Case #10

Quasi-Delicts; Concept and Requisites

The basis of their solidarity is not the Memorandum of Agreement but the fact that they
have become joint tortfeasors.

JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR. vs. Iglesia Ni Cristo, Inc.

G.R. No. 160283; October 14, 2005
Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS:
Chan owned the Aringay Shell Gas Station in Aringay, La Union. It is bounded on the south by
Iglesia ni Cristo’s chapel. The gas station was supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic
tanks for its washrooms. In view of this, the services Dioscoro "Ely" Yoro, a retired general of the
AFP, was procured as Yoro was allegedly a construction contractor in the locality.
They entered into a MOA which stipulated that ”[a]ny damage within or outside the property of
the FIRST PARTY (Chan) incurred during the digging shall be borne by the SECOND PARTY
(Yoro).” Further, the MOA discusses division of wealth in case hidden treasure is found during
the digging. After some time, Chan was informed by the members of the INC that the digging
traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter. The foundation of the chapel
was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent.
A complaint against petitioner was filed by the respondent before the RTC La Union. Petitioner
filed an Answer with Third-Party Complaint impleading Yoro.
RTC: The diggings were intended to find hidden treasure! Chan and Yoro solidarily liable to the
respondent on a 35%-65% basis.
CA: affirmed RTC.
Chan avers that no liability should attach to him by laying the blame solely on Yoro. He argues
that the MOA executed between him and Yoro is the law between them and must be given weight
by the courts. Since nothing in the MOA goes against the law, morals, good customs and public
policy, it must govern to absolve him from any liability. The respondent asserts that the MOA
should not absolve petitioner from any liability. According to the respondent, the MOA clearly
shows that the intention of the parties therein was to search for hidden treasure. The alleged
digging for a septic tank was just a cover-up of their real intention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the memorandum of agreement entered into by the petitioner and Yoro has the
effect of making the latter solely responsible for damages to the respondent.
HELD:
NO. Chan and Yoro are solidarily liable.
The basis of their solidarity is not the Memorandum of Agreement but the fact that they
have become joint tortfeasors. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so
states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

ART. 2176. – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict are the following:
(a) there must be an act or omission;
(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
(c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and
(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

All the requisites of a quasi-delict are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the
excavation which caused damage to the respondent because it was done surreptitiously within
its premises and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation on INC’s
premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the
petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other. For the damage caused
to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
The heavy reliance of petitioner in the MOA cited earlier cannot steer him clear of any liability. As
a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage,
advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after
it is done, if done for their benefit.
Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had provisions in
their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any was found within or outside petitioners
property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from liability, is the very noose that
insures that he be so declared as liable.
Besides, petitioner cannot claim that he did not know that the excavation traversed the
respondents property. In fact, he had two (2) of his employees actually observe the diggings, his
security guard and his engineer Teofilo Oller.
Thus, the petitioner and Yoro are solidarily liable since the basis of their solidarity is the fact that
they have become joint tortfeasors and not the MOA.
Side issue: INC wanted more exemplary damages. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Surreptitiously digging under the respondent’s chapel which may weaken the foundation thereof,
thereby endangering the lives and limbs of the people in worship, unquestionably amounts to
gross negligence. For such tortious act done with gross negligence, the Court feels that the
amount awarded by the Court of Appeals is inadequate. The exemplary damages must
correspondingly be increased to P100,000.00.
Case #11

Quasi-Delicts; Concept and Requisites

The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their
failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them
from causing damage.

FGU Insurance Corporation v. CA, FILCAR Transport, Inc., and Fortune Insurance
Corporation
G.R. No. 118889 March 23, 1998
Bellosillo, J.:

FACTS:

This was a two-car collision at dawn. At around 3am, 2 vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers,
cruising northward along EDSA, Mandaluyong City, figured in a traffic accident. The car bearing
owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin
Jacildone, while the other car, owned by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and
driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of the other vehicle. Upon
approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting
the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a
Philippine driver's license.

Petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the
latter P25,382.20. By way of subrogation, it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well
as respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-
delict before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer staying at his
given address; in fact, upon motion of petitioner, he was dropped from the complaint.

RTC: dismissed the case. Ground: for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation.

Respondent CA: affirmed RTC. Ground: only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was
sufficiently proved but not that of respondent FILCAR. In other words, petitioner failed to establish
its cause of action for sum of money based on quasi-delict.

Petitioner insists that respondents are liable on the strength of the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial
Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo5 that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered
by third persons although the vehicle is leased to another.

