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 ABELLA Rule 114 Table of Contents #

 BERNARDO 1 Esteban v. Alhambra 2
 CATALO
 DANSAL 2 Alva v. CA 2
 MANE 3 Santos v. Lorenzo 4
 MARCO
4 People v. Filtzegald 5
 OFALSA
 PASCUA 5 Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr. 6
 RELOX 6 Panganiban v. Cupin-Tesorero 7
 SANTIAGO
 SION 7 Floresta v. Ubiadas 8
 TORRES 8 Leviste v. CA 9
 YAMAMOTTO
9 Villanueva v. Buaya 11
10 Enrile v. Sandiganbayan 11
Government of Hongkong Special
11 13
Administrative Region v. Olalia
12 Comendador v. De Villa 14
13 Lavides v. CA 14
14 People v. Valdes 15
15 Docena-Caspe v. Bugtas
16 Santos v. Ofilada
17 Basco v. Rapatalo
18 Arroyo v. De lima

1|Crimpro_Rule114_Case Briefs_ Abella, Bernardo, Catalo, Dansal, Mane, Marco, Ofalsa,

Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
 Rule 114 Case#1 (OFALSA)
Esteban v. Alhambra
G.R. No. 135012. September 7, 2004.
Petitioner: ANITA ESTEBAN
Respondent: HON.REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, San Jose City, respondent.
FACTS: Gerardo Esteban is the accused in these criminal cases. His
sister-in-law, Anita Esteban, petitioner herein, posted cash bail of
P20,000.00 in each case for his temporary liberty. While out on bail
and during the pendency of the four criminal cases, Gerardo was
again charged with another crime for which he was arrested and
detained. "Fed up with Gerardo's actuation," petitioner refused to
post another bail. Instead, she filed with the trial court an application
for the cancellation of the cash bonds she posted in the four criminal
cases. Respondent judge denied petitioner's application. The
application for cancellation of bail
ISSUE: WON the bail bond may be cancelled?
HELD: We hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. Petitioner did
not surrender the accused, charged in the four criminal cases, to the
trial court. The accused was arrested and detained because he was
charged in a subsequent criminal case.
Moreover, the bail bond posted for the accused was in the
form of cash deposit which, as mandated by Section 14 (formerly
Section 11) of the same Rule 114, shall be applied to the payment of
fine and costs, and the excess, if any, shall be returned to the
accused or to any person who made the deposit.
The Rule thus treats a cash bail differently from other bail
bonds. A cash bond may be posted either by the accused or by any
person in his behalf. However, as far as the State is concerned, the
money deposited is regarded as the money of the accused.
Consequently, it can be applied in payment of any fine and costs
that may be imposed by the court. This was the ruling of this Court as
early as 1928 in Esler vs. Ledesma. 9 Therein we declared that "when
a cash bail is allowed, the two parties to the transaction are the State
and the defendant. Unlike other bail bonds, the money may then be
used in the payment of that in which the State is concerned — the
fine and costs. The right of the government is in the nature of a lien on
the money deposited."
2|Crimpro_Rule114_Case Briefs_ Abella, Bernardo, Catalo, Dansal, Mane, Marco, Ofalsa,
Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
Rule 114 Case #2 (BERNARDO)
Alva v. CA
GR 157331, April 12, 2006, Chico-Nazario J.
Petitioner:
 Arnold Alva – accused charged for an offense under the
crime of Estafa by representation (Art. 315 [2a], RPC)
o Petition for review on certiorari assailing the twin
resolutions of CA dated October 18, 2012 and
February 19, 2013
Respondents:
 Court of Appeals - dismissed petitioners appeal of conviction
for failing to post new bail bond to secure his provisional
liberty on appeal
Facts:
 December 18, 1993 – petitioner unlawfully and feloniously
defraud Yumi Veranga y Hervera by means of false
manifestation and fraudulent representation when petitioner
could process Yumi Veranga’s application for U.S. Visa
provided she would give the amount of P 120,000.00 which
the accused obtained misappropriated to his own personal
use. (Estafa by representation (Art. 315 [2a], RPC))
RTC of Manila (Br. 54) under Judge Muro
 September 5, 1995 – RTC issued a recall order of the warrant
of arrest issued on July 18, 1995 in view of the approved bail
bond bu Judge Bayhon (Exec. Judge of RTC of Manila)
 Petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guity
 RTC grants Petitioner’s urgent motion to cancel promulgation
and prayed to reset
 May 19, 1999 – Petitioner and counsel failed to appear
despite notice
o Joey Perez – personally delivered to the RTC a hand
written medical certificate expressing petitioner’s
absence due to hypertension
o RTC orders direction the promulgation of its decision
in absentia and issued a bench warrant of arrest
o Interregnum, Police Superintendent Ramon Flores De
Jesus (Chief of Warrant and Subpoena Section) –
Manifested the return of the unexecuted Warrant of
arrest for the reason that the address of the accused
 is not within our area of responsibility and included in
the list of wanted persons for future reference
 It revealed that the petitioner changed
address
 May 21, 1999 – Personal Bail bond issued by Mega Pacific
Insurance Corporation filed and approved by Judge Muro
o Petitioner appeared to have been admitted to bail a
new after his conviction
 May 25, 1999 – RTC found petitioner guilty and rendered
against Eastern Insurance and Surety Corporation (1 st Bonding
Company) for failure to produce the person of petitioner
within ten days and to explain why it should not be forfeited
 RTC denied MR
CA
 October 29, 2001 – Petitioner filed a compliance that a new
bond was approved by Judge Muro dated May 21, 1999
 October 18, 2002 – CA dismissed the appeal for failure to post
new bond and the personal bail bond was expired
 MR is denied on the ground that:
o petitioner has failed to submit himself under the
jurisdiction of the court or under the custody of the
law since his conviction in 1999
 No valid bail bond in place when petitioner took his appeal
prosecution, with the notice to the accused, of the following
or other similar circumstances
o (b) That the accused… or has violated the conditions
of his bail without valid justification;
 Discretionary: RTC is given discretion to admit to bail an
accused even after the latter has been convicted with a
penalty of more than 6 years but less than 20 years.
o Petitioner was convicted by the RTC to suffer
imprisonment for indeterminate term of 9years and 1
day to 17 years.
 Circumstance: Failing to inform the RTC of his change of
address, petitioner failed to hold himself amendable to the
orders and processes of RTC as it was an unmistakable arrant
breach of the conditions of his bail bond.
o Having jumped bail

