Judicial Ethics Cases

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EN BANC
MARIE ROXANNE G. A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508

RECTO, [Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2416-RTJ]
Complainant,
Present:
SERENO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,*
PERLAS-BERNABE,*
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA **
'
CAGUIOA,
MARTIRES,
TIJAM, and
REYES, JR., ***
GESMUNDO, JJ.
HON. HENRY J. TROCINO, Promulgated:

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
l'b1srl::El:- 7, 2017
BRANCH 62, BAGO CITY,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
Respondent.
f<~~~
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
• On official leave.
•• On leave .
... No part.
DECISION 2 A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508
DECISION
PERCURIAM:
1
Before the Court is an administrative complaint against Judge Henry
J. Trocino (Judge Trocino), former Executive Judge and Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Bago City (RTC), filed by Marie Roxanne
G. Recto (Complainant) for bias and partiality, ignorance of the law, grave
oppression, and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for issuing an ex
parte Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in relation to Civil Case No. 1409,
a case for Child Custody under the Family Code.
Antecedents:
The controversy stemmed from a petition 2 for Child Custody with

Prayer for Protection Order under A.M. No. 04-1 O- l l-SC 3 in relation to
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC 4 and damages filed by Magdaleno Pena (Pena) on
December 20, 2005 against complainant, entitled Magdaleno M Pena, for
himself and in behalf of his minor son, Julian Henri "Harry" R. Pena v.
Marie Roxanne G. Recto. The petition was raffled to the RTC-Branch 62.
On December 23, 2005, the RTC issued, ex parte, a Temporary

Protection Order (TP0), 5 granting, among others, the temporary custody of
their fifteen (J 5) month - old child, Julian Henri "Harry" R. Pena (Henri), to
her former live-in partner, Magdaleno Pena (Pena). Specifically, the
December 23, 2005 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be

sufficient in form and substance, the court hereby
directs the Clerk of Court to issue Summons which
1
Rollo, pp. 1-12.
2
Annex "A" of the Complaint, rollo, pp. 13-29.
3
Entitled "Rule on Violence against Women and their Children" effective October 19, 2004.
4
Entitled "Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in relation to Custody of Minors" ~
effective April 22, 2003.
5
Annex "B" of the Complaint, rollo, pp. 46-54.
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shall be served, together with copy of the petition and

its annexes thereto, personally to the respondent.
TEMPORARY CUSTODY OVER JULIAN

HENRI "HARRY" R. PENA IS HEREBY VESTED
UPON THE PETITIONER MAGDALENO M. PENA;
AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE PNP-CIDG (NCR) IS
ORDERED TO ASSIST THE SHERIFF OF THIS
COURT IN [TAKING CUSTODY] OF JULIAN HENRI
"HARRY" R. PENA WHEREVER HE MIGHT BE
FOUND WHO SHALL THEREAFTER BE
IMMEDIATELY TURNED OVER TO HIS FATHER,
THE HEREIN PETITIONER.
A protection order, which shall be effective

for thirty (30) days from service upon respondent
Marie Roxanne G. Recto, is hereby issued as
follows:
1. prohibiting the respondent from threatening to

commit or committing, personally or through
another, acts of violence against the offended
party;
2. prohibiting the respondent from harassing,

annoying, contacting or otherwise communicating
in any form with the offended party, either directly
or indirectly;
3. removing and excluding the offended party from

the residence of the respondent or from any other
place where said offended party may be found;
4. requiring the respondent to stay away from the

offended party and any designated family or
household member at a distance of two hundred
(200) meters;
5. requiring the respondent to stay away from the

residence, or any specified place frequented
regularly by the offended party and any designated
family or household member;
6. prohibiting the respondent from carrying or

possessing any firearms or deadly weapon, and
ordering her to immediately surrender the same to
the court for proper disposition; and
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~~~
7. directing the respondent to put up a bond of ONE

MILLION PESOS (P1,ooo,ooo.oo) to keep the
peace and to present two sufficient sureties who
shall undertake that respondent shall not commit
any of the acts of violence on the offended party
and/ or the petitioner or violate the protection
order.
Lastly, pursuant to Section 16 of A.M. No. 03-

04-04-SC (Rule on Custody of Minors) a HOLD
DEPARTURE ORDER is hereby issued for the
purpose of preventing the minor child from being
brought out of the country without prior order from
the court, during the pendency of the petition.
Accordingly, the Bureau of Immigration and

Deportation is directed NOT to allow the departure of
the minor child from the Philippines without the
court's permission. Likewise, the Department of
Foreign Affairs is ordered NOT to issue any passport
to said minor without the prior authority of this court.
For the guidance of said government entities,

hereunder are the pertinent information about the
subject of the Hold Departure Order:
xxx
Furnish copies of this order the Department of

Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation within twenty four (24) hours hereof and
through the most expeditious means of transmittal.
Likewise furnish copies hereof the petitioner

and counsel.
SO ORDERED.6
6
Rollo, pp. 52-54. ~1~
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The Complaint
In vehement protest, complainant filed this administrative complaint

against Judge Trocino alleging that he (1) exhibited bias and gross ignorance
of the law; (2) acted with grave oppression; and (3) violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct when he issued the TPO, ex parte, vesting immediate
custody of Henri to Pena based on hypothetical assumptions. Specifically,
the complainant alleged as follows:
9. Respondent judge is biased, ignorant of the law,

and acted with grave oppression when he issued the
TPO based on a complaint for child custody.
Respondent judge, in full disregard of the law and rule
of the Supreme Court on Custody (A.M. No. 03-04-
04-SC), issued ex-parte the so called "TPO" without
giving herein complainant Recto opportunity to file her
answer, enter into Pre-trial, and without social worker's
case study report. This conduct of the respondent
judge manifests patent bias in favor of Pefia, who is a
resident of Negros Occidental. Moreover, Pefia is not
the natural guardian of Julian Harry, being an
illegitimate child.
10. Respondent judge deliberately did not apply the

Rule on Custody but instead erroneously used R.A.
9262 to support his order giving temporary custody of
minor Harry Pefia to Magdaleno Pena, to the
prejudice of herein complainant;
11. Respondent Judge inappropriately issued the

so called "TPO" considering that the case filed by
Magdaleno Pefia is for Child Custody. The Rule on
custody should have been observed by the respondent
judge and not the Rule on Anti-Violence against
Women and their Children. A TPO cannot be issued in
favor of a man because only women and their children
are protected by R.A. 9262. Moreso, respondent's
Order giving temporary child custody to Magdaleno
Pefia has no legal leg to stand on because in custody
cases, only provisional orders for custody is issued after
an Answer is filed and after Pre-trial is conducted and a
DSWD Social Worker Case Study Report is filed. Thus,
the Temporary Protection Order used by respondent
Judge is not proper and patently illegal and void;
~~
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12. Respondent's obvious bias is further shown by

the fact that he was aware that a TPO was previously
issued against Magdaleno Pefia who is a respondent in
a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection
Order in the RTC of Mandaluyong City, yet he issued
the so called "TPO" by deliberately mis-applying the
provisions of R.A. 9262. The so called "TPO" of
respondent judge was not a product of innocent error
in judgment. x x x
13. Likewise, it is gross ignorance of the law on the

part of respondent judge in awarding temporary
custody of minor Harry to Magdaleno Pefia based on
hypothetical assumptions. Respondent judge in
justifying his unfounded order said, and we quote:
xx xx
14. Under Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the

Court may issue an ex-parte TPO where there is
reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger
of violence against women and their children exists or
is about to recur. There is complete absence of
allegation to this effect in the petition. Clearly, the
basis of the so called "TPO" is hypothetical and not
factual. Thus, respondent issued the so called "TPO"
without legal basis;
15. There is no legal basis to award custody of

minor Harry (an illegitimate child) to Magdaleno
Pefia, based on the Preamble of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child in the light of
Article 213 of the Philippine Family Code that clearly
state: "No child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order othenvise. '' Moreover,
illegitimate children shall be under the sole parental
authority of the mother (Briones vs. Miguel, 440
SCRA455);
16. The averments in the Petition for Child

Custody are not compelling reasons to immediately
award custody of the minor child to Magdaleno Pefia
to overcome Article 213 of the Family Code and the
ruling in the case of Briones vs. Miguel. Not to be
ignored is Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat
that, generally, no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother, except when the court v
.;
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~~~
finds cause to order otherwise. Only the most

compelling reasons, such as the mother's unfitness to
exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her
deprivation of parental authority and the award of
custody to someone else (Briones vs. Miguel, Ibid). It
is elementary that basic Philippine Law has greater
weight than any international law;
17. Likewise, Respondent Judge committed grave,

whimsical and capricious abuse of discretion in the
exercise of his judicial function in taking cognizance
over the petition despite apparent lack of jurisdiction
and in issuing the so called "Temporary Protection
Order" against complainant;
18. Magdaleno M. Pefia has no standing to

institute an action in behalf of complainant's 15
month old child because being illegitimate, only
complainant has parental authority on Julian Henri
"Harry" being the natural guardian, and yet with such
knowledge, the respondent judge abused his power
with full disregard for the law and the right of
complainant in order to favor Magdaleno Pefia;
19. The respondent judge could not have

innocently missed the fact that the court had no
jurisdiction because Magdaleno M. Pefia in filing for
himself has no cause of action against herein
complainant (Marie Roxanne G. Recto), and avail of
TPO [under] RA 9262 because the remedies of the law
could not be availed of by a man;
20. Likewise clearly alleged in the petition is that

Pefia is bringing the action for and in behalf of the
offended party JULIAN HENRI (HARRY R. PENA) -
his minor illegitimate son [with complainant]. As
such, it is manifest that the real petitioner is minor
Harry Pefia who is a resident of Mandaluyong City.
Under Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the verified
petition for Temporary Protection Order may be filed
with the Family Court of the place where the offended
party resides. Accordingly, the petition must be filed
before the Family Court of Mandaluyong City;
21. Respondent Judge is fully aware of this defect

of jurisdiction in the petition considering that the
alleged offended party Julian Henri "Harry" R. Pefia is
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"("\~" -- \
DECISION 8 AM. No. RTJ-17-2508
not within his territorial jurisdiction. His awareness of

wrong venue is manifested in his order stating in page
9 paragraph a) that "Harry" lives in Mandaluyong City
and not in Negros. We quote the following:
x xxx
22. Respondent judge blindly issued the so called

"TPO" without serious and judicious assessment of
the contents of and averments in the petition filed by
Pefia. This is an obvious fact because the hypothetical
approach in the petition for custody was based on
psychological incapacity for annulment of marriage and
not incapacity to rear a child. The documents speak for
themselves;
23. Apparently, respondent has no jurisdiction to

take cognizance of the petition before him and to issue
the so called "Temporary Protection Order" yet, he did
so. In so doing, respondent judge committed grave
abuse of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the so called "TPO"
issued is null and void;
24. Respondent blindly assumed jurisdiction

because respondent Judge Trocino and petitioner
Pefia were in connivance. Complainant has personal
knowledge that respondent judge was working under
the dictates of Pefia. On several occasions, while
complainant and Pefia were still live-in partners, she
has full personal and direct knowledge that
respondent judge was dictated upon by Pefia to decide
on cases at the desire of Pefia in her presence. Aside
from the personal knowledge of complainant, the close
relationship of Judge Trocino and Peiia is evident in the
case entitled Eric L. Lee vs. Hon. Henry J. Trocino, et
al., under GR No. 164648 x x x before the Supreme
Court, where respondent and Judge Trocino and
Magdaleno Pena are co-respondents/ [Emphases
supplied]
7
Rollo, pp. 5-11.
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Respondent's Position
In his Comment, 8 Judge Trocino denied the allegations and pointed

out that the TPO was sanctioned by Sections 11 9 and 15 10 of A.M. No. 04-
8
Rollo, pp. 81-99.
9
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. - The protection order shall include any, some or all of
the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibiting the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
another, acts of violence against the offended party;
(b) Prohibiting the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of
ownership of the residence, either temporally for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or
pennanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the
residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence,
remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;
(d) Requiring the respondent to stay away from the offended party and any designated family or
household member at a distance specified by the court;
(e) Requiring the respondent to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment or any
specified place frequented regularly by the offended party and any designated family or household
member;
(f) Directing lawful possession and use by the offended party of an automobile and other essential
personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to
accompany the offended party to the residence of the parties to ensure that the offended party is safely
restored to the possession of the automobile and other essential personal effects;
(g) Ordering temporary or pennanent custody of the child/children with the offended party, taking into
consideration the best interests of the child. An offended party who is suffering from Battered Woman
Syndrome shall not be disqualified from having custody of her children. In no case shall custody of minor
children be given to the batterer of a woman who is suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome;
(h) Directing the respondent to provide support 'o the woman and/or her child, if entitled to legal
import. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the
income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by his employer and to automatically remit it
directly to the offended party. Failure to withhold, remit or any delay in the remittance of support to the
offended party without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect
contempt of court;
(i) Prohibiting the respondent from carrying or possessing any firearm or deadly weapon and ordering
him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition, including revocation of license and
disqualification to apply for any license to carry or possess a firearm. If the respondent is .a law
enforcement agent, the court shall order him to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate
authority to investigate him and take appropriate action thereon;
U) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to prepare a program of intervention for the
offended party that provides advocacy, temporary shelter, crisis intervention, treatment, therapy,
counseling, education, training and other social services that the offended party may need;
(k) Requiring the respondent to receive professional counseling from agencies or persons who have
demonstrated expertise and experience in anger control, management of alcohol, substance abuse and other
forms of intervention to stop violence. The program of intervention for offenders must be approved by the
court. The agency or person is required to provide the court with regular reports of the progress and result
of professional counseling, for which the respondent may be ordered to pay; and
(I) Awarding the offended party actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not
limited to, property damage, medical expanses, childcare expenses and loss of income; and compensatory,
moral, and exemplary damages, subject to Sections 26a and 35 of this Rule.
The court may grant such other forms of relief to protect the offended party and any designated family
or household member who consents to such relief.
vJ
10
SEC. 15. Ex parte issuance of temporary protection order. - (a) If the court is satisfied from the verified
allegations of the petition that there is reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence
against women and their children exists or is about to recur, the court may issue ex parte a temporary
':h~~
10-11-SC in relation to Section 32 11 thereof as an ancillary remedy incident

to the petition for custody filed by Pefia for himself and in behalf of his
minor son. Judge Trocino asserted that the ex parte TPO was issued after a
careful evaluation not only of the material allegations in the petition but all
other circumstances relevant to the welfare and best interest of the minor
offended party, and that it was issued judiciously in complete good faith,
devoid of any grave, whimsical and capricious abuse of discretion.
Judge Trocino explained that the December 23, 2005 TPO was a
temporary order in contemplation of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC and not an
order of temporary custody pursuant to A.M. 03-04-04-SC which requires
the prior filing of an answer, pre-trial, and a social worker's study report.
Judge Trocino insisted that the TPO was properly issued considering that
Civil Case No. 1409 was a case for child custody with ancillary prayer for
the issuance of a protection order under Section 32 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-
SC and that said provision of the law authorizes an application for protection
order as an incident in criminal or civil actions.
Judge Trocino contended that the issuance of the TPO was not based
on hypothetical assumptions but was made after a thorough evaluation of the
allegations set forth in the petition and its supporting documents, and after
assessment, he believed in good faith that the TPO was legal and necessary
for the protection of the minor offended party. Judge Trocino insisted that
his act was a bonafide exercise of judicial discretion, the paramount
consideration of which was the interest of the minor child. And even
assuming that the TPO was erroneously/improperly issued, the proper
protection order which shall be effective for thirty days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined.
(b) The temporary protection order shall include notice of the date of the preliminary conference and
hearing on the merits. The following statements must be printed in bold-faced type or in capital letters on
the protection order issued by the court:
"VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BYLAW."
"IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL ON THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY
CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS ON THE ISSUANCE OF .A PERMANENT
PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE OR POSTPONE THE
PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING BUT SHALL APPOINT A LA WYER FOR THE
RESPONDENT AND IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH SAID HEARING."
"IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY
CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT
SHALL ALLOW EX PARTE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE PETITIONER AND RENDER
JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD. NO
DELEGATION OF THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE SHALL BE ALLOWED."
(c) The court shall likewise order the immediate issuance of a notice requiring the respondent to file an
opposition within five days from service. It shall further order service of (1) the notices to file opposition
and of dates of the preliminary conference and hearing, (2) the protection order, and (3) copy of the
petition, upon the respondent by the court sheriff, or any person authorized by the court, who may obtain
the assistance of law enforcement officers.
v
11
SEC. 32. Applicability to applications for protection orders filed as incidents in civil or criminal cases. - The
foregoing provisions shall also apply to applications for protection orders filed as incidents in criminal
or civil actions.
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remedy lies with the proper court as the matter was judicial in nature, and
not with Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by means of an
administrative complaint.
On the issue of jurisdiction, Judge Trocino asserted that the petition

for child custody and damages was within the competence and jurisdiction
of the RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Elg. 129 otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and A.M. No. 03-04-04-
SC. Judge Trocino argued that the petition substantially complied with the
requirements on non-forum shopping and that there was nothing in the
Verification and Certification against Non Forum Shopping that would
indicate that the pmiies raised a similar issue or cause of action in another
court, tribunal or agency.
As to the allegation that he worked under the dictates of Pena, Judge

Trocino vehemently denied the same and asserted that he never allowed
anyone to either influence or dictate on him in the discharge of his official
functions; and the fact that he and Pena were co-respondents in a particular
case filed before the Court was not an indication that he worked under
Pena's whims.
Meanwhile, on January 27, 2006, Judge Trocino voluntarily inhibited

himself from hearing the petition. 12
Complainant likewise questioned the December 23, 2005 TPO before

the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01394. 13
Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Resolution, 14 dated July 17, 2017, the OCA found no basis to hold
Judge Trocino liable for bias and partiality and grave oppression. It,
however, found him liable for gross ignorance of the law for issuing an ex
parte TPO pursuant to A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9262
and recommended that he be fined in the amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos
(P60, 000. 00) considering that Judge Trocino compulsorily retired from the
service on July 15, 2006 and was previously found administratively liable of
12
Order, rollo, pp. 141-144.
13
Promulgated on September 15, 2006. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with
Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Antonio L. Villamar, concurring. Rollo (G.R. No. 176403),
pp. 32-46. . -/
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14
Rollo, pp. 148-156.
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undue delay in rendering a decision in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1936 15 and A.M.

No. RTJ-07-205i 6 •
The Ruling of the Court
Upon review of the records, the Court agrees with the findings and
recommendation of the OCA that Judge Trocino acted with gross ignorance
of the law when he issued, ex parte, the December 23, 2005 TPO pursuant to
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9262, which granted, among
others, the temporary custody of the minor child to Pefia and issued a
protection order against complainant effective for thirty (30) days. He
deliberately ignored the provisions of the Family Code, A.M. No. 03-04-04-
SC otherwise known as the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in relation to Custody of Minors and A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC or the
Rule on Violence against Women and their Children.
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of the basic rules and
settled jurisprudence. 17 A judge owes it to his office to simply apply the law
19
when the law or a rule is basic 18 and the facts are evident. Not to know it or
to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 20
On Child Custody
Article 176 of the Family Code explicitly confers the sole parental
authority of an illegitimate child to the mother. This preference favoring the
mother is reiterated in Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that
no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother. Only
the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother's unfitness to exercise
sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and
the award of custody to someone else. 21 The mother's fitness is a question of
fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial
court. 22
15
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Henry J Trocino, et al., 551 Phil. 258 (2007).
16
Galanza v. Judge Trocino, 556 Phil. 52 (2007).
17
Department of Justice v. Mis/ang, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369 & RTJ-14-2372, July 26, 2016, 798 SCRA
225, 234.
18
Office of the Court Administrator v. Flores, 758 Phil. 30, 56 (2015).
19
Lim v. Judge Dumlao, 494 Phil. 197 (2005).
20 Id.
21
Briones v. Miguel, 483 Phil. 483, 493 (2004). i. ,-/
22
Tonog v. Court ofAppeals, 427 Phil. l, l 0 (2002). V
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On Provisional Custody
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC is instructive. Specifically, Section 13 thereof

provides:
Section 13. Provisional order awarding

custody. - After an answer has been filed or
after expiration of the period to file it, the
court may issue a provisional order awarding
custody of the minor. As far as practicable, the
following order of preference shall be observed in the
award of custody:
(a) Both parents jointly;
(b) Either parent, taking into account all relevant

considerations, especially the choice of the minor over
seven years of age and of sufficient discernment,
unless the parent chosen is unfit;
(c) The grandparent, or if there are several

grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the minor
over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment,
unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or disqualified;
(d) The eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years

of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified;
(e) The actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one
years of age, unless the former is unfit or disqualified;
or
(f) Any other person or institution the court may
deem suitable to provide proper care and guidance for
the minor. [Emphasis supplied]
Clearly, a court is not authorized to issue a provisional order awarding

custody of a minor child until after an answer to the petition has been filed
or when the period to file the same have expired and no such answer was
filed in court.
Temporary Protection Order
Judge Trocino's contention that the TPO was a temporary protection

order pursuant to A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, and not an order of temporary
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custody as contemplated in A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, is not tenable.
~'fr.,
Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides:
SEC. 15. Ex parte issuance of temporary

protection order. - (a) If the court is satisfied from the
verified allegations of the petition that there is
reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger
of violence against women and their children exists or is
about to recur, the court may issue ex parte a
temporary protection order which shall be effective
for thirty days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined.
xx x. [Emphasis supplied]
Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262 further provides:
SEC. 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order.

- The application for a protection order must be in
writing, signed and verified under oath by the
applicant. It may be filed as an independent action or
as an incidental relief in any civil or criminal case the
subject matter or issues thereof partakes of a violence
as described in this Act. A standard protection order
application form, written in English with translation
to the major local languages, shall be made available
to facilitate applications for protection orders, and
shall contain, among others, the following
information:
(a) names and addresses of

petitioner and respondent;
(b) description of relationships

between petitioner and respondent;
(c) a statement of the

circumstances of the abuse;
(d) description of the reliefs

requested by petitioner as specified in
Section 8 herein;
(e) request for counsel and

reasons for such;
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(f) request for waiver of

application fees until hearing; and
(g) an attestation that there is no

pending application for a
protection order in another court.
If the applicant is not the victim, the application

must be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant
attesting to (a) the circumstances of the abuse suffered
by the victim and (b) the circumstances of consent given
by the victim for the filing of the application. When
disclosure of the address of the victim will pose
danger to her life, it shall be so stated in the
application. In such a case, the applicant shall attest
that the victim is residing in the municipality or city
over which court has territorial jurisdiction, and shall
provide a mailing address for purposes of service
processmg.
An application for protection order filed with a

court shall be considered an application for both a
TPO and PPO.
Barangay officials and court personnel shall

assist applicants
in the preparation of the application. Law
enforcement agents shall
also extend assistance in the application for protection
orders in cases brought to their attention.[Emphasis
supplied]
A protection order is issued to prevent further acts of violence against

women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant
other necessary reliefs. 23 It is issued for the purpose of safeguarding the
offended party from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's
daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to
independently regain control over her life. 24 A protection order may be
issued ex parte if the court finds that there is danger of domestic violence to
the offended party. This provisionary protection order, however, may be
issued only if the court finds that the life, limb or property of the offended
party is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order
is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger
of violence or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. 25 If after
examining the verified petition and its accompanying affidavits the court is
satisfied that there is, indeed, a reasonable ground to believe that an
~Y
23
Garcia v. Judge Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 104 (2013).
24
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262.
25
Garcia v. Judge Drilon; supra note 23, at 105.
'\1 \P~·
'
imminent danger of violence against the offended party exists or is about to

recur, it may issue a TPO ex parte. 26
In the case at bar, a reading of the petition for child custody filed by
Pefia would show that no specific allegation of violence or abuse, whether
physical, emotional or psychological was committed or was about to be
committed against Henri. Not even the affidavits of witnesses attached to the
petition supported his positions. The averments in the petition that
complainant was suffering from personality disorder, that she subjected
Henri to psychological violence as she would always shout at the helpers,
and that complainant always leave Henri to the yaya, to name a few, are not
sufficient bases to issue the TPO.
Moreover, a perusal of the Verification with Certification of Non-

forum Shopping27 attached to the petition for child custody would reveal that
a similar case for protection order and child custody, docketed as Civil Case
No. MC05-2779, was filed by complainant against Pefia before the RTC-
Mandaluyong City. Considering that there was such a declaration, it
behooves upon Judge Trocino to inquire first about the nature and the status
of the said pending case before taking cognizance of the case and eventually
issue the TPO.
In fact, the December 23, 2005 TPO was eventually annulled and set
aside by the CA in its Decision28 dated September 15, 2006. In the same
decision, Civil Case No. 1409 was likewise dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
over the petition for protection order and child custody. The CA held that
Judge Trocino gravely abused his discretion when he issued the December
23, 2005 TPO awarding the custody of parties' common child to Pefia. It
ruled that since the RTC-Mandaluyong City had already taken cognizance of
the petition for protection order and child custody, it exercises jurisdiction
thereon to the exclusion of all other courts. Hence, the RTC-Mandaluyong
City has exclusive jurisdiction over said petition and no other petition
involving the same subject matter may be filed before any other court. The
CA decision was affirmed by the Court in a Resolution, 29 dated June 20,
2007.
The Court has always reminded judges to be extra prudent and

circumspect in the performance of their duties. This exalted position entails
a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the law. 30
Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
26
Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC.
27
V'
Rollo, p. 29.
28
See note 13.
29
Docketed as G.R. No. 176403 entitled Pena v. Recto, rollo, pp. 319-320.
i"~~
30
Enrique::. v. Judge Caminade, 519 Phil. 781, 787-788 (2006).
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the same,
nonetheless, applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable
misjudgment. 31 Where the procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as
to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to
ignorance of the law. 32 In the case of Bautista v. Causapin Jr., 33 the Court
explained thus:
Where the law involved is simple and

elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to
exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. They must know the
laws and apply them properly in all good faith.
Judicial competence requires no less. The mistake
committed by respondent Judge is not a mere error of
judgment that can be brushed aside for being minor.
The disregard of established rule of law which
amounts to gross ignorance of the law makes a judge
subject to disciplinary action.34
Given the foregoing, Judge Trocino's actions cannot be considered a

mere error in judgment that can be easily ignored. His act of issuing the
questioned TPO is not a simple lapse of judgment but a blatant disregard of
the basic rules on child custody and the rule on the issuance of a protection
order. As held by the Court in a number of cases, a patent disregard of the
basic legal commands embodied in the law and the rules constitutes gross
ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even ajudge. 35
Verily, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be the

embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. 36 A judge owes it
to himself and his office to know by heart the basic legal principles and
relevant doctrines. 37 It is highly imperative that he be conversant with them
because when a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the laws and
rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. 38
31
Department of Justice v. Mislang, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369, July 26, 2016, 798 SCRA 225, 234 (2016).
32
Office ofthe Court Administrator v. Judge Estrada, 654 Phil. 638, 648 (2011).
33
667 Phil. 574 (2011).
34
Id., at 589.
35 Ogka Benito v. Balindong, 599 Phil 196, 201 (2009); Herminia v. Judge Calimag, 417 Phil. 778, 785
(2001).
~
36
Rule 1.01Canon1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
37
Lucero v. Judge Bangalan, 481 Phil. 140, 146 (2004).
38
Office ofthe Court Administrator v. Judge Vestil, 561 Phil. 142, 166 (2007). ,.
'(\\l.cK'
Previous Record; Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.

No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable
by dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of
more than 1!20,000.00 but not exceeding 1!40,000.00. 39 In the consolidated
40
cases of Department of Justice v. Judge Mislang and Home Development
Mutual Fund v. Judge Mislang, 41 the respondent judge was found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and was dismissed from the service considering
that he was previously found administratively liable in two cases. The Court
held that despite previous warnings that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely, he still continued to transgress the
norm of judicial conduct.
Similarly, the records show that Judge Trocino was previously found
administratively liable on two (2) cases for undue delay in rendering
judgments. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1936, 42 Judge Trocino was suspended for
three (3) months; while in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2057, 43 he was fined in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
Doubtless, Judge Trocino' s infraction on this instance would have

warranted the ultimate penalty of dismissal had he not compulsory retired
from the service effective July 15, 2006.
Consequently, considering the past infractions of Judge Trocino, the

Court finds that the OCA' s recommended penalty of fine in the amount of
Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) is disproportionate to the present charge
which he was found guilty of.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Ret. Judge Henry J.

Trocino, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Bago City, Negros Occidental,
GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law. In lieu of dismissal from the
service, the Court imposes the penalty of FORFEITURE of all his
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.
SO ORDERED.
3
q Section 11, Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC (200 I).
40
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369, July 26, 2016, 798 SCRA 225.
y://
41
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372, July 26, 2016, 798 SCRA 225.
42
Office ofthe Court Administrator v. Judge Henry J Trocino, et al., 551 Phil. 258 (2007).
43
Galanza v. Judge Trocino, 556 Phil. 52 (2007).
~~
DECISION 19 AM. No. RTJ-17-2508
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
CJ:C.1~ (On Official Leave)

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On Official Leave)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
(On Official Leave)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
1
(On Official Leave)

.............
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
(On Leave)
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice ustice
'f
SAMUEL''fflf!f!!i.TIRES NOElt\~\~TAM
Associate Justice Assoclate J~tice
(NO PAKr)
ANDRE~~YES. JR.
Asro;a~e Justice
CERTIFIED X E R O P
~b~;~MA
or
CLE!-m'. COUP:T, C::N BANC
SUPREM€ CO'U~T
l\epublic of tbe jbilippineg
i>upreme lourt
;ffianila
EN BANC
RE: JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED A.M. No.14-11-350-RTC

IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 20, CAGAYAN DE ORO Present:
CITY, MISAMIS ORIENTAL
SERENO, CJ.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
DEL CASTILLO,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA **
'
CAGUIOA,
MARTIRES,
TIJAM,
REYES, JR., and
GESMUNDO, ** JJ.
Promulgated:
December 5, 2017
x-----------------------------------~4"'\-~o;..-~~---x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The present administrative matter arose from the judicial audit conducted
on March 12 and 13, 2013, of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, then presided by Judge Bonifacio M.
Macabaya (Judge Macabaya).
In a Memorandum 1 dated April 17, 2013, the audit team found that out of
the 573 cases examined by it, (1) 69 cases were submitted for decision but have
yet to be decided despite the lapse of the 90-day period [as mandated by par. 1, b~
•
••
On official leave.
On leave.
/v---
1
Rollo, pp. 1-35.
Decision 2 A.M. No. 14-11-350-RTC
2
Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution]; (2) 33 cases with pending
incidents were not yet resolved despite the lapse of the reglementary period to
resolve them; and (3) 155 cases were dormant and unacted upon for a considerable
length of time.
The audit team noted the following irregularities:
1. In Criminal Case No. 2001-888 entitled People [v.} Jabinao, the

[RTC] issued an Order dated 22 November 2011 directing the accused to secure
another bond within five (5) days from notice, 'it appearing that the bond put up
by the accused had already expired' The Order [goes against] Sec. 2(a) of Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that '(t)he
undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain
in force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, irrespective ofwhether the case wru originally filed in or
appealed to it. ' 3
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 2000-260 and 2000-316, both entitled People

[v.] Alba, et. al. as well as Criminal Case Nos. 2002-098 and 2002-100, [also]
both entitled People [v.} Alba, the [RTC] issued twin Orders, both dated 26
September 2006, directing the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against the
accused for his failure to appearr,J and directing the Branch Clerk of Court 'to
receive evidence of the prosecution through ex-parte hearing' - [in violation of]
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure [and by] existing jurisprudence x x x.4
Moreover, the audit team noted inaccuracies in the RTC's February 2013
report. It failed to include 43 cases already submitted for decision and 13 cases
with unresolved motions, while it prematurely reported six cases5 as submitted for
decision, although the records did not show that the appellees received the
appellants' briefs or memoranda, against which the prescribed period within
6
which to submit the formers' briefs or memoranda should be reckoned. These
omissions and inaccuracies in the report "jolated paragraph 8 of the Guidelines
and Instructions in Administrative Circular No. 61-2001 dated December 10,
2001, which state that "(i)nfilling up Item No. VI xx x where all the data needed
must be indicated, include all cases with unresolved motions which may determine
the disposition of the cases, e.g., Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence.
Patent non-indication of undecided cases or unresolved motions is tantamount to
falsification ofofficial document.~
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved
within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
(Emphasis supplied)
Rollo, p. 27.
4
Id. at28.
See id. Namely Civil Case No. 2011-174, Criminal Case Nos. 4819, 2010-961, 2010-1037, 2011-772 and
2011-909.
6
Id. at 27.
In addition, the audit team discovered that the docket books for civil cases
were not updated regularly; the docket inventory for the period July-December
2012 suffered from a number of defects in form; and, there was no judgment
book, no book of entries of judgment, nor an execution book. 7
The audit team furthermore noted the constant presence and active
participation of Judge Macabaya's wife during the entire judicial audit although
she was not a court employee. She was observed to be handing over case records
to, and talking with, the court staff. When this matter was brought to the attention
of Judge Macabaya, the latter assured the audit team that he was in full control of
the actions of his wife, and even acknowledged "that she has been a big help x x x
[in] overseeing the administrative functions of his office, [thus allowing] him to
8
focus his attention on his judicial functions."
In a Letter9 dated April 4, 2013, Judge Macabaya's Clerk of Court V Atty.

Taumaturgo U. Macabinlar (Atty. Macabinlar) submitted a copy of an Action
Plan 10 for the Period April 2013 to April 2014, bearing the signature of Judge
Macabaya himself The Action Plan was "formulated as a result of (their)
discussions with the Supreme Court Audit Team and (their) brainstorming session
with all the Branch 20 staff," and "is intended to make a more lasting plan of
action to prevent recurring audit exceptions." 11
The audit team noted that the action plan provided for a single strategy only
and an inflexible time frame for the disposition of three kinds of cases. 12 Hence,
the audit team recommended that the Action Plan be revised to make it more
specific and more results-oriented for easier measurement of output.
Taking a holistic approach, the audit team made the following

recommendations to Judge Macabaya to:
xx xx
1.1 SUBMIT x x x within fifteen (15) days x x x a revised action plan,

incorporating therein the strategies, specific courses of action and the
corresponding time frame[ s], to be measured by specific number of
calendar days, for: (a) the disposition of the cases x x x; (b) the resolution
of the incidents or motio.% x x; and (c) all the other judicial audit
findings above xx x; /Vt<~
Id. at 28-29.
Rollo, p. 30.
Id. at 36.
w Id. at 38-43.
11
Id. at37.
12
See id at 44. Namely: cases submitted for decision, cases with incidents or motions for resolution and cases
for ex-parte presentation of evidence.
1.2 hnmediately TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on the untranscribed

stenographic notes taken down by then court stenographer Oscar P.
Rabanes, xx x in Civil Case No. 3672, xx x and SUBMIT to this Office
within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof a written report thereon;
1.3 SUBMIT xx x within fifteen (15) days xx x a written status report on

the untranscribed stenographic notes x xx in Civil Case No. 6776 and in
Criminal Case Nos. 1863 and 3418;
1.4 ENSURE that a request for extension of time to decide a case is filed
with the Office of the Court Administrator before the expiration of the
mandated period for decision, x x x;
1.5 TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION immediately in the cases referred to

in Item No. I (7) above, and SUBMIT to this Office within thirty (30)
days from receipt hereof a written report thereon, attaching thereto copies
of the orders or decisions, if any, issued in connection therewith;
1.6 CONDUCT PERSONALLY [a] physical inventory of cases at the end

of every semester, and CONSIDER the results of the exercise in the
evaluation and assessment of the performance of the court against its
existing action plan, and use the same as a basis for drawing up a new
action plan to ensure the sustainability of the remedial measures earlier
adopted;
1.7 ADOPT a firm policy against improvident postponements and ENSURE

that cases are heard and disposed of with deliberate dispatch, x x x;
1.8 COMMENT in writing on the observations raised in Item No. II, Sub-
item Nos. 1 and 2 above, and SUBMIT the same to this Office within
fifteen ( 15) days from receipt hereof;
1.9 DISCOURAGE and MINIMIZE his wife's presence in his court, and
PREVENT her from interfering with the business of the court with a
WARNING that any violation thereof will warrant an administrative
action against him; and
1.10 SUBMIT to this Office within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof a
written report on the action/s taken on the immediately preceding
directive;
13
xxxx
14
But in a letter dated July 22, 2013, Judge Macabaya and his Branch Clerk
of Court, Atty. Macabinlar, merely submitted copies of the Decisions and Orders
in some of the cases enumerated in the April 17, 2013 Memorandum; and this was
done despite the passage of almost 10 months. Thus, in a letter-directive
Judge Macabaya dated March 14, 2014, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA)
15
to.#.;
~
/U
13
Id. at 32-33.
/
14
Id. at 243-248.
15
Id. at 289.
Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino (DCA Aldecoa-Delorino) reiterated the

recommendations above.
In reply thereto, on May 12, 2014, Judge Macabaya attached another set of
copies of orders, resolutions, and decisions, without any other explanation other
than the inadvertent attachment of the letter-directive to the RTC's October 2013
16
monthly report.
17
Via a Letter dated May 19, 2014, one month after the deadline set in the
action plan, DCA Aldecoa-Delorino gave an updated summary on the number of
cases that had not yet been decided or resolved, and acted upon. This letter
likewise reiterated the directive for Judge Macabaya to comply with the audit
team's Memorandum, particularly item nos. 2, 3, 8 and 9, with a reminder that "all
directives coming from the Court Administrator and his deputies are issued in the
exercise of the Court's administrative supervision of trial courts and their
personnel, hence, should be respected. These directives are not mere requests but
should be complied with promptly and completely." 18 Thus, DCA Aldecoa-
Delorino directed Judge Macabaya to:
1. EXPLAIN xx x the delay in: (a) deciding the remaining thirty [30] cases xx
x; (b) resolving the incidents in the remaining fifteen (15) cases listed xx x;
and (c) taking appropriate actions [on] the remaining fifty-seven [57]
donnant cases x x x; and SUBMIT the same to this Office within fifteen (15)
days from receipt hereof;
2. SUBMIT x x x within fifteen (15) from receipt hereof a copy of each of the
decisions, orders[,] or resolutions, if any, rendered or issued in the cases
referred to above; and
3. SUBMIT xx x within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof a written report
on the actions x x x taken on x x x the directives contained in our
Memorandum dated 19 April 2013 .19
20
In a letter-compliance dated June 30, 2014, Judge Macabaya attached
copies of the decisions, resolutions and orders rendered or issued by his court. He
then asked for a 90-day extension to decide or resolve the remaining cases, giving
as reason therefor the court's heavy caseload and claiming that the remaining
cases submitted for decision comprised "mainly of those referred to the B'~~~ A
Clerk of Court, Atty. Taumaturgo U. Macabinlarr,J for ex-parte hearing xx x . /v -· P""
16
Id. at 298.
17
Id. at 639-640.
18
Id. at 640. Italics in the original.
19 Id.
20
Id. at 641.
21 Id.
Owing to Judge Macabaya's repeated failure to fully comply with the

directives of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for more than one
year,22 this Court on December 1, 2014 resolved to:
1. DIRECT Judge xx x Macabaya, xx x to:
a SHOW CAUSE xx x why no disciplinary action should

be taken against him for his failure to: (a) decide the remaining
twenty-eight (28] cases due for decision; (b) resolve the incidents
in the remaining eleven [11] cases with incidents for resolution;
(c) take appropriate actions [on] the remaining thirty-eight [38]
cases found to be dormant at the time of the judicial audit, all
despite the lapse of more than one year since the said judicial
audit was conducted; and (d) comply with the other directives
contained in the 19 April 2013 Memorandum of the OCA, x x x;
b. DECIDE with dispatch the remaining twenty-eight (28)

cases submitted for decision x x x and SUBMIT x x x copies of
the Decisions within thirty (30) days from notice;
c. RESOLVE with dispatch the incidents in the remaining

eleven (11) cases xx x referred to above, and SUBMIT xx x
copies of the corresponding Orders or Resolutions within thirty
(30) days from notice;
d. TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS immediately in the

thirty-eight (38) remaining dormant cases referred to above, and
SUBMIT xx x copies of the Orders or Decisions, if any, issued
in connection therewith; and
e. SUBMIT xx x within fifteen (15) days from notice his

compliance with directive Nos. 2, 3, 8, 9[,J and 10 contained in
the 19 April 2013 Memorandum of the OCA, with a STERN
WARNING that failure to do so will be dealt with more
severely;
2. RELIEVE Judge Macabaya of his judicial and administrative

functions, effective immediately and to continue until further orders from the
Court, EXCEPT to: (a) DECIDE the remaining twenty-eight (28) cases
submitted for decision; (b) RESOLVE the remaining eleven (11) cases with
incidents for resolution; and (c) TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS [on] the
remaining thirty-eight (38) dormant cases;
3. WITHHOLD the salaries and other benefits accruing to Judge

Macabaya, effective immediately until such time that the Court shall have
ordered the restoration of his judicial and administrative functions;
4. DESIGNATE Judge Gil G. Bollozos, RTC, Br. 21, Cagayan de Or~ ~ _/H
City, Misamis Oriental, Acting Presiding Judge ofRTC, Br. 20, Cagayan de Oryvv Cff?''
22
Counting from the Memorandum dated April 19, 2013 reiterating the recommendations in the audit team's
April 17, 2013 Memorandum to the Resolution dated December I, 2014.
City, Misamis Oriental, effective immediately and to continue until further orders
from the Court, x x x and
5. ENTITLE Judge Bollozos to x x x traveling expenses with per diems

(if applicable), as well as an additional expense allowance and judicial incentive
23
allowance, x x x
On February 18, 2015, Judge Macabaya filed a Motion for

24
Reconsideration/Explanation claiming that the penalties imposed upon him were
unjust because they were solely based on the Memorandum dated April 17, 2013;
that no formal charge had been filed against him, nor had any investigation been
conducted relative to any administrative case filed against him. Simply put, Judge
Macabaya insisted that he was not given his day in court, as he "was not apprised
25
of any administrative complaint about him."
Judge Macabaya then filed a Supplemental Explanation to the Motion for

Reconsideration26 reiterating the arguments he put forward in his MR, and further
claiming that some unresolved cases, those filed between 1971 to 2009, had long
been submitted for decision, and were well within the extension of time he had
requested in his compliance. 27 Judge Macabaya claimed that the judicial audit
mistakenly and inaccurately found that there were only 26 inherited cases when in
fact he inherited no more than 361 unresolved cases. 28 Judge Macabaya also
argued that the audit team's recommendation that he be made to resolve one case
29
per day was "preposterous if not downright impossible." Nevertheless, Judge
Macabaya hastened to add that he was ready to dispose of the remaining inherited
cases. 30
On March 5, 2015, Judge Macabaya filed a Recapitulative Statement with

Urgent Reiterative Motion to Lift the Suspension of Administrative and Judicial
31
Functions and the Release of Salaries, Benefits[,] and Emoluments, to enable
him to "issue orders and help in the restoration and reconstitution of the records of
32
cases scorched by fire."
On March 16, 2015, this Court referred Judge Macabaya's (1) motion for
reconsideration/explanation dated February 16, 2015; (2) supplemental
explanation to the motion for reconsideration dated February 27, 2015, and (3)
recapitulative statement with urgent reiterative motion to lift the suspension
23
Rollo, pp. 722-723.
y ~
24
Id. at 725-736, sans Annexes.
25
Id. at 732.
26
Id. at 843-854.
27
Id. at 845.
28
Id. at 847.
29
Id. at 851.
30 Id.
31
Id. at 883-891.
32
Id. at 889.
administrative and judicial :function and the release of salaries, benefits and
emoluments dated March 4, 2015, to the OCA for evaluation, report, and
. 33
recommendat10n.
In a Memorandum34 dated May 7, 2015, the OCA recommended that the

matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative complaint; that Judge Macabaya
be adjudged guilty of gross misconduct (due to his failure to comply with the
OCA and this Court's directives) and also of gross ignorance of the law or
procedure; 35 and that Judge Macabaya be dismissed "from the service, with
forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except his accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of government, including government-
36
owned and controlled corporations."
The OCA explained that Judge Macabaya and his court staff never
questioned the findings and observations of the audit team; and that Judge
Macabaya even undertook to decide all the cases/incidents listed in the audit
findings within one year from April 2013. The OCA noted that in all five of his
letters-compliance with the April 19, 2013 Memorandum of the OCA, Judge
Macabaya never took issue with such findings, but instead merely submitted
copies of his Decisions and Orders on the cases submitted for decision in his
sala. 37 Needless to say, the derelictions imputed against Judge Macabaya
constituted insubordination, disrespect, and disdain against the authority of this
Court, as these acts stemmed from his deliberate failure to comply with the
directives of the OCA - which directives contained the command to "be complied
with promptly and completely."38 The OCA likewise noted the officious
interference of Judge Macabaya's wife in the court's :functions - an observation
that was never refuted by Judge Macabaya; this, in turn, further tarnished Judge
Macabaya's already compromised integrity. 39
Lastly, the OCA affirmed the findings of the audit team that Judge
Macabaya's Order dated November 22, 2011 in Criminal Case No. 2001-888,40
and his twin Orders dated September 26, 2006 in Criminal Case Nos. 2000-260,41
2000-316 and 2000-098, were clearly violative of the Constitution and ~~ la')z
42 43
thus rendering Judge Macabaya guilty of ignorance of the law and procedure/VV' ~
33
Id. at 892.
34
Id. at 893-920.
35
Id.at916.
36 Id.
37
Id. at 904.
38
Id. at 912.
39
Id. at 911.
40
Entitled People v. Jabinao.
41
Entitled People v. Alba.
42
43
I
Issue
I
I
Whether Judge Macabaya is guilty of gross misconduct and of !foss ignorance of

the law, warranting his dismissal from the service and the forfeiture of his
1
retirement benefits (except accrued leave credits), with prejudict to reinstatement

in any branch of government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
Our Ruling
We adopt and agree with the OCA' s findings but witli modification as
regards the recommended penalty.
Judge Macabaya claimed that the audit team made vague and sweeping
accusations that were allegedly meant to mislead and misinform the Court about
44
the status of cases pending before his sala. He also insisted that the
administrative charges against him were made without notice and hearing, hence
violative of his right to due process. Judge Macabaya moreover assailed the
Report/Memorandum dated April 17, 2013, saying that the 264-working day-
period requiring him to decide or resolve 168 cases was unrealistic due to (1) the
cases' voluminous records, (2) his sala's receipt of 761 new cases upon his
assumption into office, (3) his appointment as acting presiding judge of the RTC
Branch 9 in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, (4) the assignment to his court of other
cases from other courts caused by the inhibition of other judges, and (5) his busy
schedule of hearings. 45 Lastly, Judge Macabaya maintained that as much as he
was willing to decide the 12 remaining cases that he had inherited, he was unable
to do so because of the conflagration that gutted the records in the Hall of Justice
ofCagayan de Oro.46
Judge Macabaya's arguments lack basis.
We find it surprising that throughout the breadth and length of the space
and time that were accorded to him as shown in the OCA's (1) Memorandum
dated April 19, 2013, (2) the letter dated March 14, 2014, and (3) the letter dated
May 19, 2014, Judge Macabaya never protested against the validity or correctness
of the judicial audit's findings. Interestingly, it was only after this Court resolved
on December 1, 2014 to withhold his salaries and benefits that he started to
question the audit findings. However, his assertion that the audit findings were
incorrect or baseless, is self-serving and lacked ~ence vis-a-vis the clear-cut and
well-supported findings of the audit team./~~
44
See rollo, p. 843.
45
Id. at 849-850.
46
Id. at 851.
Judge Macabaya's woeful lamentation that his right to due process had
been violated fails to persuade. It is axiomatic that due process requires nothing
else but the opportunity to be heard - by no means does it require a formal, trial-
type hearing. Thus we held in FIO Ledesma v. Court ofAppeals:47
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations
require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified
of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself
In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable
opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process
is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained 0£
Here, Judge Macabaya was given ample opportunities to be heard. Indeed,

as early as April 19, 2013, Judge Macabaya was asked to submit a written
explanation to answer the directives issued in the Memorandum dated April 17,
2013 48 and to comment (in writing) on the observations raised in the judicial
audit. 49 In a letter50 dated March 14, 2014, the OCA acknowledged receipt of
Judge Macabaya's and his clerk of court's compliance letter dated July 22, 2013,
but noted the lack of explanation/full compliance to its directives, as mandated in
the OCA's earlier letters. In the May 19, 2014 OCA letter51 and December 1,
2014 Court Resolution, 52 Judge Macabaya was directed anew to explain the delay
in (1) deciding cases, (2) resolving incidents, and (3) taking appropriate action in
dormant cases. Yet, despite such repeated behests and warnings, punctuated by
the caveat that "all directives from the Court Administrator and his deputies are
issued in the exercise of the Court's administrative supervision of trial courts and
their personnel, hence, said directives should be respected [and should not be
construed] as mere requests [and] should be complied with promptly and
completely," 53 Judge Macabaya only submitted decisions and resolutions on a
piecemeal basis sans explanation for his failure to comply in full. Judge
Macabaya ought to be reminded that:
A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere

request, and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to
comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also
disrespect for the Court's lawful order and directive. This contumacious conduct
of refusing to abide by the lawful directives issued by the Court has likewise
been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt o~ tlre~~
47
565 Phil. 731, 740 (2007). Citations omitted.
48
See rollo, p. 45.
49 Id.
50
Id. at 292.
51
Id. at 639-640.
52
Id. at 721-724.
53
Id. at 640.
54
system. x x x
The records disclose that Judge Macabaya utterly failed to decide the cases
submitted for decision or resolve pending incidents within the reglementary period
as well as within the time frame that he himself fixed in the initial Action Plan. As
noted during the audit, these cases were already deemed submitted for decision
much further beyond the period55 allowed by the Constitution and by statute. In
Re: Judicial Audit of the RTC, Br. 14, Zamboanga City, 56 we cited Rule 3.05 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct which underscores the need to speedily resolve
cases, thus:
The Supreme Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to
decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is
justice denied. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period
fixed by law constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the
parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.
The office of the judge exacts nothing less than faithful observance of the
Constitution and the law in the discharge of official duties. Section 15 ( 1), Article
VIII of the Constitution mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts
must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are
submitted for decision or resolution. Moreover, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct directs judges to 'dispose of the court's business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods.' Judges must closely adhere to the
Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the integrity, competence, and
independence of the judiciary and make the administration of justice more
efficient. Time and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe this duty
so as not to negate our efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin
problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. Finally,
Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics [exhort] judges to be prompt and
punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before
their courts, to wit:
6. PROMPlNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him,
remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties,
recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of
value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad
example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the
administration ofjustice.
Parenthetically, Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1988,

requires all magistrates to observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in Article
VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution and to act pro~}; on all motions and
interlocutory matters pending before their courts. / vd~
54
Office ofthe Court Administrator v. Judge Jndar, 725 Phil. 164, 177 (2014). Citations omitted.
55
CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 15, paragraph 1.
56
517 Phil. 507, 516-518 (2006). Citations omitted.
We cannot overstress this policy on prompt disposition or resolution of

cases. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith
and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards.
Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong

and justifiable reason, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of
administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.
Nor is there merit in Judge Macabaya's claim that at the time his motion for
reconsideration was filed, there were only 11 to 12 cases left undecided or
unresolved, and that the period to decide or resolve these cases were within the
57
time extension he prayed for. Judge Macabaya ought to know that requests for
extension of time are not always granted as a matter of course and, even if they
were, such requests for extension of time in no wise operate to absolve him from
administrative liability. Here, the records showed that Judge Macabaya asked for
additional time to resolve the cases submitted for decision only on June 30, 201458
and on November 24, 201459 - or 61 and 208 days respectively, past the deadline
that Judge Macabaya himself set in the action plan. The audit team even reminded
him to submit the request for extension of time before the mandated period to
decide would expire. 60 This, he failed to do.
Even so, our independent examination disclosed the following

discrepancies between the status of the cases and the allegations of Judge
Macabaya:
1. In Civil Case Nos. 1971-3672 and 1971-3673, Judge Macabaya

insisted that the above-mentioned inherited cases were disposed of on June 24,
2014. 61 However, the alleged decision or order disposing of the case has not been
attached on record; the only relevant document related to the instant case being an
Order dated March 25, 2014 ordering the parties to appear for a preliminary
conference on May 2, 2014. 62
2. There was no decision, resolution or order attached in the records in the

following cases:
a. Civil Case No. 1990-258 entitled Integrated Rural Bank v.

Acenas;63
b. Civil Case No. 1995-403 entitled Minda Development Bank v. Sp~~

57
See rollo, pp. 731, 851 and 884.
58
Id. at 641.
59
Id. at 885.
60
Id. at 33.
61
Id. at 846.
62
Id. at 309.
63
See id. at 1.
Rabaya; 64
c. Civil Case No. 1996-514 entitled PC! Leasing and Finance, Inc. v.
Sps. Lee; 65
d. Civil Case No. 1996-521 entitled BA Savings Bank v. Sps. Yap, et

al.;66
e. Civil Case No. 1998-176 entitled Minda Development Bank v.

Agcopra;67
£ Civil Case No. 2004-214 entitled Veluz v. Morados; 68
g. Civil Case No. 2011-220 entitled Tomarongv. P/Supt. Pimentel; 69
h. LRC No. 1999-085, LRC No. 2000-039, and LRC No. 2006-020
all concerning Phividec Industrial Authority as the applicant; 70
71
1. Criminal Case No. 2004-100 entitled People v. Manlunas;
J. Civil Case No. 1992-503 entitled Republic of the Philippines v.

Yanez, et a l. ,.72
k. Civil Case No. 1996-167 entitled Dumdum v. Dumdum; 73
1. Civil Case No. 2002-195 entitled Shoreline Environment

Association, Inc. v. Reyes, et al.; 74
m. Civil Case No. 2002-290 entitled Asset Pool, et al. v. Sps.

