Rule 79, provides for appointment of one
administrator in case of intestacy, except in certain cases in which
2 or more joint, but not separate and independent, administrators
421 Am. Jur., 833; De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 106
5taken from section 685 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, Act 190,
as amended
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may be appointed under section 3, Rule 82. Therefore the
administrator appointed to administer and liquidate the exclusive
property of a deceased spouse shall also administer, liquidate and
distribute the community property because the estate of a
deceased spouse which is to be settled (administered, liquidated,
distributed) consists not only of the exclusive properties of the
decedent, but also of one-half of the assets of the conjugal
partnership, if any, which may pertain to the deceased, as
determined after the liquidation thereof in accordance with articles
1421 to 1424 of the CC.
There is absolutely no reason for appointing 2 separate
administrators, especially if the estate to be settled is that of a
deceased husband for according to art 1422 and 1423 of CC, only
after the dowry and parapherna of the wife and the debts, charges,
and obligations of the conjugal partnership have been paid, the
capital or exclusive property of the husband may be liquidated and
paid in so far as the inventoried estate may reach; and if the estate
inventoried should not be sufficient to pay the dowry and the
parapherna of the wife and the debts, charges and obligations of
the partnership, the provision of Title XVII of CC relating to
concurrence and preference of credits shall be observed. If 2
separate administrators are appointed as done here, in every
action which one of them may institute to recover properties or
credit of the deceased, defendant may raise the question or set up
the defense that plaintiff has no cause of action because the
property or credit in issue belongs to the class which is being
administered by the other administrator, which cannot be done if
the administrator of the entire estate is only one.
As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed
to administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased
spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may
be appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a
special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is
appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator. "When there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration
occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of
will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a special
administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators thereupon appointed" (sec. 1, Rule
81). Although his powers and duties are limited to "collect and take
charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator
afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and
maintain suits as administrator, and may sell such perishable and
other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator
shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased." (Sec. 2, Rule
81.)
Appointing Natividad to only the conjugal property is not logical
and Maria as to the exclusive property is not logical as Natividad
has or claims to have the same beneficial interest after the TC
decision disapproving the will, which is now pending on appeal, as
she had prior to it, because the decision is not yet final and may be
reversed by the appellate court.
Even if the will is not probated, the widow Natividad would have,
under the law, the right of usufruct over ½ of the exclusive property
of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. The
beneficial interest required as a qualification for appointment as
administrator of the estate of a decedent is the interest in the
whole estate and not only in some part thereof. Natividad being
entitled to one-half in usufruct of all the exclusive properties of the
decedent, she would have as much if not more interest in
administering the entire estate correctly, in order to reap the
benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the state,
and not suffer the consequences of the waste, improvidence or
mismanagement thereof. The good or bad administration of the
property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a
property.
2. MATIAS V GONZALES (1957)
Ponente: Concepcion, J.
DOCTRINE: There are authorities in support of the power of courts
to appoint several special co-administrators. Inasmuch as the
lower court had deemed it best to appoint more than one special
administrator, justice and equity demands that both factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased.
QUICK FACTS: Will submitted by Matias where she was instituted
as sole heir was denied probate by lower court. The case is still
pending, upon appeal by Matias to the SC. However, special
administrator appointed by the lower court was relieved of his
duties by respondent judge and instead replaced with Oppositors
Basilia Salud, et al. They proceeded to secure orders from
respondent judge to collect rents and later sell properties of the
estate. SC annulled orders, and while affirming that the court can
appoint more than one special administer, it declared that justice
and equity demands that both factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased and thus, ordered
lower court to re-hear the case with regard to special administrator.
FACTS:
Nature:
TC. Request by Special Administrator to collect rents and sell land.
Granted.
SC. Orders annulled.
Aurea Matias file a petition for the probate of a document
purporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt, Gabina
Raquel, who died single on May 8, 1952, at the age of 92 years,
where she was designated as heir to the entire estate of the
deceased except for some properties bequeathed to her other
niece and nephews (including Victorina Salud). Basilia Salud, a
first cousin of the deceased, opposed the probate of her alleged
will. Respondent judge sustained the opposition and denied the
petition for probate. Matias appealed to this Court, and such
appeal is still pending.
Another issue arose, this time between Aurea Matias and Basilia
Salud regarding the person to be appointed special administrator
of the estate of the deceased. The former proposed Horacio
Rodriguez, whereas the latter urged the appointment of Victorina
Salud. Hon. Jose Bernabe, Judge, decided the matter in favor of
Horacio Rodriguez and against Victorina Salud, upon the ground
that, unlike the latter, who, as a pharmacist and employee in the
Santa Isabel Hospital, resides in the City of Manila, the former, a
practicing lawyer and a former public prosecutor, and later, mayor
of the City of Cavite, resides in Cavite.
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However, respondent Judge found Rodriguez guilty of abuse of
authority and gross negligence, and, accordingly, relieved him as
special administrator of the estate of the deceased upon motion of
Basilia Salud. He then appointed Basilia Salud as special
administratrix thereof, to "be assisted and advised by her niece,
Miss Victorina Salud," who "shall always act as aide, interpreter
and adviser of Basilia Salud." Said order, likewise, provided that
"Basilia Salud shall be helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . . who is
hereby appointed as co-administrator."