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s bail bond on appeal can be

admitted (NO)

Held: NO, It is beyond dispute that the subject bail bond issued by
Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation was irregularly approved.
 petitioner being a fugitive until and unless he submits himself
to the custody of the law, in the manner of being under the
jurisdiction of the courts, he cannot be granted any relief by
the CA
 Prosecution appears not to have been given the chance to
object to the application or approval of the subject bail
bond.
 SEC. 5, Rule 114, ROC – If the court imposed a penaly of
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years. But not more than 20
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously
granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the
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Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
 Rule 114 Case # 3 (PASCUA)
Santos v. Lorenzo
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1702 August 20, 1002

4|Crimpro_Rule114_Case Briefs_ Abella, Bernardo, Catalo, Dansal, Mane, Marco, Ofalsa,

Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
 Rule 114 Case # 4 (RELOX)
People v. Filtzegald
GR 149723 October 27, 2006

5|Crimpro_Rule114_Case Briefs_ Abella, Bernardo, Catalo, Dansal, Mane, Marco, Ofalsa,

Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
 Rule 114 Case # 5
Trillanes v. Pimentel Jr
GR no 179817 June 27 2008
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by
junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into
the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of then President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military
soldiers surrendered that evening. In the aftermath of such event
dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV
was charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a
seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an
Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate
Sessions and Related Requests. Trillanes requested to be allowed to
attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC
however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with
the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides
legal justification to allow him to work and serve his mandate
as senator
2. Whether or not there are enough precedents that
allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners who are
held without bail
HELD:
Trillanes’ election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him
to serve his mandate
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is
no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court
categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply
to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office,
does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory
only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the
Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could
6|Crimpro_Rule114_Case Briefs_ Abella, Bernardo, Catalo, Dansal, Mane, Marco, Ofalsa,
Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within
the confines of prison.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon
court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed
to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to
register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy
in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as
senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a
seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be
accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks
on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and
blanket authorizations.
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital
offense,17 or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. The same
applies equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly
no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude
involved in the crime charged. In the present case, it is
uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release
on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of
guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for
bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction, justifies
the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the
right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal
action."
 Rule 114 Case # 6 (TORRES)
Panganiban v. Cupin-Tesorero
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1454 August 27, 2002

7|Crimpro_Rule114_Case Briefs_ Abella, Bernardo, Catalo, Dansal, Mane, Marco, Ofalsa,

Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
 Rule 114 Case # 7 (MARCO)
FLORESTA VS UBIADAS
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1774. May 27, 2004
FACTS:
 Then Provincial Prosecutor, now Regional Trial Court Judge
Dorentino Z. Floresta (complainant) administratively charged
Judge
Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of the Olongapo City Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 72 with "gross ignorance of [the] law, grave
abuse of authority and violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
 Complainant faults respondent for dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction, on motion of the accused, by Order 2 of July 9,
1997, Crim. Case No. 212-97, People of the Philippines v. Chia
Say Chaw, et al., for illegal entry.
 Complainant likewise faults respondent for failure to resolve,
as he has yet to resolve, the Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Clarification of the abovesaid Order of July 9, 1997,
despite the lapse of more than two years since the filing of
the motion.
 Thus, the complainant charged respondent with with violation
of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to dispose of the
court's business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods, and of SC Circular No. 13 (July 1, 1987)
which requires lower courts to resolve cases or matters before
them within three months or
ninety days from date of submission.
 Complainant furthermore faults respondent for granting,
"without giving notice to the prosecution," the petition for bail