Forster; 75
n. Civil Case No. 2006-123 entitled Sps. Nera v. Tobias; 76
o. Civil Case No. 2011-062 entitled Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc.
v. Escaus ,77
~~~~~~~~~-
64 See id. at 2.
0~
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68
See id. at 3-4.
69
See id. at 4.
70
See id. at 5. This is notwithstanding Judge Macabaya's Orders relating to LRC Nos. 2002-034, 2006-02, and
2006-005. See also id. at 20.
71
See id. at 6.
72
See id. at 12.
73 Id.
74
See id. at 13.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77
See id. at 15.
p. Civil Case No. 2011-191 entitled Sps. Encinareal v. Hult, et al.; 78
q. Spec. Proc. Case No. 2010-135 with Santiago C. Sabal as

petitioner; 79
80
r. Criminal Case No. 4804 entitled People v. Roque, et al. ;
s. Criminal Case Nos. 2005-103 to 107 and 2005-156 to 157 all

81
entitled People v. Autor;
t. Criminal Case Nos. 2005-462 to 463 both entitled People v.
. 82
Roszos;
u. Criminal Case No. 2010-925 entitled People v. Velez; 83 and,
v. Criminal Case No. 2011-323 entitled People v. Gelam. 84
In some of the above-mentioned cases, 85 Judge Macabaya claimed that he

submitted a decision/order/resolution concerning the same through an alleged
Compliance dated November 24, 2014. However, a perusal of the records shows
that this alleged Compliance was never submitted to this Court.
3. Judge Macabaya claimed that he already resolved Civil Case

No. 1998-04 last December 19, 2014 but failed to attach the same at the
earliest possible time. Judge Macabaya submitted a mere photocopy
thereof in his Supplemental to the Reiterative Motion to Release of
Salaries, Benefits and Other Emoluments Dated 27 October 2015,86
without any explanation for the belated submission thereof notwithstanding
his previous submission of a Motion for Reconsideration/Explanation87
dated February 16, 2015; Supplemental Explanation to the Motion for
Reconsideration88 dated February 27, 2015; Recapitulative Statement with
Urgent Reiterative Motion to Lift the Suspension of Administrative and
Judicial Function[s] and the Release of Salaries, Benefits and
Emoluments89 dated March 4, 2015, Compliance/Report90 dated September
18, 2015, and Reiterative Motion to Release of Salaries, Benefits an~~
78
See id. at 16.
79
See id. at 19.
80
See id. at 20.
81
See id. at 22.
82 Id.
83
See id. at 23.
84 Id.
85
Particularly Civil Case Nos. 1990-258, 1996-514, 1996-521, 1998-176, 2011-220, 2011-191, and Spec.
Proc. No. 2010-135.
86
Id.at971-985.
87
Id. at 725-736 sans attachments.
88
Id. at 843-854.
89
Id. at 883-891.
90
Id. at 931-936.
Emoluments91 dated October 27, 2015.
4. Similar to Civil Case No. 1998-04, Judge Macabaya claimed to have

issued a Consolidated Order92 dated November 20, 2015 dismissing Civil Case
No. 2010-103 entitled Sandigan v. Cagayan De Oro Holy Infant School and Spec.
Proc. Case No. 2010-116 in Re: Petition to Approve the Will of Gregoria Veloso
but only attached the same to its Letter of Transmittal of Decided Cases Subject to
A.M. No. 14-11-350-RTC in the RTC ofCagayan De Oro City, Misamis Oriental,
Br. 20 with Reiterative Request for Certification (Letter of Transmittal). 93
Although Judge Macabaya alleged that "he has already submitted them with the
Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division as part of his pleadings and
94
compliance with copies furnished to this Honorable Office," a thorough review
of the records reveals that the said cases were not submitted to this Court prior to
said Letter of Transmittal.
5. In Criminal Case No. 2002-394, Judge Macabaya issued an Order95

dated June 28, 2013 recalling the previous order declaring the case submitted for
decision on the ground that the records showed "that the prosecution has not yet
presented their evidence."96 However, the audit team noted that "this case may be
considered as inherited since the hearing in this cases [sic] was entirely heard by
the former judge, although the motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 15
[Sept]. 2003 denying the Formal Offer of Exhibits of the accused was only
resolved on 15 Nov. 2011."97 The audit team's observation runs counter to Judge
Macabaya's findings that the prosecution has not yet presented its evidence. To
date, no other order has been submitted to this Court regarding the status of the
instant case.
6. In Criminal Case Nos. 2011-772, 2011-909 and 2012-732 Judge

Macabaya issued Orders dated June 19, 2013 98 and July 3, 2013 99 which deemed
the criminal cases submitted for judgment. However, to date, Judge Macabaya
has not submitted to this Court a copy of the said judgment (despite the numerous
pleadings he has filed in the instant administrative case). Judge Macabaya is
reminded of this Court's Resolution dated December 1, 2014 "to take appropriate
action on the remaining dormant cases" such as Criminal Case Nos. 2011-772,
2011-909, and2012-732.
Also, despite this Court's directive for Judge Macabaya to decide or resol~
91
ld. at 957-963.
92
Id. at2104-2105.
93
ld. at 1080-1085.
94
Id. at 1084.
95
ld. at 167.
96 Id.
97
Id. at 6.
98
Id. at 237 and 237-A, respectively.
99
Id. at 238.
the remaining cases/incidents that were included in the judicial audit, Judge
Macabaya failed to comply with the same. Even with Judge Macabaya's own
100
acquiescence that the remaining cases have to be resolved/acted upon by him,
he merely attached orders 101 issued by Acting Presiding Judge Gil G. Bollozos,
concerning cases under the former's responsibility in clear defiance of this Court's
mandate, to wit:
1. Civil Case No. 1998-325-R entitled Heirs ofYacapin v. Buhay; 102
2. Civil Case No. 2010-022-R entitledEmata, Jr. v. Emano; 103
3. Civil Case No. 2010-282 entitled Maybank Philippines, Inc. v. Naval

and John Doe; 104
4. Civil Case Nos. 1984-9853 entitled Padilla v. Development Bank ofthe

Philippines and 1985-10009-R entitled Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Padilla; 105
5. Civil Case No. 1996-766 entitledNabo v. Lim; 106
6. Civil Case No. 2011-055-R entitled First Standard Finance Corp v.

C'
0ps. Pacatan; 107
7. Civil Case No. 2011-241-R entitled Soriano v. Onari; 108
8. Civil Case No. 2012-253 entitled Heirs of Longos v. Kahayag Home

C'
0eftlers Assoczatzon,
. . .inc.;
T 109
9. LRC Case No. N-2006-005 with Phividec Industrial Authority as

applicant; 110
Judge Macabaya's negligence does not end here.
For, aside from the delay/sin rendering a Decision or Resolution on cases

submitted for decision, the judicial audit team also found errors or irregu1arities in
several orders issued by Judge Macabaya. ~~
100
Id. at 961.
101
Some merely photocopies thereof.
102
See rollo, p. 968 and 1095.
103
See id. at 1016 and 2125.
104
See id. at 969-970 and 1092-1093.
105
See id. at 1034-1035.
106
See id. at 1091.
107
Id. at 1086.
108
See id. at 1017-1020 and 1087-1090.
109
See id. at 1096-1097 and2211-2212.
l IO See id. at 967, 1099 and 2210.
In Criminal Case No. 2001-888, entitled People v. Jabinao, Judge

Macabaya issued an Order dated November 22, 2011 directing the accused to
secure another bail bond within five days from notice, "it appearing that the bond
put up by the accused had already expired," 111 in clear violation of Section 2(a)
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
SECTION 2. Conditions of the Bail; Requirements. -All kinds of bail

are subject to the following conditions:
(a) The lll1dertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless

cancelled, shall remain in force at all stages of the case Wltil promulgation of the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was
originally filed in or appealed to it;
This Court, in its Resolution112 of July 20, 2004, had already clarified that
"[u]nless and until the Supreme Court directs otherwise, the lifetime or duration of
the effectivity of any bond issued in criminal and civil action/special proceedings,
or in any proceeding or incident therein shall be from its approval by the court
until the action or proceeding is finally decided, resolved or terminated." 113
Then again, in Criminal Case Nos. 2000-260 and 2000-316, both entitled
People v. Alba, and in Criminal Case Nos. 2002-098 and 2002-100, also entitled
People v. Alba, Judge Macabaya issued twin Orders directing his Branch Clerk of
Court "to receive evidence of the prosecution through ex-parte hearing." 114
Nowhere in the Rules of Criminal Procedure are Clerks of Court allowed to
receive evidence ex-parte in criminal proceedings - unlike in ordinary civil actions
and in special proceedings where the judge may delegate such act to his Clerk of
Court. 115 These orders clearly showed gross ignorance of the rules of procedure.
Thus, we held in Spouses Lago v. Judge Abu!, Jr.: 116
Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of the
rules, and that, when committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative
sanction, the rule applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable
misjudgment. When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or
to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. One who
accepts the exalted PQSition of a judge owes the public and the court proficiency ~~
111
112
Id. at27. ~
A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC Guidelines on Corporate Surety Bonds.
113
Id., Item No. VII.
114
Rollo, p. 28.
115
See: Section 9, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court.
SECTION 9. Judge to Receive Evidence; Delegation to Clerk of Court. - The judge of the
court where the case is pending shall personally receive the evidence to be adduced by the parties.
However, in default or ex parte hearings, and in any case where the parties agree in writing, the
court may delegate the reception of evidence to its clerk of court who is a member of the bar. The
clerk of court shall have no power to rule on objections to any question or to the admission of
exhibits, which objections shall be resolved by the court upon submission of his report and the
transcripts within ten (10) days from termination of the hearing.
116
654 Phil. 479, 491 (2011 ). Citations omitted.
in the law, and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. When a
judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence
of the public in the courts. A judge is expected to keep abreast of the
developments and amendments thereto, as well as of prevailing jurisprudence.
Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.
(Underscoring supplied)
The audit team also noted that Judge Macabaya's wife meddled or interfered
with the court's business. Judge Macabaya, however, saw nothing wrong with
that, and even claimed that her presence helped him focus more on his judicial
functions. Apparently, Judge Macabaya seems to have missed the point of his
being the presiding Judge of his court; he seems to be unaware that this
unwholesome atmosphere can only further aggravate the court's already fractured
integrity and efficiency. It is not too much to say that the court's official business
is none of Mrs. Macabaya's officious business. In Gordon v. Judge Lilagan, 117
we said:
As pointed out by the Investigating Justice in his factual findings, there is

enough evidence on record to show that respondent Oudge] permitted [his wife]
to have access to court records in order to monitor the dates when cases are
submitted for decision. There is impropriety in this. Records of cases are
necessarily confidential, and to preserve their integrity and confidentiality, access
thereto ought to be limited only to the judge, the parties or their counsel and the
appropriate court personnel in charge of the custody thereof. Since [the judge's
wife] is not a court employee, much less the employee specifically in charge of
the custody of said records, it was improper for respondent to allow her to have
access thereto.
In this regard, the Code of Judicial Conduct states in no uncertain terms

that-
Rule 3.08. A judge should diligently discharge administrative

responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court
management and facilitate the performance of the administrative
functions of other judges and court personnel.
Rule 3.09. A judge should organize and supervise the court

personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business and
require at all times the observance of high standards of public service
and fidelity.
The foregoing rules should be observed by respondent judge with the

help of his staff and without the intervention of his wife who is not a court
employee. It needs be stressed in this regard that respondent judge is not wanting
in help from his staff to warrant the assistance of one who, while closely related
by affinity to respondent judge, is actually an outsider in his sala insofar as
official business and court functions are concerned.
In sum, Judge Macabaya must be held to account for acts constitutive ~,,,A
117
414 Phil. 221, 229-230 (2001).
serious misconduct and gross ignorance of the law and/or procedure.
Although this Court has meted out the penalty of dismissal or forfeiture of
118
retirement benefits to judges who were found guilty of several infractions such
as in this case, we have nevertheless imposed lighter penalties towards members
of the bench when mitigating circumstances merit the same.
Judge Macabaya has continuously rendered almost 31 years of government

service - starting as Trial Attorney II of the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office on
December 2, 1986, as Public Attorney II of the Public Attorney's Office from
January 1, 1990 to March 31, 1997, as a prosecutor on April 1, 1997 up to his
119
appointment to the Judiciary on March 5, 2010. In the three decades he has
been in public service, this Court has not adjudged him guilty of any infraction -
with four of the six administrative cases filed against him dismissed. 120
Also, this Court notes that in the four years Judge Macabaya was sitting as
121
Presiding Judge of Branch 20, 761 new cases were raffled to his sala. At the
same time, he was appointed as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 9 of the RTC of
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon - some 93 kilometers away from his sala- to hear,
resolve and dispose of cases in that branch. 122 This is notwithstanding the
assignment of other cases from other courts where judges had inhibited and his
continuous hearings in his sala. 123
Lastly, this Court notes the fire that engulfed the Cagayan de Oro Hall of
Justice last January 30, 2015. 124 Albeit beyond the prescribed period for Judge
Macabaya to act on the cases mentioned in the audit, this may have contributed to
the difficulty in disposing of or resolving the remaining cases under his
responsibility.
In light of the above-mentioned circumstances, we believe that a fine

equivalent to two (2) months' salary, with a stem warning that a repetition of the
same or similar offenses shall be dealt with severely, is more commensurate~
118
See Tuvi//o v. Judge Laron, A.M. Nos. MTJ-10-1755 and MTJ-10-1756, October 18, 2016; Re: Judicial
Audit Conducted in the RTC Br. 20, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, 730 Phil. 23 (2014); and
Samson v. Judge Caballero, 612 Phil. 737 (2009).
119
Bonifacio Magto Macabaya's Service Records.
120
A.M. No. 11-3803-RTJ dismissed on December 9, 2013; A.M. No. 11-3815-RTJ dismissed on November
11, 2012; A.M. No. 13-4082-RTJ dismis~ed on August 7, 2017; and A.M. No. 13-4097-RTJ dismissed on
July 18, 2014. Aside from the instant case, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2475 is still pending with this Court.
121
Rollo, p. 849.
122
See id. at 850.
123 Id.
124
Id. at 732. See also Fire hits Cagayan de Oro Hall of Justice, says Sereno
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/6692821 /fire-hits-c~an-de-oro-hall-of-j ustice-says-sereno (visited October
18, 2017).
WHEREFORE, Judge Bonifacio M. Macabaya, Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, is
hereby found GUILTY of: (1) gross misconduct for his repeated failure to comply
with the directives of the Office of the Court Administrator and this Court; and (2)
gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Nevertheless and in view of the
mitigating circumstances mentioned above, the Court hereby imposes upon him a
FINE equivalent to two (2) months' salary, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Judge Macabaya is also ORDERED to:
1. SUBMIT a copy of his Judgment on the following cases within 30 days

from receipt of this Decision:
a. Criminal Case No. 2002-394 entitled People v. Baylon;

b. Criminal Case No. 2011-772 entitled People v. Valledor;
c. Criminal Case No. 2011-909 entitled People v. Tan;
d. Criminal Case No. 2012-732 entitled People v. Mendoza; and
e. Civil Case No. 2009-003 entitled Heirs of Ramos v. Heirs of
Abejuela, et al.
2. FURNISH a copy of the Decision/Resolution/Order in the following

cases:
a. Civil Case No. 1971-3672 entitledPabito v. Nicolas;

b. Civil Case No. 1971-3673 entitledRustia v. Pabito;
c. Civil Case No. 1990-258 entitled Integrated Rural Bank v. Acenas;
d. Civil Case No. 1995-403 entitled Minda Development Bank v. Sps.
Rabaya;
e. Civil Case No. 1996-514 entitled PC! Leasing and Finance, Inc. v.
Sps. Lee;
f. Civil Case No. 1996-521 entitledBA Savings Bankv. Sps. Yap;
g. Civil Case No. 1998-176 entitled Minda Development Bank v.
Agcopra;
h. Civil Case No. 2004-214 entitled Veluz v. Morados;
i. Civil Case No. 2011-220 entitled Tomarong v. P/Supt. Pimentel;
j. LRC No. 1999-085, LRC No. 2000-039, and LRC No. 2006-020 all
concerning Phividec Industrial Authority as the applicant;
k. Criminal Case No. 2004-100 entitled People v. Manlunas;
1. Civil Case No. 1992-503 entitled Republic of the Philippines v.
Yanez;
m. Civil Case No. 1996-167 entitled Dumdum v. Dumdum;
n. Civil Case No. 2002-195 entitled Shoreline Environment
Association, Inc. v. Reyes; r; ~
o. Civil Case No. 2002-290 entitled Asset Pool v. Sps. Forste/P' ~. ~
p. Civil Case No. 2006-123 entitled Sps. Nera v. Tobias;

q. Civil Case No. 2011-062 entitled Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. v.
Escauso;
r. Civil Case No. 2011-191 entitled Sps. Encinareal v. Hult;
s. Spec. Proc. Case No. 2010-135 with Santiago C. Sabal as petitioner;
t. Criminal case No. 4804 entitled People v. Roque;
u. Criminal Case Nos. 2005-103 to 107 and 2005-156 to 157 all
entitled People v. Autor;
v. Criminal Case Nos. 2005-462 to 463 both entitled People v. Rosios;
w. Criminal Case No. 2010-925 entitled People v. Velez; and
x. Criminal Case No. 2011-323 entitled People v. Gelam.
3. CREATE, MAINTAIN and REGULARLY UPDATE the following

books in accordance with Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 136 of the Rules of
Court:
a. Judgment Book;
b. Book of Entries; and
c. Execution Book.
4. UPDATE his court's docket books;
5. UPDATE and make the necessary CORRECTIONS in his court's

Docket Inventory Report, particularly:
a. COMPLY with the prescribed form of the Docket Inventory

Report;
b. INCLUDE a column for the following details:

i. "Last Trial/Action Taken and Date thereof;"
ii. Names of the judges to whom cases are assigned;
iii. Pre-trial dates for criminal cases;
c. REMOVE the following columns for being unnecessary:

i. "Bonded or Detained;"
ii. "Place of Detention;" and
iii. "Date of Detention."
6. ENSURE the accuracy of monthly reports, in accordance with

Paragraph 8 of the Guidelines and Instructions in Administrative
Circular No. 61-2001 dated December 10, 2001; ~/
7. DISALLOW his wifo to have access to court records and MINIMIZE

her presence in his court to prevent the impression of interference in the
discharge of his judicial and administrative functions.
Failure to comply with any of the directives set herein shall constitute open
defiance of this Court's orders and shall be dealt with accordingly.
Judge Macabaya is DIRECTED to report to this Court the actual date of

his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension
shall have taken effect.
The current Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial

Court of Cagayan De Oro City is mandated to CONTINUE TRIAL on the
following cases WITH DISPATCH while Judge Macabaya is serving his two-
year period of suspension:
1. Criminal Case Nos. 2000-260 and 2000-316 both entitled People v.

Alba, et al.; and
2. Criminal Case Nos. 2002-098 and 2002-100 both entitled People v.

Alba.
The current Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial

Court of Cagayan De Oro City is ordered to RECALL Judge Macabaya's
previous Order dated November 22, 2011 in Criminal Case No. 2001-888 entitled
People v. Jabinao as the bail bond put up by the accused in the said case remains
valid during the pendency of the case.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Judge

Macabaya and furnished to Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan De
Oro for its proper compliance.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

ChiefJustice
ANTONIOT.C PRESBITER<YJ. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
J~~lt~
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO .PERALTA
Associate Justice
JteP~BERNABE
(On official leave)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ESTELA
(On leave)
FRANClS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
Ut1AtlJtlftt4
s LR.~S
Associate Justice
~/
~.TIJAM
:l\ ANDRE (!fl.I'
REYES, JR.
Asso~iate Justzce
-~ ,,Z9 r., ~o ~~
~~~~~~
Associ te Justice
~-
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice
l\.epublic of tbe ~bi(tppines
~upreme Q'.Court
;fll.anila
EN BANC
PROSECUTOR IVY A. TEJANO, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492

Complainant, [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4103..
RTJ]
Present:
SERENO, C.J,
CARPIO,*
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
-versus- PERALTA
'
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA/*
CAGUIOA,
MARTIRES,
TIJAM,
REYES, JR., and
PRESIDING JUDGE ANTONIO GESMUNDO, JJ
D. MARIGOMEN and UTILITY
WORKER EMELIANO C.
CAMAY, JR.,1 both of Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61,
Bogo City, Cebu, Promulgated:
Respondents. ~~ 262 2017
x---------~------~--~~----~------------~--~-~-~~~~~----~--x
1
All pleadings refer to him as "Emiliano C. Camay, Jr." but his signi;)d Comrnent shows "Emeliano C.
p
Camay, Jr." See Rollo, pp. 56-58.
• On official time.
•• On official leave.
Resolution 2 A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4103-RTJ]
RESOLUTION
LEONEN,J.:
Without a standing warrant of arrest, a judge not assigned to the

province, city, or municipality where the case is pending has no authority to
grant bail. To do so would be gross ignorance of the law.
This resolves the Affidavit-Complaint2 filed by Prosecutor Ivy A.

Tejano (Tejano) against Presiding Judge Antonio D. Marigomen (Judge
Marigomen) and Utility Worker Emeliano C. Camay, Jr. (Camay), both of
Branch 61, Regional Trial Court, Bogo City, Cebu. Tejano charged Judge
Marigomen with grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law,
and Camay with violating the Anti-Red Tape Act.
Pending before Branch 61, Regional Trial Court, Bogo City was a
civil case 3 for declaration of absolute nullity of deed of absolute sale filed
against Tejano by Jose Andrino (Andrino). This civil case was assigned to
then Assisting Judge of Branch 61, Judge James Stewart Ramon E.
Himalaloan (Judge Himalaloan), 4 pursuant to Administrative Order No. 113-
2011.5
On July 19, 2012, Andrino moved6 that Presiding Judge Marigomen

instead try the civil case because hearings had been repeatedly postponed by
Judge Himalaloan. Judge J\rfarigomen granted the Motion in an Order7 dated
July 30, 2012.
On September 17, 2012, Administrative Order No. 137-20128 was

issued where Judge Mario 0. Trinidad (Judge Trinidad) of Branch 64,
Regional Trial Court, Gtiihulngan City, Negros Oriental was designated as
the new Assisting Judge of Branch 61, Regional Trial Court, Bogo City,
Cebu. As Assisting Judge, Judge Trinidad was directed to take cognizance
of all the cases handled by the former Assisting Judge, Judge Himalaloan.
Judge Trinidad was likewise directed to take cognizance of cases where
Presiding Judge Marigomen inhibited, those newly filed, and those where
trial had not yet begun, i.e,, where "the accused or any of the accused in a
criminal case ha[d] not yet been arraigned," and civil cases where pre-trial
had yet to be condvcte.d or terminated. 9
Rollo, pp. l·-5.

J
Id. at 26. Docketed as Civil Case No. Bogo~02753.
4
Id. at 117.
Id at 121. OCA Report dated April 4, 2016.
6
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 8.
9
Id.
In 2013 and during the pendency of the civil case, Tejano filed a
criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Children Act against Andrino. 10 This criminal case was raffled to Branch 20
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City presided by Judge Bienvenido R.
Sani(;!l, Jr. (Judge Saniel). 11
On May 9, 2013 and with no standing warrant of arrest against him,

Andrino posted bail before Branch 61, Regional Trial Court, Bogo City, 12
not before Branch 20 in Cebu City where the criminal case was pending. Iµ
posting bail, Andrino was assisted by Camay, who was assigned to Branch
61.13
On the same day that Andrino posted bail, Judge Marigomen ordered
Andrino's release. 14
Tejano filed before this Court an Affidavit-Complaint1 5 against Judge

Marigomen and Camay on June 21, 2013.
On her charge of grave. abuse of authority, Tejano contended that

Judge Marigomen refused to transfer the civil case to Judge Trinidad, the
newly designated Assisting Judge of Branch 61, in violation of
Achninistrative Order No. 137-2012. When this Administrative Order was
issued on September 17, 2012, 16 trial in the civil case had not yet begun,
with the pre-trial allegedly conducted only on January 7, 2013. 17
On her charge of gross ignorance of the law, Tejano alleged that

Judge Marigomen issued the Order of Release on May 9, 2013 with no
standing warrant of arrest against Andrino, in violation of Rule 114, Section
1 of the Rules of Court. The Warrant of Arrest was issued by Judge Saniel
only on May 30, 2013. 18
As for Camay, Tejano charged him with violating the Anti-Red Tape
Act for allegedly fixing Andrino's bail application and facilitating police
10
11
Id. at 2. Docketed as CBU"99648-49, s(!e rollo, p. 11.
J
Id. at 3.
12
Id. at 9.
13
ld. at 56.
14
Id. at 10.
15
Id. at i-5.
16
Id at 8.
17
Id. at 1-2.
18
Id. at 2-3.
Resolution 4. A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492
assistance to Andrino. 19 It was also Camay who allegedly convinced

Andrino to file the civil case against her. 20
Judge Marigomen and Camay filed their respective Comments 21 on

September 17, 2013.
According to Judge Marigomen, he granted Andrino' s Motion to try

the civil case because the former Assisting Judge, Judge Himalaloan, had not
been conducting hearings since 2012. He also did not anticipate that a new
Assisting Judge would be assigned to Branch 61. Therefore, he continued
on hearing the civil case. 22
As to Andrino's bail bond, Judge Marigomen approved it in the

exercise of his sound discretion. He argued that in applications for bail, the
stringent application of the Rules of Court may be relaxed in favor of the
accused. 23
For his part, Camay admitted that he assisted Andrino in posting bail
but only because he was a public employee obliged to do so. He denied that
he was a fixer24 and claimed that he had no personal interest in the outcome
of the civil case filed by Andrino against Tejano. 25
The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Marigomen guilty

of gross ignorance of the law and of violating Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars. However, it dismissed the complaint for violation
of the Anti-Red Tape Act against Camay. 26
According to the Office of the Court Administrator, Judge Marigomen

violated Administrative Order Nos. 113-2011 and 137-2012 by taking
cognizance of the civil case for declaration of absolute nullity of deed of sale
cognizable only by Assisting Judge Himalaloan and, subsequently, by Judge
Trinidad. That Judge Himalaloan had not been hearing cases since 2012 was
not an excuse for granting Andrino' s Motion to handle and try the case. The
Office of the Court Administrator stated that Judge Marigomen could have
19
20
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 1.
I
21
Id at 20-24 and 56--58.
22
Id. at 21.
23
Id. at 23-24.
24
Rep. Act No. 9485, sec. 4(g) provides:
Section 4. Definition of Terms. ·-As used in this Act, the following tenns are defined as follows:
(g) "Fixer" refers to any individual whether or not officially involved in the operation of a government
office or agency who has access to people working therein, and whether or not in collusion with
them, facilitates speedy completion of transactions for pecuniary gain or any other advantage or
consideration.
25
Id at 56-57.
26
Id. at 123-124.
[Fom1erly OCA IPI No. 13-4103-RTJ]
sought guidance from this Court on how to remedy the continued delay in
the proceedings. Furthermore, upon the designation of Judge Trinidad as the
new Assisting Judge, Judge Marigomen should have transferred the civil
27
case, considering that it was still at its pre-trial stage.
For violating Supreme Court Administrative Order Nos. 113-2011 and

137-2012, Judge Marigomen was found guilty of an offense considered a
less serious charge. 28 The Office of the Court Administrator recommended
that Judge Marigomen be fined the amount of Pl0,000.00. 29
In addition, Judge Marigomen was found guilty of improperly

applying the rules on bail bond applications. Under Rule 114, Section
17(a)30 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, bail may be posted in
another court only if the judge where the case is pending is absent or
unavailable. The Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge
Marigomen failed to prove that Judge Saniel, the judge of the court where
the criminal case against Andrino was pending, was absent or unavailable.
In addition, there was no standing warrant of arrest against Andrino at the
time he posted bail on May 9, 2013. The Warrant of Arrest was issued only
on May 30, 2013. 31
For granting Andrino's bail despite the absence of a warrant of arrest,

Judge Marigomen was found guilty of ¥ross ignorance of the law.
Considering that it was his second offense, 3 Judge Marigomen was fined
with the maximum amount allowable, specifically, P40,000.00 and was
sternly warned that repeating the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely. 33
Without discussing the reasons for its finding, the Office of the Court
Administrator found no merit in the Complaint against Camay, and hence,
recommended its dismissal. 34
27
28
29
Id. at 121-122.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, sec. 9.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8·10-SC, sec. 1l(B).
I
JO RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 17(a) provides;
Section 17. Bail, Where Filed. -- {a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or Jn the absence or unavailability of thci judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or
municipality. If the accuse<;! is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is
pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is
available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.
31
Rollo, p. 122.
32
See Salazar v. Judge Marigomen, 562 Phil. 620 ('.2007) [Ptir J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
33
RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, sec. 1l(A).
34
Rollo, p. 124.
Resolution 6. AM. No. RTJ-17-2492
In sum, the Office of the Court Administrator made the following

recommendations in its Report35 dated April 4, 2016:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the

consideration of the Honorable Court that:
1. the instant administrative complaint against Hon. Antonio D.

Marigomen, Presiding Judge, Branch 61, Regional Trial Court,
Bogo City, Cebu, be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter;
2. respondent Judge Marigomen be found GUILTY of Violation

of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars and Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Procedure, and be meted the penalty
of FINE in the amounts of Ten Thousand Pesos (Php
10,000.00) and Forty Thousand Pesos (Php 40,000.00),
respectively, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or any similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely; and
3. the instant administrative complaint against Mr. Emiliano C.

Camay, Jr., Utility Worker, Branch 61, Regional Trial Court,
Bogo City, Cebu, be DISMISSED for lack ofmerit. 36
On June 14, 2017, Tejano filed an Affidavit37 before this Court,

stating that her filing of the Complaint is "only a product of
miscommunication." 38 Thus, "in order to move on," 39 she declared that she
was withdrawing the Complaint she had filed against Judge Marigomen.
This Court notes the Office of the Court Administrator's Report dated
April 4, 2016 and Tejano's Affidavit withdrawing her Complaint. The
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Office of the Court
Administrator are adopted with modification that the fine for gross
ignorance of the law is increased from P40,000.00 to Pl00,000.00.
The civil case filed by Andrino against Tejano was assigned to Judge
Himalaloan pursuant to Administrative Order No. 113-2011. However,
Judge Marigomen granted Andrino's Motion to try the civil case, in
violation of this Administrative Order.
35
Id.at117-124.
I
36
Id. at 123-124.
37
Id. at 133-134.
38
Id.atl33.
39 Id.
Assuming that Judge Himalaloan had repeatedly postponed hearings,

Judge Marigomen should have instead sought the guidance of this Court on
how to address the delay in the proceedings. After all, the Constitution
grants this Court the power of administrative supervision over all courts and
their personnel. 40
Worse, despite the designation of Judge Trinidad as Assisting Judge

under Administrative Order No. 137-2012, Judge Marigomen usurped Judge
Trinidad's authority by failing to transfer the civil case to him.
For violating Administrative Order Nos. 113-2011 and 137-2012,

Judge Marigomen is guilty of violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and
circulars, a less serious charge41 punishable by either suspension for not less
than one ( 1) month but not more than three (3) months, or fine of more than
Pl0,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. 42 Under the circumstances, the
fine of P20,000.00 is proper.
II
The charge of gross ignorance of the law against Judge Marigomen

merits a more serious sanction.
Bail, as defined in Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, is "the

security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by
him [or her] or a bondsman, to guarantee his [or her] appearance before any
court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified." Based on this
definition, the accused must be in custody of the law or otherwise deprived
of his or her liberty to be able to post bail.
Generally, bail is filed before the court where the case is pending.
However, if bail cannot be filed before the court where the case is pending-
as when the judge handling the case is absent or unavailable, or if the
accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the
case is pending-Rule 114, Section 17{a) of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 17. Bail, ·where Filed. - (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed
with the court where the case is pending, or in the .. ab§ence or
unavap&;biJity of the j1,1.d.,ge, . th~reofA,-:vvith any regional trial . judge,
metr9nolitan trial judg~. municipal trjal i).!dge? or municipal circµit tri51l
judge in the }2rovince, city, or myp.icipality. If the accus~d is arrested in a
province, city, or municipfility otheUhan where the case is pending, bail
may i;!lso be fileg with any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge
4
° CONST., art. VIII, sec. 6.
f
41
42
RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No, 01-8-10-SC, sec. l l(B).
thereof is available, wit]]._ruw metropglitan trial judge, municipal trial

judge, or IDJ,micipal circuit trial judge therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The text of Rule 114, Section 17(a) of the Rules of Court shows that
there is an order of preference with respect to where bail may be filed. In
the absence or unavailability of the judge where the case is pending, the
accused must first go to a judge in the province, city, or municipality where
the case is pending. Furthermore, a judge of another province, city, or
municipality may grant bail on(y if the accused has been arrested in a
province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending.
A judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where the

case is pending but approves an application for bail filed by an accused not
arrested is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The last sentence of Rule
114, Section l 7(a) is clear that for purposes of determining whether or not
the accused is in custody of the law, the mode required is arrest, not
voluntary surrender, 43 before a judge of another province, city, or
municipality may grant a bail application. In the same vein, it is gross
ignorance of the law if a judge grants an application for bail in a criminal
case outside of his or her jurisdiction without ascertaining the absence or
unavailability of the judge of the court where the criminal case is pending. 44
Judge Marigomen was not a judge in the province, city, or

municipality where the case was pending. Neither was Andrino arrested in
a province, city, or municipality other than where the case was pending
precisely because no warrant of arrest had yet been issued when he posted
bail on May 9, 2013. Judge Marigomen violated Rule 114, Section 17(a)
and is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Moreover, Judge Marigomen did not ascertain the absence or

unavailability of Judge Saniel. This duty to ascertain is a consequence of
Judge Marigomen not being the judge of the place where the criminal case
was pending and could have been satisfied by inquiring and coordinating
with the court personnel belonging to Branch 20, where the criminal case
was pending. Had Judge Marigomen done his duty, Judge Saniel would
have already been informed of the grant of bail on May 9, 2013, and
therefore, would not have superfluously issued a Warrant of Arrest 21 days
later. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty 45 cannot /J
be appreciated in favor of Judge Marigomen. X
43
See Miranda v. Tuliao, 520 Phil. 907, 919 (2006) [Per 1. Chico-Nazario, First Division], citing
Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, 317 Phil. 862 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division]; Dinapol v.
Ba/dado, 296-A Phil. 81 (1993) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
4
" See Adapon v. Judge Domagtoy, 333 Phil. 696 (1996) [Per J, Padiila, First Divisionl.
45
RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, sec. 3(m).
Under Rule 140, Section 1 l(A) of the Rules of Court on the

Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court
of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, a serious charge such as gross ignorance
46
of the law is punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00. 47 However, considering that this was Judge
Marigomen's second offense, as he had been previously found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law in Salazar v. Judge Marigomen, 48 this Court fines
him with an amount more than P40,000.00, specifically, Pl 00,000.00. This
is allowed under Rule 140, Section 1l(A), which uses the permissive "may"
in enumerating the imposable sanctions for serious charges. 49
While it is true that Tejano filed an Affidavit withdrawing her

Complaint against Judge Marigomen, withdrawal of an administrative
complaint Hdoes not divest [this Court] of [its] disciplinary authority over
court personnel. " 50 This Court "cannot be bound by the unilateral decision
of a complainant to desist from prosecuting a case involving the discipline of
51
parties subject to its administrative supervision." As elaborated in Nones
. 52
v. 0 rmzta:
[T]he faith and confidence of the people in their government and its
agencies and instrumentalities need to be maintained. The people should
not be made to depend upon the whims and caprices of complainants who,
in a real sense, are only witnesses. To rule otherwise would subvert the
fair and prompt administration of justice, as well as undermine the
discipline of court personnel. 53
This doctrine applies especially in this case where respondent is not

54
just any other court personnel. Respondent is a judge, who is supposedly
knowledgeable of the law but has been found grossly ignorant of it, not just
once but twice.
46
47
I
48
562 Phil. 620 (2007) [Per J. Carpio~Morales, En Banc].
49
RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, sec. 11 (A), as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, provides:
Section 11. Sanctions. ~ A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismis~al from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may detennine, and
disqua,lification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including govemment-
owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits;
2. _Sµspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding
six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
'° Casar1ova, Jr. v. Cajayon, 448 Phil. 573, 582 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
si Lapena v. Pamarang, 382 Phil. 325, 330 (2000) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division] cited in Casanova,
Jr. v. Cajayon, 448 Phil. 573, 582 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
52
439 Phil. 370 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division] cited in Casanova, Jr. v. C11jayon, 448 Phil.
573, 582 (2003) [Per J. Ynares"Santiago, First Division].
s3 Id. at 379.
~
4
See Dadap-.Malinao v. Judge Mijares, 423 Phil. 350 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division];
See also Vasquez v. Judge Ma/var, 174 Phil. 274 (1978) [Per J. Makasiar, En Banc]. ·
In sum, the penalty recommended by the Office of the Court

Administrator is increased. Instead of fining Judge Marigomen the amount
of P40,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, he is ordered to pay the
amount of Pl 00,000.00. Adding the P20,000.00 fine for his violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, Judge Marigomen is liable in
the total amount of Pl20,000.00.
III
This Court sustains the dismissal of the administrative charge for

violation of the Anti-Red Tape Act against Camay. Tejano failed to allege
and prove that he assisted with Andrino's application for bail in
consideration of economic gain or any other advantage. 55
WHEREFORE, this Court NOTES the Office of the Court

Administrator's Report dated April 4, 2016 and Prosecutor Ivy A. Tejano's
Affidavit withdrawing her Complaint against Presiding Judge Antonio D.
Marigomen of Branch 61, Regional Trial Court, Bogo City, Cebu. Despite
this Affidavit, this Court finds Presiding Judge Antonio D. Marigomen
GUILTY of the less serious charge of violating Supreme Court rules,
directives, and circulars, and of the serious charge of gross ignorance of the
law. He is meted the penalty of FINE on both charges in the total amount of
Pl20,000.00.
The Complaint against Utility Worker Emeliano C. Camay, Jr. of