ISSUE:

For damages suffered by a third party, may an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a
rent-a-car company and, consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in
driving the rented vehicle?
HELD:

No, the action based on quasi-delict shall not prosper against a rent-a-car company.

The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code. To sustain a claim based thereon, the
following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.

We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second
requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of
Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage
caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen
swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that
the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the
other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein.

The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on
the part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due
care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Yet, as
correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the
circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR
being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As
such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent
FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not
being an employer of the latter.

We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides: "In motor
vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune . . . . If the owner was not in the
motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184
is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between respondent
FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR
on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.

Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a misapprehension of our

ruling therein. In that case, the negligent and reckless operation of the truck owned by petitioner
corporation caused injuries to several persons and damage to property. Intending to exculpate
itself from liability, the corporation raised the defense that at the time of the collision it had no
more control over the vehicle as it was leased to another; and, that the driver was not its employee
but of the lessee. The trial court was not persuaded as it found that the true nature of the alleged
lease contract was nothing more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the
burdens and responsibilities of an employer. We upheld this finding and affirmed the declaration
of joint and several liability of the corporation with its driver.

Thus, the petition is denied.

Case #12

Quasi-Delicts; Concept and Requisites

PETITIONER’S CIVIL COMPLAINT, READ IN ITS ENTIRETY, IS A COMPLAINT BASED ON

QUASI-DELICT UNDER ARTICLE 2176, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 26 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, RATHER THAN ON MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

Zenaida R. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, Sansio Philippines, Inc., and Emma J. Datuin
G.R. No. 179799; September 11, 2009
Nachura, J.:

FACTS:
The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint4 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 by
respondent Emma J. Datuin (Datuin), as Officer-in-Charge of the Accounts Receivables
Department, and upon authority of petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc. (Sansio), against petitioner
Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio) and one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of Alvi Marketing, allegedly
for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances bought
by Alvi Marketing from Sansio.
As the address stated in the complaint was incorrect, Gregorio was unable to controvert the
charges against her. Consequently, she was indicted for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
The MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest, and it was served upon her in Quezon City while she
was visiting her husband and their two daughters at their city residence.
Datuin submitted an Affidavit of Desistance stating, among others, that Gregorio was not one of
the signatories of the bounced checks subject of prosecution.
Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin before the RTC alleging,
among others: “That the plaintiff, being completely innocent of the charges against her as
adverted to in the preceding paragraphs, was socially humiliated, embarrassed, suffered physical
discomfort, mental anguish, fright, and serious anxiety as a proximate result of her unjustified
indictment, arrest and detention– all of these ordeals having been exacerbated by the fact that
plaintiff is a woman who comes from a respected family in Oas, Albay, being the wife of an
executive of the Philippine National Construction Corporation, the mother of two college students
studying in Manila, a pharmacist by profession, a businesswoman by occupation, and an
incumbent Municipal Councilor (Kagawad) of Oas, Albay, at the time of her arrest and detention.”
Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint, being one for
damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts
constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint.
RTC: denied motion to dismiss
CA: granted respondents’ appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based on quasi-delict or malicious
prosecution.
HELD: The civil suit is based on quasi-delict.

Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by the material averments in
the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Undeniably, Gregorio’s civil complaint, read
in its entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of
the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution.

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no
preexisting contractual relation between the parties.

On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention,
and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the
following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family
relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.

A scrutiny of Gregorio’s civil complaint reveals that the averments thereof, taken together, fulfill
the elements of Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code. It appears that
Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed
by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the
identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This
fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus
depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper
notice. Because she was not able to refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted
for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was never found at No. 76 Peñaranda
St., Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminal complaint, Gregorio
was conveniently arrested by at her city residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while
visiting her family. She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and
detention and she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and
reputation, considering that she had held several honorable positions in different organizations
and offices in the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her
arrest. There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand,
Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability, as
employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee Datuin.

Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorio’s complaint is based on malicious
prosecution. In an action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and
established that Sansio and Datuin were impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately
initiating an action against Gregorio, knowing that the charges were false and groundless,
intending to vex and humiliate her. As previously mentioned, Gregorio did not allege this in her
complaint. Moreover, the fact that she prayed for moral damages did not change the nature of her
action based on quasi-delict. She might have acted on the mistaken notion that she was entitled
to moral damages, considering that she suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation on account
of her indictment and her sudden arrest.

Thus, petition is granted.