Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)

Neopopulism and Its Limits in Collor's Brazil

Author(s): Francisco Panizza
Source: Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 19, No. 2, Special Issue: Old and New
Populism in Latin America (Apr., 2000), pp. 177-192
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)
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 BULLETIN OF
LATIN AMERICAN
RESEARCH

PERGAMON Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192 ================

Neopopulism and its limits in Collor's Brazil

Francisco Panizza*
Government Department, London School of Economies and Political Science, Houghton Street,
London WC2A 2AE, UK

Abstract

The election of Fernando Collor de Mello as President of Brazil in 1989 was regarded as part
of a new wave of neopopulist leaders in contemporary Latin America. The article explores the
conditions of emergence of Collor's neopopulist project, the nature of his appeal and the causes
of his downfall. The article argues that the emergence of Collor's neopopulist challenge was the
result of a crisis of representation in Brazil's fledging democratic order. The article concludes
that Collor's demise from power in 1992 had to do with the precarious nature of his appeal and
his failure to ground his project in a new set of political institutions. ? 2000 Society for Latin
American Studies. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Discourse; Institutions; Liberal democracy; Populism; Neoliberalism; Neopopulism;

Representation (crisis of)

1. Introduction

In March 1990 a relatively unknown politician, Fernando Collor de Mello, was

installed as the first democratically elected President of Brazil in nearly 30 years. The
significance of the event was overshadowed by the new president's controversial
political style and by the way he had won the election. Ailegedly, the country's
conservative establishment 'manufactured' Collor as a candidate when faced with the
possibility of an electoral contest between two equally untrustworthy and unpalatable
candidates: The left-wing former trade unionist Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and the
veteran populist Leonel Brizola. Eventually, Collor, with the help of some dirty tricks
and the overwhelming support of the country's largest television network, the Rede
Globo, was able to snatch the narrowest of victories in a run-off against Lula.

* Corresponding author. Tel.: + 171-955-7681; fax: +171-831-1707.

E-mail address: f.e.panizza@lse.ac.uk (F. Panizza)

0261-3050/00/S20.00 ? 2000 Society for Latin American Studies. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.
All rights reserved.
PII: S0261-3050(99)00079-0

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178 F. Panizza / Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192

However, to claim that Collor's victory was a product ofthe power of TV Globo and
that he represented the country's conservative forces begs a number of questions
about the nature and the limitations of his political strategy.
In seeking to answer these questions this article explores the conditions
under which Collor's neopopulist project emerged, the nature of his appeal and the
causes of his downfall. The article argues that the emergence of Collor's neo?
populist challenge was the result of a crisis of representation in Brazil's fledging
democratic order. It further argues that Collor's neopopulism was rooted in the
plebiscitary nature of Brazil's presidential elections, in traditional popular alienation
from politics and in the populist content of his economic stabilisation plan. The
article concludes that Collor's demise had to do with the precarious nature
of his appeal and his failure to ground his project in a new set of political institutions.
The concluding section also discusses the implications of Collor's ill-fated political
project for a better understanding of the nature and limits of Latin America's
neopopulism.

2. Populism and neopopulism: conceptual similarities and contextual differences

Together with the likes of Peru's Alberto Fujimori and Argentina's Carlos Menem,
Collor has been regarded as a typical case of Latin American neopopulism.1 Beyond
obvious similarities in style, this common characterisation raises questions about
the concept of populism and about the relation between neopopulism and Latin
America's 'classical' post-war populism. On this latter point, it is my contention
that there are no conceptual differences between populism and neopopulism. Accord-
ingly, neopopulism is used here as a shorthand term for alluding to the historical
differences that distinguish Latin America's post-war populism from its more contem?
porary manifestations. However, the theoretical identification of the two concepts still
leaves open the question about what is meant here by populism, why it is pertinent to
identify certain political regimes as neopopulists and what the relationship is between
neopopulism and neoliberalism.
As Paul Cammack argues in this issue, populism may be seen as a matter of
ideology and discourse or as a substantive socio-economic programme. In the latter
line of thinking, populism in Latin America has been reduced to its post-war version.
Accordingly, this view emphasises the substantive relations between populist regimes
and the state-centred model of economic development that was in force in Latin
America for almost half a century.2 While populism was indeed historically associated
with the statist, inward-looking, post-war model of development, this is a narrow view

1 For a general discussion ofthe concept of neopopulism see Knight (1998), Philip (1998), Weyland (1996)
and Roberts (1995). For Menem see Novaro (1994), Nun (1994) and Palermo (1998a, p. 2). For Alan Garcia
and Alberto Fujimori in Peru see Kay (1996) and Checchi (1993).
2 For an economist view of populism see Dornsbuch and Edwards (1991). For an analysis of the politics
and economies of the state-centred matrix of economic development see Cavarozzi (1992).