Branch 61, Regional Trial Court, Bogo City, Cebu is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
55
Rep. Act No. 9485, sec. 4(g} provides:
Section 4. Definition a/Terms. -As used in this Act, the following terms are defined as follows:
(g) "Fixer" refers to any individual whether or not officially involved in the operation of a government
office or agency who has access to people working therein, and whether or not in collusion with
them, facilitates speedy completion of transactions for pecuniary gain or any other advantage or
consideration.
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
On official time
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
t~~k~
Associate Justice
~~~
~ffu~o C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
J.f'E~ERNABE
On official leave
ESTELA FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate\Justice Associate Justice
s uJf'f.4TIRES
Associate Justice
NOEL GI~ ANDRE~. ~YES, JR.

Ass~citfte Justice
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EN BANC
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369

represented by SECRETARY [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3907-RTJ]
LEILA M. DE LIMA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
JUDGE ROLANDO G.
MISLANG, Presiding Judge,
Branch 167, Regional Trial
Court, Pasig City,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------x
HOME DEVELOPMENT A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372
MUTUAL FUND (HDMF), [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3736-RTJ]
represented by ATTY. JOSE
ROBERTO F. PO, Present:
Petitioner,
SERENO, C.J,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR., *
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA, * and
JUDGE ROLANDO G. CAGUIOA,JJ
MISLANG, Presiding Judge,
Branch 167, Regional Trial Promulgated:
Court, Pasig City,
Respondent. J~ 26 2016
x---------------------------------------------------~~~-~~-------x
No part.
R
Decision 2 A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369
[Formerly OCA LP.I. No. 12-3907-RTJ]
and A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372
DECISION
PERCURJAM:
This is a cons0lidation of the Administrative Complaints which the ·

then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila M. De Lima and Pag-
IBIG Fund/Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), represented by Atty.
Jose Roberto F. Po, filed against Hon. Rolando G. Mislang, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 167.
The following are the factual and procedural antecedents of the case:
On October 29, 2010, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted in view of the
HDMF's Complaint Affidavit against Delfin S. Lee and other officers of
Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation (Globe Asiatique) for the
crime of syndicated estafa constituting economic sabotage under Presidential
Decree No. 1689, in relation to Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
through the fraudulent take-out of housing loans for fake borrowers.
Allegedly, these borrowers had actually no intention to apply for housing
loans but were merely paid by Globe Asiatique agents to sign blank loan
documents. Said loan documents were then submitted to the HDMF for
processing. Because of this fraudulent scheme, the HDMF suffered
damages in the amount of about 1!6.5 Billion. The DOJ then formed a panel
of prosecutors to investigate the complaint, which was docketed as NPS
Docket No. XVI-INV-lOJ-00319 (P1 DOJ case). Subsequently, or on
November 15, 2010, Lee, together with Globe Asiatique, filed a Complaint
for specific performance and damages against the HDMF before the Makati
RTC.
On December 10, 2010, the NBI Anti-Graft Division recommended

that Lee, among others, be charged with the crime of syndicated estafa
constituting economic sabotage. Thus, the DOJ formed a panel of
prosecutors that would handle the preliminary investigation of the
complaint, which was docketed as NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-lOL-00363
(2nd DOJ case). On January 27, 2011, Lee filed a Petition seeking the
suspension of the proceedings in the 2nd DOJ case pending the outcome of
the Makati civil case, because there were issues in the civil case which
purportedly constituted a prejudicial question to the 2nd DOJ case. However,
the DOJ panel issued an Omnibus Order dated February 21, 2011 which,
'\\'r~-~
among others, denied said petition for lack of common issues and parties. In
denying Lee's prayer for suspension, the panel of prosecutors explained:
At first glance, it may appear that the issues in Civil Case No. 10-
1120 are related to the issues in NPS No. XVI-INV-IOL-00363, however,
a cursory reading of the pertinent records of the two cases will reveal that,
in the first, the main issue is the right of GA to replace its buyers pursuant
to the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), Funding Commitment
Agreement (FCA), and Collection Servicing Agreement (CSA) it entered
into with HDMF while, in the second, the matter to be resolved is whether
or not respondents are liable for the crime of syndicated estafa. Moreover,
there is no commonality of parties in the two cases, therefore, whatever
would be the decision of the court in the aforementioned civil case will
certainly not affect the resolution of the herein criminal complaint. And
this is true since, as shown in the complaint in Civil Case No. 10-1120, the
case is not about the sale of the properties to Evelyn B. Niebres, Ronald
Gabriel Perez San Nicolas, and Catherine Bacani, rather, the action was
filed by GA to compel HDMF to honor the provisions of the MOA, FCA
and CSA entered into by the parties and/or compel HDMF to accept the
replacement buyers/borrowers as offered by GA. 1
Lee moved for a partial reconsideration of the abovementioned

Omnibus Order but the same was denied. The DOJ panel of prosecutors
likewise directed him to file his counter-affidavit. On July 28, 2011, after
filing his counter-affidavit, Lee filed a Petition for Injunction (with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order or TRO) against the DOJ,
which was raffled to the sala of Judge Mislang. Again, Lee sought to
suspend the preliminary investigation being conducted by the DOJ in the 2nd
DOJ case, and subsequently, to likewise prevent the filing of the Information
in the 1st DOJ case. On August 5, 2011, Lee's counsel inquired ifthe DOJ's
counsel would be willing to enter into a stipulation with regard to the
existence of the 2nd DOJ case and the Makati civil case. After the counsel of
the DOJ had acceded to said request, the parties, with the permission of
Judge Mislang, then agreed to submit for resolution the petition for
injunction upon submission of their respective memoranda within fifteen
( 15) days, since there were no longer factual matters that needed to be
threshed out in a full-blown trial. However, on August 12, 2011, after Lee
had submitted his memorandum the day before, he filed an unverified
Urgent Motion for the ex-parte resolution of his application for the issuance
of a TRO. Thereafter,, without waiting for the DOJ's memorandum, Judge
Mislang issued Orders dated August 16, 2011 and August 26, 2011, granting
Lee's petition. Thus, the HDMF and the DOJ filed separate complaints,
docketed as OCA LP.I. No. 11-3736-RTJ and OCA LP.I. No. 12-3907-RTJ,
respectively, against Judge Mislang, alleging that the latter acted in patent
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369), p. 8.

/~
~~"
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. '12-3907-RTJ]
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3736-RTJ]
disregard of the rules on injunctive relief and prejudicial question, exhibited

gross ignorance of the law and/or procedure, and manifested partiality and
gross misconduct in issuing the assailed Orders.
After a careful review and evaluation of the case, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) recommended in both Complaints that Judge
Mislang be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be dismissed from
service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits except leave credits, and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. 2
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the findings and
recommendations of the OCA.
The application for TRO for the 2nd DOJ case was incorporated in the
petition for injunction. However, the DOJ was not given any notice of Lee's
Urgent Motion for ex-parte resolution of his TRO application. And despite
the parties' agreement in court to submit for resolution said petition for
injunction only upon submission of their respective memoranda, Judge
Mislang granted Lee's application for TRO without waiting for the DOJ's
memorandum. He never conducted a hearing on either the application for
TRO or on the motion for resolution of the TRO. Clearly, this is in violation
of the DOJ's constitutional right to be heard and to due process. Judge
Mi slang's wanton disregard of the DOJ' s right to due process was repeated
when he granted the TRO for the 1st DOJ case. Although the application for
TRO was contained in a verified petition, the DOJ was not properly served
with a copy of the petition or the urgent motion for hearing. It was not
likewise served with any notice of hearing. And notwithstanding the lack of
proof of service, Judge Mislang still proceeded to hear the application for
TRO against the 1st DOJ case during the hearing on the petition for issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction against the 2nd DOJ case.
Verily, Judge Mislang manifested serious lack of knowledge and

understanding of the basic legal principles on prejudicial question and on
jurisdiction in petitions for suspension of criminal action based on
prejudicial questions, as prescribed by Sections 63 and 7, 4 Rule 111 of the
2
Evaluation and recommendation submitted by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez and
Deputy Court Administrator Thelma C. Bahia, dated October 8, 2013.
3
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office
of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has b:~
~\-"M"'"
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The OCA adopted the ruling of the
Court of Appeals (Seventeenth Division) in Department of Justice v. The
Hon. Rolando Mislang, etc. and Delfin Lee, CA-G.R. SP No. 121594, dated
April 16, 2012, thus:
After a thorough and judicious study of the attendant factual and

legal milieu, this Court has come to the conclusion that no prejudicial
question exists that would justify the issuance by public respondent
Judge of the writ of preliminary injunction as both cases before the
DOJ can proceed independently of that with the Makati RTC.
This Court agrees with petitioner's contention that no prejudicial

question exists with respect to the first DOJ case. A prejudicial question is
understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and
which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the
criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil
action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. As
it was shown that the recommendation by the NBI for DOJ to
investigate Lee and other officials of the GA for estafa was filed ahead
of the civil case which Lee filed against HDMF before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, the doctrine of prejudicial question is
untenable in the first DOJ case.
Moreover, it did not escape this Court's attention that when Lee
moved for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the DOJ,
in the first DOJ case, . . . he did not file a petition for suspension of
criminal action by reason of prejudicial question before the panel of DOJ
prosecutors, in violation of the provisions of Section 6, Rule lll of the
Revised Rules of Court ... The rule is clear that in filing a petition for
suspension of criminal action based upon a pendency of a prejudicial
action in a civil action, the same should be made before the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
If an information had already been filed before the court for trial, the
petition to suspend should be filed before the court where the
information was filed.
Considering that no information has yet been filed against Lee and
the action that was brought before the court a quo was one for injunction
and damages, the public respondent Judge gravely erred when he took
cognizance of Lee's prematurely filed petition and granted his prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
Nevertheless, even if the civil case was filed ahead of the first DOJ
case, the doctrine of prejudicial question is still inapplicable.
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before
the prosecution rests.
4
Section 7. Elements ofprejudicial question. -The elements ofa prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal actitm, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. "'~
)'t~
xxx
... (l)njunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because

public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and
protected for the protection of society. It is only in extreme cases that
injunction will lie to stop criminal prosecution. Public respondent Judge
anchored his issuance of the writ on the existence of a prejudicial
question. However, this Court finds that the facts and issues in the
Makati civil case are not determinative of Lee's guilt or innocence in
the cases filed before the DOJ. Verily public respondent Judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction when he issued the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
the DOJ from filing an information of estafa against Lee in the first DOJ
case and from proceeding with the preliminary investigation in the second
DOJ case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is

hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order issued by public respondent
Judge dated September 5, 2011 in Civil Case No. 73115-PSG for
Injunction is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby lifted for lack of basis both in
fact and in law. 5
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled
jurisprudence. A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have
been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring,
contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. Though not
every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in
good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the same applies only
in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. 6 Such, however, is
not the case with Judge Mislang. Where the law is straightforward and the
facts so evident, failure to know it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 7 A judge is presumed to have acted
with regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions. But
a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions of a statute, as
well as Supreme Court circulars enjoining their strict compliance, upends
this presumption and subjects the magistrate to corresponding administrative
sanctions. 8
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order,
decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must
not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372), pp. 140-141. (Emphasis in the original)

6
Peralta v. Judge Omelio, 720 Phil. 60, 86 (2013).
~..r-v
7
Id.
Caguioa v. Judge Lavina, 398 Phil. 845, 848 (2000).
1''rw~~
established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some

other like motive. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws
and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no
less. Thus, unfamiliarity with the rules is a sign of incompetence. Basic
rules must be at the palm of his hand. When a judge displays utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he betrays the confidence of the public in the
courts. Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges owe it to
the public to be knowledgeable, hence, they are expected to have more than
just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules; they
must know them by heart. When the inefficiency springs from a failure to
recognize such a basic and elemental rule, a law or a principle in the
discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving
of the position and the prestigious title he holds or he is too vicious that the
oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse
of judicial authority. In both cases, the judge's dismissal will be in order. 9
Judge Mislang issued two (2) TROs, a writ of preliminary injunction

and a status quo order, both of which did not satisfy the legal requisites for
their issuance, in gross violation of clearly established laws and procedures
which every judge has the duty and obligation to be familiar with. The
antecedent incidents of the case brought before Judge Mislang were clear
and simple, as well as the applicable rules. Unfortunately, he miserably
failed to properly apply the principles and rules on three (3) points, i.e., the
prematurity of the petition, the inapplicability of the prejudicial question,
and the lack of jurisdiction of the court. His persistent disregard of well-
known elementary rules in favor of Lee clearly reflects his bad faith and
partiality.
However, Judge Mislang cannot be held administratively liable for

not requiring Lee to post a bond for the issuance of a TRO. In Bautista v.
Abdulwahid, 10 the Court dismissed the charge of gross ignorance of the law
and procedure against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Hakim S.
Abdulwahid for, among others, issuing an ex-parte TRO without requiring
the posting of a bond. The Court upheld the OCA' s recommendation that
the complaint should be dismissed for lack of factual and legal bases,
considering that the issuance of the TRO ex-parte was the most reasonable
way to enjoin the enforcement of the final notice to vacate issued by the
Municipal Trial Court without rendering the action sought to be enjoined
moot and academic.
9
Re: Complaint Against Justice John Elvi S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals, 547 Phil. 418, 438
(2007).
IO
522 Phil. 390 (2006).
,. . . . .,v/
~~\}"- ~
The Court notes that this is not the first time that Judge Mislang has
committed a serious infraction. In fact, he has been facing a seemingly
endless string of administrative charges since April 2007. In A.M. No. RTJ-
08-2104, 11 one Atty. Leo C. Romero charged Judge Mislang with
misrepresentation, violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
13, gross ignorance of the law, and grave abuse of discretion relative to the
issuance of a search warrant against David C. Romero for .violation of
Article 293 (Robbery) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court then found
Judge Mislang guilty and ordered him to pay a fine of P20,000.00, with a
stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
In A.M. No. RTJ-15-2434, 12 the Court likewise found him guilty of

gross ignorance of the law. In this case, Jeffrey B. Patawaran filed a
complaint against Judge Mislang. A criminal case for unlawful importation
of assorted jewelry worth millions of pesos filed by the government through
the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group had been assigned to Judge Mislang.
The accused in said case, Siu Ting Alpha Kwok, was charged with violation
of Section 3601, in relation to Section 2530, of the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines. Then after the prosecution rested its case, Kwok filed a
Demurrer to Evidence which Judge Mislang granted on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He likewise directed the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) and the customs officer who had custody of the seized
jewelry to immediately release the same to Kwok, despite the existing
Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the Bureau of Customs. The
Court had ruled that while Judge Mislang' s ruling on the Demurrer to
Evidence may have been a purely judicial matter, he was guilty of Gross
Ignorance of the Law when he directed the immediate release of the
smuggled jewelry to Kwok. As a judge, he ought to know that the RTCs are
devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure
and forfeiture proceedings which the Bureau of Customs conducted and to
enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. 13 Also, forfeiture of
seized goods in the Bureau of Customs is a proceeding against the goods and
not against the owner. It is a proceeding in rem, which means it is directed
against the res or the illegally imported articles, and entails a determination
of the legality of their importation. Accordingly, while the accused in an
unlawful importation case may tum out to be absolved from any criminal
liability, it does not necessarily follow that the seized goods should also be
automatically released. Indubitably, Judge Mislang's directive for the
immediate release of the confiscated contraband shows his ignorance of the
11
12
13
Romero v. Judge Mislang, February 6, 2008, First Division Resolution.
Patawaran v. Judge Mislang, August 12, 2015, Third Division Resolution.
Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr., 398 Phil. 60, 70 (2000), citing Bureau of Customs v. Ogario, 385 Phil.
928 (2000), further citing Jao v. CA, 319 Phil. 105 (1995).
/
v
*'~0'
law and settled jurisprudence. At this instance, in view of the prior warning
and the gravity of his offense, the penalty of dismissal would have been
warranted. Out of benevolence, however, the Court simply suspended him
for six (6) months without pay, and reiterating the warning of a more serious
penalty in the event of another similar transgression.
Gross ignorance of the law, which is classified as a serious charge, is

punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00,
and suspension from office for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months, without salary and other benefits, or dismissal from service. 14 In
Peralta v. Judge Omelia, 15 the Court found that Judge Omelio had already
been sternly warned in two (2) previous cases that repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Yet, he still continued
transgressing the norms of judicial conduct. The Court then ruled that all his
past and present violations raised a serious question on his competence and
integrity in the performance of his functions as a magistrate. It thus adopted
the recommendation of the OCA that the supreme penalty of dismissal was
the proper penalty to be imposed, since it was already the third time that he
was found administratively liable. Indeed, the Court could no longer afford
to be lenient this time, lest it would give the public the impression that
incompetence and repeated offenders are being countenanced in the
judiciary. Judge Mislang's actions did not only affect the image of the
judiciary, it also put his competency and even his moral character in serious
doubt. In order to have a successful implementation of the Court's relentless
drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials, and
personnel, a rigid set of rules of conduct must necessarily be imposed on
judges. The standard of integrity applied to them is - and should be - higher
than that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the
privilege and right to judge. 16 Considering Judge Mislang's repeated
infractions and obstinate refusal to correct his ways despite previous
warnings, the Court is constrained to impose the penalty of dismissal in this
case.
14
Section 8 of Rule 140 on the Discipline of Judges and Justices, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC, classifies gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct as serious charges, with the following imposable penalties:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided, however, That
the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
,r
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than Jl20,000.00 but not exceeding ~0,000.00
15
Supra note 6.
16
Samson v. Judge Caballero, 612 Phil. 737, 752 (2009).
ctr'
\9'~~
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds Judge

Rolando G. Mislang, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 167,
GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law in A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369 and
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372 and ORDERS his DISMISSAL from the service
with FORFEITURE of retirement benefits, except leave credits, and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.

Chief Justice
~ A.~(N-...1o IA. ~
ANTONIO T. CARPIO c~~fT OJ.VELASC~
""""'- )
Associate Justice sociate Justice
~~&~
~
ARTURO D. BRION
~
.PERALTA
'
,,,.
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MA NO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
JOS z
JOSE CA¥NDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

AssfJ:t~ fuk~ice Associate Justice
ESTELA 4~BERNABE
Associate Justice
No part
FRANCIS H. Jl\RDELEZA S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
3&epubltc of tbe tlbilippines
~upreme <tourt
;ifElantla
EN BANC
FERDINAND S. BASCOS, A.M. No. P-08-2418

Complainant, (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2152-P)
Present:
-versus- SERENO, CJ. *

CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR., **
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
RAYMUNDO A. RAMIREZ, Clerk BRION, ·
of Court, Regional Trial Court, PERALTA,
Hagan, Isabela, BERSAMIN,
Respondent. DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ **
'
MENDOZA,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE, and
LEONEN, JJ.
Promulgated:
DECEMBER 04, 2012
X------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----X
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case is an offshoot of the case previously filed by

Ferdinand S. Bascos (complainant) against Atty. Raymundo A. Ramirez
On leave.
No part. Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. and Justice Jose P. Perez signed in the OCA Memorandum
dated July 18, 2005, as then Court Administrator and Deputy Court Administrator, respectively. Rollo,
pp. 68-71.
Decision 2 A.M. No. P-08-2418
Ramirez(respondent), Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of

the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela (RTC-Ilagan),for neglect of duty,
arrogance, willful and deliberate violation of the Court’s circulars relating to
Presidential Decree No. 10791 (PD 1079), and attempted extortions.
The Facts
In a letter-complaint dated January 31, 2003,2complainant informed

Executive Judge Juan A. Bigornia, Jr. (Judge Bigornia) of the RTC-Ilagan
that respondent failed to abide by the judge’s verbal order to designate a day
of the week for the raffling of judicial and extrajudicial notices and other
court processes requiring publication. He accused respondent of being
partialwhen the latterawarded to Isabela Profile, a regional weekly
newspaper, around 13 extra-judicial foreclosures without conducting any
court raffle.
On February 3, 2003, Judge Bigorniarequired respondent to file his

comment on the complaint, followed by another letter dated February 27,
20033 directing him to submit the following:
1. Copies of the application for Extra-Judicial Foreclosures together with

the docket number from December, 2002 to date (February 27, 2003);
2. To whom among the Deputy Sheriffs of this Court were these

applications for extra-judicial foreclosure raffled respectively; and
3. The name of the newspaper to whom these notices where sent for
publication.4

1
Revising and Consolidating All Laws and Decrees Regulating Publication of Judicial Notices,
Advertisements for Public Biddings, Notices of Auction Sales and Other Similar Notices.
2
Rollo, p. 5.
3
Id. at 7.
4
Id.
It also contained a directive which reads:
From hereon, application for judicial foreclosure either by Notary

Public or by the Sheriff shall be raffled to the different Deputy Sheriffs
under my direction. The Deputy Sheriffs of this Court, in turn, shall raffle
the notices for publication to the accredited newspaper under my direction.
Any violation of this directive shall be dealt with severely.5
Without offering any explanation, respondent never complied with the

aforesaid directives.6
On March 8, 2005, complainant filed with the Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA) a sworn letter-complaint dated November 25, 20047
charging respondent of neglect of duty, arrogance, willful and deliberate
violation of circulars of the Court in relation to PD 1079, and for attempted
extortions.
After due proceedings, the OCA recommended that respondent be

fined in the amount ofP2,000.00 with a warning that similar infractions in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.8
In the Court’s Decision dated January 31, 2008,9 the Courtagreed with
the OCA’s findings but increased the fine to P20,000.00, stressing that “[o]n
the more than twenty instances that respondent failed to include in the raffle
the notices for publication, respondent displayed on each occasion

5
Id.
6
Id. at 68.
7
Id. at 1-2.
8
Id. at 71.
9
Id. at 95-105.
dereliction and gross neglect of duty.”10Moreover, having observed that

respondent failed to comply withthe directives contained in the letter of
Judge Bigornia, it ordered the submission of the required documents.
The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:11
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio

Provincial Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Atty.
Raymundo A. Ramirez, GUILTY of dereliction of duty, gross neglect,
insubordination and for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is ordered to pay a FINE of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000) Pesos, with WARNING that the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is further ORDERED to submit with utmost

dispatch the records and documents specified in the February 27,
2003 Letter of then Executive Judge Juan A. Bigornia, Jr. This is
without prejudice to the possible filing of criminal charges against
respondent under Section 6 of P.D. 1079.” (Emphasis supplied)
In his attempt to comply with the foregoing directives of the Court,

respondent, in his letter dated February 26, 2008,12merely submitted a
certified true copy of the letterof Judge Bigorniadated February 27, 2003.
Thus, the Court, in its Resolution dated April 30, 2008, required respondent
to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for his failure to pay the imposed fine and submit the required
records and documents.13
In compliance, respondent paid the P20,000.00 fine on July 25,

200814 but still failed to submit the required records and documents. He

10
Id. at 103.
11
Id. at 104-105.
12
Id. at 106-107.
13
Id at 108.
14
Under OR No. 1408301;id. at 120
explained15that the three deputy sheriffs who were “beneficiaries”16of the

subject documents died in 2005 and 2006, leaving only one sheriff,
Christopher R. Belleza, to assist him in locating the same.17Nonetheless, he
had requested the warehouseman of the RTC-Ilagan to find the expediente of
the extra-judicial foreclosures filed and raffled to the sheriffs during the
subject period.18
On the basis of the memorandum of the store room-in-Charge of

RTC-Ilagan, Aristotle Tumaneng (Mr.Tumaneng), respondent reported19 that
only 56 applications for extra-judicial foreclosure within the subject period
were kept in the storeroom of the court. He also explained that he cannot
submit the other questioned applications for foreclosure because of the
untimely demise of the concerned sheriffs, and that his job was only to
docket the foreclosures, collect the docket fees and sheriff’s commission
after the auction sale, and forward the applications for extra-judicial
foreclosure to the Executive Judge for approval.20
On June 1, 2011, the Court referred the matter to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.21
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
On November 15, 2011, the OCA found respondent guilty of grave

misconduct for his contumacious conduct of disrespect for the Court’s

15
Compliance/Explanation dated July 23, 2008;id. at 110-111.
16
Addendum to the Compliance/Explanation;id. at 121.
17
Id at 111.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 121-122.
20
Id. at 122.
21
Id at 135.
lawful order and directive and recommended his dismissal from service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or-controlled corporations.22
It observed that only 51 applications for extra-judicial foreclosure, not

56 as claimed by respondent, were listed in the memorandum of
Mr.Tumaneng. Out of these cases, only 42 were filed within the
coveringperiod December 2002 to February 27, 2003. It also noted
thatwhilethe memorandumprovided thetitles of the cases, dates of their filing
and the sheriffs in charge, it failed to indicate the names of the newspaper to
which the notices for extra-judicial foreclosure were sent for publication.23It
likewise did not find sufficient respondent’s justifications that his inability to
comply was due to the deaths of his co-sheriffs and that his job was only to
docket the applications for foreclosure and collect the docket fees and
sheriff’s commission.24In sum, the OCA concluded that respondent defied
the lawful orders of the Court despite its warning that the commission of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
The Issue
The only issue to be resolved is whether respondent is guilty of grave

misconduct warranting his dismissal from service.

22
Id. at 136-141.
23
Id. at 139.
24
Id. at 140.
The Court adopts the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of

action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, wilful in
character, improper or wrong behavior. Qualified by the term “grave” or
“gross,” it means conduct that is "out of all measure; beyond allowance;
flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."25
In this case, respondent has conveniently ignored the letter-directive

of Judge Bigornia since it was issued in 2003 and such crude
insubordination was characterizedby the Courtas “an obstinate refusal to
perform his official duty and to comply with a direct order of a
superior.”26Nonetheless, respondent was given another opportunity to submit
the records and documents required of him by Judge Bigornia in the Court’s
Decision dated January 31, 2008 with a warning that “the commission of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.”27
However, respondent continued to defy, not only the orders of Judge

Bigorniabut also the lawful directive of the Court.Respondent’s justification
that his co-sheriffs died in 2005 and 2006 does not merit consideration since
the directive was issued as early as 2003 long before their deaths. Besides,
the order to submit the subject documents was directed to him and not to the
other sheriffs.

25
Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, A.M. No.CA-05-20-P, September 9, 2005, 469 SCRA 439, 469; Hallasgo
v. COA, G.R. No. 171340, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 514, 529.
26
Rollo, p.103.
27
Id. at 104.
Neither can the Court accept the reason that “he is not in a position to
have the documents be submitted”28nor that hisjob “is only to docket the
foreclosure as filed xxx and to collect the docket fees and sheriff’s
commission after the auction sale and forward the same (applications for
extra-judicial foreclosure) to the Honorable Executive Judge xxx.”29 As
Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Provincial Sheriff, respondent is tasked to
assist inthe raffle of applications for extra-judicial foreclosure;30 presumed to
know that notices of extra-judicial foreclosure shall be raffled to accredited
newspapers for publication;31 and expected to keep a record thereof.32
In the Decision of the Court, finding respondent guilty of dereliction

of duty, gross neglect, insubordination and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, it stressed the duties of respondent as a lawyer
and employee of the court, thus:
Respondent, as a lawyer and an employee of the court, ought to

know the requirements in and the importance of distributing notices for
publication. And he is expected to keep his own record of the
applications for extra-judicial foreclosure and the minutes of the
raffle thereof so he can effectively assist the judge in the performance
of his functions. It is incumbent upon him to help the judge devise an
efficient recording and filing system in the court so that no disorderliness
can affect the flow of cases, particularly foreclosure cases, and their
speedy disposition. That all efforts should be addressed towards
maintaining public confidence in the courts can never be
overemphasized.33 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

28
Id. at 124.
29
Id. at 122.
30
Seepar. 4 of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 known as the “Procedure in Extra-judicial Foreclosure of
Mortgage,” August 7, 2001; Chapter 6, Subsection F, par. 10.3.7 of the 2002 Revised Manual for
Clerks of Court.
31
SeeChapter 6, Section F, par. 10.3.6 of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court; Sec. 2, PD 1079.
32
Seefootnote 22 in the Court Decision, A.M. No. P-08-2418,January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 238, 247,
stating that “Administrative Order No. 6, dated June 30, 1975 and Circular No. 7 dated September 23,
1974 requiring that raffle proceedings should be stenographically recorded, and the results signed by
the Judges or their representatives and the Clerk of Court in attendance, and the branch assignment
shall be recorded in words and figures on the rollo.” Moreover, the Clerk of Court has the control and
supervision over court personnel like stenographers whose duty is to “transcribe, duly accomplish and
sign the minutes of the raffle proceedings” under Chapter 6, Section E, par. 1.13.2 of the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court.
33
Rollo, p. 102.
Evidently, respondent, by his failure to comply with the directives of

the Court, was remiss in his duty of keeping his own records of applications
for foreclosure as well as the minutes of the raffle of notices for publication,
and of producing them when required if he had kept such records in his
possession. In both situations, respondent’s actions constitute grave
misconduct.
The Court has consistently held that it is the sacred duty of everyone charged
with the dispensation of justice, from the judge to the lowliest clerk, to
maintain the courts’ good name and standing as true temples of justice.34
Their conduct at all times must not only be characterized with propriety and
decorum, but above all else, must be above suspicion.35 Thus, there ought to
be no compunction to punish anyone who brings or threatens to bring
disgrace to the judiciary and to weed them out from the service if necessary.
Recently, in OCA v. Reyes,36where a clerk of court was dismissed

from service for repeatedly failing to heed the Court’s order to transmit the
records of a criminal case and to file his comment to the complaint against
him, the Court ruled that the repeated failure to comply with the Court’s
directives amounts to grave or gross misconduct. In Martinez v. Zoleta,37the
Court emphasized that a resolution of the Court should not be construed as
mere request and should not be complied with partially, inadequately or
selectively.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent guilty of grave misconduct
for his utter recalcitrance and stubbornness to obey legitimate directives of

34
Vilar v. Angeles, A.M. No.P-06-2276, February 5, 2007, 514 SCRA 147, 157, citing Basco v.
Gregorio, 315 Phil. 687; 245 SCRA 619 (1995).
35
Id.
36
SeeA.M. No. P-08-2535, June 23, 2010, 621 SCRA 511.
37
A.M. No.MTJ-94-904, September 29, 1999, 315 SCRA 438, 449.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent guilty of grave misconduct

for his utter recalcitrance and stubbornness to obey legitimate directives of
this Court, which is classified as a grave offense under Section 46(A), Rule
10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the. Civil Service 311 with
the corresponding punishment of dismissal from service.
WHEREFORE, respondent Raymundo A. Ramirez, Clerk of Court

and Ex-Officio Provincial She'riff of the Regional Trial Cowi of Ilagan,
Isabela, is hereby DISMISSED from service with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including govemment-
owned or -controlled corporations.
Let a copy of this Decision be filed m the personal record of

respondent.
SO ORDERED.
On leave
Chief Justice
38
Promulgated by the Civil Service Commission through Resolution No. II 01502 dated November 18,
2011.
(\
Decision
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EN BANC
WILFREDO F. TUVILLO, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755
Complainant,
- versus -
JUDGE HENRY E. LARON,

Respondent.
x-----------------------x
MELISSA J. TUVILLO a.k.a A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
MICHELLE JIMENEZ,
Complainant, Present:
SERENO, CJ,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ,*
MENDOZA,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA, and
CAGUIOA,JJ
JUDGE HENRY E. LARON, Promulgated:

Respondent. October 18, 2016 .
x -----------------------------------------------------~~~--:::-~-------x
DECISION
Per Curiam:
This is a consolidation of two cases filed against Judge Henry Laron,

Presiding Judge of Branch 65, Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City
(MeTC). The first case arose from the complaint of Wilfredo Tuvillo
·No Part.
. ',,
·"
DECISION 2 A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755 &

A.M.No. MTJ-10-1756
(Wilfredo) for immoral conduct. and the second case from the complaint of
Melissa Tuvillo (Melissa) for unexplained wealth and immorality.
Wilfredo and Melissa Tuvillo are husband and wife. Wilfredo works
as a seaman and is out of the country most of the time. Melissa is a
businesswoman with several B.P. Big. 22 cases filed against her in the
MeTC of Makati City. In her desire to have her cases resolved, she
approached the respondent Judge Henry Laron (Judge Laron). The
respondent is married but his wife was in the United States at the time the
events of this case transpired. Due to their frequent interaction with each
other, Melissa and Judge Laroi: became intimate with each other and their
relationship gave rise to these administrative cases.
The Complaint of
Wilfredo Tuvillo
On May 2, 2008, Wilfredo wrote a letter-complaint against Judge

Laron to the Court Administrator for immorality and unacceptable
wrongdoing. He submitted a Complaint-Affidavit 1 where he alleged, among
others, that his wife Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron for the
resolution of the cases filed against her; that, in turn, Judge Laron asked
money from Melissa and forced her to produce it whenever he needed it;
that they lost all their savings and their two houses and lots because of Judge
Laron's constant requests for money from Melissa; that Judge Laron would
physically hurt Melissa when she could not produce the money he needed;
and that Judge Laron "transgressed, intruded and besmirched the tranquility
and sacredness of our marital union and family unity." To support his
complaint, Wilfredo attached Melissa's complaint-letter and her affidavit
where she admitted having illicit relations with Judge Laron. 2
Wilfredo also submitted the Joint Affidavit of his two sons 3 wherein
they alleged:
6. That sometime in the year 2007, we were living in our

house in Antipolo city; We were surprised that certain Tito Henry
Laron used to go to our house in Antipolo; He slept in our house
twice or thrice a week specially during weekends; Nagtaka kami
mga magkakapatid bakit natutulog si Tito Henry Laron sa bahay
namin at sinusundo na kami at ang mama namin tuwing umaga
minsan gamit ang kanyang sasakyan minsan aming sasakyan ang
ginagamit niya at sunduin kami sa school tuwing hapon.
1
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755). pp. 24-26.
y('~
2
Id. at 31.
3
Id. at 34-35.
')\\~
DECISION 3 AM. No. MTJ-10-1755 &
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
This allegation was confirmed by their caretaker in her Affidavit4

stating that Judge Laron slept in the Antipolo house during weekends,
picked up Melissa and her children in the morning, and fetched them from
school in the afternoon using either his own or Melissa's car.
In his July 2, 2008 Comment; 5 Judge Laron averred that he had

already confessed his affair with Melissa to his wife. In his December 18,
2008 Comment, 6 he claimed that Melissa told him that she was a widow and
explained that his relationship with her was an intimate emotional and
personal attachment that did not involve any sexual liaison.
Wilfredo subsequently filed an adultery case against Melissa and

Judge Laron before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati but it was later
dismissed for lack of probable cause. 7 Wilfredo's petition for review was
also dismissed by the Department of Justice 8 for failure to comply with DOJ
Circular No. 70 and for lack of reversible error. 9
The Complaint of Melissa

Tuvillo
This case was initiated by Melissa on May 14, 2008 when she wrote a
letter to the Court Administrator accusing Judge Leron of unexplained
wealth and immorality. In her letter, she asked that Judge Laron be
investigated because based on his salary as a judge, he could not have
acquired their P9 million house. She also claimed that Judge Laron could
not have afforded to buy several Lamarroza paintings, four Plasma
televisions, expensive furniture, a Nissan Patrol, and to send his three
children to private schools. Her letter also bore her admission that she was
his mistress for three years.
In his July 21, 2008 Comment, 10 Judge Laron explained how he was
able to afford and own the properties that Melissa claimed were beyond his
means. He said that he and his wife sold their townhouse for P 1. 7M and
obtained a P3.2M loan from Land Bank to cover the P4.4M construction
cost of his house. 11 The Nissan Patrol, a 2001 model, was allegedly bought
for Pl.ISM with money borrowed from his father's retirement proceeds. 12
The Lamarroza paintings, accumulated through the years from 2004 to
4
Id. at 36.
5
Id. at 20-23.
6
Id. at 52-65.
7
Id. at 95-99.
8
Id. at 99-100.
9
The verification of the petition was lT•<•de, not by Wilfredo Tuvillo as required by the DOJ Circular, but by
Wilfredo's counsel.
10
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), pp. 22-25.
11
Id. at 27-28.
qr'~
12
Id. at 31.
"{\'r0
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
200i 3 for a total value of µ410,000.00, were purchased at a low price

because the artist was his wife's friend. The two (2) plasma televisions, on
the other hand, were gifts to them while the other two were purchased in
2000 and 2002. His children's tuition fees were covered by educational
plans 14 and their furniture was part of his wife's commission as a dealer in
his relative' s furniture shop.
In her July 31, 2008 Complaint-Affidavit, 15 Melissa admitted that she

had approached Judge Laron when she needed help regarding the pending
cases against her. Her liaisons with Judge Laron started in November 2005
in his office (doon una niya akong naangkin). She said that he slept in their
house in Antipolo and was in her Pasong Tamo condominium almost daily
from August 2007 to January 2008. At that time, Melissa was receiving a
monthly allowance of US$2,000.00 from her husband while Judge Laron
would ask money from her every month and whenever he needed it. She
cited several occasions when she gave him money. Judge Laron would hurt
her physically and threaten to tell her husband about their relationship every
time she would refuse to give him money. To meet Judge Laron's demand
for money, she said that she sold her house and lot in Taguig City and her
two vehicles - a Pajero and a Honda CRY. Yet, only two of her four pending
cases were settled. She also mentioned an incident in Judge Laron 's office
in April 2008 when a lawyer attempted to effect a reconciliation between her
and Judge Laron.
Defense ofJudge Laron
In his October 27, 2008 Comment, 16 Judge Laron related that Melissa
was introduced to him in November 2005 and that in December 2005, she
informed him about her B.P. Blg. 22 cases. He refuted the alleged sexual
liaisons that happened in his chambers by attaching affidavits of his staff
who swore that the door to his chambers was necessarily open because the
air conditioner that supplied the cold air to the staff room, the telephones, the
fax machine, the coffee maker, and the refrigerator were all in his chambers.
He likewise denied that he had asked Melissa for money or that she gave
him money. He pointed out that Melissa could have settled the cases against
her by paying the complainants because she had the money. The cases
against her were violations of B.P. Blg. 22: two counts for P20,000.00, two
counts for Pl 9,377.00, and two counts for P24,620.00. He also mentioned
that the threats and harassment against him started when he began avoiding
her.
13
Id. at 29.
,fv
14
Id. at 33-34.
15
Id. at 36-39.
16
Id. at 58-65.
~z-l'"'
AM. No. MTJ-10-1756
A member of the staff of Judge Laron, Ma. Anicia Razon, related in

her affidavit that on April 16, 2008, a woman went inside the chamber of
Judge Laron and started shouting and berating the judge. 17 A man, who was
then with her, pulled the woman away and brought her out of the room. She,
however, continued her outburst even when they were already along the
corridor. Seven other staff members executed a joint affidavit 18 about the
incident narrating that they ran to his chambers after they heard a woman
shouting and then saw the woman berating Judge Laron (minumura at
inaalipusta) while the judge just remained quiet (nanatiling tahimik). The
woman's shouts were heard even in the courtroom. They recounted that the
woman told the judge: "IDEDEMANDA KITA!" to which the judge retorted:
"Jdedemanda ka rin ng misis ko. "
Imelda Laron, the wife of Judg~ Tuvillo, also executed an affidavit

where she recounted that sometime in January 2008, she lifted their home
phone and heard a conversation between her husband and another person. 19
She confronted her husband about what she overheard and they had a serious
talk about Melissa. She also stated that after that incident, "nasty text
messages with threats from different cellphone numbers were sent to me;"
that their sons also received the same messages in their cell phones; and that
her relatives in the province, whose cellphone numbers were listed in her list
of contacts, called her "about the damaging text messages they received
about my husband and the woman named Michelle."
The Office of the Court Administrator in its Report 20 recommended

the consolidation of the two complaints as all the allegations in both were
rooted on the alleged affair between Judge Laron and Melissa. 21 After its
evaluation, the OCA recommended that Judge Laron be found guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge and be fined Pl0,000.00, and that the case
for unexplained wealth be dismissed for being unsubstantiated.
The Court's Ruling
Unexplained Wealth
The charge of unexplained wealth was disputed by Judge Laron who

was able to explain the source of the money he used to pay for the
construction of his house and the purchase of his vehicle, televisions and
furniture. He also attached copies of the educational plans of his children.
On the other hand, Melissa failed to substantiate her claim that Judge Laron,
17
Id. at 72.
18
Id. at 73- 74.
19
Id. at 70-71.
20
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-1755), p. 118.
'fl\'"y('~
21
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-1756), pp. 80-84.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
by his salary, could not afford to buy those properties and send his children
to private schools. For said reason, the Court agrees with the OCA's
recommendation that the complaint for unexplained wealth against Judge
Laron be dismissed.
Immorality
The charge of immorality, however, is a serious one covered by

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The penalty therefor includes
dismissal from the service. Section 8 of Rule 140 provides:
Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;

2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as
determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a
case pending before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits. [Emphasis Supplied]
Moreover, members of the judiciary are essentially guided by the

Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics in their acts.
Canon 4, Section 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Judge Laron's conduct of carrying on an affair with a married woman is
highly improper. Pertinently, Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
provides:
3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety.
A judge's official conduct should be free from the

appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only
upon the bench and in the performance of official duties, but
,K~<
also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
1'f
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must
be free of a whiff of impropriety both in his professional and private conduct
in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the court. 22 As the
judicial front-liners, judges must behave with propriety at all times as they
are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of
the people's sense of justice. 23 These most exacting standards of decorum are
demanded from the magistrates in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary. 2 No position is more demanding
as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat
on the Bench. 25 As the epitome of integrity and justice, a judge's personal
behavior, both in the performance of his official duties and in private life
should be above suspicion. For moral integrity is not only a virtue but a
necessity in the judiciary. 26
In these cases at bench, the conduct of Judge Laron fell short of this
exacting standard. By carrying an affair with a married woman, Judge Laron
violated the trust reposed on his office and utterly failed to live up to noble
ideals and strict standards of morality required of the members of the
judiciary. 27 As the Court wrote in Re: Letter of Judge Augustus Diaz, 28 "a
judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. He must comport
himself in a manner that his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety,
not only with respect to the performance of his official duties but also as to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. His character must
be able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny because the ethical
principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation
of the people's faith in the judicial system."
In these cases, both Judge Laron and Melissa admitted the affair. In
the case filed by Wilfredo, the July 2, 2008 Comment 29 of Judge Laron
reads:
1. Sometime in November 2005, Melissa Tuvillo was introduced to

me. In December 2005, Melissa approached me regarding
problems about a vehicular accident she was involved in. She
later informed me about the bouncing checks filed against her. At
that time, I had been married for more than 17 years, and my wife
was in the United States attending to her ailing father. Melissa
was likewise then without a husband and Mr. Tuvillo was out at
sea. She was aware of my marital status and that I have three
22
Garcia v. Valdez, 354 Phil. 475, 480 (1998).
23
Calilung v. Suriaga, 393 Phil. 739, 764 (2000).
24
Vedana v. Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 329 (1998).
25
Naval v. Judge Panday, 378 Phil. 924, 939 (1999).
26
Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, 328 Phil. 692-707 ( 1996).
27
Naval v. Panday, 378 Phil. 937 (1999).
~-~
28
560 Phil. 1, 4-5 (2007).
29
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), pp. 20-23.
1'r-~
DECISION 8 AM. No. MTJ-10-1755 &
AM. No. MTJ-10-1756
sons. We were both mature lonely people whose marriages had
lessened sheen. She brought me a sense of soul connection,
understanding and great company. [Emphasis supplied]
2. On the week of the May 2007 elections, Melissa called and

told me that her husband Wilfredo died of illness in China. She
even told me that the remains were cremated, that a padasal was
held at Brgy. Pitogo, Makati City, the place of her husband. After
that, she frequently asked for my presence and company, she even
asked me to help her guide her four children, and we developed an
intimate personal attachment to each other. She showered me with the
affection I felt I needed, and I reciprocated. We however tried our best
to be discreet and sensitive to the sensibilities of those around us.
3. September of 2007 was a turning point. Imelda, my

previously distant wife became ever present. My wife was all over
me, ever caring and loving. On November 2007, I started to
distance myself from Melissa.
4. Around the first week of January 2008, Imelda would later

hear of the affair, she confronted me and I soon had to choose
between the mother of my three children, or Melissa, the woman
who made me feel needed and cared for. One look at my three
sons made the choice plainly clear. I could not abandon my
family. I confessed to the affair, and vowed that I would
immediately mend· my ways. I started to exercise more self-
discipline, and became more aware of my responsibilities to my
family. I now persevere in keeping true to the straight and narrow
path." [Emphases supplied]
The affidavit of Melissa, on the other hand, stated that: 30
I have been maintaining an illicit relation with the said

2.
Judge above-named since November 2005 until March 2008. Our
relation is known among the personnel in the court's premises in
Makati City.
3. To support my complaint are the various text messages

and videos, ATM cards, bank checks which I am willing to present
in the proper forum. [Emphasis supplied]
The illicit affair must have been known to the staff of the court
because in their joint affidavit recounting the scene created by Melissa when
she berated the judge in his office, none of them attempted to stop her
harangue which was highly disrespectful of the judge's status. Judge
Laron' s inaction on the face of Melissa's verbal attack was a strong
indication that they had a relationship which was more than official or
professional.
30
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 5.
/~
~\"yr
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
In finding Judge Laron guilty of immorality, the Court is guided by

the ruling in Geroy v. Calderon 31 where it was written:
The bottom line is that respondent failed to adhere to the

exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of
the judiciary is expected to observe. Respondent is a married man,
yet he engaged in a romantic ·relationship with complainant.
Granti.ng arguendo that respondent's relati.onship with
complainant never went physical or inti.mate, still he cannot
escape the charge of immorality, for his own admissions show that
his relationship with her was more than professional, more than
acquaintanceship, more than friendly.
As the Court held in Madredijo v. Loyao, Jr.: 32
[l]mmorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes

conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of
respectable members of the community and an inconsiderate
attitude toward good order and public welfare. [Italics Supplied]
Immorality under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by

A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001 on the discipline of Justices
and Judges, is a serious charge which carries any of the following sanctions:
( 1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) a
fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
The Court also finds Judge Laron guilty of gross misconduct for
violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. This is another serious charge under
Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. The illicit relationship started
because Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron with respect to her pending
B.P. Blg. 22 cases and, apparently, he entertained the request for assistance.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
Rule 2.04.-A judge shall refrain from influencing in any

manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another
court or administrative agency.
31
593 Phil. 585, 597 (2008).
32
375 Phil. 1, 17 (1999), citingAlfonso v. Juanson, A.M. No. RTJ-92-904, December?, 1993, 228 SCRA 239.
vry
\',._~
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
Judge Laron admitted that Melissa had informed him about the four
B.P. Blg. 22 cases against her one month after she was introduced to him.
One of those cases was before Judge Laron himself. The case was dismissed
upon agreement of the parties. 33 Another case was pending before the sala
of another judge which was provisionally dismissed. 34 The situation highly
smacked of impropriety because Judge Laron, at the very least, "aided"
Melissa in a case pending before him and before another judge.
Another situation of impropriety was when Judge Laron asked money

from Melissa who was a litigant in a case pending before his court. This is
also a serious charge under Section 8 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Wilfredo and Melissa alleged in their complaints that Judge Laron
continuously demanded money from Melissa which led to the sale of their
houses and vehicles. Melissa claimed that: Judge Henry Laron was asking
an amount of money on a monthly basis. In addition, he is also asking me to
purchased his medicines (Teveten, Forecad. I even shoulder the expenses of
his executive check-up (07-08 June 2007) and also the normal visitation to
his doctor (Dr. Antonio Sibulo, St. Luke's Hospital) in which he kept all the
receipt. He was also asking for cell phone load, gasoline, and monthly
groceries (Puregold). Judge Henry Laron even ask for an allowance when
he was sent to Canada (a total of 2,000 US dollars) for a study grant last
year. 35 She further claimed that Judge Laron would physically hurt her
whenever she could not give him money and this averment was corroborated
by her sons who stated in their affidavit that "he is hurting physically our
mother because we saw once our mother having maraming paso, the result
of the physical punishment made by Tito Henry Laron. " 36 Melissa also
submitted a photocopy of a Bank of Philippine Islands deposit slip for
US$200 deposited in the account of "Henry E. Laron. " 37
All these conduct and behavior are contrary to the canons of judicial
conduct and ethics. Judges are held to higher standards of integrity and
ethical conduct than other persons not vested with public trust and
confidence. Judges should uplift the honor of the judiciary rather than bring
it to disrepute. Demanding money from a party-litigant who has a pending
case before him is an act that this Court condemns in the strongest possible
terms. In the words of Velez v. Flores, 38 such act corrodes respect for the
law and the courts, committed as it was by one who was tasked with
administering the law and rendering justice.
33
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 50a.
34
Id. at 51.
~
35
Id. at 15.
36
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 34.
37
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 50.
38
445 Phil. 54, 64 (2003). ~
~\rr
A.M.No. MTJ-10-1756
Judge Laron's immorality and serious misconduct have repercussions

not only on the judiciary but also on the millions of overseas Filipino
workers (OFW) like Wilfredo. While Wilfredo was working hard abroad to
earn for his family, Judge Laron was sleeping with his wife in his bed in his
house and spending his hard-earned dollars. What was even worse was the
flaunting of the illicit relationship before his young boys (aged 13 and 14)
who related it to him upon his return from abroad. This is the nightmare
scenario of every OFW - to be confronted upon their return with stories
from their own children about the "other man or woman" sleeping in their
house while they were away enduring the bitter cold or searing heat,
homesickness, culture shock, and occasional inhumane treatment just to earn
the dollars for the food, shelter, clothing, and education of their family back
home.
Under these circumstances, the Court finds itself unable to adopt the
recommendation of the OCA that Judge Laron be simply found guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a public official and be fined Pl0,000.00. The
OCA' s recommended dismissal of the charge of immorality is not warranted
by the evidence on hand. Judge Laron himself admitted his immorality and
even prayed that he be forgiven and that· no disciplinary action be taken
against him. 39 To disregard Judge Laron's admission and grant his plea
would mean a betrayal of the public trust.
WHEREFORE, finding Judge Henry Laron, Presiding Judge of

Branch 65, Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, GUILTY of
IMMORALITY and SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, the Court hereby metes
him the maximum penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture
of all benefits except accrued leave credits. He is likewise disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
The charge of Unexplained Wealth is DISMISSED for insufficient

evidence.
SO ORDERED.

Chief Justice
39
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 22.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755 - Wilfredo F. Tuvillo, complainant, v. Judge
Henry E. Laron, respondent; A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756 - Melissa J.
Tuvillo a.k.a. Michelle Jimenez, complain_ant, v. Judge Henry E. Laron,
respondent.
Promulgated:
October 18, 2016

x--------------------------------------------------------"0-<:\-~~=-~
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I CONCUR with the ponencia finding respondent judge Henry Laron 1

guilty of immorality and serious misconduct. I DISSENT, however, from
its imposition of only a three-year suspension for his grave offenses. I
submit that the respondent should be dismissed from judicial service and
be disbarred from the practice of law.
Background Facts
The case arose from two letter-complaints filed against Judge Laron
by Wilfredo Tuvillo (Wilfredo) and Melissa Tuvillo (Melissa). Wilfredo
charged Judge Laron with immorality and unacceptable wrongdoing.
Melissa accused Judge Laron of unexplained wealth and immorality and of
violation of anti-graft laws and disgraceful immoral conduct, in her
complaint and supplemental complaint, respectively.
A. Wilfredo's letter-complaint and supplemental complaint
In his May 2, 2008 complaint, Wilfredo, a seaman, declared that he

treated Judge Laron as a close family member and would "entrust" his wife
to him whenever he was abroad. I Ie heard rumors about the relationship of
Melissa and Judge Laron while he was overseas; his children had confirmed
to him that Judge Laron was always in their house and had physically hurt
Melissa. He stated that Melissa admitted to having an affair with Judge
Laron when he confi·onted her about it.
In his comment to Wilfredo's complaint, Judge Laron claimed that

Melissa approached him sometime in December 2005, to inform him about
the 'bouncing checks cases' filed against her; that Melissa told him that her
husband had died of illness in China. He said that Melissa knew of his
~
Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 2 A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755
marital status yet they still "developed an intimate personal relation with
each other." 2 He claimed to have distanced himself from Melissa in
September 2007, and that he had already confessed his affair with Melissa to
his wife.
Judge Laron further explained that his affair with Melissa "is a purely
personal matter" 3 which has no bearing on his professional responsibilities
as a judge and as a lawyer.
In his supplemental complaint-affidavit dated June 3, 2008, Wilfredo

further alleged that Melissa had sought Judge Laron's help for the
expeditious resolution of the cases filed against her; that Judge Laron had
demanded money from Melissa whenever he needed it; that he and Melissa
had lost all their savings and their property because of Judge Laron's
constant demands for money; that Judge Laron had physically hmi Melissa
when she could not produce the money he needed; and that Judge Laron had
"transgressed, intruded, and besmirched the tranquillity and sacredness of
[their] marital union and family unity." 4
In his comment to the supplemental complaint, Judge Laron

maintained that he did not extort money from Melissa, and that the loss of
the complainant's houses and lots could not be attributed to him. He denied
inflicting physical harm on Melissa, pointing out the lack of any medical
certificate to support this alleg~tion. He also denied violating the marital
union and family unity of the spouses Tuvillo, adding that Melissa had led
her to believe that Wilfi~edo had died of illness in China. Further, he
described Wilfredo's complaint as a "harassment suit supported by dubious
documents. " 5
B. Melissa's charges against Judge Laron
In her May 14, 2008 letter to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), Melissa asked that Judge Laron be investigated for unexplained
wealth and immorality alleging that he could not have acquired the
following properties on his salary as a judge: a P9-million house not
including appliances and decor - four (4) Lamarroza paintings; four (4)
plasma television sets and expensive furniture; a 2005 model Nissan Patrol
vehicle; and various high-caliber guns. Melissa also questioned how Judge
Laron could have afforded to send his three children to private schools.
Melissa disclosed that she had been Judge Laron 's mistress for three
(3) years. She claimed that Judge Laron had constantly asked money from
her for various expenses such as medicine and medical check-ups, cellular
phone loads, gasoline, monthly groceries, and study grant allowance.
Melissa also accused Judge Laron of physically hurting her.
Rollo, pp. 20-21.

Id. at 22.
~
Id. at 25.
Id. at 59.
In his comment to Melissa's letter, Judge Laron explained that he and

his wife bought their present house by selling their old town house for Pl.8
million and by obtaining a P3 .2-million bank loan to cover construction
costs. He said that he borrowed his father's retirement proceeds to buy a
2001 Nissan Patrol vehicle, and that he purchased the Lamarroza paintings
at a low price because the artist was his wife's friend. He added that the two
plasma television sets were gifts by his wife's uncle while the other two
were purchased in 2000 and 2002. Judge Laron also said that his children's
tuition fees were covered by educational plans and that their furniture were
part of his wife's commission as a dealer in his relative's furniture shop. He
explained that he had acquired his guns before joining the judiciary.
Judge Laron likewise denied asking money from Melissa for his
personal expenses and maintained that he did not inflict any physical harm
on her.
In her supplemental complaint-affidavit dated July 31, 2008, Melissa

stated that she was introduced to Judge Laron by a fiscal to assist in her
cases pending before the Makati City courts. She claimed that Judge Laron
promised to help her in these cases. When she followed up her cases on the
second week of November 2005, Judge Laron kissed her on the cheeks. On
November 28, 2005, they had their first sexual encounter; subsequent trysts
took place inside his office and at the Silver Place Hotel in Makati City.
Melissa added that Judge Laron often slept in her house in Antipolo,
and came to her condominium almost daily from August 2007 to January
2008. She added that she was receiving a $2,000.00 monthly allowance
from her husband, and that Judge Laron had asked money from her every
month. She reiterated that he had physically hurt her and had threatened to
reveal their relationship to her husband whenever she refused to give him
money. Melissa also disclosed that she sold her house and lot in Taguig City
and two vehicles to meet Judge Laron's demands for money.
In his comment to the supplemental complaint, Judge Laron explained

that he was introduced to Melissa sometime in November 2005, and that the
latter informed him about her B.P. 22 cases pending before the Makati
courts. Judge Laron denied that he had sexual liaisons with Melissa inside
his chambers; he also denied having asked money from Melissa. He
countered that the threats and harassments against him began when he
started avoiding Melissa.
Wilfredo filed an adultery case against Melissa and Judge Laron

before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati, which was later dismissed for
lack of probable cause. Wilfredo's petition for review was also dismissed by
the Department of Justice for lack of reversible error and failure to comply
with DOJ Circular No. 70.
~
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
The OCA recommended the consolidation of the two (2) complaints

against Judge Laron. After evaluating the evidence presented, the OCA
recommended that Judge Laron be found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judge, and be fined Pl 0,000.00. However, recommended the dismissal of
the charge of unexplained wealth for being unsubstantiated.
The Ponencia's Ruling
The ponencia found Judge Laron guilty of immorality and serious

misconduct, and suspended him for three (3) years. It dismissed the charge
of unexplained wealth due to insufficiency of evidence.
The ponencia stressed that immorality is a serious charge under

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and carries with it any of the
following sanctions: dismissal from the service; suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six
months; or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Noting that both Judge Laron and Melissa admitted their affair, the
ponencia thus concluded that Judge Laron "violated the trust reposed in his
office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of
morality required of the members of the judiciary" 6 when he carried on an
affair with a married woman.
The ponencia also found Judge Laron guilty of gross misconduct for
aiding Melissa "in a case pending before him and before another Judge. "7
It found that Judge Laron entertained Melissa's request for assistance
regarding her B.P. 22 cases pending in his (Judge Laron 's) and in another
judge 's sala.
Citing Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the ponencia stressed

that a judge shall refrain from influencing in any other manner the outcome
of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency.
The ponencia also considered as gross misconduct Judge Laron's act

of asking money from Melissa who was a litigant in a case pending before
his court. It found that Judge Laron continuously demanded money from
Melissa that led to the sale of the houses and vehicles she and her husband
owned. The ponencia also believed Melissa's allegation that Judge Laron
would physically hurt her whenever she would not give in to his request for
money, as corroborated by Melissa's sons.
~
6
Ponencia, p. 7.
Id. at IO.
The ponencia imposed on Judge Laron the penalty of suspension for

three (3) years since he "admitted his immorality and even prayed that he be
forgiven xx x." 8 According to the ponencia, Judge Laron's admission of his
weakness and lapses during the times he felt lonely and forlorn due to the
prolonged absence of his wife can be considered as a mitigating
circumstance. It added that Judge Laron appeared contrite and apologetic.
On the charge of unexplained wealth, the ponencia explained that

Melissa failed to substantiate her claim that Judge Laron could not afford to
buy the properties she mentioned in her complaint and to send his children to
private schools. Judge Laron, on the other hand, clarified the sources of the
money he used for the construction of his house and the purchase of his
vehicle, television sets, and furniture. He also presented copies of his
children's educational plans.
The Dissent
I take the position that Judge Laron should be dismissed from the
service since his transgressions make him unworthy to wear the judicial
robe. He should likewise be disbarred as he does not deserve to remain in
the legal profession any minute longer.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the

embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. He should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. His personal behavior, not only while in the
performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond
reproach, for he is, as he so aptly is perceived to be, the visible
personification of law and justice. 9
I. The Immorality Charge
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Comi enumerates transgressions

classified as serious, as follows:
SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:

Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019); .

Judicial Conduct;

determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding;
~
Id. at 11.
9
Resngit-Marquez v. Judge Llamas, Jr., 434 Phil. 184, 203 (2002).
.•

8. Immorality;
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits. (emphasis supplied)
Immoral conduct is behavior that is willful, flagrant, or shameless,

and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. 10 It refers not only to sexual matters but also to
"conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare. 11
In the present case, Judge Laron did not deny that he, a married
man, had an affair with Melissa - a married woman; he even asked that
he be forgiven by the Comi Administrator and that no disciplinary action be
taken against him.
In his comment to the May 2, 2008 complaint of Wilfredo, Judge

Laron averred that:
xx xx
1. x x x At that time, I have been married for more than 17

years, and my wife was in the United States attending to her ailing father.
Melissa was likewise then without a husband as Mr. Tuvillo was out at
sea. She was aware of my marital status and that I have three sons. We
were both mature lonely people whose marriages had lessened sheen.
She brought me a sense of soul connection, understanding, and great
company.
2. x x x After that, she frequently asked me to help her guide

her four children, and we developed an intimate personal attachment to
each other. She showered me with the affection I felt I needed, and I
reciprocated. We however tried our best to be discreet and sensitive
to the sensibilities of those around us.
3. xx xx
~
10
See Elape v. Elape, 574 Phil. 550, 553-554 (2008).
II
Judge Adlawan v. Capilitan, 693 Phil. 351, 354 (2012).
4. Around the first week of January 2008, Imelda would later

hear of the affair; she confronted me and I soon had to choose between
the mother of my three children or Melissa, the woman who made me feel
needed and cared for. x x x I confessed to the affair, and vowed that I
would immediately mend my ways. x x x
5. Ironically, my troubles seem[ ed] to start after I decided to

mend my ways. x x x x I started paying dearly for my indiscretion after
I distanced myself from Melissa.
xx xx
8. The affair is a purely personal matter and does not affect my

professional responsibilities as a judge and as a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and trusting myself to

your mercy, I have the courage to respectfully pray to the Honorable Court
Administrator, that I be forgiven, and that the present administrative
com~laint be dismissed and that no disciplinary action be taken against
me. 1 [emphasis supplied]
In his comment to Wilfredo's supplemental complaint affidavit, Judge

Laron stated that:
xx xx
23. Respondent did not wilfully violate the marital union as what
was present then as intimate personal attachment was emotional
attachment and not sexual liaison. 13
Significantly, Melissa admitted in her May 14, 2008 letter to then

Court Administrator Zenaida Elepafio that she was Judge Laron's mistress,
thus:
It's hard to admit, but I am the mistress of Judge Henry Laron

for three years. I am one of whom he cheated and maltreated in different
ways.xx x 14
Melissa reiterated this admission in her affidavit submitted to support

her letter-complaint to Court Administrator Elepafio, viz:
xx xx
2. I have been maintaining an illicit relations with the said Judge

above-named since November 2005 until March 2008. Our said relation is
known among the personnel in the court's premises in Makati City;
3. To support my complaint are the various text messages and

videos, ATM cards, bank checks which I am willing to present in the
proper forum; xx x 15
12
Rollo, pp. 20-22.
~
13
Id. at 69.
14
Id. at 6A-68.
15
Id. at 60.
Melissa also revealed in her supplemental complaint affidavit that:
xx xx
9. That after such unforgivable moments of our indecent affair,

it was followed with several times, inside his office last December 3, 2005
(Sat.), December 15, 2005, and then continued December 2005 to October
2007, we check[ ed]-in at Silver Place Hotel at the side of the new City
Hall building at Makati City. Not only that sometimes he slept in our
house in Antipolo, and almost daily in our condo at Pasong Tamo, Makati
City, since August 2007 up to January 2008.
10. That due to our indecent affair, he capitalized and abused my

innocence, by asking money monthly x x x.
xx xx
12. Not only that, when [he] attended seminar at Baguio City last
November 13-16, 2007, he asked me money again, I gave 700 US$ for his
pocket money, all these caprices of Judge Henry Laron was uncontrollable
because every time I refused to give him money, he will hurt me, followed
by threatening me to divulge our relation to my husband, afraid of
losing my husband and my family, I was forced to follow all the caprices
with closed eyes, co'z I was already there at the middle of darkness of
agony;
xx xx
14. That it was too late for me to realize the disgraceful and
immoral conduct of our unforgiven happiness, damage has been done,
my relation to my husband and family were ruined by Judge Laron,
thru his seduction move[d] and promises that make us both
disgraceful and immoral one[s] xx x.
No less than Melissa's children also acted as witnesses, stating in their

JOmt affidavit that Judge Laron fetched them from school and Melissa
starting in 2007, and slept in their house twice or thrice a week. Socorro
Divina, the caretaker of the Tuvillo's house, likewise declared in her
affidavit that Judge Laron fetched Melissa and her children and slept at the
house of the spouses Tuvillo during weekends.
Clearly, Judge Laron showed his moral indifference to the sensitivities

of Melissa's minor children and to the opinions of respectable members of
the community by having a relationship with a maiTied woman, by violating
the complainants' own marital abode, and by attempting to rationalize this
forbidden affair. The souring of his relationship with his wife, coupled with
his feeling of loneliness, could never justify Judge Laron's marital
indiscretion.
That Melissa allegedly told Judge Laron that her husband died of
illness in China is of no moment. Even if true, Judge Laron is a married
person: he had no business entering into an affair with a woman even if the
latter was a widow.
~·
Also, the claim that Melissa has been "widowed" is preposterous and
cannot be reconciled with Judge Laron's having a share of Melissa's
monthly bonanza from overseas. At any rate, it had been proven that
Melissa's husband, Wilfredo, was alive. In fact, even after Judge Laron saw
Wilfredo in the Philippines after the latter was hospitalized in China, Judge
Laron did not put an end to this illicit relationship.
I find it unnecessary to dwell on the specific issue of whether Judge

Laron and Melissa had engaged in a sexual relationship from all the
evidence presented, including Judge Laron's; the only direct evidence
missing would be the actual copulation between them.
Overwhelmingly and by direct admission of both Judge Laron and

Melissa, they had slept together in Melissa's Antipolo house and in her
Makati condo. It would certainly be very naive to believe that their
relationship was platonic. Precisely, by his own admission, his relationship
with Melissa started because his wife was away and he was lonely.
In appreciating all these, the Court should not forget that the mere act
of having an affair with a married woman and, worse, acting as her husband
(i.e., sleeping in her house and condominium, fetching her and the children,
etc.) already shows the depravity of Judge Laron's morals.
It is also immaterial that Melissa was the one who "sought" Judge
Laron, or that she gave way to the forbidden relationship. It was incumbent
upon Judge Laron - as a married person and a member of the Judiciary - to
have distanced himself from any woman with whom he felt he could have an
emotional attachment. Being the visual representation of justice, Judge
Laron should have exercised restraint, and not have given in to whatever
feelings he might have had for Melissa.
I cannot agree, too, with Judge Laron's pronouncement that his affair
with Melissa was a purely persona.I matter that does not affect his
professional responsibilities as a judge and as a lawyer. The faith and
confidence of the people in the administration of justice cannot be
maintained if a judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal
judicial virtue of moral integrity and, more so, who obtusely continues to
commit an affront to public decency. 16
Under the norms of legal and judicial ethics that a judge adopts when
he becomes a lawyer and a judge, the line between his official and personal
conduct blurs when it comes to morality. This is the price a judge has to pay
for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary; he cannot freely venture
outside this circumscribed circle of morality and expect to retain his exalted
position. No position is more demanding on an individual's moral
righteousness and uprightness than a seat on the Bench. Thus, a judge ought
to live up to the strictest standards of honesty, integrity, and uprightness. To
~
16
See Exec. Judge Naval v. Judge Panday, 341 Phil. 657, 690 (1997).
be sure, having and maintaining a mistress are not acts one would expect of
a judge who is expected to possess the highest standard of morality and
decency. 17
Our ruling in De Villa v. Judge Reyes 18 on this point is instructive:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge

must be free of [even] a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his official duties, but also to his behaviour outside his
sala and as a private individual. xx x [t] here is no dichotomy of morality:
a public official, particularly a member of the judiciary is also judged by
his private morals.
Simply put, a judge's official life cannot be detached or separated

from his individual persona. As the subject of constant public scrutiny, a
judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might
be viewed as burdensome by an ordinary citizen. Stricter still, the
personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and
in private life, should be above suspicion. 19
II. Gross Misconduct
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a

rule of law or standard of behavior in connection with one's performance of
official functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the
judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to
violate the law or by a persistent disregard of well-known rules. The
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
. dgment. 20
JU
In the present case, Melissa informed Judge Laron that she had
several pending B.P. 22 cases in different courts in Makati City, including
the sala where Judge Laron was a pairing judge. Instead of distancing
himself from Melissa, Judge Laron entertained her request for assistance,
meeting her frequently from 2005 to 2007.
Judge Laron's frequent fraternizing with a litigant who has a pending

case in a court where he is a pairing judge is highly condemnable. We note
in this regard that Judge Laron (as pairing judge of Branch 66) issued an
order on April 10, 2006, dismissing one of the cases filed against Melissa
(Civil Case No. 86602) on joint motion of the parties. Whether the dismissal
was proper or not is beside the point; Judge Laron's acquaintance with
Melissa put the order of dismissal in a suspicious light and totally against his
ethics as a judge.
17
Supra note 9, at 204, citing Re: Complaint of Mrs. Rotilia A. Marcos and her children against
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, RTC, Br. 20, Cebu City, A.M. No. 97-2-53-RTC July 6, 2001, p. 23.
18
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1925, June 26, 2006, 525 SCRA 485, 511.
19
Sec Torm is v. Judge Paredes, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366, February 4, 2015.
20
See My/a C Castro. joined by her hushand, l'agumpay Castro, and Luciana Vda. De Roja/es,
~
complainant, v. Judge Wilji-edo De Joya Mayor. respondent, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2268, en bane unsigned
resolution dated November 25. 2014.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion II A.M. No. MTJ-I0-1755
Judge Laron's act, too, of promising to aid Melissa in her other cases
pending before other judges - even if he did not actually broker for the
favorable decision in these cases - is reprehensible and cannot but have a
corrosive effect on people's respect for the law and the courts. The promise
gave the impression that judges could be used for influence peddling or
intercession.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "a judge

should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities." Rule 2.01 and Rule 2.04 of the Code provide as follows:
Rule 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote

public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
xx xx
Rule 2.04 - A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner

the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency."
21
The New Code of Judicial Conduct essentially reiterated these rules,
as follows:
CANON4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance

of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. I. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety in all of their activities.
xx xx
SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office
to advance their private interests, or those of a member of their family or of
anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the impression that
anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in the performance of
judicial duties.
CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is a prerequisite to the rule of law and a

fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and
exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional
aspects.
xx xx
SEC. 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome
oflitigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
~
21
Took effect on June 1, 2004.
Concun-ing and Dissenting Opinion 12 AM. No. MTJ-10-1755
The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provide that [a] judge's official
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties
but also his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
These canons require judges to avoid not only impropriety, but even
the appearance of impropriety in all their conduct, whether in their
public or private life. The proscription includes a judge's meddling with
judicial processes in courts other than his own and acting in a manner that
22
would arouse suspicion that he is meddling with such court processes.
Clearly, Judge Laron violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial

Conduct. The ponencia itself affirmed this when it held that "Judge Laron
apparently entertained" Melissa's request for assistance, and "aided her in
a case pending before him and before another judge. " We cannot tolerate
this appalling conduct as it erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
It has also been claimed that Judge Laron had been constantly
requesting money from Melissa. As a result, the latter was forced to sell
some of her houses and lots. I cannot support this claim for lack of
supporting evidence.
Nonetheless, it has been shown that Melissa submitted a Bank of the

Philippine Islands (BPI) deposit slip for $200 deposited to the account of
"Henry E. Laron." Whether this money was voluntarily given by Melissa on
account of their illicit relationship or requested by Judge Laron himself,
under the threat of blackmail if Melissa would refuse to give in to Judge
Laron's request, is of no moment: Judge Laron cannot accept any money
from a party-litigant.
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the

Rules of Court on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, which took effect on
October 1, 2001, gross misconduct and immorality are classified as serious
charges, each of which carry with it a penalty of either (a) dismissal from
the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations;
provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits; (b) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or (c) a
fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. 23
Judge Laron's behavior demonstrates his unfitness to remain in office

and to continue to discharge the functions of a judge. He has tainted the
image of the judiciary whose reputation and integrity he must keep unsullied
24
at all times. Taking into account the Court's policy to purge the judicial
22
See Punzalan v. Judge Plata, 423 Phil. 819, 83 l (2001).
~
23
Rivera v. Blanca.flor, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2290, November 18, 2014. 740 SCRA 528, 554.
24
See Calilung v. Judge Suriaga. 393 Phil. 739, 765 (2000).
ranks of those unworthy to don the judicial robe, I find no reason for the
Court to withhold the imposition of the severest form of disciplinary action
for Judge Laron's irresponsible and shameless conduct. This penalty, after
all, is what the rules and jurisprudence command.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness

from its occupant than does the judicial office. Judges in particular must be
individuals of competence, honesty, and probity, charged as they are with
safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should
behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all his activities. His personal behaviour outside the court,
and not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond
reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice.
25
Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he represents.
I disagree in particular with the ponencia's ruling that Judge Laron's

"admission of his weakness and lapses during the times he felt lonely and
forlorn during the prolonged absence of his wife can be considered as a
mitigating circumstance." This is the kind of lax ruling that cannot be
allowed to stand in the case book as it can, down the road, only lead to the
weakening of the moral fiber of the judiciary.
I also find misplaced the ponencia's reliance on the case of Judge

Caguioa v. Flora 26 to justify the three-year suspension it imposed on Judge
Laron.
First, the respondent in Flora was not a judge, but a sheriff. Second,
the acts committed by the respondent sheriff in Flora were different from
those committed by Judge Laron. The respondent sheriff in Flora was
intoxicated when he shouted "kalbo" at Judge Caguioa during trial; Judge
Laron, in the present case, was a married man who had an affair with a
married woman with a pending case before his court, and who
accommodated the woman's request for help in cases pending before his sala
and the sala of other judges.
Thus, the difference in the factual situations between Judge Caguioa

v. Flora and Judge Laron's case renders inapplicable the use of the Caguioa
ruling. To be sure, Judge Laron's remorsefulness should not be enough to
steer the Court's decision towards leniency. With transgressions as severe
as Judge Laron's, the Court itself would be brought to disrepute if it simply
imposes a slap on the wrist of Judge Laron. As we explained in Concerned
27
Employees of RTC of Dagupan City v. Judge Fallora-Aliposa:
[A] member of the Judiciary is commanded by law to exhibit the highest

degree of moral certitude and is bound by the highest standards of honesty
25
See Anonymous v. Achas, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 18, 25.
~
26
412 Phil. 426 (2001).
27
383 Phil. 168, 191 (2000).
and integrity. Life, liberty, and prope1iy are defined and molded as judges
perform their sworn tasks to uphold the law and to administer justice.
There is no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting
standards of judicial conduct and integrity. This court has been watchful of
dishonest judges and will not withhold penalty when called for to uphold
the people's faith in the Judiciary.
III. Charge of unexplained wealth
As the OCA did, I find that Melissa failed to substantiate her

allegations that Judge Laron was living beyond his means. Other than her
bare claims on this matter, Melissa failed to present any other evidence to
corroborate her charge of unexplained wealth.
Judge Laron, on the other hand, submitted the following pieces of

evidence to refute Melissa's allegations: deed of sale of motor vehicle
showing that what had been sold to him was a 2001 and not a 2005 Nissan
Patrol model; certificate of registration showing that the vehicle's ownership
was transferred under his name, and not under the name of his father; two
Prudential Life Education Plans dated May and July 1996, respectively; a
certification from Mrs. Ano Tan that three paintings were sold to the
spouses Laron at special discounted prices; and a notarized bill of materials
and cost estimates showing the estimated construction costs of their house.
Disbarment
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC (which took effect on October 1, 2002)

provides that an administrative case against a judge of a regular court based
on grounds which are also grounds for disciplinary action against members
of the Bar, shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such
judge as a member of the Bar. It also states that judgment in both respects
may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand,
provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of
law, among others, for gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on

what grounds. - A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as
an attorney for a party t6 a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers. constitutes malpractice.
~
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Indar, 28 the Court

automatically disbarred the respondent judge pursuant to the provisions
of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, adopting the reasoning held in Samson v.
Caballero that:
Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to

comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be
suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as member of
the Bar." The rule does not make it mandatory, before respondent may be
held liable as a member of the bar, that respondent be required to comment
on and show cause why he should not be disciplinarily sanctioned as a
lawyer separately from the order for him to comment on why he should
not be held administratively liable as a member of the bench. In other
words, an order to comment on the· complaint is an order to give an
explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only
as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair
and reasonable meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative cases
against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as
lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid
the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an
administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a
disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the
rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly
instituted with the filing of an administrative case against a justice of the
Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of
a first- or second-level court.
It cannot be denied that respondent's dishonesty did not only affect

the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious doubt
and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of
good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but
also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. If the practice of law
is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those
counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles
but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of
good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general
public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. [emphasis in
the original]
The Court had a similar ruling in the fairly recent case of Office of the
Court Administrator v. Presiding Judge Joseph Cedrick 0. Ruiz2 9 where we
dismissed the erring judge from the service and at the same time disbarred
him.
Judge Laron is a disgrace to both the bar and the bench. Considering
that Judge Laron is guilty of immorality and gross misconduct, I maintain
that - aside from being dismissed from the service - he should likewise be
disbarred and his name stricken out from the roll of attorneys.
28
685 Phil. 272, 292-293(2012), citing Samson v. Cahallero, J\.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5,
2009, 595 SCRA 423, 435-436.
~
29
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361, February 2, 2016.
A Heinous Administrative Offense
A point that I have reserved for the last in order not to be missed, is
the heinous character of the administrative offenses committed considering
the parties' respective situations. This characterization entitles this case to a
