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LEGAL ETHICS

J. Lucas P. Bersamin Cases


LEGAL ETHICS>Notarial Law

IMELDA BIDES-ULASO, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, Respondent
A.C. No. 7297 , September 29, 2009
(First Division)

FACTS: Bides averred that Ulaso had taken her owners certificate of title during her absence from her
residence and that Ulaso had then caused the transfer of the property to herself through the fraudulent
execution of the deed of sale.

The amended complaint of Bides contained a so-called amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping, on which was a signature preceded by the word for above the printed name IRENE BIDES.
The signature bore a positive resemblance to the respondent’s signature as the notary on the jurat of
the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping. Seeing the defective execution of
the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping, Ulaso and her co-defendants filed a motion
to dismiss.

ISSUE: Whether or not the notarization of the jurat of the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping attached to the initiatory pleading even before the plaintiff-client has affixed her own signature
amounts to censurable conduct on the part of the notary-counsel.

HELD: YES.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found respondent Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana, the notary-
counsel, guilty of gross negligence and of a violation of the Notarial Law; and recommended her
suspension from the practice of law for six months. She now pleads her cause before us.

The jurat is that end part of the affidavit in which the notary certifies that the instrument is sworn to before
her. As such, the notarial certification is essential. Considering that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act, the faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath
in the jurat are sacrosanct.

Specifically, the notarial certification contained in the jurat of the amended verification and affidavit of non-
forum shopping SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, on this 18th day of June 2003, affiant
IRENE BIDES, showing to me her CTC Nos. 11833475 issued on November 21, 2002, in
Manila indicated both the necessity for the physical presence of Bides as the affiant and the fact that the
signing was done in the presence of the respondent as the notary. The physical presence of Bides was
required in order to have her as the affiant swear before the respondent that she was that person and in
order to enable the respondent as the notary to ascertain whether Bides had voluntarily and freely
executed the affidavit. Thus, the respondent, by signing as notary even before Bides herself could appear
before her, failed to give due observance and respect to the solemnity.

Being a lawyer commissioned as a notary, the respondent was mandated to discharge with fidelity the
sacred duties appertaining to her notarial office. Such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest, she could not disregard the requirements and solemnities of the Notarial
Law.

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LEGAL ETHICS>Attorney-client relationship

NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,


vs.
DANIEL CASTILLO, respondent.
G.R. No. 154124 August 4, 2010
Third Division

Facts: Petitioner National Tobacco Administration (NTA) seeks the review of the decision dated March
22, 2002 (denying NTA's petition for review), and the resolution dated June 26, 2002 (denying NTA's
motion for reconsideration), both promulgated by the Court of Appeals; where the parties are National
Tobacco Administration v. Daniel Castillo. Castillo was dismissed because of the reorganization of the
NTA. On Appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because of CSC’s favorable decision to Castillo
to be reinstated, the appeal was denied. NTA then filed a motion or reconsideration and a supplemental
motion of reconsideration and it was again denied. The last remedy tried by the NTA to the CSC is a
petition for relief, it was denied again. In the petition for relief, CSC stated that the correct remedy was to
file an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). When NTA filed a petition for review to the CA, it was filed
beyond the reglementary period to appeal. Upon elevation to the Supreme Court, NTA raised the defense
of excusable negligence in order to allow the filing of the certiorari, because NTA’s counsel is loaded with
work and has herculean tasks.

Issue: Whether or not the National Tobacco Administration is bound by the untimely filing of a pleading
by their counsel.

Held: Yes.

The client is generally bound by the mistakes of his lawyer; otherwise, there would never be an end to a
litigation as long as a new counsel could be employed, and who could then allege and show that the
preceding counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. The legal profession
demands of a lawyer that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family; such
lawyer should adopt the norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. Moreover, a lawyer owes it
to himself and to his clients to adopt an efficient and orderly system of keeping track of the developments
in his cases, and should be knowledgeable of the remedies appropriate to his cases.

LEGAL ETHICS> Judicial Conduct> Gross Ignorance of the Law

LOURDWES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARNADEZ, Complainants,


vs.
JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila, Respondents
A.M. No MTJ-05-1580, October 6, 2010

FACTS: A case for forcible entry was decided by Respondent Judge. Plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for
execution, however respondent judge denied the motion by reason of an appeal seasonably. That by
virtue of such appeal the court loses jurisdiction pursuant to Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Herein Complainants contended that Respondent Judge exhibited his ignorance of the law in relying on
Section 9, Rule 41; that the applicable rule should be Section 19, Rule 70 that appeal in forcible entry and
detainer cases was not perfected by mere filing of a notice of appeal but by filing a notice of appeal and a
sufficient supersedeas bond approved by the trial judge. Court administrator recommends that
Respondent Judge be fined.

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ISSUE: Whether Judge Romeo A. Rabaca’s error is an error amounting to incompetence that calls for
administrative discipline.

HELD: NO.

Even if Respondent Judge’s omission would have easily amounted to gross ignorance of the law and
procedure, a serious offense under Section 8, Rule 140, the fact that the complainants did not establish
bad faith impelled his omission to act, or that fraud, dishonesty, or a corrupt motive attended his omission
to act demands downgrading of the liability. In Domingo vs Judge Pagayatan, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1751, 10
June 2003, the penalty of fine in the amount of five thousand pesos was deemed sufficient where it was
held that respondent’s lack of malice or bad faith frees him from administrative liability but not for gross
ignorance of law

LEGAL ETHICS> Attorney’s Fees

JESSIE R. DE LEON, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO G. CASTELO, Respondent.
A.C No. 8820, January 12, 2011

FACTS: Atty. Castelo represented spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in a civil case. As counsel he filed
various pleadings for them despite said spouses being already deceased at the time of filing. De Leon
avers that Atty. Caselo violated His Lawyers Oath and The Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Castelo claims that he prepared the initial pleadings based on his honest belief that spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chiu were then still living. Had he known that they were already deceased, he would have
moved to substitute Leonardo and William Lim, children of the spouses, as defendants.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Castelo violated the letter and spirit of the Lawyers Oath and Code of Professional
Responsibility in making said pleadings

HELD: NO.

Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not only the presumption of regularity in their
discharge of their duties, but also the immunity from liability to others for as long as the performance of
their obligations to their clients does not depart from their character as servants of the Law and as officers
of the Court.
Atty. Castelo directly stated in the answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and
crossclaim, and in the clarification and submission, that the Spouses Lim hio and Dolores Chu were
already deceased. And having made clear at the start that the spouses we no longer actual owners due
to transfer of ownership even to the institution of the action, and that the actual owners needed to be
substituted in lieu of said spouse, whether said spouses were still living or deceased as of the filing of the
pleadings became immaterial.

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LEGAL ETHICS>Judicial Ethics>Gross Ignorance of the Law

ANGELINA PAHILA-GARRIDO,Petitioner,
vs.-
ELIZA M. TORTOGO et. al, Respondents
G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011
FIRST DIVISION

FACTS: On June 23, 1997, Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in Bacolod City an action for
ejectment with prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict several defendants, including the
respondents herein, from his properties. He amended the complaint to implead the spouses of some of
the defendants. However, he died during the pendency of the action, and his surviving spouse was
substituted for him. The MTCC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. The respondents herein
appealed the dismissal to the Court via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 143458), but the Court rejected
their recourse and issued an entry of judgment on October 20, 2000. On April 5, 2000, the MTCC issued
the writ of execution upon the petitioners motion. On October 1, 2001, the respondents, led by
respondent Elisa M. Tortogo, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order) in the RTC docketed as SCA Case No. 01-11522.

On October 11, 2001, Judge Gorgonio J. Ybaez, to whose branch SCA Case No. 01-11522 was raffled,
granted the respondents prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO). On October 25, 2002, the
petitioner sought a clarificatory order, moving that the TRO be vacated due to its being effective for only
twenty days and because such effectivity could neither be extended nor be made indefinite. On
November 12, 2002, the RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The petitioner
via her pleading denominated as a petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner has come directly to the
Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 48, in Bacolod City for the nullification of the order
dated November 12, 2002 (granting the respondents application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction [enjoining the execution of the final and executory decision rendered in an ejectment suit by the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities [MTCC], Branch 6, in Bacolod City]) issued in SCA Case No. 01-
11522[3] for being in violation of law and jurisprudence. The petitioner also prays that the Court should
enjoin the RTC from taking further proceedings in SCA Case No. 01-11522, except to dismiss it.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to
enjoin the execution of the already final and executory March 17, 1999 decision of the MTCC.

HELD: NO.

At this juncture, we find and declare that the RTC Judges issuance of the assailed order dated November
12, 2002 granting the respondents application for the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction constituted manifestly grave abuse of discretion. We further note that the RTC Judge expressly
made the TRO effective until further orders from him. He thereby contravened explicit rules of procedure.
He knowingly did so, considering that he thereby disregarded the nature and purpose of the TRO as a
temporary and limited remedy, instead of a permanent and unrestricted relief. He disregarded Section 5,
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which expressly stated that the life span of a TRO was only 20 days from
service of the TRO on the party or person sought to be enjoined. Considering that the limited life span of
a TRO was a long-standing and basic rule of procedure, he consciously arrogated unto himself a power
that he did not have. Ignoring a rule as elementary as the 20-day life span of a TRO amounted to gross
ignorance of law and procedure. His violation is seemingly made worse by the fact that he thereby
usurped the authority of the Court as the only court with the power to issue a TRO effective until further
orders.

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LEGAL ETHICS>Attorney’s fees

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner


vs
HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY, namely: CEBU, BATOWA-AN, SAYANA, NASSER, MANTA,
EDGAR, PUTRI , MONGKOY*, and AMIR, all surnamed MACABANGKIT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011
(First Division)

FACTS: The respondents as the owners of land sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and
of the property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation. After the trial, RTC ruled
in favour of the plaintiffs decreeing amongst others payment to the plaintiff the sum equivalent to 15% of
the total amount awarded, as attorneys fees.

Atty. Dibaratun was the original counsel of the Heirs of Macabangkit. When the appeal was submitted for
decision in the CA, Atty. Ballelos filed his entry of appearance, and a motion for early decision. Atty.
Ballelos subsequently filed also a manifestation, supplemental manifestation, reply and ex parte motion
reiterating the motion for early decision. Shortly before the rendition of the decision, Atty. Dibaratun filed
in the CA a motion to register attorneys lien, alleging that he had not withdrawn his appearance and had
not been aware of the entry of appearance by Atty. Ballelos. A similar motion was also received by the
Court from Atty. Dibaratun a few days after the petition for review was filed. Both Atty. Dibaratun and Atty.
Ballelos posited that their entitlement to attorneys fees was contingent. Atty. Dibaratun and Atty. Ballelos
each claimed attorneys fees equivalent to 15% of the principal award

ISSUE: Whether or not the 15% attorney’s fees claimed would be excessive and unconscionable and
whether or not Atty. Dibaratum is entitled to the attorneys fees.

HELD: YES.

Giving to each of the two attorneys 15% of the principal award as attorneys fees would be excessive and
unconscionable from the point of view of the clients. Thus, the Court, who holds and exercises the power
to fix attorneys fees on a quantum meruit basis in the absence of an express written agreement between
the attorney and the client, fixes attorneys fees at 10% of the principal award.

Quantum meruit literally meaning as much as he deserves is used as basis for determining an attorneys
professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery of attorneys fees on the basis of
quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the
legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the
attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in
pursuing the clients cause, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.

Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the proper
amount of attorney fees, to wit:

Rule 20.1 A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficult of the questions involved;
c) The important of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

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f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and


j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his client, and the intervention
of the courts is sought, the determination requires that there be evidence to prove the amount of fees and
the extent and value of the services rendered, taking into account the facts determinative thereof

Atty. Dibaratun, the attorney from the outset, unquestionably carried the bulk of the legal demands of the
case. He diligently prepared and timely filed in behalf of the Heirs of Macabangkit every pleading and
paper necessary in the full resolution of the dispute, starting from the complaint until the very last motion
filed in this Court. He consistently appeared during the trial, and examined and cross-examined all the
witnesses presented at that stage of the proceedings. The nature, character, and substance of each
pleading and the motions he prepared for the Heirs of Macabangkit indicated that he devoted substantial
time and energy in researching and preparing the case for the trial. His representation of all the Heirs of
Macabangkit was not denied by any of them. In fairness and justice, the Court accords full recognition to
Atty. Dibaratun as the counsel de parte of the Heirs of Macabangkit who discharged his responsibility in
the prosecution of the clients cause to its successful end. It is he, not Atty. Ballelos, who was entitled to
the full amount of attorneys fees that the clients ought to pay to their attorney. Given the amount and
quality of his legal work, his diligence and the time he expended in ensuring the success of his
prosecution of the clients cause, he deserves the recognition, notwithstanding that some of the clients
might appear to have retained Atty. Ballelos after the rendition of a favorable judgment

LEGAL ETHICS>Contempt

DENIS B. HABAWEL and ALEXIS F. MEDINA, Petitioners,


vs
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 174759, September 7, 2011
(First Division)

FACTS: The petitioners motion for reconsideration contained the following statements, to wit: (a) it is
gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over the instant
petition; (b) the grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the
unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction; and (c) the Honorable Courts lack of
understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis. The CTA First Division, taking notice of the
language the petitioners employed in the motion for reconsideration, required them to explain within five
days from receipt why they should not be liable for indirect contempt or be made subject to disciplinary
action. The petitioners submitted a compliance in which they appeared to apologize but nonetheless
justified their language as, among others, necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the
grievousness of the error by calling a spade by spade. The CTA First Division found the petitioners’
apology wanting in sincerity and humility, observing that they chose words that were so strong, which
brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity for brazenly pointing to the Courts alleged ignorance and
grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner violated Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

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HELD: YES

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all attorneys to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. It is conceded that an attorney or any
other person may be critical of the courts and their judges provided the criticism is made in respectful
terms and through legitimate channels.

The petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as attorneys, and disregarded
their sworn duty to respect the courts. An imputation in a pleading of gross ignorance against a court or
its judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is a serious allegation, and constitutes direct
contempt of court. It is settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings
or written submissions presented to the same court or judge in whom the proceedings are pending are
treated as direct contempt because they are equivalent to misbehaviour committed in the presence of or
so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. This is true, even if the derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements are not read in open court.
Such contempt of court cannot be condoned or be simply ignored and set aside, however, for the
characterization that the statements were strong, tactless and hurtful, although obviously correct,
provides no ground to be lenient towards the petitioners, even assuming that such strong, tactless and
hurtful statements were used to explain their client’s position in the case.

LEGAL ETHICS>Retaining client’s fund

TERESITA T. BAYONLA, Complainant,


vs
ATTY. PURITA A. REYES, Respondent.
A.C. No. 4808, November 22, 2011

FACTS: Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty, deceit, conversion, and breach of trust.
Bayonla alleged that she and Alfredo had engaged the legal services of Atty. Reyes to collect their share
in the expropriation compensation from the Air Transportation Office (ATO), Cagayan De Oro
City, agreeing to her attorney’s fees of 10% of whatever amount would be collected. Bayonla alleged that
Atty. Reyes should be disbarred for depriving her of her just share despite several demands.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Reyes violated the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES

Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of her client that may come into her possession. Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 imposes on the
lawyer the duty to account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03
of Canon 16 demands that the lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand, subject to the lawyer’s lien over the funds, or the lawyers option to apply so much of the funds
as may be necessary to satisfy the lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to the
client.

The canons are appropriate considering that the relationship between a lawyer and her client is highly
fiduciary, and prescribes on a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. There is no question that

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the money or property received by a lawyer for her client properly belongs to the latter. Conformably with
these canons of professional responsibility, we have held that a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting
of all the property and money she has collected for her client. This obligation includes the prompt
reporting and accounting of the money collected by the lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his
client.

By not delivering Bayonlas share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated the aforestated canons.
The money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of Bayonla was unquestionably money held in trust to
be immediately turned over to the client. The unjustified withholding of money belonging to the client
warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the lawyer. Without doubt, Atty. Reyes failure to
immediately account for and to deliver the money upon demand was deceit, for it signified that she had
converted the money to her own use, in violation of the trust Bayonla had reposed in her. It constituted
gross misconduct for which the penalty of suspension from the practice of law became justified pursuant
to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

LEGAL ETHICS>Gross negligence

ROLANDO SOFIO and RUFIO SOFIO,Petitioners,


vs
ALBERTO I. VALENZUELA, GLORIA I. VALENZUELA, REMEDIOS I. VALENZUELA, and CESAR I.
VALENZUELA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 157810, February 15, 2012
(First Division)

FACTS: This is an appeal by petition for review on centiorari of the petitioners for the denial of CA on
February 13, 2003 of the motion to recall entry of judgment finding the negligence of the petitioner’s
former counsel being matched by their own neglect (of not inquiring about the status of the case from
their former counsel and not even taking any action against said counsel for neglecting their case). The
petitioners insist that the CAs denial of their motion to recall entry of judgment denied them fair play,
justice, and equity; that pursuant to Ramos v. Court of Appeals, a final and executory judgment may be
amended under compelling circumstances; and that a compelling circumstance applicable to them was
that their former counsel, Atty. Romulo A. Deles, had been guilty of gross negligence for not filing their
appellees brief in the CA, and for not filing a motion for reconsideration against the May 27, 1998 decision
of the CA

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Romulo A. Deles, had been guilty of gross negligence

HELD: NO

Although the petitioners former counsel was blameworthy for the track their case had taken, there is no
question that any act performed by the counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is still
regarded as an act of the client. In view of this, even the negligence of the former counsel should bind
them as his clients. To hold otherwise would result to the untenable situation in which every defeated
party, in order to salvage his cause, would simply claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel as a
ground for reversing the adverse judgment. There would then be no end to litigation, for every
shortcoming of the counsel could become the subject of challenge by his client through another counsel
who, if he should also be found wanting, would similarly be disowned by the same client through yet
another counsel, and so on ad infinitum. This chain of laying blame could render court proceedings
indefinite, tentative and subject to reopening at any time by the mere replacement of the counsel.

Nonetheless, the gross negligence of counsel alone would not even warrant a deviation from the principle
of finality of judgment, for the client must have to show that such negligence resulted in the denial of due

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process to the client. When the counsels mistake is so great and so serious that the client is prejudiced
and is denied his day in court, or when the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the client’s
deprivation of his property without due process of law, the client is not concluded by his counsel’s
mistakes and the case can be reopened in order to give the client another chance to present his case. As
such, the test herein is whether their former counsel’s negligence deprived the petitioners of due process
of law.

For one to properly claim gross negligence on the part of his counsel, he must show that the counsel was
guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the clients cause. Considering that the Court has held
that the failure to file the appellants brief can qualify as simple negligence but cannot amount to gross
negligence that justifies the annulment of the proceedings, the failure to file appellees brief may be
similarly treated.

The Court has also held that the failure to file a motion for reconsideration only amounted to simple
negligence. In Pasiona v. Court of Appeal, the Court declared that his counsel’s failure to file a motion for
reconsideration did not necessarily deny due process to a party who had the opportunity to be heard at
some point of the proceedings

LEGAL ETHICS> Attorney’s Fees

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
VERONICA ATAGE NABLE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 176692, June 27 2012

FACTS: Veronica Atega Nable was the sole owner of land consisting of three contiguous agricultural lots
which the DAR acquired pursuant to RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988). Here, the
primary dispute lies on the determination of the value of just compensation. The RTC rendered its
judgement in favor of Land Bank of Philippines and awards Attorneys Fee which is 10% of the total
amount awarded as just compensation.

ISSUE: Whether the award of Attorneys Fee is proper

HELD: NO.

An award of attorneys fees requires factual, legal, and equitable justifications. The reason for the award
must be explained and set forth by the trial court in the body of its decision. The award that is mentioned
only in the dispositive portion of the decision should be disallowed. The Supreme Court cannot make its
own finding on the matter because an award of attorneys fees demands the making of findings of fact.

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LEGAL ETHICS>negligence

DENNIS Q. MORTEL, Petitioner,


vs.
SALVADOR E. KERR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 156296, November 12, 2012
(First Division)

FACTS: Mortel, through Atty. Tumulak, filed a verified petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court.the RTC denied the verified petition for relief from judgment on the ground that the
petition for relief had been filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days based on a reckoning of the
start of the period from March 1, 2001, the date when Atty. Mas received the notice and copy of the
Order. Mortel moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his petition for relief from judgment. The RTC
granted the withdrawal of Atty. Lacambra and Atty. Mas as counsels for Mortel, and finally recognized
Atty. Tumulak as the only counsel. The RTC treated Mortel’s motion for reconsideration as a mere scrap
of paper and ordered it stricken from the records for failure of the counsel to serve a notice of hearing with
the motion for reconsideration. The CA denied Mortel’s motion for reconsideration. Instead of appealing
via petition for review on certiorari in the Supreme Court (SC), Mortel, through Atty. Tumulak, filed in the
CA on December 20, 2002 an urgent motion for extension of time to appeal to the SC. Mortel, by himself,
sought an extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari. Mortel, still by himself, filed his
petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA’s dismissal of his petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of Mortel’s previous counsels should bind him

HELD: NO.

As a rule, a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistake in handling a case. To allow
a client to disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to
reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.But the rule admits of exceptions.The negligence
and mistakes committed by his several counsels were so gross and palpable that they denied
due process to Mortel and could have cost him his valuable asset. They thereby prevented him
from presenting his side, which was potentially highly unfair and unjust to him on account of his
defense being plausible and seemingly meritorious.

LEGAL ETHICS>Conflict of interests

ROBERT VICTOR G. SEARES, JR., Complainant


vs
ATTY. SANIATA LIWLIWA V. GONZALES-ALZATE, Respondent.
Adm. Case No. 9058; November 14, 2012
(First Division)

FACTS: Atty. Saniata Liwliwa V. Gonzales-Alzate is charged with incompetence and professional
negligence, and a violation of the prohibition against representing conflicting interests by her former client.
Seares, Jr. alleges that Atty. Gonzales-Aizate was his legal counsel when he ran for the position of
Municipal Mayor of Dolores, Abra in May 2007 election. Allegedly, Atty. Alzate filed in his behalf a
"Petition of Protest Ad Cautelam" which was dismissed for being "fatally defective;" Also, she filed a
“Petition of Protest” in the RTC, but the petition was also dismissed on the ground that it was already
time-barred, and on the further ground of forum shopping because the certification against forum
shopping was false. Moreover, .Seares, Jr. asserts that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate violated Canon 15, Canon
17 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for negligently handling his election protest,

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for prosecuting him, her former client, and for uttering false and hurtful allegations against him. Atty.
Gonzales-Alzate denies the charges of professional negligence and incompetence, and of representing
conflicting interests.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not Atty. Gonzales-Alzate guilty of professional negligence and incompetence in
her handling of Seares, Jr.’s electoral protest in the RTC?

