MANAHAN v FLORES 5.
Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was convicted by the
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. 1863
captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a suit for damages filed before
the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge Maribeth
Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863, Judge Manahan
issued an Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily inhibited from hearing Civil Case No.
1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and
discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and judges, would
amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action of a
member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate investigation and sanction. 2
Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) deemed the
pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal administrative Complaint against Atty. Flores. Docketed
as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal for
investigation, report and recommendation.3
In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation, 4 Investigating Judge Josephine Zarate Fernandez
(Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of the case as follows:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal docketed
as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The Public Attorney’s Office (PAO)
thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores appeared as
counsel for the defendant.
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered his appearance and was
given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial
Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was expunged from the records without prejudice
to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. x x x Atty. Flores asked
for ten (10) days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for failure of respondent
Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. The court
a quo likewise issued Orders dated September 15 and October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty. Flores a
last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so shall be considered a
waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September 14, 2010 stating
among others, the following allegations:
xxxx
4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth, justice and
fair play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater?
Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1But even worse is a lawyer who violates the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine Constitution
commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the plaintiff is violative of the
foregoing divine and human laws.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely
superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. During the preliminary conference on
November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of his
MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores again failed to appear and to
submit the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Letter
of even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the
attached Motion which you may once more assign to the waste basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for another lawyer to
represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because I feel I cannot do anything right in your
sala.5
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by failing to
obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The Investigating
Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one year. 6
The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge. 7
Our Ruling
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected not
because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration
that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our
Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the
incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial
incumbents is disrespect to that branc the Government to which they belong, as well as to the State
which has instituted the judicial system."8
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores
is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his client's genuine
interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his
c1iticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be
exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not
freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to his client must not
be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be done within the
confines of reason and common sense.9
However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the infractions
committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent. Also,
we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian
reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a
century.10 Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine
respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to
obey and respect court processes.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of ₱5,000.00 with STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
COLLANTES v ROMERON
PER CURIAM:p
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney
Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed
against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular
actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute
Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present complaint charges the respondent with the
following offenses:
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to
act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with
Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer
certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material
benefit from the person or persons interested therein.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending
official transaction before him.
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some
163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the
lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform
deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real
estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended the
registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement"
between them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban
to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon
City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163
registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a
round trip plane ticket for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent
through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent imposed
additional registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant
wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of
V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to
the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to
parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said
denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15)
years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents which have been
repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City
under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty.
Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same documents of the same tenor have been refused
or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In a
Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents
were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds
of sale with assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987
administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed respondent to
explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondent was
further asked whether he would submit his case on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal
investigation.
In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving
pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action.
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney
Collantes' charges against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Both
parties submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty; (2)
causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting or
refusing, in spite repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on
the registration of the documents involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from
the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official, extortion, and
directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official
transactions before him.
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on
February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be
found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented
to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct.
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports
the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for
registration and, notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious
action on the said documents, he continued with his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the
documents involved; that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said
documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof, that
the Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in
question; and that, such resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still
refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of
additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial.
xxx xxx xxx
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that he neither
touched nor received the money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the
circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 earlier
sent to him as plane fare, not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills.
The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related incident in his
letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate
his liability. His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws, rules
and regulations and should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties.
(pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from
the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment
in the government service, effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165
dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes
also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent.
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may
also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his
misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes
upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics,
Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon
him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders
rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This
discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a
lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high
sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility— all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral
character.
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest
order.1âwphi1 A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless
crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis supplied.)
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars.
[c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any
transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything
of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office
(See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or
delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the
profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest
standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have
demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra,
142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be
disbarred.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice
of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
ALI v BUBONG
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition for disbarment[1] filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found
guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by
complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah, [2] Ambobae
Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and
manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.[3]
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique
Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that he has no
case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that the complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence. [4]
The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08
September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal
exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave
misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation
of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latters co-accused. As a result
of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondents dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41
adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondents dismissal from
government service. Respondent subsequently questioned said administrative order before this Court
through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition[5] claiming that the Office of the President did
not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that respondents [6] in
that petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to
resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition for failure on the part of
petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned order.[7] Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied with
finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the
disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had proven
himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney[8] and that he poses a serious threat to
the integrity of the legal profession.[9]
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT
No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law [10] and jurisprudence support
his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications
for land registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the
Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was
duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latters co-
defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces
tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved
in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was
based solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainants allegation, therefore, that he
influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.
Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,[11] this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP
commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent portion
of this order provides:
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.
The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of evidence vis--vis
this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both
parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for
appropriate action.[12]
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner
Fernandezs recommendation for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the Western
Mindanao Region governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation,
report, and recommendation.[13] The IBP Resolution states:
Resolution No. XII-96-153
Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer
of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor George C.
Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report and
recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter
dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter
requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and
recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors. [14]
In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter [15] informed the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel [16] had sent notices to both complainant
and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato
Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for five years.
 On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the
records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-
96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandezs Order dated 23 February 1996.
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to
comment on respondents motion.[17] Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no opposition to
respondents motion for the transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City.[18] On 25 September
1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of
respondents evidence.[19] This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in
its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal of the case
records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate the
recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the Board of Governors. [20]
Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion
praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the
records.[21] Respondent insists that the investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the
authority to conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner
Fernandezs Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this
case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP
Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process.
Complainant opposed[22] this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to
complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that
respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these,
respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even bother to submit
his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City
Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally,
complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the
process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,[23] Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter
to submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the
submission of the position paper were duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a
member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy
of the panels order dated 4 August 1997.[24] Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued
by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten notation reading
Atty. Mosib A. Bubong.
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the
Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation submitted by
IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its
Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:
RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of
Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-
evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice. [25]
Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali,
complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of
peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting the withdrawal of this case. [26]
Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman
of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao
del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of this case. [27] This motion was effectively denied by Atty.
Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002.[28] According to Atty. Castillo
After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the report of the
IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned
sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and recommendation on
the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato City.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby
denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office
within ten (10) days from date hereof.
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP
Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:
The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the President in
Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent was found guilty of
Grave Misconduct in:
a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,
b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.
And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment
filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T.
No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-
squatting law, which by the way, was filed against respondents relatives. Going over the Decision of the
Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were
taken into account and fully explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the
finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported
by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of
respondent in the present case.
In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.[29]
In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved,
with modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification
pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice of law which should be imposed on
respondent whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for
a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter
denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.[30]
The issue thus posed for this Courts resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave
misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the
affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has
joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing
the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as
a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds.[31] Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be
disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal
profession.[32]
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,[33] we ordered the disbarment of
respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting
the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his
responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rests the grave
responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As
an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only
criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility,
its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those
qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously
described as moral character.[34]
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,[35] this Court found sufficient basis to disbar
respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services
of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case
[A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the
legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a
lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and
subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office
as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land
registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to
perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in the public office he used to occupy