category of its own - a heinous administrative offense.
This case involves a member of the Judiciary found liable for charges
related to the discharge of the functions of his office. He used and abused
the functions and prerogatives of his office to the prejudice of the offended
parties and of the institution he serves, the Judiciary. He breached the trust
that the Constitution, the laws, and the Judiciary have conferred on him as a
public official, a lawyer, and a judge.
On the complainant's end, one of the offended parties is a female

litigant with a case pending before the respondent Judge, which gave the
Judge the excuse and occasion to commit the offenses charged. The other
offended party is the litigant's cuckolded spouse, an Overseas Filipino
Worker (OFW) whose rights to the sanctity of his marriage, the unity of his
home, and his and her children's peace of mind were violated by the
respondent judge.
The members of the Court may not be fully aware of the nature of the
offenses committed from the OFW perspective: one of the worst news that
an OFW could receive while overseas would be the infidelity of his or her
spouse. This has driven many an OFW to desperation and to commit
wrongful or shameful acts they would not otherwise have done in their sane
moments. This was the news that the complaining husband rudely received,
together with the bitter confirmation that the salary he assiduously remitted
from overseas had dissipated and partly spent on the offending judge.
These painful and unpleasant circumstances and the heinous

characterization of the offenses would be equivalent to rubbing salt and
chili on a raw wound or burn injury should the Judiciary, in taking care of its
own, give the respondent judge in this case a mere slap on the wrist by
penalizing him with less than the capital penalties required for the offenses
committed. I pray this kind of judicial action will not take place. Such
action, if taken by this Court, will immeasurably damage this Cami's
integrity and reputation, and would negate everything positive this Court has
recently achieved in the field of legal and judicial ethics.
With the termination of the Court's action on this administrative case,

there should no longer be any stumbling block to the referral of the Comi's
ruling to the Honorable Ombudsman for its appropriate action.
ri111il'l~~
ARi'l11M
Associate Justice
c;::;:.r:::.".,::() XEno.::, COPY:
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A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755 [Formerly OCA-1.P.I. No. 08-2011-MT.J] -
WILFREDO F. TUVILLO, Complainant, v. HENRY E. LARON,
Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City,
Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756 [Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-2017-MTJ] -

MELISSA J.F. TUVILLO, a.k.a. MICHELLE JIMENEZ, Complainant,
v. HENRY E. LARON, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
65, Makati City, Respondent.
Promulgated:
October 18, 2016

x-------------------------------------------··-----------------f.J-~.. ~------------x
DISSENT
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Majority today vote to reject the charge of unexplained wealth

brought against respondent Judge Henry E. Laron, Presiding Judge of
Branch 65, Metropolitan Trial Court, in Makati City, but recommends his
immediate dismissal from the Judiciary for immorality and gross
misconduct.
I respectfully DISSENT as to the penalty of dismissal, which I

consider to be too harsh, and as to the finding of gross misconduct.
The Case
Before us are the consolidated administrative cases filed against the

respondent initiated by Wilfredo Tuvillo, charging immoral conduct, and by
Melissa Tuvillo, charging unexplained wealth and immorality.
Salient Facts of the Case
In his Complaint Affidavit filed on June 3, 2008, 1 complainant

Wilfredo Tuvillo stated that he had been a seafarer for more than 20 years;
that in 2005, a case was filed against his wife, Melissa Tuvillo, in the Makati
MeTC; that he came to know respondent only because his wife had sought
the latter's help for the expeditious resolution of her cases; that the
Rollo, pp. 24-27.
~
Dissent 2 A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
respondent abused his wife's innocence and trust by extorting money from
her to the point that their savings and properties were dissipated; that in spite
of all the money that the respondent received, the cases of his wife were not
settled; and that the respondent also transgressed the sanctity of their
marriage and their family.
In her Complaint Affidavits dated May 14, 2008 2 and July 31, 2008, 3
complainant Melissa Tuvillo alleged that the respondent amassed
unexplained wealth in the form of a fully-furnished house and lot worth at an
estimated cost of IJ9,000,000.00 in Filinvest II, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, 4
and a Nissan Patrol vehicle; that the respondent sent his children to
exclusive private schools; 5 that he owned several expensive pieces of
furniture and paintings; 6 that he solicited and got money from her for his
cellular phone loads, gasoline expenses and monthly groceries; 7 that her
husband was a seafarer, by reason of which she regularly received a monthly
remittance of US$2,000.00 in addition to her own income; 8 that in the third
week of October 2005, a certain Prosecutor Giorsioso introduced her to the
respondent in relation to her criminal cases pending in the Makati MeTC; 9
that such first meeting was succeeded by other meetings, one of which was
10
in the second week of November 2005, when he kissed her on the cheek;
that such kissing later on became a regular habit every time she visited
him; 11 that on November 28, 2005, their first sexual congress occurred in his
office; that several more sexual congresses occurred between them either in
his office or at the Silver Place Hotel near the Makati City Hall; 12 that he
also sometimes slept in her Antipolo house and in her condominium unit in
Makati City; 13 that he asked money from her every month and whenever he
needed it; that she gave him US$ l ,OOO.OO of the US$2,000 monthly
remittances from her husband; 14 that the respondent also borrowed money
from her, including $800.00 to pay his executive check-up at St. Luke's
Hospital, IJ20,000.00 to defray his birthday treat for his office staff,
IJ25,000.00 for his bi1ihday celebration at Firewood, Mandaluyong City,
$2,000.00 as pocket money when he went on a study grant to Canada, and
$700.00 when he went on a study grant to Baguio City; 15 that he hurt her
physically and threatened to divulge their relationship to her husband if she
refused to give in to his demands for money; that only two of her four cases
Id. at 11-14.
Id. at 36-38.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
Id.atll.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 36
Id.
io Id.
Ii ld.at36-37.
12
Id. at 37.
i:; Id.
l·I Id.
15 Id.
S?
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
were ultimately settled; and that she lost her husband as well as the respect
of her family and friends because of the~r illicit affair.
In his Comment, the respondent admitted having developed an

"intimate personal attachment to each other" with Melissa, 16 but denied her
other allegations. Anent the charge of unexplained wealth, he asserted that
he had purchased the new house in Quezon City partly from the proceeds of
the sale of his own townhouse and from the proceeds of his loan from the
Land Bank; 17 that the pieces of furniture in his residence were earned by his
wife who was a dealer of wooden furniture; that he had acquired the Nissan
Patrol second-hand with money borrowed from his father; 18 and that he sent
his children to school with the use of the educational plans he had bought for
them. 19
On the charge of immorality and gross misconduct, the respondent

averred that he did not promise to help her with her cases; that he did not
have sexual congress with her in his office; that he did not demand or
receive money from her, 20 having paid his executive check-up at the St.
Luke's Hospital with his own funds; 21 and that he did not oblige her to pay
for the office dinner on the occasion of his birthday.
The respondent denied that the Tuvillos' real properties had been sold
because of him. He insisted that she had told him that her husband had died
in China. 22 He contended that Wilfredo could not have written the letter
dated August 8, 2008 to the Judicial and Bar Council because he was not in
the country at that time; 23 that it was not Wilfredo who had signed the
complaint; that she was conducting a demolition job against him; 24 that he
had reason to believe that she was responsible for the same because he had
received text messages from anonymous senders warning him of such
demolition job against him; that the threats and harassment against him
started after he had decided to keep distance between him and Melissa; that
even their telephone line at home was tapped; 25 and that she had gotten hold
of his contacts list and had then sent damaging text messages to persons
found in the list.
ic, Id.
17
Id. at 20.
18
Id. at 22.
19
Id. at23.
2
u Id.
21
Id. at 24.
22
Id.
2' Id. at 62.
24 Id.
25
Id. at 64.
q
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
Recommendation of the
Court Administrator
After his own investigation, Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, now

an illustrious Member of the Court, recommended that the respondent be
held guilty only of conduct unbecoming of a judge and fined in the amount
of ~10,000.00; and that the consolidated charges of immorality and
unexplained wealth be dismissed for being unsubstantiated.
Recommendations
I agree that the charge of unexplained wealth was successfully

disputed by the respondent; hence, the charge is being properly dismissed.
I agree, too, that there was adequate basis for concluding that the
respondent and Melissa had a romantic affair that constituted immorality
that is sanctionable under our canons of judicial conduct, but I am
constrained to differ from the Majority on the appropriate penalty to be
meted on the respondent. He should not be dismissed from the service, but
should only be condignly punished with suspension from the service without
pay, or fined.
I respectfully differ on the finding of gross misconduct against him. I

humbly submit that this charge was unfounded, and, therefore, I urge that the
Court dismiss the charge for insufficiency of evidence.
Re: Judge Laron's Alleged Gross Misconduct
The charge of gross misconduct against the respondent was not

competently established.
First of all, Melissa claimed that she had come to meet the respondent
for the first time in November 2005 with the help of the public prosecutor
because she was looking for someone who could help her with her pending
cases in the Makati Metropolitan Trial Court. The respondent strongly
denied her claim, however, averring that he did not know of the various
cases pending against her when she was first introduced to him, and insisting
that he came to know of such cases only after a month following the first
meeting. I feel that we should be more circumspect in accepting her claim.
To start with, she did not even present the public prosecutor who had
arranged that first meeting between her and the respondent to corroborate
her version. Moreover, none of her cases was assigned to his court, and he
acted in two of such cases only as a pairing judge. Also, the dismissals of
most of her pending cases had been upon the joint instance of the parties
4
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
(i.e., Melissa and the Prosecution), debunking her statement that he had
intervened with his co-judges in her behalf.
Secondly, Melissa charged that the respondent had physically

maltreated her whenever she could not give him the money he demanded;
and that she had lost her family's possessions just to satisfy the respondent's
immodest demands, to the point of claiming that she had given to him half of
her monthly remittance (i.e., $1,000.00) out of fear that he would disclose
their illicit affair to her husband. But her charges - which were not even
supported by evidence other than her self-serving allegations - were highly
improbable for being inconsistent with human nature and daily experience.
For one, it was highly unnatural for her to be intimidated into giving to him
so much if she had her young children and a household to take care of on a
daily basis. There was certainly something amiss with her if she had given
him half of her $2,000.00 monthly remittance with such regularity just to
indulge the respondent. As to his supposed threats of exposing their
romantic relationship to her husband, this seems illogical and highly unlikely
in the face of the reality that he had much more to lose from making good
such threats. Verily, while she wol)ld lose her husband and the affection of
her family and relatives, he would lose not only the affection of his own wife
and their family but also his professional life and his budding career in the
Judiciary.
And, thirdly, Melissa's unilateral portrayal of the respondent as a poor

leech-like opportunist and a violent person should not be accepted without
question. We should look for her motivations in suddenly denouncing him
before the Court for supposedly committing so many grave sins. In my view,
she was either a spurned woman who could not accept his rejection of her, or
someone looking for a plausible scapegoat on whom to lay the blame for her
unexplainable loss of the family possessions and wealth by her own
profligacy and recklessness. Either of these scenarios seems to make more
sense than her unproved charges of gross misconduct considering that the
two administrative complaints subject of these consolidated cases were
simultaneously filed in the middle of 2008 right at the time that her husband
had returned to the country and could have discovered their depleted
resources and rightly demanded that she should account for them.
Judge Laron's Explanations Should Be

Carefully Studied And Considered
The appreciation of facts in these cases should not be solely based on

the complainants' affidavits and complaints. The charges of gross
misconduct .should be appreciated in the context of the probable ill motives
of Wilfredo and Melissa for bringing their charges. We should be cautious
before condemning the respondent to suffer any penalty.
<l)
Dissent 6 A.M. No. MTJ-l0-1755
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
The complainants' convoluted and improbable tale of woe begs us to

listen to the respondent's side of the story. Audi alteram partem. 26 This is
what we should now do in this adjudication.
For the direct appreciation of every Member of the Court, therefore, I

am quoting the succinct explanations tendered by the respondent in his
Comment, 27 and let us reflect on his explanations to determine whether he
uttered the truth, or prevaricated; and whether or not it was Melissa who was
duplicitous in her attempt ~o cover the truth with her concocted tale against
him, to wit: ·
1. The charges against me by Ms. Tuvillo are full of allegations

which arc distortions of the truth. This is not the first charge against me
by this person. It speaks of her propensity to present lies in order to put
me to shame, public ridicule or contempt, and as part of the demolition job
against me.
2. She was introduced to me in November 2005. In December

2005, she informed me about her problems about a vehicular accident and
the cases against her for bouncing checks. I never told nor promised her
that I can help regarding her bouncing checks cases.
3. The allegations in no. 7 of the complaint anidavit arc not

correct. She could have mentioned again the cases against her but I never
promised any help. We merely shook hands after the conversation.
4. There is absolutely no truth to the allegations in no. 8 of the

complaint affidavit. November 28, 2005 is a Monday. For that Monday, I
conducted hearings in civil cases in the morning in my court and criminal
cases in the afternoon in the pairing court, Branch 66. From July 2005 to
May 2006, I presided over my pairing court, holding hearings on Monday
a11ernoon and Wednesday morning, aside from resolving
incidents/matters, in addition to my duties in my Branch. In the court at
the old building (Chatcau), at all times, the door of the chambers is
always open, not only because the lock of the same was destroyed, hut
also it is my habit not to close such door when I am around. Also,
there arc only two aircon units in our office, one in the courtroom and
one in the chambers. The door in the chamhc1·s to the staff room is
always open so that staff could also have cool air in their room. The
refrigerator and the coffee maker of the branch arc inside the
chambers that the staff go in and out freely when they need
something. Further, on top of the table in the chambers is a thin glass.
The affidavits of Lylanic Cayetano, Nelia Nanat, and joint aflidavit or
Amabelle Feraren and Nelly Montealegre, are attached hereto as Annexes
"A", "B" and "C", respectively.
5. Same with the allegations in No. 8, what were stated in no. 9

arc pure lies. In the Chatcau, what divides the chamber and the staff
room is a mere plywood and an open door. As earlier stated, the door
between the chambers and the staff room is always open. Thus, the
2
r' Translated: The other side should be heard.
27
Rollo, pp. 58-65.
0
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
allegation about December 15, 2005, a Thursday, and her account of

"several times" is impossible. To her allegation about December 3,
2005, I never went to the office on that day; as I only report on
Saturdays if the branch is on duty. Even when we transferred to the
new City Hall building, the door of the chambers is always open when
I am around, even if I have visitors. Her allegation about Silver Place
Hotel is another lie. There is also no truth that sometimes I sleep in her
Antipolo house and almost daily in the Pasong Tamo condo; I always
sleep with my wife in our house (see affidavit of Imelda B. Laron attached
hereto as Annex "D"). Ms. Tuvillo's narrations are but a product of her
imagination, her propensity to concoct lies.
6. The allegations in no. 10 of the complaint affidavit are

absolutely lies. I never asked nor obliged her to give me money, $1,000
monthly from November 2005 to February 2008 as she stated. I never
received such amount from her. She claimed to have a monthly allotment
of $2,000.00, it is out of logic to throw away half of it and take only half
for her family.
To reiterate my comment in OCA IPI No. 08-2017-MTJ, I was the

one who paid for my executive check-up at St. Lukes Hospital, I did
not borrow from her. The dinner for my birthday in July 3, 2006 was
_just for my staff in Branch 65 and the pairing court (Branch 66) and
around ten guests; she showed up but I did not ask her for money for
my birthday and I did not obliged (sic) her to pay for the bills.
7. Another lie is her allegations in no. 11 of the affidavit complaint

that I asked for $2,000.00 and $700.00 for the Canada trip and Baguio
seminar, respectively. As I have stated in my Comment in OCA IPI No.
08-1017-MTJ, I did not ask for, and she did not give me, money in such
occasions. As also stated in the same Comment, there is no truth to her
claim that I hurt her and threatened to blackmail her when she refused to
give money.
8. I never interceded in the cases against her. The case she

mentioned which I resolved was the one in my pairing court, Branch
66, which was dismissed upon motion filed by the parties.
9. Her description about the incident in the presence of Atty.

Laguilles is inaccurate. I requested Atty. Laguilles not to go out of the
room so he could hear what she might say, as she and/or her cohorts
had previously scattered information which maligned me. I did not
shout at her, she was the one who boasted that she will file cases
against me. I did not call her tarantado, .she was the one who shouted
such word to me. She was the one who acted to put up a scandalous
scene in my office in the presence of my staff. The affidavit of Ma.
Anicia Razon and the joint affidavit of Nelly Montealegre, Amabelle
Feraren, Liezl Mandin, Arlen Quirante, Lylanie Cayetano, Nelia Nanat
and Michelle Grace Malonzo are attached hereto as Annexes "E" and "F",
respectively.
10. To the allegation that she lost her husband, here is a text
message passed to me on August 13, 2008 from her number
(+639174794034):
fl I
& A.M. No. MT.J-10-1756
Sweet na cut line tatawag ka pa ba? Tawag ka Ing para

malibang ang pananakit ng sikmura ko ..Ingat at wag
mambababae.kung d mapigilan INGAT Ing mabuti. Alam mo
kung anong ibig kung sabihn. Nakausap kuna may ari ng
SCANMAR.2loy ang movilization by Nov.My 15% ncrcase sa
boung sahod mo at 50% bstat pa absorb or maiwan ka dyan.
Madami bnefit.na inilatag sakin .. Wag kana muna
Umuwi.Pagbigyan natn Scanmar kaht another 3
mnths.Xtension Jang. Then lipat kana ky captain Paulin.Mas
matsas pa dn offer sau dun! Biro mo 7,500$ sa scanmar pwedc
na dn kc madami bnefit at malapit pa ofic d2 sa scol mga
bata.Andyan na pala tao na nag join.Kunin u agad ung pnadala
ko,ma22wa ka sa.San Mateo yan. Tmbrland retirement lot
mo.dream mo d ba mgkaron farm lot, yan na un! D ba nakwn2
ko sau 2mama ng lottery c james.Eh ang bakla ask nya ako ano
gus2 ko ko balato, e ngbro Ing naman ako Yun! Tino2o nga ..
Sana kuna ikwn2 lahat. Wag kana muna Umuwi ako na Jang
ulit pupunta sau .. Iagi ko cnasabi sau para sa mga anak mo at
sau gnagawa ko kaya ayaw na naman kita pauwiin .. Ung 2ngkol
sa pagka kapitan mo wag kana dn mag alala my order na na
dina kylangan mag take ng Exam mga chfmate. Sa Nov. Din
ang effctvty and kylangan lang Training 80,Th Ing ang bbyaran
sa Iahat. Pero inilalaban dn na Ma eliminate ung MLC nay an!.
Cge na Mag ingat ka at Wag mang agrabyado ng BABAE at
wak ka mag bago, at asahan mo Iagi ako and2 maggng
ka2wang at mag aalaga sau.Bastat Magpaka bait ka.D ba motto
ko yun.D baling ako ang Salbahe was Ing ikaw,at d baling ako
ang Mag Sinungaling was Ing din ikaw.Kc Iahat ng gnagawa
my Dahilan.Hay Buhay nga naman!@
("sweef' refers to her husband.) ls this the message to a husband she

claimed she lost? Defin_itely not.
If ever she still has unsettled cases, it was her sole decision and
style not to settle the same. I never promised her anything about her cases.
It appears that the cases against her for violation of BP 22 in MeTC
Makati City are: Crim. Case Nos. 341616-17 (two counts for P20,000.00
each filed on June 27, 2005), Crim. Case Nos. 344609-10 (two counts for
Pl 9,377.00 each, filed on October 2005), and Crim. Case No. 354008-09
(two counts of P24,620.00, filed on October 2007). Is it not logical to just
settle the cases rather than to always give money to someone so this
person will settle the cases? Is it not ludicrous for her to go through all the
trouble and risk of giving money always to me when she could have
directly dealt with her cases by settling the sad amounts?
Much has to be known why she wants the cases for BP 22 to

remain pending, even if she can and is able to settle the cases.
If ever she sold her house and lot in Taguig City and the two
vehicles she mentioned, it was her own decision to do so, but not because I
extorted from her. As I have stated in par. 7 of my comment in OCA-IPI
No. 08-2017-MTJ dated 21 July 2008, assuming that she sold her property
located at Taguig City, she did that for reasons only known to her, but not
because I was asking for her money.
(!J
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
· 11. As I have stated before, at about the time of the elections in

May 2007, she told me that her husband Wilfredo died while he and she
was in China. (sic) I was surprised upon receipt of the complaint in OCA
IPI No. 08-2011-MTJ "signed" by Wilfredo Tuvillo.
In a text message to me on March 19, 2008 from her number

(+639174794034), it was stated:
"Namatay nanay W.Kanina lam.'Nagulat lahat. Biglaan

ulit wala pa lyear cya naman."
(She was referring to the death of the mother of Wilfredo

Tuvillo [W] which happened less than a year from the "death of
Wilfredo").
A check with the Bureau of Immigration record of Wilfredo shows

that he arrived in the Philippines on May 17, 2007 (immediately after the
elections) and left the country on June 9 of the same year.
For the year 2008, the record of Wilfredo shows that he arrived on
March 24, 2008 and left the country on May 17, 2008. She coincided the
presence of Wilfredo in the Philippines with the filing of the complaint
verified by "Wilfredo" on May 15, 2008. The truth is it was not Wilfredo
Tuvillo who signed such complaint.
In a letter allegedly written and sent by "Wilfredo Tuvillo" to

111
the Judicial and Bar Council, dated '8 day of August 2008", a time
when he was not in the Philippines, "he" made allegations against my
application with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Such
letter was submitted to the JBC after my name was read by her and/or her
cohorts as included in the publication for applicants. The immigration
record taken on August 28, 2008 shows that he was in the country on
March 24, to May 17, 2008 only.
A text message from +639174916604 passed to me on August

10, 2008 states:
"Bunso is the Jack of all trades of our GROUP.Gaya ng

gnagawa sau ngaun.Iisa Ing ang kumikilos si hunso
lng.wala ng iba. Tip ko yan sau Panycro.Walang
WILFREDO"
("Bunso" refers to Melissa Tuvillo, that is her name in what she

calls her group.)
The immigration records of Wilfredo Tuvillo for the years 2007

and 2008 and the letter allegedly signed by "Mr. Tuvillo" on August 8,
2008 are attached hereto as Annexes "G", "I-I" and "I", respectively.
12. [n her desire to distort the truth, she stated that I took
advantage of her so that I could gain profit. I did not do any damage to
her as she always claimed. In presenting her "facts", she has always
casted aspersions on my person, these could be seen upon a closer look at
her statements submitted to this Office. In an attempt to discredit me, she
resorted to fabrications and prevarication. Here is a text message to me
from her number (+639065594387) on July 18, 2008:
~
Dissent IO A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
"Kylangan Ing mapaniwala ko cla na wala ako pera.walang

wala .. Yan palagi sabhn nyo.Yun and cnasbi nya daw palagi
MADRAMA ako.Pwes ggawin ko nga.Palibhasa gawain ny''
A text message to me from her number (+639174794034) on

August 17, 2008 reads:
"Bntayan mo lang ang mga icnasagot at cnasabi.Wag Ing

malaman na iisa ang kumikilos.Kylangan lagi ipaalam so lahat
magtatanong na agrbyado ung"
On October 17, 2008, (days after I received the Complaint

Affidavit dated 31 July 2008 and filed a motion for extension to file
comment), I received a text message from +639158228039 stating:
"Wag muna sagutin yan! Para d na lumala ng lumala."
These messages show that a demolition job has been set up

against me. Her allegations were presented to portray that she is grieving
and down, as can be seen in the first two text messages, so as to merit
sympathy. Then in the Jhird text message, she and/or her cohorts do not
want me to put a defense and.coupled it with a threat.
13. ln the year 2007, she even told me about at least three
incidents in that year wherein she was a victim of hold-up. She stated that
these happened in the corner of J.P. Rizal and F. Zobel Streets in Makati
City, inside the ladies comfort room at the ground floor of the Makati City
Hall Building, and in Quezon City. I consider such incidents involving a
single person and which "happened" in a year to be strange; it is also odd
that one incident happened inside the City Hall of Makati.
Worth to note is an e-mail message about the names she has

been using, to wit: Mishelle Jimenez, Catherin Lopez, Socorro Rodrigo,
Rowena Divina, Mishel/e Mijares, Liza Geneta, Mary Borchers, etc.
14. Threats and harassment against me started when

distanced myself from her, these continue up to the present, in text
messages. I received text messages insisting that I must talk to her I
realized that she wants me to be associated with her, there is no
reason for me to submit to what she wants.
Even the telephone line in my residence was tapped; I received

text messages from her cellphone number the contents/subject of
which pertain to conversations I previously had with certain persons.
The acts of tapping our telephone line, getting into our Contacts
list and sending messages to persons listed therein, distributing mails/e-
mail to certain persons, and alleging fabrications to put me to shame,
public ridicule and content, and the lies from her, will show that there is
ill-motive on the part of Melissa Tuvillo and/or her cohorts and
predcterminatc plan to put me in jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied)
As the above-quoted portions of his Comment shows, the respondent

thoroughly and credibly bebunked the many attributions to him of
~
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
misdemeanor and misconduct, like committing physical abuse and extortion

against Melissa, and aiding her or intervening in her behalf with his co-
judges in the Makati MeTC. His detailed explanations reflected candor and
sincerity, indicating the absence of prevarication and duplicity.
I do not wonder, therefore, that then Court Administrator Perez

submitted the following well-studied evaluation and rational conclusions on
the charge of gross misconduct in his report and recommendation dated
December 22, 2009, 28 to wit:
EVALUATION: xx x
xx xx
Well-settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must not only

proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in
itself - such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. (People vs. Ricamora, G.R.
No. I 68628 [December 6, 2006}); (People vs. Garin, G. R. No. 139069
[June 17, 2004]).
We have no test of truth of human testimony, except its conformity

to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to
these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.
xx xx
As to complainant Melissa's claim that respondent took

advantage of his position, frequently demanding and receiving
pecuniary gain from complaint, we also find these claims unworthy of
belief. Under Section 3 (d) of Ruic 131 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, it is presumed that every person takes ordinary care of his
concerns. It is hard to believe that a businesswoman and a general
manager of a local employment agency can be so "abused of her
innocence" that she would unhcsitantly give away half of her monthly
allotment of US$2,000 from the hard labors of her husband overseas
.iust to satisfy the caprices of the respondent. Such allegations of the
complainant totally run counter to common human experience and
observation. It was likewise unbelievable that on top of giving away
half of her monthly allotment from her husband, complainant even
went to the extent of selling their con.iugal house and two motor
vehicles just only to give in to respondent's demands.
More importantly, not a scintilla of competent and credible

evidence was adduced to support the claims of the complainant. It is a
basic rule in evidence that a party must prove his affirmative allegations.
Certainly, he who asserts not he who denies must prove (Martin vs. Court
a/Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 82248 [January 30, 1992})
Although complainant attached an alleged deposit slip to the

dollar account of the respondent, that can hardly prove the alleged
28
ld.at108-118.
~
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
demands for money of the respondent as there is no showing that it

was complainant who made the deposit as demanded by respondent.
The claim of complainant Melissa that she was maltreated by

respondent if she could not produce the amount demanded cannot be
given credence for being bare, self serving and uncorroborated.
There is no evidence at all to prove that respondent inflicted physical
harm upon complainant. No medical certificate was adduced by the
complainant in support of her claim of maltreatment. The fact also
that complainant Melissa did not file any criminal complaint for
physical injuries against the respondent betrays her allegation of
physical harm inflicted by the respondent.
The statements of the children of the complainants cannot also

help establish the alleged physical punishment being inflicted upon
complainant Melissa as the same is admittedly hearsay. Moreover, it
is likewise relevant to note that in the joint affidavit of the children of
the complainants, they refer to a "certain Tito Henry Laron, which
gives the impression that they do not know personally the person
referred to as "certain" Tito Henry Laron. The same is true with the
affidavit of the caretaker of the complainants in their house in
Antipolo City. She could not have positively identified the respondent
as the one who frequently slept at the complainant's house in Antipolo
City as there is no showing that she personally knows the respondent.
As to the alleged unexplained wealth of the respondent, suffice

it to say that just like any other allegations of the complainant
Melissa, the same is completely bare, self serving and uncorroborated.
No evidence was presented by complainant to prove that respondent
was living beyond his means. Moreover, the material allegations of
the complainant were convincingly refuted by the respondent with
independent and competent evidence thereby clearly showing that the
complaint for unexplained wealth is merely concocted.
As to complainant Wilfredo Tuvillo, the same cannot be

considered for being purely hearsay as it was completely anchored on
the complaint of his wife, complainant Melissa Tuvillo, of which he
has no personal knowledge of and which nonetheless has been fully
passed upon above. "
Be that as it may, we arc not suggesting in any way that the

allegations against respondent judge are untruthful or fictitious, but rather
we are inclined to dismiss the case for failure of the complainants to prove
satisfactorily the charges of immorality and unexplained wealth against
respondent judge. However, respondent judge cannot be completely
exonerated because at the very least, complainants were able to prove and
as admitted too by respondent judge, that there existed between the
complainant Melissa Tuvillo and respondent judge "an intimate personal
attachment to each other". The act of respondent judge who is a married
man of having "an intimate personal attachment" with complainant
Melissa Tuvillo, who herself is married, does not necessarily constitute
immorality but certainly suggests an appearance of impropriety and
unbecoming conduct and thus, exposes respondent judge to administrative
culpability.
~
Dissent 13 A.M. No. MTJ-l 0-1755
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
Such behavior constitutes a light offense punishable by a fine not

less than Pl,000.00 but not more than Pl0,000.00. (Rule 140, Secs. JO and
11, RULES OF COURT,) In light of the circumstances affecting not only
the reputation of Judge Laron himself but the image and reputation of the
whole judiciary as well, we find it reasonable to impose upon him the
maximum fine of Pl0,000.00.
"A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his
private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized. He
should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess
moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright
man." (Tan v. Pacuribot, A.M No. RTJ-06-1982[December14, 2007])
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the

consideration of the Court are our recommendations:
1) that these cases be RE-DOCKETED as regular administrative

matters;
2) Hon. Henry E. Laron, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial

Court, Branch 65, Makati City be found guilty of Unbecoming Conduct
and be fined the amount of Pl0,000.00;
3) that these consolidated cases for Immorality and Unexplained

29
wealth be dismissed for being unsubstantiated.
The Majority should give due regard to the well-considered

appreciation and conclusions by the Court Administrator. I do not see any
good reason why we should not. Accordingly, we should not punish the
respondent for gross misconduct for lack of evidence.
Proper Penalty for the

Charge of Immorality
The respondent cannot anymore undo or erase his past with Melissa.
Had he resisted the temptation and fought his very human needs and urges,
he would not now be having these cases against him. What was done is
done.
No offense by the respondent should go unsanctioned because the law

will be less in the eyes of the people otherwise. It is punishment that is one
of the major moving factors for the people do what is legal and proper, and
for individuals to keep within the bounds of what is right and just. But the
punishment should not exceed what is condign and commensurate to the act
or omission, and should be meted in consideration of all the circumstances
that have affected the offense as well as the.offender. This is the reason why
the Court has calibrated the sanctions to be prescribed on members of the
19
Id. at 114-118.
~
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
Bench and the Bar who have erred with a view to serving the essence of
justice and equity in administrative proceedings.
Accordingly, we have consistently mitigated or aggravated the

sanctions after duly taking into good account all the known circumstances
surrounding the offenses and the offenders, including those personal to the
respondents or relevant to the charges notwithstanding that some of the
circumstances may not have been expressly recognized in the relevant
administrative rules. Indeed, we have looked at the peculiar factual milieu of
every case, the acts or omissions of the respondents, their previous
transgressions, their notable contributions to the legal profession as well as
to the Judiciary, their judicial and non-judicial backgrounds, and many
others like length of service, remorse, family circumstances, ages and even
humanitarian and equitable matters. The objective for doing so has always
been to make the sanctions not only correct and commensurate but just and
fair as well. As such, any tailor-fitting of the sanctions imposed on the
respondent will not be unprecedented.
The respondent should be favored with the mitigating circumstances

of voluntary admission of the immorality that reflected his genuine remorse,
his commission of the offense for the first time, and his long years of service
in the Judiciary (i.e., nearly 12 years, having been appointed on December 1,
2004 as MeTC Judge in Makati City, Branch 65). In addition, we should
weigh the fact that he has no record of other administrative charges.
The respondent was not an automaton, but was of flesh and blood, a
descendant of Adam who fell prey to temptation and engaged in consensual
romantic relationship with an adult. We should also consider this
circumstance, and be more understanding of his weakness. Doing so would
not be the first time for the Court. The heavy hand of the Court should be
stayed, and instead we should desist from imposing the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service. Although we should not be too tolerant, we
should not also be too harsh. In Viojan v. Duran, 30 an administrative case
against a sitting Justice of the Peace who had consensual sexual intercourse
with a married woman, the investigating district judge submitted a report
and recommendation for the suspension of the respondent judge for a period
of three months through the Secretary of Justice for the consideration of the
President who would be acting on the recommendation. The erudite report
and recommendation of the investigating district judge justly recognized the
human weakness that had intervened on the occasion of the commission of
the sin by the respondent through the following passages, which we should
bear in mind in meting the penalty to be justly imposed on the respondent
herein, to wit:
0
' Adm. Case No. 248, February 26, 1962, 4 SCRA 390.
Aj
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
"The respondent has committed an act of immorality. The flesh is

weak. But man should possess that consciousness to do the right and avoid
the wrong. And one who has taken the oath of public service to dispense
with justice, should be more possessed of the courage and the will to
overcome the weakness of the flesh. Since the dispensation of justice has
to originate from sound moral consciousness, one who lacks it, or has
shown to be wanting of it, cannot offer the guaranty required for the
performance of a just dispensation. A magistrate has to live by the
example of his precepts. He cannot judge the conduct of others when his
own needs judgment. It should not be 'do as I say and not what I do.' For
then the court over which he is called to preside will be a mockery, one
devoid of respect. Hence, the necessity for the magistrate to possess
enough fortitude to subdue his passion for wrong.
"There is, therefore, no question that for the immorality he

committed within the territory of his jurisdiction as a Justice of the Peace,
the respondent should be punished. But, considering the tempting
circumstances which surrounded him for that length of time, which
circumstances, were indirect invitations, his falling to sin should not
be dealt with severity. Few men, and very few indeed, could have
resisted that temptation; could have the moral strength, the spiritual
energy to impose on his weaker self the will to ignore such enticement.
Although we want to count the respondent among these few, yet it
would be too much wishing to expect him to be among them before he
learns the hard lesson brought about by repentance. This misstep, the
first that he committed, should not be taken as the measure of his
whole conduct. He should be given the chance after now to benefit
himself out of his stumble. For after all, it was rightly said that
'without an clement of the obscene, there can be no true and deep
aesthetic or moral conception to life. ' 31
Given all the foregoing, the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the
service is too harsh a penalty. I am inclined to impose the penalty of
suspension from office for three years. The Court has to exercise
compassion in favor of the respondent. Let us not forget that the petitioner
did not exactly come to the court with clean hands herself.
Re: Application of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
A.l'vI. No. 02-9-02-SC, which took effect on October I, 2002,

relevantly states:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals

and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and court
officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise
grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of
the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of
conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the
discipline of lawyers.
11
Id. at 392.
~
& A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also

be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent Justice, judge or
court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may
forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily
sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Given that immorality is also a ground for disciplinary action against

lawyers, the respondent may also be considered as subject to disciplinary
action as a member of the Bar.
However, this rule only goes as far as treating the complaint as both a
disciplinary action against him as a judge and as a lawyer, and does not in
any way dispense with or set aside the respondent's right to due process. As
such, his disbarment as an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without
requiring him to comment on the disbarment is violative of his right to due
process.
I vote to DISMISS the charge of gross misconduct, and to impose on

the respondent the penalty of suspension from office for three years.
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EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755 [Formerly OCA-IPI No. 08-2011-MT.J] -

WILFREDO F. TUVILLO, Petitioner, v. HENRY E. LARON, Presiding
Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati City, Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756 [Formerly OCA-IPI No. 08-2017-MTJ]

MICHELLE J. F. TUVILLO a.k.a. Michelle Jimenez, Petitioner, v.
HENRY E. LARON, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
65, Makati City, Respondent.
Promulgated:
October 18, 2016
x------------------------------------------------------------------ .~--x
SEPARATE OPINION
LEONEN,J.:
A married judge who enters into an illicit relationship with a married

woman commits conduct unbecoming of a judge. When their affair is
flaunted in front of her young children, and his other woman is a party-
litigant from whom he solicits money, the married judge defiles the integrity
of the judiciary even further.
I concur with the ponencia's findings that respondent Judge Henry E.

Laron is guilty of immorality and serious misconduct. However, looking
into the odious conduct with which Judge Laron comported himself, I vote
to impose the more severe penalty of his dismissal from service.
On December 17, 2004, Judge Henry E. Laron (Judge Laron) was

appointed to Branch 65 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City. 1 He
was concurrently Branch 66 Pairing Judge for the Pilot Project of the Small
2
Claims Court. Before the same metropolitan trial court, Melissa J. Tuvillo
(Melissa) was charged with criminal cases 3 for violation of Batas Pambansa _
Big. 22. The first two (2) informations were filed on May 27, 2005, 4 which
were followed by two (2) more on September 15, 2005. 5
I
Masterlist of Incumbent Judges as of August 19, 2016
<http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/masterlb+/_MeTC.pdt> (visited October 1, 2016).
http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/masterlist/ _MeTC.pdfld. The Small Claims-Pilot Project officially took
effect on October 1, 2008. See Adn1. Order No. 141-2008, Re: Designation of Pilot Courts for Small
Claims Cases dated September 29, 2008, appointiag Judge Laron as Pairing Judge for the Small
Claim<> Pilot Court of Makati City, Branch 66
4
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), pp. 66-67, 70- 71; rollo CAM. No. MTJ-10-J 755), pp. 68-69.
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), pp. 66-ti7.
Id. at 68-69.
Separate Opinion 2 A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755 and
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
On the third week of October 2005, Melissa was allegedly introduced

to Judge Laron by a certain Fiscal Giorsioso, her godfather, as she needed
help with the four (4) pending cases filed against her. 6 According to
Melissa, Judge Laron promised to provide her assistance. 7
On the second week of November 2005, Melissa visited Judge Laron

in his office to follow up on these cases. He allegedly kissed her on the
cheeks. 8 Taken aback, Melissa asked why he did that, and Judge Laron said
it was simply beso-beso. 9 According to Melissa, the beso-beso became a
regular habit of Judge Laron on her visits to his office. 10
Judge Laron admitted that they were introduced sometime in

November 2005 11 and that he knew of the bouncing checks cases filed
against her. 12 At that time, Judge Laron was also aware that Melissa is
married to Wilfredo F. Tuvillo (Wilfredo), who works as a seafarer. 13
Melissa and Wifredo have four (4) children. 14 Judge Tuvillo is likewise
married and has three (3) sons. 15 His wife, Imelda B. Laron 16 (Imelda), was
in the United States to attend to her ailing father. 17
Melissa alleged that their affair began on November 28, 2005. 18

According to her, while in his office, Judge Laron asked her if she knows
how to eat hamon (Christmas ham). 19 He then pulled her close, held her by
her nape, and forced her20 towards the front of his pants. 21 He unzipped his
pants and made her suck his genital. 22 Later, he told her to lie on the table,
where he "owned" her. 23 Judge Laron relieved himself without having to
insert his whole genital into her hers. 24
Melissa did not spe~ify if the act complained of happened during

office hours, or whether it happened after work was finished, when no one
could possibly witness the scene.
6
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 36, Complaint Affidavit.
Id.
/
Id.
9
Id.
IO Id.
II Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 20, Comment.
I2 Id.
13
Id.
I4 Id.
is Id.
IG Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 70, Imelda B. Laron Affidavit.
17
Rollo, (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 20.
18
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 36.
I9 Id.
20
Id. at 36-37. Melissa alleged that "bigla akong isinubsob" toward the front of his pants.
21
Id. at 36-37.
22
Id. at 37.
23 Id.
24 Id.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
In his defense, Judge Laron alleged that they merely shook hands and
that he never promised to help her. 25 He claimed to have been busy
conducting hearings on November 28, 2005, which was a Monday. 26 To
back up his claims, he attached the affidavits of his staff. 27
In their Joint Affidavit, Branch 65 Criminal Case In-Charge Amabelle

C. Feraren and Court Aide Nelly A. Montealegre claimed that it was
impossible for Judge Laron to have laid a hand on Melissa without anyone
witnessing it. 28 All employees in the staff room were said to have access to
Judge Laron's chamber at any given time, 29 as the fax machine, telephone,
refrigerator, and coffee maker were inside his chamber. 30
According to Branch 65 Court Stenographers Lylanie U. Cayetano31

and Nelia B. Nanat, 32 Judge Laron's chamber was inside the staff room. 33
The door between the staff room and his chamber was allegedly always kept
open for the employees to enjoy the cool air from his chamber. 34 The staff
room may also get cool air from the adjacent court room, 35 which was cold
as it had its own air-conditioning. 36
Melissa alleged that the "unforgivable moments of [their] indecent

affair" 37 continued on December 3, 2005, a Saturday, in Judge Laron's
office, and then from December 15, 2005 to October 2007, where they
checked in at Silver Place Hotel, located beside the new City Hall
Building. 38 The new City Hall Building houses the Metropolitan Trial Court
ofMakati City. 39 According to Melissa, Judge Laron would sometimes sleep
in the Tuvillos' conjugal house in Anti polo, and almost daily in her condo in
Pasong Tamo, Makati City, from August 2007 to January 2008. 40
For his part, Judge Laron admitted that his marriage to Imelda had
"lessened [its] sheen" and that Imelda was distant to him. 41 Melissa
"brought [him] a sense of soul connection, understanding and great
company." 42 He stated that he reciprocated Melissa's affection to him. 43
25
26
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 58, Comment.
Id.
J
27
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), pp. 68--69.
28 Id.
29
Id. at 66--67.
30
Id. at 66.
31 Id.
32
Id. at 67.
33
Id. at 66--67.
34
Id. at 67.
35
Id. at 68.
36 Id.
37
Id. at 37.
38
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 37.
39
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 58.
40
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 37.
41
Rollo (Adm. Matter. No., MTJ-10-1755), p. 20 and 21, Laron Comment to Wilfredo's Complaint.
42 Id.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
According to Socorro R. Divina (Divina), caretaker of the Tuvillo

Family House in Antipolo, Ju~ge Laron would come and sleep over in
Antipolo on weekends. 44 Divina herself opened and closed the gate
whenever Judge Laron would fetch Melissa and the children in the
moming. 45 She would also see Judge Laron fetching the children back from
school in the afternoon, sometimes using his own car, and on other times,
. M e1.1ssa' s car. 46
usmg
Wilfredo and Melissa's sons, Renz Don Willie (14 years old) and
Raphael Thom (13 years old) Tuvillo, corroborated Divina's statement. 47
They stated that Judge Laron would pick them up from home to school. 48
According to them, "Tito Henry Laron used to go to our house in Antipolo;
[h]e slept in our house twice or thrice a week specially during
weekends [. ]" 49
On one occasion, they saw their mother bruised and found out that
Judge Laron inflicted the injury on her. 50 Judge Laron assailed the allegation
of hitting Melissa as hearsay, 51 as the children did not mention seeing the
incident or having personal knowledge of it. 52
Melissa would receive a monthly allotment of US$2,000.00 from

Wilfredo, who works as Chief Officer/Chief Mate at sea. 53 He has been an
Overseas Filipino Worker for more than 20 years. 54 Melissa claimed that in
exchange for his help, Judge Laron asked her for money every month, and
whenever he needed it. 55
On April 10, 2006, Judge Laron ordered the dismissal of a civil case,
YL Finance Corp. v. Tuvillo, et al., with prejudice. 56 This was in lieu of the
parties' Joint Motion to Dismiss. 57 The other cases remained pending
against Melissa.
As regards Judge Laron's alleged extortion, Melissa cited that Judge
43
44
45
Id. at 21.
Id. at 36, Affidavit of Socorro R. Divina.
Id.
I
46 Id.
47
Id. at 34.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51
Id. at 56.
52 Id.
53
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), pp. 43--45, Allotment Slip.
54
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 24, Complaint Affidavit.
55
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10: 1756), pp. 36, Complaint Affidavit.
56
Id. at 50A, Order.
57 Id.
Separate Opinion 5 AM. No. MTJ-10-1755 and
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
Laron asked her for money to treat his office staff on his birthday on July 3,
2006. 58 Melissa paid a total of P25,000.00 for this birthday treat at
Firewood, Mandaluy.ong. 59 Another time, when he went to Canada for a
study grant on the second week of March 2007, he solicited US$2,000.00
from her as pocket money. 60 Melissa likewise advanced the payment for his
executive check up in June 2007 at St. Luke's Hospital. 61 Judge Laron again
asked her for allowance when he attended a seminar in Baguio City on
November 13 to 16, 2007, and she gave him US$700.00. 62
Melissa alleged that she had to sell their house and lot in Taguig and
two (2) vehicles, a Pajero and a Honda CR-V, to satisfy Judge Laron's
financial pleas. 63 She presented a Bank of Philippine Islands deposit slip for
US$200.00 addressed to one "Henry E. Laron," dated February 1, 2008. 64
Judge Laron allegedly became uncontrollable and would hurt Melissa

when she refused to give him money. 65 According to Melissa, Judge Laron
threatened to divulge their relationship to Wilfredo. 66 Thus, she "was forced
67
to follow all his caprices with ... closed eyes[. ]"
Judge Laron gave bare denials. 68 He claimed that he never received

these amounts from Melissa, nor did she give him money on such
occasions. 69 He added that Melissa never attached any sworn medical
certificate to prove that she sustained an injury. 70 Judge Laron also alleged
that he did not blackmail her. 71
Judge Laron claimed that he "always [slept] with [his] wife in [their]
house." 72 He attached his wife's affidavit to support this. 73 Imelda,
however, had been in the United Stat~s to look after her ailing father. 74
Neither she nor Judge Laron mentioned when she actually came back home
and slept with him.
Sometime in May 2007, more than one ( 1) year since the start of their
5s
59
Id. at 37.
Id.
/
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63
Id. at 38.
64
Id.at 50, Deposit Slip.
65
Id. at 37.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68
Id. at 59, Comment.
69
Id. at 59-60, Comment.
70
71
72
Id. at 59.
73
Id.at70-71.
74
Separate Opinion 6 AM. No. MTJ-10-1755 and
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
extramarital affair, Melissa allegedly told Judge Laron that Wilfredo died of
illness in China. 75 To support his allegation, Judge Laron presented the
affidavits of Branch Clerk of Court Romualdo I. Balancio 76 and Clerk III
Jeffrey C. Bat-og77 of Branch 67 of the Municipal Trial Court of Makati
City. Melissa questioned their affidavits for being "unbelievable and
unreliable because of the enormous influence and authority over them by
respondent Laron. " 7 s
Wilfredo averred that Judge Laron's alibi "was a big lie, because on
the [third] week of May 2007, [Judge Laron] visited [the Tuvillo Family]
house in Antipolo at the early time of the day[.]" 79 Judge Laron allegedly
told Wilfredo of his meeting with an attorney in Ynares Stadium, Antipolo,
Rizal.so A purported record from the Bureau of Immigration, which Judge
Laron himself attached and relied on,s 1 showed that Wilfredo was indeed in
the Philippines on the third week of May 2007, specifically: from May 17,
2007 to June 9, 2007.s 2
On September 18, 2007, two (2) more criminal cases for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were filed against Melissa. Prosecutor III George
V. De Joy impleaded Melissa's husband, Wilfredo.s 3
On October 23, 2007, Presiding Judge Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag of

Branch 67 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City provisionally
dismissed the first two (2) cases of bouncing checks against Melissa.s 4
Imelda learned of her husband's affair in January 2008s 5 after she

overheard a telephone conversation between Judge Laron and Melissa.s 6
Judge Laron then confessed the affair to his wife and vowed to mend his
ways.s 7 Their three (3) sons, aged 18, 17, and 15, also found out about his
indiscretion.ss Judge Laron acknowledged that his family was hurt.s 9
On April 16, 2008, one Atty. Jun Laguilles 90 (Atty. Laguilles) came
with Melissa to see Judge Laron in his chamber. Atty. Laguilles is the
75
76
Id.
Id. at 73-74.
I
77
Id. at 72.
78
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 96.
79
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 77.
80 Id.
81
Id. at 62, Comment.
82
Id. at 75, Travel Information of Wilfredo F. Tuvillo.
83
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10: 1755), pp. 70-71, Informations for Violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22.
84
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 51.
85
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 21.
86
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 70.
87
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 21.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 37.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
husband9 I of Former Makati City Regional Trial Court Judge Zenaida T.

Galapate-Laguilles. He allegedly sought to settle the differences between
Melissa and Judge Laron. 92 Melissa averred that Judge Laron cursed at her
and ordered to have her sent out of his office. 93 Melissa also cursed and
shouted at Jud~e Laron. 94 She demanded that he return all the money he
took from her. 5 He said he would, to which she replied that he include
everything he received from her, even his underwear. 96 Atty. Laguilles
helped Melissa out of Judge Laron's chamber. 97
In May 2008, Wilfredo arrived from abroad. 98 The children reported

to their father what happened at home: "Tito Henry" would sleep in the
Antipolo home, especially on weekends, and he physically hurt their
mother. 99
Wilfredo filed a case for adultery against Judge Laron and Melissa.
The Makati City Prosecution Office later dismissed it for lack of probable
cause (for failure to establish all the elements of the crime). Ioo This was
affirmed by the Department of Justice. IOI
On May 23, 2008, Melissa entered into the police blotter Judge
Laron's alleged threats on her life. According to her, Judge Laron told her,
"ipapayari kita o kaya ipapatumba nalang kita." 102
Judge Laron admitted the existence of their extramarital

relationship. Io3 However, he denied that he ever asked money, 104 committed
violence against her, or violated her marital union and family unity. 105
Wilfredo maintained that Judge Laron "capitaliz[ed] and abus[ ed] the
innocence, trust and .confidence of [Melissa]." 106 Judge Laron's extortion
allegedly led to the depletion of all their savings, including their houses and
lots. 107 He called Judge Laron "a hoodlum in robes who should be removed
from the judiciary before he can commit more atrocities."I 08
91 Id.
)
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97
Id. at 72.
98
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 34.
99 Id.
100
Id. at 95-98.
101
Id.at99-100.
102
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 18, Police Blotter Certification.
103
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 21.
104
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 59.
105
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 52.
106
Id. at 24.
107
Id. at 25.
108 Id.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
Regir v. Regir 109 has defined immorality as:
[I]mmorality is not based alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is not

confined to sexual matters, but includes conducts inconsistent with
rectitude, or indicative of. corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
110
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare (Emphasis
supplied)
Rule 140, Section 8(8) of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC, 111 classifies immorality as a serious charge. 112 As penalty,
Section ll(A)(l) allows for the imposition of dismissal from service,
forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, and disqualification
from holding any public office, including those in government-owned or
.
contra 11 ed corporations.
113
In Perfecto v. J.udge Esidera, 114 we have ruled that lawyers and judges
are bound to uphold secular morality, not religious morality. 115 We look past
religious doctrine and determine what is good or right based on shared
community standards and values:
This court may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a

particular religion. We do not have jurisdiction over and is not the proper
authority to determine which conduct contradicts religious doctrine. We
have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as it involves
conduct that affects the public or its interest.
Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of

lawyers and judges, "immoral conduct" should relate to their conduct as
officers of the court. To be guilty of "immorality" under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer's conduct must be so depraved as to
109
)
612 Phil. 771 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
110
Id. at 779.
111
Proposed Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re Discipline of Justices and Judges (2001).
112
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, sec. 8 provides:
SECTION 8. Serious charges.~ Serious charges include .... [i]mmorality[.]
113
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, sec.l l(A)(l) provides:
Section 11. Sanctions.
A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits[.]
114
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417, July 22, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20 l 5/july20 l 5/RTJ-15-2417 .pdf>
[Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
115
Id.at8.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
116
reduce the public's confidence in the Rule of Law.
Guided by this standard, I find Judge Laron's actions to be indicative

of his moral indifference and questionable integrity, amounting to
immorality.
Although it may be true that they were lonely people 117 who
reciprocated each other's affections, 118 it is also true that Melissa was
desperate to wriggle out of the criminal cases that had strangled her. 119 It is
likewise true that both of them are married, 120 and their extramarital
relationship was not kept hidden, especially from Melissa's children. 121
That Melissa first approached or sought Judge Laron 122 is immaterial

as a defense. Judge Laron knew that she was in dire need, and he took
advantage of her weaknesses. He was in a position of power: unlike
Melissa, he has legal expertise, and he was not facing a string of criminal
cases. He is a judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, before
which she was charged.
Judge Laron claims to have been fooled of Wilfredo's alleged death in

2007. This does not convince. Judge Laron himself has shown that he is
capable of acquiring Wilfredo's 2006-2008 travel information from the
Bureau oflmmigration. 123 ·
Even if Judge Laron believed Wilfredo's death to be true, it still does

not exonerate him. His attempts to dangle a red herring must fail. Judge
Laron entered into a relationship with Melissa beginning in 2005. 124 At that
time, he was fully aware that her husband was simply at sea, alive and
. 125
work mg.
As the affair broke down, Judge Laron now paints himself as victim of
Melissa's calls and text messages, as well as threats to embarrass him and
cause his dismissal from service. 126 He attempts to soften the impact of his
127
actions by stating that they were "mature people" when they entered into
the extramarital affair. However, when it comes to facing the consequences,
J
116
Id. at 9.
117
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 20.
118
Id. at 21.
119
Id. at 24.
120
Id. at 20.
121
Id. at 34.
122
Id. at 59.
123
Id. at 75.
124
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 36.
125
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 20.
126
Id. at 21-22.
127
Id. at 20.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
Judge Laron bails out and blames Melissa for allegedly hurting his wife and
children with her news of the affair. 128
Maturity does not consist of welcoming a mistress' affections 129 but

rejecting the repercussions when things go sideways. Judge Laron cannot
lay the blame on Melissa, especially when he himself was a kept man of a
married woman.
In any case, it is Judge Laron's private acts that are under scrutiny, not
Melissa's. Judge Laron states that his extramarital affair "[was] a personal
matter and d[id] not affect [his] professional responsibilities as a judge and
as a lawyer." 130 This is a tall tale.
In Perez v. Catindig, 131 we disbarred a lawyer who had an extramarital

affair with another woman. Although his second marriage with the other
woman was void, we have stated that the lawyer "definitely manifest[ ed] a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws .... He exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar[.]" 132
In Leynes v. Judge Veloso, 133 this Court ruled that "[i]f good moral
character is required of a lawyer, with more reason that requirement should
be exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to
observe irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public
decency." 134
In Castillo v. Judge Calanog Jr.: 135

must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala
and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As
we have very recently explained, a judge's official life can not simply be
128
I
Id. at 21.
129 Id.
130
Id. at 22.
131
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l5/march2015/5816.pdf> [Per
Curiam, En Banc].
132
Id. at 10.
133
172 Phil. 312 (1978) [Per J. Aquino, En Banc].
134
Id. at 315.
135
276 Phil. 70 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
detached or separated from his personal existence. 136 (Emphasis

supplied)
Anyone applying for the judiciary is expected to have a thorough

understanding of community standards and values. No one forced Judge
Laron to become a judge. When he be~ame a judge, he agreed to abide by
the Code of Conduct for members of the Philippine Judiciary.
Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine

. .
J u d1ciary 137
prov1"des:
CANON2
Integrity
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial

office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct

above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the

people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary[.]
Judges decide .not only on matters of law, but also of equity. They
determine what is right and wrong in the cases before them. Ajudge should,
therefore, be able to walk the talk. He or she should be and appear to be a
person with integrity and credibility. In Dia-Anonuevo v. Judge Bercacio: 138
Although every office in the government service is a public

trust[,] no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness
and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. A
magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a
manner that his conduct[,] official or otherwise[,] can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome
of integrity and justice. 139
Judge Laron's words and actions reflect on the judiciary as a whole.

He is expected to avoid conflicts of interest and instances where the morality
and legality of his actions are cast in a bad light. Judge Laron cannot simply
accept the perks of. his position but shy away from the discomfort and
responsibilities involved. He should embrace both the boons and banes of t/
the job, which he willingly entered into. In Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr: 140 /f
136
Id. at 81.
137
A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC (2004).
138
160-A Phil. 731 (1975) [Per J. Mufioz-Palma, En Banc].
139
Id. at 739.
140
.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely

and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest

public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the Eerformance
of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. 41
In that case, this Court dismissed a judge who had a mistress, with
whom he bore a child, for immorality. This Court held the dismissal to be
"with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any public office
including a government-owned or controlled corporation, and forfeiture of
retirement benefits, if any." 142 Thus:
Judge Calanog has behaved in a manner not becoming of his robes

and as a model of rectitude, betrayed the people's high expectations, and
diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in general.
It is of no import that the evidence on record is not sufficient to

prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts of concubinage having indeed
existed and been committed. This is not a criminal case for concubinage
but an administrative matter that invokes the power of supervision of this
Court over the members of the judiciary.
The circumstances show a lack of circumspection and delicadeza

on the part of the respondent judge by failing to avoid situations that make
him suspect to committing immorality and worse, having that suspicion
confirmed. 143
Under Section 1 of Canon 4, judges have the duty to "avoid

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities."
According to Judge Laron, he and Melissa "tried [their] best to be

discreet and sensitive to the sensibilities of those around [them]." 144 This is
not true. Judge Laron and Melissa were together for three (3) years. 145 He
did not even attempt to hide it from Melissa's minor children 146 and her
family's caretaker. 147
The response of the court employees is even more telling. On April

16, 2008, when Melissa came to Judge Laron's chamber, none of them ~
141
Id. at 81-82.
142
Id. at 83.
143
Id. at 80.
144
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 21.
145
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-1O,1756), p. 11.
146
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 34.
147
Id. at 36.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
intervened when she began shouting at the judge 148 and demanding that he
return all the money and things he received from her. 149 The eight (8) 150
court employees who witnessed the scene only stood by to watch 151 as the
former lovers quarr~led. 152 Melissa shouted that she would file a case
against Judge Laron, who retorted, "my wife will also sue you." 153 Only
Atty. Laguilles, who came with Melissa to mediate between her and Judge
Laron, 154 stepped in and helped her out of the door. 155
Judge Laron willingly consented to their extramarital relationship. He

did not keep it between only the two of them. Divina 156 and the Tuvillo
children 157 certainly knew. There are good reasons to suppose that Atty.
Laguilles 158 and his wife 159 were likewise aware of the relationship. The
court employees, 160 who simply looked on as Melissa and Judge Laron
argued about returning her money and his underwear, could also have
suspected about them, to say the least. ·
While Wilfredo was busy providing for his family, Judge Laron
usurped Wilfredo's role as husband and father, sleeping in their house,
driving for Melissa, and picking up her children from school. 161 Judge
Laron is well-known·to the Tuvillo children. They even fondly called him
"Tito Henry." 162
Thus, one cannot imagine the shock of Wilfredo, who, for more than
20 years, 163 worked away on board a ship-battling against homesickness,
the perils of sea, and the emotional strain caused by his physical separation
from his family-only to come home and find out that another man was
enjoying his wife and the money he sent. Wilfredo's children themselves
broke the news to him. 164 They found out about Judge Laron's trysts with
their mother, as Judge Laron did not mind flaunting their relationship in
front of Wilfredo's children. 165
In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Marcos and children against Judge,,,('
148
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 72.
149
Id. at 37.
150
Id. at 72-73.
151
Id. at 60.
152
Id. at 61.
153
Id. at 73.
154
Id. at 37.
155
Id. at 72-73
156
Rollo (A.M No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 36.
157
Id. at 34.
158
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 37.
159 Id.
160
Id. at 72.
161
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755), p. 34.
162 Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
Marcos, 166 this Court dismissed from service a judge who flaunted his other
woman as though she were his wife. It did not matter that the judge had
been physically separ:ated from his wife for three (3) years, or that he had no
children with his mistress. His public display of the illicit relationship
constituted a conduct "unbecoming of a judge[,] whose conduct must at all
times be beyond reproach." 167
Judge Laron entered into an extramarital affair with Melissa, a hapless

litigant who faced a series of cases. His seduction led to a three-year
relationship where Judge Laron exchanged his help for her money, and their
relationship injured persons other than the two of them.
Judge Laron's indiscretion hurt not only his family 168 but also
Melissa's husband who, after discovering their affair, sued his wife and the
judge for adultery. 169 The judge, a powerful figure in the legal circle, also
publicly threatened Melissa that Imelda, his wife, would sue her. 170 The
scandal in his chamber, in front of a private lawyer as well as court staff and
employees, dragged down the dignity of his office.
Under Section 2 of Canon 4, "judges shall conduct themselves in a

way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office."
Judge Laron's extramarital affair, his public display of his also-

married "other" woman, and the damage his indiscretion caused not just to
other people but also to the dignity of the office he serves, certainly reek of
immorality. His actions exhibit indecency, lack of integrity, depravity, and
moral indifference to community standards and values. 171
For transgressing public morals and defiling the image of the

judiciary, he must be stripped of his judicial robe and dismissed from
service.
II
Section 8(3), in relation to Section ll(A)(1) 172 of Rule 140 of the A

166
167
Id. at 92.
168
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 21.
169
Id. at 95-98.
170
Id. at 72.
171
Regir v. Regir, 612 Phil. 771, 779 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
172
RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, sec. l l(A)(l) provides:
SECTION 11. Sanctions.
A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
Separate Opinion 15 . A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755 and
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
Rules of Court, further supports Judge's Laron's dismissal from service.

[G]ross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct" 173 is a serious charge allowing for a judge's removal from
• 174
service.
In Sison-Barias v. Judge Rubia, 175 we dismissed a judge who privately

met with a litigant at a restaurant and advised her to speak with the other
party's counsel. We have ruled that this act violated Canons 1
176
(Independence), 2 (Integrity), 3 (Impartiality), and 4 (Propriety).
Similarly, Judge Laron violated the same provisions of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary:
CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a

fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and
exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional
aspects.
SECTION 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function

independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and in
accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any
extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct
or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
SECTION 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner

the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency.
SECTION 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other

relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of
judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are
in a special position to influence the judge.
/
173
RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, sec. 8(3) provides:
SECTION 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of.Judicial Conduct[.]

174
RULES OF COUR.T, Rule 140, sec. l l(A)(l) provides:
SECTION 11. Sanctions.
A. If the respondent is guilty ofa serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the ser-vice, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
175
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388, June 10, 2014, 726 SCRA 94 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
176
Id. at 139.
..
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
SECTION 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in

general and in relation to the particular parties to a dispute which he or she
has to adjudicate.
SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the

discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the
institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.
SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of

judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary,
which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
CANON2
Integrity
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial

office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct

above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the

people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
CANON3
Impartiality
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial

office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by
which the decision is to be made.
SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their duties without favor, bias

or prejudice.
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in

and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the
legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and the
judiciary.
SECTION 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct

themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for
them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
CANON 4
Propriety
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the

performance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety in all of their activities.
J
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must

accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity
of the judicial office.
SECTION 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with

individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their
court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality.
In Gacayan v. Judge Pamintuan, 177 this Court ruled that it is improper

for a judge to have a private meeting with the accused, especially "in the
seclusion of his [or her] chambers," without the presence of the
. 178
comp Iamant.
Judge Laron first met Melissa, who was criminally charged with
violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22, inside his chamber, without the
presence of the offended parties. They became lovers, and their meetings
extended to more private spaces.
For a judge, having a close friendship with the litigant is to be avoided

at all costs. With more reasons should a romantic relationship with one be
shunned as this destroys the litigants' confidence in the "judge's impartiality
and[,] eventually, undermine the people's faith in the administration of
justice." 179
Judge Laron, as the judge in a case against Melissa, dismissed that

case with prejudice upon motion by the parties. 180 Another judge in the
Makati City Metropolitan Trial Court likewise provisionally dismissed
Melissa's two other cases. 181 It is not farfetched to conclude that Judge
Laron provided assistance to his former lover in the cases pending before
him and another judge. These incidents cannot be said to be above
suspicion, or otherwise entirely free from the appearance of impropriety.
In Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon

Committee Hearing Held on September 26, 2013 Against Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan, 182 we found a Sandiganbayan Justice and
Chairperson of the Fourth Division liable for impropriety for visiting and
socializing with a litigant, Janet Lim-Napoles {Napoles), whom his Division/
177
373 Phil. 460 (1999) [Per Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
178
Id. at 477. .
179
Santos v. Lacurom, 531 Phil. 239, 252 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, Third Division].
180
Rollo, (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756), p. 50A.
181
Id. at 51.
182
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 12 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
..
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
acquitted. Sandiganbayan Justice Gregory S. Ong was relieved from

• 183
service.
Fraternizing with litigants taints a judge's appearance of

impartiality. 184 Canon 1, Section 3 states that "[j]udges shall refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another court or administrative agency." In Rallos v. Judge Gako
Jr.: 185
Well-known is the judicial norm that judges should not only be

impartial but should also appear impartial. Jurisprndence repeatedly
teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge. . . . Judges must not only render just, correct and
impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to
their fairness, impartialify and ·integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal,

metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein respondent,
because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the
litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting
interests and the embodiments of the people's sense of justice. Thus, their
official conduct should be beyond reproach. 186 (Emphasis supplied)
In Garcia v. Judge Burgos: 187
We deem it important to point out that a judge must preserve the

trust and faith reposed in him by the parties as an impartial and objective
administrator of justice. When he exhibits actions that give rise fairly or
unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are
eroded[.] 188
Likewise, Judge Laron's asking for money from a litigant constitutes

gross misconduct. In Sison Jr. v. Camacho, 189 we disbarred a lawyer for
failing to account for the funds he solicited as payment for additional docket
fees. We have ruled that "[t]hose in the legal profession must always
conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all their dealings." 190
According to Melissa, Judge Laron would solicit money from her to

pay for his medicines, executive check-up, regular visits to the doctor, cell
183
Id. at 100-101.
~
184
Gacayan v. Judge Pamintuan, 373 Phil. 460, 477 (1999) [Per Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
185
85 Phil. 4 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
186
Id. at 20.
187
353 Phil. 740 (1998) [First Division, Per J. Panganiban].
188
Id. at 771.
189
A.C. No. 10910, January 12, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/20l6/january2016/1091 O.pdf>
[Per Curiam, En Banc].
190
Id. at 5.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
phone load, gasoline expenses, and monthly groceries, among other

things. 191 A US$200.00 deposit to the account of "Henry E. Laron" 192
supports the claim of solicitation. There is no indication that the money was
ever returned or refused.
In Galang v. Judge Santos, 193 a judge's personal actions, whether in

the bench or in his daily life, should be beyond reproach and free from the
manifestations of impropriety. 194
In In Re: Solicitation of Judge Virrey, 195 this Court dismissed from

service a judge who solicited "donations" for the repair of his office and for
his personal travel expenses. This Court has held that such irresponsible and
improper conduct erodes the public's faith in the judiciary. 196 These acts
clearly violate the judge's duties of integrity, independence, and propriety. 197
In Quiz v. Judge Castano, 198 this Court dismissed from service a judge
who attempted to extort money from a litigant. The judge visited the litigant
in the place he stayed in, met with him at an eatery, and pocketed a sum of
money from him. This Court acknowledged that, under the prevailing
circumstances, it could not simply give the errant judge a slap on the
wrist. 199
We ruled similarly in Re: Allegations Against Justice Ong and

dismissed the Sandiganbayan Justice for gross misconduct. We held that the
Sandiganbayan Justice's acts of consenting to be Napoles' contact at the
Sandiganbayan, "fixi~g" the criminal case in her favor, and accepting money
and favors from her "constitute gross misconduct, a violation of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary." 200
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to find respondent Judge Henry E. Laron

GUILTY of immorality and gross misconduct. Respondent Judge Henry E.
Laron should be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, with perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in any government agency, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.
191
/
Rollo (A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756,), p. 3.
192
Id. at 50.
193
194
Id. at 89.
195
196
Id. at 694.
197 Id.
198
194 Phil. 187 (1981) [Per J. Teehankee, En Banc].
199
Id. at 196.
200
Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on September
26, 2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, September
23, 2014, 736 SCRA 12, 80 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
~

A.M. No. MTJ-10-1756
I likewise concur with Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion's opinion to

DISBAR respondent Judge Henry E. Laron.
..,
/ Associate Justice
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ENBANC
RE: FINDINGS ON THE A.M. No. 12-8-59-MCTC

JUDICIAL AUDIT
CONDUCTED AT THE 7TH Present:
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT, LILOAN- -SERENO, C.J.
COMPOSTELA, LILOAN, CARPIO,
CEBU. VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,y
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA, and
CAGUIOA, JJ.
Promulgated:
:x------------------------------------------------------~~~o~~~
-· - ----- ------- -------------:x
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from the judicial audit and
physical inventory of court records conducted in the ih .Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Liloan-Compostela, Li loan, Cebu (MCTC), presided by Judge
Jasper Jesse G. Dacanay (Judge Dacanay).
• On official leave.
µ
Resolution 2 A.M. No. 12-8-59-MCTC
The Facts
Following a judicial audit of the MCTC presided by Judge Dacanay,

which was conducted on July 17 and 18, 2012, the judicial audit team of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) issued its Findings on the Judicial
Audit Conducted at the ih Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Liloan-
Compostela, Liloan, Cebu 1 and Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in
the ih Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Liloan-Compostela, Liloan, Cebu2
both dated August 1, 2012, revealing that the MCTC had a caseload of 663
cases (415 criminal cases and 248 civil cases) with 103 cases submitted for
decision and 93 cases with pending incidents submitted for resolution. 3 99
out of the 103 cases submitted for decision were all beyond the 90-day
reglementary period to decide; 4 and 91 out of the 93 cases with pendi~g
incidents were also beyond the required period to act upon. 5 The judicial
audit team also disclosed that there were also a number of cases where no
initial action had been taken since their filing, while there were others which
failed to progress after a ~onsiderable length of time. 6 In view of the
foregoing, the judicial audit team recommended that: (a) Judge Dacanay be
directed to cease and desist from conducting hearings and to devote his time
in deciding and resolving the matters pending before his court, instructed to
furnish the Court with copies of the decisions related thereto, and pending
full compliance thereof, his salaries, allowances, and other benefits be
ordered withheld; (b) Judge Dacanay be directed to explain in writing why
no administrative sanction should be taken against him for his failure to
decide the 99 cases submitted for decision and resolve the 91 cases with
pending incidents which were all beyond the reglementary period to decide
and act upon; (c) Judge Jocelyn G. Uy Po be designated as acting presiding
judge of the MCTC; and (d) MCTC Clerk of Court II Henry P. Cafiete, Jr.
(MCTC Clerk of Court Cafiete, Jr.) be directed, among others, to submit a
monthly report of cases for the MCTC. 7 In a Resolution 8 dated November
12, 2012, the Court adopted the recommendations of the judicial audit team.
In his letter-explanation dated January 23, 2013, 9 Judge Dacanay

claimed that his failure to decide and resolve cases on time was not brought
about by his laziness, willful neglect of duty or complacency, but was due to
the heavy workload in his court which is a circuit court composed of two (2)
municipalities with the highest number of cases received every month. He
explained that he spends most of his time hearing cases in court and issuing
orders 10 and, thus, lacks time to write decisions. Such delay is further
Rollo, pp. 1-24.

Id. at 25-49.
4
See id. 6 and 31.
6
See id. at 23-24 and 47-48.
ld. at 62-65.
9
ld. at 51-52.
10
See id. at 51.
l)
compounded by insufficient staff and cases that lacked stenographic notes. 11

In addition, he likewise claimed that he was suffering from cardiovascular
disease, hypertension, impaired glucose tolerance, and chronic back pains;
and, in the year 2008, he suffered a stroke while he was attending to his
court duties. In this light, Judge Dacanay revealed his plans of retiring early
and requested for the release of the withheld salary which he needs to sustain
his daily maintenance medicines and travelling expenses. 12
In its Memorandum, 13 the OCA denied Judge Dacanay's request for

the release of his withheld salaries, finding his reasons to be flimsy and
irrelevant. Considering that a majority of the cases docketed in Judge
Dacanay's sala were submitted for decision and resolution even before the
year 2008, when he claimed to have suffered a stroke, the OCA concluded
that his heavy workload was due to his inefficiency and judicial indolence.
In this regard, the OCA noted that from the time the judicial audit was
conducted in July 2012 and up to the time he submitted his letter-
explanation in January 2013, Judge Dacanay has not submitted a single
decision or resolution to show at least partial compliance and proof of his
good faith, and neither did he request for any extension of time for the
disposition of his cases. Consequently, the OCA directed Judge Dacanay to
fully comply with the Court's Resolution dated November 12, 2012 by
deciding and resolving the pending cases and resolutions in his sala within a
non-extendible period of one ( 1) month from notice and, afterwhich, an
evaluation shall be made on his administrative liability. 14
In connection with a subsequent Resolution 15 dated July 10, 2013 of

the Court, MCTC Clerk of Court Cafiete, Jr. submitted various letters of
Compliance dated August 30, 2013, 16 February 3, 2014, 17 and May 23,
2014, 18 updating the OCA of the status of cases pending before the MCTC,
with copies of the decisions, resolutions, and orders related thereto.
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
In a Memorandum 19 dated July 7, 2015, the OCA recommended, inter

alia, that Judge Dacanay be found guilty of gross inefficiency and,
accordingly, be meted a fine in the amount of P75,000.00 with a warning
that a similar infraction would be dealt with more severely. 20
11
See id. at 52.
12
Seeid.at51-52.
13
Dated May 21, 2013. Id. at 71-74.
14
See id. at 72-74.
15
Id. at 81-83.
16
See id. at 84-220.
17
See id. at 255-259.
18
See id. at 260-436.
19
Id. at 232-254.
20
See id. at 253-254.
~
While the OCA noted that Judge Dacanay had fully complied with the
Court's Resolution dated November 12, 2012 directing him to resolve the
pending cases and incidents in his sala, it nevertheless found him
administratively liable for his failure to decide the 99 cases submitted for
decision and resolve the 91 cases with pending incidents for resolution
within the reglementary period provided for by law. The OCA concluded
that such judicial indolence on the part of Judge Dacanay is considered gross
inefficiency in the performance of duties, and as such, administrative
sanctions should be imposed upon him. 21
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue presented for the Court's resolution is whether or not
Judge Dacanay should be held administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court agrees with the
findings and recommendation of the OCA, and resolves to adopt the same in
its entirety.
Article VIII, Section 15 (1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower

court judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of ninety (90)
days. The Code of Judicial Conduct under Ruk 3.0~ of Canon 3 22 likewise
directs judges to administer justice without delay and dispose of the courts'
business promptly within the period prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the
time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent
needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-
23
day period is mandatory. In Re: Cases Submitted for Decision 13efore Hon.
Teresito A. Andoy, former Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Cainta, Rizal, 24 the
Court stressed the importance of deciding cases within the periods
prescribed by law and, at the same time, reiterated that a judge's failure. to
decide a case within the prescribed period constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions, to wit:
21
See id. at 252-254.
22
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
Canon 3
A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH
IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
xx xx
Rule 3.05. -A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods.
xx xx
23
See Re: Cases Submitted for· Decision Before Hon Teresita A. Andoy, former J11dge; Municipal Trial
Court, Cainta, Rizal, 634 Phil. 378, 381 (2010), citing Gachon v. Devera, Jr., 340 Phil. 647 (1997).
24 Id.
v
Judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Any delay, no

matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermines the people's faith
and confidence in the judiciary. It also deprives the parties of their right to
the speedy disposition of their cases.
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to

decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept
that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases
with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the
performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases
erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers
its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case
within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on
25
the defaulting judge. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is not unmindful of the

heavy dockets of the lower courts. '.fhus, upon their proper application for
extension, especially in meritorious cases involving difficult questions of
law or complex issues, the Court grants them additional time to decide
beyond the reglementary period. In these situations, the judge would not be
subjected to disciplinary action. 26
In this case, Judge Dacanay clearly failed to decide the 99 cases

submitted for decision and resolve the 91 cases with pending incidents in his
sala within the prescribed reglementary period - with some of those
cases/incidents taking more than ten (10) years to be decided or resolved. In
an attempt to absolve himself from administrative liability, Judge Dacanay
attributed such failure to heavy workload, and mentioned that in 2008, he
suffered a stroke which limited his physical capability to decide cases or
resolve incidents in his already docket-laden sala. 27 However, records show
that most of the cases and incidents for decision or resolution in his sala
were submitted long before he suffered a stroke in 2008. Moreover, records
are bereft of any showing that he requested for extensions of the period
within which he can decide or resolve the aforesaid cases and incidents, or
that he proferred any credible explanation for the delay in their disposition.
Hence, the OCA correctly found Judge Dacanay administratively liable.
It is settled that failure to decide or resolve cases within the

reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency. 28 It is a less serious
charge and is punishable by either suspension from office without salaries
and benefits for not less than one (1) month, but not more than three (3)
months, or a fine of more than Pl 0,000.00, but not exceeding P20,000.00. 29
It must be noted, however, that the fines imposed on each judge may vary,
25
Id. at 381-382; citations omitted.
26
See Bontuyan v. Villarin, 436 Phil. 560, 568-569 (2002).
27
See Judge Dacanay's letter-explanation dated January 23, 20 I 3; rollo, pp. 51-52.
28
OCA v. Ismael, 624 Phil. 275, 278-279 (2010).
29
Id. See also Section 9, in relation to Section 11 (B), of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, entitled "RE: PROPOSED
AMENDMENT TO RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT RE: DISCIPLINE OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES"
(October I, 200 I).
v
depending on the number of cases undecided or matters unresolved by said

judge within the reglementary period, plus the presence of aggravating ·or
mitigating circumstances, such as the damage suffered by the parties as a
result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, and other analogous
• 30
circumstances.
In OCA v. Leonida,3 1 the erring judge was fined in the amount of

P50,000.00 for his failure to decide an aggregate of 145 cases within the
reglementary period. 32 Similarly, in OCA v. Alumbres, 33 the respondent
judge was fined also in the amount of P50,000.00 for failing to decide a total
of 154 cases on time. 34 On the other hand, in Pacquing v. Cobarde, 35 the
delinquent judge was fined by the Court the amount of Pl 00,000.00 for
failing to decide a staggering 191 cases within the allowable period, noting
that said judge was previously held administratively liable for the same
offense. In view of the foregoing. cas_es and the circumstances of this case,
the Court agrees with the OCA that Judge Dacanay should be fined in the
amount of P75,000.00 for his failure to decide the 99 cases submitted for
decision and resolve the 91 cases with pending incidents in his sala within
the 90-day mandatory reglementary period provided by law.
WHEREFORE, Judge Jasper Jesse G. Dacanay is found GUILTY of

gross inefficiency in the performance of his duties and is hereby FINED in
the amount of P75,000.00, with a STERN WARNING that the commission
of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. His salaries and
allowances, after deducting the fine of P75,000.00, are ordered RELEASED
for having fully complied with the directives of the Court contained in the
Resolution dated November 12, 2012.
Moreover, Clerk of Court II Henry P. Canete, Jr. is DIRECTED to

COMPLY with the other directives of the Court in the same Resolution
within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice and
SUBMIT proof thereof.
SO ORDERED.
JfA{)i LJ;M/'
ESTELA M.fERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
30
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branches 72 and 22,
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, 687 Phil. 19, 23 12012).
31
654 Phil. 668 (2011 ).
32
Id. at 679.
33
515 Phil. 348 (2006).
34
See id. at 355-356 and 363.
35
See Minute Resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2042 dated September 30, 2014.
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO 0 J. VELASCO, JR.

~~h~
Q~{J~
ARTURO D. BRION
On Official Leave
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
DOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice
.4
/
CERTIFIED XEROX C~
~~~A
CLERK OF COURT, EN BANC
SUPREME COURT
3aepublic of tbe Jlbilippines
$->upreme Q[ourt
;!OOanila
EN BANC
CONCERNED LAWYERS OF A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183

