United States Supreme Court

WILSON V Girard, (1957)

No. 1103
Argued: July 8, 1957 Decided: July 11, 1957

FACTS:
Girard (defendant) was a United States Army Specialist stationed in Japan. He was
engaged in an exercise with his unit in an area where Japanese civilians were retrieving
expended cartridge cases. Girard had a grenade launcher on his rifle. He placed an
expended cartridge case on the rifle, and launched it by firing a blank. The case struck
and killed a Japanese civilian woman. The United States notified Japan that it would be
delivering Girard to Japan for trial. Japan indicted Girard for causing death by wounding.
Girard petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in U.S federal district court, but his petition
was denied. However, he was granted declaratory relief and an injunction was issued
against his delivery to Japan. Wilson (plaintiff) appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. Girard filed a cross-petition for certiorari to review the denial of his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. claiming he was held unlawfully by the Army. This was denied by
the district court, but the district court did enjoin the Army from handing him over to the
Japanese. Both sides appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Does a sovereign nation have exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws
committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its
jurisdiction?
HELD:
The court first noted the principle that a sovereign nation always has exclusive
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes in its territory, unless it consents to prosecution by some
other authority. The court then cited the U.S.-Japan SOFA for the conditions of Japan's
consent to U.S. jurisdiction in this case. One of those conditions was that the U.S. could
waive its jurisdiction, which is what the U.S. did in this case. Japan's cession to the
United States of jurisdiction to try American military personnel for conduct constituting
an offense against the laws of both countries was conditioned by the protocol
agreement, which provided that "the authorities of the state having the primary right
shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other state
for a waiver of its right in cases where that other state considers such a waiver to be of
particular importance." The court then stated that it saw no constitutional problems with
such a diplomatic agreement, and that therefore the "wisdom" of such agreements are
completely within the realm of the political branches. The court upheld the district court's
denial of habeas corpus, and reversed the injunction. This cleared the way for the
Executive Branch to hand Girard over to the Japanese.

Blackmer v. United States

284 U.S 421 (1932)
Argued: January 5,6, 1932 Decided: February 15, 1932

FACTS:

Harry M. Blackmer was a United States citizen resident in Paris. Blackmer was found
guilty of contempt by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for refusing to
appear as a witness for the United States in a criminal trial, which is related to
the Teapot Dome Scandal, after being subpoenaed.

Blackmer was subsequently fined $30,000 and the costs of the court. Blackmer
challenged the fine under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The Court unanimously ruled against Blackmer, with Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes delivering the judgment and opinion of the Court and Justice Owen Josephus
Roberts not participating.

Chief Justice Hughes, in delivering the opinion of the Court, stated "[n]or can it be
doubted that the United States possesses the power inherent in sovereignty to require
the return to this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the public interest
requires it, and to penalize him in case of refusal." Also, "[i]t is also beyond controversy
that one of the duties which the citizen owes to his government is to support the
administration of justice by attending its courts and giving his testimony whenever he is
properly summoned."

ISSUE:

Must there be due process for the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in personam?

HELD:

Yes. For the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in personam, there must be due process.
Due process requires appropriate notice of the judicial action and an opportunity to be
heard. The statute provides that when the presence of a citizen of the United States
who resides abroad is required in court, a subpoena be issued addressed to a consul of
the United States. The consul must serve the subpoena on the witness personally with
a tender of traveling expenses. Upon proof of such service and of the failure of the
witness to appear, a court order may be issued. If the witness fails to comply with the
court order, the court may adjudge the witness guilty of contempt. Congress acted
pursuant to its authority in enacting the statute and it could prescribe a penalty to
enforce it. Affirmed

The Wildenhus’ Case

120 U.S 1 (1887)

Argued : December 7, 1886 Decided January 10, 1887

FACTS:

