Journal of Slavic Military Studies

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British “Lend-Lease” Tanks and the Battle for

Moscow, November–December 1941—A Research
Note

Alexander Hill

To cite this article: Alexander Hill (2006) British “Lend-Lease” Tanks and the Battle for Moscow,
November–December 1941—A Research Note, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 19:2, 289-294,
DOI: 10.1080/13518040600697811

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040600697811

Published online: 21 Sep 2006.

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Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 19: 289–294, 2006
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN 1351-8046 print
DOI: 10.1080/13518040600697811

1351-8046
FSLV
Journal of Slavic Military Studies,
Studies Vol. 19, No. 02, April 2006: pp. 0–0

BRITISH “LEND-LEASE” TANKS AND THE BATTLE FOR

MOSCOW, NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1941—A RESEARCH
NOTE

Alexander Hill
British “Lend-Lease”
Alexander Hill Tanks

This research note suggests that those British tanks supplied to the Soviet
Union during the first months of the Great Patriotic War were, despite
their shortcomings, of considerably more significance to the Soviet war
effort than is generally accepted in the literature, highlighting the critical
resource situation faced by Soviet forces in the early winter of 1941.

This research note is concerned with the significance of British supplied tanks
for the Soviet war effort up to the end of December 1941, by which point
Soviet forces had gone over to the offensive along the whole front after hav-
ing fought stubbornly at the gates of Moscow and indeed Leningrad. This
note, continuing discussion on the significance of Lend-Lease for the Soviet
war effort in the pages of this journal,1 suggests that the input of British armor
in to the later stages of the Battle for Moscow was far more significant for the
Soviet war effort than acknowledged in published Soviet sources, recent post-
Soviet Russian language works, or widely realized in the West, although was
certainly not decisive. The strength of this argument rests on Russian-
language source material unavailable to Western and indeed most Soviet
authors prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Much Soviet archival mate-
rial on Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union remains “secret” in the Central
Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and Russian
State Archive of the Economy, or at least has not been declassified.2

Address correspondence to Alexander Hill, Dept. of History, Univ. of Calgary, Social Sciences
656, 2500 University Dr. NW, Calgary, Alberta, T2N IN4, Canada. E-mail: hilla@ucalgary.ca
1
See for example B. V. Sokolov, ‘The Role of Lend-Lease in Soviet Military Efforts, 1941–
1945’, in Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 7, 3 (1994) pp. 567–586, and V.F. Vorsin, ‘Motor
Vehicle Transport Deliveries through “Lend-Lease”’, in Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 10, 2
(1997) pp. 153–175.
2
As much for want of funding to formally sort through the vast quantities of material still
“secret” as the desire to keep much of the material classified if reliable sources are to be believed.
290 Alexander Hill

Crucial in gaining an appreciation of the use to which British tanks

were put during the first months of the war has been the recent publication
of the wartime service diary of N.I. Biriukov, Military Commissar of the
Main Auto-Armor Board of the Red Army from 10 August 1941 and
responsible for the distribution of recently manufactured or acquired
tanks to front-line units.3 Soviet and indeed post-Soviet Russian academic
authors (i.e., those providing scholarly apparatus) have been unwilling or
unable to systematically trace British or US tanks or indeed aircraft pro-
vided to the Soviet Union through to front-line units, a task made possible
for armor by Biriukov’s information on the units to receive such vehicles.
This information can be used in conjunction with the Order of Battle of
the Soviet Army during the war4, also unavailable to Western and indeed
manySoviet researchers prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and
published works, to gain an appreciation of the importance of these
imported tanks in the fighting before Moscow in late 1941.
When Allied, and in particular British, deliveries of key weapons sys-
tems for the war as a whole are compared to Soviet production for the
same period they can understandably be viewed as being of little signifi-
cance. If Soviet production of tanks and self-propelled guns is taken as
110,340 for the whole war,5 then 4,542 tanks supplied by Britain might
seem of little significance.6 However, Soviet production of principle types
of tanks and self-propelled guns (T-34, KV series and light tanks was in
the region of only 4,649 for the second half of 1941.7
Under the provisions of the 1st Lend-Lease or Moscow Protocol Brit-
ain supplied Matilda (Mk II) and Valentine tanks to the Soviet Union.
While these models were inferior to the T-34, Soviet production of the T-
34 (and to a lesser extent the KV series), was only just getting seriously
underway in 1942,8 and hence the relative inferiority of British tanks to
the Soviet armored pool as a whole was less during this period than it
would be only a few months later after the 1st Moscow Protocol period to
the end of June 1942.
Soviet production was well below plan targets. Production of the T-34
at Factory Number 112, the conversion of which from producing subma-
rines to tanks was ordered on 1 July 1941, according to a GKO order of 9