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 F. Panizza / Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192 179

of populism that does not account for its occurrence elsewhere and at different points
in time. In contrast with this narrow, economic reductionist view of populism as
confined to post-war Latin America, the alternative ideological/discursive approach
understands populism as an anti-status quo discourse that simplifies the political
space by symbolically dividing society between 'the people' (as the 'underdogs') and
'its Other'. Needless to say, the identity of both 'the people' and 'the Other' are
political constructs, symbolically constituted through their antagonistic relationship
rather than sociological categories.3 The specific content of a given populist appeal
varies in accordance with the different ways this antagonistic relationship is defined.
'The Other', in opposition to 'the people', can be constituted in political or economic
terms or as a combination of both, signifying 'the oligarchy', 'the politicians', or
a dominant ethnic or religious group that is deemed to oppress the people and deny
their rights.
The discursive approach has the merit of defining populism as a form of political
representation. Social identities are constituted politically and, as the discursive
approach emphasises, at the heart of the populist appeal lies the imaginary constitu?
tion of popular identities in opposition to the established order.4 An anti-status quo
dimension is essential to populism, as the full constitution of popular identities
necessitates the symbolic disarticulation ofthe power block, that is ofthe Other' that
is deemed to oppress or exploit 'the people'. Populism's ideological appeal, however,
does not operate in isolation from its institutional and economic dimensions. Popu?
lism may be indelibly associated with the theatre of the crowds in the streets
encapsulated by the mythical 17 October 1945 in Argentina and the outpouring of
mass emotion that followed the publication of Vargas' testament in Brazil. But
populism encompasses more than mass mobilisations against an oppressive or illegit-
imate ruler. It also refers to populism as a type of political regime, such as those in
Argentina under Peron, Brazil under Vargas and Mexico under Cardenas, all of which
manifested personalist leadership and mass mobilisations together with significant
institution building.
Although populist movements in Latin America preceded the 1930s economic
crisis, most populist regimes emerged out of the crisis of economic and political
liberalism that marked the decade.5 In contrast, the neopopulism ofthe late 1980s and
1990s emerged in Latin America under political and economic circumstances that
were, on the surface, hardly conducive to neopopulism. After a long decade dominated
by military regimes, liberal democracy emerged in the 1980s as the politically and
ideologically hegemonic form of political representation. In contrast to populism's
dichotomy between the political space of 'the people' and 'the Other', modern
liberal democracy represents a complex political order based on pluralism and the

3 The classical formula tion ofa discursive theory of populism is Laclau (1977).
4I use the term 'imaginary' here in the way that Benedict Anderson uses it to define the nation: 'It is
imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members,
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds ofeach lives the image of their communion.' (Anderson, 1991,
p. 6, emphasis added)
5 For an extensive bibliography on traditional Latin American populism see Conniff(1999).

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180 F. Panizza / Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192

proliferation of differences. Unlike traditional populism's corporatist set-up of vertical

social institutions linked to the state, it favours autonomous political parties and
a strong civil society. With regard to economies, the free-market policies espoused by
liberals appear hardly to be compatible with classic Latin American populism's
emphasis on inter-class solidarity and redistributive policies.
So, how could populist regimes emerge under these apparently adverse circumstan?
ces? It is my contention that populism is always the result of a crisis of repres?
entation in the existing political order, which has been the case in the emergence of
neopopulist regimes in contemporary Latin America and that now, as in the past,
neopopulism can be articulated in conjunction with a variety of different economic
projects. The rise and fall of Fernando Collor de Mello's presidency in Brazil
(1990-1992) allows us to explore the nature and limits ofthe crisis of representation
that brought him to power as the first directly elected president of Brazil since Janio
Quadros in 1960.6

3. The making of a political outsider: the politics of anti-politics

Collor came on the political scene at a time in which the initial euphoria of his
country's return to democracy was overshadowed by a generalised feeling of dis-
enchantment with the new political order.7 Corruption, the crisis of governability
brought by the lengthy process of constitutional reform and the collapse of the
Cruzado Stabilisation Plan were the key elements ofthe political crisis that unravelled
during the second-half of the administration of the first post-authoritarian civilian
president, Jose Sarney (1985-1990) and became the political backdrop to the 1989
election.
Disenchantment is discontent without representation (Rabello de Castro and
Ronci, 1991, p. 152) and crises of representation are the conditions under which
populist leaders emerge.8 As Mancur Olson notes (Olson, 1982), a society that faces no
major crises experiences a build-up in the power of pressure groups and a consequent
decline in flexibility as policymakers become prisoners ofthe status quo. Olson argues
that by undermining the previous system a major crisis, such as hyperinflation or
military defeat, opens the door to policy reform. A very similar explanation has been
advanced for the rise of populism. Ernesto Laclau claims that populism is the result of