ISSUE #2: Whether or not Atty. Gonzales-Alzate violate the prohibition against representing conflicting
interests when she assisted Turqueza in his administrative case against Seares, Jr., her former client?

HELD #1: NO

For administrative liability under Canon 18 to attach, the negligent act of the attorney should be gross and
inexcusable as to lead to a result that was highly prejudicial to the client’s interest. The Court has found
the attendance of inexcusable negligence when an attorney resorts to a wrong remedy or belatedly files
an appeal or inordinately delays the filing of a complaint or fails to attend scheduled court hearings. Gross
misconduct on the part of an attorney is determined from the circumstances of the case, the nature of the
act done and the motive that induced the attorney to commit the act.

There were no traces of professional negligence or incompetence on the part of Atty. Gonzales-Alzate in
her handling of Seares, Jr.’s protest, especially because she even filed in his behalf a “Motion for
Reconsideration,” a “Comment on the Court’s Dismissal of the Protest Ad Cautelam” and a “Motion to
Withdraw Cash Deposit.” Also, Atty. Gonzales-Alzate professionally negligent in respect of the filing and
eventual dismissal of the subsequent “Petition for Protest.” The verification and certification against forum
shopping attached to the petition contained handwritten superimpositions by Atty. GonzalesAlzate, but
such superimpositions were apparently made only to reflect the corrections of the dates of subscription
and the notarial document number and docket number for the verification and certification.

HELD #2: NO

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits an attorney from representing a party in a
controversy that is either directly or indirectly related to the subject matter of a previous litigation involving
another client. Relevantly, Rule 15.01, Rule15.02 and Rule15.03 provide:
Rule 15.01—A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and
if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.

Rule 15.02—A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client.
Rule 15.03—A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

Atty. Gonzales-Alzate’s legal representation of Turqueza neither resulted in her betrayal of the fidelity and
loyalty she owed to Seares, Jr. as his former attorney, nor invited the suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double dealing while she was performing her duties as an attorney. Representing conflicting interests
would occur only where the attorney’s new engagement would require her to use against a former client
any confidential information gained from the previous professional relation. The prohibition did not cover a
situation where the subject matter of the present engagement was totally unrelated to the previous
engagement of the attorney. To constitute the violation, the attorney should be shown to intentionally use
against the former client the confidential information acquired by her during the previous employment. But
a mere allegation of professional misconduct would not suffice to establish the charge, because
accusation was not synonymous with guilt.

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LEGAL ETHICS>Attorney-client relationship

JOHNNY M. PESTO, Complainant


vs
MARCELITO M. MILLO, Respondent
Adm. Case No. 9612 : March 13, 2013
(First Division)

FACTS: Johnny Pesto, a Canadian national, charged Atty. Marcelito M. Millo with conduct unbecoming
an officer of the Court, misleading his client, bungling the transfer of title, and incompetence and
negligence in the performance of his duty as a lawyer. He averred that in May 1990, his wife Abella Pesto
(Abella) retained the services of Atty. Millo to handle the transfer of title over a parcel of land to her name,
and the adoption of her niece, Arvi Jane Dizon. Johnny and Abella gave to Atty. Millo the amounts of
P14,000.00 for the transfer of title2 and P10,000.00 for the adoption case. Atty. Millo thereafter repeatedly
gave them false information and numerous excuses to explain his inability to complete the transfer of title;
that Atty. Millo likewise made them believe that the capital gains tax for the property had been paid way
back in 1991, but they found out upon their return to the country in February 1995 that he had not yet paid
the tax. Atty. Millo insisted that he had already paid the same, but he could not produce any receipt for
the supposed payment. Also, Atty. Millo reluctantly returned to Abella the amount of P14,000.00 only after
he stormed out of Atty. Millo's office in exasperation over his stalling tactics. Lastly, Atty. Millo then further
promised in writing to assume the liability for the accrued penalties. Exasperated by Atty. Millo's neglect
and ineptitude, Johnny brought this administrative complaint in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on March 14, 1995, praying for disciplinary action to be taken against Atty. Millo, and seeking the refund
of P15,643.75 representing the penalties for the non-payment of the capital gains tax, and of the
P10,000.00 given for the adoption case. Being a resident of Canada, he constituted one Tita Lomotan as
his attorney-in-fact to represent him during his and his wife's absence from the country.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Milo is liable for violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

HELD: YES

Atty. Millo had the obligation to serve his clients with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, expressly so demanded of him. Canon 18 provides that a lawyer
shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 states further that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients. He must be ever mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him by the clients. His duty to safeguard the clients' interests commences
from his engagement as such, and lasts until his effective release by the clients. In that time, he is
expected to take every reasonable step and exercise ordinary care as his clients' interests may
require.byAtty. Millo's acceptance of the sums of money from Johnny and Abella to enable him to attend
to the transfer of title and to complete the adoption case initiated the lawyer-client relationship between
them. From that moment on, Atty. Millo assumed the duty to render competent and efficient professional
service to them as his clients. Yet, he failed to discharge his duty. He was inefficient and negligent in
going about what the professional service he had assumed required him to do. He concealed his
inefficiency and neglect by giving false information to his clients about having already paid the capital
gains tax. In reality, he did not pay the capital gains tax, rendering the clients liable for a substantial
financial liability in the form of penalties.

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LEGAL ETHICS>Conduct unbecoming of a judge

SONIA C. DECENA and REY C. DECENA, Petitioners


vs.
JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, IN PILI, CAMARINES SUR,
Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217; April 8, 2013
(First Division)

FACTS: Rey C. Decena had brought an administrative case against Judge Malanyaon’s wife, Dr. Amelita
C. Malanyaon (Dr. Amelita), then the Assistant Provincial Health Officer of the Province of Camarines
Sur; that during the hearing of the administrative case on May 4, 2006, Judge Malanyaon sat beside his
daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina C. Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the case. The complainants
averred that the actuations of Judge Malanyaon during the hearing of his wife’s administrative case in the
Civil Service Commission constituted violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippines
Judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of constituted conduct
unbecoming of a judge?

HELD: YES

A judge may not involve himself in any activity that is an aspect of the private practice of law. His
acceptance of an appointment to the Bench inhibits him from engaging in the private practice of law,
regardless of the beneficiary of the activity being a member of his immediate family. He is guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge otherwise.

Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from
engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11,28 Canon 4
(Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate
the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The
prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and
functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties,
powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time
and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their own private interests, and
assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. The term practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in court proceedings, but extends to the
preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or
persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are
secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings.

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LEGAL ETHICS>Legal Ethics>Indirect Contempt>Attorney’s duty to assist in the speedy and


efficient administration of justice

PHILWORTH ASIAS, INC. et. al, Petitioners,


vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK,Respondent.
G.R. No. 161878, June 05, 2013
(FIRST DIVISION)

FACTS: On May 31, 1991, the former Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) sued petitioners
in the RTC to recover upon an unpaid debt (Civil Case No. 911536), alleging that on September 22, 1988,
petitioner Philworth Asia, Inc. (Philworth) had borrowed P270,000.00 from PCIB to be paid on or before
November 8, 1988 in accordance with a promissory note; that petitioners Spouses Luisito and Elizabeth
Mactal (Mactals) and Spouses Luis and Eloisa Reyes (Reyeses) had executed a deed of suretyship
binding themselves to pay Philworth’s obligations under the promissory note should Philworth refuse to
perform its obligation; that Philworth had paid only partially, leaving an unpaid balance of P225,533.33,
inclusive of interest and penalty charges; that Philworth had not paid its balance despite repeated
demands; and that attempts to collect from the Mactals and Reyeses had likewise failed. On July 5, 1991,
the Reyeses filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses, specifically countering that PCIB
had no cause of action against them; that Luis Reyes had signed the promissory note as an employee of
Philworth, but had not signed the deed of suretyship in November 1988 because he had already resigned
from Philworth on October 16, 1988; that Luisito Mactal, the President and General Manager of Philworth,
should be the person liable under the deed of suretyship; that PCIB had not made demands upon all the
parties; and that PCIB did not exhaust all the available properties of Philworth before bringing the suit
also against them. JUNE2013 In their answer filed on August 20, 1991, the Mactals averred that the
defendants had substantially paid their obligation, but that PCIB had unreasonably refused to properly
account for and credit the payments; that PCIB had been charging exorbitant and unconscionable
interest, penalties and other charges; and that if the previous payments were duly credited, the unpaid
balance would only be minimal. The first pre-trial conference, which was set on May 19, 1994, was
moved several times afterwards, until the parties were notified that the conference would finally be held
on April 25, 1995. On April 3, 1995, petitioners sought the transfer of the conference of April 25, 1995 to
May 2, 1995. They later on further moved for the conference to be held on May 12, 1995. But no
conference was held on May 12, 1995. Instead, the conference was reset on two later dates, i.e., June 2,
1995 and July 21, 1995. Although petitioners again moved to reset the conference on June 1, 1995, the
RTC denied petitioners’ motion for postponement on June 2, 1995, and declared them as in default
because of their non-appearance and allowed PCIB to present evidence ex parte.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC violated their right to due process of law by deciding the case on the
merits based solely on the evidence of PCIB; that the delay could not be blamed exclusively on
petitioners; and that substance should take precedence over mere technicalities.

HELD: NO.

A party and its counsel who deliberately or neglectfully delay the prompt termination of their court case
are further guilty of abuse of court processes and of impeding the smooth administration of justice,
rendering them amenable to being cited for indirect contempt of court under Section 3, (c) and (d), Rule
71 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners and their counsel should then show cause why they should not be
adjudged guilty of contempt of court. The trial judge’s tolerance of the delays or liberality did not
exonerate them and their counsel from their impeding the smooth administration of justice.

On the part of petitioners’ counsel, he was expectedly aware of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which required him as an attorney to exert every effort and to consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. He should not ever ignore such duty, even upon the

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pretext of giving his entire devotion to the interest of his clients. He ought not to forget that as an attorney,
he was, first and foremost, an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort to comply with the
requirement under Canon 12.

LEGAL ETHICS>Trust and confidence

FERDINAND A. SAMSON, complainant,


vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA, respondent.
A.C. No. 6664 July 16, 2013
EN BANC
Facts:

Ferdinand A. Samson (Samson) has brought this complaint for disbarment charging respondent Atty.
Edgardo O. Era (Atty. Era) with violation of his trust and confidence of a client by representing the interest
of Emilia C. Sison, his present client, in a manner that blatantly conflicted with his interest. Samson is a
victim of a pyramiding scam perpetrated by the ICS corporation (ICS). ICS is a corporation controlled by
the Sison’s, among whom is Emilia C. Sison. Atty. Era was employed by Samson to represent him in
claiming after his investments in ICS. Samson and ICS reached a compromise where a parcel of land will
be assigned to Samson, for Samson to the filing of a criminal case against ICS its board of directors; the
board is composed of Sison family. As part of the compromise, Atty. Era delivered 5 deed of absolute
sale’s over the parcel of land. However, Samson found out that the land was already under the name of
Bank Wise. Thereafter, Samson was given a silent treatment of Atty. Samson. Samson hired a new
counsel. During the hearings in RTC with the new counsel, Samson found out that Atty. Era is already
representing ICS corporation and appeared in several estafa cases in their behalf; this series of
discoveries led to the filing of a disbarment complaint against Atty. Era by Samson.