Aurea Matins asked that said order be set aside and that she be
appointed special co-administratrix, jointly with Horacio Rodriguez,
upon the ground that Basilia Salud is over eighty (80) years of age,
totally blind and physically incapacitated to perform the duties of
said office, and that said movant is the universal heiress of the
deceased and the person appointed by the latter as executrix of
her alleged will. This motion was denied. However, later, Basilia
Salud tendered her resignation as special administratrix by reason
of physical disability, due to old age, and recommended the
appointment, in her place, of Victorina Salud.
Before any action could be taken thereon, or on March 21, 1956,
Aurea Matias sought a reconsideration of said order of March 10,
1956. Moreover, on March 24, 1956, she expressed her conformity
to said resignation, but objected to the appointment, in lieu of
Basilia Salud, of Victorina Salud, on account of her antagonism to
said Aurea Matias — she (Victorina Salud) having been the
principal and most interested witness for the opposition to the
probate of the alleged will of the deceased — and proposed that
the administration of her estate be entrusted to the Philippine
National Bank, the Monte de Piedad, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands, or any other similar institution authorized by law therefor,
should the court be reluctant to appoint the movant as special
administratrix of said estate. This motion for reconsideration was
denied on March 26, 1956.
Shortly afterwards, or on June 18, 1956, respondents Ramon Plata
and Victorina Salud requested authority to collect the rents due, or
which may be due, to the estate of the deceased and to collect all
the produce of her lands, which was granted on June 23, 1956. On
June 27, 1956, said respondents filed another motion praying for
permission to sell the palay of the deceased then deposited in
different rice mills in the province of Cavite, which respondent
judge granted on June 10, 1956.
Later on, or on July 10, 1956, petitioner instituted the present
action against Judge Gonzales, and Victorina Salud and Ramon
Plata, for the purpose of annulling the above mentioned orders of
respondent Judge, upon the ground that the same had been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
Main Issue: WON the court can appoint more than one (1)
administrators
Held: YES. In the case at bar there is only one (1) special
administration, the powers of which shall be exercised jointly by
two special co-administrators. The rule, laid down in Roxas vs.
Pecson (supra), to the effect that "only one special administrator
may be appointed to administrator temporarily" the estate of the
deceased, is not squarely in point. The lower court appointed
therein one special administrator for some properties forming part
of said estate, and a special administratrix for other properties
thereof. Thus, there were two (2) separate and independent
special administrators.
The record shows that there are, at least two (2) factions among
the heirs of the deceased, namely, one, represented by the
petitioner, and another, to which Basilia Salud and Victorina Salud
belong. Inasmuch as the lower court had deemed it best to
appoint more than one special administrator, justice and
equity demands that both factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased.
Other Issues:
1. WON Horacio Rodriguez was validly relieved of his duties as
special administrator
2. WON Basilia Salud et al were validly appointed as special
administrator to the estate
Held:
1. No. There was no due process. Horacio Rodriguez only
received copy of said motion of February 24, 1956, or after
the date set for the hearing (February 17, 1956). Further,
notice of the order of respondent Judge, dated February 23,
1956, postponing said hearing to February 27, 1956, was not
served on petitioner herein.
2. No. There was also no due process. Petitioner had no notice
that her main opponent, Basilia Salud, and the latter's
principal witness, Victorina Salud, would be considered for the
management of said as Basilia Salud only prayed for the
appointment of Ramon Plate. Thus, petitioner had no
opportunity to object to the appointment of Basilia Salud as
special administratrix, and of Victorina Salud, as her assistant
and adviser.
Said order was also issued with evident knowledge of the
physical disability of Basilia Salud. Otherwise respondent
Judge would not have directed that she "be assisted and
advised by her niece Victorina Salud," and that the latter
"shall always act as aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia
Salud."
Further, while will was denied probate by respondent judge,
the order to this effect is not, as yet, final and executor as it is
pending review on appeal taken by Aurea Matias. The
probate of said alleged will being still within realm of legal
possibility, Aurea Matias has — as the universal heir and
executrix designated in said instrument — a special interest to
protect during the pendency of said appeal. Thus, in the case
of Roxas vs. Pecson* (46 Off. Gaz., 2058), this Court held that
a widow, designated as executrix in the alleged will and
testament of her deceased husband, the probate of which had
denied in an order pending appeal, "has . . . the same
beneficial interest after the decision of the court disapproving
the will, which is now pending appeal, because the decision is
not yet final and may be reversed by the appellate court."
B. Powers and duties
1. DE GALA V GONZALES (1929)
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Case: SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner-appellant, vs. APOLINARIO
GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA, opponents-appellants.
Ponente: Ostrand, J.
Doctrine: The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely
in the sound discretion of the court; the function of such an
administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by
a creditor and cannot pay any debts of the deceased.
Quick facts: Severina Gonzales died with a will but with no issue
so her niece, Serapia de Gala was appointed as special
administratrix. Serapia demanded from the surviving spouse,
Sinforoso Ona, the delivery to her of the property inventoried and
of which he was in possession. Ona refused and filed a motion to
remove her as special administratrix. The court granted and
appointed Ona in her place.
Facts:
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the lower court admitting the
will to probate and removing the special administratrix.
In Nov. 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in
which Serapia de Gala, a niece, was designated executrix.
Severina died in November, 1926, leaving no heirs by force of law.