and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the
intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for the
withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot
be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of
the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.[37] As we have previously explained in the
case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:[38]
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer
to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice. [39]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
OCA v LADAGA
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L.
Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal
Case No. 84885, entitled People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladagafor Falsification of Public Document pending
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40.[1] While respondents letter-request was
pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to
the Court Administrator, dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to
respondents authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case. [2] On September 7,
1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment. [3]
In his Comment,[4] dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in
Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances
surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough
resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was a
member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that
his appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did
not take advantage of his position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave application
approved by the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying respondents request for authorization
to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him
for appearing in court without the required authorization from the Court. [5] On January 25, 1999, the
Court Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2)
of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the
administrative complaint.
 In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close blood cousins who belong
to a powerless family from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte.From childhood until he
finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked up to her as a
mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondents help and advice
when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo
Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to seek vengeance on her cousin. He
explained that his cousins discord with Ms. Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres,
left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres
and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the
falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family,
he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladagas plea to be her counsel since she did not have enough funds
to pay for the services of a lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted
government service, initially with the Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had
performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this particular case that he had been
administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance for
humanitarian purpose. He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the
questioned appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati
where he is holding office. He stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as
shown by his approved leave applications attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents comment and referred the
administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-
Salonga, for investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and
recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa
Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before
the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was
without the previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as such
counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence.Moreover, his Presiding
Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the respondent appeared
as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively
declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and
respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and
high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member
of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case
amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top
of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and
independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin without
first securing permission from the court, and considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with
the fact that said appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is
hereby respectfully recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of
such act would be dealt with more severely.[6]
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which
disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar
or give professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession, specifically the law profession
in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates
a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7] we explained the meaning of the term private practice
prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists
in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law to fall within
the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,
647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in
the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.[8]
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private practice of the law
profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of
law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court
as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee
is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be
fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or
employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an
officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and
public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the
management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. [9]
 Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e.,
May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is
true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed
to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department.The presiding judge of the court to which
respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby
REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.
PIMENTEL v FABROS
CORONA, J.:
A complaint for disbarment was filed against Attys. Vitaliano C. Fabros and Pacifico S. Paas by
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr. for unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in relation to the
discharge of their duties as chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the provincial board of canvassers,
Province of Isabela (PBC-Isabela) in the 1995 elections.
Complainant alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
8. Among the duties of the [PBC-Isabela] was to canvass the results of
the elections from the various municipalities and component cities of the
Province of Isabela and submit the Provincial Certificate of Canvass to
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). This Provincial Certificate of
Canvass was to be submitted to the COMELEC together with its
supporting Statement
of Votes per Municipality for the Province of Isabela, and as required by
law, these documents were prepared under the control and supervision
of the [PBC-Isabela] of which herein respondents are officials.
9. In fact, with respect to the Provincial Certificate of Canvass of Isabela,
respondents were required to certify under oath that they duly canvassed
the votes cast for each candidate for Senator in the election held on May
8, 1995. And with respect to the Statement of Votes per Municipality,
they were required to certify that each entry made is true and correct.
xxx xxx xxx
11. It would appear, however, that the Statement of Votes per Municipality
(annex B) prepared and certified to be true and correct by herein
respondents was actually a fraudulent statement which had been altered
and which contain false and untrue entries. By comparing the said
statements with the Municipal/City Certificates of Canvass of some of
the municipalities and component cities for the Province of Isabela, it is
clearly apparent that in nine (9) municipalities and one (1) city of the said
province, the votes of candidates Enrile, Honasan and Mitra were
padded and increased by some 27,755, 10,000 and 7,000, respectively.
xxx xxx xxx
13. The anomalous, irregular and illegal padding of the votes in the
Provincial Certificate of Canvass for the Province of Isabela cannot be
attributed [to] mere computation or recording error, but was ostensibly
the result of a premeditated scheme knowingly implemented by herein
respondents.
14. The respondents, chairman and vice chairman of the [PBC-
Isabela], willfully, feloniously, unethically and in wanton and
reckless regard of the duties and responsibilities reposed upon
them by virtue of their official positions, signed the Provincial
Certificate of Canvass (annex A) and the Statement of Votes
per Municipality (annex B) for the Province of Isabela, well
aware that the same contained false statements which has
altered the results of the senatorial elections in said
province. Their submission of these falsified documents to the
COMELEC is an act constituting a gross violation of the
Omnibus Election Code and existing penal laws, and a serious
breach of public trust and of their oaths as duly licensed
members of the Philippine Bar.
15. For under section 27 of R.A. 6646 it is provided that any member of
the board of canvasser who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes
received by a candidate in any election shall be guilty of [an] election
offense.
16. And, under provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. xxx xxx xxx.[1](Emphasis ours)
In his comment, respondent Fabros reproduced the counter-affidavit he filed with the
COMELEC-Manila since the issues raised in the complaint were identical to those brought before the
Commission. He denied committing any act which violated his oath as a lawyer. Specifically, he stated that:
(1) he neither consented nor allowed any member of PBC-Isabela to increase the votes of
Senators Enrile, Honasan and Mitra; (2) the canvassing was done in public view; (3) he faithfully read the
votes as reflected in the municipal/city certificates of canvass, repeating the same twice or thrice and (4)
the canvassing proceeded in an orderly manner after counsels and watchers were given the chance to
examine the certificates of canvass.[2]
Aside from substantially echoing the statements of Fabros, respondent Paas alleged that he was in no
position to manipulate the figures since Fabros did the reading throughout the canvass, while he attended
to maintaining the integrity of the envelopes containing the statement of votes. Both attributed to human
fatigue or simple negligence any error in the figures since the board and its staff allegedly worked
continuously to finish the canvassing within 72 hours as directed. [3] Paas claimed that if there were figures
in the certificates of canvass which did not match the statement of votes prepared by the PBC, he honestly
believed that this was due to human fatigue.[4] He alleged that, if at all, he could only be faulted for failing
to see for himself if the reading by Fabros of the number of votes and the tabulation thereof faithfully
reflected the figures in the PBCs copy of the election returns.
Both respondents do not, however, deny that they authenticated the provincial certificate of
canvass and signed the statement of votes as true and correct. Their only excuse for any discrepancy was
their alleged reliance on the documents prepared by the secretary of PBC-Isabela, Olympia Marquez.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner George Briones heard the case on
January 20, 1997.[5] By agreement of the parties, the Investigating Commissioner ordered the parties to
submit simultaneous verified position papers with the affidavits of their witnesses. [6] On June 21, 2003, the
IBP board of governors issued a resolution adopting the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Respondents were found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and were penalized with a fine of P10,000 each, with a warning that a violation on similar
grounds will be dealt with more severely.
Based on the evidence presented, we find respondents guilty of misconduct. The records reflect, and
respondents admit, the discrepancy between the questioned certificate of canvass and the statement of
votes of the Province of Isabela in the 1995 elections. While there was no question that the municipal/city
certificates of canvass were not tampered with, the tabulation of the figures on the statement of votes was
anomalous. For this, respondents were responsible.[7]
As chairman and vice-chairman of PBC-Isabela, respectively, respondents were mandated to receive the
municipal/city certificates of canvass, and to canvass them for the votes of the members of the Senate,
among others.[8] They were also required to determine the provisional total votes of each candidate as of
each adjournment. On final adjournment, they were tasked to prepare a statement of votes with a
certification of the same as official.[9] In addition, they prepared the provincial certificate of canvass (in
which the padded figures were discovered) with the certification under oath as public officers that the
entries were true and correct.[10]
More than simply affixing their signatures for the purpose of identifying the documents, respondents signed
the documents certifying (and vouching) for the correctness and accuracy of their contents. Even if they
allegedly had no participation in the misdeed, they nevertheless remained responsible for it as officials of
PBC-Isabela. Respondents must bear the consequences of any misstatement or falsehood arising from such
certification.[11] They cannot evade responsibility by pointing to other persons who supposedly prepared
the documents in question.[12] They had the opportunity to check, as they should have checked, the
accuracy of the figures they were certifying to.[13] By certifying to false figures, they committed misconduct
subject to disciplinary action.[14] In fact, by invoking the defenses of honest mistake, oversight due to fatigue,
even simple negligence, respondents virtually admitted the existence of the discrepancies in the number of
votes reflected in the questioned documents.[15]
As public officers, respondents failed to live up to the high degree of excellence, professionalism,
intelligence and skill required of them.[16] As lawyers, they were found to have engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.[17] They also violated their oath as officers of the court
to foist no falsehood on anyone. Furthermore, by express provision of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the avoidance of such conduct is demanded of them as lawyers in the government service:
CANON 6 These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks.
As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under an even greater obligation to
observe the basic tenets of the legal profession because public office is a public trust.[18]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Atty. Vitaliano C. Fabros and
Atty. Pacifico S. Paas GUILTY of misconduct and imposes on them a FINE in the amount of P10,000
each, with a WARNING that the commission in the future of a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and entered in the records of respondents.
BERENGUER-LANDERS v FLORIN
REYES, J.:
This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer
(complainants) against herein respondents Isabel E. Florin (Florin), Marcelino Jomales (Jomales) and
Pedro Vega (Vega).
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, Carlo Berenguer and Belinda Berenguer-Aguirre, Rosario Berenguer-
Landers and Pablo Berenguer (Berenguers) are the registered owners of a 58.0649-hectare land in
Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Sometime in April 1998, a notice of coverage was issued by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) regarding the acquisition of their landholding pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Berenguers
protested and applied for the exclusion of their land with the DAR and for a notice to lift coverage based
on the ground that their landholdings have been used exclusively for livestock pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order No. 09.2
On October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the application for exclusion,
cancelled the Berenguers’ certificates of title on the land and issued Certificates of Land Ownership
Award3 (CLOAs) in favor of the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development
Cooperative (BARIBAG).
Eventually, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Dalugdug) denied their application for exclusion
from the CARP’s coverage in the Order4 dated February 15, 1999 based on the Investigation Report
dated February 9, 1999 submitted by the DAR Region V Investigation that said area sought to be
excluded is principally devoted to coconuts and not the raising of livestock.5
Aggrieved, the Berenguers filed a notice of appeal6 with the Secretary of DAR.
While the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a petition7 for the implementation of the Order dated
February 15, 1999 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). This was granted by
Florin, as RARAD, in an Order8 dated March 15, 1999. Accordingly, Florin directed the issuance and
implementation of the Writ of Possession.9
On March 19, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion for reconsideration,10 claiming that they were denied
due process as they were not furnished with a copy of BARIBAG’s petition for implementation. Florin
denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in an Order 11 dated March 22, 1999.
On March 25, 1999, the Berenguers appealed12 to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). BARIBAG, on
other hand, filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession.13 The Berenguers opposed14 the
motion saying that the execution would be premature in view of their pending appeal before the
DARAB. Nevertheless, BARIBAG still filed a Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff. 15
In his Order16 dated April 6, 1999, DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S. Navarro denied the Berenguers’
appeal.
On April 8, 1999, Florin issued a Resolution,17 which granted BARIBAG’s Motion for the Appointment of
a Special Sheriff and ordered the issuance of the writ of possession prayed for.
On April 13, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion to set aside18 the Resolution dated April 8, 1999,
arguing that: the DARAB already acquired jurisdiction over case when they seasonably filed an appeal
before it; and that Florin should have waited until the DARAB has decided the appeal. In an
Order19 dated April 21, 1999, Florin denied the said motion prompting the Berenguers to move for her
inhibition20 on ground of partiality.
The Berenguers elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 51858, which was denied outright on procedural grounds, to wit: (1) copy of the
assailed order bears the words "certified true copy" but the name and authority of the person certifying
is not indicated as required in SC Circular No. 3-96, and the signature therein is illegible; (2) only one of
the petitioners signed the certification on non-forum shopping which is an insufficient compliance of
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court; and (3) there is non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies as the assailed order of the Regional Director is not directly reviewable by the CA.21
Undaunted, the Berenguers filed a second petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 53174, which questioned the Orders dated March 15, 1999 and March 22, 1999 issued by Florin.
The petition was also denied on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and wrong mode of appeal. 22
Thus, Florin issued on April 21, 1999 a Writ of Possession23 in favor of BARIBAG.
Florin subsequently directed the full implementation of the writ of possession pursuant to Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court in spite of the Berenguers’ protestations.24
On June 3, 1999, the Berenguers moved to quash25 the Writ of Possession, to no avail.
On August 4, 1999, the complainants filed the instant Complaint26 for the disbarment of respondents
Florin, Jornales, in his capacity as Assistant Regional Director for DAR, and Vega, in his capacity as DAR
Legal Officer V, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the commission of the following acts:
certification of finality as prescribed by the DARAB rules; (2) Atty. Federico De Jesus (De Jesus), as
Berenguers’ counsel, was not furnished with a copy of the writ because it was not yet issued at the time
when it was requested; (3) there was no intent to hide the writ; (4) when the writ of possession was
finally signed, it was delivered to the sheriff for service and enforcement; (4) it was unfair to impute
illegal acts against Vega and Jornales as DAR lawyers in view of the DAR’s denial of the motion for a
cease and desist order and because of the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duty; (5) the petitions for certiorari filed with the CA were both dismissed; and (6) the findings of DAR
and the issuance of the CLOAs remain undisturbed. Florin also claimed that it is Atty. De Jesus who
wants her disbarred and not the Berenguers.
In a separate Comment,29 Vega denied the allegations against him arguing that: (1) the writ of possession
is not illegal in the absence of a court order stating its invalidity; (2) he did not participate in the issuance
of the writ of possession because he did not appear as the farmers’ counsel; (3) the Legal Division he
heads has no control or influence over the DARAB; and (4) his presence in the execution of the writ of
possession was to ascertain that no violations against any law are committed by the person/s executing
the writ.30
Jornales’ Comment,31 for his part, stated that: (1) the writ has no prima facie infirmity; (2) he is not privy
to the issuance thereof; (3) he has no supervision and control over the DAR which issued the writ; and
(4) he has no authority to determine the writ’s validity or invalidity. Jornales admitted, however, that he
was in the meeting presided by the PNP Provincial Director of Sorsogon prior to the writ’s
implementation in his capacity as Regional Assistant Director for Operations of DAR Region V and not
as a lawyer. He added that the disbarment complaint against him is not only malicious for lack of legal
basis but is also meant to harass and intimidate DAR employees in implementing the CARP.32

A. ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN AS REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR KNOWINGLY RENDERING

After the complainants filed their Consolidated Reply, 33 the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
AN UNJUST JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS ADVERSE AND PREJUDICIAL
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
TO THE INTEREST OF PETITIONERS;

IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San Juan) Recommended34 that Florin be
B. ISSUING AN ORDER AND GRANTING A WRIT OF EXECUTION EX-PARTE AND
"suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUING AND SIGNING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT
Orders and Resolutions adverse and prejudicial to the interests of the Complainants."
CERTIFICATION OF FINALITY ISSUED BY THE PROPER OFFICER FULLY KNOWING
THAT SHE HAS NO AUTHORITY AND TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE APPLICABLE
RULES AND IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE Commissioner San Juan, meanwhile, recommended that the charges against Jornales and Vega be
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD; FURTHER, HIDING dismissed for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges against them. 35
THE WRIT OF POSSESSION FROM PETITIONERS INSPITE OF REQUEST FOR A COPY;
Commissioner San Juan’s recommendation against Florin is based on the findings 36 of the CA in its
C. REFUSING TO TAKE ACTION ON PLEADINGS FILED BY PETITIONERS THRU Decision dated December 26, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 53174,37 which reads:
COUNSEL AND FAILING AND REFUSING TO CONDUCT A HEARING AS PRAYED FOR
BY COUNSEL; FAILING AND REFUSING TO FORWARD THE APPEAL TO THE PROPER
The Petition for Certiorari filed by the complainants before the Court of Appeals was treated as a
APPELLATE BOARD;
petition for review and the court found the following errors:

D. UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS TO THE

"1) Respondent DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the subject properties being devoted to pasture
PREJUDICE OF PETITIONERS AND LAWYER; ABUSE OF AUTHORITY TO CITE
and livestock and already classified as residential and industrial land, hence, outside the coverage of
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT AND ISSUING AN ORDER OF ARREST
Republic Act 6657. (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) The generation and issuance of Certificate of
WITHOUT HEARING CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF COURT;
Landownership Award (CLOA) was therefore void;"

E. ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES AND ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, INSPITE OF THEIR

2) Being outside the coverage of CARL (Republic Act 6657), respondent Hon. Isabel E. Florin who is
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION, PERSISTED AND
exercising delegated jurisdiction from the DARAB has no jurisdiction over Petitioners’ Properties as held
ASSISTED IN THE ILLEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION TO THE
in Krus na Ligas Farmer’s Coop vs. University of the Philippines; G.R. No. 107022, 8 December 1992,
PREJUDICE OF LEGITIMATE FARMERS AND PETITIONERS.27
which is squarely in point with the case at bar."

Florin filed her Comment28 stating, among others, that: (1) the writ of possession is anchored on the
CLOAs issued by the Register of Deeds, and not on a final and executory decision that would require a
Anent the issue regarding the qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, the Court ruled thus – "Assuming
that the lands are indeed agricultural, we cannot understand why the DAR awarded them to members of
respondent Baribag and not to the farmers in the area, in violation of Sec. 22 of the CARL x x x."
The court further stated – "We cannot xxx close this discussion without mentioning our observation on
the actuations of Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Isabel Florin. Just why she issued a writ of
execution and eventually a Writ of Possession in favor of respondent Baribag puzzles us no end. She
knew that Baribag is not a party in petitioners’ application for exclusion filed with the Office of DAR
Regional Director Percival Dalugdug. Obviously, she never acquired jurisdiction over Baribag. She also
knew that petitioners appealed to the DAR Secretary from the Order of Regional Director Dalugdug
dismissing petitioners’ application for exclusion. Clearly, such order was not yet final and executory
when she issued the assailed writs of execution and possession. Thus, the writ are [sic] void and would
be set aside."38
In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the three (3)
respondents as members of the bar. The grounds asserted by the complainants in support of the charges
against the respondents, however, are intrinsically connected with the discharge of their quasi-judicial
functions. Nevertheless, in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,43 the Court already ruled that if a misconduct as
a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then a lawyer may be disciplined
by this Court as a member of the Bar, viz:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as
a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by
this Court as a member of the Bar.
xxxx

On May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVII-2006-282 modifying the
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the
recommended penalty, viz:
Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the
conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, clear from Canon 644 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for knowingly rendering an unjust Judgment,
Orders and Resolutions, adverse and prejudicial to the interest of the complainants, Atty. Isabel F. Florin
x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. The charges against Atty. Marcelino
tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity
Jornales and Atty. Peter Vega are DISMISSED for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges
of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
against Respondents.39
dealing.1âwphi1 Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private
In her opposition,40 Florin averred that: (1) jurisdiction was acquired over BARIBAG at the time it filed a practice.45 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
petition for the implementation of the Order dated February 15, 1999; (2) the DARAB has jurisdiction
to issue the CLOAs; (3) as RARAD, she has concurrent jurisdiction with DARAB; (4) the Berenguers
Thus, in Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,46 the Court ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for acts
were not denied due process; and (5) the Berenguers never questioned the regularity of the DAR’s
committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the DARAB may be likened to administrative cases
acquisition of their landholding nor did they file a petition for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to
against judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our government.47
BARIBAG.

Similarly in this case, Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official
This Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors but modifies the penalty to be
functions of a RARAD that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be
imposed.
likened that of a judge whose decision, including the manner of rendition, is made subject of an
administrative complaint.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
Going now to the acts complained of, Section 29 of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00 provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.—A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
SEC. 29. Effect of Appeal.—Appeal to the Secretary, the Office of the President, or the Court of Appeals
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
shall have the following effects:
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority so to do. x x x. (a) Appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to the Secretary.—The appeal shall stay the
order appealed from unless the Secretary directs execution pending appeal, as he may deem just,
considering the nature and circumstances of the case (Executive Order No. 292 [1987], Book VII,
In Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr.,41 the Court ruled that:
Chapter 4, Sec. 21).