61 agree with Cammack's claim in this issue that if a populist initiative is to make a lasting difference it
will need to contain a foundational project which itself creates new institutions. However, I disagree with his
claim that the analysis of neopopulism can be successfully conducted from the abstract starting point ofthe
role of institutions in capitalist societies. Rather, I would suggest that Latin America's neopopulism should
be understood as the product ofthe crisis of representation that affected a number of countries ofthe region
foilowing their return to democracy.
7 For an analysis of the reasons for disenchantment with democracy in Latin America see Munck
(1993).
8 For an analysis ofthe crisis of representation in Argentina under Alfonsin see Novaro (1994, pp. 11-19).

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 F. Panizza / Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192 181

a crisis in the power bloc. When a new faction within the bloc seeks to impose its
hegemony but is unable to do so within the existing relations of power, it may choose
to directly appeal to the people to displace the dominant factions from power and
impose an alternative political programme (Laclau, 1977, p. 173).
This was precisely the strategy pursued by Collor, who sought to use his autonomy
from the country's political establishment and his electoral legitimacy to drive
through his programme of economic modernisation. But an analysis of the specific
nature of his neopopulist appeal is essential for a better understanding of both his
success and limitations. Within the broad definition of populism adopted in this
article it is possible to distinguish three aspects of Collor's neopopulist strategy which
found political resonance with the Brazilian people: The plebiscitarian nature of
Brazilian presidential elections; a tradition of popular alienation from politics; and the
populist elements of Collor's stabilisation plan.
Arguably, presidential elections are the only true national moment in Brazilian
politics. Historically, Brazilian politics have been dominated by a conservative
political elite that controls the popular vote through local networks of patronage
and clientelism (Faoro, 1975; Roett, 1984). State assemblies and the Federal
Congress reflect local relations of power, because congressmen and state deputies'
political careers depend on the reproduction of local clientelistic exchanges at
state and national levels. Presidential elections, however, open a rare opportunity to
challenge the entrenched power of the political elite. During the presidential
campaign it is possible for a candidate to appeal directly to the citizens as a unified
entity and not just as a conglomerate of fragmented local clienteles. Arguably,
even the personalist nature of presidential contests allows the people to identify
with leaders committed to a programme of change as opposed to the local
political bosses committed to upholding the status quo (Mangabeira Unger, 1990,
pp. 320-322).
The politico-institutional context in which the 1989 electoral campaign de?
veloped reinforced even further the plebiscitary aspects of presidential elections
in Brazil. In 1989, the presidential election was held for the first time in isolation
from congressional elections. This set-up made the need for multi-party alliances
less relevant at the same time that it accentuated the dominance of television for
reaching voters over the traditional party machines (Von Mettenheim, 1998, pp.
124-129). Moreover, the personalist nature ofthe contest was accentuated by the fact
that this was the first direct democratic election in almost 30 years and that the
election was conducted under a new run-off electoral system sanctioned by the
constitution.
The presidential campaign took place in a context of high electoral volatility and
political uncertainty in which Collor carefully cultivated his image as a political
outsider (Boschi, 1989).9 Although he was from a political family and a prominent
member of his state's political oligarchy, his arrival in national politics from a back-
ward and impoverished state contributed to his image as an anti-establishment figure.

* For an analysis of the symbolic meaning of Collor's personal image see Soares (1990, pp. 16-22).

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182 F. Panizza / Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192

Symbolically, his political journey paralleled the journey of millions of nordestinos