In 1926, Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will for
probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased, filed an
opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been executed in
conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix
of the estate. She returned an inventory of the estate on March 31,
1927, and made several demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the
surviving husband of the deceased, for the delivery to her of the
property inventoried and of which he was in possession. The CFI
ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver to Serapia de Gala all the
property left by the deceased. Instead of delivering the property as
ordered, Sinforoso filed a motion asking the appointment of
Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that he,
Sinforoso, be appointed in her stead which was granted. It was
principally on the ground that he had possession of the property in
question and that his appointment would simplify the proceedings.
In 1928, the court declared the will valid and admitted it to probate.
All of the parties appealed, Serapia de Gala from the order
removing her from the office of special administratrix, and
Apolinario Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona from the order probating
the will.
Issue:
Whether or not the special administrarix can be removed
on a ground not falling under section 653 of the Code of Civil
Procedure?
Held:
YES. Section 653 of the Code of Civil Procedure only
applies to executors and regular administrators, and the office of a
special administrator is quite different from that of regular
administrator. The appointment of a special administrator lies
entirely in the sound discretion of the court; the function of such an
administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by
a creditor and cannot pay any debts of the deceased. The fact that
no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a special
administrator indicates that both his appointment and his removal
are purely discretionary. In removing Serapia de Gala and
appointing the present possessor of the property pending the final
determination of the validity of the will, the court probably
prevented useless litigation.
Note:
The Court also upheld the validity of the will. The
principal points raised by the appeal are (1) that the person
requested to sign the name of the testatrix signed only the latter's
name and not her own; (2) that the attestation clause does not
mention the placing of the thumb-mark of the testatrix in the will;
and (3) that the fact that the will had been signed in the presence
of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but only in
the last paragraph of the body of the will.
The Court answered each argument: 1) When, therefore,
the law says that the will shall be 'signed' by the testator or
testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by the customary written
signature but by the testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. A statute
requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by
the testator's mark. 2) It maybe conceded that the attestation
clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing alone, it does not
quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection
with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and
sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it leaves no possible
doubt as to the authenticity of the document. 3) No merit; the fact
is expressly stated in that clause.
2. LIWANAG V CA (1965)
Case: GLICERIA C. LIWANAG, Special Administratrix of the
Estate of PIO D. LIWANAG, petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS DE VEYRA, as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MANUEL
AGREGADO, respondents.
Ponente: Concepcion
DOCTRINE: A special administrator can be made defendant in a
suit against the estate in order to protect the creditors’ rights
because (1) the statute of limitations on prescription apply to
creditors and (2) the appointment of a regular administrator might
be delayed.
QUICK FACTS: Agregado commenced an action against Liwanag
as a special administratix for the foreclosure of a REM made by
the decedent. Liwanag filed MTD contending she cannot be made
defendant because she’s just a special administratix. CFI and CA
dismissed MTD.
FACTS:
Nature:
CFI: Motion to dismiss an action (foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage)
CA: Certiorari
SC: Certiorari. SC said that since the cause of action (foreclosure
of REM) doesn’t affect CFI’s jurisdiction, the right remedy was
appeal and not certiorari
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Gliceria Liwanag (petitioner) is the special administratix of the
estate of Pio D. Liwanag
January 9, 1962 – Manuel Agregado (private respondent)
commenced an action against Liwanag for the foreclosure of
a REM in his favor by the deceased Pio D. Liwanag.
July 18, 1962 - Liwanag filed Motion to Dismiss upon ground
that as a special administratix she cannot be sued by
Agregado.
August 1, 1962 – CFI denied MTD.
Liwanag went to CA to annul the order by certiorari. CA
issued preliminary injunction enjoining CFI from hearing the
case.
December 3, 1962 – CA affirmed CFI. Lifted the PI.
ISSUE: WON Liwanag as a special administratix can be made a
defendant to a foreclosure action against the estate
DECISION: YES.
Liwanag’s contention: Section 2, Rule 81 of the (old) Rules of
Court, "a special administrator shall not be liable to pay any
debts of the deceased," and hence , Agregado has no cause
of action against her as a special administratrix.
SC:
o In Liwanag v. Hon. Luis B. Reyes (1964) involving
the same administratix involved in a foreclosure
action of a different mortgage and an identical MTD
and issue, the SC said:
 Rule 86 Section 7 of the NEW Rules
provides that a creditor holding a claim
against the estate, secured by a
mortgage, has the following remedies:
a. abandon his security and
prosecute his claim and share in
the general distribution of the
assets of the estate;
b. foreclose his mortgage or
realize upon his security by an
action in court, making the
executor or administrator a
party defendant, and if there is a
deficiency after the sale of the
mortgaged property, he may
prove the same in the testate or
intestate proceedings; and
c. rely exclusively upon his
mortgage and foreclose it any
time within the ordinary period
of limitations, and if he relies
exclusively upon the mortgage,
he shall not...share in the
distribution of the assets.
 Agregado clearly chose the 2nd remedy.
o The Rules do not expressly prohibit making the
special administratrix a defendant in a suit
against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would
find the adverse effects of the statute of
limitations running against them in cases where
the appointment of a regular administrator is
delayed. If such an action will be denied on such
technical ground, and the appointment of a
regular administrator will be delayed, the very
purpose for which the mortgage was constituted
will be defeated.