3
N. Biriukov, Tanki – frontu! Zapiski sovetskogo generala (Smolensk: Rusich 2005).
4
Voenno-nauchnoe upravlenie General’nogo shtaba. Voenno-istoricheskii otdel. Boevoi sostav
Sovetskoi armii. Chast’ I (iiun’-dekabr’ 1941 goda), (Moscow: undated) and Chast’ II (Ianvar’-
dekabr’ 1942 goda) (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo Ministervstva oboroni SSSR 1966).
5
N. Simonov, Voenno-promishlennii kompleks SSSR v 1920–1950 godi (Moscow: ROSSPEN,
1996) p. 164.
6
M. Suprun, Lend-liz i severnie konvoi 1941–1945 (Moskva: Andreevskii flag 1997) p. 358.
7
Simonov (note 5) p. 162.
8
Ibid., pp. 163–4.
British “Lend-Lease” Tanks 291

July 1941 was supposed to rise from 10 units in August 1941 to 250 by
December, a total of 710 units over five months.9 The reality was, in itself
a significant achievement given the conversion of this factory from the
series production of submarines to armored vehicles, the production of
173 units to the end of 1941.10 Production targets continued to be unreal-
istic in to 1942, with Factory Number 112 having targets to produce a
total of 1,240 units during June-September 1942 alone, where actual pro-
duction was 2,584 for 1942 as a whole.11 From 22 June to 31 December
1941, according to Krivosheev only 3,200 medium and heavy tanks were
delivered to the Red Army, figures including Lend-Lease equipment
starting to filter through.12 Simonov gives production of the T-34 and KV
series for the second half of 1941 as 2,819 units, with Suprun noting 361
heavy and medium British Lend-Lease tanks having reached the Red
Army by this point, giving a grand total of 3,180.13
The Matilda and Valentine had two-pounder main armaments increas-
ingly only satisfactory for light tanks, the absence of a high-explosive capa-
bility being a significant drawback, prompting Soviet attempts to up gun
both, the Matilda with a 76mm gun.14 Nonetheless, the armor of the Matilda
and Valentine tanks put them firmly in the heavy and medium categories,
respectively. Yet, even excluding the issue of main armament, both the
Matilda and the Valentine required modification for service in Russian con-
ditions. It was, for instance, soon identified that the pneumatic transmission
on Matildas could not stand up to the temperatures to which they were sub-
jected in Russia, and required replacement with mechanical alternatives.15
Not only were the track plates on Valentines considered too narrow, and
suitable only for summer conditions, but spurs were considered necessary
in Russian conditions and had to be manufactured locally. British supplied
track pins were considered weak and difficult to replace.16

9
Postanovlenie Gosudarstvennogo Komiteta Oboroni “Ob organizatsii proizvodstva sred-
nikh tankov T-34 na zavode “Krasnoe Sormovo”, No. 1 ss, 1 July 1941 g., in Iu. A. Gor’kov
(ed.), Gosudarstvennii Komitet Oboroni postanovliaet (1941–1945). Tsifri, dokumenti (Moskva:
OLMA-PRESS, 2002) pp. 495–7 and GKO. Postanovlenie No. GOKO-82/ss ot 9 July 1941 g.
Moskva, Kreml’. Ob obespechenii proizvodstva tankov T-34 na zavode “Krasnoe Sormovo”.
Russian State Archive for Socio-Political History (RGASPI) f.644.o.1.d.1.l.272.
10
Simonov (note 5) p. 163.
11
GKO. Postanovlenie No.GOKO-1880/ss ot 5 iiunia 1942 g. Moskva, Kreml’. O proiz-
vodstve tankov T-34. RGASPI f.644.o.1.d.38.l.266 and Simonov (note 5) p. 163.
12
Along with 2,400 light tanks. G.F. Krivosheev (ed.), Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses
in the Twentieth Century (London: Greenhill Books 1997) p. 252, Simonov (note 5) p. 162.
13
Simonov (note 5) p. 162, and Suprun (note 6) p. 52.
14
Biriukov (note 3) pp. 55, 71.
15
Ibid., pp. 62, 68–9.
16
Secret Cipher Telgram. From: 30 Military Mission. To: The War Office. Recd 22/11/41.
The UK National Archives (TNA) WO193/580.
292 Alexander Hill

While in British service in North Africa both faced contemporary

German tanks, in Soviet service they were apparently increasingly frequently
used in defensive operations or for infantry support in conjunction with
Soviet tanks.17 This was certainly a realistic limitation from the second
half of 1942 onwards, but prior to this, Soviet stocks of medium and
heavy tanks did not always permit the relegation of British tanks to sup-
porting roles. While the Soviet Union had developed tanks far superior to
those in service in Britain and the United States, and indeed of such effec-
tiveness to drive Germany to produce the overcomplicated Panther in
response to the T-34 and KV-1, not only did it not have the planned quan-
tities of these types, but was barely able to maintain force levels in the
face of horrendous losses. According to Krivosheev, the Soviet Union lost
20,500 tanks between 22 June and 31 December 1941, of which 3,200
were either heavy or medium, with an initial stock of such types of 1,400.
Only 5,600 tanks were received during the same period, of which, as
noted above, only 3,200 were medium or heavy tanks including imports.18
By the end of 1941 Britain had delivered 466 tanks out of 750 prom-
ised, of which 259 were Valentines and 187 Matildas, the remainder
apparently Tetrarch. Of these, 216 Valentines and 145 Matildas had been
supplied to the Red Army.19 With total Red Army tank stocks, as of 31
December, consequently being in the region of 7,700 according to Kri-
vosheev (or 6,347 on 1 December according to Suprun), of which only
1,400 were medium or heavy models, then British deliveries to date repre-
sented in the region of only 6.5% of total Red Army tank strength, but
over 33% of medium and heavy tanks, with British vehicles actually in
Red Army hands representing about 25% of medium and heavy tanks in
service.20
Given disruption to Soviet production and high losses the Soviet Union
was understandably concerned to put British and US armour into action as
soon as possible, quickly attempting to amend any serious defects. A
good indication of Soviet efforts to this end can be gained from the ser-
vice diary of N.I. Biriukov, Military Commissar of the Main Auto-Armor
Board of the Red Army from 10 August 1941. According to Biriukov’s
notes, the first 20 British Valentine tanks arrived at the tank training
school in Kazan’ on 28 October 1941, at which point a further 120 were
unloading at Arkhangel’sk.21 Courses for the preparation of Soviet crews
for Valentines and Matildas had started during November while the first