who had also made the journey from their states to the centres of economic and
political power in the southeastern region of the country. As part of his image-
building Collor engaged in glamorous pursuits, riding high-powered motor bikes and
participating in other sporting enterprises, which was amply reported by the main
television network, TV Globo. This unorthodox political image-building had two
main objectives: First, at a time in which the language of politics had lost public
credibility, he used his image as 'a non-political' meta-language to appeal to the
people. Through his 'private' political activities Collor was signalling that he was not
a 'typical politician' at the same time that he conveyed the political attributes of
leadership, courage and decisiveness required to address the problems of the country.
His 'private activities' linked his own personal image to the imagery of modern
popular culture, a culture in which a fragmented and divided people could recognise
some common cultural codes drawn from the language of television and sports.
Second, Collor's political discourse tapped into the traditional popular viewpoint
that the country's political establishment was self-serving and corrupt. Popular
alienation from politics is rooted in Brazil's history of political authoritarianism,
in the political parties' fragile and fragmented identities and in popular perceptions
of the government as systematically neglecting the poor. The belief that all
politicians are corrupt and are only concerned with defending their own interests
is a theme frequently expressed in everyday conversational discourse (Pinto, 1989,
p. 97).
Collor seized on the high degree of elite continuity that characterised Brazil's
transition to democracy as proof that all politicians were alike: Equally corrupt
betrayers of the people's trust. He was uncompromising in his attacks against the
state's bureaucracy, the political establishment and, particularly, against President
Sarney. His decisive action, while governor of Alagoas, against the state's corrupt high
bureaucracy (the so-called marajas) was skilfully turned into an anti-state, anti-party,
anti-Sarney, anti-tado que esta ai (against everything that is out there) campaign
(Schneider, 1991, pp. 323-324). He claimed that President Sarney was corrupt, that the
parties did not represent the people and that the state was colonised by a self-serving
and overpaid bureaucracy.10 For Collor, the restoration of social order was not so
much a matter of specific policy but above all a moral crusade against a privileged
political and economic elite that had become rich at the expense of the poor masses.
He called for a radical renewal ofthe country's political and economic order, a task, he
claimed, which could only be undertaken by someone such as him, with no political
ties to the country's discredited political establishment (Diniz, 1990a, p. 43).
Collor's populist appeal was explicit throughout his campaign. He presented
himself as the protector of the socially and politically excluded, whom he addressed
as the shirtless 'os descamisados\ an obvious reference to Peron's mythical appeal
to the Argentine working class. He stressed his independence from organised
interest groups by publicly rejecting the political endorsement of business groups,

}For a detailed analysis of Collor's electoral discourse see Pinto (1995).

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 F. Panizza I Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192 183

including, among others, the powerful Federagao das Industrias do Estado de Sao
Paulo (Federation of Industries of The State of Sao Paulo, FIESP). As he put it:

[I] have got here with you alone, without support from organised groups,
politicians or businessmen. They [the business organisations] can claim that
they are voting for me. At the end of the day they are entitled to vote as they
wish. But my public commitment is to govern for the poorest among the poor.
I am publicly committed to look after those who have never had anything. You
all know that I am a man of my word, that I have honour and courage. And
everybody but everybody intuitively knows this!11

The 1989 political campaign, however, was not centred only on the dividing line
between Collor the political outsider and the political and economic establishment.
The election also had a conventional left-right cleavage, with strong presidential
contenders in Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, the Partido dos Trabalhadores, (Workers'
Party PT) candidate and Leonel Brizola, the Partido Democratico Trabalhista
(Democratic Labour Party PDT) leader. Notwithstanding his appeal to the country's
underprivileged poor, Collor was the adopted candidate of the right while Lula and
Brizola were the candidates of the left. Collor did not hesitate to use traditional
right-wing rhetoric against Lula, accusing the PT of supporting armed struggle and of
promoting land invasions. But in typically populist fashion, his discourse straddled
the left-right political dividing line as shown by his attacks on the political oligarchy
and the economic elite. This made it difficult for the left to attack him without
appearing to defend entrenched privileges. He also stressed ecological concerns, which
were not part of the right's traditional political agenda. As he put it, his aim was 'to
make the right indignant and leave the left perplexed' and to a certain extent he
succeeded in this endeavour (Schneider, 1991, p. 331).
On 15 December 1989 Collor narrowly defeated Lula in a runoff by 53-47 per cent
and was elected president of Brazil.12 His electoral support came primarily from the
poorest sectors ofthe population, with a 51-41 per cent advantage among low-income
voters, compared to Lula's 52-40 per cent margin among those who earned more
than 10 times the minimum salary. Altogether, however, the correlation between
income and intended vote was modest (Schneider, 1991, p. 324; Mainwaring, 1995,
pp. 372-373).
As Brazil's first directly elected president in 29 years Collor assumed the presidency
with a high degree of legitimacy. His inaugural discourse was much more conciliatory
toward the political establishment than the abrasive speeches of his electoral cam?
paign. In contrast with the politics of anti-politics that was at the core of his electoral
campaign, he highlighted his family's political roots and his own political credentials
as a former member of parliament. He pledged to work in harmony with Congress, to

11 Programa Eleitoral Gratuito de Televisao, transcribed in Pinto (1995, my translation).

12 Collor polled 28.5 per cent of the vote in the first round. Lula da Silva came second with 16.1 per cent
while the PDT candidate Leonel Brizola was a close third with 15.5 per cent. The candidates of the main
parties, the PMDB and the PFL both polled less than 5 per cent ofthe vote (Mainwaring, 1995, p. 372).