3. ANDERSON V PERKINS (1961)
Case: DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, petitioner-appellee, vs.
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, oppositor-appellant.
Ponente: Reyes, JBL
DOCTRINE:
a. The function of a special administrator is only to collect
and preserve the property of the deceased until a regular
administrator is appointed. This includes the duty to
preserve the value of the property.
b. A special administrator can be given authority to sell
things that are not perishable.
QUICK FACTS: The special administrator sought to have authority
to sell certain personal properties of the estate. The surviving
spouse of the decedent opposed stating that not all of the
properties sought to be sold belong to the estate. CFI gave
authority. Appealed to SC.
FACTS:
Nature:
CFI: Opposition against petition seeking authority to sell by the
special administrator
CA: N/A
SC: Appeal
April 28, 1956 – Eugene Arthur Perkins (decedent) died in
Manila, leaving personal and real property with probable value
amounting to P5 million.
May 10, 1956 – Dora Perkin Anderson filed a petition for
probate of the supposed will of Eugene Arthur with the CFI
Manila. She also asked that Alfonso Ponce Enrile be
appointed as a special administrator. CFI agreed upon
Alfonso posting bond amounting to P50k.
July 9, 1956 – Idonah Slade Perkins (surviving wife) opposed
the probate of the will.
September 28, 1956 – Alfonso submitted inventory of all the
assets that have come to his knowledge
September 4, 1958 – Alfonso petitioned for authority to sell, or
give away to some charitable or educational institution or
institutions, certain personal effects left by Eugene, such as
clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which
were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in
order to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever
value might be obtained in their disposition
September 25, 1958 – The petition was heard and Alfonso
was required to submit specification of the assets to be sold
October 21, 1958 – Alfonso submitted, in place of
specification, a copy of the inventory already submitted with
the items sought to be sold marked with a check in red pencil,
with the statement that said items were too voluminous to
enumerate.
July 9, 1956 (sic) – Idonah opposed the petition contending:
o Most of the properties sought to be sold were
conjugal properties;
o Unauthorized removal of the fine pieces of furniture
has been made
December 2, 1958 – CFI approved authority to sell.
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Idonah filed MR contending:
o that said order in effect authorized the special
administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the
deceased, contrary to Rule 81, section 2 of the
Rules;
o that said order was issued without a showing that
the goods and chattels sought to be sold were
perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of
Court;
o that the personalty sought to be sold represented
the lifetime savings and collections of Idonah;
o that there is evidence showing unauthorized
withdrawals from the properties of the estate, and
the sale of the inventoried lot would prevent
identification and recovery of the articles removed;
and
o that there is also evidence showing Idonah’s
separate rights to a substantial part of the personal
properties.
CFI denied MR. Idonah appealed to SC.
ISSUE:
o WON the things sought to be sold need to be
perishable in order for the special administrator to
be authorized to sell them
o WON CFI correctly gave authority to Alfonso to sell
the properties as special administrator
DECISION: CFI decision set aside.
a. No.
b. No.
A. In re perishability of the goods
Idonah contents that since the personal properties
sought to be sold were not perishable, Alfonso as
special administrator has no legal authority to sell
them.
Idonah was wrong. Section 2 Rule 81 of the Rules
specifically provides that the special administrator
"may sell such perishable and other property as the
court orders sold", which shows that the special
administrator's power to sell is not limited to
"perishable" property only.
B. In re Alfonso’s authority to sell as a special administrator
The function of a special administrator is only to
collect and preserve the property of the deceased
until a regular administrator is appointed (Sec. 2,
Rule 81). But it is not alone the specific property of
the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as
well. It is in line with this general power of the
special administrator to preserve not only the
property of the estate but also its value, that section
2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to
sell "other property as the court ordered sold;" .
However, there was a problem in the CFI’s order
authorizing Alfonso:
i. Idonah opposed the authority contending,
among others, that a large portion of the
personal properties in question either
belong to her exclusively or belong to the
conjugal properties, over which she has a
right.
ii. The records show that no proceeding had
as yet been taken to segregate the
alleged exclusive properties of Idonah
from the estate or to at least liquidate from
the conjugal partnership of Idonah and the
deceased. Until such time, or at least an
agreement be reached with Idonah that
she would not mind the properties being
sold in order to preserve their value, the
proposed sale by Alfonso would be
premature.
iii. No reason for the urgency of the sale
because most of the items sought to be
sold — pieces of furniture, kitchen and
dinner ware, electrical appliances, various
gadget and books — can easily be
protected and preserved with proper care
and storage measures in either or both of
two residential houses (in Manila and in
Baguio City).
iv. Alfonso’s claim that Idonah should have
indicated the alleged "fine furniture" which
she did not want sold and that her refusal
to do so is an indication of her
unmeritorious claim, is untenable. Idonah
was not given reasonable opportunity to
point out which items in the inventory she
did not want sold.
4. SILVERIO V CA (1999) - Supra, Copied from digest in Rule 78
Ponente: Purisima
DOCTRINE: The Special Administrator may only sell properties
which are not perishable and personal properties not real
properties in pursuance of his responsibility to preserve the estate
and it is for the best interest of the estate. A special administrator
may be allowed to sell the properties of the estate if the purpose is
to preserve the properties and its value but not payment of debts.