of Jose Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a warrant
issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Subic, Zambales
 Complainant faults respondent for disqualifying him
(complainant) from appearing in Crim Case No. 634-99,
People v. Esmane-Diaz, despite his (complainant's)
designation to handle the prosecution of the case by the
Ombudsman.
 Respondent contends that petitioner had no legal capacity
to initiate the complaint against him for the complainant is
not a party to the aforementioned cases.
8|Crimpro_Rule114_Case Briefs_ Abella, Bernardo, Catalo, Dansal, Mane, Marco, Ofalsa,
Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
 The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found, as to the
first charge, that it was not shown that respondent acted with
malice, oppression or bad faith sufficient to find him guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, it having appeared that
respondent based his dismissal order on his interpretation of a
provision of law.
 While with regard to the second charge, the respondent
erred in granting bail without hearing the prosecution’s side.
 The OCA recommended that respondent be fined in the
amount of P20,000.
ISSUE: WON the respondent erred in granting bail without hearing the
prosecution’s side.
HELD:
 YES. In the case at bar, there was a hearing for petition for
bail that was conducted.
 Given the filing of the petition only the day before, at close to
noontime, it cannot be said that the prosecution was
afforded reasonable notice and
opportunity to present evidence after it received a copy of
the petition minutes before it, was filed in court.
 Reasonable notice provided under Sec 18 of Rule 114
depends of course upon the circumstances of each
particular case, taking into account, inter alia, the offense
committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence
of guilt in the hands of the prosecution.
 In the criminal case against Mangohig, the same is
punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua and
subsequently indicted for statutory rape 31 qualified by
relationship which is punishable by death.
 Thus, by respondent's assailed grant of bail, the prosecution
was deprived of due process for which he is liable for gross
ignorance of the law or procedure
32 which is a serious charge under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.
 RULE 114 Case#8 (MANE)
LEVISTE VS. CA
G.R. NO. 189122- MARCH 17, 2010
PARTIES: Petitioner: Jose Antonio Leviste
FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner
Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending
appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending
appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming
the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail.
It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal,
that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should
be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.”
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied
ISSUE:
Whether or not bail should automatically be granted absent any of
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court filed by an appellant pending appeal?
HELD:
NO. Absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 means that a less stringent
approach in granting bail only subject to the discretion of the court to
grant bail.
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or
9|Crimpro_Rule114_Case Briefs_ Abella, Bernardo, Catalo, Dansal, Mane, Marco, Ofalsa,
Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of
his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to
an accused may be summarized in the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more
than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances
stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present
and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing
a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more
than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5
or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no
bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x1[24]
(emphasis supplied)
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two
scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for
bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with
the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely,
recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous
escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of
the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of
the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon;
circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail;
undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the
appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second
scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said
circumstances.
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion.
This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has
the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending
appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating2[26] circumstances
in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other
words, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal where
none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself,
constitute abuse of discretion.
whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or
stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending
appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the
appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of
sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on
the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the
second scenario, the appellate court’s stringent discretion requires
that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of
the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are
prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of
any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail.
Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present
will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply
authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion
approach.