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
xxxx
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant
unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct
prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this Based on the foregoing provision, the appeal of the Berenguers to the DAR Secretary clearly stayed the
conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.42 (Citations omitted) implementation of Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999. Moreover, it is the
DAR Secretary who has jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal. Records reveal that there was
no order by the DAR Secretary directing execution of the Order dated February 15, 1999 during the
pendency of the Berenguers’ appeal.
Corollarily, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for the instances when execution may be had,
namely: (1) after a decision or order has become final and executory; 48 (2) pending appeal, only upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing;49 and (3) execution of several, separate or
partial judgments.50
Moreover, Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB reads:
Sec. 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision.—Execution shall issue upon an order, resolution or
decision that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall issue as a matter of course
and upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the penalty recommended and instead
impose the penalty of suspension for three (3) months 55 without pay. As also held in Rallos v. Judge
Gako, Jr.,56 three (3) months suspension without pay was imposed against a judge after finding out that
the ignorance of the law he committed was not tainted with bad faith.
With respect to the complaint against Jornales and Vega, the Court agrees and adopts the finding of the
IBP that no sufficient evidence was adduced to substantiate the charges against them. Hence, the
complaint against them should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN is found guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is penalized with SUSPENSION from the
practice of law for three (3) months effective upon notice hereof. The complaint against Atty. Marcelino
Jornales and Atty. Pedro Vega is DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of
The Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the proper officer that a resolution, order or
the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
decision has been served to the counsel or representative on record and to the party himself, and has
become final and executory, and, upon motion or motu proprio, issue a writ of execution ordering the
DAR Sheriff or any DAR officer to enforce the same. In appropriate cases, the Board or any of its PEOPLE v PINEDA
Members or its Adjudicator shall deputize and direct the Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the
Philippines or any of their component units or other law enforcement agencies in the enforcement of any
SANCHEZ, J.:
final order, resolution or decision.

Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the Court of First
Sec. 2. Execution Pending Appeal. — Any motion for execution of the decision of the Adjudicator
Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases, four for murder, viz:
pending appeal shall be filed before the Board which may grant the same upon meritorious grounds,
upon the posting of a sufficient bond in the amount conditioned for the payment of damages which the
aggrieved party may suffer, in the event that the final order or decision is reversed on appeal, provided Criminal Case 1246 — murder of Neceforo Mendoza;
that the bond requirement shall not apply if the movant is a farmer-beneficiary/pauper litigant. (Emphasis
ours)
Criminal Case 1247 — murder of Epifania Mendoza;

In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR Regional Director Dalugdug denying the
Criminal Case 1248 — frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza;
Berenguers’ application for exclusion from CARP is yet to become final and executory as it was
seasonably appealed to the DAR Secretary. There is also nothing in the records that will show whether
BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to the Rules. Criminal Case 1249 — murder of Teofilo Mendoza;

While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with Criminal Case 1250 — murder of Marcelo Mendoza.
a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice, 51 the facts on hand prove otherwise. Florin’s
issuance of the writ of execution and writ of possession in order to fully implement Regional Director
The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his
Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999 clearly constitutes ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of
investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be tested in the crucible of a full-dress trial on
execution is issued only after the subject judgment or order has already become final and
the merits.
executory.52 As aptly stated by IBP Commissioner San Juan, Florin ordered the issuance of such writs
despite the pendency of the appeal with the DARAB. 53 Consequently, the Court finds merit in the
recommendation of suspension. The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:

As to the penalty –
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do
injustice will be administratively sanctioned.54 In this case, it appears, however, that this is the first time
that Florin has been made administratively liable. Although there is no showing that malice or bad faith
attended the commission of the acts complained of, the same does not negate the fact that Florin
executed an act that would cause an injustice to the Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the writ
of execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment but an obstinate disregard
of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana
Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22)
and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza
fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein, and let loose
several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, — all minor children of the couple — and wounding Valeriana
Bontilao de Mendoza.
Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed — Tomas Narbasa and Tambak
Alindo — moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case." Their plea is that "said cases
arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse."
Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May 13, 1966, directed the City
Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information in Case 1246. He also ordered
that the other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the docket."
The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the ground that
"more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was killed." The
defense opposed.
On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position that the acts
complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by different
and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though
the series of shots killed more than one victim;" and that only one information for multiple murder
should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one."
Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966, as having been issued
without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion, the People came to this Court
on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.
This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.
The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information, either for the complex
crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery with multiple homicide and
frustrated homicide? Or, should the five indictments remain as they are?
1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, which reads:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be
imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto);
and, second, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (delito complejo).1
Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results in the death of two
or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this factual setting, the complex crime defined in the first
part of Article 48 finds application.2 A similar rule obtains where one stabbed another and the weapon
pierced the latter's body through and wounded another. The first died instantaneously; the second, seven
days later. This Court convicted the assailant of double murder. 3 So where a person plants a bomb in an
airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result that a number of persons are killed, that single act again
produces a complex crime.4
A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the
doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct
crimes.5 Thus, where the six defendants, with others (armed with pistols, carbines and also a submachine
gun and Garand rifles), fired volleys into a house killing eleven and wounding several others, each of the
said accused is "guilty of as many crimes of murder as there were deaths (eleven). 6 Again, eleven persons
were indicted for quadruple murder — with the use of bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow and a piece of
bamboo — of a man, his common-law wife, and their two children in cold blood. The accused were
found guilty by the trial court of such offense. This Court, in reversing this ruling below, held that "[t]he
four victims were not killed by a single act but by various acts committed on different occasions and by
different parties"; that such acts "may not be regarded as constituting one single crime"; and that "[t]hey
should be held as separate and distinct crimes."7 And a third. At the commencement exercises of an
elementary school, "a shot suddenly rang out" followed by a "series of shots" — from a pistol. Two
persons lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who later on also died. This Court there ruled that
there were "three distinct and separate murders" committed by appellant Juan Mones. 8 And finally,
in People vs. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule — who
were asleep — were killed by one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a second burst of machinegun
fire, two of the couple's children — also asleep — were killed. The accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was
found guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal, this Court declared that "appellant must
be declared guilty of four murders."9
The present ease is to be differentiated from People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955. There, on a
single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards. It was held that there was
only one complex crime. In that case, however, there was no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing. In the
case at bar, defendants performed several acts. And the informations charge conspiracy amongst them.
Needless to state, the act of one is the act of all.10 Not material here, therefore is the finding
in Lawas that "it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by each and everyone" of the
accused. It is to be borne in mind, at this point, that apply the first half of Article 48, heretofore quoted,
there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law.11
The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of the five cases into
one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save
time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these
cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied.12
Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the five
separate informations — four for murder and one for frustrated murder.
2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an affidavit of one of the
witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to commit robbery, and that the acts
constituting murders and frustrated murder complained of were committed in pursuance thereof. If true,
this would bring the case within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48, which treats as a
complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly performed.13 If the
Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to said affidavit wherein it is alleged that certain personal properties
(transistor radio and money) were taken away by the culprits after the shooting, we are not to jettison
the prosecutor's opinion thereon. The Fiscal could have had reasons for his act. For one thing, there is
the grave problem of proving the elements of that offense — robbery. For another, the act could have
been but a blind to cover up the real intent to kill. Appropriately to be noted here is that all the
informations charged evident premeditation. With ponderables and imponderables, we are reluctant to
hazard a guess as to the reasons for the Fiscal's action. We are not now to say that, on this point, the
Fiscal has abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no
compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to
prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not
to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have
to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction.
In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being
unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due process
— the sporting idea of fair play — may be transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope 75 Phil. 810, 815,
this Court made the pronouncement that "[i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one
charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be
controlled by the off ended party."14
3. The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of the
prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal
charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in
court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason
then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail.
In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that
criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to
stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration
of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c)
to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in
proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.' "15 Nothing in the
record would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just
recited.1äwphï1.ñët
And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we are loathe to tag the
City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder and frustrated
murder, instead of a single case for the complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide
under the provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for that matter, for multiple
murder and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal's discretion should not be controlled.
Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the orders of respondent
Judge of May 13, 1965 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set and declared null and void, and, in consequence,
the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of
the said orders; and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes his place, is hereby directed to reinstate
Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as they were commenced, and to take steps towards
the final determination thereof.
MISAMIN v SAN JUAN
FERNANDO, J.:
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a member of the bar,
respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of certain
establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an
employee, complainant Jose Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan
Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on
the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation,
report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart on the part of
complainant. That could very well be the explanation for the non- appearance of the lawyer employed by
him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were
thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be expected. For the
law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case
for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed, This is one
of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be found
guilty of malpractice.
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as counsel for the
New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila
Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise
of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is
not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The
respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC
proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his
separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese
community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the resolution of this
Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office set the case for investigation on July 2
and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August
15, 1975. At the latter date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said
counsel did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent the complainant to explain the
reason for his absence. When the case was again called for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for
complainant failed once more to appear. The complainant who was present explained that his lawyer was
busy "preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila." When asked if he was willing to
proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the complainant declared, apparently without
any prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained that he brought the present action
in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust dismissal of
his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after reexamining his case, he believed the
respondent to be without fault and a truly good person." 2
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession
notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. The
respondent's appearance at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer
of the City of Manila may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil
Service Commission." 3 As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have been filed and are
under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police Commission." As for the
charges that respondent conspired with complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting
having' received his separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it is understandable why the
Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance
with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set
forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should
follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption
is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the
court in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. 6
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might have been
of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of
Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding
as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be
dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances
of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the
concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge
he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to
frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and
call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent,
in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts
and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the
bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his
honor remains unsullied
WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for not
having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.
VITRIOLO v DASIG
PER CURIAM:
 This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, [1] an official of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in
violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment
of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while
she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section
27,[2] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-
in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a
teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the
amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation
of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition,
Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of
the existence of a prior registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from
Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was subsequently confirmed
to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application
for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition,
the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by
Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of name. [3]
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11)
baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which
were subsequently dismissed.[4]
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 36 [5] of
Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to Borela Tire Supply and Novas
Lining Brake & Clutch as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued, [6] the complaint sheet, and the
subpoena issued to respondent.[7]
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant
Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son,
Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the
Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats
against the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.[8]
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a
libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11)
CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end
view of securing an appointment for herself.[9]
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the
charges.[10] A copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart
II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this Court with the notation Unclaimed. [11]
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by
registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed the
Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio Molon,
an authorized agent of respondent on August 27, 1999.[12]
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to the Commission
on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent to
submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and the case heard ex
parte. Respondent failed to heed said order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to
file her Answer, but again she failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that
she had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and the case was mainly
resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline stated
as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation of her oath as a
government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or attempted to extort
money from certain people who had pending applications/requests before her office in exchange for her
promise to act favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public
office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the
Commission on Higher Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar action in the future
will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text
of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A:; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules; and considering that respondent unlawfully used her public
office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the
Commission on Higher Education, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) years.[13]
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC)
of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her
position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED.
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. [14] However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be
disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.[15]
 In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC,
Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G.
Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending
applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure,
despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to
comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a
character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known
that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval
of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation
thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath imposes
upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed
in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[16] Respondents demands for sums of money to
facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs
afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the
conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is
clear from Canon 6[17] of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost
fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional
obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before
her office are violative of Rule 1.01[18] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members
of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts
constitute a breach of Rule 6.02[19] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting
their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value
in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his
office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from
all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not
only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry
in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in
private practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 and [20]
Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well
as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty
of three years suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by
the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys
upon finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and
dishonesty in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
hereby ordered DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
HUYSSEN v GUTIERREZ
PER CURIAM:
This treats of a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L.
Gutierrez.
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas
under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law. Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa
applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a
period of one year which could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was indeed
required by law, complainant deposited with respondent on six different occasions from April 1995 to
April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he
received the amounts deposited by the complainant but refused to give her copies of official receipts
despite her demands. After one year, complainant demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000
who assured her that said amount would be returned. When respondent failed to return the sum
deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to
respondent for the immediate return of the money. In a letter dated 1 March 1999, respondent
promised to release the amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to comply with his promise, the
World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. In response thereto, respondent sent complainant a
letter dated 19 March 1999 explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited
amount. He enclosed two blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized
complainant to fill in the amounts. When complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due
dates, the same were dishonored because respondent had stopped payment on the same. Thereafter,
respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the reasons for stopping payment
on the checks, and gave complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that said checks would be
honored. Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were all
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by
respondent. After respondent made several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited amount,
complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to respondent. The demand
letters remained unheeded.
Thus, a complaint2 for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required 3 respondent to
submit his answer within 15 days from receipt thereof.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,4 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint claiming
that having never physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not have
appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the amount was used as payment for services rendered for
obtaining the permanent visas in the Philippines. Respondent explained thus:
a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the complainant,
the latter was introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem
concerning their stay in the Philippines, herself and three sons, one of which is already of
major age while the two others were still minors then. Their problem was the fact that since
they have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as holders of missionary
visas (9G) they could no longer extend their said status as under the law and related polic[i]es
of the government, missionary visa holders could only remain as such for ten (10) years after
which they could no longer extend their said status and have to leave the country.
b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better secure a
permanent visa under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota
Visa and thereafter, provided them with list of the requirements in obtaining the said visa, one
of which is that the applicant must have a $40,000 deposited in the bank. I also inform that
her son Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age, has to have the same amount of
show money separate of her money as he would be issued separate visa, while her two minor
 children would be included as her dependents in her said visa application. I advised them to
get a lawyer (sic), complainant further requested me to refer to her to a lawyer to work for
their application, which I did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration lawyer, to
do the job for the complainant and her family.
c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the
same was finished and the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant
and her family. Her son Marcus Huyssen was given an independent permanent visa while the
other two were made as dependents of the complainant. In between the processing of the
papers and becoming very close to the complainant, I became the intermediary between
complainant and their counsel so much that every amount that the latter would request for
whatever purpose was coursed through me which request were then transmitted to the
complainant and every amount of money given by the complainant to their counsel were
coursed thru me which is the very reason why my signature appears in the vouchers attached
in the complaint-affidavit;
d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for services of a
lawyer that I myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza
and inquired from him regarding the matter and the following facts were revealed to me:
1) That what was used by the complainant as her show money from the bank is
not really her money but money of World Mission for Jesus, which therefore is a
serious violation of the Immigration Law as there was a misrepresentation. This
fact was confirmed later when the said entity sent their demand letter to the
undersigned affiant and which is attached to the complaint-affidavit;
2) That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the very same
amount used by her son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his separate permanent visa.
These acts of the complainant and her son could have been a ground for
deportation and likewise constitute criminal offense under the Immigration Law
and the Revised Penal Code. These could have been the possible reason why
complainant was made to pay for quite huge amount.
e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family became very close to
undersigned and my family that I was even invited to their residence several times;
f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money given and
surprisingly they want to recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no
longer around, he died sometime 1997;
g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden and that the
amount of money is now being sought to be recovered from me;
h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the consequences of having
signed the same and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed
but up to the present my standby loan application has not been released and was informed
that the same would only be forthcoming second week of August. The same should have been
released last March but was aborted due to prevalent condition. The amount to be paid,
according to the complainant has now become doubled plus attorney’s fees of P200,000.00.
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of
Evidence on 25 August 2003.
On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondent’s evidence but the scheduled
hearings (11 settings) were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was allegedly out of the
country to attend to his client’s needs. Reception of respondent’s evidence was scheduled for the last
time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent failed to appear, despite due notice and without just
cause.
On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her
report5 recommending the disbarment of respondent. She justified her recommendation in this manner:
At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent received the amount of
US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A to
F of complainant) showing his receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however claims that
he did not appropriate the same for himself but that he delivered the said amount to a certain Atty.
Mendoza. This defense raised by respondent is untenable considering the documentary evidence
submitted by complainant. On record is the 1 March 1999 letter of respondent addressed to the World
Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint) where he stated thus:
"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the deposit but I repeat, nobody really
intended that the thing would happen that way. Many events were the causes of the said delay
particularly the death of then Commissioner L. Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the needed
papers for the immediate release. It was only from compiling all on the first week of January this year,
that all the said papers were recovered, hence, the process of the release just started though some
important papers were already finished as early as the last quarter of last year. We are just going through
the normal standard operating procedure and there is no day since January that I do not make any follow
– ups on the progress of the same."
and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated thus:
"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your good self in
connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. It might take some
more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers are being still
compiled are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and
who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the documents
needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay."
From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers
were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts
therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal checks
to cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the
Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated the same for his personal use. It
should also be noted that respondent has failed to establish that the "late Atty. Mendoza" referred to in
his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one correspondence from Atty. Mendoza regarding the
visa application of complainant and his family, and complainant has also testified that she never met this
Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.
Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with
the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible
as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent has
violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."
On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved 6 the Investigating Commissioner’s report I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your goodself in
with modification, thus: connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made papers are still being compiled and are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence approved your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later
on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 as all the documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay.
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law and ordered to return the amount with legal interest from receipt of the money until
xxxx
payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative
action. As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6, 1999 and the
other one dated April 20, 1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you to fill them up on
their due dates the peso equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be sure that the peso equivalent of
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely sanctioned.
your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have postdated them to enable me to raise some more pesos
to cover the whole amount but don’t worry as the Lord had already provided me the means.
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task
have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely
3) Letter15 dated 25 April 1999 provides:
condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.7

Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have done my very best for the
It is undisputed that respondent admitted8 having received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown by
early return of your money but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that there are still papers
his signatures in the petty cash vouchers9 and receipts10 he prepared, on the false representation that
lacking. When I stopped the payment of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that everything is
that it was needed in complainant’s application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he
fine, but it is not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact that I really have to personally return the
misappropriated the said amount and interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty.
money out of my own. The issue should stop at my end. This is the truth that I must face. It may hurt me
Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their application for visa in the BID.11 Such defense
financially but it would set me free from worries and anxieties.
remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty.
Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action
of respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has been naturally silenced by fate, is not only I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one last Saturday the releases of
impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not which are on the following:
enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against
him.12 He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times
May 4, 1999- 200,000
is expected of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show that even
though he was given the opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the evidence against him in a
formal investigation, he failed, without any plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case May 11, 1999 -200,000
was set for reception of his evidence despite due notice.
May 20, 1999-200,000
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is
inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability;
June 4, 1999-200,000
otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.

I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral.