QUICK FACTS: Beatriz died. After 3 years, one of her sons,
Edgardo, filed for Letters of Administration. Court granted the
petition. Beatriz’s husband and Edgardo’s stepfather Ricardo Sr.
opposed.
FACTS:
Nature: Petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of CA
denying the petition of Ricardo Sr. in the lower court to declare
void the appointment of Edgardo as Special Administrator, inter
alia.
TC. – RTC Makati
CA.
SC.
Facts:
TC - Beatriz died. Her property was in the
possession of one son, Ricardo Jr and no partition has been made.
After 3 years, one of her sons, Edgardo, filed for Letter of Admin.
The lower court granted the petition. Ricardo Sr. opposed. The
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presentation of evidence was postponed many times because
Ricardo Sr. is living in Australia, has gone to US, is preparing to
assume office as Congressman of Bulacan, etc. the court deemed
these as waiver of rights so his petition/opposition was denied.
CA - Affirmed TC. Ricardo Sr. was barred by laches.
The rule is clear and unequivocal: It does not provide that the
surviving spouse takes precedence exclusive of and over all other
heirs of the deceased in the appointment of the administrator. CA
Judge Velez also authorized and ordered the Administrator to
sell any and/or all of the aforesaid real properties for such
amount or amounts approximating their fair market value and
to pay out from the proceeds of such sale the corresponding
attorneys fees of petitioners counsel Atty. Cesar P. Uy
equivalent to 33 1/3 percent of the fair market value of the
aforementioned three properties recovered by said petitioners
counsel for the benefit of the intestate estate of Beatriz S.
Silverio.
Chismis: Ricardo Sr. allegedly cheated on his wife by maintaining
an illicit affair with one Carmen Zuniga. While the admin/trustee of
the conjugal property, he bought 3 houses at Old Forbes, North
Forbes and Manila Bel Air and placed them in the name of his 3
illegitimate children. He used the conjugal property to invest in
California, USA, beyond the reach of his wife. And he was facing
charges of tax evasion (Ricardo Sr.: it was violation of the
Securities Act). Hence he is not capable of assuming the
administration of his wife’s estate. In addition, he was crony of
Pres. Marcos.
Chismis, too: The value of the property in 1991 was P450M.
Edgardo and his lawyer Uy allegedly agreed to give the latter 33%
as attorney’s fee.
Fact: Edmundo, another son, filed a manifestation contesting the
appointment of Edgardo without his consent. He did not receive
notice through personal service (because the court resorted to
publication).
Ricardo Sr. argued that Edgardo does not have the power to sell
their conjugal property. It was accumulated through the effort of
Ricardo, Sr.
ISSUE: WoN CA Judge Velez has the power to authorize Edgardo
S. Silverio to sell the conjugal partnership properties and even real
properties of the estate to pay the attorneys fees of Atty. Cesar P.
Uy.
DECISION: No.
HELD: In the aforesaid Order dated July 31, 1996, Judge Velez
approved the Agreement for Attorneys Contingent Fee which was
allegedly entered into by Atty. Cesar P. Uy with Edgardo on
January 21, 1991 for his approval. This alleged agreement was not
previously submitted to Judge Velez immediately after January 21,
1991 for his approval. Neither were the heirs specially Ricardo
informed of the unconscionable agreement which will give to Atty.
Cesar P. Uy 33 1/3 percent of the estate to the prejudice of the
heirs. For the subject properties, which according to Atty. Cesar P.
Uy is estimated to have a fair market value of P450,000,000.00,
the latter claims that he is entitled to 33 1/3 percent
orP150,000,000.00, much bigger than the share of Ricardo who is
a partner in the conjugal properties and an heir expects to get.
Even assuming arguendo that the appointment of Edgardo as a
special administrator was valid and that his act of retaining Atty.
Cesar P. Uy as counsel for the subject estate of a contingent fee of
33-1/3 % of any recovery was also valid, the Order of July 31,
1996 nevertheless erred in awarding to Atty. Cesar P. Uy a 33-1/3
% interest in the three Makati real properties. The reason is that
Atty. Uy was retained only as a counsel for the subject estate and
not for Ricardo.
Ricardo was already represented by the law firm of Quisumbing
Torres and Evangelista in Civil case No. 17467 where the three
Makati properties were recovered. The said law firm was also
representing the original plaintiff Nelia Silverio Dee. Nelia Silverio
Dee who was the first to prosecute the cause of action to declare
the defendants holding title to the Makati properties in trust for the
conjugal partnership, and for reconveyance thereof to the conjugal
partnership.
Judge Velez has no power to authorize Edgardo to sell the
conjugal partnership properties and even real properties of the
estate to pay the attorneys fees of Atty. Cesar P. Uy. The Special
Administrator may only sell properties which are not perishable
and personal properties not real properties in pursuance of his
responsibility to preserve the estate and it is for the best interest of
the estate.
A special administrator may be allowed to sell the properties of the
estate if the purpose is to preserve the properties and its value but
not payment of debts. The order of Judge Velez authorizing
Edgardo to sell the subject properties of any portion thereof to pay
to pay (sic) alleged attorneys fees of Atty. Cesar P. Uy in the
estimated amount of P150,000,000.00 is definitely a grave abuse
of judicial discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This is not
preservation but dissipation of the estate.