17
Suprun (note 6) p. 52.
18
Krivosheev (note 12) p.252, Suprun (note 6) p. 52.
19
Suprun (note 6) pp. 49, 52.
20
Krivosheev (note 12) p. 252, Suprun (note 6) p. 53.
21
Biriukov (note 3) pp. 16, 47.
British “Lend-Lease” Tanks 293

tanks, with British assistance, were being assembled from their in-transit
states and undergoing testing by Soviet specialists.22
According to the British Military Mission in Moscow by 9 December
1941 about 90 British tanks had been in action with Soviet forces.23 On 20
November 1941 Biriukov reported that 137 and 139 Tank Battalions of
146 Tank Brigade, along with 131 Independent Tank Battalion had been
equipped with 21 Valentines each, with 132 Independent Tank Battalion
having 19 Valentines and 2 Matildas, 138 Independent Tank Battalion 15
Matildas and 6 Valentine, and 136 Independent Tank Battalion having 3
Matildas and 9 Valentines.24 Of these units, the British Military Mission
was referring to 146 Tank Brigade and 131, 136, and 138 Independent
Tank Battalions. The first of these units to have been in action seems to
have been 138 Independent Tank Battalion, which as part of 30 Army of
the Western Front along with 24 and 145 Tank Brigades and 126 Indepen-
dent Tank Battalion was involved in stemming the advance of German
units in the region of the Volga Reservoir to the north of Moscow in late
November.
The exploits of 136 Independent Tank Battalion are more widely
noted, being part of a scratch operational group of 33 Army of the West-
ern Front consisting of 18 Rifle Brigade, two ski battalions, 5 and 20 Tank
Brigades, and 140 Independent Tank Battalion. The 136 Independent
Tank Battalion was combined with the latter to produce a tank group of
only 21 tanks, which was to operate with the two ski battalions against
German forces advancing to the West of Moscow in early December. The
131 Independent Tank Brigade was in action with the Western Front from
early December with 50 Army to the east of Tula to the south of Moscow,
with 146 Tank Brigade also seeing action with 16 Army of the Western
Front from early December in the region of Kriukovo to the immediate
west of the Soviet capital.25
According to Rotmistrov, at the end of November 1941 there were only
670 Soviet tanks for the Fronts before Moscow, that is the recently
formed Kalinin, Western and South-Western Fronts, of which only 205
were heavy or medium types. Most of this tank strength was concentrated
with the Western Front, with the Kalinin Front having only two tank bat-
talions (67 tanks) and the South-Western two tank brigades (30 tanks).26
Alternative figures suggest that of 667 tanks with front-line units of the
Kalinin, Western and right wing of the South-Western Fronts as of 1
22
Ibid., pp. 51–55.
23
Secret Cipher Telegram. From: 30 Military Mission. To: The War Office. Recd 11/12/41.
TNA WO193/580.
24
Biriukov (note 3) p. 57.
25
P.A. Rotmistrov, Vremia i tanki (Moscow: Voenizdat 1972) pp. 107–118.
26
Ibid., p. 112.
294 Alexander Hill

December 1941, 607 were with the Western Front, of which 205 were KV
series and T-34s, with the Kalinin Front and the right wing of the South-
Western Front having 17 and 43 tanks, respectively, none of which were
apparently KV series or T-34s.27 Either set of figures is a significant
improvement on the 141 heavy and medium tanks available to the West-
ern, Reserve and Briansk Fronts before Moscow as of 1 October 1941.28
In the light of these statistics, it is reasonable to suggest that British sup-
plied tanks made up in the region of 30–40% of the heavy and medium
tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of Decem-
ber 1941, and that they made up a significant proportion of such vehicles
available as reinforcements at this critical juncture.

27
Not including 9, 17 and 24 Tank Brigades. “Moskovskaia bitva v tsifrakh (period kontr-
nastupleniia),” in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No.1 (1967) p. 92.
28
“Moskosvskaia bitva v tsifrakh (period oboroni)”, in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 3
(1967) p. 71.