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184 F. Panizza / Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192

respect the judiciary and to promote social justice and ecological preservation. But the
centrepiece of his new administration was clearly economic modernisation and
restoring economic stability, more specifically, as he put it, 'not to contain inflation
but to liquidate it'. Towards the end of this largely conciliatory speech the populist
element of his presidency became apparent as Collor claimed there were two types of
elites in Brazil: 'A responsible, modern and creative elite' and 'an anachronistic and
backward-looking one'. The latter, he claimed, lived off bureaucratic privileges and
the defence of special interests and he warned: Tt is against this elite's sickening
self-interest that my project of modernisation of Brazil is directed'.13
As president, Collor faced a country politically divided and on the verge of
hyperinflation. The gravity ofthe situation and the electoral failure ofthe mainstream
political parties meant that Collor was able to present his government as the only
credible alternative to economic chaos. As in Menem's Argentina, the idea was
imposed, not least by Collor himself, that there was a war against inflation and that
economic stabilisation was the goal to be pursued above all others (Sarlo, 1994, p. 34).
This strategy amounted to a commitment to restore public order, as a crisis of
inflation is always a crisis of public institutions. Money is a crucial institution of
modern societies, articulating social relations and symbolising a nation's identity.
High inflation produces deep social dislocations as it affects notions of social time and
disrupts the myriad of collective and individual relations that depend on monetary
exchanges. Incomes and jobs are obliterated. As its mooring in the national currency,
the tax system and other public institutions, including the political system, is danger-
ously loosened the economy becomes de-institutionalised.
Thus, Collor's promise ofa 'new order' is an example ofa political strategy which is
often accepted by citizens, not because they particularly like its content, but because it
represents an order, a seemingly credible alternative to the existing crisis of public
order. Given inflation's nature as society's 'main enemy' and because of the failure of
previous stabilisation plans, what 'needed to be done' to liquidate inflation amounted
to an open mandate that gave Collor significant policy autonomy.

4. Collor's high-risk strategy

The day after being sworn into office Collor introduced a new anti-inflationary
package, the so-called 'Plan Collor'. The plan was the most radical economic package
since the country's return to democracy.14 Its key component was the confiscation
of most financial assets for an 18-month period. This included all deposits in

13Discurso pronunciado por sua Excelencia o Senhor Fernando Collor, Presidente da Republica
Federativa do Brasil na cerimonia da posse no Congresso Nacional (Speech by his excellency Mr Fernando
Collor de Mello, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil in the inauguration ceremony in the
National Congress) Brasilia 15 March 1990 (http://www.collor.com/press-150390.htm). My translation.
14 In addition to the freezing of around 80 per cent of the nation's savings, the plan included the
introduction ofa new currency, a temporary wage and price freeze, a substantial tax increaseand a one-time
levy on all financial transactions and measures to reduce public expenditure (Kingstone, 1997, p. 8).

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 F. Panizza I Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192 185

the overnight markets, financial transactions and saving accounts that exceeded
Cr$ 50,000 (US$ 1300) (Baer, 1995, pp. 182-186). But, the plan was much more than
just a traditional anti-inflationary package: It amounted to the first serious attempt to
break with the statist model of economic development which had been in force for
almost half a century (Diniz, 1990b, pp. 25-30). Among other initiatives, the govern?
ment promoted the liberalisation of the exchange rate and the swift opening of the
Brazilian economy to external competition. As a result, Brazil experienced the most
drastic economic opening of its post-war history. Between 1990 and 1992 average
import tariffs dropped from 32.2 to 21.2 per cent. The National Privatisation Pro?
gramme was announced in December 1990 and a Privatisation Steering Committee
was appointed to oversee the privatisation process. The plan also called for the
extinction of a number of federal government agencies and the lay-off of about
360,000 public sector workers (Baer, 1995, p. 184).
As Lourdes Sola (1993, p. 156) notes, these policies affected powerful interests
entrenched in the state and required the severing of long-established ties between
the state and the private sector, both national and foreign. Collor sought to enforce
his policies by imposition rather than negotiation. The plan was drafted in secret
by a closed group of economic advisers, mostly academics and businessmen, with no
links to the techno-bureaucracy which had traditionally dominated economic
policy making in Brazil.15 No consultation with the political and economic
elite preceded the launching of the plan. As Sarney had done before him, Collor used
the plan to centralise power in the executive but he also used this power as a way to
contrast his decisiveness with Congress' political impotence. Meanwhile, he
continued his attacks against organised business interests and the state bureaucracy,
which he denounced as enemies of his economic modernisation project (Werneck
Vianna, 1991, p. 22).
The Collor Plan's key measure, the temporary confiscation of financial assets, had
as much political as economic significance. In a country in which the poor had no
savings and did not operate in the financial sector, the confiscation meant that those
better oflfwere perceived to be bearing the burden ofthe stabilisation plan. Privatisa?
tion and economic liberalisation, too had clear political aims as they were set up to
undermine the power of the state bureaucracy and of private oligopolies. Moreover,
Collor sought to give substance to the distinction he made in his inaugural speech
between a 'modern elite and a traditional, self-serving one' by attacking vested
economic interests entrenched in the state. Thus, he promoted the rapid opening of
the economy despite the interests of important sectors of domestic industry. Although
his modernisation drive did have significant support from important economic
interests, he repeatedly clashed with the country's most powerful business organisa?
tion, the Federa9ao das Industrias do Estado de Sao Paulo (Federation of Industries
of the State of Sao Paulo, FIESP) and sought the support of alternative business
associations, such as the Pensamento Nacional das Bases Empresariais (National

15 For a brief analysis of the political origins of Collor's economic advisers see Rebello de Mendonca
(1990, pp. 31-36).