Issues:

Whether or not Atty. Era may be meted with the penalty of suspension by representing conflicting
interests.

Whether or not the execution of a compromise agreement severs lawyer-client relationship.

Held:

As to the first issue, yes. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
"A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts." There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence
has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof. Moreover, the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer
to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. Nor should the lawyer
disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. 34 In this regard, Canon

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17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause
of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."

As to the second issue, no. Atty. Era's contention that the lawyer-client relationship ended when Samson
and his group entered into the compromise settlement with Sison on April 23, 2002 was unwarranted. The
lawyer-client relationship did not terminate as of then, for the fact remained that he still needed to oversee
the implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed with the criminal cases until they were
dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court. It is also relevant to indicate that the execution of a
compromise settlement in the criminal cases did not ipso facto cause the termination of the cases not
only because the approval of the compromise by the trial court was still required, but also because the
compromise would have applied only to the civil aspect, and excluded the criminal aspect pursuant to
Article 2034 of the Civil Code.

In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his group after full disclosure to them of the
conflict of interest, therefore, the most ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done was either to outrightly
decline representing and entering his appearance as counsel for Sison, or to advice Sison to engage
another lawyer for herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and should now suffer the proper sanction.

LEGAL ETHICS>Grave Misconduct>Falsification of court decision

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,


WESTERN VISAYAS, REGIONAL OFFICE (NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY,
complainant,
vs
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE,
respondent.
A.C. No. 6732 October 22, 2013
EN BANC

Facts:

A disbarment case is filed against Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. for alleged falsification of an inexistent
decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by Regional
Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido. The falsification was discovered when Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a
Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK), asked the Judge sitting in the RTC, by way of correspondence, to
provide a copy of Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. The court found out that the case does not exist, and the case
number is for a different party. Later, it was found out that the author of the falsified documents is Atty.
Pe.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Pe is guilty of grave misconduct because of his alleged falsification of a court
decision, and suffer the penalty of disbarment.

Held:

Yes. In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having
authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of
the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or

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private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." Lawyers are further
required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest
and immoral or deceitful conduct. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the
respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a
mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to
mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing
as a member of the Bar.

LEGAL ETHICS>Grossly Immoral Conduct

JOCELYN DE LEON, Complainant


vs.
ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA, Respondent
A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013
(En banc)

FACTS: Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint for disbarment
or suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone Pedreña, a Public Attorney. She averred in
her complaint affidavit that Atty. Pedreña had sexually harassed her. In his answer, Atty. Pedreña averred
that De Leon’s allegations were unsubstantiated; that entertaining such a complaint would open the gates
to those who had evil desires to destroy the names of good lawyers; that the complaint was premature
and should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping because De Leon had already charged him
with acts of lasciviousness in the Parañaque City Prosecutor’s Office; and that he had also filed a
complaint for theft against De Leon. Only De Leon appeared during the hearing. Hence, Atty. Pedreña
was deemed to have waived his right to participate in the proceedings.

Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Pedreña and the
striking off of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE: Whether the sexual harassment done by Atty. Pedrena constitute a grossly immoral conduct

HELD: NO.

The sexual harassment done by Atty. Pedrena does not constitute a grossly immoral conduct.

The records show that Atty. Pedreña rubbed the complainant’s right leg with his hand; tried to insert his
finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed
his finger against her private part. Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were not
merely offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral.

An immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to


be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the community’s sense of decency.

Verily, the determination of the penalty to impose on an erring lawyer is within the Court’s discretion. The
exercise of the discretion should neither be arbitrary nor despotic, nor motivated by any animosity or
prejudice towards the lawyer, but should instead be ever controlled by the imperative need to
scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the Bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance
with his duties to the Court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession, and to the general public.

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The Court SUSPENDS ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA from the practice of law for two years effective upon
receipt of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

LEGAL ETHICS>Judicial Ethics>Inhibition

RE: LETTERS OF LUCENA B. RALLOS, FOR ALLEGED ACTS/INCIDENTS/OCCURENCES


RELATIVE TO THE RESOLUTION(S) ISSUED IN CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 BY COUIRT OF APPEALS
EXECUTIVE JUSTICE PAMPIO ABARINTOS and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON PAUL
HERNANDO and VICTORIA ISABEL PAREDES.
IPI No. 12-203-CA-J December 10, 2013
[formerly A.M. No. 12-8-06-CA]

RE: COMPLAINT FILED BY LUCENA B. RALLOS AGAINST JUSTICE GABRIEL T. INGLES,


PAMELA ANN MAXIMO, and CARMELITA S. MANAHAN.
A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA
(En banc)

FACTS: Rallos asserted that respondent Justice Ingles, Justice Maxino and Justice Manahan had
"knowingly disobeyed" the resolutions promulgated on December 5, 2007 in G.R. No. 179662 and on
December 6, 2010 in G.R. No. 194111 by their issuance of the June 26, 2012 resolution granting Cebu
City’s application for the writ of preliminary injunction; that the issuance constituted serious misconduct
and a violation of Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 6713 and Republic Act No.
3019; that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was on the basis of the convenio, a document
that had not been formally offered in evidence by Cebu City during the hearing for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction; that even had the convenio been formally offered in evidence, it should still not
have been considered because:(1) it was only a machine copy and was even unsigned; (2) Cebu City
was not a party to the convenio; and (3) the supposed donation to Cebu City was void because it had not
been accepted in a public document by Cebu City during the lifetime of the purported donor.

She maintained that the CA was barred from entertaining Cebu City’s petition and application for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction because Cebu City had previously appealed the decisions
rendered on January 14, 2000 and July 24, 2001 as well as the consolidated order of March 21, 2002
(CA-G.R. CV No. 76656) but had lost the appeal.

As relief, Rallos prayed that the respondent Justices be held guilty of serious misconduct, and meted the
penalty of removal from office and perpetual disqualification from holding office or employment in the
Government.

ISSUE: Whether the party-litigant is entitled to be notified of the CA’s action on the motion for inhibition
and of the reasons for the action.

HELD: NO.

We do not subscribe to Rallos’ suggestion that the series of inhibitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676
constituted a scheme to favor Cebu City. She presented no proof to validate her suggestion. In fact, she
herself conceded that she was thereby only voicing out her suspicion of an irregularity. To stress, their
good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties, which are strong presumptions under our
laws, should prevail unless overcome by contrary proof. Worth noting in that regard is that there was even
no valid reason that could have prohibited the Justices charged in A.M. No. 12-9-08-CAfrom participating
in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676. It serves well to consider, too, that none of the respondent Justices charged in
IPI No. 12-203-CA-J is anymore participating in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676; and that the respondent Justices

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charged in A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA were chosen by raffle as required under pre-existing rules and
regulations to replace the Justices who had meanwhile voluntarily inhibited themselves from further
participation for valid reasons.

Judicial officers cannot be subjected to administrative disciplinary actions for their performance of duty in
good faith.

LEGAL ETHICS>Legal Ethics> Lawyer’s Oath>Good Moral Character

BENJAMIN Q. ONG, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10179 (Formerly CBD 11-2985), March 4, 2014
(EN BANC)
FACTS: In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty. William F.
Delos Santos by Sheriff Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After several calls
and personal interactions between them, Ong and Atty. Delos Santos became friends. 1 In time, according
to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to encash his postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need of
cash. To reassure Ong that the check would be funded upon maturity, Atty. Delos Santos bragged about
his lucrative practice and his good paying clients. Convinced of Atty. Delos Santos’ financial stability, Ong
handed to Atty. Delos Santos on January 29, 2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in exchange for the latter’s
Metrobank Check No. 0110268 postdated February 29, 2008. However, the check was dishonored upon
presentment for the reason that the account was closed. Ong relayed the matter of the dishonor to Atty.
Delos Santos, and demanded immediate payment, but the latter just ignored him.4 When efforts to collect
remained futile, Ong brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
against Atty. Delos Santos. Ong also brought this disbarment complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which docketed the complaint as CBD Case No. 11-2985.
ISSUE: By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
HELD: YES

Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and responsibility to maintain his good moral
character. In this regard, good moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to his admission
into the practice of law, but is a continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his membership in the
Philippine Bar. The Court unwaveringly demands of him to remain a competent, honorable, and reliable
individual in whom the public may repose confidence. Any gross misconduct that puts his moral character
in serious doubt renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.

In issuing the dishonored check, Atty. Delos Santos put into serious question not only his personal
integrity but also the integrity of the entire Integrated Bar. It cannot be denied that Ong acceded to Atty.
Delos Santos’ request for encashment of the check because of his complete reliance on the nobility of the
Legal Profession. That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer
invested him — whether he was acting as such or in a non-professional capacity — with the obligation to
exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in his relationship with others.

Atty. Delos Santos should always be mindful of his duty to uphold the law and to be circumspect in all his
dealings with the public. Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation
as a lawyer but would also erode the public’s faith in the Legal Profession as a whole. His assuring Ong
that he was in good financial standing because of his lucrative law practice when the contrary was true
manifested his intent to mislead the latter into giving a substantial amount in exchange for his worthless

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post-dated check. Such actuation did not speak well of him as a member of the Bar. Accordingly, Atty.
Delos Santos was guilty of serious misconduct, warranting appropriate administrative sanction.

Legal & Judicial Ethics>Judicial Ethics>Undue Delay


Spouses Cesar and Thelma Sustento, Complainants
vs.
Judge Frisco Lilagan, Respondent
785 SCRA 612, March 08, 2014

FACTS: Spouses Cesar and Thelma Sustento filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the
Regional Trial Court in Tacloban, Leyte, praying for the annulment of the Order issued by Jude Pocpoc-
Lamoste. Almost six (6) months had already elapsed and only after the spouses filed a motion for Early
Resolution before Judge Lilagan issued an Order dated September 08, 2009 dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari. Spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration and on December 01, 20019, Judge Lilagan issued
an Order Deeming the Motion for Reconsideration submitted for resolution. However, of the instant
administrative matter was filed, July 05, 2010, Judge Ilagan has still yet to resolve the Motion for
Reconsideration. Spouses withdrew their charges against the Judge because she wants to give herself a
softer atmosphere to focus more on the appeal of the main case from which the complaint emanates.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Lilagan is guilty of the less serious offense of undue delay in rendering an
order by not resolving the motion for reconsideration within the prescribed period.

HELD: Yes.

Decision-making is primordial among the many duties of judges. The speedy disposition of cases thus
becomes the primary aim of the judiciary, for only thereby may the ends of justice not be compromised
and the judiciary may be true to its commitment of ensuring to all persons the right to a speedy, impartial
and public aim. In respect of decisions, judges are given 90 days from the time the cases are submitted
for determination within which to render their judgments. Also, Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to promptly dispose of the court’s business and to decide cases
within the required periods. Failure to render a decision within the 90-day period from submission of a
case for decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of the judicial office, and constitutes a
derogation of the speedy administration of justice. Accordingly, any judge who delays the disposition of
any case or matter beyond the prescribed period without the Court’s express clearance is liable for gross
inefficiency and must be administratively sanctioned.