BULACAN,
Complainant, Present:
- versus - SERENO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR., *
PRESIDING JUDGE
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,**
VICTORIA VILLALON-
PERALTA,
PORNILLOS, ETC.,
BERSAMIN,
Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO,
MENDOZA,
REYES,
RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
PERLAS-BERNABE,
CLEMENCY OF THEN JUDGE
JARDELEZA,
VICTORIA VILLALON-
LEONEN, and
PORNILLOS.
CAGUIOA, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 14, 2017
~~~-~
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
PERCURIAM:
For resolution is a petition for judicial clemency filed by Victoria

Villalon-Pomillos (respondent), former Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 10, Malolos City, Bulacan, through a letter 1 dated
December 28, 2016.
No part.
•• No part.
1
Rollo, pp. 192-196.
"
The Facts
On July 7, 2009, the Court rendered a Decision, 2 dismissing

respondent from service, after having been found guilty of gross misconduct,
i.e., borrowing money from a lawyer in a case pending before her court,
aggravated by undue delay in rendering decisions or orders, and violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars. The dispositive portion of the
subject Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judge Victoria Villalon-Pornillos, Presiding

Judge of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, is found
guilty of violating paragraph 7, Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
(borrowing money from a lawyer in a case pending before her court)
which is also a gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, aggravated by, inter alia, undue delay in rendering
decision or orders, and violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars. She is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-
employment in any government agency or instrumentality. Immediately
upon service on her of this decision, she is deemed to have vacated her
office and her authority to act as judge is considered automatically
terminated.
SO ORDERED. 3
On August 8, 2016, respondent filed a Petition for Absolute Pardon

from 'Dismissal from the Service Sentence' 4 accompanied by a letter5 dated
August 4, 2016 addressed to the Office of the President (OP), which was
referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), for appropriate
action. 6 In a Resolution7 dated November 8, 2016, the Court denied the said
petition for being an improper pleading.
Meanwhile, on November 3, 2016, respondent also filed a letter8

addressed to the OCA, informing the OP's transmittal of her petition for
judicial clemency to the Court, and requesting that the same be subject for
judicial review and, consequently, the subject Decision be reversed in her
favor. The Court, in a Resolution9 dated November 29, 2016, noted the said
letter without action.
Id. at 2-23.
Id. at 22.
4
Id. at 119-134.
Id. at 136-146.
6
See letter dated September 5, 2016 of Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Ryan Alvin
R. Acosta; id. at 44:
Id. at 115.
Id. at 117. ~ J"'
9
Id. at 189-190. ~•
./
~\:'~
On December 28, 2016, respondent filed another letter, 10 reiterating

her plea for judicial clemency. Respondent insists that she has endured
almost eight (8) years of unfounded punishment as the charges and findings
against her were based on mere gossip. 11 Likewise, she cites the Court's
exoneration of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, begging that the
same privilege be extended to her in the spirit of Christmas. 12
The Court's Ruling
Judicial clemency is an act of mercy removing any disqualification

from the erring judge. 13 It can be granted only if there is a showing that it is
merited; thus, proof of reformation and a showing of potential and
. are m
promise . d'1spensa ble. 14
Proof of remorse and reformation is one of the requirements to grant

judicial clemency. As held by the Court in Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C.
Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for
Judicial Clemency: 15
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include

but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s)
or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community with proven
integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative
case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to
ensure a period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude,

learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant
skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
10
Id. at 192-196.
11
See id. at 192, 194-195.
12
Id. at 194-195.
13
See Resolution in OCA v. Caballero, A.M. No. P-05-2064, January 12, 2016.
14
Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, MTC-QC, Br. 37, Appealing/or Judicial Clemency, 560 Phil. 1,
5 (2007); emphasis and underscoring supplied.
is Id.
~
16
Id. at 5-6, citations omitted.
'\~~
In this case, records are bereft of showing that respondent has

exhibited remorse for her past misdeeds, which occurred more than eight (8)
years ago. Apart from respondent's submission to the Court's disciplinary
authority, there were no signs of repentance showing that at the very least,
she accepted the judgment of the Court in her case. In fact, she even sees
nothing wrong with her actions. In her petition, respondent narrates that she
"stood her ground against offers of bribery for her to agree to issue orders
that would give a go signal to the anomalous Bullet Train Project of Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo." 17 She even touts herself as a judge who committed
"honest acts and deeds," 18 and submits that the only way to give her justice
is through absolute pardon. 19 In this relation, she firmly insists that she was
unduly deprived of her fundamental rights under the constitution when she
was unceremoniously disrobed, raising doubts as to the integrity and
impartiality of the court process.
Likewise, respondent points out that the charge of borrowing money

from a litigant, for which she was dismissed, occurred more than fourteen
(14) years ago and, at that time, she had a very "slim chance" 20 of borrowing
money since: (a) her "salary as a judge was substantially big enough
compared against other employees or lawyers or businessman"; 21 and (b)
both her parents are lawyers who left her "substantial real and personal
property that would easily be sufficient for her and her children to live for a
lifetime." 22 She claims the same of her late husband who was "well-off' and
landed thus, making the act imputed against her unbelievable. 23
Far from exhibiting remorse and reformation, the tenor of

respondent's petition only demonstrates her attitude of impenitence, self-
righteousness, and even, vindictiveness, which unquestionably renders her
undeserving of judicial clemency. Neither did she show compliance with the
other requisites for judicial clemency as cited above. Accordingly, there is
no quibble that the instant petition should be denied.
The Court, in numerous cases, has come down hard and wielded the
rod of discipline against members of the judiciary who have fallen short of
the exacting standards of judicial conduct. 24 Judicial clemency is not a
privilege or a right that can be availed of at any time, 25 as the Court will
grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. 26 Verily, clemency, as an
act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the
preservation of public confidence in the courts. 27
17
Rollo, p. 46.
is Id.
19
Id. at 59.
20
Id. at 50.
21 Id.
22
Id. at 50-51.
23
Id. at 51.
24
A/iv. Pacalna, 722 Phil. 112, 117 (2013).
"""~
25
See Resolution in OCA v. Caballero, supra note 13.
26
Ali v. Pacalna, supra note 24, at 118.
z1 Id.
\~\:">A
WHEREFORE, the petition for judicial clemency is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Chief Justice
QZJ~
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
~~·
J'~·~Jlv ~
Associate Justice
,,,,.
/~~d?
~ -
Associate Justice
~.~-
JOSE C~~I~_LT_~~ENDOZA
ESTELA~E~ERNABE
Associate Justice
S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
CERTIFIED XEROX COPY:
~E~~~.~~~
CLERK OF CO\iJ:'i:"L Ei'l BANC
SUPREME C.OUiH
f
~
3Republic of tbe ~bilippines
~upreme <!Court
;!OOanila
EN BANC
OFFICE OF THE COURT A.M. No .. RTJ-13-2361

ADMINISTRATOR, [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4144-RTJ]
Complainant,
Present:
SERENO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,*
DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA, and
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSEPH CAGUIOA, ** JJ
CEDRICK 0. RUIZ, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, Promulgated:
MAKATI CITY,
_____
Respon~~=------------.jG~:~
February 2, 20j_~ v
x---------------------------------------
DECISION
PERCURIAM:
Before us is the administrative complaint filed by the Office of the

Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent Judge Joseph Cedrick 0.
Ruiz, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Makati
City.
.. No Part.
On Official Leave.
This administrative case traces its roots to the Informations for

violation of Section 3(e) 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and malversation
of public funds 2 filed by the People of the Philippines against the respondent
judge before the Sandiganbayan. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 27467-68.
The Informations essentially alleged that the respondent, then the City
Mayor of Dapitan City, had conspired with Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Pepe
Nortal to facilitate the latter's withdrawal of Pl million from the
Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CJF) and, thereafter, used this amount
for his (the respondent's) personal benefit.
In its decision3 dated April 29, 2013, the Sandiganbayan's First

Division found the respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged.
The Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution successfully proved that

the respondent "instigated" Nortal's withdrawal of a Pl million cash
advance from the CIF allotted for the Mayor's Office, and that he (the
respondent) received and used this amount for his personal benefit. The
court found that the respondent directed Nortal's request for the cash
advance because he (the respondent) already had four (4) unliquidated cash
advances as of December 31, 2006, and that three of these cash advances
(with a total of Pl,384,280.00) already came from the CIF. The testimonies
of the city treasurer, the city accountant, and the city budget officer
supported the conclusion that the respondent actively worked for the
approval of the Pl million cash advance.
The Sandiganbayan also found that the respondent acted in bad faith
since the cash advance was made five (5) days after he had lost his bid for
re-election, and that the proposed withdrawal covered the CIF appropriations
for the entire year. The court likewise found no merit in the respondent's
defense of denial.
Section 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019 provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
2
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. - Presumption of malversation. - Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriati9n or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer: xx x
3
Rollo, pp. 1-26; penned by Associate Justice Efren N. Dela Cruz, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rodolfo A. Ponferrada and Rafael R. Lagos.
v
~Ir-~
The Sandiganbayan accordingly imposed the following penalties on

the respondent: (a) the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one ( 1)
month, as minimum, to eight (8) years. as maximum, in Criminal Case No.
27467 for violation of Section 3(e) ofR.A. No. 3019; (b) the indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
minimum, as minimum, to eighteen ( 18) years and one ( 1) day of reclusion
temporal maximum, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. 27468 for
malversation; and (c) perpetual special disqualification. The court also
ordered him to pay a P950,000.00 fine; and P950,000.00 as indemnity to the
City ofDapitan.
The respondent moved for the reconsideration of the judgment of

conviction and likewise moved for a new trial, but the Sandiganbayan
denied these motions in its resolution4 of August 28, 2013.
The OCA received a copy of the Sandiganbayan's April 29, 2013

decision in Criminal Case Nos. 27467 and 27468, and in its Report5 of
October 4, 2013, made the following recommendations:
x x x Respectfully submitted. for the consideration of this

Honorable Court are the following recommendations:
1. that the instant report be considered a formal complaint against

Joseph Cedrick 0. Ruiz, Presiding Judge, Branch 61, Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, for convictiqn of a crime involving
moral turpitude and that the same be RE-DOCKETED as a
regular administrative matter;
2. that Judge Joseph Cedrick 0. Ruiz be FURNISHED a copy of

this report and that he be required to comment thereon within
ten (10) days from notice; and
3. that Judge Joseph Cedrick 0. Ruiz be SUSPENDED without

pay and other monetary benefits effective immediately from
his receipt of this Court's resolution, pending resolution of the
instant administrative matter, or ilntil "lifted by this Honorable
Court. 6
x x x x (emphasis in the original)
The OCA reasoned out that conviction of a crime involving moral

turpitude is classified as a serious charge under Section 8(b) of Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court. It likewise explained that the Court's power to
preventively suspend judges, although not clearly delineated under Rule 140
of the Rules of Court, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision
over all courts and their personnel, and that a judge can be preventively
4
Id at 27-35. In the same resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted the respondent's request for
correction of errors in his motion for reconsideration.
rv
5
Id at 36-42. The Report was signed by Court Administrator Midas P. Marquez and OCA Chief of
Office (Legal) Wilhelmina D. Geronga.
6
Id at42.
~
"t'~y;
suspended until a final decision is reached in an administrative case against

him .
The records also showed that on October 18, 2013, the respondent
filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing his
convictions by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27467 and 27468.
This case was docketed as G.R. Nos. 209073-74. 7
In its November 20, 2013 minute resolution, 8 the Court's Third

Division resolved: (1) to re-docket the OCA report dated October 4, 2013, as
a regular administrative matter, and to consider it as a formal complaint
against the respondent for having been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (2) to furnish the respondent a copy of the OCA's Report, and to
require him to file a comment; and (3) to suspend the respondent from office
without pay and other monetary benefits, effective immediately from his
receipt of "this Court's Resolution, pending resolution of the instant
administrative matter, or until lifted by this Court."
In his comment dated January_24, 2014, the respondent posited that

the administrative complaint against him is premature because his
Sandiganbayan convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 27467 and 27468 are not
yet final. The respondent also stated that he went on leave of absence after
his Sandiganbayan conviction, and had submitted his application for
optional retirement on May 27, 2013 (to take effect on December 31, 2013).
The respondent thus argued that there was no more need to suspend him
from office because he should be considered already retired from
government service" when he received on January 9, 2014, a copy of the
Court's November 20, 2013 Resolution.
THE COURT'S RULING
We resolve to dismiss the respondent from the service he has

dishonored and to bar him from the ranks of legal professionals whose
standards he has likewise transgressed.
I. The Court's disciplinary powers over justices and judges
We find no merit in the respondent's claim that the present

administrative case against him is premature because his criminal
convictions by the Sandiganbayan are not yet final.
7
On October 2, 2013," the respondent filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review on certiorari, but the Court denied this motion in its resolution dated October 16, 2013 for failure to
show that petitioner has not lost the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, in view of the lack of statement
of material date of receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. The Court, however,
granted the respondent's motion for reconsideration, and admitted the respondent's petition for review on
certiorari in its resolution of January 27, 2014. In the same resolution, the Court also required the People
of the Philippines to file its Comment to the petition. ~ /
8
Rollo, p. 43. '.Z"
I
rr"
~\<"y\
Decision 5 AM. No. RTJ-13-2361
Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants the Supreme

Court administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel. This
grant empowers the Supreme Court to oversee the judges' and court
personnel's administrative compliance with all laws, rules, and regulations, 9
and to take administrative actions against them if they violate these legal
norms. Io
In the exercise of this power, the Court has promulgated rules of

procedure in the discipline of judges. Section I, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A. M. No. 01-8-10-SC, provides:
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for the discipline of

Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme
Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who
have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents
which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint,
supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall
be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions
constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by
law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Based on this rule, disciplinary proceedings against sitting judges and

justices may be instituted: (a) motu proprio, by the Court itself; (b) upon
verified complaint, supported by the affidavits of persons with personal
knowledge of the facts alleged, or by documents substantiating the
allegations; or (c) upon anonymous complaint supported by public records
of indubitable integrity. I 1
It was pursuant to this power that the Court - on its own initiative -
ordered the re-docketing of the OCA's report as a formal complaint against
the respondent and as a regular administrative matter for the Court's
consideration.
The Court likewise possesses the power to preventively suspend an

administratively charged judge until a final decision is reached, particularly
when a serious charge is involved and a strong likelihood of guilt exists.
This power is inherent in the Court's power of administrative supervision
over all courts and their personnel as a measure to allow unhampered formal
investigation. It is likewise a preventive measure to shield the public from
any further damage that the continued exercise by the judge of the functions
of his office may cause.
In the present case, we placed the respondent under preventive

suspension because he is alleged to have committed transgressions that are
See Civil Service Commission v. Anda!, G.R. No. 185749, December 16, 2009, 608 SCRA 370,
377.
r
10
Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics (2009), Eighth Edition, p. 686. . /
II
See lubaton v. Lazaro, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013, 704 SCRA 404, 409-410.
1
CY'
~'\~
classified as serious under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:

Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);

Judicial Conduct;.

determined by a competent court in an appropriate
proceeding;

8. Immorality;
10. Partisap pol_itical activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits. (emphasis supplied)
The respondent's convictions by the Sandiganbayan for violation of

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for malversation of public funds confirm
that the administrative charges for which he may be found liable are serious
charges under Section 8(2) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Malversation is likewise considered as a serious charge since it is a crime
involving moral turpitude.
While the term moral turpitude does not have one specific definition
that lends itself to easy and ready application, 12 it has been defined as an act
of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in the performance of private and
social duties that man owes to his fellow man or to society in general. 13
Notably, jurisprudence has categorized the following acts as crimes

involving moral turpitude: abduction with consent, bigamy, concubinage,
smuggling, rape, attempted bribery, profiteering, robbery, murder, estafa,
theft, illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, intriguing against honor, violation of the Anti-Fencing
12
See Concurring Opinion of J. Brion in Teves v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180363, April
28, 2009, 587 SCRA I, 27. ~
13
See Re: SC Decision Dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 366, 371. /
~~
r
Law, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, perjury, forgery, direct bribery,
frustrated homicide, adultery, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry,
blackmail, bribery, duelling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making
fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract, mutilation of public records,
fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction
under the promise of marriage, estafa, falsification of public document, and
estafa thru falsification of public document.
To our mind, malversation - considering its nature - should not be

categorized any differently from the above listed crimes. The act of
embezzling public funds or property is immoral in itself; it is a conduct
clearly contrary to the accepted standards of justice, honesty, and good
morals. 14
The preventive suspension we impose pending investigation is not a

penalty but serves only as a preventive measure as we explained above.
Because it is not a penalty, its imposition does not violate the right of the
accused to be presumed innocent. It also matters not that the offenses for
which the respondent had been convicted were committed in 2001 when he
was still the Mayor of Dapitan City. 15 As explained below, it is likewise
immaterial that his criminal convictions by the ~andiganbayan are still on
appeal with this Court.
Optional early retirement
The records show that the respondent wrote the Court a letter on May
27, 2013 (or soon after his Sandiganbayan convictions), requesting that he
"be allowed to optionally retire effective November 30, 2013." 16 He later
requested, in another letter, 17 that the. effectivity date of his optional
retirement be changed from November 30, 2013 to December 31, 2013.
The Court has not acted on the respondent's request for optional early
retirement in view of his standing criminal convictions; he stands to suffer
accessory penalties affecting his qualification to retire from office should his
convictions stand. 18 The OCA records 19 also show that he is currently on
"on leave of absence" status. In any case, that a judge has retired or has
otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily divest the
14
Supra note 12, at 25-27.
15
The respondent was appointed as Presiding Judge of Branch 49 of the RTC of Iloilo City on
December 17, 2003; and as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 61, Makati City on July 1, 2009.
16
Rollo, p. 348.
17
Id. at 350.
18
See Articles 30-33 and 40-45, Revised Penal Code, as amended.
19
http://oca.judiciary.gov.ph/wp, visited on April 27, 2015. The records also disclosed that the
respondent filed an application for leave on the following dates: May 6-10, 14-17, 20-24, 27-31, 2013; June
3-7, 10-11, 13-14, 17-21, 24-28, 2013; July 1-5; 8-12, 15-19, 22-31, 2013; August 1-2, 5-8, 12-16, 19-20,
22-23, 27-30, 2013; September 2-6, 9-13, 16-20, 23-27, and 30, 2013; October 2-4, 7-11, 14-18, 21-25, and
28-31, 2013; November 4-8, 11-15, 18-20, 25-29, 2013; and December 2-6, 9-13, 16-20, 23, 26-27, 2013.
,r'y-Y
"{\~~
Court of its jurisdiction to rule on complaints filed while he was still in the
service. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero: 20
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent
had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains
jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of
the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught
with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications x x x
If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and
faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a
penalty proper and imposable under the situation. ·
Nor does separation from office render a pending administrative charge

. 21
moot an d academ1c.
II. Administrative Liability
In the present case, our task is not to determine the correctness of the
Sandiganbayan's ruling in Criminal Case Nos. 27467-68, a case that is
separately pending before us · and which we shall consider under the
evidentiary rules and procedures of our criminal laws.
In the present proceedings, our function is limited to the determination

of whether substantial evidence exists to hold the respondent
administratively liable for acts he is alleged to have committed while he was
still the mayor ofDapitan City.
In this determination, it is immaterial that tne respondent was not yet a

member of the Judiciary when he allegedly committed the acts imputed to
him; judges may be disciplined for acts committed prior to their
appointment to the judiciary. Our Rules itself recognizes this situation, as it
provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition
and adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP,
including those filed prior.to their appointment to the judiciary. It need not
be shown that the respondent continued to do the act or acts complained of;
it is sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge/s against the
respondent through proof that the respondent committed the imputed act/s
violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the applicable provisions of
the Rules of Court. 22
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Sardido, 23 the Court

definitively ruled that:
20
See Gallo v. Cordero, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1035, June 21, 1995, 245 SCRA 219, 226, citing Zarate
v. Romanillos, 312 Phil. 679 (1995).
21
See Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila v. Veneracion, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920 (Formerly OCA
LP.I. No. 01-1141-RTJ), April 26, 2006, 488 SCRA 285, 298-299, citing Office of the Court Administrator
~;Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511,_ August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA 81. ~
-- Heck v. Judge Santos, 467 Phil. 798, 818 (2004).
23
449 Phil. 619, 628 (2003).
I
rr'"
1'\r'~
The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the same

time both a criminal act and an administrative offense. Whether the
criminal case against Judge Hurtado relates to an act committed
before or after he became a judge is of no moment. Neither is it
material that an MTC judge will be trying an RTC judge in the criminal
case. A criminal case against an attorney or judge is distinct and separate
from an administrative case against him. The dismissal of the criminal
case does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative case arising from
the same set of facts. x x x (emphases supplied)
We reiterate that only substantial evidence is required to support our

conclusions in administrative proceedings. 24 Substantial evidence is that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. The standard of substantial is satisfied
when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is responsible
for the misconduct complained of, even if such might not be overwhelming
or even preponderant. 25 That the respondent committed acts constituting
malversation or violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
should be adjudged in the same manner that other acts classified as serious
charges under Rule 140 (such as bribery, immorality, gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and partisan political activities) should be weighed - through
substantial evidence. 26 Expressed from the point of view of criminal law,
evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary in an
administrative proceeding like the present case.
The Sandiganbayan, in considering the respondent's guilt in the

criminal case before it, gave full probative value to the testimonies of
Fatima Ruda (OIC-City Budget Officer), Jose R. Torres (OIC-City
Treasurer), Glendora Deloria (City Accountant), and Pepe Nortal (Police
Inspector of the Dapitan City Police). These conclusions and approach do
not mean that we shall not examine, on our own ~n the present proceedings,
the evidence on record before us.
For purposes of the original administrative proceeding before us

and to fully accord the respondent the due process owed him in these
proceedings, we shall examine all the evidence adduced and apply to these
pieces of evidence the substantial evidence rule that the present proceedings
require. This approach is only proper, as the present proceeding is not an
appeal from the Sandiganbayan ruling but is an original one for purposes of
establishing or negating the claimed administrative liability on the part of the
respondent.
What do the evidence on record show?
24
Re: Allegations Made Under Oath that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on
September 26, 2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J
(Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB), September 23, 2014, 736 SCRA 120.
25
See Liguid v. Judge Camano, 435 Phil. 695, 706-707 (2002).
26
See similar discussions in Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion in Re:
Allegations Made Under Oath that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing Held on September 26, ~
2013 Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan, supra note 24.
I"
~
"'\'~
Torres testified that when his office received a Request for Obligation
Allotment (ROA) 27 and a Disbursement Voucher (D V) 28 on May 16, 2001,
for a Pl million cash advance payable to Nortal, he immediately sent a letter
to the respondent (through the City Budget Officer) informing him that he
could not accommodate the request because the CIF appropriation covered
the whole of2001, and that Nortal was not properly bonded.
On the same day, Torres' letter was returned with the respondent's
handwritten notation asking him to reconsider his position. Torres eventually
signed the ROA after the respondent prevailed upon him to reconsider, 29
although he still noted his objection to the payment of the claim when he
received the disbursement voucher from the accounting office, on the belief
that the disbursement should only cover two quarters, not the whole year.
In his affidavit, Torres stated that the CIF could not be released
without the respondent's approval because this fund was an appropriation
under the Office of the City Mayor.
Ruda declared on the witness stand that right after the May 11, 2001
elections, the respondent directed her to release the whole appropriation
(totalling Pl million) for the CIF. Ruda hesitated to do as told considering
that the respondent's term would end on June 30, 2001, while the amount to
be released corresponded to the appropriation for the entire 2001. Ruda
gave in to the respondent's request after the latter stressed to her that he
(respondent) was still the mayor until the end of June 2001.
In her affidavit, Ruda stated that it was not customary for her office to
release, in the middle of the year, the whole intelligence fund appropriation
for the year.
Deloria testified that when she received a ROA and a DV for a Pl

million CIF cash advance, she informed the respondent that the amount
requested covered the appropriations for the e~tire 2001. The respondent
informed her that the city government needed the money badly. Ruda
reviewed the request and found out that the payee, Nortal, had not yet posted
a fidelity bond. The respondent told Ruda that he had already applied for
Nortal's bond.
In her affidavit, Deloria stated that it was the first time that her office
processed a request for funds intended for the entire year.
Nortal, for his part, narrated that the respondent asked him on May 16,
2001, to withdraw Pl million from the CIF on his (respondent's) behalf.
Nortal initially refused since he might not be able to liquidate this amount as
the respondent had lost in the elections. Instead, Nortal suggested that the
Chief of Police be asked to make the withdrawal. The respondent, however,
27
28
29
No. 101-1011-05-0204-01.
No. 101-0105-3888.
Torres signed the ROA, but wrote, "Provided that Police Inspector Nortal is duly bonded."
v1
.
y<
~'('
assured Nortal that one of his men would help him liquidate the requested
amount. Nortal thus yielded to the respondent's request and proceeded to
the City Budget Office to sign the covering ROA and DV.
Nortal added that the respondent's private secretary picked him up at

his house on May 30, 2001, informing him that the check of Pl million was
already at the Treasurer's Office. After securing the check, they proceeded
to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Dipolog City to encash it.
Thereafter, they went to the respondent's office where Nortal handed him
the Pl million. Nortal asked the respondent for a receipt, but the latter
refused to issue one; instead, the respondent gave him P50,000.00 to be used
in the city's drug operations.
In his affidavit, Nortal stated that the respondent told him that he
(respondent) could no longer make· any cash· advances since he had
unliquidated cash advances.
Leonila Morales, State Auditor of the City Auditor's Office from

1997 to 2000, corroborated Nortal's affidavit when he testified that the
respondent had not liquidated his cash advances from the CIF.
Aside from the testimonies of these witnesses and their respective

affidavits, the records before the Sandiganbayan are replete with
documentary proof showing that the respondent committed the acts
attributed to him. The respondent failed to refute these pieces of evidence
before the Sandiganbayan or in the comment he filed with this Court.
The respondent's signature on the following documents showed that

he facilitated Nortal's withdrawal of Pl million from the CIF: (a)
Disbursement Voucher No. 105.0105.3888; (b) Request for Obligation
Allotment; and (c) PNB Check No. 0001097358.
The respondent's signature, as approving officer, on Disbursement

Voucher No. 105.0105.3888, proved that he authorized the disbursement of
a P 1 million cash advance "to defray Confidential and Intelligence
Expenses." 30 The respondent's signature on the ROA also showed that he
(and Nmial) requested Pl million to be used for confidential expenses.
Finally, the respondent's signature on the PNB check established that he
allowed Nortal to withdraw the requested amount.
Considering that the CIF was an appropriation under the Mayor's

Office, it is unlikely that Nortal would attempt to withdraw the P 1 million
CIF cash advance without the respondent's imprimatur. In other words,
Nortal - even: if he wanted to - could not have withdrawn any amount from
the CIF without the approval and authority of the. respondent City Mayor.
That the respondent authorized the withdrawal of the entire CIF for
the year 200 I after he lost in his reelection bid (and less than two months '~
30
Rollo, p. 170.
"\''t-y'(
before the expiration of his term) js iridicative of his bad faith. We note that
several of the city's financial officers, no less, made known to him their
objections to the request due to its patent irregularity.
Indeed, if the request for cash advance request had been legitimate,
there would have been no need for Nortal's intervention in effecting a
withdrawal as the respondent was the City Mayor and the CIF was a fund
under his office. This reality validates Nortal' s claim that the respondent
could no longer withdraw from the CIF because he already had existing
unliquidated advances.
Significantly, the records show that the withdrawn amount was never
liquidated as shown by the Commission on Audit's schedule of unliquidated
cash advances as of January 31, 2013. No evidence also exists showing that
the withdrawn fund had been used for its intended purposes, i.e., for
confidential or intelligence activities.
Viewed against the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses,

which are supported by the documents on record, the respondent's denial
cannot stand. The respondent even failed to substantiate his claim that the
charges against him had been politically motivated. Thus, by substantial
evidence, we consider it fully established that the respondent actively
worked for the approval of the Pl million cash advance.from the CIF; that
he facilitated the withdrawal of the Pl million by Nortal; and that he
received and used this withdrawn amount for his personal benefit.
Ill. The Appropriate Penalty
Section 11 of Rule 140, as amended, states that [i]f the respondent is

guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed: (a) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations; (b) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six
months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering the nature and extent of the respondent's transgressions,

we find the imposition of the supreme administrative penalty of dismissal to
be appropriate. The people's confidence in the judicial system is founded
not only on the competence and diligence of the members of the bench, but
also on their integrity and moral uprightness. 31 We would violate this
standard and unduly tarnish the image of the Judiciary if we allow the
respondent's continued presence in the bench. We would likewise insult the
legal profession if we allow him to remain within the ranks of legal
professionals.
31
PIS lnsp. Fidel v. Judge Caram;, 442 Phil. 236, 242 (2002). )~/
~"'~
We emphasize that judges should be the embodiment of competence,

integrity, and independence, and their conduct should be above reproach.
They must adhere to exacting standards of morality, decency, and probity. A
magistrate is judged, not only by his official acts, but also by his private
morality and actions. Our people can only look up to him as an upright
man worthy of judging his fellow citizens' acts if he is both qualified and
proficient in law, and equipped with the morality that qualifies him for that
higher plane that standing as a judge entails.
In Conrado Abe Lopez v. Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon, 32 we ruled that:

must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala
as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As
we have recently explained, a judge's officic:rl life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence. ~emphasis ours)
The conduct of judges, official or otherwise, must always be beyond

reproach and must be free from any suspicion tainting him, his exalted
office, and the Judiciary. A conduct, act, or omission repugnant to the
standards of public accountability and which tends to diminish the people's
faith and confidence in the Judiciary, must invariably be handled with the
required resolve through the imposition of the appropriate sanctions imposed
by law33 and by the standards and penalties applicable to the legal
profession.
Administrative Matter No. 02-9-02-SC (which took effect on October

1, 2002) provides that an administrative case against a judge of a
regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for the
disciplinary action against members- of the Bar, shall be considered as
disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar. It also
states that judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one
decision or resolution.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand,
provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of
law, among others, for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by the Supreme Court on

what grounds. - A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
32
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837 [fonnerly OCA IPI No. 12-2463-MTJ], September 24, 2014, 736 SCRA
291, citing Vadana v. Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 329-330 (1998).
33
. . See En Bane's Resolution in Jn Re: [Jnda~ed Letter Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. I\ J
Lzmkarchong, G.R. No. 179120, A.M. No. 09-2-19, August 11, 2009. ~
I
"f\\'-0

before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In Bengco v. Bernardo, 34 we ruled that it is not sound judicial policy

to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a
lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to
apply the rules on admission to, and continuing membership in the legal
profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final
disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress
for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare and to· save courts of justice from persons unfit to practice
law. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Joseph Cedrick 0. Ruiz

is hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of all
benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment
in the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies
including government-owned and -controlled corporations. As a
consequence of this ruling, Judge Ruiz is likewise declared DISBARRED
and STRICKEN FROM the roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be (1) attached to the records of

Judge Ruiz with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court and
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and (2) posted at the Supreme
Court website for the information of the Bench, the Bar, and the general
public.
SO ORDERED.

Chief Justice
~.sit.:S. 6~
RO J. VELASOO, JR.
Associate Justice 'f\ssociate Justice
34
A.C. No. 6368, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 8, 19, citing Yu v. Palana, A.C. No. 7747, July 14,
2008, 558 SCRA 21.
~ Yn.~ --· j}~~ ~ Qzaw;f?;~

TERESITA J.~QNA~O-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
fn _· . :;t
.... ~,
(No Part)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE CA~ENDOZA
Ass~:~J~~tice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. ~~ERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice J
(On Official Leave)

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
/,
4..., ~~~;~
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4144-RTJ] -

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSEPH CEDRICK 0. RUIZ, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, MAKATI CITY, Respondent.
Promulgated:
February 2, 2016
x------------------------------------------------------------~~-~--~x
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN,J.:
This court resolves an administrative Complaint filed by the Office of

the Court Administrator against respondent Judge Joseph Cedrick 0. Ruiz,
Presiding Judge of Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, for
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Law, and for conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, which are serious charges under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules
of Court.
Informations for violation of Section 3(e)(l) of Republic Act No. 3019

and malversation of public funds were filed against respondent before the
Sandiganbayan. 1 The case was docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27467-68.
It was alleged that respondent, as then Mayor of Dapitan City,

conspired with and facilitated Police Inspector Pepe Nortal's withdrawal of
Pl million from the Confidential and Intelligence Fund of the Mayor's
Office and used it for his own benefit. 2
On April 29, 2013, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan found

respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 3 Respondent moved for
reconsideration and new trial; however, the Sandiganbayan denied his
4
Motions in its August 28, 2013 Resolution.
On October 18, 2013, respondent filed before this court a Petition for
Review on certiorari assailing his convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 27467- . f
Ponencia, p. 2.
2
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Concurring Opinion 2 A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361
68. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 209073-74. 5
Respondent was found administratively liable. Respondent's

convictions before the Sandiganbayan constitute serious charges under Rule
• . 6
140, Section 8(2) and (5) of the Rules of Court:
The respondent's convictions by the Sandiganbayan for violation

of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for malversation of public funds
confirm that the administrative charges for which he may be found liable
are serious charges under Section 8(2) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
as amended. Malversation is likewise considered as a serious charge since
it is a crime involving moral turpitude. 7
In finding respondent administratively liable, the ponencia laid down

the pieces of evidence amounting to substantial evidence that respondent
committed the acts complained of and is, thus, guilty of serious charges. 8
I concur with the finding of respondent's administrative liability. Rule

140, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides the sanctions a judge may
suffer if he or she is found guilty of a serious charge:
SEC. 11. Sanctions.-A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious

charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the

government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for

more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
6
Id. at 4.
As amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC (2001).
f
SEC. 8. Serious charges.-Serious charges include:
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an
appropriate proceeding;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;
8. Immorality;
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.
7
Ponencia, p. 6.
Id. at 12.
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. 9
In National Bureau of Investigation v. Reyes, 10 the respondent judge

was dismissed from service and disbarred for being guilty of malfeasance
through bribery, which is a serious charge under the Rules of Court. In
Office of the Court Administrator v. Indar, 11 the respondent judge was
dismissed for issuing decisions without conducting judicial proceedings.
This constituted a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of
Court. 12
However, I must clarify that the acts committed by judges or justices

prior to their appointment to the judiciary must not be automatically taken to
affect their standing or qualification as members 'of the judiciary.
The ponencia stated that:
Jn this determination, it is immaterial that the respondent was not

yet a member of the Judiciary when he allegedly committed the acts
imputed to him; judges may be disciplined for acts committed prior to
their appointment to the judiciary. Our Rules itself recognizes this
situation, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme
Court for disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and
judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to
the judiciary. It need not be shown that the respondent continued to do the
act or aCts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record
supports the charge/s against the respondent through proof that the
<
respondent committed the imputed act/s violative of Code of Judicial
Conduct and the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court. 13 (Emphasis
supplied)
While it is true that the acts of judges or justic~01nmitted prior to

appointment to the judiciary may be a basis for disciplinary measures by this
court, qualifications as to when a judge or justice may be removed must be
made.
There may be situations where a closer review of the facts and

corresponding charges or crimes is necessary. For example, the Judicial and
Bar Council may have known about an applicant's pending case but chose to
regard him or her as qualified. Before an applicant is appointed to the
judiciary, he or she is subjected to the rigorous application and nomination
procedure by the Judicial and Bar Council. 14 The Rules of the Judicial and
Bar Council prescribes the minimum requirements for nominations: J
9
As amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC (2001).
10
11
12
This was Judge Cader Indar's third offense.
13 . p. 8.
p onenc1a,
14
See CONST., art. VIII, sec. 8 and 9.
[Formerly OCAIPI No. 13-4144-RTJ]
constitutional and statutory qualifications; competence, which includes

educational preparation, experience, performance, and other
accomplishments; integrity; independence; and sound physical, mental, and
.
emot10na 1 con d.1t1on.
. is
In Rule 4, Section 5 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council,

persons are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to the
judiciary when they have pending criminal or administrative cases before
courts:
SEC. 5. Disqualification. - The following are disqualified from

being nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as
Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals;

and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an

administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of
more than Pl0,000, unless he has been granted judicial clemency.
By nominating an applicant for appointment, the Judicial and Bar

Council gives its imprimatur to the applicant. It deems the applicant to have
the "reputation for honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable
conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards." 16 If we do not
carefully consider the prior acts of judges or justices in relation to their
judicial functions and automatically find convictions or pronouncements of
guilt as a reflection of the qualifications of the judge or justice, then we
disregard the Judicial and Bar Council's nomination process. This disregard
is even more apparent when the appointing authority-the President-
appoints a nominee from the Judicial and Bar Council's list. To
automatically dismiss a judge or justice based on the above grounds
undermines the President's appointment.
In another situation, an applicant may not have any pending criminal

or administrative charge when he or she applies for a post in the judiciary.
After the applicant's appointment to the judiciary, a disgruntled party-litigant
decides to look into the judge's past and files criminal charges against him or
her. The case may or may not be relevant to the functions of the judge or
may not constitute a crime of moral turpitude. However, damage to the
judge's perceived integrity and probity has already been made.
15
See JBC - 009, Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2000), as amended
/
<http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php/jbc-rules-and-regulations/jbc-009>.
16
JBC - 009, Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (2000), as amended, Rule 4, sec. I
<http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php/jbc-rules-and-regulations/jbc-009>.
Concurring Opinion S A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361
The judiciary must find a balance between maintaining the integrity

and competence of its judges, justices, and other personnel and protecting its
members from harassment that aims to prevent the miscarriage of justice.
As this court has said before:
[I]t is established that any administrative complaint leveled against

a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its
consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that
the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or
disbarment. As aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases
against judges may be used as tools to harass them and may in the
long run create adverse consequences. 17
ACCORDINGLY, I vote that respondent Judge Joseph Cedrick 0.

Ruiz, Presiding Judge of Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
be DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except
accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in Government
or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned and controlled corporations. Respondent should also be
DISBARRED and his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Associate Justice
,. Y\~~~;M~
SUPREME COURT
17
See Re: Judge Adoracion Angeles, A.M No. 06-9-545-RTC, 567 Phil. I 89 (2008) (Per J. Nachura,
Third Division], citing Emmanuel Ymson Velasco v. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, 557 Phil. I (2007)
[Per J. Carpio, En Banc] and Mataga v. Judge Rosete, 483 Phil. 235 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago,
First Division].
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4144-RTJ] -

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant v.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSEPH CEDRJCK 0. RUIZ, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 61, MAKATI CITY, Respondent.
Promulgated:
February 2, 2016
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -UR..i ~ ... ~ - - - -A -- - ,., - - - - -- x
1-1~, - -~~-r~
DISSENT
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Majority of the Court vote to dismiss the respondent Judge from
the Judiciary, and to disbar him as well.
I DISSENT. I humbly submit that this administrative matter may be

prematurely adjudicated in the light of the pending appeal by the respondent
of his convictions. But if it is unavoidable that we find him guilty on the
basis of the convictions, I urge that his dismissal from the service and his
disbarment are penalties too heavy and too harsh to mete on him under the
circumstance of the case.
This administrative matter has been brought about by the receipt by

the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of a copy of the decision
rendered on April 29, 2013 in Criminal Case No. 27467 and Criminal Case
No. 27468 entitled People v. Joseph Cedrick 0. Ruiz and Police Inspector
Pepe Nortal respectively charging the accused with violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019 and malversation of public funds, whereby the
Sandiganbayan found the respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged, and sentenced him to suffer the c01responding indeterminate
sentences.
In its ensuing report, the OCA recommended to the Court that the
respondent, the incumbent Presiding Judge of Branch 61 of the Regional
Trial Court in Makati City, be fonnally charged for being convicted of
crimes involvillg moral turpitude, and that he be forthwith suspended
without pay pending the resolution of the administrative matter, unless the
suspension would be lifted by the Court.
I wish to point out, however, that the convictions are not yet final, but
are in fact undergoing a time]y appeal. By pronouncing him guilty in this
~
~
Dissent 2 A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361
administrative matter as to dismiss him from the Judiciary and to disbar him
as a member of the Bar, the Majority of the Court are likely prejudicing his
appeal. In order not to be unjust, I humbly opine that we should exercise
self-restraint, and await the outcome of the appeal before deciding this
administrative matter.
Although there is a distinction between administrative liability and

criminal liability, for the purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to
protect the public service to enforce the constitutional tenet that a public
office is a public trust, while the objective of the criminal prosecution is the
punishment of the c;rim.e, · any judgment in this administrative matter
effectively removes the distinction considering that the Majority predicate
their action against the respondent on the same· evidence that will be
considered in the appellate review of the convictions. Thus, the very adverse
factual findings made in the Majority's opinion will prejudicially influence
the review of the convictions against him.
Nonetheless, the harsh outcome, if it is now unavoidable such that we

must sanction the respondent, should be mitigated. It will not be
unprecedented to do so here, because the Court has refrained from imposing
the administrative penalties expressly prescribed by law or regulation in
consideration of the presence of mitigating factors, like, among others, the
respondent's length of service, his ready acknowledgement of his
infractions, his remorse, his family circumstances, his advanced age, and.
even humanitarian and equitable considerations, and impose the lower or
lesser penalty. 1
I urge the Court to show compassion to the respondent in light of the

following mitigating factors in his favor, to wit:
1. He has devoted nearly 30 years of his life in the service of

the Government in various capacities as a local appointed
and elective public officer, and as a member of the
Judiciary; 2
2. This administrative charge relates to an act done when he

was the Mayor of Dapitan City, and had nothing to do with
the discharge of his office as Judge of the RTC;
3. He is being administratively sanctioned for the first time in
See, e.g., Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Aguilar, Regional Trial Court, Branch 70,
Burgos, Pangasinan, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087 (Formerly OCA LP.I. No. 07-2621-RTJ), June 7, 2011.
2
Rollo, pp. 348-349 (his judicial service started on December 17, 2003, upon his appointment as the
Presiding Judge of Branch 49 ofthe RTC in Iloilo City; he was designated on July 1, 2009 as the Presiding
Judge of Branch 61 of the RTC in Makati City).
~
this case. The other administrative complaints previously

brought against him, according to the records of the Court,
were already either dismissed, 3 or cancelled, 4 or closed and
terminated. 5
4. His convictions by the Sandiganbayan that furnished the

ground for this administrative matter are still under appeal. 6
Without touching on the propriety of the convictions, I
submit that the criminal trial included peculiar
circumstances of relevance in the determination of the
imposable penalty.
Let me focus on the last of the foregoing mitigating factors. I begin by

noting that the convictions largely depended on the direct testimony of
Police Inspector Pepe E. Nortal, the respondent's co-accused, from which
the trial court inferred that the respondent had actually received the amount
of Pl,000,000.00 as cash advance sourced from the Confidential Intelligence
Fund (CIF) of Dapitan City for 2001. In contrast, the other testimonial and
documentary evidence adduced by the Prosecution tended to show only that
the respondent had merely actively facilitated the processing and withdrawal
of the amount. To me, however, Nortal's testimony should not determine the
respondent's administrative liability, for how could Nortal be a reliable
witness if he was himself charged in conspiracy with the respondent with
having committed the crimes charged.
A co-accused like Nortal - a co-conspirator at that - is not allowed to

testify against another accused in the same case unless he is first discharged
as a state witness. The discharge is necessary to avoid the self-incrimination
of the witness. The process of discharge is delineated in Section 17, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. - When two

or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense,
upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may
direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so
that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied
that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused

whose discharge is requested;
OCA IPI No. 04-2121-RTJ; OCA IPI No.10-3549-RTJ; OCA IPI No. 13-4060-RTJ; OCA IPI 09-
3232-RTJ; OCA IPI No.10-3358-RTJ; OCA IPI No. 12-3825-RTJ; OCA IPI No. 09-3169-RTJ; OCA IPI
No. 12-3958-RTJ.
4
OCA IPI No. 14-4247-RTJ.
OCA IPI No. 11-10-193-RTC.
6
Docketed as G.R. No. 209073-74.
I
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4144-RTJ] "
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper

prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially

corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not! at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically

form part of the trial. If the colllrt denies the motion for discharge of the
accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
The rule requires the discharged witness not to appear to be the most
guilty, a requirement that has been accorded the following understanding in
Jimenez, Jr. v. People,7 viz.:
By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of

culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and
does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed. While all
the accused may be given the; same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet
one may be considered to have lesser or the least guilt taking into account
his degree of participation in the commission of the offense.
Before Nortal's testimony is appreciated against the respondent, there

ought to be the showing that the proper procedure for his discharge was
followed. If the April 29, 2013 decision of the Sandiganbayan did not
indicate why Nortal was not himself tried for any criminal liability for the
crimes charged against him and the respondent, then the Court, in this
administrative matter, should at the very least first satisfy itself that Nortal
did not appear to be the more guilty between himself and the respondent.
Otherwise, we would have incriminating testimony that is tainted by the
witness' desire to save himself and lay the blame on the respondent.
Moreover, the person liable in malversation is the public officer who,

by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, and appropriates the same. 8 Here, that public official was Nortal,
not the respondent, because the three documents relevant to the transaction -
specifically, Disbursement Voucher No. 105.0105.3888,9 Check No.
1097358, 10 and the Special Ledger 11 ~ all indicated that the cash advance of
7
G.R. No. 209195 & 209215, September 17, 2014.
Article 217, Revised Penal Code.
9
Rollo, p. 161.
10
Id. at 164.
11
Id. at 197.
1
Pl,000,000.00 was payable to Nortal. Under the pertinent laws -

specifically, Section 101 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (The State Audit
Code of the Philippines) and Section 5 of Commission on Audit (COA)
Circular No. 97-002 - Nortal should liquidate the cash advance. The
respondent, being only the approving authority for the release of the CIF,
was liable only to explain his participation, which he was not made to do.
Nortal's ineligibility for the discharge to be a witness against the

respondent due to his being the person directly accountable for the
Pl,000,000.00 cash advance was validated when the Ombudsman dismissed
him from the service for grave misconduct. 12 The Ombudsman concluded in
its resolution dated April 20, 2007 as follows:
x x x Pepe E. Nortal, [he] admitted all the material allegations

against him but interposed the defense of coercion and tremendous
pressure from then Mayor Ruiz, which forced him to commit the unlawful
act complained of even against his will.
His defense is untenable, outright unbelievable and not supported

with any credible evidence. Other than the self-serving claim of
respondent Nortal, there is nothing on record to show that he was
coerced or intimidated into committing the wrongful act of
withdrawing the amount of Pl Million from the CIF of the Office of
the Mayor for the FY 2001. In fact, the wrongful act did not end with
the simple withdrawal of the said amount because, as admitted by
Nortal himself, he also benefited from the proceeds thereof when he
received an aggregate amount of PSS,000.00 as his share, and which
amount remained unliquidated up to the present time. Having
benefited therefrom, he cannot now profess innocence to escape
liability as he knew all along about the highly questionable nature of
the said transaction. By all indications, and knowing fully well that a
new local chief executive was about to succeed, he, together with the
outgoing Mayor, devised a plan to withdraw the entire CIF for the
year 2001, appropriating the same for their own private interests and,
consequently, depriving the city government of the said funds. It was,
therefore, a deliberate act on their part to defraud the city
government of its appropriated funds, which is a patent indicia of bad
faith and deceit. As such, there can be no doubt that respondent Nortal
committed a misconduct of a grave nature, which is a· clear deviation from
the established norms of conduct required of a public servant. 13 (bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
What should be the mitigated liability of the respondent?
The Court is sanctioning him now as an incumbent Judge of the RTC.

Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a judge found guilty of a
serious charge may be subjected to any of the following penalties:
12
Id. at 209.
13
Id. at 208.
""
'?
~

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4144-RTJ] ~
Section 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious

charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the

reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including govemment-
owned or controlled corporatioJ,ls: Provided, however, that the forfeiture
of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from off~ce without salary and other benefits for

more than three (3) but not exce~ding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding M0,000.00.
Dismissal from the service should not be imposed because of the

mitigating factors I have noted. The next penalty is suspension, but in the
light of the respondent's manifestation of his intention to exercise his option
for early retirement pursuant to Section 1 of Republic Act No. 910, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9946, 14 he could no longer be suspended.
Thus, I recommend that he be fined in the amount of P40,000.00, which is
the next lower penalty.
Lastly, I consider the disbarment of the respondent unfounded. The

act complained against was done by him when he was the Mayor of Dapitan
City, and did not involve his professional or ethical conduct as an attorney.
Hence, disbarring him is unfair, because such penalty becomes proper only
when the attorney commits any misconduct of a very serious or gross nature
in connection to the discharge of his professional responsibilities. I also urge
that at the very least we should first hear him fully on the matter.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to punish respondent Judge JOSEPH

CEDRICK 0. RUIZ with the maximum fine of P40,000.00, conformably
with Section 11, 3, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; and to lift the sanction of
his disbarment.
CERr~o XEROX co~
,'
...... ~ - ~EUP~:i~
cu::;:,:K or COiJR"f, EN BANC
SUPRl:ME COvRT
14
Jd, at 348.
l\epublic of tbe ~bilippines
~upreme Qtourt
. :fflanila
ENBANC
OFFICE OF THE COURT A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181
ADMINISTRATOR [Formerly A.M. No. 09-4-174-RTJ]
Complainant,
Present:
SERENO, C.J,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
*PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
-versus-
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, .
MENDOZA,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE, and
LEONEN,JJ
RETIRED JUDGE GUILLERMO Promulgated:

R. ANDAYA, JUNE 25, 2013
Respondent.
X---------------------------------------------------------------- ------------X
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative case for gross incompetence,

inefficiency, negligence, and dereliction of duty against Judge Guillermo R.
Andaya, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City, Quezon, who
retired on March 27, 2009.
' On official leave.

On January 19, 20, and 21, 2009, a judicial audit docketed as A.M.
No. 09-4-174-RTC was conducted on the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53,
Lucena City, Quezon, then presided by the respondent Judge Guillermo R.
Andaya. In a Memorandum1 dated April 14, 2009, then Court Administrator
and now Hon. Associate Justice Jose P. Perez recommended that a fine be
imposed on respondent Judge in the amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P80,000.00). The fine, which was to be deducted from his retirement or
terminal leave benefits was recommended based on the findings that
respondent Judge:
i) Failed to take action on the following Civil Cases from the time
of their filing: 94-122, SP-00-87, 01-47, 99-122, SP No. 03-54,
05-96, SCA 05-19, 07-45, 07-161, 08-93;
ii) Failed to take appropriate action on Criminal Cases Nos. 01-

294, 96-343, 96-344, 96-345, 96-346, 02-998, 03-1378, 02-673,
03-1235, 99-1097, 02-365, 05-232 and 07-01-A and Civil Cases
Nos. 89-38, 96-78, 94-180, SP 01-40, 99-135, 01-96, MC-0196,
MC 03-107, 05-41, SCA-06-31, 04-82, SP 07-43 and 06-201;
iii) Failed to resolve the pending motions in Criminal Cases Nos.

08-1031, 01-503, 02-837, 02-838, 93-336, 98-92, 04-154, 04-
1206, 95-327, 04-1068, 03-654, 06-342, 05-296, 05-1129, 05-
1130, 05-797, 07-460, 05-270 and in Civil Cases Nos. 94-04,
98-177, 99-158, 93-145, 99-13, 02-13, 97-86, 93-41, 01-11, 02-
149, 03-97, 02-05, 03-1, 03-143,03-156, 04-40, 03-89, 04-73,
04-108, MC 02-77, 04-131, 03-19, 02-41, 05-72, 03-148, 98-
149, 06-39, 96-60, 94-144, 92-81, 03-115, SCA 06-34, SCA 06-
36, 05-28, SCA 06-32, 07-03, 07-08, 08-05, 00-84, 07-62, 08-
34, 89-79, 90-124, MC 06-192, 07-68, 7677, 06-80, 06-102, 08-
54, 96-159 and 89-02; and
iv) Failed to decide Criminal Cases Nos. 99-1058, 97-284, 97-285,

98-734, 01-897, 02-1250, 93-982, 02-730, 02-555, 04-296, 04-
297, 03-1225, 02-987, 03-418, 01-775, 02-330, 03-602, 04-
1114, 03-404, 05-322, 04-483, 01-578, 01-579, 05-181, 02-382,
04-612, 05-894, 01-6 and 01-659 and Civil Cases Nos. 90-76,
91-141, 95-09, 98-122, 91-48, 93-103, 0537-M, 01-8, 00-171,
94-107, SP 02-14, 01-3, MC 02-126, MC 02-127, 01-138, 91-
132, 99-122, 01-136, 00-13, 04-131, 04-08, LRC-01-1, 04-20,
05-176, 06-09, 04-84, SCA 06-21, 00-84, MC 06-144, 98-167,
MC-07-85, MC 08-26, SCA-08-09-A, SCA 08-02-A and MC
08-157.
1
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181), pp. 1-41.
In a Resolution2 dated April 29, 2009, the Second Division of this

Court resolved to docket the judicial audit report as an administrative
complaint against respondent for gross incompetence, inefficiency,
negligence, and dereliction of duty. Respondent Judge was required to
manifest his willingness to submit the matter for resolution on the basis of
the pleadings filed. Respondent Judge sent a letter3 dated June 24, 2009
manifesting his willingness to do so, and sought the compassion of the Court
in the resolution of his administrative case. He asked the Court to consider
his deteriorating health condition which included a heart problem and
cataracts in both eyes. The latter adversely affected his work efficiency
despite an operation on his right eye. Respondent also asked the Court to
consider his thirty-four (34) years of government service, twenty-two (22) of
which were in the judiciary.
Meanwhile, another administrative case, docketed as A.M. No. 09-11-

477-RTC, arose in relation to the Certificate of Clearance that the respondent
Judge filed in relation to his application for Compulsory Retirement
Benefits. In a Memorandum4 dated November 9, 2009, then Court
Administrator and now Hon. Associate Justice Jose P. Perez recommended
the imposition of a fine, to be deducted from his retirement/gratuity benefits,
in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). The recommendation
was made upon the finding that the respondent Judge had failed to decide
forty-five (45) cases submitted for decision beyond the reglementary period
of three (3) months as per the March 2009 Monthly Report of Cases.5
In a Resolution6 dated November 24, 2009, the Court resolved to re-

docket A.M. No. 09-11-477-RTC as A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 and impose a
fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) on the respondent Judge for his
failure to decide forty-five (45) cases submitted for decision, with the
amount to be deducted from his retirement/gratuity benefits. A subsequent
Resolution7 dated January 26, 2010 was issued by the Court, directing
Acting Presiding Judge Rodolfo D. Obnamia, Jr. to decide with dispatch the
forty-five (45) cases.
The respondent Judge sent a letter8 dated March 4, 2010 addressed to

then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno , manifesting that: (a) both A.M. No.
RTJ-09-2208 and A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181 involves the charge of gross
inefficiency; and (b) that “the Court had not been given the opportunity to
2
Id. at 45-46.
3
Id. at 378-380.
4
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208), pp. 1-2.
5
Id. at 9-14.
6
Id. at 4.
7
Id. at 15.
8
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181), pp. 395-397.
appreciate his explanation regarding his health conditions”9 since he did not
know about A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 until he received a copy of the
Resolution of this Court dated November 24, 2009. Respondent prayed for
the Court to take cognizance of: (a) his health problems; (b) the fact that he
had already been fined Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for gross
inefficiency in A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208; (c) that he has not received any
benefit since he retired on March 27, 2009; and (d) that he had served the
government for thirty-four (34) years, twenty-two (22) of which were in the
judiciary.
In a letter10 dated March 27, 2010 addressed to Court Administrator

Jose Midas P. Marquez, respondent Judge claimed that he should not be
penalized for gross inefficiency in A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181 because it would
be akin to splitting the complaints against him. Attached to the letter was the
March 4, 2010 letter addressed to then Chief Justice Puno.
On April 27, 2010, a Resolution11 was issued by the Court in A.M.

No. RTJ-09-2208 noting the Certification12 of the SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer Cleofe R. Norberte that respondent Judge had paid the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as court fine, which was deducted from
his terminal leave benefits, and duly receipted under O.R. No. 6066167.
In a Memorandum13 dated June 11, 2010 signed by Court

Administrator Marquez, the Office of the Court Administrator (“OCA” for
brevity) noted that the respondent Judge paid the Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) fine in the other complaint on April 14, 2010. The OCA also
noted that twenty-three (23) criminal cases and nine (9) civil cases included
in the March 2009 Monthly Report of Cases14 in A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208
were included in the present complaint. The OCA then reiterated its
recommendation that respondent Judge be fined, but that the amount be
reduced from Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).
Respondent then sent a letter15 dated August 17, 2010 reiterating his
manifestations in the letter dated March 4, 2010. Respondent prayed for the
dismissal of the present case for the sake of justice tempered by leniency on
the following grounds: (a) his serious health problems that affected his work
efficiency in the last months of his service; (b) the penalty in A.M. No. RTJ-
09-2208 was imposed without him being given a chance to explain; and (c)
he has served twelve (12) years as an assistant city prosecutor, three (3)
9
Id. at 397.
10
Id. at 429-430.
11
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208), p. 20.
12
Id. at 16.
13
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181), pp. 416-418.
14
Id. at 421-422.
15
Id. at 454-457.
years as a Municipal Trial Court judge, and nineteen (19) years as a

Regional Trial Court judge.
In a subsequent letter16 dated February 7, 2011, respondent Judge

pointed out an apparent overlap between A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 and the
present complaint and prayed that the two not be considered as separate
complaints because to do so would be akin to splitting the causes of a
complaint. Respondent also prayed for the early resolution of the present
case.
In response to the letter, the OCA sent a Memorandum17 dated

February 16, 2011, bringing to the attention of the Court what respondent
claimed as a similarity in the offenses involved in A.M. No.RTJ-09-2208
and A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181 and the possibility that he may be penalized
twice for the same offense. The OCA noted that it was not accurate for
respondent Judge to conclude that he stands to be penalized twice for the
same lapses since the judicial audit in the present complaint was more
comprehensive in scope than the Monthly Report of Cases submitted in
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208. They further noted that the Monthly Report of
Cases only covered forty-five (45) cases for the month of March, and despite
the overlap of the cases, there were still numerous decisions and motions left
unresolved that respondent Judge should be held accountable for.
Nevertheless, the OCA reiterated its recommendation that the penalty
imposed be reduced from Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) in view of the previous penalty imposed on
him.
In a Resolution18 dated January 17, 2012, the Court resolved to

approve the release of respondent’s retirement benefits subject to the
retention of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and pending the resolution
of the present case. On January 24, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution19 in
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208 considering the case as closed and terminated.
The Court takes note of the findings of the OCA.
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower courts

to decide or resolve cases or matters for decision or resolution within three
(3) months from date of submission. Section 5 of Canon 6 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct provides that judges should perform all judicial duties
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. The same principle is
embodied in Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
states that a judge should dispose of the court’s business promptly and
16
Id. at 470-474.
17
Id. at 475-477.
18
Id. at 549.
19
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2208), p. 334.
decide cases within the required periods. Judges are to be held at a higher
standard in the performance of their duties, and the failure to fulfill this duty
would not only violate every litigant’s constitutional right to the speedy
disposition of cases, but will also hold the erring judge administratively
liable for the offense. Under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge
punishable by either suspension from office without salary or benefits, or a
fine.
After an extensive judicial audit conducted by the OCA on Branch 53

of the Regional Trial Court in Lucena City, Quezon, it was found that while
respondent Judge exerted efforts to take appropriate action on the cases
subject to the audit, he still:
i) failed to take action on ten (10) civil cases from the time
of filing;
ii) failed to take appropriate action on thirteen (13) criminal
cases and thirteen (13) civil cases for a considerable
length of time;
iii) failed to resolve pending motions in eighteen (18)
criminal cases and fifty-one (51) civil cases; and
iv) failed to decide twenty-nine (29) criminal cases and
thirty-five (35) civil cases.
A comparison of the cases involved in the March 2009 Monthly

Report of Cases, which was used as the basis for the findings in A.M. No.
No. RTJ-09-2208, and the cases involved in the judicial audit report of the
present complaint yields the finding that, indeed, twenty-three (23) criminal
cases and nine (9) civil cases are included in both reports.20 However, it must
be noted that the March 2009 Monthly Report of Cases only covered forty-
five (45) cases, while there were forty-three (43) criminal cases and forty-six
(46) civil cases that were the subject of the judicial audit report of the
present complaint. This means that despite the overlap, there are still twenty
(20) unresolved criminal cases and thirty-seven (37) unresolved civil cases
for which the respondent Judge might be held accountable for. The other
complaint also does not include the unresolved motions in twenty-nine (29)
criminal cases and fifty-three (53) civil cases,21 which are included in the
judicial audit report in the present complaint.
Be that as it may, the respondent Judge could no longer be made liable

for these infractions.
20
The overlapping cases were: Criminal Cases Nos. 97-285, 02-1250, 02-284, 93-982, 02-730, 02-555,
04-296, 03-1225, 02-987, 03-418, 01-775, 02-330, 03-602, 04-1114, 03-404, 05-322, 04-483, 01-578,
01-579, 05-181, 02-382, 04-612, and 05-894; Civil Cases Nos. 90-76, 91-141, 95-09, 91-48, 94-107,
SP 02-14, 91-132, 00-13 and 98-167.
21
Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2181) p. 418. As per OCA Memorandum dated June 11, 2010.
A review of the records shows that the judicial audit was conducted on
January 19, 20, and 21, 2009 during the respondent Judge’s incumbency.
However, the administrative complaint was docketed only on April 29, 2009
after his compulsory retirement on March 27, 2009.
In the case of Re: Missing Exhibits and Court Properties in Regional

Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo City, Davao del Norte,22 a Memorandum
recommending that court’s presiding Judge, Jesus L. Grageda, who
compulsorily retired on November 25, 2009, be held liable for not ordering a
prompt investigation as to missing court exhibits and properties and be made
to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) was submitted by the
OCA to the Court on July 10, 2012, or more than two (2) years after he
retired. In dismissing the complaint against him, We ruled that:
In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative

case, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the
respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of
respondent’s cessation from office. In Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge Hamoy, the Court held that:
Respondent’s cessation from office x x x does not

warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed
against him while he was still in the service nor does it
render said administrative case moot and academic. The
Court’s jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that
the respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of
the case.
In the present case, Judge Grageda’s compulsory retirement

divested the OCA of its right to institute a new administrative case against
him after his compulsory retirement. The Court can no longer acquire
administrative jurisdiction over Judge Grageda by filing a new
administrative case against him after he has ceased to be a public
official. The remedy, if necessary, is to file the appropriate civil or
criminal case against Judge Grageda for the alleged transgression.
(emphasis provided)
Similarly, in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Jesus L.

Grageda,23 the Court dismissed another pending administrative case against
him, thus:
Records show that Judge Grageda compulsorily retired on

November 25, 2009 while the judicial audit was conducted at RTC, Br. 4,
Panabo City from November 17 to November 26, 2009. The OCA then
submitted its report only on March 24, 2010, which was re-docketed as a
22
A.M. No. 10-2-41-RTC, February 27, 2013.
23
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235, March 11, 2013.
regular administrative matter on April 28, 2010, or months after Judge

Grageda retired from the judiciary. Consequently, his retirement
effectively barred the Court from pursuing the instant administrative
proceeding that was instituted after his tenure in office, and divested the
Court, much less the OCA, of any jurisdiction to still subject him to the
rules and regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him for the
infractions committed while he was still in the service. As held in the case
of OCA v. Judge Celso L. Mantua [A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291, February 8,
2012]:
This Court cone<edes that there are no promulgated

rules on the conduct of judicial audit. However, the absence
of such rules should not serve as license to recommend the
imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their
incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the
circumstances behind the results ofthe judicial audit.
In light of these pronouncements, the Court has lost jurisdiction to

find him liable for the cases and motions left unresolved prior to his
retirement.
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the complaint against

respondent Judge GUILLERMO R. ANDAYA, formerly of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City, Quezon, is DISMISSED. The
Financial Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator is
DIRECTED to release the Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) retained from
his retirement pay unless withheld for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
0 VICTOR FAMORCA LEON

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
PRESBITERO . VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Ass
»fl{-~fedit~
~ ~ lb ll~:e;;;:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DECASTRO
Associate Justice
lJ//J/Jfn.ff~
. Associate Justice
(On official leave)

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
~~~;,
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
~.VILL J
Associate J
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
~.,M/
ESTELA M. PfRLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
31\.epublic of tiJ£ ~bilippines
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ENBANC
RE: FAILURE OF FORMER A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC

JUDGE ANTONIO A.
CARBONELL TO DECIDE Present:
CASES SUBMITTED FOR
DECISION AND TO RESOLVE SERENO, C.J.
PENDING MOTIONS IN THE CARPIO,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, VELASCO, JR.,
BRANCH 27, SAN FERNANDO, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
LA UNION. *BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE, and
LEONEN, JJ.:
Promulgated:
JULY 09, 2013
r) ()
X----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------X
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case originates from the judicial audit conducted

by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on March 3 and 4, 2008 in
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 27, in view of
the disability retirement of Presiding Judge Antonio A. Carbonell on
December 31, 2007.
According to the Audit Team's Report, Branch 27 had a total caseload

of 231 cases, consisting of 14 7 criminal cases and 84 civil cases, and Judge
Carbonell failed to decide 41 criminal cases (one inherited) and 22 civil
' On leave.
Resolution 2 A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC
cases (four inherited), namely: Criminal Case Nos. 1183, 4559, 5117, 3532,
3672, 5165, 5007, 5946, 6934, 5763, 7014, 5991, 4724, 6311, 6076, 4789,
6297, 5424, 4928, 6403, 6816, 5635, 5666, 5134, 5865, 6284, 6454, 5394,
6770, 5375, 5356, 7557, 5940, 6311, 6333, 7729, 7111, 6325, 6068, 6517,
and 7766; and Civil Case Nos. 3009, 4564, 4563, 4714, 3647, 4362, 6041,
4798, 4561, 6989, 2882, 6185, 7153, 7163, LRC 2332, SCA 7198, 7310,
3487, 7327, 7331, 7298, and 7323.1
Judge Carbonell was also reported to have failed to resolve pending

motions or incidents in four criminal cases and 12 civil cases, to wit:
Criminal Case Nos. 7559, 6409, 7787, and 7788; and Civil Case Nos. 4793,
LRC 1308, 7064, 4973, SP 2901, SP 2952, AC 1797, 7100, 7152, 7060, SP
2986, and SP 2987.2
In a Memorandum dated May 15, 2008, the OCA recommended to the

Court that a fine of P50,000.00 be imposed upon Judge Carbonell for gross
inefficiency for failing to promptly decide the cases and to resolve pending
motions and incidents.3
On June 17, 2008, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to furnish
Judge Carbonell with a copy of the Audit Team’s Report, and ordered him
to submit his comment on the report within ten days from notice.4
Not having received the comment from Judge Carbonell despite the
lapse of the time given, the Court resolved on September 21, 2010 to require
him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt.5
Judge Carbonell replied,6 stating that he had incorporated his

comment/compliance to the June 17, 2008 resolution in the letter dated July
17, 2008 (Re: Very Urgent Request for Release of Disability Retirement
Benefits and Money Value of Accrued Leave Credits) he had sent to Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno.7 He remarked that the Court had actually granted
his request for the payment of his disability retirement benefits subject to the
retention of P200,000.00 pending resolution of the pending administrative
cases against him.8
1
Rollo, pp. 2-14.
2
Id.
3
Id. at 15.
4
Id. at 76.
5
Id. at 82.
6
Id. at 84-85.
7
Id. at 86-87.
8
Claim for Disability Retirement Benefits of Hon. Antonio A. Carbonell, former Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union, A.M. No. 12815-Ret., September 24, 2008.
In his July 17, 2008 letter to Chief Justice Puno, Judge Carbonell
surmised that the Audit Team might have overlooked the fact that he had
inherited some of the undecided cases from the predecessor judge; that said
cases had no transcripts of stenographic notes, because of which he was
impelled to require the parties to submit their respective memoranda; that the
cases would only be considered submitted for decision after the parties
would have filed their respective memoranda; and that he had undergone a
quadruple heart bypass operation in 2005 that had adversely affected his
pace in deciding the cases.
On November 23, 2010, the Court referred Judge Carbonell’s letter to

the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation.9
In its Memorandum dated February 2, 2011,10 the OCA reiterated its

recommendation to impose a fine of P50,000.00 on Judge Carbonell, noting
that he had failed to render any valid reason for his delay in deciding the
cases submitted for decision and in resolving the pending motions or
incidents in other cases. The OCA noted that only five cases submitted for
decision had been inherited; and that the case records did not bear any
requests for extension of time or any directive for the transcription of
stenographic notes. It stressed that heavy caseload would not justify the
failure to promptly decide and resolve cases because he could have simply
asked the Court for an extension of time.
The recommendation of the OCA is well-taken, subject to the

modification of the penalty to be imposed.
As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should at all times

act with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to
the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of
excellence ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the
least that he can do to sustain the trust and confidence that the public have
reposed in him and the institution he represents.11
The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or

resolution of cases.12 Delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in
the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial system, as judges
have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay.13 Thus,
judges have been constantly reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on the
speedy disposition of cases and observe the periods prescribed by the
Constitution for deciding cases, which is three months from the filing of the
9
Rollo, p. 98.
10
Id. at 102-103.
11
Juson v. Mondragon, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1685, September 3, 2007, 532 SCRA 1, 13.
12
Id. at 12.
13
Office of the Court Administrator v. Castañeda, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2316, October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA
321, 343.
last pleading, brief or memorandum for lower courts.14 To further impress

upon judges such mandate, the Court has issued guidelines (Administrative
Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999) that would insure the speedy
disposition of cases and has therein reminded judges to scrupulously observe
the periods prescribed in the Constitution.
Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges
and understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly
disposing of their businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of
time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do
is to request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases, and the
Court has almost invariably granted such request.
Judge Carbonell failed to decide a total of 63 cases and to resolve 16

pending motions or incidents within the 90-day reglementary period. He
intimated that his poor health affected his pace in deciding the cases. Had
such been the case, then he should have explained his predicament to the
Court and asked for an extension of time to decide the cases. Unfortunately,
he failed to do so.
Judge Carbonell claims that some of the inherited cases had no

transcripts of stenographic notes, thereby preventing him from resolving the
cases on time. He posits that a case would not be considered submitted for
decision if the parties did not yet file their respective memoranda.
The Audit Team’s Report shows that, in an apparent attempt to

suspend the running of the 90-day period to decide the cases, Judge
Carbonell liberally gave the parties in most of the overdue cases several
extensions of time to file their respective memoranda. Some extensions were
even for indefinite periods, with the parties being simply given “ample time
to file their memo,” as the relevant court orders stated.
In view of the foregoing, Judge Carbonell’s excuses are futile in the

light of the following provisions of Administrative Circular No. 28, dated
July 3, 1989, viz:
(3) A case is considered submitted for decision upon the admission of the
evidence of the parties at the termination of the trial. The ninety (90)
days period for deciding the case shall commence to run from
submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the
Court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered
submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or the
expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of
transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt
14
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution.
or suspend the period for deciding the case unless the case was
previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge in which
case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days from the
completion of the transcripts within which to decide the same.
(4) The court may grant extension of time to f1le memoranda, but the
ninety (90) day period for deciding shall not be interrupted thereby.
Without a doubt, Judge Carbonell's failure to decide several cases

within the reglementary period, without justifiable and credible reasons,
constituted gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative
sanctions, 15 like fines. The fines imposed have varied in each case,
depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the
reglementary period and other factors, including the presence of aggravating
or mitigating circumstances like the damage suffered by the parties from the
delay, the health condition and age of the judge, etc. 16 Thus, in one case, the
Court mitigated the liability of a Judge who had been suffering from
illnesses and who had later retired due to disability, and imposed upon him a
fine of P20,000.00 for failure to decide 31 cases. 17
Considering that Judge Carbonell similarly retired due to disability,

the Comi believes that his poor health condition greatly contributed to his
inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial judge. That mitigated his
administrative liability, for which reason the Court reduces the
recommended penalty of fine from P50,000.00 to P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, Retired Judge Antonio A. Carbonell is ORDERED

to pay a fine of P20,000.00 to be deducted from the P200,000.00 that was
withheld from his retirement benefits, and the balance to be immediately
released to him.
SO ORDERED.
15
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory ol Pending Cases in the MTCC. Branch I
and the RTC. Branch 57, both in Lucena City, A.M. No. 96-7-257-RTC, December 2, 1999, 319 SCRA
507,512.
16
Re.· Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC, Branches 29 and 59, Toledo City, A.M. No. 97-9-
278-RTC, July 8, 1998, 292 SCRA 8, 23.
17
Supra note 15.
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
/
PRES BITE J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
T~.~£t-~mo Associate Justice

(On Leave)
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
$~.?
Associa e Justice Associate Justice
\
~
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
JOS REZ .JOSE C~MENDOZA

:e1ustice
1
AJ1
IENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M.~I~S-BERNABE

Associate Justice
l\epublic of tbe ~btlippines
~uprcmc Qtourt
1iaguio QCitp ·
ENBANC
OFFICE OF THE COURT A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691

ADMINISTRATOR, [Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
Petitioner,
Present:
-versus-
SERENO, C.J,
JUDGE ANATALIO S. CARPIO,
NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE VELASCO, JR.,
GIL R. ACOSTA, Branch 3; JUDGE LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Branch BRION,
4; and JUDGE EDGEMELO C. PERALTA,
ROSALES, Branch 8; all of MTCC- BERSAMIN,
Cebu ·City; CELESTE P. RETUYA, DEL CASTILLO,
Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6, Cebu ABAD,
City; CORAZON P. RETUYA, VILLARAMA, JR.,
Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch PEREZ,
6, Cebu City; RHONA F. MENDOZA,
RODRIGUEZ, Administrative REYES,
Officer I, Office of the Clerk of *PERLAS-BERNABE, and
Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC) LEONEN,JJ
Cebu City; EMMA D. VALENCIA,
Court Stenographer III, RTC,
Branch 18, Cebu City; MARILOU
CABANEZ, Court Stenographer,
MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;
DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, Process
Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;
REBECCA ALESNA, Court
Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu
City;. and HELEN MONGGAYA,
Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch Promulgated:
4, Cebu City.
Respondents. ~ril 2, 2013
*On official leave.

Decision 2 A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691
[Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC]
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This Court has long held that “[the] administration of justice is

circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. It requires that
everyone involved in its dispensation ― from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk ― live up to the strictest standards of competence, honesty,
and integrity in the public service.”1
THE CASE
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007

Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).2 The judicial
audit team created by the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the
solemnization of marriages in several branches of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City.3 Certain
package fees were offered to interested parties by “fixers” or “facilitators”
for instant marriages.4
THE FACTS
On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor,

proceeded to Cebu City and headed the audit team created by OCA in
investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City.5 A female
and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a couple looking to
get married. They went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by the
guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain “Meloy”. The male
lawyer feared that he would be recognized by other court personnel,
specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4 who was a former law school
classmate. The two lawyers then agreed that only the female lawyer would
go inside and inquire about the marriage application process. Inside Branch
4, a woman named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When
the female lawyer asked if the marriage process could be rushed, Helen
1
Re: Anonymous letter-complaint against Hon. Marilou Runes-Tamang, Presiding Judge, MeTC
Pateros, Metro Manila and Presiding Judge, MeTC San Juan, Metro Manila, A.M. MTJ-04-1558
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1594-MTJ), 617 SCRA 428, April 7, 2010, citing Re: Withholding of Other
Emoluments of the Following Clerks of Court: Elsie C. Remoroza, et. al., A.M. No. 01-4-133-MTC,
August 26, 2003, 409 SCRA 574, 581-582.
2
Rollo, pp. 1-2.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 3.
5
Id. at 2.
assured the lawyer that the marriage could be solemnized the next day, but
the marriage certificate would only be dated the day the marriage license
becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a
fee of three thousand pesos (P3,000) only.6
In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum

dated 6 July 2007 of the judicial audit team as a formal administrative
complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta,
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their
respective comments.7 The Court also suspended the judges pending
resolution of the cases against them.8
On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court

Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño submitted its Memorandum dated 29
August 20079 and Supplemental Report.10 Six hundred forty-three (643)
marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit team.11 The team
reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages
were solemnized under Article 3412 of the Family Code.13 The logbooks of
the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages than
the number of marriage certificates in the courts’ custody.14 There is also an
unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars
of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu.15 There were even marriages
solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day.16 The
town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu
City and entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours.17 Liloan, Cebu, on the
other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City.18
The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other

court and government personnel, also reported the following:
1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to

get married by checking whether their documents were complete
and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and Rosales
6
Office of the Court Administrator Memorandum dated 15 June 2010.
7
Rollo, pp. 24-25.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 106.
10
Id. at 107.
11
Id. at 5.
12
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. (76a)
13
Rollo, p. 9.
14
Id. at 2.
15
Id. at 109.
16
Id. at 5.
17
Supra note 15.
18
Id.
afterwards;19
2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to

Judge Necessario. There were also “assistants” who would go over
the couples’ documents before these couples would be referred to
Judge Necessario. Retuya also narrated several anomalies
involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of marriage
licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu despite the
fact that parties were not residents of Barili. Those anomalous
marriages were solemnized by Judge Tormis;20
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of

the available judges. She admitted that after the payment of the
solemnization fee of three hundred pesos (P300), a different
amount, as agreed upon by the parties and the judge, was paid to
the latter.21 She admitted that she accepted four thousand pesos
(P4,000) for facilitating the irregular marriage of Moreil
Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the
payment to a certain “Mang Boy”;22
4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to

get married and that most of the marriage licenses were obtained
from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the
registrars in those towns were not strict about couples’ attendance
in the family planning seminar. She also admitted that couples
gave her food while the judge received five hundred pesos (P500)
if the marriage was solemnized inside the chambers. Foreigners
were said to have given twice the said amount. The judge accepted
one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for gasoline expenses if
the marriage was celebrated outside the chambers;23
5) Marilou Cabañez admitted that she assisted couples and referred

them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, or Rosales. However, she
denied receiving any amount from these couples. She told the audit
team that during the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the month, seven (7) to
eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
for a fifteen-minute marriage solemnization;24
6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in

2003. He told the investigating team that Judge Gil Acosta would
talk to couples wishing to get married without a license. He would
produce a joint affidavit of cohabitation form on which he or the
clerk of court would type the entries. The judge would then receive
19
Rollo, p. 179.
20
Id. at 180-182.
21
Id. at 183-184.
22
Id. at 197.
23
Supra note 6, at 12.
24
Id.
an envelope containing money from the couple. Aranas also

confirmed the existence of “open-dated” marriage certificates;25
7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told

the investigating team that couples looked for Judge Geraldine
Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9,
Cebu City, “para menos ang bayad.”26 The excess of three hundred
pesos (P300) that couples paid to Judge Econg as solemnization
fee went to a certain “sinking fund” of Branch 9;27
8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to

Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to get married
under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-
forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten pesos (P10);28
9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City,

admitted that he referred couples to Branch 2, Clerk of Court,
Harrish Co. Oca declared that on 28 June 2007, he accompanied a
couple to the chambers of Judge Necessario.29 He informed the
judge that the couple only had birth certificates.30 The respondent
judge then inquired about their ages and asked them if they had
been previously married then proceeded to solemnize the
marriage;31 and
10)Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared

that she does not scrutinize marriage applications.32 Couples who
are non-Barili residents are able to obtain marriage licenses from
her Barili office because these couples have relatives residing in
Barili, Cebu.33 She also added that while couples still need to
submit a certificate of attendance in the family planning seminar,
they may attend it before or after the filing of the application for
marriage license.34
Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui

Lou Baguio-Manera was a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu and on 21
May 2007, she and her then fiancé wanted to set a marriage date.35 Her
younger sister who was married in a civil wedding last year gave her the
number of a certain “Meloy”. After talking to Meloy on the phone, the
wedding was scheduled at 2 p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were
25
Id.
26
Rollo, p. 188.
27
Supra note 6.
28
Id. at 13.
29
Rollo, p. 189.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 192.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Affidavit dated 5 July 2007.
asked to bring their birth certificates. No marriage license was required from
them. Meloy asked for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500).
According to Baguio-Manera, their marriage certificate was marked as “No
marriage license was necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Art. 34
of Executive Order No. 209”. Their marriage was solemnized that day by
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera claimed that they did not
understand what that statement meant at that time. However, in her affidavit,
she declared that the situation premised under Article 34 did not apply to her
and her fiancé.
Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In

her 5 July 2007 affidavit, she recounted how she and her boyfriend went to
the Provincial Capitol to get married in February 2006. While logging in at
the entrance, they were offered assistance by the guards for a fee of one
thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). The guard also offered to become
“Ninong” or a witness to the wedding. The couple became suspicious and
did not push through with the civil wedding at that time.
On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a)

requiring Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M.
Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC, Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8,
respectively, of Cebu City, to comment on the findings of the 14 August
2007 Supplemental Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice;
b) directing the Process Servicing Unit to furnish the judges with a copy of
the Supplemental Report; c) requiring the court personnel listed below to
show cause within fifteen (15) days from notice why no disciplinary action
should be taken against them for their alleged grave misconduct and
dishonesty and impleading them in this administrative matter:
1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;

2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu
City;
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk
of Court, RTC, Cebu City;
4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu
City;
5) Marilou Cabañez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu
City;
6) Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;
7) Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;
8) Helen Mongaya,Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.
The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas for appropriate action on
the administrative matter involving the violation of the law on marriage by
Ms. Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and one Ms.
Veronica S. Longakit, former Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu; b)

directed the Process Serving Unit to furnish the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas with a copy of the Supplemental Report of the
OCA; and c) required Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, RTC, Branch 9,
Cebu City, to comment within fifteen (15) days from notice on the statement
of staff member Antonio Flores saying that Branch 9’s court personnel
received an amount in excess of the P300 solemnization fee paid by couples
whose marriages were solemnized by her. This amount goes to the court’s
“sinking fund”.36
In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July

2007 of the OCA and its Supplemental Report,37 the respondent judges
argued the following:
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity

regarding the documents presented to him by contracting parties.38 He
claims that marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code
had the required affidavit of cohabitation. He claims that pro forma
affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other judges even before he
became a judge.39 He avers that he ascertains the ages of the parties, their
relationship, and the existence of an impediment to marry.40 He also asks the
parties searching questions and clarifies whether they understood the
contents of the affidavit and the legal consequences of its execution.41 The
judge also denies knowledge of the payment of solemnization fees in
batches.42 In addition, he argues that it was a process server who was in-
charge of recording marriages on the logbook, keeping the marriage
certificates, and reporting the total number of marriages monthly.43
Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage
license and that he is not required to inquire whether the license was
obtained from a location where one of the parties is an actual resident.44 The
judge believes that it is not his duty to verify the signature on the marriage
license to determine its authenticity because he relies on the presumption of
regularity of public documents.45 The judge also outlines his own procedure
in solemnizing marriages which involves: first, the determination whether
the solemnization fee was paid; second, the presentation of the affidavit of
cohabitation and birth certificates to ascertain identity and age of the parties;
third, if one of the parties is a foreigner, the judge asks for a certificate of
36
Resolution dated 27 November 2007.
37
Rollo, pp. 106-202.
38
Id. at 77.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 78.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 79.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 47.
45
Id. at 48.
legal capacity to marry, passport picture, date of arrival, and divorce papers
when the party is divorced; fourth, he then asks the parties and their
witnesses questions regarding cohabitation and interviews the children of the
parties, if any.46
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA.

She calls the actions of the judicial audit team during the investigation an
“entrapment”.47 She also claims that there is nothing wrong with
solemnizing marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage license
and with the fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place
where neither of the parties resided.48 As to the pro forma affidavits of
cohabitation, she argues that she cannot be faulted for accepting it as
genuine as she and the other judges are not handwriting experts.49 The
affidavits also enjoy the presumption of regularity.50 Judge Tormis also
discredits the affidavit of Baguio-Manera as hearsay.51 The respondent said
that when Baguio-Manera and her husband were confronted with the
affidavit they executed, they affirmed the veracity of the statements,
particularly the fact that they have been living together for five years.52 The
judge also attributes the irregularity in the number of marriages solemnized
in her sala to the filing clerks.53
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage.54

He maintains that it is the local civil registrar who evaluates the documents
submitted by the parties, and he presumes the regularity of the license
issued.55 It is only when there is no marriage license given that he ascertains
the qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to marry.56
As to the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes there is nothing
wrong with the fact that these are pro forma. He states that marriage
certificates are required with the marriage license attached or the affidavit of
cohabitation only and the other documents fall under the responsibility of the
local civil registrar. He surmises that if the marriage certificate did not come
with the marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, the missing document
might have been inadvertently detached, and it can be checked with the
proper local civil registrar. As to the payment of the docket fee, he contends
that it should be paid after the solemnization of the marriage and not before
because judges will be pre-empted from ascertaining the qualifications of the
couple. Besides, the task of collecting the fee belongs to the Clerk of
46
Rollo, pp. 46-47 and 226-231.
47
Id. at 53.
48
Id. at 55.
49
Id. at 56.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 60-61.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 816.
54
Id. at 34.
55
Id.
56
Id.
Court.57 The judge also argues that solemnization of marriage is not a

judicial duty.58
On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a

Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting of Suspension
and Dismissal of Case.59 This Court in a Resolution dated 11 December
2007 lifted the suspension of the respondent judges but prohibited them from
solemnizing marriages until further ordered.60
On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for

Early Resolution with Waiver of Formal and/or Further Investigation and
Motion to Dismiss.61 In a Resolution dated 15 January 2008, the Court noted
the motion and granted the prayer of Judges Tormis and Rosales for the
payment of their unpaid salaries, allowances and all other economic benefits
from 9 July 2007.62
THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA
In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010,63 the OCA recommended the

dismissal of the respondent judges and some court employees, and the
suspension or admonition of others. The OCA summarized the liabilities of
the respondents, to wit:
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross

inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents and wherein one of the contracting parties is a
foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of
the required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the
Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors
during the cohabitation.
xxx
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or

neglect of duty for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been
paid. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing
marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the
contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross

57
Rollo, pp. 36-39.
58
Id. at 625.
59
Id. at 238.
60
Id. at 258.
61
Id. at 265.
62
Id. at 273.
63
Supra note 6.
questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization

fee has been paid and for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the
contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his
capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy. He is
also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing a marriage
without the requisite marriage license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross

fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the
capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from the embassy and
for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.
xxx
HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating

Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel [that]
prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or
benefit based on any or explicit or implicit understanding that such gift,
favor or benefit shall influence their official actions and for giving false
information for the purpose of perpetrating an irregular marriage.
RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for

violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage
license by instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.
DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of

conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for providing couples
who are to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the
required affidavit of cohabitation.
CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA

ALESNA are guilty of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel from
receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting or attending to parties
engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the
Judiciary.64
The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the

complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Corazon P. Retuya,
and Marilou Cabañez, for lack of merit.
THE ISSUE
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel
64
Id. at 33-34.
of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law,
gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn,
warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
THE COURT’S RULING
The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court

Administrator are supported by the evidence on record and applicable law
and jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed
with a heavy burden and responsibility of keeping the faith of the public.65
In Obañana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the

performance of official functions must be avoided. This Court shall not
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved
in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.66
The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a

hub of swift marriages. The respondent judges and court personnel
disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties and the proper
administration of justice.
The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta,

Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales are all guilty of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized marriages without
following the proper procedure laid down by law, particularly the Family
Code of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down
aspects of the solemnization process which were disregarded by the judges.
The Court will now discuss the individual liabilities of the respondent judges
and court personnel vis-à-vis the evidence presented by the OCA against
them.
Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario
The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one

thousand one hundred twenty-three (1,123) marriages from 2005 to 2007.67
However, only one hundred eighty-four (184) marriage certificates were
65
Alejandro v. Martin, A.M. No. P-07-2349, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 698, 704.
66
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1545, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 223, p. 228, citing Angeles v. Eduarte, 457 Phil 49
(2003).
67
OCA 2010 Memorandum supra note 6 at 8.
actually examined by the judicial audit team.68 Out of the 184 marriages,
only seventy-nine (79) were solemnized with a marriage license while one
hundred five (105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
Out of the 79 marriages with license, forty-seven (47) of these licenses were
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This translates to
42.93% of the marriages he solemnized with marriage license coming from
Liloan for over a period of years.69 There were also twenty-two (22)
marriages solemnized by the judge with incomplete documents such missing
as marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint
affidavit of cohabitation.70
Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable

supporting documents such as marriage licenses.71 The OCA found that the
place of residence of the contracting parties appearing in the supporting
documents differ from the place where they obtained their marriage
license.72 The documents invited suspicion because of erasures and
superimpositions in the entries of residence.73 Likewise, in lieu of the
required certificate of legal capacity to marry, a mere affidavit was submitted
by the parties.74 Variations in the signatures of the contracting parties were
also apparent in the documents.75
The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under

Article 34 of the Family Code. These marriages appeared dubious since the
joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties show minority of one or both of
them during cohabitation.76 For example, he solemnized on 14 May 2004 the
marriage of 22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old Dinalyn S.
Paraiso who are residents of Lapu-Lapu City.77
There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official
receipts of the solemnization fee but the corresponding marriage certificates
cannot be found.78 The presence of the receipts implies that these marriages
were solemnized.
Liability of Judge Gil R. Acosta
Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from
68
Id.
69
Rollo, p. 109.
70
Id. at 114-119.
71
Id. at 119-123.
72
Supra note 67.
73
Rollo, pp. 119-123.
74
Supra note 67.
75
Id. at 9.
76
Id.
77
Rollo, p. 124.
78
Supra note 6 at 9.
2003 to 2007.79 However, the logbook showed that he solemnized two

hundred seventy-two (272) marriages while the monthly reports of cases
showed that he solemnized five hundred twelve (512) marriages over the
same period. Out of the 87 marriages, he solemnized seventy-five (75) under
Article 34 of the Family Code.80 This is equivalent to 86.21% of the
marriages solemnized under Article 34 in a four-year period.81
There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge

Tormis or Judge Necessario as solemnizing officers found in his custody.82
There were also ten (10) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code
where one or both of the contracting parties were minors during
cohabitation.83 To illustrate, respondent judge solemnized on 4 May 2004 the
marriage of Julieto W. Baga, 22 years old, and Esterlita P. Anlangit, 18 years
old.84
There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither

of the contracting parties were residents of Cebu City.85 The judge
solemnized three (3) marriages without the foreign party’s required
certificate of legal capacity to marry.86 Lastly, there was no proof of payment
of the solemnization fee in almost all of the marriages the judge officiated.87
Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181)

marriages from 2003 to 2007 based on the marriage certificates actually
examined.88 However, the monthly report of cases showed that she
solemnized three hundred five (305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to
2007.89 The OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her
court started to use a logbook to keep track of marriages.90
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with

incomplete or missing documents such as the marriage license, certificate of
legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.91 In several
instances, only affidavits were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Rollo, p. 129.
82
Supra note 78.
83
Rollo, pp. 130-131.
84
Id. at 130.
85
Id. at 131-133.
86
Id. at 133-134.
87
Supra note 78.
88
Rollo, p. 134.
89
Id.
90
Supra note 78.
91
Rollo, pp. 135-144.
certificate of legal capacity to marry.92
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the

questionable character of the validity of the required documents particularly
the marriage license.93 The judicial audit team found numerous erasures and
superimpositions on entries with regard to the parties’ place of residence.94
In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo
and Anselma B. Laranio on 28 December 2006 despite the marriage license
containing a rubberstamp mark saying, “THIS LICENSE EXPIRES ON”
and a handwritten note saying “12/28/06” under it.95
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under

Article 34 of the Family Code wherein the marriage requirements’
authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the cohabitation of the
parties and the given address of the parties.96 These irregularities were
evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya
who were married on 25 May 2007. The residential address of the couple in
the marriage certificate is “Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu City.” However,
there was an application for marriage license attached to the marriage
certificate showing that Secuya’s address is “F. Lopez Comp. Morga St.,
Cebu City.”97
Liability of Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales
Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121)

marriages from 2006 to 2007 based on the marriage certificates examined by
the judicial audit team.98 However, only three (3) marriages were reported
for the same period.99 Out of the 121 marriages the judge solemnized, fifty-
two (52) or 42.98% fall under Article 34 of the Family Code.100 Thirty-eight
(38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66) obtained or 57.57% were
from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu.101 Nineteen (19) or 28.79%
were from the local civil registrar of Liloan, Cebu.102 Nine (9) or 13.64%
were from other local civil registrars.103
There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage

licenses, applications for marriage license, certificates of legal capacity to
92
Id.
93
Id. at 144-149.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 148.
96
Id. at 149-160.
97
Id. at 157.
98
Supra note 6 at 10.
99
Id.
100
Rollo, p. 161.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
contract marriage, affidavits in lieu of certificate of legal capacity to contract

marriage, joint affidavits of cohabitation, and other documents referring to
the solemnization of one hundred thirty-two (132) marriages, with no
corresponding marriage certificates.104 He solemnized two marriages of
Buddy Gayland Weaver, an American citizen, to two different persons within
nine (9) months.105 No copy of the required certificate of legal capacity to
contract marriage or the divorce decree was presented.106
The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with

incomplete supporting documents such as the certificate of legal capacity to
marry and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.107 He solemnized nine (9)
marriages under questionable circumstances such as the submission of an
affidavit or affirmation of freedom to marry in lieu of the certificate of legal
capacity to marry, the discrepancies in the residence of the contracting
parties as appearing in the marriage documents, and the solemnization of the
marriage on the same day the marriage license was issued.108
Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no

proof that the solemnization fee of P300 was paid.109 On the other hand,
there were twenty-six (26) marriages whose solemnization fees were paid
late.110
To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages

even if the requirements submitted by the couples were incomplete and of
questionable character. Most of these documents showed visible signs of
tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the
parties’ place of residence.111 These included indistinguishable features such
as the font, font size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage
certificate and marriage license.112 These actions of the respondent judges
constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala,113the Court held that
inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding
the payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v.
Adolfo,114 defined neglect of duty as the failure to give one’s attention to a
104
Id.
105
Id. at 162.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 163-172.
108
Id. at 172-176.
109
Id. at 176-177.
110
Id. at 177-178.
111
112
Rollo, p. 111.
113
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1997, October 23, 2006, 535 SCRA 729.
114
A.M. No. P-06-2231, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 286.
task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or
the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by
the audit team show that corresponding official receipts for the
solemnization fee were missing115 or payment by batches was made for
marriages performed on different dates.116 The OCA emphasizes that the
payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage application
process and even puts a “stamp of regularity” on the process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized

marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not submit a
certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the
foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry.
The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under
Article 21 of the Family Code117 displayed the gross neglect of duty of the
judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents
required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have
been prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract marriage.118
Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of

gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code119 with
respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed
during cohabitation such as the minority status of one party.120 The audit
team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages
ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married
by mere submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation.121These
affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself.122
Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the

solemnization of marriages of some couples where no marriage license was
previously issued. The contracting parties were made to fill up the
application for a license on the same day the marriage was solemnized.123
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that
the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope
of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces
of evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the
115
116
Supra note 112.
117
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be
necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to
contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.
118
119
Supra note 12.
120
121
Rollo, p. 111
122
Id.
123
Supra note 6, at 9.
presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license disappears the

moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.
In People v. Jansen,124 this Court held that:
…the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a

marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has
been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas,125 that “the

presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.” The visible
superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the
solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance.
It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires

the submission of the certificate from the embassy of the foreign party to the
local registrar for acquiring a marriage license, the judges should have been
more diligent in reviewing the parties’ documents and qualifications. As
noted by the OCA, the absence of the required certificates coupled with the
presence of mere affidavits should have aroused suspicion as to the
regularity of the marriage license issuance.
The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they
solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code without the
required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as
minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those made
under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license.126 Under the
rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule should be strictly
but reasonably construed.127The affidavits of cohabitation should not be
issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of
the Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one
of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract.128 The parties should have been capacitated
to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the time of the
marriage.129
124
54 Phil. 176, 180 (1929) as cited in Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007, 531
SCRA 446.
125
G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 428, 443.
126
Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 435.
127
Id.
128
Ninal v. Badayog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000).
129
Id.
To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the

respondents, the Family Code provides the requisites for a valid marriage:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2
of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void

ab initio.130 The actions of the judges have raised a very alarming issue
regarding the validity of the marriages they solemnized since they did not
follow the proper procedure or check the required documents and
qualifications. In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano,131 the Court said that a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void and the subsequent
issuance of the license cannot render valid or add even an iota of validity to
the marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage
without a license constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at

least proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
layman. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and
applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in the instant case. It is not too much to
expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.132
It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis ordered Celerina Plaza, a personal employee of the
judge, to wait for couples outside the Hall of Justice and offer services.133
Crisanto Dela Cerna also stated in his affidavit that Judge Tormis instructed
him to get all marriage certificates and bring them to her house when she
found out about the judicial audit.134 In the language of the OCA, Judge
130
Cariño v. Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).
131
430 Phil. 197 (2002).
132
328 Phil. 435 (1996), p. 444.
133
Supra note 6, at 34-35. See also Rollo, pp. 887-889.
134
Rollo, pp. 894-895.
Tormis considered the solemnization of marriages not as a duty but as a

business.135 The respondent judge was suspended for six (6) months in A.M.
No. MTJ-071-962 for repeatedly disregarding the directives of this Court to
furnish the complainant a copy of her comment. She was also fined the
amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000) in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-
7-374 RTC.136 She was reprimanded twice in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 and in
A.M. No. MTJ-001337.137 Finally, in the very recent case of Office of the
Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S.
Teves, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, promulgated last 12 March 2013, Judge
Tormis was found guilty of gross inefficiency, violation of Supreme Court
rules, directives and circulars and gross ignorance of the law by this Court.
She was dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all benefits and
privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
The respondent judges violated Canons 2138 and 6139 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in the
performance of their duties. This Court previously said that “Ignorance of
the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is
elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of
integrity.”140 In connection with this, the administration of justice is
considered a sacred task and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be
an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law
and more importantly of justice.141
The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright

shameful.
Liability of Other Court Personnel
The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the

liability of the following employees:
Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis,

MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City, is guilty of grave misconduct when she
informed the female lawyer of the judicial audit team that she can facilitate
135
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
INTEGRITY. Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
139
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Competence and diligence are pre-requisites to the due
performance of judicial office.
140
Macalintal v. Teh, 345 Phil. 871 (1997).
141
Office of the Court Administrator v. Gines, A.M. No. RTJ-92-802, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 261.
the marriage and the requirements on the same day of the lawyer’s visit.142
What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for
a fee of P3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor
or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift,
favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
Mongaya’s claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what
she knew from other offices as the usual practice143 is inexcusable. As found
by the OCA in its Memorandum, “Monggaya deliberately gave false
information for the purpose of perpetrating an illegal scheme. This, in itself,
constitutes grave misconduct.”144Sec. 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as “a
grave offense that carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service
even on a first offense.
In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the

dispensation of justice; parties seeking redress from the courts for
grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or position, as
part of the Judiciary. In performing their duties and responsibilities, these
court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on
their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and
the people’s trust and confidence in this institution. Therefore, they are
expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the honor and
dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the people's confidence in the
Judiciary.145
Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of

court personnel. Her actions placed doubts on the integrity of the courts.
Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk

of Court of the MTCC, Cebu City, is guilty of gross misconduct. She
assisted the couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel Albater, and demanded and
accepted P4,000 from them.146 The act was a violation of Section 2, Canon I
of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. As found by the OCA and
adopted by this Court, Rodriguez induced Albater to falsify the application
for marriage license by instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili,
Cebu.147 The claim that she gave the amount to a certain Borces who was
allegedly the real facilitator belies her participation in facilitating the
marriage. According to the OCA, when the couple went back for their
142
Supra note 6, at 9.
143
Rollo, p. 874.
144
145
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1727, (Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 03-1465-MTJ), March 22, 2011. See also
Angeles v. Eduarte, supra note 66.
146
Id.
147
Id.
marriage certificate, they approached Rodriguez and not Borces.148 When

Borces told Rodriguez that the marriage certificate had been misplaced, it
was Rodriguez who instructed Sebial to fill up another marriage
certificate.149
This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section

2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, merits a grave
penalty.150 Such penalty can be dismissal from service.
Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and

Rebecca Alesna are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best of interest of the
service. Aranas provided couples who were to be married under Article 34 of
the Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation.151 On the other
hand, Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire the said affidavit
which according to Alesna costs P10. As aptly put by the OCA, even if the
amount involved in the transaction is minimal, the act of soliciting money
still gives the public the wrong impression that court personnel are making
money out of judicial transactions.152
The Court said in Roque v. Grimaldo153 that acts of court personnel

outside their official functions constitute conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service because these acts violate what is prescribed for court
personnel. The purpose of this is to maintain the integrity of the Court and
free court personnel from suspicion of any misconduct.
Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City,

Emma Valencia, Stenographer III of Branch 18, RTC, Cebu City, and
Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1, MTCC, Cebu City, admitted
to the audit team that they received food from couples they assisted.154 This
is in violation of Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other
remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or
involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary. As recommended by
the OCA, they are admonished considering that this is their first offense and
the tips were of minimal value. In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, this Court
held that commission of an administrative offense for the first time is an
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
In Re: Improper Solicitation of Court Employees - Rolando Hernandez, A.M. No. 2008-12-SC, and
Office of the Court Administrator v. Sheela Nobleza, A.M. No. P-08-2510, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA
325, 332-334.
151
Supra note 6 at 32.
152
Id.
153
A.M. No. P-95-1148, July 30, 1996, 260 SCRA 1.
154
Supra note 6 at 32.
extenuating circumstance.155
The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P.

Retuya. The OCA reports that Corazon Retuya admitted initially that she
received P5,000 from spouses Ichiro Kamiaya and Mary Grace Gabiana to
secure necessary documents.156 The information was volunteered by
Corazon Retuya with no supporting sworn statement from the couple.
However, she denies this fact later on in her Comment.157 Finding the earlier
statement of Corazon Retuya as unclear and lacking support from evidence,
the Court adopts the findings of the OCA and decides to give her the benefit
of the doubt.
The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims

against Marilou Cabañez. Cabañez was only implicated in this case through
the sworn statement of Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera who attested that they
paid a certain “Meloy” P1,200 for the wedding under Article 34 of the
Family through the assistance of Cabañez.158 Cabañez denies that she was
the one who assisted the couple and explained that it may have been
Celerina Plaza, the personal assistant of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-
Manera got the nickname “Meloy” not from Cabañez herself but from
Baguio-Manera’s younger sister.159 When Baguio-Manera met the said
“Meloy” at the Hall of Justice, she did not obtain confirmation that the said
“Meloy” is Cabañez. The Court adopts the findings of the OCA that there is
lack of positive identification of Cabañez and finds merit in her denial.160
The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal

of the case against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg. The judge was only
implicated through the statement of Process Server Antonio Flores about an
“alleged sinking fund”. No evidence was presented as to the collection of an
excess of the solemnization fee. Neither was it proven that Judge Econg or
her staff had knowledge of such fund.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:
1. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial

Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law
155
A.M. No. P-99-1285, October 4, 2000, 342 SCRA 6, 18.
156
Id.
157
Rollo, pp. 577-578.
158
Supra note 6 at 33.
159
Rollo, pp. 876-879.
160
Supra note 158.
and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with

forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any,
and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporation;
2. Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in

Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his
retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial

and that she would have been DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave
credits, if any, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporation, had she not been previously dismissed from service
in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-
MTCC);
4. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial

and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any,
and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporation;
5. Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in

Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of violating Section 2,
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she
be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her
retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
6. Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk

of Court, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the
application for marriage and that she be DISMISSED FROM
THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except
leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from

government-owned or -controlled corporation;
7. Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in

Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and that he be SUSPENDED without
pay for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely;
8. Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,

Branch 1, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be
SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with a
warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
9. Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch

6, Cebu City, and Emma Valencia, Stenographer III, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b),
Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that
they be ADMONISHED with a warning that a similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely;
The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City; Corazon P. Retuya,
Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City;
and Marilou Cabañez, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn

statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna, should be
REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of initiating
disbarment proceedings against the judge.
The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be

furnished copies of the Supplemental Report dated 14 August 2007 and are
ADVISED to conduct an investigation with respect to the statements of
Filomena C. Lopez, Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and Bonita I. Pilones,
Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu, regarding the processing of marriage
licenses and to take the necessary action as the findings of the investigation
may warrant.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents’ files that

are with the Office of the Bar Confidant and distributed to all courts and to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

Chief Justice /l
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PRESBITER<i:J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice ~ciate Justice
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ARTURO D. BRION
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~::~0 C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
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Associate Justice
JOSE CA~NDOZA
Ass~~J~~ce Associate Justice
(On official leave)

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EN BANC
OFFICE OF THE COURT A.C. No. 9920

ADMINISTRATOR, [Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691]
Complainant,
Present:
SERENO, CJ,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
-versus- DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA, and
CAGUIOA,JJ
FORMER JUDGE ROSABELLA Promulgated:

M. TORMIS, August 30, 2016
:x------------------~~~~~~~~~~~------------15-~-~~--:.~---------:x
RESOLUTION
PERCURIAM:
A judge should know, or ought to know, his or her role as a

solemnizing officer.
• On leave.
Resolution 2 A.C. No. 9920'
[Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691]
This disbarment complaint is an offshoot of our Decision in Office of

the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et al. 1 Respondent Former
Judge·"Rosabella M. Tormis (Tormis), together with other judges and
· 'employees of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, was dismissed
for turning. the solemnization of marriages into a business. 2 Tormis was
dismissed from the service for the second time, and this Court directed the
Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate disbarment proceedings against her.
On July 3, 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor,

led the judicial audit.team created by the Office of the Court Administrator
to investigate Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
of Cebu City for alleged misdeeds in the solemnization of marriages. 3
Two (2) undercover agents from the judicial audit team, posing as a
couple, went to the Palace of Justice to ask about the marriage application
process. 4 They were told by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look
for a certain "Meloy." 5
Fearing that the male undercover would be recognized by the court

employees in Branch 4, the two agreed that only the female undercover
would go inside the court. 6 She was then assisted by a woman named Helen.
Helen assured the female undercover that their marriage process could be
7
hurried. She also claimed that it was possible for the marriage to be
solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated
when the marriage license became available. 8
The Office of the Court Administrator found that the respondent

judges in that case connived with the court personnel, who acted as "fixers"
9
in solemnizing marriages. The judges heedlessly kept solemnizing
marriages despite irregularities in the requirements provided under the law. 10
In the Resolution dated July 10, 2007, this Court treated the judicial
audit team's memorandum as an administrative complaint against the
respondent judges, including Tormis. 11 The judges were directed to file their

2
Id. at 362.
Id. at 334.
4
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rollo, p. 491, Office of the Court Administrator's Report.
IO Id. at 494-497.
11
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et al., 707 Phil. 328, 334 (2013) [Per Curiam, ,_/
En Banc].
,,,.
v-
""'\v"r
Resolution 3 A.C. No. 9920
comments on the charges against them. 12 They were also suspended pending
resolution of the case. 13
On August 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N.

Elepafio of the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a Memorandum
dated August 29, 2007 and Supplemental Report. 14 The Report stated that:
Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the

judicial audit team. The team reported that out of the 643 marriage
certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized under Article 34 of
the Family Code. The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher
number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates
in the courts' custody. There is also an unusual number of marriage
licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and
Liloan, Cebu. There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with
marriage licenses obtained on the same day. The town of Barili, Cebu is
more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel
time of almost two (2) hours. Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more
than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City. 15 (Citations omitted)
The Report included the court employees' admissions of their

participation in the alleged misdeeds. The following personnel substantiated
the charges against Tormis:
(1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the Municipal Trial

Court in.Cities, Cebu City, confirmed that she would personally
assist couples who wished to be married by checking that their
documents were complete before referring them to the judges,
. 1u d.mg T ormIS;
me . 16
(2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer of Branch 6 of the

Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, "narrated several
anomalies involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of
marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu
despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili." 17
These marriages were solemnized by Tormis; 18
(3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of

the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City,
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15
Id. at 335.
16
Id. at 336.
17
ls
Id.
Id. qA,V
f.."t':r-
Resolution 4 A.C. No. 9920.
would aid couples in the solemnization of their marriages by

referring them to the judges; 19
(4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III of Branch 18 of the

Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, "admitted that she assisted
couples seeking to get married and that most of the marriage
licenses were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili
and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those towns were not
strict about couples' attendance in the family planning
. " 20
semmar ·
'
( 5) Marilou Cabafiez, Court Stenographer of Branch 4 of the

Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, admitted that she
would assist couples and refer them to the judges, including
Tormis. 21 She added that "during the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the
month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage
. . " ;22
so1emmzat10n
(6) Rebecca L. Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1 of the

Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, admitted that "she
usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis.
Couples who wanted to get married under Article 34 of the
Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint
cohabitation for ten pesos (Pl 0)"; 23 and
(7) Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu,

admitted that she did not examine marriage applications. 24
Couples who were not Barili residents could obtain a marriage
license from her, provided that they had relatives residing in
Ban·1·1; 25
Affidavits of private individuals were also attached to the records. 26

Among these individuals was Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera (Baguio-Manera),
a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu. Baguio-Manera claimed that her
marriage was solemnized by Tormis with the aid of "Meloy," who asked for
a fee of Pl,500.00. 27 ·She and her then fiance were not required to present a
19 Id.
20 Id.
21
Id. at 337.
22 Id.
...~~
23
Id. at 337-338.
24
Id. at 338.
zs Id.
26
27
Id.
Id. at 338-339. ~\<"~
marriage license; they were only directed to bring their birth certificates. 28
She averred that while Article 3429 did not apply to them, their marriage
certificate was marked with the annotation, "No marriage license was
necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Article 34 of Executive
Order No. 209." 30
On November 27, 2007, this Court En Banc issued the Resolution

requiring all the judges involved, including Tormis, to comment on the
Supplemental Report. 31 The Resolution also directed the Process Servicing
Unit to furnish all the judges with a copy of the Report. 32 Further, all the
court personnel involved were asked to show cause why they should not be
disciplined for their misconduct. 33
In her comm~nt, Tormis denied the charges against her. 34 She

claimed that the action of the Office of the Court Administrator was an
"entrapment." 35 According to her, there was nothing wrong with
solemnizing marriages on the same date the marriage license was issued. 36
In view of the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she relied on the
presumption of regularity. 37 Tormis asserted that she should not be blamed
for assuming that the affidavits were true since judges are not handwriting
experts. 38
Tormis also claimed that Baguio-Manera's affidavit was hearsay. 39

She averred that when Baguio-Manera and her husband was asked about the
affidavit, they confirmed the truthfulness of their statements, particularly
that they had been living together for five (5) years. 40 Lastly, Tormis
blamed the filing clerks for the irregularities in the number of marriages
solemnized in her sala. 41
On November 12, 2007, Tormis, together with Judge Edgemelo C.