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate

court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully
ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact
exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or
revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants
bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be
committed.

Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application

for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of
two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish

10 | C r i m p r o _ R u l e 1 1 4 _ C a s e B r i e f s _ A b e l l a , B e r n a r d o , C a t a l o , D a n s a l , M a n e , M a r c o , O f a l s a ,
Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
 Rule 114 Case # 9 (YAMAMOTO)
Villanueva v. Buaya
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131
Facts: Lorna Villanueva assisted by her father filed a case against
Judge Buaya of Leyte for gross ignorance of the law and abuse of
authority. Villanueva filed a case for qualified seduction against vice
mayor Tupa of leyte. MTC Judge Bertulfo allowed vice mayor tupa for
bail. However, assistant provincial prosecutor borgueta issued a joint
resolution recommending the filing of information and cancellation of
bail bond against tupa. Judge Menchavez, RTC of leyte issued a
warrant of arrest against Tupa. Judge Menchavez, however, was
reassigned to Cebu RTC, and was replaced by Judge Buaya. Tupa
filed for an ex-parte motion to grant bail. This was granted by Judge
Buaya. Villanueva moved to reconsider the granting of the ex-parte
motion arguing that an application for bail should be heard and
cannot be contained in an ex-parte motion. Judge Buaya noted that
the motion was submitted by the private prosecutor without the
conformity of the public prosecutor as required by the rules of criminal
procedure. This irked Villanueva and filed the present suit for
ignorance of the law and abuse of authority as judge buaya granted
the ex-parte motion for bail without notice and hearing as required,
but denied the motion for reconsideration just because it was not in
conformity by the public prosecutor. Judge Buaya stood his ground
and stated that tupa’s case was bailable.
Issue: whether Judge Buaya abused his discretion in granting the ex-
parte motion for bail without notice and hearing.
Held: Yes. Notice and hearing is required whether the bail is a matter
of right or discretion.
11 | C r i m p r o _ R u l e 1 1 4 _ C a s e B r i e f s _ A b e l l a , B e r n a r d o , C a t a l o , D a n s a l , M a n e , M a r c o , O f a l s a ,
Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
Rule 114 Case#10
Enrile v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 213847 , August 18, 2015
DOCTRINE: Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless
of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed,
denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not
serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
ACTION: petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to
assail and annul the resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division), where he has been charged with plunder along with
several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively
denied his Motion to Fix Bail and his Motion for Reconsideration,
were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
PETITIONER: JUAN PONCE ENRILE
RESPONDENTS: SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile
and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of
their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF). On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed
his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among
others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be
found against him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan
after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying
Enrile's motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its
prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
General Hospital following his medical examination.
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail, both dated July 7, 2014, which
were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. In support of the
motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail
because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with
plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal,
notreclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age
and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is
entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the
Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under
the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to
bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering
the presence of two mitigating circumstances — his age and his
voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with
proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that
he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is
already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social
standing.
Issue: Whether or not Enrile should be granted bail.
Held: Yes, Enrile should be granted bail.
Ratio:
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the
presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be
appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at
the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he
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Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
voluntarily surrendered. This national commitment to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear
and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk
or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in
court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is
highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment
for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for
the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an
earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in
both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service,
and history's judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted
bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile's health presents another
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the
charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail
despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial. It is relevant to
observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him
to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better
attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice.
This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but,
more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored
the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during
the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the
fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile's
Motion to Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction. Rule 114 Case # 11 (CATALO)
The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by GR 163675 April 19, 2007
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.