Judge Lilagan cannot be spared from the consequences of his undue delays in the case of the spouses
Sustento. He did not show that he ever requested the Court for additional time within which to dispose of
the matters therein. It then becomes inescapable for him to face the consequences of his unexplainable
inaction. He was guilty of gross inefficiency and neglect of duty. Failure to render a decision within the 90-
day period from the submission of a case for decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of the
judicial office, and constitutes a derogation of the speedy administration of justice.

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LEGAL ETHICS> Disbarment>Faulty, Highly Improper, Suspicious Anomalous and Unlawful
Practice

HEINZ R. HECK, Complainant,


vs.
CITY PROSECUTOR CASIANO A. GAMOTIN, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 5329, March 18, 2014
(First Division)

FACTS: This administrative complaint was brought against a City Prosecutor whose manner of dealing
with the complainant, a foreigner, had offended the latter. Complainant filed a criminal case against one
Oliver Cabrera in the office of respondent prosecutor. After the case against him was dismissed, Cabrera
countered criminal cases against Heck. Respondent prosecutor initially dismissed the same but later on
granted the motion for reconsideration. Complainant Heck challenged the order of the respondent. He
further averred that that the latter screamed at him and uttered the following remarks, “You foreigner, go
home here we the law of the Filipinos, I am the Authority”.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged acts of the respondent prosecutor constituted a breach of the norms
of professional conduct and legal ethics, and thus, warrants his disbarment.

HELD: No.

A lawyer like the respondent is not to be sanctioned for every perceived misconduct or wrong actuation.
He is still to be presumed innocent of wrongdoing until the proof arrayed against him establishes
otherwise. It is the burden of the complainant to properly show that the assailed conduct or actuation
constituted a breach of the norms of professional conduct and legal ethics. Otherwise, the lawyer merits
exoneration. In this case, the utterances made by respondent were only triggered by the harsh words of
complainant against the Philippines. Lawyers may be expected to maintain their composure and decorum
at all times, but they are still human, and their emotions are like those of other normal people placed in
unexpected situations that can crack their veneer of self-control. Thus, the complaint for disbarment was
dismissed.

LEGAL ETHICS>Legal Ethics>Lawyer’s Oath> Rule 10.01, 11.02, 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner,


vs.
ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 3452 June 23, 2014

(First Division)

FACTS: On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this administrative complaint
against respondent Atty. Gines N. Abellana who had represented him as the plaintiff in a civil case. In the
administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts of professional misconduct by Atty.
Abellana, to wit:
1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had filed Civil Case No.
CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their agreement, although the complaint was
actually filed on June 14, 1988;

2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis-à-vis the answer with
counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the pre-trial of the case; (b) inform the trial court

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beforehand that Samonte could not be available on a scheduled hearing, thereby incurring for the
plaintiff’s side an unexplained absence detrimental to Samonte as the plaintiff; and (c) submit an
exhibit required by the trial judge, only to eventually submit it three months later;

3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings; and

4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by Samonte for his
court appearances and his acceptance of the case.

In his comment dated April 6, 1990, Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of documents,
clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on June 14, 1988 instead of on June
10, 1988 because Samonte had not given enough money to cover the filing fees and other charges
totaling P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00, contrary to their agreement in April
1988 on paying to him P10,000.00 as the acceptance fee in addition to the filing fees. He asserted that
the charge of dereliction of duty was baseless, because he had filed the reply on December 2, 1988 after
receiving the answer with counterclaim of the defendants on August 2, 1988, anent his nonattendance at
the hearings in Civil Case No. CEB-6970, he explained that although he had informed the RTC of his
having been either stranded in another province, or having attended the arraignment of another client in
another court, the presiding judge had opted not to await his arrival in the courtroom. He blamed Samonte
for his inability to submit the formal offer of exhibits on time, pointing out that Samonte had failed to give
the duplicate originals of the documentary exhibits despite his request because of the latter’s absence
from the country. He countered that it was Samonte who had been dishonest, because Samonte had
given only the filing fees plus at least P2,000.00 in contravention of their agreement on the amount of
P10,000.00 being his acceptance fees in addition to the filing fees; that the filing fees paid were covered
by receipts issued by the Clerk of Court; that no receipts were issued for the P200.00/appearance fee
conformably with the practice of most lawyers; and that Samonte had not also demanded any receipts.

Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samonte’s submission of a motion to change counsel, stating that the
latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy of informing him beforehand on the intention of not meeting his
obligation to him as the counsel; that Samonte had been forced to issue to him a check after the Branch
Clerk of Court had told him that his motion to change counsel would not be acted upon unless it carried
Atty. Abellana’s conformity as the counsel; and that he had duly acknowledged the check.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Abellana was in contravention of his duties as a lawyer.

HELD: Yes.

By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain
from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as
well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that
honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit: Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall
punctually appear at court hearings. Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of
his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in his dealings with
Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by
superimposing “0” on “4” in order to mislead Samonte into believing that he had already filed the
complaint in court on June 10, 1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988, the date when he had
actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of the belated filing on account of
his inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed

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upon, did not excuse the falsification, because his falsification was not rendered less dishonest and less
corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to remember that honesty and integrity
were of far greater value for him as a member of the Law Profession than his transactions with his client.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to
practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers
preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception,
including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the
trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights
the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stem disciplinary
sanctions.

LEGAL ETHICS>Legal Ethics> Amicus Curiae

FOREST HILLS GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., Petitioner,


vs.
GARDPRO, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 164686, October 22, 2014
FIRST DIVISION
FACTS: Petitioner Forest Hills Golf and Country Club, Inc. (interchangeably Forest Hills or Club), a non-
profit stock corporation, was established to promote social, recreational and athletic activities among its
members. In 1996, Gardpro, Inc. (Gardpro) bought class “C” common shares of stock, which were special
corporate shares that entitled the registered owner to designate two nominees or representatives for
membership in the Club. When the general manager of the club, notified the shareholders that they were
already accepting applicants, Gardpro designated Fernando R. Martin and Rolando N. Reyes to be its
corporate nominees; hence, the two applied for membership in the Club. Forest Hills charged them
membership fees of P50,000.00 each, prompting Martin to immediately call up Albert and complain about
being thus charged despite having been assured that no such fees would be collected from them. With
Albert assuring that the fees were temporary, both nominees of Gardpro paid the fees. Later, Gardpro
decided to change its designated nominees, and Forest Hills charged Gardpro new membership fees of
P75,000.00 per nominee. When Gardpro refused to pay, the replacement did not take place and for this,
it filed a complaint before the SEC. The Sec hearing officer decided in favor of Gardpro. SEC En Banc
affirmed the findings of the hearing officer. The SEC En Banc found that what the by-laws authorizes is
the collection of a “transfer fee,” in such amount as may be prescribed by the Board, for every change in
the designated nominees of a juridical entity (Art. II, Sec. 2.2 Subsection 2.2.2). This should be
differentiated from the provision of Art. III, Sec. 13.6 of the By-laws, which authorizes the collection of
“transfer fee” of P60,000 for corporate members for each transfer of stock in the club's books. The
transfer fee under the former provision refers to the one imposed on the change in the corporate
member's designated nominee only while the transfer fee under the latter provision refers to the a transfer
of the stock itself from one corporate member to another which necessitates entry in the club's books. CA
affirmed the findings of SEC. Forest Hills moved to reconsider the decision. Later, the Federation of Golf
Clubs (Phil.), Inc. (Federation) sought leave to intervene as amicus curiae,15 but the CA denied the
motion to intervene on March 1, 2004 because it doubted the Federation’s impartiality due to Forest Hills
being one of its members; and because the issues did not concern matters of broad public interest to
make it necessary to invite amicus curiae.16

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error of law in not allowing the intervention of
the Federation of Golf Club of the Philippines, Inc. as amicus curiae.

HELD: NO.
The CA properly disallowed the intervention of the Federation of Golf Clubs of the Philippines, Inc.
as amicus curiae.The courts may invite experienced and impartial attorneys to appear as amici curiae to

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help in the disposition of issues submitted to them. As such, the appearance of amicus curiae, whether by
invitation or by leave, has always been a matter of favor or grace, not of right or privilege. There is no
right to compel the courts to permit amici curiae to appear. This simply means that the intervention of
amicus curiae lies in the discretion of the courts, which may grant or refuse leave, according as they
deem the proffered information timely and useful, or otherwise. Where matters of public concern are
involved, the courts exercise great liberality in granting leave to appear; but where the parties are
assisted by competent counsel, leave to appear as amici curiae has been usually withheld. In general, the
courts desist from allowing the intervention as amicus curiae of anyone whose attitude appears to be
partisan (such as a person in the service of those having private interests in the outcome of the litigation).

LEGAL ETHICS>Disbarment>Falsification of court order

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants,


vs.
ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO,
JR., AND ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.
A.C. No. 8261

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants,


vs.
ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR., AND ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.
A.C. No. 8725 March 11, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: This is a consolidated administrative case wherein complainants inherited a residential lot under
a Transfer Certificate of Title. They discovered that such TCT had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort. Thus, they
caused the annotation of their affidavit of adverse claim thereon. The parties later on had an amicable
settlement, thus thru their counsels (herein respondents) they withdraw their claims and counter-claims
which the Court approved. The complainants later on sought the disbarment of respondents for allegedly
falsifying a court order that became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation of the notice of
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents falsified the Court’s order as a violation of Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court and thus warrant their disbarment.

HELD: No.

The complaints for disbarment are bereft of merit. The test is whether a lawyer’s conduct shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. If in the affirmative, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides that:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

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In this case, the records indicated the complainants own active participation in arriving at the amicable
settlement which caused for the Court to issue an Order of the cancellation of their annotation of the
notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City. Hence,
they could not now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they had themselves entered into. In
fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement subsisted.

LEGAL ETHICS>Suspension>Gross Misconduct>Proposal to Commit Illegal Remedy>

GABRIELA CORONEL, Petitioner,


vs.
ATTY. NELSON A. CUNANAN, Respondent.
A.C. No. 6738, August 12, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Complainant engaged the services of respondent to transfer to her name and her co-heirs the
parcels of land covered under a Transfer Certificate of Title. Respondent proposed to complainant that
the transfer may be effected by two means namely: first, by way of "ordinary procedure"; and second, by
way of "direct registration". Ordinary procedure involves transfer by way of execution of Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement, publication, payment of capital gains tax, etc., and registration with the Register
of Deeds. Direct registration, on the other hand, involves preparing documents upon advise of the
Register of Deeds and will involve an estimated cost to be negotiated with the officials or employees of
the Register of Deeds to a flat amount of Php50,000.00. Transfer by this means will take only one (1)
month or less. The complainant agreed with the latter process and paid the alleged necessary fees.

ISSUE: Whether the proposal made by the respondent a remedy that is contrary to law, public policy,
public order and public morals, or that lessens the public confidence in the legal system and hence
renders him guilty of gross misconduct, and should be suspended from the practice of law, or even
disbarred.

HELD: Yes.

A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.He shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; or counsel or abet
activities aimed at a defiance of the law or at a lessening of confidence in the legal system. He should
advise his client to uphold the law, not to violate or disobey it. Conversely, he should not recommend to
his client any recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order, and public morals.