The properties which form part of the conjugal assets and the
estate were accumulated through the efforts of Ricardo and
Edgardo must not be allowed to dilute the same to his advantage
and to the detriment of the other heirs and therefore must be
stopped. The interest of the Edgardo in the estate is only 1/8 as
against Ricardo and the other heirs supporting petitioner which is
7/8. Judge Velez did not consider these facts in all his actuations.
5. HEIRS OF CASTILLO V LACUATA-GABRIEL (2005)
Case: HEIRS OF BELINDA DAHLIA A. CASTILLO, namely, BENA
JEAN, DANIEL, MELCHOR, MICHAEL and DANIBEL, all
surnamed CASTILLO, Petitioners, v. DOLORES LACUATA-
GABRIEL, Respondent.
Ponente: Callejo, Sr.
DOCTRINE: The principal object of appointment of temporary
administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands
of person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors
and heirs. It is merely temporary. The probate court has wide
discretion as regards the appointment.
QUICK FACTS: Crisanta died. A will was discovered by his
adopted son, Roberto, instituting him as her sole heir. Roberto was
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appointed as special administrator. When he died, Dolores, his
wife, applied to substitute him as the special administratix of
Crisanta’s estate. The heirs of Belinda (Belinda claimed to be the
only legitimate child of Crisanta and her husband) opposed stating
lack of kinship. Probate court appointed Dolores. CA affirmed.
FACTS:
Nature:
CFI: Opposition to the appointment of Dolores as special
administratix.
CA: Appeal by certiorari. Denied.
SC: Appeal by certiorari. Denied.
January 25, 1989 – Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel (decedent) died
leaving estate of P1.5 Million composed of real estate and
shares of stock. She was also survived by her husband,
Lorenzo B. Almoradie.
Crisanta’s mother, Crisanta Santiago vda. de Yanga,
commenced intestate proceedings claiming that letters of
administration be issued in favor of her son, Mariano Yanga
Jr. (Crisanta’s brother) because Lorenzo was a ―wastrel and
incompetent.‖ RTC Malabon nonetheless appointed Lorenzo
as administrator.
The marriage between Crisanta and Lorenzo was declared
void for being bigamous. Lorenzo was removed as
administrator. Mariano was appointed.
October 16, 1989 – Belinda Dahlia Y. Almoradie Castillo,
claiming to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and
Crisanta, filed a motion for intervention, which was held in
abeyance pending some incidents in the CA.
November 3, 1989 – Roberto Y. Gabriel, legally adopted son
of Crisanta filed before RTC Malabon a petition for probate
after he discovered his mother’s alleged will on October 25,
1989. The alleged will instituted Roberto as sole heir.
June 2, 1990 – Belinda died.
May 15, 1991 – the intestate proceedings were dismissed.
Mariano appealed to the CA through certiorari (CA affirmed
dismissal)
July 8, 1991 – Roberto was designated as special
administrator of Crisanta’s estate.
April 16, 2001 – Roberto died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel
(respondent) informed the RTC of Roberto’s death and
prayed that she be admitted as administratix of Crisanta’s
estate. She alleged that she had a bachelor’s degree in law
and had worked for several years in a law office.
August 14, 2001 – the heirs of Belinda opposed stating that
Dolores was not next of kin of Crisanta.
August 24, 2001 – Bena Jean Castillo (one of the heirs) asked
the RTC to appoint her as administratix of Crisanta’s estate.
October 11, 2001 – Dolores opposed Bena Jean’s motion
claiming failure to prove kinship and qualification to act as
administratix.
December 5, 2001 – RTC appointed Dolores as special
administratix upon filing bond of P200,000.00:
o RTC found that Dolores has amply proven her
kinship with Roberto (being his widow) and
therefore kinship by law with Crisanta (Roberto had
a wife before named Lucita V. Cruz but the RTC
found that this marriage was already dissolved
when Roberto and Dolores was married in 1997).
o Even assuming such kinship was not proven, the
RTC ruled that the strict rules regarding the rules of
preference in the appointment of administrator must
be relaxed since special administrators are just
temporary.
The heirs of Belinda filed MR. RTC denied.
The heirs filed certiorari with CA. CA dismissed and affirmed
RTC. CA found that even if Dolores was a third person to the
estate of Crisanta, she is still entitled to the administration
being the lawful heir of her husband Roberto, whose estate is
the former estate of Crisanta.
ISSUE: WON the probate court was correct in appointing Dolores
as special administrator.
DECISION: Yes. RTC and CA affirmed.
The contention of the heirs:
o Roberto was just a nephew of Crisanta and not a
legally adopted son.
o Even if Roberto was in fact a legally adopted son,
Dolores still should not be appointed since she is
not naturally related to Crisanta.
o The principal consideration in the in the
appointment of administrator of a deceased
person’s estate is the applicant’s interest therein
that is why there is an order of preference provided
in the Rules (Rule 78 Sec 6).
o According to the heirs, the policy of this rule is that
those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy,
economical administration of the estate, or suffer
the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and
most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly.
o Since the intestate proceedings had long been
dismissed by the CA, a regular administrator of the
said estate should now be appointed.
Supreme Court:
o A special administrator is a representative of a
decedent appointed by the probate court to care for
and preserve his estate until an executor or general
administrator is appointed. When appointed, a
special administrator is regarded not as a
representative of the agent of the parties suggesting
the appointment, but as the administrator in charge
of the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court.