13 | C r i m p r o _ R u l e 1 1 4 _ C a s e B r i e f s _ A b e l l a , B e r n a r d o , C a t a l o , D a n s a l , M a n e , M a r c o , O f a l s a ,
Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
 Rule 114 Case # 12 (YAMAMOTO) Rule 114 Case# 13 (ABELLA)
Commendador v. De Villa Lavides v. CA
GR 93177, 95020, 96948, 97454 August 2, 1991 GR 129670 February 1, 2000

Facts: members of the AFP were charged with the violation of the
articles of war. The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the
pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was denied.
De villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty invoking
that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail. Decision
was rendered stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of
respondent that bail does not apply among military men facing court
martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal.

Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the right to bail.

Held: Yes. Bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as

an exception to the rule in the constitution. The reason for this is that
mutinous soldiers who will be released on provisional liberty will gain
the chance to continue their mutinous plots against the government

14 | C r i m p r o _ R u l e 1 1 4 _ C a s e B r i e f s _ A b e l l a , B e r n a r d o , C a t a l o , D a n s a l , M a n e , M a r c o , O f a l s a ,
Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
 or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt
is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The pivotal question is: How should We construe the term "punishable"
under the provisions above-quoted?

Rule 114 Case # 14
(OFALSA)
People v. Valdez
GR 216007-09 December 8, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ and
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
FACTS
The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit executed by Sheila S.
Velmonte-Portal and Mylene T. Romero, both State Auditors of the
Commission on Audit Region VI in Pavia, Iloilo, who conducted a post-
audit of the disbursement vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City
Government. Among the subjects thereof were the reimbursements of
expenses of private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a
former mayor of Bacolod City. Based on the verification conducted in
the establishments that issued the official receipts, it was alleged that
the cash slips were altered/falsified. Consequently, Valdez was
charged with eight cases four of which were for Violation of Section 3
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half were for the
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents. Since the Ombudsman recommended "no
bail" , Valdez, who is still at-large, caused the filing of a Motion to Set
Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail.
Following Temporada, for the complex crime of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an
amount that exceeds P22,000.00, the "prescribed penalty" is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. After trial,
should the commission of such crime be proven by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt, the "imposable penalty" is reclusion
perpetua in view of the RPC mandate that the prescribed penalty of
reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua shall be applied in
its maximum. 27 The falsification, which is the means used to commit
the crime of malversation, is in the nature of a generic aggravating
circumstance that effectively directs the imposition of the prescribed
penalty in its maximum period. 28 The phrases "shall be applied" and
"shall impose," found in Articles 63 and 64, respectively, of the RPC, are
of similar import as the phrase "shall be imposed" found in Article 48.
Both Articles 63 and 64 refer to the penalty to be imposed after
considering the aggravating or mitigating circumstance/s. Finally, the
"penalty actually imposed" is still reclusion perpetua, considering that
the ISL finds no application as the penalty is indivisible.

ISSUE
WON an accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents where the amount involved
exceeds P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right because it
has an actual imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua.