Wildenhus, a Belgian national and crewmember on board a Belgian ship docked at

Jersey City in the United States, killed a fellow crewmember and Belgian national
onboard the ship. Local American police arrested Wildenhus and detained him and two
other Belgian crewmembers as witnesses. The Belgian consul applied for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to Article 11 of the Convention Concerning the Rights,
Privileges, and Immunities of Consular Officers between the United States and Belgium.
This Convention provided that the consuls of a home State should exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over the internal matters affecting that State’s vessels, regardless of whether
the vessel is located within a foreign State’s territory. However, the Convention provided
that when a matter is of such a nature as to disturb the peace and tranquility of the local
State, that State’s authorities may exercise jurisdiction over the matter without
interference from the home State. The circuit court refused to grant the Belgian consul’s
application for a writ of habeas corpus, and the consul appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Does the sovereignty of the home of the ship deal with disorders which disturbs only the
peace of the ship of those on board and does the proper authorities of the local
jurisdiction punish those who disturb public peace?

HELD:

Yes, the sovereignty of the home of the ship deals with disorders that disturbs only the
peace of the ship or those on board but the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction
punishes those that disturb public peace. The court affirmed the circuit court's denial of
the writ and found that the onboard incident was such that it disturbed the onshore
public peace, despite the fact that only those on the ship witnessed the incident. The
felonious homicide was a subject for the local jurisdiction, and the consul had no right to
interfere to prevent the proper local authorities from proceeding with the case in a
regular way. As such, Convention Concerning the Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of
Consular Officers, Mar. 9, 1880, U.S.-Belg., art. XI, 21 Stat. 776, 781 did not entitle the
consul to take custody of the sailor. The sailor was not entitled to be discharged from
his incarceration.

Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.

509 U.S 155 (1993)

FACTS:

The ouster of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in September of 1991 created a deluge

of refugees who attempted to flee their Haitian homeland by boat but, ultimately, were
turned back by the Coast Guard, which systematically interdicted them on the high
seas. This interdiction program was the result of a bilateral agreement entered into in
1981 between the United States and Haiti, then ruled by Jean-Claude Duvalier, who
continued the regime created by his father, Francois Duvalier. However, the bilateral
agreement, Executive Order No. 12,324 3 and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service's Guidelines 4 (INS Guidelines) promulgated to effectuate the interdiction
program all provided that those who were accorded political refugee status would not be
returned to Haiti. 5 Pursuant to the INS Guidelines, Haitians interdicted on the high seas
were to be interviewed at sea to determine if they were political refugees with a credible
fear of persecution. If a refugee was found to have a credible fear of persecution, he
would be "screened in" and permitted to enter the United States to apply for political
asylum. The others were "screened out" and repatriated to Haiti. Later, in November
1991, the United States opened the base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for the purpose of
interviewing interdictees.
On May 24, 1992, President George Bush, by Executive Order No. 12,807
(Kennebunkport Order), terminated the screening process and allowed the Coast Guard
to interdict Haitians on the high seas and immediately return them to Haiti without
determining whether they qualify as refugees. The Haitian Centers Council, Inc., a
collection of organizations representing illegal Haitian aliens and Haitian detained at
Guantanamo, requested that the District Court for the Easter Distric of New York delay
the implementation of the order. The council argued that the order violated sec 243(H)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and Article 33 of the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees which protect individuals escaping potential
prosecution from forced repatriation. The District Court denied the council’s request, but
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.

ISSUE:

Is Executive No 12807 a violation of section 243 (h) or Article 33?

HELD:

No. In a majority opinion, the Court observed that Acts of Congress do not generally
have application outside of the United States territory, unless explicitly noted. It also
found that both section 243(h) and Article 33 are silent regarding extraterritorial
application, in fact, the language of both suggests that only individuals who have
already arrived on the United States soil are protected, and their use throughout history
confirms this interpretation. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

Rodriguez v. United States

575 U.S (2015)

FACTS:
On the evening of March 27, 2012, Dennys Rodriguez was stopped by a police officer
on a highway near Waterloo, Nebraska, after the officer observed him swerve out of his
lane of traffic. When the officer approached the vehicle, he reported an “overwhelming”
scent of air-fresheners emanating from the car. After questioning Rodriguez and
another passenger in the car, the officer placed a call for backup and conducted a
records check on the vehicle’s passenger. The officer handed a warning ticket to
Rodriguez, and then proceeded to walk Floyd, his drug detection dog, around the
outside of Rodriguez’s vehicle. When the dog indicated the presence of drugs, the
officer searched the car and discovered methamphetamine inside the vehicle. The
officer reported that approximately seven or eight minutes passed between the time he
issued the warning ticket to the time at which the dog indicated the presence of drugs.

Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence found in the search, claiming the dog
search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The
District Court denied the motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the search was constitutional because the brief delay
before employing the dog did not unreasonably prolong the otherwise lawful stop.

Issue:

Is the use of a K-9 unit, after the conclusion of a traffic stop and without reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on
unreasonable search and seizures?

HELD:

Yes, the Court held that the use of a K-9 unit after the completion of an otherwise lawful
traffic stop exceeded the time reasonably required to handle the matter and therefore
violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Because the mission of the stop determines its allowable duration, the
authority for the stop ends when the mission has been accomplished. The Court held
that a seizure unrelated to the reason for the stop is lawful only so long as it does not
measurably extend the stop’s duration. Although the use of a K-9 unit may cause only a
small extension of the stop, it is not fairly characterized as connected to the mission of
an ordinary traffic stop and therefore unlawful.

United States v. Pizzarusso

388 F 2d. 8 (2d CIR 1968)

FACTS:

Pizzarusso, a citizen of Canada, was taken into custody in New york, indicted, and
convicted of the crime of knowingly making a false statement under oath in a visa
application to an American consular official located in Canada in violation of a United
States statute. Under 18 USC, Section 1546, whoever knowingly makes under oath
any false statement with respect to a material fact in any application for a visa violates
this law. The District Court of New York found that each of the false statements made
by Pizzarusso was patently material to the matter at hand. Pizzarusso appealed.

ISSUE:

Does a stated have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct outside its territory that threaten its security as a state or the operation of its
governmental functions?

HELD:

Yes. International law has recognized, in varying degrees, five bases of jurisdiction with
respect to the enforcement of the criminal law. The protective principle covers the
instant case. By virtue of this theory a state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
attaching legal consequences to conduct outside its territory that threatens its security
as a state or the operation of its governmental functions, provided the conduct is
generally recognized as a crime under the law of states that have reasonably developed
legal systems. A violation of section 1546 is complete at the time the alien perjures
himself in the foreign country. It may be possible that the particular criminal sanctions of
section 1546 will never be enforced unless the defendant enters the country as
Pizzarusso did in the case at bar, but entry is not an element of the statutory offense.

United States v Alvarez-Machain

504 U.S 655 (1992)

FACTS:

Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez) (defendant), a Mexican citizen and resident was

indicted in United States federal district court for participating in the kidnapping and
murder of United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) special agent Enrique
Camarena-Salazar (Camarena) and a Mexican pilot working with Camarena, Alfredo
Zavala-Avelar. On April 2, 1990, Alvarez, a doctor, was forcibly kidnapped from his
medical office in Guadalajara, Mexico and flowed to El Paso, Texas where he was
arrested by DEA officials and indicted. Alvarez moved to dismiss the indictment by
claiming that his abduction constituted outrageous government conduct and that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to try him because he was abducted in violation of the
Extradition Treaty of 1979 between the United States and Mexico. The district court
rejected Alvarez’s outrageous government conduct claim, but ruled that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case because Alvarez had been abducted in violation of the
Extradition Treaty. The district court ordered that Alvarez be repatriated to Mexico. The
United States government (plaintiff) appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed
dismissal of the indictment and repatriation of Alvarez. The court of appeals held that
although not expressly prohibited by the Extradition Treaty, forcible abduction violated
the purpose of the treaty. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

ISSUE:

Does the presence of an extradition treaty between the United States and another
country not necessarily preclude obtaining a citizen of that nation through abduction?