Although the respondent outlined to the complainant the "ordinary procedure" of an extrajudicial
settlement of estate as a means of transferring title, he also proposed the option of "direct registration"
despite being fully aware that such option was actually a shortcut intended to circumvent the law, and
thus patently contrary to law. The transfer under the latter option would bypass the immediate heirs of
their grandparents (i.e., the complainant's parent and her co-heirs parents), and consequently deprive the
Government of the corresponding estate taxes and transfer fees aside from requiring the falsification of
the transfer documents. He assured that he could enable the direct transfer with the help of his contacts
in the Office of the Register of Deeds and other relevant agencies of the Government, which meant that
he would be bribing some officials and employees of those offices. The proposal of "direct registration"
was unquestionably unlawful, immoral and deceitful all at once.

Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year.

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LEGAL ETHICS>Judicial Ethics>Gross Ignorance of the Law>Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge

DR. CORAZON D. PADERANGA, DULCE P. GUIBELONDO, PATRIA P. DIAZ, CARMENCITA P.


ORSENO, AND DR. AMOR P. GALON, Complainants,
vs.
HONORABLE RUSTICO D. PADERANGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, IN MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2383 (Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I No. 05-2301-RTJ)

PATRIA PADERANGA DIAZ, Complainant,


vs.
HON. RTC JUDGE RUSTICO D. PADERANGA, AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, IN MAMBAJAO, CAMIGUIN, Respondent.
[A.M. No. RTJ-07-2033 (FORMERLY A.M. OCA I.P.I No. 06-2485-RTJ)]

August 17, 2015


(First Division)

FACTS: This is a consolidated administrative case wherein the complainants who are siblings in full blood
with the respondent judge alleged that the latter, being a magistrate, failed to exert any effort to mediate
the differences and misunderstandings between his siblings. The complainants also allege that
Respondent Judge compounded the trouble between his siblings when he instigated, encouraged and
advised Narciso, Jr. to file charges against his sister, Dra. Corazon. They assert that the Respondent
Judge abused his power as a judge by continuously trying to harass and oppress his female siblings by
threatening to file Civil and Criminal cases against Carmencita and Dulce for not giving him his share of
the fruits of the land held in common by the three of them. Finally, he issued a warrant of arrest against
his sister Patria that was pending in the Fiscal’s office after uttering the following remarks at her: "Ikaw
bugok, iduot taka, epapreso taka anang imong caso naa sa fiscal!" ("You idiot, I will send you to prison in
that case against you pending now in the fiscal's office!")

ISSUE #1: Whether or not the alleged acts committed by the respondent Judge constituted conducts
unbecoming of a judge.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not his issuance of the warrant of arrest against Patria amounted to gross
misconduct, ignorance of the law, disregard of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and abuse of authority.

HELD #1: Yes as to the act of appropriating the co-owned land unto him.

The appropriation of Lot 12910 by the respondent was really prejudicial to Dra. Corazon because he
erected a fence around the property and introduced improvements thereon without the conformity of the
latter. He did so at a time when he was still an active member of the Bench, and despite knowing that he
was expected to uphold the legal rights of others in their exclusive property, whether the rights were
under litigation in his court or elsewhere. Such conduct on his part was unbecoming of any judge like him.
He thereby disregarded the sworn obligation of every judge to observe respect for the rights of others at
all times if he expected others to respect the courts and its judges, as well as the Judiciary as an
institution. His failure in this regard merited him the condign administrative penalty.
However, the other imputations against the respondent were baseless, or were not subject to
administrative sanction.

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HELD #2: Yes.

Section 5, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct reprises the foregoing rule, to wit:
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to
counsel within the fourth civil degree;

The respondent's issuance of the warrant of arrest against his own sister was an outright violation of the
stringent rules on compulsory disqualification. For him, self-disqualification was absolute and should have
been immediate. It did not matter that he presided in a single-sala station. Neither was it an excuse that
the private complainant in the criminal case against his sister could protest unless he acted as promptly
as he did on the case. No protest would be justified should self-disqualification be mandatory.
Consequently, he was not exempt from administrative liability for acting upon the criminal case involving
his own sister, and issuing the warrant of arrest against her.

LEGAL ETHICS>Judicial Ethics>Gross Ignorance of the Law>Improper Issuance of an Order

SUGNI REALTY HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS


CHAIRMAN/PRESIDENT, CYNTHIA CRUZ KHEMANI, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE BERNADETTE S. PAREDES-ENCINAREAL, [THEN IN HER CAPACITY AS ACTING
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 10, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, IN DIPOLOG CITY], PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, OROQUIETA CITY, Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2102 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2762-RTJ), October 14, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: The complainant instituted an action for unlawful detainer against Spouses Rally and Noemi
Falame. The MTCC rendered its decision in favor of the complainant, which promptly filed a Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal. In the RTC, the appeal was assigned to respondent Judge. The complainant
then filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal, averring as grounds for dismissal the Falames' failure to
post the supersedeas bond. However, respondent Judge did not resolve its Urgent Motion to Dismiss
Appeal but instead issued an Order allowing the Spouses Falame additional days to post supersedeas
bond.

ISSUE: Whether or not such order of the respondent judge constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

HELD: Yes.

The issuance of the order did not accord with the law and jurisprudence.

Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides: Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. -
If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion,
unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient
supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to
pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and
unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent
due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable
value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined
by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The

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supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of
the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed, x x x

Thus, respondent judge thereby disregarded Section 19, supra, which allowed the filing of
the supersedeas bond only with the MTCC as the trial court. She should have instead granted the
complainant's Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed for it had become her ministerial duty to do so
upon the failure of the Falames to move to stay the immediate execution of the decision in accordance
with Section 19.

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS>LEGAL ETHICS>Lawyer’s Oath>Code of Professional


Responsibility

ANGELITO RAMISCAL and MERCEDES ORZAME, Complainants,


vs.
ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO, Respondent
A.C. No. 10945, February 23, 2016
EN BANC

FACTS: Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and Mercedes Orzame (Ramiscals) engaged the legal services of
Atty. Edgar S. Orro to handle a case which they were defendants seeking the declaration of the nullity of
title to a parcel of land in the Province of Isabela. The spouses was able to secure a favourable decision
in the trial court. On appeal, Atty Orro requested an additional amount of Php30,000.00 for the
preparation and submission of the spouses’ appellees’s brief in the CA.

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC which was not communicated to Ramiscals that they only
learned of the adverse decision from their neighbours. Atty. Orro then asked an additional Php7,000.00
from them as his fee in filing a motion for reconsideration, albeit telling them that such motion would
already be belated. Only then that they found out later on that Atty. Orro did not file the motion for
reconsideration. The decision attained finality, eventually resulting in the loss of their property.

The spouses then filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Orro but despite due notice, the
Ramiscals and the respondent did not appear during the scheduled mandatory conferences set by the
IBP. Neither did they submit their respective evidence

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Orro is guilty of violation of Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18

HELD: Yes

To accord with this highly fiduciary relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of the
former’s cause and to be diligent in handling the former’s legal affairs. As an essential part of their highly
fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the
developments of the case.

As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing professional and
ethical burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best of his knowledge and
discretion and with all good fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking up their cause, he gave his
unqualified commitment to advance and defend their interest therein. Even if he could not thereby
guarantee to them the favorable outcome of the litigation, he reneged on his commitment nonetheless
because he did not file the motion for reconsideration in their behalf despite receiving from them the
P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He further neglected to regularly update them on the status
of the case, particularly on the adverse result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the proceedings that

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were gradually turning against their interest. Updating the clients could have prevented their substantial
prejudice by enabling them to engage another competent lawyer to handle their case. As it happened, his
neglect in that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were then available. His various omissions
manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards them.

We further underscore that the respondent owed it to himself and to the entire Legal Profession of the
Philippines to exhibit due respect towards the IBP as the national organization of all the members of the
Legal Profession. His unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him by the IBP to comment and to
appear in the administrative investigation of his misconduct revealed his irresponsibility as well as his
disrespect for the IBP and its proceedings. He thereby exposed a character flaw that should not tarnish
the nobility of the Legal Profession. He should always bear in mind that his being a lawyer demanded that
he conduct himself as a person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings
with others. He should never forget that his duty to serve his clients with unwavering loyalty and diligence
carried with it the corresponding responsibilities towards the Court, to the Bar, and to the public in
general.

There can be no question that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct sufficient to justify his suspension or
disbarment if he so acts as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence involved in his official oath and is
found to be wanting in that honesty and integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar in the
performance of their professional duties.

LEGAL ETHICS>
Simplecio Marsada, Complainant
vs.
Romeo Monteroso, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Cabdbaran, Agusan del Norte, A.M.
AM No. P-10-2793 March 08, 2016
EN BANC

FACTS: Romeo Monteroso, Sheriff IV of Branch 34 of the regional Trial Court in Cabdbaran, Agusan del
Norte was lodged with a task to execute judgment rendered by Judge Orlando Doyon. The writ of
execution stated only “as far as the amount of P35,000.00 is concerned. Ultimately, however, Monteroso
delivered only P25,000.00 to Marsada, the winning litigant, but requested the latter to sign a prepared
typewritten acknowledgement receipt indicating that he received the amount P25,000.00 as FULL AND
ENTIRE SATISFACTION of the defendant’s obligation. Marsada later asked Monteroso for the balance,
but the latter informed him that the defendant no longer had any property or money with which to fully
satisfy the judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sheriff Monteroso’s actions constitutes misconduct as he exceeded his authority
in the enforcement of the Writ of Execution.

HELD: Yes
It is not for the Monteroso to determine whether the payment made, although insufficient, amounted to a
full satisfaction of the judgment debt, upon his belief in good faith that defendant Ramilo is incapable of
complying with his obligation. Marsada claimed that Monteroso had represented to him that the defendant
could no longer pay the balance. The representation, even if true, did not justify Monteroso’s unilateral
decision to discontinue the effort to recover the balance. It clearly devolved upon him as the sheriff to levy
upon the execution debtor’s properties, if any, as well as to garnish the debts due to the latter and the
credits belonging to the latter. Marsada did not establish that the act complained of was tainted with
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or disregard of established rules. Consequently, Monteroso’s
liability only amounted to simple misconduct.

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LEGAL ETHICS>Legal Ethics>Misconduct>Attorney’s Fees

NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner,


vs.
ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent)
with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his
professional services despite his not having performed the contemplated professional services. She avers
that in March 2005, she sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her in the annulment of
her marriage with her estranged husband; that she had only learned then that what he had contemplated
to file for her was a petition for legal separation, not one for the annulment of her marriage; that she
subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he
refused to do the same as he had already started working on the case; that she had sent him a letter,
through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less whatever amount
corresponded to the legal services he had already performed; that the respondent did not heed her
demand letter despite his not having rendered any appreciable legal services to her; and that his constant
refusal to return the amounts prompted her to bring an administrative complaint against him in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.

IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent’s insistence that he
could have brought a petition for legal separation based on the psychological incapacity of the
complainant’s husband was sanctionable because he himself was apparently not conversant with the
grounds for legal separation; that because he rendered some legal services to the complainant, he was
entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00
being the value of the services rendered under the principle of quantum meruit; and that, accordingly, he
should be made to return to her the amount of P30,000.00

IBP also recommended that Atty. Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
months.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not the respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not he should be ordered to return the attorney’s fees paid.

HELD #1: YES.

Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant. As the
foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for
annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer
accepting a professional engagement for either causes of action. His explanation that the client initially
intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably
contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other than an action for
annulment of the complainant’s marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her British
fiancée. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her
incapacitated to remarry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition
for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney’s fees if she desired to have the action for
annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify
his claim for services rendered.