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186 F. Panizza / Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192

Thought ofthe Business Bases, PNBE), which represented the progressive wing ofthe
state's industry (Schneider, 1991; Kingstone, 1997).16
Collor's attempt to rule with the support of public opinion but without the
backing of a stable party alliance was a high risk and ultimately costly political
strategy. Initiatives such as the privatisation of public enterprise drew strong
opposition from the influential managers of state firms as well as from local political
forces that traditionally drew political benefits from the presence of state firms in
their localities. At opposite sides of the political spectrum opposition also rose from both
the nationalist military and the left. As a result, it took two years from the announce-
ment of the privatisation programme to sell the first major public enterprise
(Sola, 1993). Powerful industrial lobbies also opposed initiatives such as trade liberal?
isation and industrial regulation. More importantly, by October 1990, the stabilisa?
tion plan was already in trouble both politically and economically. After a rapid fall in
the wake of the freezing of financial assets, inflation rose again in the second half of
1990 to reach a monthly average of sixteen per cent by the year's end (Baer, 1995,
pp. 184-191)
Economic growth was also seriously affected by the plan's recessionary impact, as
GDP fell by four point four per cent in 1990. Foilowing a pattern similar to that
of Sarney's failed Cruzado Plan, a new anti-inflationary package (Collor II) was
launched in January 1991. But while Collor I was the crystallisation of a top-down
project of radical economic reform, Collor II was the defensive strategy of a failing
populist project. To overcome its political difficulties in the second half of 1990, the
government sought to reach a tripartite agreement with business and trade unions, the
very same groups it had previously scorned. Negotiations, however, remained dead-
locked and broke down by the year's end due to the government's refusal to ease
monetary policy. Belatedly, the government attempted to strengthen its links with
both traditional conservative forces and the centre-left. Collor appointed respected
conservative senator Jarbas Passarinho as Justice Minister and offered a cabinet post
to Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy,
PSDB) leader Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The strategic shift, however, did not
produce the desired political effect and the government found itself increasingly
isolated.
When, in May 1992, accusations of corruption were lodged against Collor by his
own brother the incident appeared to present no great danger for the president.
Allegations of corruption against prominent politicians were not unusual in Brazil,
but they had rarely in the past resulted in their removal from office.17 Furthermore, as
Weyland (1993, p. 4) suggests, the conservative political force's initial objective was
not to topple the president but to weaken him in order to make him more dependent
on their support. But the accusations soon gathered their own momentum and

16 Pensamento Nacional das Bases Empresariais is an unusual name in its original language, making its
English translation very awkward.
17 Collor himself had made widespread accusations of corruption against President Sarney during his
electoral campaign.

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 F. Panizza / Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192 187

exposed Collor's political isolation. The failure of the stabilisation plan had lost
Collor much of the considerable support he once enjoyed from business and public
opinion and the press, which had played such a prominent role in his elevation to
power, now became his nemesis.
Compounding Collor's problems was the fact that Brazilian society had changed
considerably over the last decade. There was little left of the old industrial unions
which had supported Vargas' populist appeal and new organisations of civil society
now played a prominent role in the struggle for democracy and human rights. The
mobilisation of organisations of civil society, gathered together in the so-called
Movement for Ethics in Politics, stiffened Congress' resolve to impeach the President.
Three months later, on 29 December, Collor resigned from office, just before the
Senate voted to remove him from the presidency to face trial for corruption. Brazil's
neopopulist regime had come to an abrupt end.