When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge.
Such admissions were also apparent in the following letters of respondent to complainant:
I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which I assure you will be
13 sufficiently funded on their due dates by reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the last
1) Letter dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:
time, if any of these checks, is returned, don’t call me anymore. Just file the necessary action against me, I
just had to put an end to this matter and look forward. x x x
Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the latest of
which is 09 March 1999. Should it not be released on said date, I understand to pay the same to you out
4) Letter16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:
of my personal money on said date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody here at the
office on that day and the amount would be given to you wether (sic) from the Bureau or from my own
personal money. The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I issued. In fact I
stopped all payments to all other checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to give
preference to the check I issued to you.
2) Letter14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:
This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of returning the other checks I
requested for stop payment - instead honored them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a
very big surprise to me and discouragement for I know it would really upset you.
In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan to withdraw
from the Bank. However, I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring the same to
your place considering that its quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for you to immediately
deposit today and I was assured by the bank that it would be honored this time.
Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another.
As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have issued his
personal checks if said amount were officially deposited with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.
possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. 24
Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline
the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts
and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose
utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in
them as members of the bar.25 These pronouncement gain practical significance in the case at bar
considering that respondent was a former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears
stressing also that government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public
trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as their
disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye. 26

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands
Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s pending application
and high standards of the legal profession.
for visas is violative of Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of
the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts
constitute a breach of Rule 6.0218 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or
their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in
in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of
office.19 Respondent’s conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral character required from all the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully
lawyers, especially from one occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. 27
to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry
in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,28 we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC,
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
Legal Services, Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as consideration for the
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in
approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona, 29 we also
private practice.
disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations Commission, who was caught by the National
Bureau of Investigation in the act of receiving and counting money extorted from a certain person.
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another
by issuing several worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.
Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high
standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves
In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, 20 as the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.30
the effect "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to
holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well
return the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for
society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate
check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary
administrative action. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals."21
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
RAMOS v IMBANG
payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude. 22
PER CURIAM:
Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant;
worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up
his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue, being a member of the bar. This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension [1] against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege THE COMPLAINT
bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at
all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. [2] She gave
to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.[3]
lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes suspension and disbarment. 23 More importantly,
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly,
respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then
come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. [4] This
happened six times and for each appearance in court, respondent charged her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about
the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that
respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO).[5]
RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very
start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal
Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Bian, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's
daughter.[6]
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses.[7] Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he
declined.[8] Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a
private practitioner.[9] Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she was unable to
come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.[10] Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant
allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she might spend the cash
on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty.
Ungson's acceptance fee.[11]
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her
daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously given the respondent for
safekeeping.[12] Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992. [13]
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.[14] A few months later or in September 1994, the
complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a
private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as
he lost contact with the complainant.[15]
RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD
submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors. [16]
The CBD noted that the receipt[17] was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the
PAO.[18] It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that
respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a
spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he
issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request. [19] It found respondent guilty of violating the
prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than
their salaries.[20] The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from a client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should
know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if,
with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who
is competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered him
to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.[21]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rules
1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's
recommendation with regard to the restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned
from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of six
months.[22]
THE COURT'S RULING
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.[23] More specifically, lawyers in
government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public
scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public
service.[24]
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason,
the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws,
the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.[25]
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote
themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992
while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship.[26] Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the
receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant.
Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government
lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the
purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. [27] Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V
of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal
assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-
judicial cases.[28]
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was
inconsistent with the office's mission.[29] Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees
other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
[30]
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the observance of the above-
mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and
received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of
the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition
on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees,
respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against
the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant
to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were
being tried and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that never took place. These
acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood. [31]
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers,
specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any
act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility,
higher than his brethren in private practice.[32]
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but
accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an
amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client)[33] nor was it
given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). [34] Nevertheless,
respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and
not allowed to accept them.[35]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyers oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000 with interest at the legal
rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.
QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN SILVERIO
BRION, J.:
This administrative matter started as a letter-query dated March 4, 2008 of Atty. Karen M.
Silverio-Buffe (Atty. Buffe) addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator, which query the latter
referred to the Court for consideration. In the course of its action on the matter, the Court discovered
that the query was beyond pure policy interpretation and referred to the actual situation of Atty. Buffe,
and, hence, was a matter that required concrete action on the factual situation presented.
The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as
amended (or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This provision
places a limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency, and those
already separated from government employment for a period of one (1) year after separation, in
engaging in the private practice of their profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 provides:
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts
and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
xxx
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year
after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of
subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his
profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in
which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these questions: Why may an incumbent engage in private
practice under (b)(2), assuming the same does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official duties, but a non-
incumbent like myself cannot, as is apparently prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec. 7? Why is the former
allowed, who is still occupying the very public position that he is liable to exploit, but a non-incumbent like myself
who is no longer in a position of possible abuse/exploitation cannot?[1]
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008.
Thereafter (and within the one-year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she
engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch
81 of Romblon.
Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an incumbent
public employee, who may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as this practice does not
conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or employee who has
retired, resigned, or has been separated from government service like her, is prohibited from engaging in
private practice on any matter before the office where she used to work, for a period of one (1) year from
the date of her separation from government employment.
 Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention of the above prohibition is to remove the exercise
of clout, influence or privity to insider information, which the incumbent public employee may use in the
private practice of his profession. However, this situation did not obtain in her case, since she had already
resigned as Clerk of Court of RTC-Branch 18 of Romblon. She advanced the view that she could engage
in the private practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so long as her appearance as legal counsel
shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her former duties as former Clerk of Court of that Branch.
Then Deputy Court Administrator (now Court Administrator) Jose P. Perez made the following
observations when the matter was referred to him:
The general intent of the law, as defined in its title is to uphold the time-
honored principle of public office being a public trust. Section 4 thereof provides for
the norms of conduct of public officials and employees, among others: (a)
commitment to public interest; (b) professionalism; and (c) justness and sincerity.
Of particular significance is the statement under professionalism that [t]hey [public
officials and employees] shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their
roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was intended to avoid
any impropriety or the appearance of impropriety which may occur in any
transaction between the retired government employee and his former colleagues,
subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity, moral ascendancy or undue
influence, as the case may be.[2]
Subsequently, in a Minute Resolution dated July 15, 2008, we resolved to refer this case to the
Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) for evaluation, report and recommendation. [3] The OCAT took the
view that:
The premise of the query is erroneous. She interprets Section 7 (b) (2) as a blanket
authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. Clearly, there is a
misreading of that provision of law.[4]
and further observed:
The confusion apparently lies in the use of the term such practice after the phrase
provided that. It may indeed be misinterpreted as modifying the phrase engage in
the private practice of their profession should be prefatory sentence that public
officials during their incumbency shall not be disregarded. However, read in its
entirety, such practice may only refer to practice authorized by the Constitution or
law or the exception to the prohibition against the practice of profession. The term
law was intended by the legislature to include a memorandum or a circular or an
administrative order issued pursuant to the authority of law.
xxx
The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits incumbent
public officials and employees from engaging in the practice of law, which is declared
therein a prohibited and unlawful act, accords with the constitutional policy on
accountability of public officers stated in Article XI of the Constitution
xxx
The policy thus requires public officials and employees to devote full time public
service so that in case of conflict between personal and public interest, the latter
should take precedence over the former.[5][Footnotes omitted]
With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel the rule that deals with outside employment by an incumbent judicial employee and
which limits such outside employment to one that does not require the practice of law.[6] The prohibition
to practice law with respect to any matter where they have intervened while in the government service is
reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which governs the conduct of
lawyers in the government service.[7]
In view of the OCAT findings and recommendations, we issued an En Banc Resolution
dated November 11, 2008 directing the Court Administrator to draft and submit to the Court a circular
on the practice of profession during employment and within one year from resignation, retirement from
or cessation of employment in the Judiciary. We likewise required the Executive Judge of the RTC of
Romblon to (i) verify if Atty. Buffe had appeared as counsel during her incumbency as clerk of court and
after her resignation in February 2008, and (ii) submit to the Court a report on his verification. [8]
In compliance with this our Resolution, Executive Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of RTC-Branch
81 of Romblon reported the following appearances made by Atty. Buffe:
(1) Civil Case No. V-1564, entitled Oscar Madrigal Moreno, Jr. et al. versus
Leonardo M. Macalam, et al. on February 19, 2008, March 4, 2008, April 10, 2008 and
July 9, 2008 as counsel for the plaintiffs;
(2) Civil Case No. V-1620, entitled Melchor M. Manal versus Zosimo
Malasa, et al., on (sic) February, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff;
(3) Civil Case No. V-1396, entitled Solomon Y. Mayor versus Jose J. Mayor,
on February 21, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff; and
(4) Civil Case No. V-1639, entitled Philippine National Bank versus Sps.
Mariano and Olivia Silverio, on April 11, 2008 and July 9, 2008, as counsel for the
defendants.
Atty. Buffe herself was furnished a copy of our November 11, 2008 En Banc Resolution and she filed a
Manifestation (received by the Court on February 2, 2009) acknowledging receipt of our November 11,
2008 Resolution. She likewise stated that her appearances are part of Branch 81 records. As well, she
informed the Court that she had previously taken the following judicial remedies in regard to the above
query:
1. SCA No. 089119028 (Annex C), filed with Branch 54 of the
RTC Manila, which had been dismissed without prejudice on July 23, 2008 (Annex D)
a recourse taken when undersigned was still a private practitioner;
2. SCA No. 08120423 (Annex A), filed with Branch 17 of the
RTC of Manila, which had been also dismissed (with or without prejudice) on
December 4, 2008 (Annex B) a recourse taken when undersigned was already
a public prosecutor appearing before the same Branch 81, after she took her
oath of office as such on August 15, 2008.[Emphasis supplied]
She also made known her intent to elevate the dismissal of the above cases so that eventually, the Honorable
Supreme Court may put to rest the legal issue/s presented in the above petitions which is, why is it that R.A. No.
6713, Sec. 7 (b)(2) and last par. thereof, apparently contains an express prohibition (valid or invalid) on the private
practice of undersigneds law profession, before Branch 81, while on the other hand not containing a similar, express
prohibition in regard to undersigneds practice of profession, before the same court, as a public prosecutor within
the supposedly restricted 1-year period?
OUR ACTION AND RULING
Preliminary Considerations
As we stated at the outset, this administrative matter confronts us, not merely with the task of
determining how the Court will respond to the query, both with respect to the substance and form (as
the Court does not give interpretative opinions[9] but can issue circulars and regulations relating to
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts[10] and in the exercise of its administrative supervision over
all courts and personnel thereof[11]), but also with the task of responding to admitted violations of Section
7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 and to multiple recourses on the same subject.
After our directive to the Office of the Court Administrator to issue a circular on the subject
of the query for the guidance of all personnel in the Judiciary, we consider this aspect of the present
administrative matter a finished task, subject only to confirmatory closure when the OCA reports the
completion of the undertaking to us.
Atty. Buffes admitted appearance, before the very same branch she served and immediately
after her resignation, is a violation that we cannot close our eyes to and that she cannot run away from
under the cover of the letter-query she filed and her petition for declaratory relief, whose dismissal she
manifested she would pursue up to our level. We note that at the time she filed her letter-query (on March
4, 2008), Atty. Buffe had already appeared before Branch 81 in at least three (3) cases. The terms of Section
7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her in any way and her misgivings about the fairness of the law
cannot excuse any resulting violation she committed. In other words, she took the risk of appearing before
her own Branch and should suffer the consequences of the risk she took.
Nor can she hide behind the two declaratory relief petitions she filed, both of which were
dismissed, and her intent to elevate the dismissal to this Court for resolution. The first, filed before the
RTC, Branch 54, Manila, was dismissed on July 23, 2008 because the court declined to exercise the power
to declare rights as prayed for in the petition, as any decision that may be rendered will be inutile and will
not generally terminate the uncertainty or controversy.[12] The second, filed with the RTC, Branch
17, Manila, was dismissed for being an inappropriate remedy after the dismissal ordered by the RTC,