As such officer, he is subject to the supervision and
control of the probate court and is expected to work
for the best interests of the entire estate, especially
its smooth administration and earliest settlement.
The principal object of appointment of
temporary administrator is to preserve the
estate until it can pass into hands of person
fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of
creditors and heirs.
o In many instances, the appointment of
administrators for the estates of decedents
frequently become involved in protracted litigations,
thereby exposing such estates to great waste and
losses unless an authorized agent to collect the
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debts and preserve the assets in the interim is
appointed. The occasion for such an appointment,
likewise, arises where, for some cause, such as a
pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will,
regular administration is delayed.
o Section 1 Rule 80 expanded the basis for
appointment of an special administrator, and such
appointment is allowed when there is delay in
granting letters of testamentary or administration.
o The appointment of a special administrator lies in
the sound discretion of the probate court. It may
appoint a special administrator should there be a
delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration. The basis for appointing a special
administrator under the Rules is broad enough to
include any cause or reason for the delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration.
Likewise, when from any cause general
administration cannot be immediately granted, a
special administrator may be appointed to collect
and preserve the property of the deceased. (De
Guzman v. Guadiz, Jr.)
o Crisanta left a document purporting to be her will
where Roberto was named as the sole heir of all her
properties. However, pending probate of the will,
Roberto died leaving Dolores as his sole heir, giving
Dolores much stake in Crisanta’s estate in case the
latter’s will is allowed probate. Thus, the preference
of respondent is sound, that is, not whimsical, or
contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
o The heir’s invocation of Section 6 Rule 78 is wrong.
The rule refers to the appointment of regular
administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the
other hand, applies to the appointment of a special
administrator. The appointment of special
administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the appointment of regular administrators.
Rule 81 – Bonds of Executors and Administrators
A. Kinds
B. Conditions
1. COSME DE MENDOZA V PACHECO (1937)
Ponente: Laurel, J.
Doctrine
Probate court has the power to require the filing of the bond, fix the
amount thereof, and hold it accountable for any breach of
administrator’s duty. Surety is liable for the bond during accounting
in the probate proceedings, not in another separate proceeding.
Quick Facts
Manuel Soriano was former administrator of the estate of Cosme.,
who filed a bond for P5,000 with respondents as sureties. When an
account was made, Soriano was indebted to the estate. Thus, the
lower court ordered the execution of his bond. Some time later,
Soriano and the new administratrix entered into a settlement
whereby Soriano ceded certain real properties to the estate,
thereby reducing his indebtedness to P5,000. The sureties now
question the jurisdiction of the court to execute the bond.
Facts
Cast of Characters:
Soriano: First administrator
Cosme: Second administrator
Pacheco and Cordero: sureties
Former administrator Soriano filed a P5K bond, with Pacheco and
Cordero as sureties. Upon accounting, Soriano was indebted to
the estate for P23K and was unable to return it to the estate. New
administrator Cosme demanded the execution of Soriano’s bond.
CFI Laguna ordered such, after notice to the sureties. Soriano and
Cosme agreed to a settlement, which CFI approved. As a result,
Soriano ceded some real properties which reduced his debt from
23K to 5K.
A year after, Cosme requested the sheriff to levy the properties of
the sureties and advertise public sale thereof to collect the
remaining unpaid debt of P5K. Sureties filed motion to be
discharged from the bond but CFI denied. They filed Motion for
Reconsideration (MfR) to CFI and appeal to SC, but were all
denied. SC ruled that since they did not file MfR and appeal on the
execution order, their MfR for the levy was too late. Case was
remanded to CFI. They challenged, for the first time, that CFI had
no jurisdiction to issue execution of bond.
Issue
W/N probate court can order execution of bond
Held: YES.
1) Probate court has the power to require the filing of the
bond, fix the amount thereof, and hold it accountable for
any breach of administrator’s duty. Surety is liable for the
bond during accounting in the probate proceedings, not
in another separate proceeding.
2) To begin with, it lies within discretion of the court to
select an administrator of the estate of a deceased
person. Before an administrator, or an executor, enters
upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary
or of administration are issued, the person to whom they
are issued is required to give a bond in such reasonable
sum as the court directs, with one or more sufficient
sureties, conditioned upon the faithful performance of his
trust. The administrator is accountable on his bond along
with the sureties for the performance of certain legal
obligations.
3) It is clear that the Court of First Instance, exercising
probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of
the administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to
hold it accountable for any breach of the administrator's
duty. Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing power
over the administrator's bond and over administration
proceedings, a Court of First Instance in a probate
proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority to
execute and make that bond answerable for the very
purpose for which it was filed. It is true that the law does
not say expressly or in so many words tat such court has
power to execute the bond of an administrator, but by
necessary and logical implication, the power is there as
eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal term.
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2. OCAMPO V OCAMPO (2010)
Ponente: Nachura, J.
Doctrine
The posting of the bond is a pre-requisite before respondents
could enter their duties and responsibilities as joint special
administrators. The administration bond is for the benefit of the
creditors and the heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether
regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge
the obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to
safeguard the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond
should not be considered as part of the necessary expenses
chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts
constituting the care, management, and settlement of the
estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a
qualification for the office of administration.