HELD:
No. The presence of an extradition treaty between the U.S and another country
does not necessarily preclude obtaining a citizen of that nation through abduction. It has
been established that abduction, in and of itself, does not invalidate prosecution against
a foreign national. The only question to be answered is whether the abduction violates
any extradition treaty that may be in effect between the U.S. and the nation in which the
abductee was to be found. The international law applies only to situations where no
extradition treaty exists, so it is irrelevant here. Since the extradition treaty does not
prohibit an abduction as it occurred in this case, then it is not illegal.

Government of the United States of America v. Guillermo G. Puruganan and Mark

B. Jimenez a.k.a Mario Batacan Crespo
Gr. No 148571, September 24, 2002

FACTS:
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v.
Ralph C. Lantion where the court held that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on 18 May 2001, the appropriate
Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case 01192061. The Petition
alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on 15 April 1999.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed that Jimenez’s application for an arrest
warrant be set for hearing. In its 23 May 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of
Jimenez and set the case for hearing on 5 June 2001. In that hearing, Jimenez
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the
accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a
warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on 15 June 2001. Thereafter,
the court below issued its 3 July 2001 Order, directing the issuance of warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1 million in cash. After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated 4 July 2001. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be
issued
Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings
are pending
HELD:
No.To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution
itself requires only the examination — under oath or affirmation — of complainants and
the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear
the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further

examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the act of
respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses
at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the
accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima
facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from
presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage — if he so desires — in his effort
to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a
prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial
of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of
extraditions.
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must
study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are
sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty
and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants
and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie
finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at
the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary
hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the
opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing
procedure will “best serve the ends of justice” in extradition cases.

No.Extradition cases are different from ordinary criminal proceedings. The constitutional
right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.”It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti in arguing that, constitutionally,
“[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law.”
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition
proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the
familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at
the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to
be heard. Where the circumstances — such as those present in an extradition case —
call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition
court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due
process and fundamental fairness.
 Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Felixberto Olalia Jr.
nad Juan Antonio Munoz
Gr. No. 153675, April 19, 2007

FACTS:
Juan ANtiono Munoz, who was charged before the Hongkong Court with 3 counts of the
offense of ‘accepting an advantage as an agent” conspiracy to defraud, was penalized
by a common law of Hong kong. A warrant of Arrest was issued and if convicted, he
may face jail terms. On September 23, 1999, he was arrested and detained.
On November 22, 1999, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with RTC of
Manila a petition for his extradition. Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which
Judge Felixberto Olalia granted.
Petitioner, filed a petition to vacate such order, but it was denied by the same judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post bail when there is
nothing in the Constitution or Statutory law providing a potential extraditee a right to bail
.
HELD:
The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person (Sec 2 Art II 1987 Constitution) have the obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty.
The rights of a prospective extradite to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of the human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty.
While our extradition law does not provide for grant of bail to an extradite, however,
there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due
process under the Constitution.
The time honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor
its obligations under the Extradition treaty it entered into with Hongkong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our
foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.

Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion and Mark B. Jimenez

 GR No. 139465, October 17, 2000

FACTS:
On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs a request fro the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest , and other supporting documents for
said extradition were attached along with the request. The charges include conspiracy
to commit offense or to defraud the U.S, attempt to evade or defeat tatx, Fraud by wire,
radio or television, false statement or entries, election contribution in name of another.
The department of Justice, through a designated panel proceeded with the technical
evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters
needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents
included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it.
The secretary of Justice denied request on the ground that first. he found it premature to
secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. AT that point in time, the
DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the
relevant law (PD 1069-Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty)
have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the
documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
Secondly, the U.S requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the
information in the documents. Finally, country is bound to Vieenna convention on law of
treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties. The respondent filed
for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and
obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty?
HELD:
No. The U.S and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and
punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both States accord common due
process protection to their respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesn’t
fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice nad hearing in the Sec. 3
rules 112 of the Rules of Court.
 Justice Serafin R. Cuevas v. Juan Antonio Munoz
GR No. 145020, December 18, 2000
FACTS:

The Hong Kong Magistrate’s Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Munoz for
accepting bribes in violation of a HK ordinance and for conspiring to defraud. Later, the
Philippines DOJ was requested by the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit of the Hong Kong
DOJ for the provisional arrest of Munoz pursuant to the RP-HK Extradition Agreement.
The request was forwarded to the NBI. Subsequently, a warrant for the arrest of Munoz
was issued by the RTC. Munoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus assailing the validity of the Order of Arrest, which the CA granted on the ff.
grounds: 1) that the request was unauthenticated and mere facsimile copies which are
insufficient to form a basis for its issuance; 2) that the 20 day period under PD 1069 or
the Philippine extradition law was not amended by the RP-HK extradition agreement
which provides for a 45 day period for provisional arrest; 3) the judge issued it without
having personally determined the existence of probable cause; and 4) the requirement
of dual criminality under the Philippine extradition law has not been satisfied as the
crimes complained of are not punishable by Philippine laws.

Cuevas, as Sec. of DOJ filed the instant petition. Munoz filed for release
contending that since he has been detained beyond 20 days, the maximum for the
provisional arrest, without a request for extradition being received by the DOJ, he
should be released. Cuevas, on the other hand, avers that: i) The Philippine DOJ had
already received a formal request for extradition; ii) There was urgency for the
provisional arrest; iii) The municipal law does not subordinate an international
agreement; iv) The supporting documents for the request need not be authenticated; v)
There was factual and legal bases in determining probable cause; vi) The offense of
accepting an advantage as an agent is punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisional warrant of arrest issued by the RTC was void.

HELD:

Sec. 20 of PD 1069 provides that the requesting state may, pursuant to the
relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the
provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition. In
urgent cases, the person sought may, in accordance with the law of the requested
Party, be provisionally arrested on the application of the requesting Party. There was
urgency in the present case as there was a concern of Munoz being a flight risk if he will
be informed of the pending request for extradition especially given the fact that if he will
be found guilty of the charges against him, the penalties are of such gravity as to
increase the probability of Munoz absconding if allowed provisional liberty. Sec. 20
(d) of PD 1069 provides that if within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs has not received the request for extradition, the accused
shall be released from custody. While the RP-HK Extradition Agreement provides for 45
days. Cuevas’ argument that the latter agreement amended PD 1069 has been
rendered moot and academic by the fact that the Phil. DOJ had already received a
request for extradition as early as 12 days after his provisional arrest. Contrary to
Munoz’s contention, the request for extradition need not be filed in court, rather only
need be received by the requested state. The request, as well as the accompanying
documents, is valid despite lack of authentication. The pertinent extradition law does
not provide for a requirement of authentication for the provisional arrest.
Moreover, the authenticated copies of the decision or sentence imposed upon Munoz
by HK and the warrant of arrest has already been received by the Phil. Furthermore, the
extradition agreement only requires authentication for the request of extradition and not
for the provisional arrest.

Provisional arrest is a solution to the impending risk of flight as the process of

preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents is time-
consuming and leakage-prone. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting state
to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable or facsimile. The temporary
hold on private respondent’s privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right
to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to
resist the request for his extradition to HK. There is no denial of due process as long as
fundamental fairness is assured a party. As to Munoz’ contention that it should be the
Foreign Diplomat who should send the request for provisional arrest, as required by PD
1069, the invoked provision only provides for the request for extradition and not the
provisional arrest. There is sufficient compliance with the law if the request for
provisional arrest is made by an official who is authorized by the government of the
requesting state to make such a request and the authorization is communicated to the
requested state.

There was sufficient factual and legal basis for the determination of probable
cause as a requisite for the issuance of the Order of Arrest. Probable cause is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to
be arrested. The judge sufficiently complied with the requirement of personal
determination if he reviews the information and the documents attached thereto, and on
the basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of the crime with
which he is being charged. He need not examine personally the complainant and the
witnesses.