5. Neopopulism and its limits: what Collor was and what he was not

As with any political discourse, populism always speaks from a certain standpoint.
Collor appealed to the Brazilian people as an alternative to a corrupt and self-serving
political and economic elite but his appeal had no solid ground to stand on. With the
strong backing of TV Globo, Collor was able to take full advantage ofthe plebiscitar-
ian elements of the presidential campaign to reach the people without the support of
established parties. Collor, however, neither sought to mobilise his supporters or to
organise them in a new political force. As shown by his electoral victory, the Brazilian
people identified with him but in the absence of any strong social and institutional
roots, this identification was always passive and volatile. Rather than a mobilising
populism ofthe people in the streets, his was a tele-populism subject to fluctuations in
public opinion. His party, the Partido da Reconstrugao Nacional (National Recon?
struction Party, PRN), was an empty political shell with insignificant electoral
support. In contrast, in Argentina, Menem addressed the people from within his
country's main populist tradition, that of Peronism. As part of this tradition, Menem's
appeal was grounded in certain social sectors (the organised working class) and
embedded in a set of political institutions (the Justicialista party, the trade union
movement). The common political and institutional ground between Menem and his
addressees facilitated his audience's identification with the leader's appeal and
legitimised his claim to represent them. However, there was no Brazilian equivalent to
Argentina's Justicialismo. In spite of its enduring institutional legacy embedded in the
state, Varguismo did not have in Brazil the same symbolic density that Peronismo had
in Argentina, nor was Collor in a position to articulate Vargas' political legacy within
his own project.
Similarly, the anti-establishment message that was key to his electoral triumph
did not become the foundation of a new political order as it did in other cases of
neopopulism, notably in Peru and Venezuela. Once in office Collor faced two options:
he could either radicalise the 'politics of anti-politics' campaign and refuse to acknowl-
edge the legitimacy of the existing political establishment or, alternatively, become

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188 F. Panizza / Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192

immersed in the political game, thus losing his status as political outsider. Eventually
Collor fell between two stools. As he showed in his inaugural speech, once elected
President, he placed himself within the political order. However, he refused to play by
Brazil's traditional rules of coalition presidentialism and patronage politics, parti?
cularly in the first year of his mandate. Because of his popularity he was initially quite
successful in forcing legislation through Congress without entering the give-and-take
tradition of Brazilian politics. But his top-down isolation made him highly dependent
on the support of public opinion. Once this support weakened, Congress turned the
tables on him and his attempts to resort to patronage to save his presidency
completed his symbolic transformation from a political outsider to an archetypal
corrupt politician.
His economic populism was also of a limited nature. Demands for social justice,
economic growth and economic redistribution are usually at the heart of populist
appeals. In the case of Brazil, all these themes were present in the transition to the new
democratic order, setting a fertile ground for economic populism.18 As suggested
above, Collor's economic stabilisation plan had a strong populist component, namely,
the temporary confiscation of financial assets and the top-down promotion of
economic opening which undermined the entrenched interests of significant sectors of
the country's industrial elite. However, his economic strategy proved to have clear
material limitations. As opposed to other stabilisation plans such as the ones set up by
Menem in Argentina and Cardoso in Brazil, after its initial success the Collor Plan
could neither secure economic stability nor could it avoid bringing the economy into
a sharp recession. Moreover, the confiscation of financial assets not only affected the
rich but also the middle classes which became increasingly vocal about their plight.
The subsequent selective unfreezing of financial assets left Collor open to accusations
that he had caved in to the very same economic elite he had denounced during his
electoral campaign.
The failure of Collor's neopopulist project helps us to better understand the
relations between neopopulism, liberal democracy and economic reform. The in-
compatibility of populism and liberal democracy is paradoxically confirmed by
the different fates of the region's major neopopulist experiences, those of Brazil
and Argentina on the one hand and those of Peru and Venezuela on the other.
While in Brazil and Argentina populism has lost its appeal and been superseded
by a more consolidated liberal democratic regime, in Peru and Venezuela the
consolidation of populism has led to a serious erosion of the institutions of liberal
democracy.

18 The military regime's economic policies led to an extreme concentration of wealth and income and the
democratic opposition formulated a powerful critique of the social costs of the regime's economic model.
Furthermore, attempts at economic adjustment during the last years of military government were de-
nounced by the opposition as anti-popular as they entailed heavy economic costs in the form of job losses
and a decline in real wages. Thus, with the return to democracy, the economic policies of the new
democratic government were politically conditioned by demands for economic redistribution and for
retaking economic development with measures to address the country's 'social debt' (Sola, 1991, p. 169,
Bresser Pereira, 1991, pp. 10-11).

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 F. Panizza / Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192 189