Rosales, filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting
28 Id.
29
FAMILY CODE, art. 34 provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
30
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et al., 707 Phil. 328, 339 (2013) [Per Curiam,
En Banc].
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34
Id. at 342.
35 Id.
36
37
Id.
Id. ~v
"\\~K
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
of Suspension and Dismissal of the Case. 42 This Court lifted the suspension
43
of the judges but forbade them from solemnizing marriages.
On December 7, 2007, both judges moved for early resolution with a

44
waiver of formal and/or further investigation and to dismiss. This Court
noted their Motion and affirmed the relief they sought, thus allowing the
45
payment of the judges' unpaid salaries and benefits from July 9, 2007.
The Office of the Court Administrator, through a memorandum dated

June 15, 2010, found Tormis guilty of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with

fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the
capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from the embassy and
46
for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.
This Court upheld the findings of the Office of the Court

Administrator and noted the individual liability of the judges:
Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181)

marriages from 2003 to 2007 based on the marriage certificates actually
examined. However, the monthly report of cases showed that she
solemnized three hundred five (305) marriages instead for the years 2004
to 2007. The OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her
court started to use a logbook to keep track of marriages.
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with

incomplete or missing documents such as the marriage license, certificate
of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. In
several instances, only affidavits were submitted by the foreign parties in
lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to marry.
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the

questionable character of the validity of the required documents
particularly the marriage license. The judicial audit team found numerous
erasures and superimpositions on entries with regard to the parties' place
of residence. In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex
Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B. Laranio on 28 December 2006 despite
the marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS
LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten note saying "12/28/06"
under it.
Id.
y/
42
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. ~
~'fr
46 Id. at 344.
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under

Article 34 of the Family Code wherein the marriage requirements'
authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the cohabitation of
the parties and the given address of the parties. These irregularities were
evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza
Secuya who were married on 25 May 2007. The residential address of the
couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu City."
However, there was an application for marriage license attached to the
marriage certificate showing that Secuya's address is "F. Lopez Comp.
Morga St., Cebu City."47
This Court ruled that:
3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial

and that she would have been DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave
credits, if any, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporation, had she not been previously dismissed from service
in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-
MTCC);
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn

statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna, should be
REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of
initiating disbarment proceedings against the judge. 48 (Emphasis in the
original)
The affidavits of Celerina Plaza (Plaza) and Crisanto Dela Cerna

(Dela Cerna) resulted from Marilou Cabanes' (Cabanes) and Helen
Mongaya's (Mongaya) separate supplemental comments on the charges
against them. 49 Cabanes, then Court Stenographer of Branch 4, named Plaza
as Tormis' assistant, in charge of meeting couples at their lobby.so On the
other hand, Mongaya, then Court Interpreter of Branch 4, attached Dela
Cerna's affidavit to her comment.s 1
Plaza claimed to be Tormis' personal aide since 2002.s 2 She alleged

that after Tormis' suspension in 2006, she was directed to find couples who
47
Id. at 349-350.
,~
48
Id. at 362-364.
49
Rollo, p. 126, Office of the Court Administrator's Memorandum.
50 Id. qi"
51
Id. at 127.
t-lff"'\
52
Id. at 34, Celerina Plaza's Affidavit.
wanted to get married. 53 She was also told to direct the parties to Branch 4
54
and find Cabanes or "Meloy."
In his affidavit, Dela Cerna stated that he was employed as Tormis'

personal aide. 55 He claimed that during the investigation, Tormis directed
him and Tormis' children to bring all the marriage certificates from her
56.
office to her house.
In view of Judge Necessario, et al., the Office of the Bar Confidant

recommended that the case be docketed as A.C. No. 9920 (Formerly A.M.
No. MTJ-07-1691) and entitled Office of the Court Administrator v. Former
Judge Rosabella M Tormis. 57
On June 18, 2013, this Court approved the docketing of the case and
directed respondent Former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis to comment on the
disbarment charge against her. 58
Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification59 dated August

12, 2013 asking the Office of the Court Administrator to state the particular
Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility that she had violated as
basis for her disbarment.
In the Resolution60 dated September 10, 2013, this Court noted the
Urgent Motion for Clarification and directed the Office of the Bar Confidant
to inform respondent of the particular Canons that she had violated.
On November 29, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant sent

respondent a letter informing her that the charges in her administrative cases
as a judge were the grounds for her disbarment. 61 It cited A.M. No. 02-9-02-
62
SC, which provides that administrative cases against judges shall also be
considered as disciplinary charges against them as members of the bar. 63
Some administrative cases against judges stand on grounds that similarly
violate the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, or on other breaches long recognized as
53 Id.
54 Id.
55
Id. at 37.
56
Id. at 38, Crisanto dela Cema's Affidavit.
57
Id. at 41, Office of the Bar Confidant's Memorandum.
58
Id. at 42.
59
Id. at 52-53.
60
Id. at 49.
61
Id. at 57-58.
62
Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
63
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar
(2002).
Rollo, p. 57. gJ"'
,V
'f\lf~
grounds for discipline of lawyers. The Office of the Bar Confident reiterated
that, in those cases, the respondent judge may be directed to comment on the
complaint and explain why he or she should not be punished as a member of
the bar. 64
The letter cited the previous administrative charges against

respondent, thus:
(a) A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, 65 where respondent was dismissed

from service, had she not been previously dismissed from
service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 66 for gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the law by turning
solemnization of marriage into a business; 67
(b) A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692, 68 where respondent was suspended for

six (6) months without salary for gross misconduct for
repeatedly disregarding the directives of this Court to furnish
the complainant with her comment; 69
(c) A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC70 and A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC, 71

where respondent was fined P5,000.00 for gross violation of
Rule 114, Section 1772 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure by inappropriately approving the bail posted by an
. a cnmma
accuse d m . . 1 case; 73
64
Id.
65
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et al., 707 Phil. 328 (2013) [Per Curiam, En
Banc].
66
Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Tormis, et al., 706 Phil. 113 (2013) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
67
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et al., 707 Phil. 328, 363 (2013) [Per Curiam,
En Banc].
68
Visbal v. Judge Tormis, 564 Phil. 8 (2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division].
69
Id. at 18.
70
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, 488 Phil. 250 (2004)
[Per Curiam, En Banc].
71
Re: Violation ofJudge Ildefonso Suerte, RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu ofAdministrative Order No. 36-
2004 Dated March 3, 2004, 488 Phil. 250 (2004) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
72
RULES OF COURT, Rule 114, sec. 17 provides:
SEC. 17. Bail, Where Filed. - (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case
is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or
municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is
pending, bail may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is
available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.
(b) Where the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks to be released on
recognizance, the application may only be filed in the court where the case is pending, whether on
preliminary investigation, trial, or appeal.
73
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the
province, city, or municipality where he is held.
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, 488 Phil. 250, 277
(2004) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
/
v
"{\It-~"""
Resolution IO A.C. No. 9920
(d) A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609, 74 where respondent was severely

reprimanded for her "unauthorized receipt of cash bond and
75
keeping the same in her house";
(e) A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, 76 where respondent was dismissed

from service for gross inefficiency, violation of Supreme Court
77
rules, directives and circulars, and gross ignorance of the law;
and
(f) A.M. No. MTJ-001337, 78 where respondent was reprimanded

after being found "guilty of improper conduct for trying to
influence the course of litigation in Criminal Case No. 99796-
12."79 She, together with another judge, was admonished for
80
her "unbecoming conduct as dispensers of justice."
Respondent filed her one-page Comment81 on January 10, 2014,

asking this Court to grant her peace of mind. 82 She states that she is
adopting her Motion for Reconsideration83 in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 as her
84
Comment on the disbarment case against her. In this Motion, respondent
enumerates her previ0us administrative cases with her justifications.
For A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692, respondent claims that she had furnished
85
the complainant with a copy of her comment three (3) times. She avers
that the complainant even acknowledged the receipt of her comment through
her manifestation, as noted in this Court's July 30, 2003 Resolution. 86
Despite this, she was still fined P2,000.00 for her repeated defiance to this
Court's directive to furnish the complainant with a copy of her comment. 87
She believed that the case ended upon resolution and upon this Court's
noting her payment of the fine. However, she claims that:
[The Supreme Court] made an underground evaluation of the case and

made it appear that when she complied with their Resolution in 2 March
2005 to impose a fine of P2,000.00, it was already an admission that
"[s]he (respondent) refused to present proof of service to complainant of
74
Lachica v. Tormis, 507 Phil. 211 (2005) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
75
Rollo, p. 470, Resolution of Supreme Court Special First Division.
76
Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Tormis, et al., 706 Phil. 113 (2013) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
77
Id. at 137.
78
Judge Navarro v. Judge Tormis, 471 Phil. 876 (2004) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division].
79
Id. at 887.
80
Id. at 888.
81
Rollo, p. 61.
Id.
~~
82
83
Id. at 62-80.
84
Id. at 61.
85
Id. at 163.
86 Id.
'Y'~r
87 Id.
her Comment or she did not furnish complainant with said document[.]" 88
For A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC and A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC,

respondent claims that this Court "obviously ignored" her explanation. 89
She asserts that she was the only available judge at that time since she was
working from Mondays through Saturdays and even Sundays due to her load
of cases. 90
For A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609, respondent questions why this Court

ruled that she deliberately made untruthful statements in her Comment with
.
the mtent . th"1s c ourt. 91
to dece1ve
For A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, respondent claims that the audit was
conducted one (1) day after she had served a prior suspension. 92 She argues
that since she was not in her court for a long time, she cannot be faulted for
knowing nothing about what has been happening in her sala during her
absence. 93 She alleges that the Clerk of Court, her co-respondent in the case,
"could have manipulated it so that even if the cases had already been
disposed of some years back he made it appear that this had remained
unacted upon." 94
For A.M. No. MTJ-001337, respondent claims that the dismissal of

the judges was based on an alleged "entrapment." She argues that it was
impossible for her to act on the marriage of the undercover agents because
she was in Tacloban City for her high school reunion. 95 She was merely
indicted based on the statements of Plaza and Dela Cerna, who had been
intimidated by Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Office of the Court Administrator
judicial audit team he.ad. 96
On March 18, 2014, this Court noted respondent's Comment and

resolved to refer the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
investigation, report, and recommendation. 97
In its Report and Recommendation98 dated August 24, 2015, the

Office of the Bar Confidant noted that the Office of the Court Administrator,
represented by Atty. Miguel Mergal, presented Plaza and Dela Cerna as their
88
Id. at 164.
89
Id. at 65.
90 Id.
91
Id. at 67.
92
Id. at 187.
93 Id.
...~
94
Id. at 78.
95
Id. at 73.
96
Id. at 73-74.
97
Id. at 82.
98
Id. at 618--625 ·
'f''ty\
witnesses. 99 Respondent also requested Atty. Rullyn Garcia's presence in

. 100
t h e procee dmgs.
However, none of the witnesses participated in the proceedings.

Hence, the parties were required to just submit their respective memoranda
c
1or eval uat10n.
. 101
The Office of the Court Administrator filed a memorandum 102 dated

February 27, 2015 quoting the facts and ruling in Judge Necessario, et al. It
avers that Plaza's and Dela Cema's testimonies "are beside the point and
these have been rendered moot because of their failure to appear at the
hearings scheduled by the Office of the Bar Confidant." 103
The Office of the Court Administrator argues that respondent should

be disbarred due to gross misconduct for her participation in the
solemnization of marriages. 104 It points out that the various administrative
charges against respondent "clearly shows that she does not possess high
standards of competence and reliability required of a practicing lawyer." 105
On the other hand, respondent's memorandum 106 dated February 26,

2015 mainly anchored on the claim that Atty. Rullyn Garcia's report
submitted was falsified. 107 Respondent claims that Atty. Rullyn Garcia
intimidated the court employees and caused them to "admit whatever
allegations he brought up during the investigation." 108 She prays that the
case be dismissed for lack of substantial evidence since Plaza's and Dela
Cema's affidavits were not personally attested to by the affiants. 109
The Office of the Bar Confidant, after conducting the proceedings and
considering the memoranda of the parties, recommended that the disbarment
case against respondent be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. 110 It
emphasized that formal investigation is indispensable in disbarment
proceedings:
For the charge of gross misconduct for the irregularities in the

solemnization of marriages as the basis for this disbarment
proceedings.
99
Id.at618.
100 Id.
IOI Id.
102
Id.atlll-129.
103
Id. at 127.
104
Id.
/r
105
Id. at 128.
106
Id. at 130-137.
107
Id. at 136.
108
Id. at 135. ~
109
\"'~
Id. at 136.
110
Id. at 625.
~
This case ·was set for hearing. During the scheduled hearing, the
representative from OCA manifested that they are presenting two (2)
witnesses in the persons of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto Dela Cerna. The
purposes of their testimonies are for them to substantiate the allegations
against former Judge T ormis, identify and authenticate the existence and
veracity of their respective affidavits submitted to the Court. However,
the two witnesses failed to appear during the proceedings of this case.
Thus, their affidavits are considered hearsay and inadmissible in evidence
... in this proceeding. The affidavit are [sic] not entirely reliable evidence
in court due to their incompleteness and inaccuracies that may have
attended in their formulation. The affidavit does not purport to contain a
complete narration of facts and that court testimonies are generally viewed
as more reliable as they are subjected to cross examination from the
opposing party.... Likewise, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, the OCA audit team
head, failed to appear. The purpose of his testimony would be to shed
light more on whether the alleged affidavits executed by Celerina Plaza
and Crisanto Dela Cerna were actually and voluntarily submitted to the
Court and, if so, who required them to execute and submit the same to the
Court.
The determination of the merit of th[ ese] disbarment proceedings

may not be relied upon solely on the premise of the dismissal from the
service of former Judge Tormis. As earlier discussed, the grounds for
dismissal from the service of former Judge Tormis, in her capacity as
presiding judge, in administrative matter is different from this disbarment
proceedings against her. Otherwise, the Court would have ruled on the
disbarment aspect, which shall be incorporated in the decision of dismissal
from the service of former Judge Tormis in one decision only. As
provided for under the constitutional right to due process, former Judge
Tormis should be given full opportunity to be heard and confront
witnesses against her in th[ ese] disbarment proceedings. This
constitutional right should not be denied to former Judge Tormis, who
cried for due process since her dismissal from the service.
For the dismissal from the service, in her capacity as judge, for
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law
in performance of her duties as presiding judge.
Former Judge Tormis cried for justice in dismissing her from

service, as presiding judge, without according her due process. She was
not given the opportunity to be heard but the only basis of her dismissal
from the service was the testimonies/allegations against her of some courts
[sic] personnel, who were allegedly intimidated by the judicial audit team,
during the judicial audit. She was not given the chance to confront nor
furnished copies of the said court personnel's testimonies. She was denied
her constitutional right against searches and seizures of documents from
her sala when the audit team obtained documents and records, as evidence
against her, when they conducted the investigation in her sala, since she
was not informed of the said audit.
In A.M. No P-08-2519 and A.M. No. P-08-2520, the Court held

that the rights against unreasonable searches and seizures as provided ~/
V
~~
under Section 2, Article III in the Constitution may be invoked even in

administrative proceedings. The exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2),
Art. III of the Constitution also bars the admission of evidence obtained in
violation of such "right. The fact that the present case is administrative in
nature, does not render the above principle inoperative. As expounded in
Zulueta vs C.A., any violation of the aforestated constitutional right
renders the evidence inadmissible for any purpose in any proceedings.
Records show that all the administrative sanctions against former

Judge Tormis were all for simple gross inefficiency or neglect of duties
and gross ignorance of the law in the discharge of her duties and
responsibilities as the presiding judge of the MTCC, Br. 4, Cebu City.
Neither of these findings held her for gross misconduct, which constitute
immoral conduct, that would tend to affect her standing and moral
character as an officer of the court and as a member of the Bar. Further,
she has never been found guilty for graft and corruption during her entire
service in the judiciary as a member of the bench in the lower court that
would cause her automatically disbarred from the practice of law.
Finally, the counter-charges of former Judge Tormis against Atty.

Rullyn Garcia may not be given due course in th[ ese] proceedings for lack
of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is

respectfully recommended that the disbarment case against former
JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS be DISMISSED for insufficiency
111
of evidence. (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
The issues for resolution are as follows:
First, whether the alleged irregularities committed by respondent in

the solemnization of marriages, where she was found guilty of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law, constitute
gross misconduct warranting her disbarment;
Second, whether Plaza's and Dela Cema's affidavits are indispensable

in finding that respondent's acts constitute gross misconduct and merit the
penalty of disbarment; and
Lastly, whether respondent's long line of administrative sanctions

should affect her standing as a member of the bar.
Although this Court recognizes the indispensability of the appearance

of Plaza and Dela Cerna in the proceedings before the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the disbarment case cannot be dismissed solely based on this.
ni Id. at 624-625. y<_v

~~
An affidavit is commonly recognized as hearsay evidence. 112 Since it

is often prepared not by the affiant but by another person who makes use of
his or her own language in writing the statements, it is generally rejected
unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify. 113 "Courts take
judicial notice of the fact that an affidavit does not purport to contain a
complete narration of facts." 114 Court testimonies, therefore, are favored
b ecause th ese can b e sub~.ecte d to cross exammat10n.
. . 115
Plaza and Dela Cerna failed to appear in the proceedings before the
Office of the Bar Confidant. The Office of the Bar Confidant noted that
their testimonies would have supposedly confirmed the charge against
respondent regarding the alleged irregularities in the solemnization of
marriages. 116 Plaza's and Dela Cema's testimonies would have likewise
verified the existence and veracity of their affidavits. 117
Similarly, Atty. Rullyn Garcia failed to appear in the proceedings. His

purported testimony would have disproved the accusation that Plaza's and
Dela Cema's testimonies were executed with his intimidation. 118 Due to
their absence, Plaza's and Dela Cema's allegations in their affidavits were
. dmiss1
rendere d ma . "ble. 119
Nevertheless, despite the inadmissibility of the affidavits, this Court in

Judge Necessario, et al. upheld the finding of the judicial audit team that
respondent committed irregularities in the solemnization of marriages. This
Court ruled that these findings had sufficient basis and were supported by
evidence, pertinent laws, and jurisprudence. 120 Respondent was held guilty
of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the law
warranting her dismissal, had she not been previously dismissed from
. m
service . another case. 121
The administrative case against respondent in Judge Necessario, et al.

should likewise be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against her under
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals
112
Flores, et al. v. Lofranco, 576 Phil. 25, 31 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division], citing
People's Bank and Trust Co. v. Judge Leonidas, 283 Phil. 991, 994 (1992) [Per J. Nocon, Second
Division].
113 Id.
114
People v. Villena, 439 Phil. 509, 526 (2002) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
115 Id.
116
Rollo, p. 624.
117
Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et al., 707 Phil. 328, 357 (2013) [Per Curiam, En
121
Banc].
Id. y
~\>"y("
Resolution 16 A.C. No. 9920.
and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and court
officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise
grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of
the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of
conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the
discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also

be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent Justice, judge
or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may
forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary
sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
While respondent blatantly violated particular Canons of Judicial

Ethics with her participation in the alleged marriage scam, she similarly
breached the following Canons on the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession....
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law[.]
Membership in the bar is an essential requirement for membership in

the bench. 122 "[T]he moral fitness of a judge also reflects his [or her] moral
fitness as a lawyer.".123 Consequently, a judge who violates the code of
judicial conduct similarly violates his or her lawyer's oath. 124
Respondent's act of heedlessly solemnizing marriages in utter

disregard of the law and jurisprudence clearly constitutes gross misconduct.
The repetitiveness of her act shows her clear intent to violate the law. She
disregarded the lawyer's oath, which mandates lawyers to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. In view of this, either the penalty of
suspension or disbarment is warranted. Rule 138, Section 27 provides:
122
Samson v. Caballero, 612 Phil. 737, 748 (2009) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
123
124
Id.
Id.
cr/V"
"f'.Y'r
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;

grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
Gross misconduct is an "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression

of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction
of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error
in judgment." 125 To consider gross misconduct "the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must
be manifest[.]" 126
The Supplemental Report of the Office of the Court Administrator

made the following findings:
III On Judge Rosabella M Tormis
1. Based on the documents, i.e., marriage certificates and other

supporting documents, actually examined, she solemnized a total of one
hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007, while the monthly
reports of cases reflected a total of three hundred and five (305) marriages
she solemnized from 2004 to 2007.
2. It was only last July that her court started using a logbook to
record the marriages she solemnized, which, as of the date of the judicial
audit and investigation, reflected a total of sixty-three (63) marriages for
that month.
3. Of the 181 marriages she solemnized, one hundred thirty-one

(131), or 72.38% were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code,
while fifty (50), or 27.62% were with marriage licenses.
4. Of the 50 marriages with marriage license, forty (40), or 80%

marriage licenses were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili,
Cebu, while the remaining ten (10), or 20%, were obtained from other
local civil registrars.
5. The following marriages were solemnized by her with no or

incomplete supporting documents:
125
Spouses Whitson v. Atty. Atienza, 457 Phil. 11, 18 (2003) [Per J. Puno, Third Division], citing Osop v.
Fontanilla, A.C. No. 5043, September 19, 2001, 365 SCRA 398 (2001) [Per J. Buena, Second
Division].
126
Lagado v. Leonida, A.M. No. P-14-3222, August 12, 2014, 732 SCRA 579, 584 [Per J. Perlas-
Bemabe, En Banc]. ~
~~~
6. The following marriages were solemnized by her even if the

validity of the supporting documents, especially the marriage licenses
presented, appear to be questionable[.]
7. The authenticity of the requirements for the following

marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code, by reason of the (a)
circumstances of the cohabitation, (b) minority during the period of
cohabitation, and (c) given address of the contracting parties, appears to be
questionable:
8. In almost all of the marriages solemnized by her, there was no

proof that the solemnization fee of P300.000, as required under Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, was paid by the contacting parties. 127
The act of solemnizing marriages without the required marriage

128
license constitutes misconduct. The positive testimonies substantiate that
respondent solemnized marriages without previously issued licenses; hence,
respondent's act deviates from the established rule. 129 In Aranes v.
. 130
0 cczano:
[A] marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void,
and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or
even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by
law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. 131
Tupa! v. Rojo 132 explained the role of a judge as a solemnizing officer:
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must

personally interview the contracting parties and examine the requirements
they submitted. The parties must have complied with all the essential and
formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a
marriage license.
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties

who have all the qualifications and none of the legal disqualifications to
contract marriage. Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge
must personally examine the marriage license presented.
127
Rollo, pp. 518-544.
128
Moreno v. Bernabe, 316 Phil. 161, 166-167 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
129
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et al., 707 Phil. 328, 352-353 (2013) [Per
Curiam, En Banc].
130
430 Phil. 197 (2002) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
131
Id. at 203, citing People v. Lara, C.A. O.G. 4079. . ~
132
A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842, February 24, 2014, 717 SCRA236 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
A
Y
,.JA
"f\~
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for

at least five years and have no legal impediment to marry, they are exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Instead, the parties must present
an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally
examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and the absence of any
legal impediment to marry each other. The judge must also execute a
sworn statement that he personally ascertained the parties' qualifications
to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage. Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the

marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any
legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contractinf parties and
found no legal impediment to the marriage. 13 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Although it is true that marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code

merit exemption from a marriage license, respondent should have complied
with the mandate of personally ascertaining the circumstances of
cohabitation of the parties. Records reveal that the declarations embodied
in the required joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties do not actually
represent the accurate circumstances of their alleged cohabitation. 134
In addition, there were marriages solemnized by respondent

involving foreigners who only submitted affidavits in lieu of a certificate of
legal capacity to marry. 135 In cases where one or both of the contracting
parties are foreigners, Article 21 136 of the Family Code provides that a
certificate of legal capacity to marry is necessary before the acquisition of a
marriage license. As the solemnizing officer, respondent should have
ensured that pertinent requirements were secured before the issuance of the
marriage license. Thus, the absence of a certificate of legal capacity to
marry should have prompted her to question the propriety of the issuance.
133
Id. at 245-246.
134
Rollo,p.614.
135
707 Phil. 328, 352 (2013) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
136
FAMIL y CODE, art. 21 provides:
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be
necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity
to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity
herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract . ,.:/
marriage. (Emphasis supplied) y
~~
~
Resolution 20 A.C. No. 9920 ·
The connivance between respondent and the court employees is

settled. The court employees acted as "'fixers' and 'facilitators"' 137 that
mediated between the judges and the contacting parties. Apparent are the
superimpositions and erasures in the addresses of the contracting parties so
138
they would appear to be residents of either Barili or Liloan, Cebu. For
the contracting parties to easily obtain their marriage license, discrepancies
between their true addresses as declared in their marriage certificates and
their addresses in their marriage licenses were made. The contracting
parties were able to get married despite incomplete requirements. Thus, the
handwritten marginal notes of monetary figures attached to the marriage
certificates show the presence of consideration. 139
Marriage is recognized under the law as an inviolable social

.mstitution,
. . w h"IC h IS
. the 1oun
.c: datlon
. o f the 1amI
.c. ·1y. 140 In B eso v. D aguman: 141
[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is

deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain
its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the
state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and
every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a
condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its
destruction. 142
Respondent used her authority as a judge to make a mockery of

marriage. As a judicial officer, she is expected to know the law on
solemnization of marriages. 143 "A judge is not only bound by oath to apply
the law; he [or she] must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so.
Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office[,] should be
more circumspect in the performance of their duties." 144
Similarly, as a lawyer who is an officer of the court, respondent should

have not permitted herself to be an instrument of any violation of law. Her
careless attention in dispensing with the necessary requirements of marriage
and in conniving 'Yith court employees to further monetary interests
underscores her utter disregard of the sanctity of marriage.
137
Rollo, p. 493.
138 Id.
139
Id. at 496.
14
° FAMILY CODE, art. 1 provides:
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
141
380 Phil. 544 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
142
Id. at 551.
143
Seguisabalv. Cabrera, 193 Phil. 809, 813 (1981) [Per 1. Melencio-Herrera, First Division].
144
Besa v. Daguman, 380 Phil. 544, 552 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
/~
~~~
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his or her professional

dealings or in a private capacity, is basis for suspension or disbarment. 145
Possession of good character is a fundamental requirement not only for
admission to the bar but also for the continuance of exercising the privilege
to practice law. 146 However, as a rule, disbarment is only warranted in cases
of misconduct that "seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court." 147
Respondent's undue haste in repeatedly solemnizing marriages despite

incomplete and irregular requirements shows indifference to her role as an
officer of the court. The repetitiveness of her acts shows her proclivity in
transgressing the law and protecting these violations with her authority. A
lawyer, as an officer and an essential partner of the court in the solemn task
of giving justice, is given the grave obligation of maintaining the integrity of
the courts. 148 This is especially so with judges. A judge is "the visible
representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and
awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter
must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to
follow." 149 In Samson v. Caballero: 150
The first step towards the successful implementation of the

Court's relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit members,
officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of
conduct on judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges
because, being the visible representation of the law, they should set a good
example to the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of
integrity imposed on them is - and should be - higher than that of the
average person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge. 151
Respondent was involved in infractions that warranted her prior

administrative sanctions. Her long line of cases shows her depravity of
character, in that she remained undeterred by the past penalties she had
incurred. Considering that she was repeatedly involved in administrative
charges, the severe penalty of disbarment should be meted against her.
Disbarment does not equate to a sanction stripping a lawyer of his or

her source of living. 152 It is intended to "protect the administration of
justice that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable
145
Spouses Donato v. Asuncion, Sr., 468 Phil. 329, 337 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third
Division].
146 Id.
147
Spouses Saburnido v. Madrano, 418 Phil. 241, 247-248 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
148
Bantolo v. Castillon Jr., 514 Phil. 628, 633 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
149
Moreno v. Bernabe, 316 Phil. 161, 166 ( 1995) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
150
151
Id. at 752.
152
Avancena v. Liwanag, 454 Phil. 20, 27 (2003) [Per Curiam, En Banc], citing Noriega v. Sison, 210 ~
Phil. 236, 240 (1983) [Per J. Guerrero, Second Division].
r)"
~~~
Resolution 22 A.C. No. 9920'
and reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose
confidence in them." 153 As held in Foronda v. Guerrero: 154
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence

to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree
of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of legal profession are
the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the
bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. 155
Respondent's conduct has fallen short of the strict standards required

by the legal profession. Hence, her repeated failure to live up to the values
expected of her as an officer of the court renders her unfit to be a member of
the bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis is

DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar

Confidant to be attached to respondent's personal records, to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for dissemination to its chapters and members and all
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITE~O J. VELASCO, JR.

~~de,~
On leave
ARTURO D. BRION
153 Id.
154
516 Phil. I (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
155
Id. at 3.
01
Associate\Justice
""
~ t;,.?
ARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO REZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
/A(}. KJ,~
ESTELA MtijERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

~~~-~
1
qF ELl~A .s) ANAMA
CLERK OF COURT, EN BAffC
SUPREME COURT
l\.epublic of tbe ~bilippines
~upreme Ql:ourt
;iManila
EN BANC
DR. RAUL M. SUNICO, IN HIS A.M. No. RTJ-16-2457

CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF [Formerly OCA LP.I No. 14-4291-RTJ]
THE CULTURAL CENTER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Present:
Complainant,
SERENO, CJ,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PERALTA,
DEL CASTILLO,
MENDOZA,
REYES*
'
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA, and
JUDGE PEDRO DL. GUTIERREZ CAGUIOA,JJ
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 119, Promulgated:
PASAY CITY,
Respondent. February 21, 2017
x---------------------------------------------------------~~~.:::.~-x
DECISION
PERCURIAM:
Before us is an Administrative Complaint 1 filed by Dr. Raul M.

Sunico (Dr. Sunico) against respondent Judge Pedro DL. Gutierrez
(respondent Judge), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 119,
Pasay City, for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, gross
On wellness leave.
Rollo, pp. 1-25.
neglect of duty, and violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, in

connection to Civil Case No. R-PSY-12-10726-CV, entitled "Felix Espiritu
v. Raul Sunico, in his capacity as President of the .Cultural Center of the
Philippines."
In his Complaint2 dated July 10, 2014, Dr. Sunico, in his capacity as
the President of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), alleged that
the latter entered into a five (5)-year lease contract on a property owned by
CCP with Felix Espiritu (Espiritu), covering the period of June 16, 2007
until June 15, 2012. Thereafter, Espiritu operated his Yakitori Dori Bar and
Grill Restaurant on the leased property. 3
On April 18, 2012, the CCP management notified Espiritu that it will
no longer renew the lease contract after its termination on June 15, 2012.
CCP demanded that Espiritu settle his outstanding obligation. 4 Espiritu~
however, expressed his interest to renew the lease contract for another five
(5) years, but CCP rejected the offer. On June 19, 2012, after the expiration
of the contract, CCP sent a notice of disconnection of electricity and water
supply to Espiritu. 5
On June 27, 2012, Espiritu filed a Petition for Specific Performance 6

to fix the lease period, injunction and damages before the sala of respondent
Judge Gutierrez, who was then on leave. 7 Vice-Executive Judge Wilhelmina
J. Wagan denied the application for a 72-hour TR0. 8 On July 3, 2012,
pairing Judge Rowena Nieves Tan also denied the application for issuance of
a 20-day TRO for lack of merit. 9 Meanwhile, CCP disconnected the electric
and water supplies in the subject premises. 10
On July 24, 2012, Espiritu filed an Ex Parte Manifestation with

Motion for Reconsideration and Status Quo Ante Order 11 which was set for
hearing on July 27, 2012. Dr. Sunico claimed that CCP received the copy of
the Manifestation/Motion only on August 2, 2012. 12 Dr. Sunico alleged that
despite the violation of the three (3)-day notice rule, respondent Judge
Gutierrez issued an Order dated July 27, 2012 directing CCP to file its
comment/opposition within (5) days from notice. 13 CCP received the Order
on August 22, 2012 and had until August 28, 2012 to file its comment
(August 27, 2012 was a non-working holiday). Due to time constraints, CCP
asked for extension of time, or until September 7, 2012, to file its
Id. at2-3.
Id. at 2.
4
Id.
Id. at 3.
6
Id. at 29-48.
?v
7
Id. at 3.
Id. at 49-50.
9
Id. at 51-54.
10
Id. at 4.
~t"'K
11 Id. at 77-86.
12
Id at 5.
13
Id. at 352.
comment. 14 However, on August 28, 2012, Dr. Sunico lamented that,

without waiting for their comment/opposition which was filed within the
requested period of extension, respondent judge immediately issued an
Order resolving the motion in favor ofEspiritu. 15
CCP moved for reconsideration of the Order dated August 28, 2012
but was denied. Dr. Sunico alleged that respondent judge was partial and
that he also violated CCP's right to procedural due process when he resolved
Espiritu's motion without awaiting for CCP's comment/opposition. 16
After hearing, respondent judge issued an Order dated September 25,

2012 granting Espiritu's motion for the issuance of preliminary
17
injunction. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued on September 28,
2012 after posting of bond. 18 On October 10, 2012, Dr. Sunico filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order and for the Dissolution of the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. 19 To expedite the proceedings, CCP filed a
Manifestation with Extremely Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of its
Motion for Reconsideration20 dated December 13, 2012. Dr. Sunico claimed
that respondent judge failed to act on the motion despite the lapse of more
than three (3) months from the time of the filing to resolve. 21 On March 6,
2013, CCP filed another Reiterative Motion for Speedy Resolution of the
Motion for Reconsideration. 22
Finally, after more than 5 months, respondent judge denied

Dr. Sunico's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated April 1, 2013.
Dr. Sunico resented that the said order is a mere one-page document with
three (3) short paragraphs which failed to explain how respondent judge
arrived at said order. Dr. Sunico, likewise, claimed that the "apathetic" and
"nail-pace" actions of respondent judge to CCP's motion fostered suspicion
on his impartiality. 23
On May 17, 2013, Dr. Sunico sought respondent judge's inhibition.

During the hearing, respondent judge stated that Dr. Sunico's motion was
improper, since certiorari was the better remedy. He also asked Dr. Sunico
if it was possible to give Espiritu an extension of the lease contract.
Meanwhile, on June 27, 2013, Dr. Sunico filed a Petition for Certiorari of
14
Id. at 5.
15
Id. at 88-93.
16
Id. at 6.
17
Id. at 116-122.
y
18
Id. at 123-124.
19
Id. at 127-150.
20
Id. at 153-155. ,,.,-
21
Id. at 7-8.
'*~
22
Id. at 8.
23
Id.
the Orders dated September 25, 2012 and April 1, 2013 before the Court of
Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 130529. 24
After four (4) months from the filing of the motion for inhibition,
respondent judge issued an Order25 dated September 26, 2013 stating that he
shall inhibit from the case provided that the petition for certiorari before the
CA is granted and that he is found to have gravely abused his discretion
in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
In a Decision26 dated November 11, 2013, the CA found respondent

judge Gutierrez gravely abused his discretion in issuing the Orders dated
September 25, 2012 and April 1, 2013. The appellate court · stated that
Espiritu was not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction since there was
no showing that he had a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected.
Consequently, Dr. Sunico reiterated its motion for respondent judge's

inhibition. In an Order2 7 dated January 15, 2014, respondent judge deferred
his inhibition until the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Espiritu before the CA. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution dated March 10, 2014 for lack of merit. However,
notwithstanding the denial by the CA of Espiritu's motion for
reconsideration, respondentjudge refused to recuse himself from the case. 28
On April 29, 2014, Espiritu filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari

before the Supreme Court (SC). Meanwhile, CCP fenced certain areas of the
subject property within its perimeter but excluded the subject leased
premises. Espiritu misinterpreted CCP's action as violative of the status quo
ante issued by respondent judge on August 28, 2012. Hence, Espiritu filed
an Ex Parte Manifestation with Motion for Issuance of Show Cause Order
against CCP. 29
On May 9, 2014, Espiritu filed a Supplemental Motion for Removal

of Fence, which was set for hearing on May 13, 2014. Dr. Sunico filed a
reiterative Ex-Parte Motion for Immediate Inhibition of respondent judge.
During the hearing, the Motion for Issuance of Show Cause Order and the
Supplemental Motion filed by Espiritu were simultaneously heard.
Complainant Dr. Sunico assailed the actions of respondent judge in
24 Id.
25
Id. at 161.
26
Id. at 163-180. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices
Rosmari C. Carandang and Melchor Q. C. Sadang, concurring.
r~
27
Rollo, p. 203.
28
Id. at I 0.
29
Id. at 10-11.
i"r~
entertaining Espiritu's motions. Furthermore, respondent judge urged the

parties to forge a compromise to remove the fence. 30
On June 2, 2014, Dr. Sunico filed a Consolidated Opposition to the

Motions of Espiritu with Fourth Reiteration of its motion for respondent
judge's inhibition. 31
In an Order dated June 4, 2014, respondent judge Gutierrez ruled as

follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby rules as

follows:
a. Petitioner's motion for issuance of show cause

Order is granted and hence gives respondent Raul Sunico
to explain in writing within fifteen (15) days from receipt
hereof why he should not be cited for contempt;
b. Petitioner's motion for removal of fence is also

granted and respondent through its officers are ordered to
remove all the fences around the leased premises of
petitioner within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt hereof
under pain of contempt of court for failure to comply with
the same or referral to the Ombudsman upon complaint of
petitioner; and
c. The motion to inhibit filed by respondent 1s

denied for lack of merit. 32
On June 5, 2014, CCP filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Fifth

Reiterative Motion for Inhibition. 33 Complainant Dr. Sunico insisted that
respondent judge has been partial from the very start. He ordered the
removal of the fence which was outside the subject leased premises and even
inspected the property without CCP's knowledge or presence, and continued
to hear the case apparently to accommodate and protect Espiritu.
On August 14, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)

resolved to require respondent judge to file his comment relative to the I
complaint filed against him. 34
On November 25, 2014, acting on the fifth reiterative prayer for his
inhibition and motion for reconsideration, respondent judge resolved to grant
the motion for inhibition. 35
30
/
Id at 12.
31
Id
32
Id. at 282-283.
33
Id at 284-293. fr"
~zY'
34
Id at331.
In his Comment36 dated November 26, 2014, respondent judge

categorically denied the allegations against him. He asserted that the assailed
writ and orders were issued in the exercise of his judicial function, based on
his appreciation of the facts, and within the bounds of the law and
established jurisprudence. He opined that he cannot be subjected to civil,
criminal or administrative liability for any official acts he did no matter how
erroneous they are as long as he acted in good faith. 37
Respondent judge explained that considering the urgency of the

matter, i.e., disconnection of the utilities that hamper the operation of
Espiritu's business on the leased premises, he was then duty-bound to
immediately rule on the matter which was why he granted the injunction. He
opted not to discuss the assailed orders considering that these are the subject
of certiorari proceedings before the CA and the SC. 38
Respondent judge further averred that complainant filed the instant

administrative complaint to coerce him to inhibit from further trying the
case, which he had already granted. 39
Meanwhile, in separate cases, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1858, respondent

judge was found guilty of simple misconduct and he was fined
Php20,000.00. In another administrative case, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2157,
respondent judge was reprimanded for poor ethical judgment and for failure
to uphold the dignity of the court. 40
In a Memorandum41 dated January 20, 2016, the OCA found

respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law, undue delay and
manifest bias and partiality and recommended that he be fined in the amount
of P40,000.00 and be sternly warned. It likewise recommended that the
complaint be redocketed as a regular administrative complaint against
respondent judge.
Meanwhile, on December 9, 2016, respondent judge Gutierrez

compulsorily retired.
RULING
We concur with the findings of the OCA, except as to the imposable

penalty.
.
35
Id. at 361-362.
36
Id. at 335-350.
~
37
Id. at 341.
38
Id. at 347-348.
39
Id. at 348-349. or
~'fys
40
Id. at 369.
41
Id. at 366-374.
On the charge of undue delay in rendering a

decision or order:
In the instant case, records show that on October 12, 2012, CCP filed
a motion for reconsideration and for the dissolution of the writ of
preliminary injunction. 42 On the same date, respondent judge gave Espiritu
the opportunity to file comment/opposition, and CCP to file a reply from
receipt of Espiritu's comment/opposition, which upon submission was
deemed submitted for resolution. 43 On December 13, 2012, Espiritu filed his
Comment, while on November 26, 2013, CCP filed its Manifestation with
Extremely Urgent Motion for Resolution. In the same manifestation, CCP
informed the trial court that it would no longer file a reply, and moved for
the early resolution of its motion for reconsideration. 44 Notwithstanding that
the matter had already been submitted for resolution upon submission of
CCP' s manifestation/motion, respondent judge continued with the
proceedings by setting the case for preliminary and pre-trial conference on
April 4, 2013. On March 6, 2013, CCP filed anew a reiterative urgent
motion for speedy resolution. Respondent judge Gutierrez resolved the
motion only on April 1, 2013. 45 Respondent judge did not provide any
reason for his delay in resolving the said motion.
A Motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order should be

resolved within a reasonable length of time in view of its urgency, and not
the 90-day period in the Constitution. 46 Otherwise, the issue in question may
become moot and academic. In this particular case, there was an urgent
need to resolve the motion in order to remove any doubt on Espiritu's
entitlement to a preliminary injunction. In sum, the unexplained delay of
respondent judge in resolving the motion is inexcusable, unwarranted and
unreasonable. An inexcusable failure to decide a case or motion constitutes
gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions
such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaultingjudge. 47
On the charge ofgross ignorance of the law:
Respondent judge contend that Dr. Sunico should have resorted to

judicial remedies first. He added that he cannot be held liable for gross
ignorance of the law for issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
in favor of Espiritu since it was done in the exercise of his judicial functions.
We are unconvinced.
42
Id at 127-151.
43
Id at 152.
44
Id at 153-155.
~~
45
Id. at 338.
46
Section 15( 1), Article VIII of the Constitution.
47
Spouses Marcelo v. Judge Pichay, 729 Phil. 113, 122 (2014).
i'\r~.,.,
It must likewise be emphasized that Dr. Sunico indeed elevated the

assailed orders of respondent judge before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
130529. In fact, the appellate court already ruled that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the subject injunctive writ against CCP for having no
basis in fact or in law. The pertinent discussion in the decision of the CA is
noteworthy, to wit:
In the present case, we find that private respondent Espiritu is not

entitled to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction since there is no
showing that he has a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected.
It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a

preliminary injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues only upon a showing of
the applicant's "clear legal right" being violated or under threat of
violation by the defendant. "Clear legal right," within the meaning of Rule
58, contemplates a right "clearly founded in or granted by law." Any hint
of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of
preliminary relief... These procedural barriers to the issuance of a
preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable nature of such
relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the
course of action of the defendants even before adverse judgment is
rendered against them.
xx xx
The initial evidence presented by private respondent Espiritu

before the public respondent in the preliminary injunction incident do
not show the presence of the requisites for his entitlement to a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. Ergo, public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner
CCP which has no basis in fact or in law. The only evidence needed by
(public respondent) to justify the issuance of the writ, if indeed there was a
need to issue one, was the lease contract itself which. Though evidentiary
in nature, would have shown, at first glance, that (private respondent
Espiritu) was not entitled to the writ, even without a Juli-blown trial. The
situation before the Court is ... a consequence of the parties' stipulation
of a determinate period for (the lease contract's) expiration. The
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is
not a ground/or injunction. Where the complainant's right is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper. Absent a clear legal right, the issuance
of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. A finding that
the applicant for preliminary mandatory injunction may suffer damage not
capable of pecuniary estimation does not suffice to support an injunction,
where it appears that the right of the applicant is unclear or dispute.
(Emphasis ours)
Based on the foregoing, respondent judge manifested ignorance as to

the propriety or impropriety of issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. The
evidence presented in the application for preliminary injunction do not show
the presence of the requisites for Espiritu's entitlement to a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. Indeed, the expired lease contract itself
J
r<k
1"'\f
would have easily shown that Espiritu was not entitled to the writ. In fact,
the initial attempts by Espiritu to get an injunction against CCP were denied
in the Orders dated June 27, 2012 and July 3, 2012, respectively, in the same
case. 48 It should be pointed out also that Espiritu filed a motion for
reconsideration which the CA rejected anew. Thus, without basis in fact and
in law, respondent judge's issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
shows manifest gross ignorance of the law.
Another point of concern is respondent judge's nonchalant attitude as

to the implication of the appellate court's finding of grave abuse of
discretion. The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An
act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of
a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases
wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void."
From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 will strike an act down for having been done with
grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such
act was patent and gross, 49 as what happened in this case.
Respondent judge cannot feign ignorance as to the effect of the grant

of the petition for certiorari since the dispositive portion of appellate court's
decision leaves no room for any interpretation, to wit:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The

Orders dated 25 September 2012 and 01 April 2013 of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 119, Pasay City, in Civil
Case No. R-PSY-12-10726-CV are NULLIFIED. Accordingly, the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued in favor of private respondent
Felix Espiritu doing business under the name and style "Yakitori Dori Bar
and Grill Restaurant" is LIFTED and any bond posted by the latter is
CANCELLED. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
However, even after the pronouncements of the appellate court that

respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, in an Order5°
dated May 13, 2014, he opted to proceed with the subject case and even
48
Penned by Judge Wilhelmina G. Jorge-Wagan and Judge Rowena Nieves A. Tan, respectively, in
<
Felix Espiritu, doing business under the name and style Yakitori Dori Bar And Grill Restaurant v. Raul
Sunico.
49
Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, Stayfast
Philippines, Inc.I Maria Almeida, 716 Phil. 500, 516 (2013).
50
Rollo, p. 246.
I
i\v'y(
further enjoined the parties to make a compromise agreement relative to the

removal of the fence placed on the premises of Espiritu. Worse, in an
Order51 dated June 4, 2014, respondent judge again granted Espiritu's
motion for the removal of fence which CCP constructed outside of the
leased premises, and denied anew Dr. Sunico's motion to inhibit. Clearly,
judging by the foregoing, the Court can only conclude that the actuations of
respondent Judge were not only gross ignorance of the law of the effect of
the appellate court's finding of grave abuse of discretion but defiance as
well to the lawful directives/orders of the appellate courts.
Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of

the rules, and that, when committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases within the parameters
of tolerable misjudgment. When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to
be aware of it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance
of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public
and the court proficiency in the law, and the duty to maintain professional
competence at all times. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity
with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge
is expected to keep abreast of the developments and amendments thereto, as
well as of prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can
easily be the mainspring of injustice. 52
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge

in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. However, the
assailed judicial acts must not be in gross violation of clearly established law
or procedure, which every judge must be familiar with. Every magistrate
presiding over a court of law must have the basic rules at the palm of his
hands and maintain professional competence at all times. 53
Thus, respondent judge's actuations cannot be considered as mere

error of judgment that can be easily excused. Obstinate disregard of basic
and established rule of law or procedure amounts to inexcusable abuse of
authority and gross ignorance of the law.
On bias and partiality:
Given the foregoing discussions, We find equally disturbing is

respondent judge's stubbornness to cling to the subject case for unknown
reason. Indeed, the decision of the appellate court implies that it should not
have been difficult for respondent judge to determine whether Espiritu was
entitled to an injunctive writ. Respondent judge should have been guided by
this ruling and should have refrained in further issuing orders which tend to
favor Espiritu without factual or legal basis. However, instead of rectifying
51
Id. at 280-283.
52
Spouses Lago v. Judge Abu!, Jr., 654 Phil. 479, 491 (2011).
53
Id.
y\y7
~t
his errors or inhibiting from the case at once, respondent judge appeared to
be unperturbed and insisted in hearing the case.
The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Disqualification o(judge. - No judge or judicial officer

shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the
civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent
of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify

himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.
The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and

voluntary. Under the first paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively
presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances
mentioned. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition,
leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a
case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.
Here, the case of respondent judge would fall under the concept of voluntary
inhibition.
Indeed, mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for

judges to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. 54 However,
when Dr. Sunico questioned the issuance of the subject injunctive writ
before the CA, he also moved for the inhibition of the respondent judge.
Acting on the motion, respondent judge promised in his Order dated
September 26, 2013, that he would inhibit from the case should the CA grant
the petition for certiorari filed by the CCP and with findings that there was
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the TRO and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. However, even with subsequent appellate
court's finding of grave abuse of discretion, respondent judge still refused to
inhibit. Respondent judge further issued an Order55 dated January 15, 2014
deferring his inhibition until the resolution of the motion for reconsideration
filed by Espiritu before the CA. Again, notwithstanding the appellate court's
denial of Espiritu's motion for reconsideration, respondent judge refused to
recuse himself from the case.
54
BG en. (Ret.) Ramiscal v. Hon. Jutices Hernandez, et al., 645 Phil. 550, 558 (2010).
55
Rollo, p. 203.
ury'
~~~
Noteworthy to mention also is that when the subject case was elevated
to the SC, We issued a Resolution dated June 2, 2014 in G.R. No. 211616, 56
which denied Espiritu's petition and held that the appellate court properly
nullified the subject order for having issued with grave abuse of discretion. It
is appalling that given respondent judge's admission that he received the said
Resolution of the SC on June 9, 2014, he still failed to undo his erroneous
actions which undoubtedly put petitioner in a disadvantageous position.
It was likewise shown that respondent judge inhibited himself from

hearing the subject case only on November 25, 2014, i.e., after numerous
motions for inhibition filed by CCP, the receipt of the SC Resolution dated
June 2, 2014 on June 9, 2014, and after the filing of the administrative
complaint against him. In other words, there were several valid and
significant grounds for him to inhibit from the case voluntarily yet he
refused to do so for unknown reason. His defiance of the court's rulings and
his continuous efforts to entertain Espiritu' s motions in effect unjustly
extended the latter's lease contract which had long expired. The totality of
the circumstances and the actuations of the respondent judge attendant to the
case, clearly lead to the inescapable conclusion that the respondent judge
evidently favoured Espiritu, a clear indicium of bias and partiality that calls
for a severe administrative sanction.
Records show that respondent judge compulsorily retired on

December 9, 2016. Nevertheless, his retirement does not exculpate him from
his transgressions as presiding judge. It should be noted that the Court en
bane is unanimous as to the findings of gross ignorance of the law, undue
delay in rendering an order, bias and partiality. Nonetheless, five (5)
members of the Court voted to impose upon respondent judge the penalty of
forfeiture of his retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment
in government service instead of dismissal because he is no longer
connected with the Court. However, seven (7) members of the Court
believed that the penalty of forfeiture of his retirement benefits and
disqualification from re-employment in government service to be too harsh a
penalty, considering respondent judge's length of service, and thus, voted to
impose a fine of P500,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Pedro DL. Gutierrez,

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 119, Regional Trial
Court, Pasay City, is found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law, Undue
Delay in Rendering an Order, Bias and Partiality, and is hereby
ORDERED to PAY a FINE of P500,000.00 to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY.
~/~
56
Felix Espiritu v. Cultural Center of the Philippines.
fl~~ 'J
SO ORDERED.

Chief Justice
ANTONIOT. C J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice AS!Sociate Justice
;f/Jl1A~14 ~du~
T~ffiA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
,
/VLJUt.~~~-9
/
Associate Justice
On wellness leave
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA :&~BERNABE <

/
MARVIe'M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
1~
FRANCISH.
Associate Justice
3S.epublic of tbe ~bilippine~ SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES
~upreme Qtourt
.:fflanila
-·-
PUBLIC IHFORMATION OFl'ICE
:@
EN BANC
RE: FINDINGS ON THE JUDICIAL A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC

AUDIT CONDUCTED IN
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 8, LA TRINIDAD,
BENGUET,
x--------------------------x
OFFICE OF THE COURT A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
ADMINISTRATOR, [Formerly A.M. No. 14-3-53-RTC]
Complainant,
Present:
SERENO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
MENDOZA,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA, and
JUDGE MARYBELLE L. DEMOT- CAGUIOA, JJ.
MARINAS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 8, LA TRINIDAD, Promulgated:
BENGUET,
Respondent. March 7, 2017
x-----------------------------------------------------------~~~.::"'~-x
•
Decision 2 A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC and

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
DECISION
PERCURIAM:
This is a consolidated administrative complaint against Judge

Marybelle L. Demot-Marifias (Judge Demot-Mariiias), Presiding Judge,
Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, which stemmed from
(1) the judicial audit of the RTC- Branch 8 from March 30 to April 12, 2014,
conducted by the Audit Team of the Court Management Office (Team); and
(2) the Indorsement from the Office of the Chief Justice regarding the Letter
from Ms. Lilia Nugal-Koh wherein the latter sought the intercession of the
Court for the speedy disposition of her case.
A.M No. 14-10-339-RTC
Pursuant to Travel Order No. 32-2014 dated March 20, 2014, the
judicial audit team conducted a judicial audit in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 8, La Trinidad, Benguet, from March 30 to April 12, 2014.
The Court is presided by herein respondent Judge Marybelle Demot-
Marifias.
On the basis of the records presented and actually audited by the

Team, the subject court had a total caseload of309 cases (135 criminal cases
and 174 civil cases), with 157 cases submitted for decision (47 criminal
cases and 110 civil cases) which are already beyond the reglementary period
to decide.
In a Memoradum dated October 3, 2014, the Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA) recommended to the Honorable Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno the following, to wit:
A. Hon. Marybelle Demot-Marifias, Presiding Judge, Branch 8,
Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, be DIRECTED to:
(1) CEASE arid DESIST from trying/hearing cases in her court, and to
DEVOTE her time to (la) DECIDE the one hundred fifty (150) cases [45
criminal cases and 105 civil cases] submitted for decision, which are
beyond the period to decide as provided by law, to wit:
CRIMINAL CASES
CASE CASE
COUNT NUMBER ACCUSED NATURE DATE
I 09-CR-7795 Maria Gloria Angelica Grave Coercion 09/27/09
Sabado
2 09-CR-7794 Maria Gloria Angelica Malicious Mischief 09/27/09
Sabado
3 10-CR-8135 Flor Raposas, et al. Malicious Mischief 01/04/10
w"y"
\'\~,Y\
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
4 03-CR-4932 Wilfredo Pio Alan Homicide 09/12/07

5 08-CR-7495 John Miguel Ananayo Frustrated 04/27/10
Homicide
6 08-CR-7235 Laruan Quilito Murder 03/09/10
Rogelio Andres (AL)
7 2K-CR-3934 Sunny Aglibot Theft 02/08/13
Lorenzo Adato, Jr.
Michael Ramirez
8 09-CR-7764 Arleth Buenconsejo, et Illegal Recruitment 02/08/13
al.
al.
10 09-CR-7787 Arleth Buenconsejo, Illegal Recruitment 02/08/13
et al.
al.
12 10-CR-8175 Narda Balinag Albert PD 1602 as 03/20/13
Coliado amended by RA
9287
13 11-CR-8689 Christopher Patiag RA 9165 09/17/13
14 05-CR-5991 Avalon Allan Murder 08/09/09
15 05-CR-5989 Avalon Allan Frustrated Murder 08/09/09
16 10-CR-8098 James Bagtang Sec. 5. Art. II, RA 02/09/12
9165
17 07-CR-6715 Dorico Yeno Endeniro Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 07/22/10
9165
18 06-CR-6117 Santos Balabal Sec. 5 Art. II, RA 11/19/07
9165
19 09-CR-7599 Walden Revelar Grave Threats 04/17/09
(appealed
case)
20 11-CR-8690 Christopher Patiag RA 9165 09/17/13
21 07-CR-6791 Roel Nabus PD 1602 as 01/26/09
amended by RA
9287
22 08-CR-7259 Jay Boteng Murder 01/21/13
23 10-CR-8091 Jack Bahingawan Frustrated Murder 12/06/11
24 11-CR-8475 Antonio Coyupan Malicious Mischief 07/14/11
(appealed Rey Coyupan
case) Joker Miranda
25 05-CR-6074 Fred Bilog Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 11110/08
9165
26 05-CR-5781 Hilton Pulacan Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 08/07/07
9165
27 05-CR-5782 Hilton Pulacan Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 08/07/07
9165
28 02-CR-4400 Sps. Florendo and Estafa thru 09/19/05
Josephine Lupante Falisification of
Public Documents
29 05-CR-5780 A. Empil Qualified Theft 12/05/06
30 11-CR-8284 H. Soriano Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 08/27/13
9165
31 09-CR-7738 Rowela Delfin Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 07/25111
9165
~~~-,
o/v
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
32 10-CR-8226 Sonny Dolinen Estafa 03/13/12

33 08-CR-7209 John Naboye PD 1602 as 12/17/13
E.Malicdan Amended by RA
E. Daniel 9287
E. Rones
34 11-CR-8286 Eleanor Sebiano, et al. Qualified Trespass 02/22/11
(appealed to Dwelling
case)
35 09-CR-7801 Uriel Delos Reyes Serious Physical 01/18/10
(appealed Injuries
case)
36 09-CR-7802 Uriel Delos Reyes Serious Physical 01/18/37

(appealed Injuries
case)
37 09-CR-7747 Alex Abinon Frustrated Murder 06/18/13
Romel Balarote
Dan Moria!
Juli us Casaalan
38 11-CR-8641 Jessie Bernal Estafa 12/10/13
39 13-CR-9459 Regina Samidan BP22 07/24/13
(appealed
case)
(appealed
case)
(appealed
case)
(appealed
case)
44 13-CR-9517 Fernando Asunsion BP22 08/07/13
(appealed
case)
45 13-CR-9516 Fernando Asunsion BP22 08/07/13
(appealed
Case)
CIVIL CASES
CASE CASE DATE

COUNT NUMBER TITLE NATURE SUBMITTED
FOR
DECISION
1 01-CV-1509 Joseph Tanacio, et al. v. Damages 04/16/04
Angelito Narzabal, et
al.
2 06-CV-2293 Loma Aquino v. Sps. Specific 01/22111
Antonio Abyado, et al. Performance,
Injunction and
Reconveyance
3 07-CV-2390 Belino Tam v. Milagros Reconveyance and 02/12/08
(appealed Vidal and George Vidal Damages
,.,,{""/v
~~r-r \)
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
case)
4 12-AD-1393 Aniceto A cop & Petition under 01/07/13
Shirley A cop v. Section 108 of PD
Register of Deeds, 1529 for
Benguet amendment of
entries m the
Registration Book
5 10-CV-2671 Sps. Marcial Florida v. Recovery of 01/03/11
(appealed Mario Otto & Delio Possession with
case) Otto Damages
6 07-CV-2380 Elvira Laoyan v. Mike Recovery of 07/10/11
Leo, Jr. Possession with
Damages
7 07-CV-2379 Catalina Villena v. Sps. Annulment of 09/14/11
Marcos Gayaso, et al. Deed of Sale,
Extrajudicial
Settlement of
Estate
8 10-CV-2601 Emilia Buyagoa v. Rescission of 01/27/11
Minda Colansong Contract with
Prayer for
Preliminary
Injunction
9 10-CV-2666 Macaria Molitas, et al. Forcible Entry and 01117/11
(appealed v. Cordillera Damages
case) Homeowners
Cooperative
10 10-CV-2594 Anthony Wakefiled v. Annulment of 08/19/11
Rafael Tenenan, et al. Documents
11 CV-1645 Placido Carantes v. Recovery of 10/08/10
Benguet Corporation Possession with
Preliminary
Injunction
12 LRC-N-221 Placido Carantes Application for 03/09/11
Registration of
Title
13 03-CV-1820 George Sanchez v. Annulment of 12/01/05
Edith Batore Walker, et Affidavit of
al. Adjudication
14 05-CV-2185 Heirs of Empiso Caiso, Cancelllation of 01/23/09
etal. v. The Barangay Tax Declartion
Government of
Poblacion, La Trinidad,
Benguet, et al.
15 08-CV-2455 Mario Nishiyama v. Rescission of 07112/13
Megalopolis Properties Contracts with
Inc. Damages
16 03-CV-1884 Manuel Cuilan v. Violation of 12/07/05
Mauricio Ambanloc Section 194 and
195 of the Local
Code/Injunction
with Damages
17 02-CV-1714 Feliciano Balakwid v. Judicial 05110106
Victoria Leano F oreclo~ure of
Mortgage
.,ry"
~"<['Yi
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
18 1O-CV-2679 Dionisia Palaci v. Recovery of 05/18/11

(appealed Simeon and Manuel Possession with
case) Basilio Prayer for Issuance
of Preliminary
Mandatory
Injunction and
TRO
19 I 03-CV-1865 I Angela Begnaen, et al. I Reconveryance and I 09/24/09
v. The Heirs of Damages
Angelita Begnaen
Ananayo, et al.
20 I 08-CV-2444 I Saturnine Diaz v. I Recovery of I 02/24/12
Manuel Liu Possession with
Damages
21 I 05-CV-2181 I Sps. Marcial & Imelda Injunction and I 10/03/11
Tayab v. Henry Longay Damages with
Jr. in his capacity as application for
Deputy Sheriff IV, TRO with Writ of
Cesar Macagne and Preliminary
Stephen Tolding Injunction
22 I 08-CV-2449 I Cesar Macagne and IIndirect Contempt I 10/03/11
Stephen Tolding v. Sps.
Marcial & Imelda
Tayab & Atty. Inglay
Fokno
23 02-CV-1701 I Jeffrey Garoy v. Cecilia Annulment of 08/17/05
Morales, et al. Title; Affidavit of
Loss & Affidavit
of Self
Adjudication with
Simultaneous Sale
with Damages
24 I 02-CV-1701 I Maximo Macli-ing v. I Damages I 09/02/04
Pedro Isican
25 I 2K-CV-1491 I Fibertex Corp. v. Recovery of I 06/17/06
Elizabeth Lagyop and Possession with
Darwin Dominong Damages
26 I
I 2K-CV-1527 I Constancio Olsim and Specific I 09/10/03
Gregorio Afidchao v. Performance
La Trinidad Balikatan
Homeowners Assn., et
al.
27 I 08-CV-2452 I Teresita Banggao, rep. Annulment of I 09/28/08
by Francis Salis v. Sps. Judgment with
Marcelo & Lolita Prayer for the
Geston & the Issuance of Writ of
Municipal Trial Court Preliminary
of La Trinidad Injunction
28 05-CV-2151 Sps. Alejandro and Injunction with 03104108
Feliza Carbonell v. Payer for TRO &
Ricky Alangsab, et al. Preliminary
htjunction,
Reduction of
Interest Rate of
Loan & Damages
y{,v'
~~
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
29 03-CV-1921 Rural Bank of La Collection of Sum 11/13/04