The respondent’s statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez should be treated “as a
mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the

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MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose” constituted simple misconduct that this Court cannot
tolerate. In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive and improper
language by asserting that the phraseology was not per se uncalled for and improper. He explained that
he had sufficient cause for maintaining that the demand letter should be treated as a mere scrap of paper
and should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not excuse the offensiveness and impropriety of
his language. He could have easily been respectful and proper in responding to the letter.

HELD #2: YES

The attorney’s fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer’s agreement between the client and the
attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy or public order. The underlying theory is that the retainer’s agreement
between them gives to the client the reasonable notice of the arrangement on the fees. Once the attorney
has performed the task assigned to him in a valid agreement, his compensation is determined on the
basis of what he and the client agreed. In the absence of the written agreement, the lawyer’s
compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which means “as much as he deserved.” The
determination of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is also authorized “when the counsel, for
justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion.” Moreover, quantum meruit becomes
the basis of recovery of compensation by the attorney where the circumstances of the engagement
indicate that it will be contrary to the parties’ expectation to deprive the attorney of all compensation.

The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De La Rama, Jr. in favor of the respondent was too
generous. We cannot see how the respondent deserved any compensation because he did not really
begin to perform the contemplated tasks if, even based on his version, he would prepare the petition for
legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage. The attorney who fails to accomplish
the tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform during his professional engagement does not
discharge his professional responsibility and ethical duty toward his client. The respondent was thus guilty
of misconduct, and may be sanctioned according to the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he
may be ordered to restitute to the client the amount received from the latter in consideration of the
professional engagement, subject to the rule on quantum meruit, if warranted. Accordingly, the
respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for his misrepresentation of his professional
competence, and he is further to be ordered to return the entire amount of P70,000.00 received from the
client, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.

LEGAL ETHICS>Gross Misconduct>Disbarment

THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., PICO LOCAL CENTER, Represented By
Their ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDWIN A. PANTE, Complainant.
v.
ATTY. DANIEL D. MANGALLAY, Respondent.
Administrative Case No. 10483, March 18, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: This administrative case against the respondent attorney did not arise from any attorney-client
relationship gone wrong between the parties but from the ejectment action in which the respondent
attorney, as the plaintiff, successfully defeated the local congregation of the Christian Spiritists in the
Philippines, Inc., Pico Local Center (CSP-PLC), whose church building and other structures were the
objects of the action. After the defendants filed their notice of appeal, the parties agreed to settle among
themselves, with the defendants withdrawing the notice of appeal and agreeing to voluntarily vacate and
remove their structures in consideration of the respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00. But,
despite receiving the respondent's financial assistance, the defendants reneged on their end of the

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agreement; hence, at the respondent's instance, the trial court issued the writ of execution and the writ of
demolition, by virtue of which the structures of the defendants were ultimately demolished. The demolition
impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante (Pante), to bring the disbarment
complaint against the respondent based on his allegedly gross misconduct and deceit in causing the
demolition of the structures without the demolition order from the court, violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
and disobedience to a lawful order of the court, positing that he thereby abused his legal knowledge.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Lawyer committed gross misconduct and deceit in causing the
demolition of the structures with the demolition order from the court, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and
disobedience to a lawful order of the court, positing that he thereby abused his legal knowledge.

HELD: NO.

Demolition was authorized by the order issued by the MTC. In the execution of the final and
executory decision in the Civil Case, the sheriffs dutifully discharged their functions. The complainant was
then represented by Pante and some other members of the congregation, who did not manifest any
resistance' or objection to any irregularity in the conduct of the execution. After all, elements of the
Philippine National Police were also present to ensure the peaceful implementation of the writ of
execution.

Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all criminal, in the act of the respondent of taking
away the materials of the demolished structures. The parties put an end to their dispute by the
defendants, including the complainant and Pante, opting to withdraw their notice of appeal and
undertaking to voluntarily vacate and to peacefully turn over the premises to the respondent in exchange
for the latter's financial assistance of the P300,000.00. The respondent paid the amount in the MTC, and
the amount was later on received by Maria Omiles, Feliciano Omiles, Jr., and Noralyn T. Abad as the
representatives of the CSP-PLC on the same day. But the latter reneged on their part of the agreement
without returning the P300,000.00 to the respondent, who was left to exhaust his legal remedies to
enforce the judgment against them. It is notable that the judgment expressly directed him "to exercise his
option pursuant to the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines within thirty (30)
days from the finality of this judgment insofar as the improvements introduced by the defendants on the
subject property." Article 448 of the Civil Code granted to him as the owner of the premises, among
others, "the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in articles 546 and 548." His act of taking the materials of the demolished structures was
undoubtedly the exercise of the right of appropriating them in light of the fact that the P300,000.00 earlier
delivered as financial assistance was most likely meant to indemnify the supposed builders in good faith.

The respondent has called attention to the letter of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc.,
the mother organization to which the CSP-PLC belonged, to the effect that it was disavowing knowledge
of or participation in the disbarment complaint, and that it was categorically declaring that the complaint
had been filed by Pante only for his personal interest at the expense of the congregation. The sentiments
expressed in the letter manifested the inanity of the complaint, and the ill motives behind Pante's filing of
the complaint against the respondent. The proper outcome for such a complaint is its immediate
dismissal.

The Court DISMISSES the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Daniel Dazon Mangallay for its utter
lack of merit.

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LEGAL ETHCIS>Notarial Practice

VIRGILIO D. MAGAWAY & CESARIO M. MAGAWAY, Complainants.


v.
ATTY. MARIANO A. AVECILLA, Respondent.
Administrative Case No. 7072, July 27, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: It appears that the notarization of some documents had led to the filing of two criminal cases and
a civil action. A woman in her mid-30's, claiming herself to be an employee of the Office of the Registry of
Deeds of Isabela, had accompanied an elderly woman to the respondent's law office to request him to
notarize the ready-made deed of sale the elderly woman had brought with her. Respondent notary public
alleged that he notarized the document out of pity and kindness for the elderly woman, who had affixed
her thumbprint on the document; and that the elderly woman turned out to be an impostor.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Lawyer violated the Lawyer's Oath, the duties of attorneys under
Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the rules on notarial practice, and the Code of Professional
Responsibility by notarizing the documents without ensuring the identity of the signatories.

HELD: YES.

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements in the execution of public documents. In this case, the respondent's affixing of his notarial
seal on the documents and his signature on the notarial acknowledgments transformed the deeds of sale
from private into public documents, and rendered them admissible in court without further proof of their
authenticity because the certificate of acknowledgment constituted them the prima facie evidence of their
execution. In doing so, he proclaimed to the world that all the parties executing the same had personally
appeared before him; that they were all personally known to him; that they were the same persons who
had executed the instruments; that he had inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument;
and that they had acknowledged personally before him that they had voluntarily and freely executed the
same.

As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, the respondent was mandated to discharge his
sacred duties with faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat. Indeed, such responsibility was incumbent upon him by virtue of his solemn
Lawyer's Oath to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any, and by virtue of his undertaking,
pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility, not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. His failure to
ascertain the identity of the person executing the same constituted gross negligence in the performance
of his duties as a notary public. As such, it is now unavoidable for him to accept the commensurate
consequences of his indiscretion.

The respondent's rather convenient assertion that an impostor had appeared before him and
affixed her thumbprint on the ready-made deed of sale and affidavit of non-tenancy does not sway the
Court. He should have demanded that such person first prove her identity before acting on the documents
she had brought for his notarization. The objective of the requirement, which was to enable him as the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that
the deed of sale and affidavit of non-tenancy were the party's free act and deed, was not to be served as
casually as he did. By not ensuring that the person then appearing before him as the executor of the
documents was really Elena Gongon, not the impostor, he clearly did not exercise the precautions and

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observe the protocols that would have easily insulated the performance of his notarial duties from forgery
and falsification.

By his neglect, the respondent undermined the confidence of the public on the worth of notarized
documents. He thus breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he as an
attorney commissioned to serve as a notary public was required to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes.

LEGAL ETHICS>Conflict of Interest>Lawyer-Client Relationship

NILO B. DIONGZON, Complainant.


v.
ATTY. WILLIAM MIRANO, Respondent.
Administrative Case No. 2404, August 17, 2016
(Frist Division)

FACTS: Complainant Diongzon is a businessman engaged in the fishing industry in Bacolod City,
retained respondent Atty. Mirano as his legal counsel to represent him as the plaintiff in a civil case then
pending in the City Court of Bacolod City. The complainant also retained the respondent as his lawyer in
relation to the execution of two deeds of sale covering the boats the former was selling to Spouses
Almanzur and Milagros Gonzales. The parties herein signed a retainer contract for legal services that
covered legal representation in cases and transactions involving the fishing business of Complainant
Diongzon. Spouses Gonzales sued Diongzon for replevin and damages, and sought the annulment of the
aforementioned deeds of sale. They were represented by Atty. Romeo Flora, the associate of respondent
Atty. Mirano in his law office. It appears that the respondent Atty. Mirano eventually entered his
appearance as the counsel for Spouses Gonzales against Diongzon. Therefore, Diongzon initiated this
administrative complaint for disbarment against the respondent by verified letter-complaint. The
respondent stated that Diongzon had been his client in a different civil case; that Diongzon had never
consulted him upon any other legal matter; that Diongzon had only presented the deeds of sale prepared
by another lawyer because he had not been contented with the terms thereof; that he had not been
Diongzon's retained counsel because the retainer agreement did not take effect; that he had returned the
amount paid to him by Diongzon; that he had appeared for Spouses Gonzales only after their evidence
against Diongzon had been presented. The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation. The IBP
Board of Governors finally recommended that the respondent be held guilty of conflict of interest for
appearing as the counsel for the "opponents of Diongzon with whom he had an existing lawyer-client
relationship, a gross violation of his ethical duties as an attorney.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an attorney-client relationship established between the complainant
Diongzon and Atty. Mirano that would make the respondent lawyer guilty of representing conflict of
interest.

HELD: YES.

The lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a client seeks the lawyer's advice upon a
legal concern. The seeking may be for consultation on transactions or other legal concerns, or for
representation of the client in an actual case in the courts or other fora. From that moment on, the lawyer
is bound to respect the relationship and to maintain the trust and confidence of his client. No written
agreement is necessary to generate a lawyer-client relationship, but in formalizing it, the lawyer may
present a retainer agreement to be considered and agreed to by the client. As with all contracts, the
agreement must contain all the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties. The lawyer-client
relationship between the parties was duly established beginning in 1979 and lasted until 1982. The
respondent's claim that he returned the retainer fee did not alter the juridical existence of their lawyer-
client relationship. When the complainant consulted him on the sale of the boats to Spouses Gonzales,

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the respondent reviewed the contracts of sale in the capacity of the complainant's lawyer, and even
notarized the same. He became aware of the details of the sale by virtue of the confidentiality generated
by his lawyer-client relationship with the complainant.

A conflict of interest exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two opposing
parties, like when the lawyer performs an act that will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represented him, or when the lawyer uses any knowledge he previously acquired from his first
client against the latter. When he appeared in court for the benefit of Spouses Gonzales, to try the case
against the complainant, the respondent unquestionably incurred a conflict of interest, having become
privy to the terms of the sale subject of the civil case, the conflict of interest became unmitigated because
the complainant had not expressly consented in writing to his appearing in behalf of Spouses Gonzales. It
would have been more prudent for him to have excused himself from representing either party in the civil
case.