In Brazil, Collor's impeachment was an exercise in democratic accountability that

showed the considerable strength of civil society as a check on personalist rule. The
subsequent administrations of President Itamar Franco and, particularly, that
of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, were characterised by more balanced relations
between the executive and the other branches of government. Negotiations
between the executive and Congress and between the federal government and state
governors have become the normal pattern of government. In Argentina, Menem,
like Collor, campaigned and initially ruled as a neopopulist. However, the 1994
Argentine Constitution set up new checks and balances to limit the power of
the executive and Menem's second presidency was characterised by the reassertion of
the power of Congress and the influence of the political parties, including his
own Justicialismo. In contrast, both in Peru and Venezuela the old political
order has all but collapsed. The traditional parties have disappeared or become
politically irrelevant. Both Fujimori and Chavez have sought to set up a new political
order in a way that has strong parallels with the institutionalisation of populist
regimes in the 1940s and 1950s. New constitutions have strengthened the executive
beyond the normal limits of liberal democracies. Traditional liberal democratic
principles of separation of power and checks and balances have been ignored or
extremely weakened. New political movements have emerged as instruments for the
personalist rule of their leaders. Thus, what appears to be taking shape in both
countries is what in a different regional context Bell (1995) has labelled 'illiberal
democracies', that is, democracies that do not emphasise the liberal components of
democracy.
If populism and liberal democracy are ultimately incompatible, the relation
between neopopulism and neoliberalism is much more ambiguous than has
been implied by those who thought it either incompatible or naturally comple?
mentary. For Collor, the attack on the entrenched privileges of those associated
with the old statist model constituted a key element of his political appeal.
Similarly, in Peru, De Soto's (1989) apologia of free-market economies as a
crusade in favour of 'the little man in the slums' and against the country's political
and economic oligarchy set up the ideological ground for Fujimori's neoliberal
reforms. In Argentina, the success of his stabilisation plan led President Menem
to set up a political dividing line between the order brought by the 1990 Converti-
bility Plan and the chaos of the past (Barros, 1998, pp. 156-159). The above
cases show how economic reformers have resorted to political strategies characteristic
of populism that simplify the social space around political points of antagonism,
for example, the descamisados against the marajds; a responsible modern elite
against a backward looking one; the informales against the oligarchy; order versus
chaos etc.
Nonetheless, as Collor's failure shows, the compatibility between neopopulism and
neoliberalism is problematic and subject to the influence of contingent factors.
Crucial to this matter is the relation between stabilisation, structural reform and
economic growth. In Menem's Argentina and Fujimori's Peru, the costs of stabilisa?
tion and the transitional costs of structural reform, normally borne by the popular
classes, were more than compensated for by the positive effects of the fall in inflation

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190 F. Panizza I Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192

and by the avoidance of economic recession made possible by the abundance of

foreign capital (Palermo, 1998a,b; Philip, 1993). These circumstances meant that
the economic policies could be both populist (in the sense of benefiting the
popular sectors) and virtuous (in that they were seen as being for the greatest good
and that they followed the prevalent economic consensus). A new type of multi-class
alliance was built upon these foundations, bringing electoral success for the reforming
presidents. Similar economic conditions favoured the re-election of President
Cardoso in Brazil. However, the subsequent evolution of these countries' economies
suggests that the costs of reform could not be avoided but only postponed, consider-
ably weakening the political power of the architects of reform in their second terms
in office.
In fact, the weakening of institutional checks and balances and the increase in
executive power may have been necessary to promote a change in the model of
economic development but it does not provide the framework for long-term insti?
tutional stability required by markets (Motta, 1998). Neoliberals see the con?
centration of power at the apex of the state as a necessary device to insulate
economic decision making from rent-seeking special interests. Free-market econ?
omics, however, requires an effective institutional framework able to secure the
principles of good governance, including a clear separation of the public and the
private, a predictable legal framework and an accountable and transparent decision
making process (World Bank, 1992). This is hardly compatible in the long-term with
the simplification ofthe social space and the personalisation of power that character-
ises neopopulist rule.
To conclude, why did Collor's neopopulist experiment end in failure? An answer to
this question requires an analytical distinction between 'populism in the streets' and
'populism in power'. The symbolic unity of the people that is at the essence
of populism often expresses itself in the theatre of mass mobilisations and in the
imagery of the unity of the crowd in the street. However, for popular identities to
acquire certain permanence, they need to be embedded in institutions. While in
opposition, classical Latin American populists often promoted mass mobilisations
in support of their political goals. When in power, however, populist leaders did not
rely on popular mobilisation alone but set up alternative institutional arrangements
to those of oligarchical liberalism. Collor neither sought to organise and mobilise
his supporters nor, once in office, did he attempt to restructure his country's
political institutions. It can be argued Collor had at his command the powerful
institution of the state, which in the past had been effectively used by Vargas to
organise and mobilise his supporters. However, while Collor, like Vargas, concen?
trated power at the top, his policies undermined the very same agencies of the
state that had been used in the past as instruments for organising and controlling
the people. And when, haunted by allegations of corruption, he finally appealed
to the people to come to the streets in his support, instead of the descamisados
re-enacting the play of classical populism, he faced the students re-telling the
democratic story of the Diretas Ja campaign. This is why, in Collor's Brazil, the
history of populism did not repeat itself either as a tragedy or as a farce but rather as
a parody.

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 F. Panizza / Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (2000) 177-192 191

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