Trinidad, represented of Money with
by Ricardo Salis v. Sps. Damages
Candido & Florence
Radion
30 2K-CV-1500 Eugenia Zafra Edapes, Annulment of 08/09/05
et al. v. Solomon Deeds of Absolute
Alilao, et al. Sale, TCT, Sheriffs
Certificates of
Sale,
Reconveyance and
Damages
31 97-CV-1203 Heirs of Larry Ogas v. Annulment of Sale 05/27/03
Benguet State & TCT with
University, et al. Damages
32 11-CV-2709 Sps. Cobulan v. Forcible Entry 06/21/11
Josephine Alasio
33 12-CV-2890 Heirs of Dagiw-a Baca, Recovery of 06/10/13
(appealed et al. v. Heirs of Ownership, et al.
case) Bahanio Atelba, et al.
34 12-CV-2831 Heirs of Alipio Forcible Entry 10/24112
(appealed Ballesteros, et al. v.
case) Cristina Gorio
35 92-CV-0666 Camilo Quinio v. Recovery of 09/27/02
Duray Veloso de Possession and
Erasmo, et al. Ownership
36 94-CV-0887 Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Recovery of

Inc. v. James Brett Personal Property, 07/22/04
etc.
LRC-N-153 Abanga Cossel, et al. v.
37 Director of Lands Land Registration 05/20/08
38 97-CV-1238 Vicente Lubos v. Smart Breach of Contract 11/27/03

Communications Inc. with Damages
39 01-CV-1666 Gudelia Domingo V. Damages 08/07/03
Emmanuel Mariano
40 12-CV-2830 Heirs of Toato Bugnay, Forcible Entry 09117/12
(appealed et al. v. Cristina Gorio with Damages
case)
13-CV-2946 Heirs of Cuidno Tapio Accion Publiciana,
41 (appealed v. Camilo Madadsic et al. 11115/13
case)
42 11-CV-2715 Aurea Benito, et al. v.
Reconveyance, 08/09111
(appealed Joseph Aquilet, et al.
Cancelllation of
case) Bad Title, Tax
Declaration
43 08-CV-2408 Samuel Bordon v. Lin Collection of Sum 05/08/08
(appealed Ling Sheng of Money
case)
44 03-CV-1831 Frankie Domingo v. Quieting of Title, 08/03/10
Michael Sy Damages with
Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary
Injunction
\.~y
~~r-F'
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
45 02-CV-1764 Sonia Catarroja, et al. Reconveyance, et 12/15/10

v. Damian Jimenez, et al.
al.
46 Ol-CV-1645 Sps. Gerald and Annulment of 06123105
Josephine Alejo v. Deeds, Damages et
Samahan ng Buong al.
Lahing Pilipino &
Nelia Bulahaw
47 12-CV-2841 Amada Erafi.a v. Jane Recovery of 02/08/13
Ferrer & Registry of Possession of a
Deeds parcel of land and
Damages
48 95-SP-0086 Pedro Nugal, et al. In the Matter of the 05/12/03
(Petitioners) Settlement of the
Intestate Estate of
the late Basilio
Nugal
49 12-AD-1423 Heirs of Rosalia Petition for the 05/16/13
Quintino v. Arlene Surrender of the
Lubos, et al. Owner's Duplicate
Copies of Title
50 Ol-CV-1659 Belen Tacay, et al. v. Injunction, 04/01/04
Ponciano So and Val Damages with
Nolasco Prayer for TRO
51 99-CV-1387 Heirs of Jose Turnpao Recovery of 04/01/04
v. Sps. Noel and Jessie Possession
Alos
52 03-CV-1888 Heirs of Bido Sabado v. Quieting of Title & 08/11/11
Domingo Bestre and Ownership
Miller Bestre
53 03-CV-1814 Jimmy Mateo, et al. v. Annulment of 09124109
Miguel Bato, et al. Deed of Sale, etc.
54 02-CV-1765 Mary Jane Alican v. Quo Warranto, 08/23/04
Alvin Soriano Application for
Writ of
Preliminary
Injunction and
TRO
55 Ol-CV-1662 Lolita Velasco v. Quieting of Title; 10/22/04
Charlie Lingbanan, et Annulment of
al. Title; Specific
Performance or
Reconveyance
56 92-CV-0748 Patricio Ciano v. Quieting of Title 07130104
Lutheran Church of the with Prayer for the
Philippines, et al. Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary
Injunction
57 04-CV-1995 Telesforo Amiao & Unlawful Detainer 06107104
(appealed Angela Angon v. Heirs
case) of Patricio Gabao
58 2K-CV-1565 Heirs of Rufo Sotelo, Injunction 01/13/05
Jr. v. Melchor Tican, et
al.
y
~'ry<
De'cision 9 A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC and
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
59 01-CV-1681 Ricardo Acop, et al. v. Cancellation of 06/14/07

Sps. Ricardo & Juliet Title with
Galvez Damages
60 06-CV-2217 Sps. Jaime & Mary Leo Annulment of 11116/11
v. Arlene Leo, et al. Documents,
Injunction &
Damages
61 93-CV-0799 Lourdes Maglaya & Annulment of 06/14/02
Feliza Pil-o v. Ruben Contracts
Guzman & Hydro
Electric Dev't. Corp.
62 09-CV-1578 Marek Floyd Ambos & Petition for 01129/13
Eden Ambos v. LCR of Correction of
Bokod, Benguet Entries m the
Certificate of Live
Birth of Mark
Floyd Ambos
63 99-CV-1334 Ismael Paatan v. Damages 11/10/03
Amado Cortez
64 03-CV-1812 Trinibank-Rural Bank Recovery of 09/25/08
of La Trinidad, Benguet Possession and
v. Sps. Juanito & Ownership with
Zenaida Co, et al. Damages
65 02-CV-1704 Leonardo del Rosario, Reconveyance, 06128106
et al. v. Conchita Accounting and
Lucero Damages
66 06-CV-220S Benjamin Dampac v. Abatement of 08/29/08
Sps. Victor & Frances Nuisance &
Laoyan Damages
67 2K-CV-1559 Heirs of Victor Declaration of 05106102
Alejandro Sr., et al. v. Nullity of Deed of
Andrea Balictan Donation
68 2K-CV-1573 Pilando Femandez, et Enforcement of 02/28/03
al. v. Philex Mining Contract
Corp.
69 07-CV-2347 Carmen Amboy & Forcible Entry 07109107
(appealed Florencio Amboy v.
case) Sps. Antonio & Rosita
Cal ado
70 96-CV-1113 Albert Caoili v. Congyu Quieting of Tile 05/10/02
Marcelino, et al.
71 2K-CV-1473 Heirs of Gregorio Recovery of 02/27/03
Abalos v. Peter Sukil- Possession
ap, et al.
72 04-CV-2020 Benguet Electric Injunction 07/28/09
Cooperative v. National
Transmission Corp. et
al.
73 06-CV-2195 Heirs of Violeta Annulment of 08/09/12
Baccay, et al. V. Deed of
Erasmo Aquiapao, et al. Extraj udicial
Settlement of
Estate
74 04-CV-2057 Patricia Buenafe v. Sps. Annulment of Real 09/28/05
Mario Bastian, et al. Estate Mortgage
./~
"{'\~~
Decision IO A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC and
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
75 10-CV-2649 Heirs of Carlos Amos Annulment of 12/03/10

et al. v. Delilah Judgment
Asuncion & Sps.
Basilio David, et al.
76 04-CV-2024 Alma Contada v. Allan Damages 04/22/08
Mali ones
08-CV-2420 David Dominang v. Certiorari 09/10/08
77 Hon. Jose Encarnacion
et al.
78 13-CV-2919 Agosto Domerez V. Certiorari 06/06/13
Hon. Adolfo Malingan
and Marcela Torren
79 98-CV-1290 Esteban v. Gardose Annulment and/or 11127/03
Cancellation of
Deed of
Assignment
80 2K-CV-1492 Cosme v. Piay, et al. Cancellation of 02/24/04
Real Estate
81 04-CV-2023 Estate of De Guia v. Reconveyance of 03103109
Sps. Fernandez Property, Damages
82 03-CV-1892 Benguet Electric Coop. Collection of Sum 06/28/12
v. Tacio of Money
83 02-CV-1791 M. Cadiogan v. A. Settlement of
Cadiogan Estate with Prayer 10/14/05
for Issuance of a
Restraining Order
84 10-CV-2229 Cestona v. Tulio Reformation of 08/18/11
Instrument and
Damages
85 10-CV-2645 Calawa, et al. v. Mayor Certiorari 11126/10
Abalos
86 99-CV-1345 Donato v. Balingan Declaration of 08/17/05
Nullity of
Documents
87 13-CV-2906 Esnara v. Tenefrancia, Declaration of 08/16/13
et al. Nullity of
Documents
88 03-CV-1877 Sps. Og-oget v. Luis Annulment of 10/08/06
Compromise
Settlement
89 04-CV-2060 Kidweng v. Aguilar Damages 11/16/06
90 10-CV-2599 Acop v. Municipality of Recovery of 03/30/10
(appealed Tublay, Benguet Possession and
case) Damages
91 99-CV-1420 Ambros v. Matias Annulment of Tax 11/04/03
Declaration
92 03-CV-1815 Sps. De Leon v. Dulay Constitution of 03108106
Easement of Right
of Way
93 2K-CV-1472 Ackiapat v. Berto Cancellation of 07129104
Tax Declaration
and Damages
94 02-CV-1519 Nixon Guzman, et al. v. Judicial Partition 08/23/12
Helen Abilao and
Feliza Pilo-o
_,~
'\(\~
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
95 12-CV-2877 Apolonio, Sr. v. Accion Publiciana 01/30/14

Benguet State and Quieting of
University Tile
96 08-CV-2467 Yolanda Daliones v. Conveyance and 09/16/13
Sps. Marcelo Agdasi Damages
and Ana Agdasi
97 11-CV-2773 Heirs of Rosalina Ejectment and 04/18/12
Lacamen, et al. v. Damages
Erlinda Lacamen and
Abdel Lacamen
98 13-CV-2947 Saturnino Ciano v. Forcible Entry 10/07/13
(appealed Francisco Kiwang, Jr.
case)
99 12-CV-2829 Maria Usana v. Severo Collection of Sum 10118/13
Alvarez Jr. and Estrella of Money
Alavarez
100 08-CV-2459 Edwin Zamora v. Damages 12/05/13
Rainbow Mission
Church
101 13-CV-2922 Heirs of Patricia Forcible Entry 09/13/13
(appealed Teofilo v. Sps. Cesar
case) and Virginia Singao, et
al.
102 07-CV-2382 Province of Benguet v. Collection of 03/08/13
National Power Franchise Tax
corporation
103 08-CV-2481 Phil ex Mining Petition under 05/06/10
Corporation v. The Section 195 of the
Province of Benguet Local Gov't. Code
with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary
Injunction or TRO
104 12-CV-1745 Desiree Dolin-Sawac v. Petition for 01107/13
LCR of Kapangan, Correction & to
Benguet Supply the entries
in the Certificate
of Live Birth of
Desiree Dolin
105 02-CV-1776 Toquero, et al. Heirs of Judicial Partition 02/04/13
Santiago Lictag, et al.
(1-b) DECIDE the eight (8) cases submitted for decision although still
within the reglementary period to resolve, as of audit, to wit:
CRIMINAL CASES
CASE CASE TITLE NATURE DATE

COUNT NUMBER SUBMITTED
FOR
DECISION
1 10-CR-7978 Efren Andiso Violation of Sec. 02/12114
261 (a) BP 881
'(\~,<
Decision 12 A.M. No. 14-10-33.9-RTC and
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
2 10-CR-7979 I Efren Andiso Violation of Sec. I 02/12/14

261 (a) BP 881
CIVIL CASES
CASE CASE TITLE NATURE DATE

COUNT NUMBER SUBMITTED
FOR
DECISION
1 13-AD-1487 Domingo v. Registry of Issuance of New 01/24/14
Deeds-Benguet Owner's
Duplicate
Certificate of
Title
2 12-CV-2858 Heirs of Mendoza v. Annulment of 01/24/14
Sps.Mendoza Judgment
3 2K-CV-1492 Cosme v. Piay, et al. Cancellation of 02/24/04
Real Estate
4 12-CV-2877 Apolonio, Sr. v. A cc ion 01130/14
Benguet State Publiciana and
University Quieting of Title
Heirs of Busco v. Annulment of
5 03-CV-1810 Bulso, et al. Affidavit of 02/27/14
Adjudication
Tiongsan Realty Unlawful Detainer
6 13-CV-2935 Development v. Jimmy 04/03/14
(appealed !Yu, et al.
case)
(1-c) RESOLVE the pending motions/incidents in the following

seventeen (17) cases [2 criminal cases and 15 civil cases], to wit:
CRIMINAL CASES
LAST
CASE CASE TITLE NATURE COURT
tOUNT NUMBER ACTION/
REMARKS
1 12-CR-8795 D. Oblero Estafa Demurrer to
Evidence
filed on 10-
10-13
No comment/
opposition
I filed by
prosecution
despite
directive m
Order dated
9-17-13
2 13-CR-9683 J ackellene Menzi Estafa Motion to
Quash filed
on 3-11-14
Prosecution's
comment
~~~
vr'v
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
filed on 3-11-
14
CIVIL CASES
CASE I CASE TITLE NATURE DATE

toUN11 NUMBER SUBMIITED
FOR
RESOLUTION
1 13-CV- Bangonan Livelihood Prohibition with Order dtd 11-
2967 Association Inc. v. Preliminary 15-13 Atty.
Benedict Pineda Injunction and De Guzman is
TRO given 15 days
from receipt
of a copy of
this order to
file his
comment to
the affirmative
defenses
contained m
the answer of
the
respondents,
after which
the incident
shall be
deemed
submitted for
resolution
2 03-CV- I
Rosenia Langbis, et al. Specific Order <ltd. 09-
1847 v. Sps. Juliana and Performance 15-05 after the
Bosleng Arcita filing of the
manifested
demurrer to
evidence
within 5 days
and within 10
days to
comment
thereto, the
incident shall
be deemed
submitted for
resolution
-Demurrer to
Evidence- 09-
20-05
3 13-CV- Virginia Dompiles v. Annulment of the Order dated
2958 Hon. Jose Encarnacion, Orders of the 08-01-13
MTC of Itogon and MTC with Prayer supplemental
Atok Big Wedge for TRO and petition shall
Corporation Writ of be deemed
Preliminary submitted for
Injunction resolution
~~
~r-~
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
4 13-CV- Gregorio Abalos, Jr. v. Sum of Money & I Order dated

2949 Damages 01-24-14 court
given the
chance to
submit
comment on
the Motion for
Judgment on
the Pleadings
dated 10-10-
13 within 10
days from
receipt of the
copy of the
order after
which the
incident will
deemed
submitted to
resolution
-comment
attached 02-
27-14
5 13-CV- The Province of Cancellation of Motion for
2969 Benguet rep. by Gov. ARP No. 99-016- Extension of
Nestor Fongwan v. Sps. 03588 and Time to file
Maray & Brado Moltio Annulment of comment filed
Deed of Sale on 01-02-14
with Damages Comments/
objections to
the affirmative
defense on 01-
16-14
6 I 13-CV-2959 !Fermin Semal v. Sps. Annulment of Order dated
Esteban Gayados, Jr., et Foreclosure Sale, 11-15-13 the
al. Sheriffs motion to
Certificate of dismiss shall
Sale, and be deemed
Certificate of submitted for
Title resolution
-Supplemental
Motion to
Dismiss filed
by defendants
on 02-12-14
7 08-CV-2442 IHeirs of Nuepe Lamsis, I Injunction, et al. Order dated
et al. v. Pelagia Velasco, 02-21-14 upon
et al. receipt of the
ruling of this
court on
plaintiffs
evidence on
rebuttal, the
parties are
given a period
...,-../
I'\"t-f""
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
of 30 days to
file their
memoranda
after which
this case shall
be submitted
for decision
with or
without such
memoranda
8 14-CV-3012 Sps. Bandola v. Rural Declaration of Motion to take
Bank of San Luis, Nullity of Real Disposition-
Pampanga, et al. Estate Mortgage 03-19-14
9 09-CV-2550 Heirs of the Late Olecio Annulment of I Comment/
v. Sps. Bugtong Documents Opposition to
defendants'
affirmative
defenses/
Motion to
Dismiss 05-
14-10
10 04-CV-2052 !Semon v. Carmak I Rescission of I Urgent ex-
Motors Corp. Contract parte motion
for an earlier
resolution- 01-
10-08
11 13-CV-2992 IBenguet Electric Coop. ,Reformation of Motion for
v. Equitable PCI Bank, Instrument leave to file
et al. attached reply
(for defendant
BDO) filed on
03-31-14
12 11-CV-2707 !Hermenegildo Heiras, Specific Comment to
Jr. v. Sps. William and Performance and Formal Offer
Jennifer Gan-gan, et al. Damages of Evidence
filed by
defendants on
03-11-14
13 13-CV-2936 ICristina Noepe and Declaration of Reply to the
Lester N oepe v. Nullity of Public amended
Christian Spiritista of Instrument answer - 03-
the Philippines 25-14 Motion
for Extension
was filed on
03-27-14
14 11-CV-2769 IChristian Chuang v. I Declaration of Comment/
Celevina Baylon et al. Nullity of Deed Opposition to
of Absolute Sale the
admissibility
of plaintiffs
rebuttal
evidence dated
02-20-14 filed
by defendant
J~
~\(yr
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
15 10-SP-0121 Petition for Probate of Will Motion to

Probate/Allowance of issue and an
the Holographic will of order
Satumino Ebusca v. authorizing
Rafael Ebusca, et al. Atty. Calonge
to withdraw
from BCF
Credit Coop.
filed on 03-02-
I 14
(2) FURNISH this Court copies of the decisions and/or resolutions

related to the enumerated cases. This Cease-and-Desist directive shall
continue until the aforementioned 157 cases submitted for decision and
pending motions/incidents in the 17 cases shall have been finally
decided/resolved by Judge Marinas;
(3) EXPLAIN in writing, within fifteen (15) dqays from notice, why
no administrative sanction should be taken against her for her failure to
decide the aforementioned one hundred fifty (150) cases within the
mandatory period to decide.
B) The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator

be directed to WITHHOLD the salaries, allowances and other benefits of
Judge Marybelle Demot Marinas, pending full compliance with these
directives; and
C) The Court Management Office be DIRECTED to prepare the necessary

Administrative Order for approval relative to the designation of an
assisting judge in Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet,
to specifically conduct hearings on all cases and attend to all interlocutory
matters thereat, but without prejudice to disposing of the same when
circumstance/s warrant, such designation to continue until further orders
from this Court.
On April 7, 2015, as per recommendation of the OCA, the Court

resolved to adopt the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution, in a Letter Transmittal

dated June 4, 2015, Judge Demot-Marifias apologized to the Court for her
failure to decide the cases within the reglementary period. She, however,
offered no explanation to such delay but nevertheless admitted her fault in
the said delay. She signified her intention to resign as she felt that she was
no longer an effective member of the judiciary. Attached with the Letter-
Compliance is the Letter of Atty. Maribel Brillantes Macario Pedro (Atty.
Macario Pedro), Clerk of Court V, Branch 8, RTC, La Trinidad, Benguet
showing the partial compliance to the court directives, to wit:
rr1'"
y
'!{'\'t~
De'cision 17 A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC and
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
CRIMINAL CASES
CASE ACCUSED NATURE LAST COURT DATE

NUMBER ACTION/ RESOLVED
REMARKS
12-CR- Dominga D. Estafa Demurrer to 07/31/14
8795 Oblero Evidence filed on
10-10-13
No comment/
opposition filed by
prosecution
despite directive in
Order dated 9-1 7-
13
13-CR- Jackellene K. Estafa Motion to Quash 05/12/14
9683 Menzi filed on 3-11-14
Prosecution's
comment filed on
3-11-14
CIVIL CASES
LAST COURT
CASE TITLE NATURE ACTION/ Date Resolved
NUMBER REMARKS
08-CV- Heirs of I Recovery of I Order dated 02- 06/09/14
2442 Nuepe Possession, etc. 21-14 upon
Lamsis, et al. receipt of the
v. Heirs of ruling of this court
Pelagia on plaintiffs
Lamsis evidence on
rebuttal, the
parties are given a
period of 30 days
to file their
memoranda after
which this case
shall be submitted
for decision with
or without such
memoranda
09-CV- Heirs of the. Annulment of I Comment/ 08/15/14
2550 Late Gloria Documents, Opposition to
Luis Olecio v. Cancellation of I defendants'
Sps. Rosalino TCT, affirmative
Luis Bugtong Reconveyance, defenses/Motion
Damages with to Dismiss 05-14-
Prayer for a TRO 10
and WPI
11-CV- Hermenigildo Specific Comment to 04/03/14
2707 Hieras, Jr. v. Performance with Formal Offer of
Sps. Wiliiam Damages Evidence filed by
and Jennifer defendants on 03-
Gangan, et al. 11-14
13-CV- Virginia Annulment of the Order dated 08-01- 05/12/14
,v1
~~
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
2958 Dompiles V. Orders of the 13 supplemental

Hon. Jose S. MTC with Prayer petition shall be
Encarnacion, for TRO and Writ deemed submitted
Presiding of Preliminary for resolution
Judge, MTC Injunction
of Itogon,
Benguet and
Atok Big
Wedge
Corporation
13-CV- Fermina 0. Annulment of Order dated 11-15- 01/30/15
2959 Bernal v. Sps. Foreclosure Sale, 13 the motion to
Esteban T. Sheriffs dismiss shall be
Gayados, Jr., Certificate of Sale, deemed submitted
et al. and Certificate of for resolution
Title -Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss
filed by defendants
on 02-12-14
13-CV- Benguet Reformation of Motion for leave to 04/11/14
2992 Electric Coop. Instrument with file attached reply
v. Equit:ible Prayer for (for defendant
PCI Bank, et Payment of Sum BDO) filed on 03-
al. of Money and 31-14
Damages
14-CV- Sps. Freddie Declaration of Motion to take 03/24/14
3012 H. Bandola Nullity of Real Disposition- 03-
and Celia Estate Mortgage, 19-14
Bandola v. etc.
Rural Bank of
San Luis,
Pampanga, et
al.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE
CASE ACCUSED NATURE LAST COURT Date Resolved

NUMBER ACTION/
REMARKS
10-SP- Petition for Probate of Will Motion to issue an 04/16/14
0121 Probate/ order authorizing
Allowance of Atty. Calonge to
the withdraw from
Holographic BCF Credit Coop.
will of Filed on 03-02-14
Saturnine
Ebusca v.
Rafael Ebusca
et al.
In a Resolution dated August 4, 2015, the Court referred the Letter

dated June 4, 2015 of Presiding Judge Demot-Marifias to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
,~
f-'t';y("
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
A.M. RTJ-16-2446
On February 27, 2013, the Office of the Deputy Court Administrator

Raul Villanueva (DCA Villanueva) received an indorsement from the Office
of the Chief Justice regarding the letter of Ms. Nugal-Koh wherein the latter
sought the intercession of the Court for the speedy disposition of her case
docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 95-SP-0086 entitled "Pedro
Nugal, et al. v. Lilia Nugal-Koh, et al.," which allegedly had been submitted
for resolution for more than ten (10) years already at the time of the
complaint.
Acting on the said Letter, a 1st Indorsement dated March 4, 2013

was sent directing Judge Demot-Marifias to comment thereon. On June 5,
2013, another Letter from Ms. Nugal-Koh, addressed to the Office of the
Chief Justice, was received by DCA Villanueva's office again seeking
assistance for the immediate resolution of her case. Attached to the said
Letter were the (1) Certification dated April 23, 2013 from Atty. Maribel B.
Macario, Clerk of Court V, Branch 8, RTC, La Trinidad, Benguet, attesting
that no decision was rendered yet in the subject case; and (2) another Letter
from the Office of the Chief Justice dated April 12, 2013, referring the letter
dated February 13, 2013 of Ms. Nugal-Koh to Judge Demot-Marifias
wherein the latter was requested to submit a feedback on the matter within
fifteen (15) days from the receipt thereof.
Consequently, a 2nd Indorsement dated June 5, 2013 was sent to Judge

Demot-Marinas, reiterating the earlier directive for her to comment on the
status of Ms. Nugal-Koh's case, with a stem warning that appropriate
proceedings may be initiated against her for her inaction.
On September 17, 2013, the Office ofDCA Villanueva again received

a Letter dated September 11, 2013 from Ms. Nugal-Koh repeating her
request regarding her case and appending a new certification dated
September 2, 2013 attesting that her case remained undecided. Thus, a 3rd
Indorsement was sent to respondent judge regarding the matter with the
information that initiation of administrative proceedings against her was
already being considered for her apparent delay in deciding the subject case
and her blatant disregard of directives relative thereto despite repeated
orders.
In an Agenda Report dated February 18, 2014, the OCA found that
Judge Demot-Marifias indeed failed to comply with the repeated directives
from the Office of DCA Villanueva, and with the letter from the Office of
the Chief Justice requiring her to comment on the status of the subject case.
Thus, the OCA recommended that the report be treated as a formal
administrative complaint against Judge Demot-Marifias for insubordination,
.J:~
inefficiency and neglect of duty.
"{\Yr-'\
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
In a Resolution dated June 2, 2014, the Court resolved to treat the

OCA's Agenda Report dated February 18, 2014 as a formal administrtive
complaint against Judge Demot-Marifias for Inefficiency and Neglect of
Duty. In addition, the Court also required respondent to explain why she
should not be held administratively liable for her failure to comply with the
repeated directives to comment on the status of Special Proceedings Case
No. 95-SP-0086. The Court, likewise, directed respondent to comment and
submit a report on the status of the above-mentioned case.
In a Resolution dated November 26, 2014, the Court referred the

Letter dated September 11, 2014 of Ms. Nugal-Koh to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation. As contained therein, Ms. Nugal-
Koh said that as of July 9, 2014, no decision has been rendered by
respondent Judge Demot-Marifias in her case as certified by Atty. Macario
Pedro, Branch Clerk of Court.
In a Memorandum dated December 1, 2015, the OCA recommended

that: (1) the two (2) instant administrative matters be consolidated; and (2)
respondent Judge Marybelle L. Demot-Marifias be found guilty of grave
misconduct, insubordination and gross inefficiency and be dismissed from
service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits.
On February 17, 2016, as per recommendation of the OCA,

considering the similarity of the issues of both cases, the Court resolved to
consolidate the instant administrative complaints against respondent Judge
Demot-Marifias.
RULING
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide
cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice
delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and
should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his
functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and
confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it
into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of
administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. 1
Re: Cases Submitted For Decision Before Hon. Teofila D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1,
Regional Trial Court, Tagbilman City, Bohol, 717 Phil. 11, 17 (2013).
~~/~
~~~
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
Here, there is no question as to the guilt of Judge Demot-Mari:fias. As

shown by the records, she has been remiss in the performance of her
responsibilities. She failed to decide cases and resolve pending incidents
within the reglementary period, without any authorized extension from this
Court. Respondent judge failed to: (1) decide 150 cases submitted for
decision [45 criminal cases and 105 civil case] which are beyond the period
to decide, and to (2) resolve the pending motions/incidents in 17 cases [2
criminal cases and 15 civil cases]. 2 Some of the cases were already
submitted for decision since 2002, particularly Civil Case No. 2831 and
Civil Case No. 2217. 3 More appalling is that she did not give any
reason/explanation for her failure to comply with the reglementary period
for deciding cases. There were, likewise, no previous requests by her for
extension of time to decide said cases. Thus, in the instant case, Judge
Demot-Marifias' gross inefficiency is, therefore, evident in her undue delay
deciding 150 cases within the reglementary period and her failure to resolve
pending motions/incidents in 17 cases.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that

lower courts have three months within which to decide cases or resolve
matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business
promptly and decide cases within the required period. In addition, this Court
laid down the guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13 4 which
provides, inter alia, that "[j]udges shall observe scrupulously the periods
prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the
adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts.
Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months
from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts, while all other lower
courts are given a period of three months to do so." The Court has reiterated
this admonition in SC Administrative Circular No. 3-995 which requires all
judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for
deciding cases and the failure to comply therewith is considered a serious
violation of the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of
their cases. 6
This Court has consistently held that failure to decide cases and other
matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring
magistrate. Respondent judge failed to live up to the exacting standards of
duty and responsibility that her position required. As a trial judge, Judge
2
Rollo, pp. 56-70.
See Memorandum for the Chief Justice from DCA Villanueva dated December 1, 2005, p. 143.
4
Promulgated on July 1, 1987.
Promulgated on January 15, 1999.
or,~
6
Re: Cases Submitted For Decision Before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1,
Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, supra note 1, at 16-17.
"{\~,0
Decision 22 A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC: and
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
Demot-Marifias is a frontline official of the judiciary and should have at all

times acted with efficiency and with probity. 7
A.M. RTJ-16-2446
We likewise find similarly concerning is Judge Demot-Marifias'

indifference to the indorsements requiring her to comment on the
accusations against her. In all three (3) indorsements issued by the OCA, as
well as one (1) Letter from the Office of the Chief Justice, Judge Demot-
Marifias ignored the directives for her to file the required comment since no
comment or compliance has been submitted despite several opportunities
given to her which ran in a span of more than three (3) years. Also, as per
verification by the OCA of the status of Special Proceedings No. 95-SP-
0086, as of December 2015, Judge Demot-Marifias has yet to decide the
case which was already submitted for decision since May 12, 2003. It is then
apparent that failure to comment despite several directives, as well as the
failure to comply with the immediate resolution of Ms. Nugal-Koh's letter,
show her propensity to disregard and disobey lawful orders of her superior.
We would like to further stress that all directives coming from the
Court Administrator and his deputies are issued in the exercise of this
Court's administrative supervision of trial courts and their personnel, hence,
should be respected. These directives are not mere requests, but should be
complied with promptly and completely. Clearly, Judge Demot-Marifias'
unexplained disregard of the orders of the OCA for her to comment on the
complaint shows her disrespect for and contempt, not just for the OCA, but
also for the Court, which exercises direct administrative supervision over
trial court officers and employees through the OCA. Her indifference to, and
disregard of, the directives issued to her clearly constituted insubordination
which this Court will not tolerate. 8
We cannot overemphasize that compliance with the rules, directives

and circulars issued by the Court is one of the foremost duties that a judge
accepts upon assumption to office. This duty is verbalized in Canon 1 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct: 9
SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the

discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the
institutional and operational independence of the Judiciary.
SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of

judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the Judiciary,
which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
7
Angelia v. Judge Grageda, 656 Phil. 570, 573 (2011 ).
Clemente v. Bautista, 710 Phil. 10, 16 (2013).
~~
9
Promulgated on April 27, 2004.
·\~'("~
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
The obligation to uphold the dignity of her office and the institution
which she belongs to is also found in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct under Rule 2.01, which mandates a judge to behave at all times as
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
Under the circumstances, We can thus conclude that the conduct

exhibited by Judge Demot-Marifias constitutes no less than clear acts of
defiance against the Court's authority. Her conduct also reveals her
deliberate disrespect and indifference to the authority of the Court, shown by
her failure to heed our warnings and directives.
We cannot tolerate this type of behavior especially on a judge. Public

confidence in the judiciary can only be achieved when the court personnel
conduct themselves in a dignified manner befitting the public office they are
holding. Judges should avoid conduct or any demeanor that may tarnish or
diminish the authority of the Supreme Court. Io Clearly, Judge Demot-
Marifias' attitude, as shown by her unexplained failure to decide 150 cases as
well as motions and incidents, and her failure to respond to any of the court's
directives despite several reminders, betray her lack of concern for her
office. In sum, Judge Demot-Marifias has been remiss in the performance of
her official duties exacerbated by her audacious stance in defying this
Court's orders. We cannot tolerate the attitude of respondent judge in
defying this Court's authority and undermining its integrity.
Penalty
The rules and jurisprudence are clear on the matter of delay. Failure to
decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes
gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction
against the erring magistrate. I I Further, Judge Demot-Marifias' deliberate
and repeated failure to comply with the directives of the OCA constitutes
Gross Misconduct which is a serious offense under Section 8, Il Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court.
10
See Tormis v. Paredes, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366, February 4, 2015, 749 SCRA 505, 520.
11
Rubin v. Judge Corpus-Cabochan, 715 Phil. 318, 334 (2013); OCA v. Judge Santos, 697 Phil. 292,
299 (2012); Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Han. Meliton G. Emus/an, Former Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 47, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, 630 Phil. 269, 272 (2010); Report on the Judicial
Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 22, Kabacan, North Cotabato, 468 Phil. 338, 345 (2004).
12
Rule 140, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under Rule 140, Section I !(a)
of the same Rules by: 1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits; 2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3) A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
U"',y"
ifl\>'-iV\
Decision 24 A.M. No. 14-10-3:59-RTC: and
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
In Re: Audit Report in Attendance of Court Personnel ofRTC, Branch

32, Manila, 13 We held that it is gross misconduct, even outright disrespect
for the Court, for respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolution
requiring him to comment on the accusations in the complaint thoroughly
and substantially. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a
recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the Court's lawful
order and directive.
Likewise, in Alonto-Frayna v. Astih, 14 a judge who deliberately and

continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of this Court is
guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination, and was dismissed from
service.
Judging by the foregoing circumstances, the Court can only conclude

that Judge Demot-Marifias is guilty of gross inefficiency resulting in her
unexplained failure to resolve pending cases and motions within the
reglementary period despite several reminders and follow-ups, and gross
misconduct for her non-compliance with the directives/orders of the OCA
and this Court.
In this scenario, Section 17 of the Omnibus Rules implementing the

Civil Service Law states that if the respondent judge is found guilty of two
or more charges or counts, the penalty imposed should be that corresponding
to the most serious charge or counts and the rest may be considered
aggravating circumstances. 15 The most serious of the charges against
respondent judge is her gross misconduct, and her gross inefficiency is
considered an aggravating circumstance.
We would have imposed the penalty of dismissal from service on

Judge Demot-Marifias, however, considering that on December 10, 2015,
she has filed her certificate of candidacy to run for public office, she is now
deemed resigned from judicial office. Nevertheless, cessation from office by
reason of resignation, death or retirement is not a ground to dismiss the case
filed against her at the time that she was still in the public service. 16 Thus, in
lieu of the penalty of dismissal for her unethical conduct and gross
inefficiency in performing her duties as a member of the bench, We,
however, impose instead the accessory penalty of forfeiture of all her
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits. Furthermore, she is barred
from re-employment in any branch or service of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.
13
532 Phil. 51, 63-64 (2006).
14
360 Phi. 385 (1998).
15
Dr. Hipe v. Judge Literato, 686 Phil. 723, 735 (2012).
-~
16
See OCA v. Grageda, 706 Phil. 15, 21 (2013).
\9'.'z'°~
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Marybelle L. Demot-

Marifias, former Presiding Judge of Branch 8, Regional Trial Court, La
Trinidad, Benguet is found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct and Gross
Inefficiency. Her retirement benefits, if any, are declared FORFEITED as
penalty for her offem::es, except accrued leave credits, in lieu of dismissal
from service which the Court can no longer impose. She is likewise barred
from re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY.
.,,Y
t>'\Y\
Decision 26 A.M. No. 14-10-3J9-RTC: and
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446
SO ORDERED.

Chief Justice
~17- ~'
ANTONIO T.";A~
Associate Justice
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Associate Justice
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"
M NO C. DEL CASTILO
Associate Justice
JOSE CAT~NDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Asso~t: i:ftice Associate Justice
_L[L~
ESTELA M.JPERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CERTIFU::D XEROX COPY:
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1" FELl~A aQANAMA
SUPREME COURT
STATE PROSECUTORS II JOSEF A.M . N o. RT J - 10- 2 2 16
ALBERT T. COMILANG and MA. (Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 08-
VICTORIA SUEGA-LAGMAN, 2788-RTJ)
Complainants,
Present:
CARPIO,
- ver s us VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
JU DG E M ED E L AR N AL DO B . BERSAMIN,
BE L EN , R EG I O N AL T RI AL DEL CASTILLO,
CO U RT , B R AN C H 36 , ABAD,
C AL AM B A C IT Y , VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
Respondent. MENDOZA,*
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
Jun e 2 6, 2 0 12
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by State Prosecutors Josef Albert T. Comilang (State
Prosecutor Comilang) and Ma. Victoria Suega-Lagman (State Prosecutor Lagman) against respondent
Judge Arnaldo Medel B. Belen (Judge Belen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Branch
36, for manifest partiality and bias, evident bad faith, inexcusable abuse of authority, and gross ignorance
of the law.
The Facts
State Prosecutor Comilang, by virtue of Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) Order No.
05-07 dated February 7, 2005, was designated to assist the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba City
in the prosecution of cases. On February 16, 2005, he appeared before Judge Belen of the RTC of Calamba
City, Branch 36, manifesting his inability to appear on Thursdays because of his inquest duties in the
Provincial Prosecutors Office of Laguna. Thus, on February 21, 2005, he moved that all cases scheduled
for hearing on February 24, 2005 before Judge Belen be deferred because he was set to appear for
preliminary investigation in the Provincial Prosecutor's Office on the same day.
Instead of granting the motion, Judge Belen issued his February 24, 2005 Order in Criminal Case
No. 12654-2003-C entitled People of the Philippines v. Jenelyn Estacio (Estacio Case) requiring him to (1)
explain why he did not inform the court of his previously-scheduled preliminary investigation and (2) pay a
fine of P500.00 for the cancellation of all the scheduled hearings.
In response, State Prosecutor Comilang filed his Explanation with Motion for
Reconsideration, followed by a Reiterative Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Early
Resolution. On May 30, 2005, Judge Belen directed him to explain why he should not be cited for contempt
for the unsubstantiated, callous and reckless charges extant in his Reiterative Supplemental Motion, and
to pay the postponement fee in the amount of P1,200.00 for the 12 postponed cases during the February
17, 2005 hearing.
In his comment/explanation, State Prosecutor Comilang explained that the contents of

his Reiterative Supplemental Motion were based on his personal belief made in good faith and with grain
of truth. Nonetheless, Judge Belen rendered a Decision dated December 12, 2005 finding State Prosecutor
Comilang liable for contempt of court and for payment of P20,000.00 as penalty. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied on February 16, 2006, he filed a motion to post a supersedeas bond
to stay the execution of the said Decision, which Judge Belen granted and fixed in the amount
of P20,000.00.
On April 12, 2006, State Prosecutor Comilang filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94069 assailing Judge Belens May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005
Decision in the Estacio Case. On April 24, 2006, the CA issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO)[1] enjoining Judge Belen from executing and enforcing his assailed Order and Decision for a period
of 60 days, which was subsequently extended with the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. [2]
Notwithstanding the TRO, Judge Belen issued an Order [3] on September 6, 2007 requiring State
Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to appear on September 26,
2007 to explain why he should not be cited indirect contempt of court. In his Compliance,[4] State Prosecutor
Comilang cited the CAs injunctive writ putting on hold all actions of the RTC relative to its May 30, 2005
Order and December 12, 2005 Decision during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94069. He also
manifested[5] that he was waiving his appearance on the scheduled hearing for the indirect contempt charge
against him.
Nevertheless, Judge Belen issued an Order[6] dated September 26, 2007 directing State Prosecutor
Comilang to explain his defiance of the subpoena and why he should not be cited for indirect contempt.
Judge Belen likewise ordered the Branch Clerk of Court to issue a subpoena for him to appear in the
October 1, 2007 hearing regarding his failure to comply with previously-issued subpoenas on September
18, 2007, and on October 8, 2007 for the hearing on the non-filing of his supersedeas bond. State
Prosecutor Comilang moved[7] to quash the subpoenas for having been issued without jurisdiction and in
defiance to the lawful order of the CA, and for the inhibition of Judge Belen.
In an Order[8] dated October 1, 2007, Judge Belen denied the motion to quash subpoenas, held
State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt of court for his failure to obey a duly
served subpoena, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 and to suffer two days' imprisonment. He
was also required to post a supersedeas bond amounting to P30,000.00 to stay the execution of the
December 12, 2005 Decision.[9]
Aggrieved, State Prosecutor Comilang filed a complaint-affidavit[10] on October 18, 2007 before the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Belen with manifest partiality and malice, evident bad
faith, inexcusable abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law in issuing the show cause
orders, subpoenas and contempt citations, in grave defiance to the injunctive writ issued by the CA. State
Prosecutor Comilang alleged that Judge Belen's acts were intended to harass, oppress, persecute,
intimidate, annoy, vex and coerce him, and to place him in a disadvantageous and compromising position,
as he was prosecuting the libel case instituted by herein complainant State Prosecutor Lagman against
Judge Belen when he was still a practicing lawyer, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15332-SP and pending
before Branch 32 of the RTC of San Pablo City. This libel case eventually became the basis for
Administrative Case No. 6687 for disbarment against Judge Belen.
To further show Judge Belens flagrant violation of his oath of office, State Prosecutors Comilang and
Lagman jointly filed a letter-complaint[11] dated September 28, 2007 addressed to the Office of the Chief
Justice, which the OCA treated as a supplemental complaint. They averred that State Prosecutor Jorge
Baculi, who found probable cause to indict Judge Belen with libel in Criminal Case No. 15332-SP, was also
harassed and oppressed by Judge Belen with his baseless and malicious citation for contempt and with the
use of foul, unethical and insulting statements.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
The OCA directed Judge Belen to comment on State Prosecutors Comilang and Lagman's charges against
him.
In his Joint Comment[12] dated March 7, 2008, Judge Belen claimed that the allegations against him
are factually misplaced and jurisprudentially unmeritorious, as his assailed orders were issued in
accordance with the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence. He explained that the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the CA only enjoined him from enforcing, executing and implementing the May 30,
2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision, but it never prohibited him from asking State Prosecutor
Comilang to explain his failure to comply with the order requiring the posting of supersedeas bond to defer
the implementation of the mentioned judgment, in accordance with Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. He thus prayed for the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint, claiming to have discharged
his judicial functions not in a gross, deliberate and malicious manner.
In its Report[13] dated November 27, 2009, the OCA found Judge Belen to have violated Section 4,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court by failing to separately docket or consolidate with the principal case
(the Estacio Case) the indirect contempt charge against State Prosecutor Comilang. It also found Judge
Belen to have blatantly violated the injunctive writ of the CA when he issued the orders requiring State
Prosecutor Comilang to explain why he failed to post a supersedeas bond which, given the antecedents of
his administrative cases, showed manifest bias and partiality tantamount to bad faith and grave abuse of
authority.
Judge Belen was likewise found to have violated the following provisions of the Code of Judicial
Conduct:
Canon 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE

APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES
Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Canon 3 A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY,

AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE
RESPONSIBILITIES
Rule 3.01 A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence.
Thus, the OCA recommended, inter alia, that Judge Belen be adjudged guilty of manifest bias and
partiality, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law and accordingly, be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment
in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned and
controlled corporations and government financial institutions.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether Judge Belen's actuations showed manifest partiality
and bias, evident bad faith, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law warranting his dismissal
from service as RTC Judge of Branch 36, Calamba City.
After a careful evaluation of the records of the instant case, the Court concurs with the findings and
recommendations of the OCA, but only in part.
Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by
an orderor any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or
are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall
allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge
and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis supplied)
Indirect contempt proceedings, therefore, may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the
court through an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt; or (2) by a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for
initiatory pleadings.[14] In the second instance, the verified petition for contempt shall be docketed, heard
and decided separately unless the court in its discretion orders the contempt charge, which arose out of or
related to the principal action, to be consolidated with the main action for joint hearing and decision.
In this case, the contempt charge was commenced not through a verified petition, but by Judge Belen motu
proprio through the issuance of an order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to show cause why he should
not be cited for indirect contempt. As such, the requirements of the rules that the verified petition for
contempt be docketed, heard and decided separately or consolidated with the principal action find no
application. Consequently, Judge Belen was justified in not directing the contempt charge against State
Prosecutor Comilang to be docketed separately or consolidated with the principal action, i.e., the Estacio
Case.
However, Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA enjoining the
implementation of his May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94069.
A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the latters
outcome. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the court hears fully the merits of the case. Its
primary purpose is not to correct a wrong already consummated, or to redress an injury already sustained,
or to punish wrongful acts already committed, but to preserve and protect the rights of the litigants during
the pendency of the case.[15] The status quo should be that existing ante litem motam or at the time of the
filing of the case.[16]
The CA's Resolution[17] dated July 12, 2006 states in part:
In order not to render the issues in this case moot and academic, We had in our Resolution
of April 24, 2006 granted a Temporary Restraining Order for 60 days from notice directing
the respondent Judge to refrain from executing his order of May 30, 2005 and decision of
December 12, 2005 declaring petitioner in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a
postponement fee of P1,200 and penalty of P20,000. Considering that the TRO is about to
expire, for the same reasons provided under Section 3(b) and (c) Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue, to be effective during the pendency of this
case, ordering the respondent Judge to refrain from enforcing his disputed issuances of
May 30, 2005 and December 12, 2005. The petitioner is exempted from posting the bond,
since no private interests are affected in this case.
As aptly pointed out by the OCA, the CA's disquisition is clear and categorical. In complete disobedience
to the said Resolution, however, Judge Belen proceeded to issue (1) the September 6, 2007
Order[18] requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to
require his presence in court on September 26, 2007, as well as to explain why he should not be cited for
indirect contempt; (2) the September 26, 2007 Order [19] seeking State Prosecutor Comilang's explanation
for his defiance of the subpoena requiring his presence at the hearing of even date, and directing, once
again, his attendance at the next hearing on October 1, 2007 and to explain once more why he should not
be cited for indirect contempt; and (3) the October 1, 2007 Order [20] finding State Prosecutor Comilang guilty
of indirect contempt and sentencing him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 and to suffer two days' imprisonment.
Hence, in requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his non-filing of a supersedeas bond, in
issuing subpoenas to compel his attendance before court hearings relative to the contempt proceedings,
and finally, in finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his non-compliance with the issued subpoenas,
Judge Belen effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of preliminary injunction aimed to preserve.
In the case of Pesayco v. Layague,[21] the Court succinctly explained:
No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the
laws and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good
judge. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with
procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes
the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the
law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the
duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of
incompetence. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judges hands.
Thus, this Court has consistently held that a judge is presumed to know the law and when
the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Verily,
failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes gross
ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge. [22]
This is because judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial competence
requires no
less.[23] Moreover, refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court constitutes contempt, [24] as in this
case, where Judge Belen, in contumaciously defying the injunctive order issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP
No. 94069, was found guilty of indirect contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 101081.[25]
Judge Belen's actuations, therefore, cannot be considered as mere errors of judgment that can be easily
brushed aside. Obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure amounts to
inexcusable abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, citing State Prosecutor Comilang
for indirect contempt notwithstanding the effectivity of the CA-issued writ of injunction demonstrated his
vexatious attitude and bad faith towards the former, for which he must be held accountable and subjected
to disciplinary action.
Accordingly, in imposing the proper penalty, the Court takes note of Judge Belens previous
administrative cases where he was penalized in the following manner:
Docket No. Case Title Charge Penalty
A.M. No. RTJ- Mane v. Judge Conduct Unbecoming Reprimand, with warning that a
08-2119 Belen[26] of a Judge repetition of the same or similar
acts shall merit a more serious
penalty
A.M. No. RTJ- Baculi v. Judge Gross Ignorance of the Suspended for 6 months
09-2176 Belen[27] Law without salary and other
benefits, with stern warning that
a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall merit a more
serious penalty
A.M. No. RTJ- Correa v. Judge Conduct Unbecoming Fined for PhP10,000.00 with
10-2242 Belen[28] of a Judge stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall
merit a more serious penalty
A.M. No. RTJ- Belen v. Judge Violation of Section 4 Fined for PhP11,000 with stern
08-2139 Belen[29] of Canon 1 and warning that a repetition of the
Section 1 of Canon 4 same or similar acts shall merit
of the New Code of a more serious penalty
Judicial Conduct
Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who
discharge their duties in accordance with law.[30] Hence, with the foregoing disquisitions and Judge Belens
previous infractions, which are all of serious nature and for which he had been severely warned, the Court
therefore adopts the recommendation of the OCA to mete the ultimate penalty of dismissal against Judge
Belen for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. The Court can no longer afford to be
lenient in this case, lest it give the public the impression that incompetence and repeated offenders are
tolerated in the judiciary.[31]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, having been found guilty of grave
abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, is DISMISSEDfrom the service, with forfeiture of all
benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned and controlled corporations
and government financial institutions. He shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing any official
act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the records of Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen with the
Court.
SO ORDERED.
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l\epublic-of tbe ~bilippines MAR 2 9 2016
~upreme <!Court
;ffmanila
THIRD DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF: A.M. No. RTJ-16-2452

ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT
FOR DISHONESTY, Present:
GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND
PERJURY COMMITTED BY VELASCO, JR., J.,
JUDGE JAIME E. CONTRERAS Chairperson,
(IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE THEN PERALTA,
4TH PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR PEREZ,
OF LIBMANAN, CAMARINES REYES, and
SUR) JARDELEZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 9, 2016
~~
x----------------------------------------------------------~--~=~-----------------------x
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an administrative case for gross dishonesty against Judge

Jaime E. Contreras (Judge Contreras) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Naga City, Branch 25. ·
·Facts of the Case
On November 12, 2014, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)

received an anonymous complaint 1 dated October 16, 2014 charging Judge
Contreras with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Perjury, relative to an
administrative case 2 filed against him before the Office of the Ombudsman
Rollo, pp. 7-10.

Id. at 5-6.
A
(OMB) docketed as OMB-ADM-1-94-1040, entitled Carlita I. Nudo v.

Jaime Contreras.
The complaint alleged that when Judge Contreras applied for a

position in the judiciary, he failed to disclose in his Personal Data Sheet
(PDS) that a previous administrative case was filed against him while he was
the 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Libmanan, Camarines Sur wherein
he was found guilty by the OMB for simple misconduct and was meted out a
penalty of admonition. 3
On November 21, 2014, the OCA issued its 1st Indorsement4 directing
Judge Contreras to file his Comment thereon within ten (10) days from
receipt of the Indorsement.
In his Comment5 dated January 15, 2015, Judge Contreras surmised

that the anonymous complaint was filed by a certain Jose Amel Rubio, a
former Sheriff of the RTC of Naga City, whom he dismissed from service
before by reason of his shady and anomalous transactions in the
implementation of writs of execution and improper conduct.
Moreover, Judge Contreras averred that he cannot categorically deny

or affirm the charge against him due to complainant's failure to attach the
questioned PDS. Nonetheless, he maintained that during the Judicial and
Bar Council's (JBC) interviews, he had been disclosing information relating
to the cases filed against him with the OMB.
Also, Judge Contreras claimed that in administrative cases,

admonition is not a penalty but merely an advice.
Recommendation of OCA
After evaluation, the OCA recommended the re-docketing of the

matter as a regular administrative case and that Judge Contreras be found
guilty of dishonesty and be dismissed from service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with prejudice to
reemployment in any government office, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. 6
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at I.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 95-103.
4
Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA finding Judge
Contreras guilty of dishonesty in filling out his PDS, but modifies the
recommended penalty of dismissal to suspension of one ( 1) year given the
attendant circumstances.
"Civil service rules mandate the accomplishment of the PDS as a

requirement for employment in the government." 7 "It is the repository of all
information about any government employee and official regarding his
personal background, qualification, and eligibility." 8 "Considering that
truthful completion of [PDS] is a requirement for employment in the
Judiciary, the importance of answering the same with candor need not be
gainsaid. " 9
As per the Certification 10 issued by the OMB dated February 12, 2015
and signed by a certain Natividad T. Abenir, Chief Administrative Officer of
the Central Records Division, Judge Contreras had four (4) resolved cases
filed with the OMB, namely:
(i) OMB-1-94-2624 [Case dismissed];

(ii) OMB-ADM-1-94-1040 [Sanctioned];
(iii) OMB-1-97-1152 [Case dismissed]; and
(iv) OMB-ADM-1-97-0369 [Case dismissed].
Among the four cases, Judge Contreras, while he was then a

Provincial Prosecutor, was admonished for simple misconduct in
OMB-ADM-1-94-1040 for exerting undue influence in causing the arrest of
a certain Carlito Nudo despite proof that the latter has posted a bail bond
duly approved by the court.
Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution provides the power of the

Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any
public officials, it states:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people,
shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
7
Villordon v. Avila, 692 Phil. 388, 396 (2012).
Advincu/a v. Dicen, 497 Phil. 979, 990 (2005).
9
Acting Judge Bel/osil/o v. Rivera, 395 Phil. 180, 191 (2000).
i
10
Rollo, p. 61.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. CA (161h Division), 11 this Court held

that the Ombudsman's authority as defined under the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770 is broad enough to include the direct imposition of
the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine or censure on an erring
public official or employee. This Court further held that:
All these provisions in Republic Act No. 6770 taken together

reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the [OMB] fitll
administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire
gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter
alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in
accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the
production of documents, place under preventive suspension public
officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the
appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as
warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty. 12
Undoubtedly, the finding of the OMB against Judge Contreras for

simple misconduct in OMB-ADM-1-94-1040 is considered an
administrative offense, which he should have declared in his PDS when he
was asked: "Have you ever been convicted of any administrative offense?"
Moreover, as correctly observed by OCA, the following were likewise

found in Judge Contreras' PDS forms:
2. In the PDS dated 16 April 2007 submitted before the JBC,

respondent Judge Contreras answered "NO" to the question "Have
you ever been charged with, found guilty of, or otherwise
imposed a sanction for, violation of any law, decree, ordinance,
administrative issuance or regulation by any court, tribunal, or
any other government office, agency or instrumentality in the
Philippines or in anyforeign country?"; xx x
3. In the PDS dated 24 January 2010, also filed with the JBC in
connection with respondent Judge Contreras' application for the
post of Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan, he answered "YES" to the question "Have you
ever been charged with violation of any law, decree, ordinance,
administrative issuance, or regulation by any court, prosecution
office, tribunal, or any other government office, agency or
instrumentality in the Philippines or in any foreign country?". In
relation to his affirmative answer, respondent Judge Contreras
mentioned two (2) cases filed before the [OMB] in 1997, viz:
11
524 Phil. 405 (2006).
A
12
Id. at 429-430.
Case Title/Docket Type of Complaint Disposition

Nudo vs. Contreras Violation ofR.A. 3019 Dismissed
4. In a more recent PDS dated 28 September 2013, which was also

submitted before the JBC, respondent Judge Contreras answered
"YES" to the question "Have you ever been charged with violation
of any law, decree, ordinance, administrative issuance, or
regulation by any court, prosecution office, tribunal, or any other
government office, agency, or instrumentality in the Philippines or
in any foreign country?". In relation to his affirmative answer,
respondent Judge Contreras again mentioned the two (2) cases
which were filed before the [OMB] in 1997, viz:
Case Title/Docket Type of Complaint Disposition

xx x x 13 (Citations omitted)
A careful perusal of the wording of the question "Have you ever been
charged?" would show that it solicits an answer that pertains to either past or
present charge, whether it was already dismissed or not. Judge Contreras
should have known fully well the consequences of making a false statement
in his PDS. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty
to ensure that all the laws and rules of the land are followed to the letter. His
being a judge makes the act all the more unacceptable. Clearly, there was an
obvious lack of integrity, the most fundamental qualification of a member of
. d"1ciary.
the JU . 14
Time and time again, this Court has stressed that "the behavior of all
employees and officials involved in the administration of justice, from
judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy
15
responsibility." "As visible representation of the law, respondent judge
should have conducted himself in a manner which would merit the respect of
the people to him in particular and to the Judiciary in general." 16
Dishonesty is considered a grave offense. It carries the maximum

penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service.
13
Rollo, pp. 98-99.
14
Samson v. Judge Caballero, 612 Phil. 737, 746 (2009).
15
A
Judge Santos, Jr. v. Mangahas, 685 Phil. 814, 821 (2012).
16
Atty. Fernandez v. Judge Vasquez, 669 Phil. 619, 633 (2011 ).
In OCA v. Judge Aguilar, 17 however, this Court refrained from

imposing the maximum penalty based on several factors attendant to the
case. The Court held:
Nonetheless, Rule IV, Section 53 of the Civil Service Rules also

provides that in the determination of the penalties to be imposed,
extenuating, mitigating, aggravating or alternative circumstances attendant
to the commission of the offense shall be considered. Among the
circumstances that may be allowed to modify the penalty are ( 1) length of
service in the government, (2) good faith, and (3) other analogous
circumstances.
In several jurisprudential precedents, the Court has refrained from

imposing the actual administrative penalties prescribed by law or
regulation in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the
respondent's length of service, the respondent's acknowledgement of his
or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances,
humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent's advanced age,
among other things, have had varying significance in the determination by
the Court of the imposable penalty. x x x. 18
In the present case, taking into account Judge Contreras' more than 30
years of government service, and that this is his first offense as a member of
the bench, this Court finds the imposition of suspension of one ( 1) year
without pay to be proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, Judge Jaime E. Contreras is hereby found GUILTY

of DISHONESTY and is SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) year
without pay, to take effect upon the finality hereof, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
17
666 Phil. 11 (2011).
18
Id. at 22-23.
WE CONCUR:
I 1.~J~.
DI~D~~M.PERALTA J
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
··, ~--:::;~iE COPY
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~~R 2 9 2016
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MARIE ROXANNE G. A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508

HON. HENRY J. TROCINO, Promulgated:

The controversy stemmed from a petition 2 for Child Custody with

On December 23, 2005, the RTC issued, ex parte, a Temporary

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be

shall be served, together with copy of the petition and

TEMPORARY CUSTODY OVER JULIAN

A protection order, which shall be effective

1. prohibiting the respondent from threatening to

2. prohibiting the respondent from harassing,

3. removing and excluding the offended party from

4. requiring the respondent to stay away from the

5. requiring the respondent to stay away from the

6. prohibiting the respondent from carrying or

7. directing the respondent to put up a bond of ONE

Lastly, pursuant to Section 16 of A.M. No. 03-

Accordingly, the Bureau of Immigration and

For the guidance of said government entities,

Furnish copies of this order the Department of

Likewise furnish copies hereof the petitioner

In vehement protest, complainant filed this administrative complaint

9. Respondent judge is biased, ignorant of the law,

10. Respondent judge deliberately did not apply the

11. Respondent Judge inappropriately issued the

12. Respondent's obvious bias is further shown by

13. Likewise, it is gross ignorance of the law on the

14. Under Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the

15. There is no legal basis to award custody of

16. The averments in the Petition for Child

finds cause to order otherwise. Only the most

17. Likewise, Respondent Judge committed grave,

18. Magdaleno M. Pefia has no standing to

19. The respondent judge could not have

20. Likewise clearly alleged in the petition is that

21. Respondent Judge is fully aware of this defect

not within his territorial jurisdiction. His awareness of

22. Respondent judge blindly issued the so called

23. Apparently, respondent has no jurisdiction to

24. Respondent blindly assumed jurisdiction

In his Comment, 8 Judge Trocino denied the allegations and pointed

10-11-SC in relation to Section 32 11 thereof as an ancillary remedy incident

On the issue of jurisdiction, Judge Trocino asserted that the petition

As to the allegation that he worked under the dictates of Pena, Judge

Meanwhile, on January 27, 2006, Judge Trocino voluntarily inhibited

Complainant likewise questioned the December 23, 2005 TPO before

Report and Recommendation of the OCA

undue delay in rendering a decision in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1936 15 and A.M.

The Ruling of the Court

A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC is instructive. Specifically, Section 13 thereof

Section 13. Provisional order awarding

(a) Both parents jointly;

(b) Either parent, taking into account all relevant

(c) The grandparent, or if there are several

(d) The eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years

Clearly, a court is not authorized to issue a provisional order awarding

Temporary Protection Order

Judge Trocino's contention that the TPO was a temporary protection

Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides:

SEC. 15. Ex parte issuance of temporary

Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262 further provides:

SEC. 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order.

(a) names and addresses of

(b) description of relationships