Quick Facts
Respondents, siblings of the deceased and joint special
adminstrators, pray that they be exempted from posting the
required bond, all the while exercising their duties as such. RTC
revoked their appointment. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari
citing grave abuse of discretion.
Facts
Cast of characters:
Leonardo Ocampo: decedent
Dalisay, Vince, Melinda, Leonardo, Jr.: petitioners, surviving
spouse and children
Renato, Erlinda: respondents, siblings of decedent
Vicente and Maxima: legitimate parents of decedent
Property in question:
Several properties in Biñan, Laguna owned by Vicente and
Maxima
Petition for intestate proceedings
5 months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition
for intestate proceedings in RTC Binan. Allegations:
1) Upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and
their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and
administered the estate of their parents. Under such
circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share
consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income
generated from the properties of the estate.
2) When Leonardo died, respondents took possession,
control and management of the properties to the
exclusion of petitioners.
Prayers:
1) settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the
estate of Leonardo.
2) appointment of an administrator
An opposition was filed by respondents.
Allegations:
1) Petition was defective as it sought the judicial settlement
of two estates in a single proceeding. T
2) Settlement of the estate of Leonardo was premature, the
same being dependent only upon the determination of
his hereditary rights in the settlement of his parents’
estate.
Prayer: that they be appointed as special joint administrators of the
estate of Vicente and Maxima.
RTC ruling
Denied opposition, clarified that the judicial settlement was only for
the properties of Vicente and Maxima
Motion for appointment of joint special administrators
This was filed by respondents with a prayer that they serve as
special administrators without posting a bond. Petitioners, in a
separate motion, they nominated Biñan Rural Bank to serve as
special administrator pending resolution of the motion for issuance
of the letters of administration.
RTC ruling
Appointed petitioner Dalisay and respondent Renato. This was
opposed by respondents, saying Dalisay was incompetent and
unfit, and that they should be priority being next of kin of Vicente
and Maxima, and that Dalisay was a mere daughter-in-law.
Because of this, RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay and
substituted her with Erlinda. Petitioners did not contest this order
and even manifested their desire for the speedy settlement of the
estate.
Motion for Exemption to file administrator’s bond
Respondents filed a motion for exemption to file adminisrtator’s
bond, saying they cannot raise the necessary amount.
Motion to terminate or revoke the special administration
Petitioners filed a Motion to terminate or revoke the special
administration and to proceed to judicial partition or appointment of
regular administrator, contended that the special administration
was not necessary as the estate is neither vast nor complex, the
properties of the estate being identified and undisputed, and not
involved in any litigation necessitating the representation of special
administrators. Petitioners, likewise, contended that respondents
had been resorting to the mode of special administration merely to
delay and prolong their deprivation of what was due
them. Petitioners cited an alleged fraudulent sale by respondents
of a real property for P2,700,000.00, which the latter represented
to petitioners to have been sold only for P1,500,000.00, and
respondents’ alleged misrepresentation that petitioners owed the
estate for the advances to cover the hospital expenses of
Leonardo, but, in fact, were not yet paid.
RTC ruling
Revoked and terminated the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as
joint special administrators for non-compliance with its Orders,
particularly the posting of the bond and the submission of an
inventory of the properties and of an income statement of estate.
Appointed Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to a 200K
bond.
Petition for certiorari
Respondents filed before CA. CA granted petition, contending that
the posting of the bond is a prerequisite before respondents could
enter their duties and responsibilities as joint special
administrators, particularly their submission of an inventory of the
properties of the estate and an income statement thereon.
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Issue: W/N the posting of the bond is a pre-requisite before that the only unpaid obligation is the hospital bill due
respondents could enter their duties and responsibilities as joint from Leonardo’s estate, which is not subject of this case,
special administrators judicial partition may then proceed with dispatch.

Held: YES. The administration bond is for the benefit of the

creditors and the heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether
regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge
the obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to
safeguard the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond
should not be considered as part of the necessary expenses
chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts
constituting the care, management, and settlement of the
estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a
qualification for the office of administration.

No grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC in revoking the

appoint of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators.
Respondents had already been distributing the incomes or fruits
generated from the properties of the decedents’ estate, yet they
still failed to post their respective administrators’ bonds despite
collection of the advances from their supposed shares.

Evidence:
1) Respondents have been in possession, charge and
actual administration of the estate since 2002 up to
present, despite assumption of Melinda as regular
adminsitratrix
2) Statement of cash distribution of the estate made by
respondents
3) Deed of conditional sale of one of the properties, where
they excluded the representing heirs of Leonardo

Minor issue: W/N respondents have a better right to be special

administrators of the estate.

Held: NO.
1) While the RTC considered that respondents were the
nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their
appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a
mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long
been settled that the selection or removal of special
administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the
selection or removal of regular administrators.[36] The
probate court may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those
enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the
need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness
or unfitness[37] and the application of the order of
preference under Section 6 of Rule 78,[38] as would be
proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not
obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without
grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and
legal principles, interference by higher courts is
unwarranted.[39]
2) We take into account the fact that Melinda already
posted the required bond of P200,000 and filed an
Inventory of the Properties of the Estate dated April 15,
2008.[50] These acts clearly manifested her intention to
serve willingly as administratrix of the decedents’ estate,
but her appointment should be converted into one of
special administration, pending the proceedings for
regular administration. Furthermore, since it appears
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