Branch 54, Manila, on December 4, 2008.[13] Under these circumstances, we see nothing to deter us from
ruling on Atty. Buffes actions, as no actual court case other than the present administrative case, is now
actually pending on the issue she raised. On the contrary, we see from Atty. Buffes recourse to this Court
and the filing of the two declaratory petitions the intent to shop for a favorable answer to her query. We
shall duly consider this circumstance in our action on the case.
A last matter to consider before we proceed to the merits of Atty. Buffes actions relates to
possible objections on procedural due process grounds, as we have not made any formal directive to Atty.
Buffe to explain why she should not be penalized for her appearance before Branch 81 soon after her
resignation from that Branch. The essence of due process is the grant of the opportunity to be heard; what
it abhors is the lack of the opportunity to be heard.[14] The records of this case show that Atty. Buffe has
been amply heard with respect to her actions. She was notified, and she even responded to our November
11, 2008 directive for the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to report on Atty. Buffes appearances
before Branch 81; she expressly manifested that these appearances were part of the Branch records. Her
legal positions on these appearances have also been expressed before this Court; first, in her original letter-
query, and subsequently, in her Manifestation. Thus, no due process consideration needs to deter us from
considering the legal consequences of her appearances in her previous Branch within a year from her
resignation.
The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public
officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the
practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by
the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or
her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or
employees resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of
profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition
period.As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any
matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust;
and serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions
between a former government official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or
superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use of every moment of the
prescribed office hours to serve the public.[15]
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only
prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also
applies. The latter provision provides the definitive rule on the outside employment that an incumbent
court official or court employee may undertake in addition to his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it
complies with all of the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that
practices law before the courts or conducts business with the
Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal
working hours and is not incompatible with the performance of the
court personnels duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of
law; Provided, however, that court personnel may render services as
professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or
continuing education centers or similar institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court
personnel to disclose confidential information acquired while
performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or
executive branch of government, unless specifically authorized by
the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or
where the outside employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary,
the court personnel shall not accept outside employment. [Emphasis supplied]
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of
law is covered; the practice of law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically mentions any
outside employment requiring the practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,[16] we defined the practice of law
as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. [17] Under both provisions, a
common objective is to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may wittingly or
unwittingly use confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity with
court personnel still with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel ceases to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of
R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to the extent discussed above. Atty. Buffes situation falls under Section
7.
Atty. Buffes Situation
A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffes admission that she immediately
engaged in private practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of
R.A. No. 6713. We find it noteworthy, too, that she is aware of this provision and only objects to its
application to her situation; she perceives it to be unfair that she cannot practice before her old office
Branch 81 for a year immediately after resignation, as she believes that her only limitation is in matters
where a conflict of interest exists between her appearance as counsel and her former duties as Clerk of
Court. She believes that Section 7 (b)(2) gives preferential treatment to incumbent public officials and
employees as against those already separated from government employment.
Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she interprets Section 7
(b)(2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. We reiterate what we have
explained above, that the general rule under Section 7 (b)(2) is to bar public officials and employees from
the practice of their professions; it is unlawful under this general rule for clerks of court to practice their
profession. By way of exception, they can practice their profession if the Constitution or the law allows
them, but no conflict of interest must exist between their current duties and the practice of their
profession. As we also mentioned above, no chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their
profession, as they are in fact expressly prohibited by Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel from doing so. Under both the general rule and the exceptions, therefore, Atty. Buffes
basic premise is misplaced.
As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately
after her separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions
under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of courts limitation is that she cannot practice her profession
within one year before the office where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned,
retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or employee, on the
other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used
to work with and only for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where
specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of interests
exists. This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffes basic premises.
A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffes approach to Section 7 (b)(2) is her awareness of the law
and her readiness to risk its violation because of the unfairness she perceives in the law. We find it
disturbing that she first violated the law before making any inquiry. She also justifies her position by
referring to the practice of other government lawyers known to her who, after separation from their
judicial employment, immediately engaged in the private practice of law and appeared as private counsels
before the RTC branches where they were previously employed. Again we find this a cavalier attitude on
Atty. Buffes part and, to our mind, only emphasizes her own willful or intentional disregard of Section 7
(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as unlawful, Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR
LEGAL PROCESSES
xxx
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
As indicated by the use of the mandatory word shall, this provision must be strictly complied with. Atty.
Buffe failed to do this, perhaps not with an evil intent, considering the misgivings she had about Section 7
(b)(2)s unfairness. Unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, however, does not necessarily require
the element of criminality, although the Rule is broad enough to include it. [18] Likewise, the presence of
evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential to bring his or her act or omission within the terms of
Rule 1.01, when it specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct. [19] Thus, we find Atty.
Buffe liable under this quoted Rule.
We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her lawyers oath and thereby violated Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and unlawfully practised law within the prohibited
period by appearing before the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis supplied]
By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed the footsteps of the models she
cited and wanted to replicate the former court officials who immediately waded into practice in the very
same court they came from. She, like they, disgraced the dignity of the legal profession by openly disobeying
and disrespecting the law.[20] By her irresponsible conduct, she also eroded public confidence in the law
and in lawyers.[21] Her offense is not in any way mitigated by her transparent attempt to cover up her
transgressions by writing the Court a letter-query, which she followed up with unmeritorious petitions for
declaratory relief, all of them dealing with the same Section 7 (b)(2) issue, in the hope perhaps that at some
point she would find a ruling favorable to her cause. These are acts whose implications do not promote
public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. [22]
Considering Atty. Buffes ready admission of violating Section 7(b)(2), the principle of res ipsa
loquitur finds application, making her administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[23] In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without
further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the
basis for the determination of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro,[24] the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after
considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast
dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare.
In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts
that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the
astronomical sums they claimed in their cases.[25] The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the
basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into
the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.[26]
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy,[27] that no evidentiary hearing is
required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established by the
facts on record.
We applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur once more in In re: Wenceslao Laureta[28] where we
punished a lawyer for grave professional misconduct solely based on his answer to a show-cause order for
contempt and without going into a trial-type hearing. We ruled then that due process is satisfied as long
as the opportunity to be heard is given to the person to be disciplined. [29]
Likewise in Zaldivar v. Gonzales,[30] the respondent was disciplined and punished for contempt for his slurs
regarding the Courts alleged partiality, incompetence and lack of integrity on the basis of his answer in a
show-cause order for contempt. The Court took note that the respondent did not deny making the
negative imputations against the Court through the media and even acknowledged the correctness of his
degrading statements. Through a per curiam decision, we justified imposing upon him the penalty of
suspension in the following tenor:
The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of
disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of
admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly
tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice
constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary
 action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the
contempt power.[31]
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an
errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as
the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe
has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query and
Manifestation filed before this Court.
A member of the bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[32] The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. [33]
In this case, we cannot discern any mitigating factors we can apply, save OCATs observation
that Atty Buffes letter-query may really reflect a misapprehension of the parameters of the prohibition on
the practice of the law profession under Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713. Ignorance of the law, however,
is no excuse, particularly on a matter as sensitive as practice of the legal profession soon after ones
separation from the service. If Atty. Buffe is correct in the examples she cited, it is time to ring the bell
and to blow the whistle signaling that we cannot allow this practice to continue.
As we observed earlier,[34] Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the simultaneous use of various fora
in expressing her misgivings about the perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A. 6713. She formally lodged
a query with the Office of the Court Administrator, and soon after filed her successive petitions for
declaratory relief. Effectively, she exposed these fora to the possibility of embarrassment and confusion
through their possibly differing views on the issue she posed. Although this is not strictly the forum-
shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she has done is something that we cannot help but consider
with disfavor because of the potential damage and embarrassment to the Judiciary that it could have
spawned. This is a point against Atty. Buffe that cancels out the leniency we might have exercised because
of the OCATs observation about her ignorance of and misgivings on the extent of the prohibition after
separation from the service.
Under the circumstances, we find that her actions merit a penalty of fine of P10,000.00, together
with a stern warning to deter her from repeating her transgression and committing other acts of
professional misconduct.[35] This penalty reflects as well the Courts sentiments on how seriously
the retired, resigned or separated officers and employees of the Judiciary should regard and
observe the prohibition against the practice of law with the office that they used to work
with.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of
professional misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00),
and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of this violation and the commission of other acts of
professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.
PNB v CEDO
BIDIN, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National Bank charged
respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of
complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which respondent
during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging the sale of
steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even
"noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy
authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action
arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the employ of complainant bank, appeared
as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by complainant
bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and dishonesty, respondent
appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant’s Asset Management
Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda
with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued between
complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented
by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy
but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he did not
participate in the litigation of the case before the trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda
spouses, respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the
law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually
handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a general partnership
with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein. They are only using the aforesaid
name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office as
well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own cases independently and
individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was previously fined by
this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs.
Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner
Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully substantiated. Respondent's
averment that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant
consideration in the light of the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of
the hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer,
and although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and
argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the application for a writ of injunction in the
same case, respondent impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record
that respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself a violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the client’s secrets and confidential records
and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to devise ways and
means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to
see the legal weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his
professional service. In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in
consideration of the money he expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994, submitted to
this Court its Report and recommendation in this case, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of
Governors. On December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this
Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took into
consideration the aforesaid pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize the
paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case of Pasay
Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal
Prosecutor of PARGO who participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo
Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court,
citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with
him, that even if respondent did not use against his client any information or
evidence acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy
to information regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was later
litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that
triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical
injuries. This Court's remarks inHilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations,
a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and
well-known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings
between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the
revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further
prejudice the complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former
client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their
previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the
other side in the forcible entry case. In the case of Hilado vs. David, supra, this
Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct,
but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, of good
taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the
rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like
Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double dealing. Only thus can litigants. be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to respondent in the
case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel
for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he formerly
handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on
one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires
him to oppose.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO from the
practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in Metro
Manila.
PCGG v SANDIGAN
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the
efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on
the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it
to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank.[1] It was later found by the
Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related
interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as
uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which
reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its
financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, and ordering its liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held from
March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. [5] Subsequently, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying
for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of
Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of
President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan,
Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan
Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung
Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William
T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied
Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune
Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development
Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp.,
Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo
Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan.[6]In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship
and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. [7] After the filing of the
parties comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These
cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were
represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his
private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General[10] and
counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza
allegedly intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as
then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about
GENBANKs liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for
assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a
resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. [11] It found
that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendozas former
function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that
respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during
his term as Solicitor General.[12] It further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No.
6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public
official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used
to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. [13] The PCGG
did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayans Second