LEGAL ETHICS>Disqualification to practice law by reason of a criminal complaint

INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK, PHIL., INC., REPRESENTED BY LUIS MARCO I.


AVANCEÑA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. REBECCA S. FRANCISCO-SIMBILLO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 9464, August 24, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: On March 12, 2012, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from the attorney for
complainant IntradentZahnetchnik Philippines, Inc. informing about several criminal cases filed and
pending against respondent Rebecca Francisco-Simbillo. The criminal cases had been filed by the
complainant to charge the respondent with estafa and qualified theft and with violation of Article 291 of
the Revised Penal Code. The complainant pointed out that the charges for estafa and qualified theft
involved moral turpitude. At the time, the results of the 2011 Bar Examinations had just been released,
and the respondent was among those who had passed. She was in due course formally notified by the
OBC of the letter of the complainant, and thereby required to file her comment within 15 days from notice.
The OBC also informed her that she could join the mass oath taking for the new lawyers, but she would
not be allowed to enroll her name in the Roll of Attorneys until the charges against her had been cleared.
Upon the advice of the OBC, she had the other option to sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the
condition that the letter of the complainant would be automatically converted to a disbarment complaint
against her. Choosing the latter, she signed the Roll of Attorneys on May 3, 2012.

ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment complaint to the respondent will prosper on the ground of an
existing criminal charges against her.

HELD: NO.

This administrative case started as a complaint to prevent the respondent from being admitted to the
Philippine Bar on the ground of the existence of criminal charges brought against her for crimes involving
moral turpitude. Indeed, Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that any applicant for
admission to the Bar must show that no charges against him or her for crimes involving moral turpitude
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. However, this administrative case has since
been converted to one for disbarment but without the complainant, which has all the while continued to
actively participate herein, alleging any ground for finding the respondent administratively liable except
those already averred in its letter to the OBC. The complainant has not also shown that there were other
criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed against the respondent.

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Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred on any of the following
grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a
case without authority so to do.

In fine, in order to hold the lawyer amenable to disbarment by reason of his or her having committed a
crime involving moral turpitude, it is not enough to show that there is a pending case involving moral
turpitude against him or her, because Section 27 of Rule 138 expressly requires that he or she must have
been found by final judgment guilty of the crime involving moral turpitude.

LEGAL ETHICS>Refusal to comply with the order of Secretary of Justice

SANDY V. DOMINGO, Complainant,


vs.
ATTY. PALMARIN E. RUBIO AND ATTY. NICASIO T. RUBIO, Respondents.
A.C. No. 7927, October 19, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: The complainant initiated the complaint for disbarment against Palmarin E. Rubio and Nicasio T.
Rubio directly in the Supreme Court stating that the refusal of the respondents to comply with the order of
the Secretary of Justice had caused him to remain behind bars for a crime that he had already been
exonerated of, thereby causing him and his family tremendous sufferings; that the respondents had also
withheld the filing at the DOJ of their already-prepared motion for reconsideration, and caused the filing of
the motion only many months later; that upon resuming its proceedings in the criminal case involving the
complainant in early 2007, the RTC, unaware of the appeal by petition for review of Lorna Bongalon in the
DOJ, proceeded with the case and issued on March 1, 2007 the order for the arrest against all the
accused, including him, but it could have suspended such proceedings to give way to the exercise of
review by the Secretary of Justice; that the actuations of the respondents were unjust and absolutely
prejudicial to him because he was thereby forced to languish in jail; and that the respondents deserved to
be disbarred or otherwise sanctioned for their ignorance of the law and misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents should be disbarred for withholding the filing of complainant’s
motion for reconsideration to the DOJ.

HELD: NO.

The complainant's reliance on Section 27 (Rule 128) was obviously misplaced. The observation of the
Investigating Commissioner that the Secretary of Justice was not the same as the superior court referred
to by the rule was correct. As such, the filing by the respondents of the motion for reconsideration was not
a defiance or willful disobedience to the lawful order of the superior court.

At any rate, it was not the Secretary of Justice who would ultimately determine whether the information
against the complainant, among others, would be withdrawn or not. This was because the RTC as the
trial court already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal case. As such, the decision whether or not to
allow the withdrawal of the information upon motion of the public prosecutor in compliance with the
directive of the Secretary of Justice then pe1iained to the RTC.

We deem it timely and appropriate to remind that administrative proceedings brought against lawyers,
including those in the public service, to make them be accountable for their acts or omissions in the
exercise of their profession are not alternatives to reliefs that may be sought and obtained from the proper
offices or agencies. The Court will exercise its disciplinary power only by observing due process and if the
lawyer's administrative guilt is proved by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. This norm is aimed
at preserving the integrity and reputation of the Law Profession, and at shielding lawyers, in general, due

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to their being officers themselves of the Court. Any complaint for disbarment or other disciplinary sanction
brought against lawyers that is based on frivolous matters or proof, like this case, should be immediately
dismissed because its plain objective is to harass or get even with the respondent. The public must be
reminded that lawyers are professionals bound to observe and follow the strictest ethical canons, and to
subject them to frivolous, unfounded and vexatious charges of misconduct and misbehavior is to do a
disservice to the ideals of justice, and to disregard the Constitution and the laws to which all lawyers vow
their enduring fealty.

LEGAL ETHICS>Judicial Ethics> Retirement from judicial position or public employment

ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK, Complainant,


vs
. ATTY. FELIPE G. ZAPATOS, Respondent.
A.C. No. 7388, October 19, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS: Respondent is a retired judge who took on the case that he had intervened in during his
incumbency on the Bench. The complainant was the counsel of record of the plaintiff in the case. The
charge specified that the respondent was guilty of "representing adverse interest, illegal practice of law,
conduct and (sic) becoming as a former member of the bench and conduct unbecoming in violation of the
canons of legal ethics with prayer for disbarment.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES.

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

This rule, according to Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan,8 traces its
lineage to Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has
previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in
such office or employ.

To come within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must be
shown to have accepted the engagement or employment in relation to a matter that, by virtue of his
judicial office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.That
showing was sufficiently made herein. The respondent, in his capacity as the judge of the MTCC of
Tangub City, presided over the case before eventually inhibiting himself from further proceedings. His act
of presiding constituted intervention within the meaning of the rule whose text does not mention the
degree or length of the intervention in the particular case or matter. It is also plain and unquestionable
that Canon 36, supra, from which the canon was derived, prohibited him as a former member of the
Bench from handling any case upon which he had previously acted in a judicial capacity. In this context,

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he not only exercised the power to influence the outcome of the proceedings but also had a direct hand in
bringing about the result of the case by virtue of his having the power to rule on it.

The restriction extended to engagement or employment. The respondent could not accept work or
employment from anyone that would involve or relate to any matter in which he had intervened as a judge
except on behalf of the body or authority that he served during his public employment. The restriction as
applied to him lasted beyond his tenure in relation to the matters in which he had intervened as judge.
Accordingly, the fact that he was already retired from the Bench, or that he was already in the private
practice of law when he was engaged for the case was inconsequential.

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS>JUDICIAL ETHICS>Gross Inefficiency

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, Complainant


vs.
JUDGE ALFREDO D. AMPUAN, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33, Quezon City, Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1769, October 6, 2010
THIRD DIVISION

FACTS: On August 5, 2008, Eduardo Olaguer filed an ex parte manifestation in Civil Case No. 27653
praying for its submission for decision for failure of the defendants to file their memorandum, but
respondent Judge rendered no decision despite the lapse of three months. The complainant then filed
motions to resolve on December 12, 2008 and on February 18, 2009. Still, respondent Judge did not
decide Civil Case No. 27653 until only on June 2, 2009, which was way beyond the three-month
reglementary period.
Olaguer then charged respondent Judge with delay in rendering a decision, gross inefficiency, and
conduct unbecoming of a judge relative to his handling of Civil Case No. 27653 entitled JOS Managing
Builders, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al.
On August 3, 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCAd) found respondent Judge guilty of gross
inefficiency and recommended the penalty of reprimand with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Ampuan is guilty of gross ineeficiency

HELD: Yes

Respondent Judge really failed in his duty to promptly and expeditiously dispose of Civil Case No. 27653.
In so failing, he ran afoul of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 28 dated July 3, 1989. The
respondent should have forthwith issued the order directing the stenographers to submit the TSNs after
the complainant had manifested that the defendants had not filed their memorandum. Yet, he did not, but
instead took more than seven months before issuing such order on March 15, 2009. Moreover, we state
that the additional court assignments or designations imposed upon respondent Judge did not make him
less liable for the delay. Verily, a judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases
beyond that authorized by law. Had his additional court assignments or designations unduly prevented
him from deciding Civil Case No. 27653, respondent Judge could have easily sought additional time by
requesting an extension from the Court, through the OCAd, but he did not avail himself of this remedy.
Without an order of extension granted by the Court, his failure to decide within the required period
constituted gross inefficiency that merited administrative sanction. Nevertheless, the Court recognizes
that respondent judge inherited a total of 1,605 cases upon his assumption on August 10, 2005, and that
the omission complained of is the first and only administrative charge against him. We are inclined to
mitigate his liability, and opt to impose a reprimand, with stern warning that a repetition of the offense or
the commission of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
LEGAL ETHICS>Misuse of Legal Process

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LOUISITO N. CHUA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. OSCAR A. PASCUA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10757, December 05, 2016
(First Division)

FACTS:Dr. Chua filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Pascua for encouraging suit, using
intemperate, offensive and foul language in his pleadings, for misusing the legal processes to the ends of
justice, for using another lawyers['] MCLE in his pleading and for attributing to a judge motive not
supported by the records. The IBP issued a resolution suspending Atty. Pascua from the practice of law
for six (6) months.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not Atty. Pascua's use of words and phrases like duped, to take advantage of the
innocence of, his ignorance and abusive manner, foolishness in reference to Dr. Chua as one of the
adverse parties, and bungling in reference to the trial judge, was offensive and abusive as to violate the
aforecited command to every lawyer not to use abusive, offensive or otherwise improper language in his
professional dealings.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not Atty. Pascua’s alleged usage of a wrong MCLE compliance certificate number,
or of that pertaining to another lawyer was established by the IBP.

HELD #1: NO.

Words and phrases like duped, to take advantage of the innocence of, his ignorance and abusive
manner, foolishness, and bungling (even if the latter referred to the act of the trial judge) are of common
usage in our daily life. They should be understood by what they ordinarily convey. Admittedly, they can at
times be considered as off-color or even as abrasive, but their being so considered depends on the
specific context or situation in which they are used or uttered. That they have synonyms or alternatives
that are more or less expressive does not warrant characterizing them as excessive, intemperate or
offensive. To depreciatingly generalize about them, as the Investigating Commissioner obviously did, is to
unwarrantedly relegate them to a negative light. Doing so herein would be uncalled for because the
Investigating Commissioner did not render any justification for his negative conclusion about them. His
omission has effectively deprived the Court of the factual basis for reviewing and affirming his conclusion.

HELD #2: NO.

The silence of the report and recommendation on the foregoing matters was by virtue of the absence of a
clear showing by the complainant of the factual circumstances supporting the charges against Atty.
Pascual. Otherwise, the Investigating Commissioner would have easily stated his factual findings thereon
because it was his duty to do so under Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, which expressly
provides:

Section 12.Review and decision by the Board of Governors.– (a) xxx. The decision of the Board upon
such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based. xxx
(b) xxx, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the
whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is given no alternative but to dismiss the charges against Atty. Pascua.

HAIL TO THE CHIEFS!

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