HELD
Rule 114, SEC. 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua

15 | C r i m p r o _ R u l e 1 1 4 _ C a s e B r i e f s _ A b e l l a , B e r n a r d o , C a t a l o , D a n s a l , M a n e , M a r c o , O f a l s a ,
Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
 Rule 114 Case # 15 (TORRES)
Docena-Caspe v. Bugtas
A.M. No. RTJ-0301767 March 28, 2003

16 | C r i m p r o _ R u l e 1 1 4 _ C a s e B r i e f s _ A b e l l a , B e r n a r d o , C a t a l o , D a n s a l , M a n e , M a r c o , O f a l s a ,
Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
 Rule 114 Case # 16 (PASCUA)
Santos v. Ofilada
A.M. No. RTJ-94-1217 June 17, 1995

17 | C r i m p r o _ R u l e 1 1 4 _ C a s e B r i e f s _ A b e l l a , B e r n a r d o , C a t a l o , D a n s a l , M a n e , M a r c o , O f a l s a ,
Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)
 Rule 114 Case # 17 (RELOX)
Basco v. Rapatalo
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335 March 1997Rule 114 Case # 18 (SANTIAGO)

18 | C r i m p r o _ R u l e 1 1 4 _ C a s e B r i e f s _ A b e l l a , B e r n a r d o , C a t a l o , D a n s a l , M a n e , M a r c o , O f a l s a ,
Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)

Arroyo v. De Lima
GR No. 199034, 199034 December 13, 2011
This is the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno:
[Late last Tuesday, November 15, 2011, the Supreme issued an
“immediately executory” Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
the implementation of DOJ Department Circular No. 41 and Watchlist
Order and thereby allowing the petitioners Arroyo spouses to leave
the Philippines after complying with the conditions in the Resolution.
The respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lime however prevented
the Arroyos from leaving. The government, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, immediately filed a “Consolidated Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and/or to Lift Temporary Restraining Order”.
Petitioner Gloria Macapagal Arroyo also filed an “Urgent Motion for
Respondents to Cease and Desist from Preventing Petitioner GMA
from Leaving the Country.” She also moved to cite the Respondent
Secretary of Justice in contempt for failure to comply with the TRO. On
November 18, 2011, the Court conducted a special en banc session
to tackle the pending incidents of the consolidated cases.
ISSUES:
1. Should the Resolution granting the prayer for a TRO be
reconsidered?
2. Was there compliance with the 2nd condition of the TRO? If there
is none, should the TRO be suspended in the meantime?
2. [The Court voted 7–6[1] that there was no compliance with the
2nd conditionof the TRO. But it nonetheless voted by the same 7-
6 margin that there was no need to explicitly state the legal effect on
the TRO of the noncompliance by petitioners with the 2nd condition.
The November 18, 2011 Resolution instead noted the SPA executed by
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, appointing Atty. Ferdinand Topacio as her
legal, and merely stated that “she shall commit to the Court that she
shall instruct her legal representative to amend par. (iii) of par. (b)
above to state: “to receive summons or documentary evidence”
and forthwith submit this compliance with the Court;”]
The majority argued that such a clarification is unnecessary,
because it is clear that the TRO is conditional, and cannot be made
use of until compliance has been done. It was therefore the sense of
the majority that, as an offshoot of the winning vote that there was
failure by petitioners to comply with Condition Number 2, the TRO is
implicitly deemed suspended until there is compliance with such
condition. Everyone believed that it would be clear to all that a
conditional TRO is what it is, conditional. Furthermore, it is hereby
clarified that it is mandatory for the Clerk of Court to ensure that there
is faithful compliance with all the conditions imposed in our 15
November 2011 resolution, including our second condition, before
issuing any certification that the compliance with the TRO has been
made, and only then can the TRO become effective.

HELD:
1. [The Justices maintained their 8-5 vote on the issuance of the TRO.
The majority thus “require[d]” Secretary De Lima to “IMMEDIATELY
COMPLY with the said temporary restraining order by allowing
petitioners to leave the country.”] YES, the Resolution granting the
petitioners’ prayer for a TRO should be reconsidered.
[T]his Court cannot ignore a basic constitutional precept:
the presumption of validity of official actions. Especially when the
practice of issuing watch list orders, has been practiced for decades
by the Department of Justice, and many other analogous practices
has been observed as well by many other governmental agencies,
including this court, through analogous restrictive practices.
19 | C r i m p r o _ R u l e 1 1 4 _ C a s e B r i e f s _ A b e l l a , B e r n a r d o , C a t a l o , D a n s a l , M a n e , M a r c o , O f a l s a ,
Pascua, Relox, Santiago, Sion, Torres,Yamamotto(SY16-17)