Division to the Fifth Division.[15] In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent
Mendoza.[16] It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that
the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The
PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5,
2001.[17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [18] The PCGG alleged that the Fifth
Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a
former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the
objection to respondent Mendozas appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case
No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.[19]
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import
and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the
government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
the said service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive
in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes
of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for
their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It
underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client.
The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an
obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the
lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to
lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ
markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and
procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and
continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early
America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from
colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation
was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be
fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period:
the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. [20]
The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethics in the United States.
By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the
drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct
for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second
half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George
Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties.
These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of
understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the
Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the do no falsehood oath
and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly,
limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence,
loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the
attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the
likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-
revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a
lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's
duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics. [21]
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide
lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical
standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance
from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the
statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar
association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar
association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to
the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar
associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth
century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial
predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar
Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of
conduct for their members.[22]
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The
1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for the
American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. [23]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain
the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine
Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. [24]
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons.
Among their concerns was the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and others temporarily
enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they
can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service. [25] These concerns were
classified as adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts. Adverse-interest
conflicts exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private
practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government
and the interests of the current and former are adverse. [26] On the other hand, congruent-interest
representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government
lawyers.[27] For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons,
individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added
thirteen new canons.[28] To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was
minted which disqualified them both for adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest representation
conflicts.[29] The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyers largely
discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government
client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice
clients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has
previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not,
after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated
or passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46
and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons
needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation
of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended
that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between
the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in
the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in
unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with
the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility
were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must
adhere.[34] In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)[35] became the applicable supplementary norm. The
drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in
August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code.[36]
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite
standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus,
in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model
Rules used the restatement format, where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments
following each rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement
because the only enforceable standards were the black letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad
canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules
and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number
of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.[37] In particular, the ABA
did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the
subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite nature.[38]
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a
proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for
approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to
conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former
government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2,
Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase investigated and
passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both adverse-interest
conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists
a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing
respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred to in the
rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the intervention made by the former government lawyer on
the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any discrete,
isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific
party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of intervention by
respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of
respondent Mendoza as constituting the matter where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:[40]
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing
the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to
proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of
Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key
officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy
Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special
Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano
and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they
averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who
advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said
memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the
following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies
and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31,
1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition
so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the
bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing
decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary
Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the
liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was
shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order
to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the banks liquidation. The pertinent
portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the
subject memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and
Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination
Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a
report on the current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co.,
dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings
Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting,
pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007,
a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its
attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor
General for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in
the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation
and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. In fine, the Court should resolve
whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included
within the concept of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white
in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head of
the appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the
condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall
be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the
Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the
department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall
designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking
or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as
expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the
benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but
not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the
bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or
cannot resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it
shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
 liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General,
file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken
and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall
have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such
institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The
Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized
competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the
receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator
shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or
otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the
debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary
in the appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the
Monetary Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall
be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof
that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction
shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under
this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing
proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and
the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is
pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the
court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved
upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central
Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or
plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer
by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New
Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction
contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as
they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall
not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced
by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the
appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary
Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As
amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK
is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal
Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law
are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said
act of respondent Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves.
It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The
matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by
law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in
the then Court of First Instance. The subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not
the same nor is related to but is different from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096.
Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied
Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK.
Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized
Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK.
GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of
its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation
of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply
to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil
Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03.
Intervene means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or
come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on
both sides of an intervening river . . .)[41]
On the other hand, intervention is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may
affect the interests of others.[42]
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under the first
interpretation, intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or
has no effect or little influence.[43] Under the second interpretation, intervene only includes an act of a
person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings.[44] We hold that this second meaning is
more appropriate to give to the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the
government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as x x x drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36
provided that a former government lawyer should not, after his retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase which he has investigated or passed upon resulted in
unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR
9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service,
had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR
1.11(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory
pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For
another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent
proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed
for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the
court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to
assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court
is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the
usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort
on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a
take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the
legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and
application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal
importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment
of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by
the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation. The observation
is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer
present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income
in private practice.[45] Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service
would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice
of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become
associated to be disqualified.[46] Indeed, to make government service more difficult to exit can only make
it less appealing to enter.[47]
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass
opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the
rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia has noted the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay
proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent,
and observed that the tactic was so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent
judicial and academic commentary.[48] Even the United States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the
Court of Appeals description of disqualification motions as a dangerous game. [49] In the case at bar,
the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of
respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years and
only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled
motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently
remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least, the
circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioners motive
as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice
to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a
disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual
lawyer in whom the client has confidence. [51] The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often
without the benefit of the work done by the latter.[52] The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose
an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the
rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof.
Morgan: An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving
the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be
in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private
employment does not enjoy such freedom.[53] He adds: Any system that affects the right to take a new job
affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official independence. [54] The
case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent
Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed
with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to
recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend
officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor
General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer
of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of
a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm. [55] Former government lawyers
stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of improprietyand loss of public confidence in
government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative
exercise at best[56] which can lead to untoward results.[57] No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the
lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free
flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to
protect.[58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct[59] and some courts have abandoned per se disqualification based
on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of
the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.[60]
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors
lawyers who switch sides. It is claimed that switching sides carries the danger that former government
employee may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does
not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the
Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject
matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in
Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not
inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the case at bar. For
there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working
against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action
of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide
instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of
respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching
of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of
loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service.[61] The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans
to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to
prosecute less vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960:
The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well occur during the period of
employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government policies. [63] Prof. Morgan,
however, considers this concern as probably excessive.[64] He opines x x x it is hard to imagine that a
private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client the
government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the best government lawyers
the ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates. [65] But again, this
particular concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza
that he advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents
Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and
respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
 Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the excessive
influence of former officials or their clout.[66] Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern
too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: Much of what appears to be an employees influence
may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon
departure from government x x x.[67] More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to those
sitting in government. To quote him further: x x x The idea that, present officials make significant decisions
based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the present officials than about their former
co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified
or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to
avoid even the appearance of favoritism.[68]

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong
of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr.
Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly
so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03
has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent
Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At
bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period
and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and
our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.