CHAPTER I. THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY exclusion.
exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the February 9, 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale did not
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.
CHUA V. MESINA
FACTS: Respondent was, for years, Ana Alvaran Chua and her now deceased husband Chua
Yap Ans legal counsel and adviser upon whom they reposed trust and confidence. They were
in fact lessees of a building situated at Burgos Street, Cabanatuan City (Burgos property)
owned by respondents family, and another property containing an area of 854 sq. m.,
situated at Melencio Street, Cabanatuan City (Melencio property), also owned by
respondents family whereon they (spouses Chua) constructed their house. These two
properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, respondents mother Felicisima
Melencio vda. de Mesina (Mrs. Mesina), in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure
a loan she obtained. As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, respondent
convinced complainant Ana Chua and her husband to help Mrs. Mesina by way of settling her
obligation in consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them at
P850.00/sq. m. Accommodating respondents request, the spouses Chua and their business
partner, herein co-complainant Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs. Mesinas bank obligation in the
amount of P983,125.40. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1985 conveying the
Melencio property for P85,400.00 was thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name
appears therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants. As complainants were
later apprised of the amount of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent
about it. Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be
executed, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the payment of
capital gains tax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Sale antedated
February 9, 1979 was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again appears therein as
Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants wherein the purchase price was also
indicated to be P85,400.00.
After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses in the redemption of the MESINA
properties, Mrs. Mesina was found to have an existing balance due the spouses in the
amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised respondent about it. Respondent,
by Affidavit of February 18, 1986, acknowledged such obligation to be his and undertook to
settle it within two years. Complainants were subsequently issued on January 21, 1986 a title
over the Melencio property. Not long after the execution of the February 9, 1979 Deed of
Absolute Sale or in February 1986, one Juanito Tecson (Tecson) filed an Affidavit dated
February 20, 1986 before the Cabanatuan City Prosecutors Office charging respondents
mother, the spouses Chua, Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to the said Deed of
Absolute Sale, for Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal Revenue
Code. In his complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of the Melencio
property and was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that contrary to
their agreement, the property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant, to his
reflect the true value of the Melencio property and was antedated to evade payment of
capital gains tax. Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9, 1979 Deed of
Absolute Sale was antedated. Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the
falsification charge against Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed to complainants that they would
simulate a deed of sale of the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to
Mrs. Mesina. Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986[6] conveying to Felicisima M. Melencio the Melencio
property for P85,400.00.
A new title was accordingly issued on April 4, 1986 in the name of Felicisima M. Melencio,
the owners copy of which was entrusted to complainants. Tecson subsequently filed before
the Cabanatuan City Prosecutors Office an Affidavit of Desistance dated September 5, 1986
alleging that his filing of the criminal complaint arose out of mere misunderstanding and
difference with herein complainants and their co-respondents and he had no sufficient
evidence against them. Some years later or on May 2, 1990, respondent approached
complainants and told them that he would borrow the owners copy of Mrs. Mesinas title
with the undertaking that he would, in four months, let Mrs. Mesina execute a deed of sale
over the Melencio property in complainants favor. In fact, respondent gave complainants a
written undertaking dated May 2, 1990. In the meantime, Mrs. Mesina died in the early part
of 1991. Despite respondents repeated promises to effect the transfer of title in
complainants name, he failed to do so. Complainants were later informed that the Melencio
property was being offered for sale to the public.
ISSUE: WON the Respondent violated the CPR.
HELD: Yes, Atty. Mesina is Disbarred. This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of
gross misconduct. First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale
antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his duty to promote
respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet activities aimed at defiance of the law;
That respondent intended to, as he did defraud not a private party but the government is
aggravating. Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another
document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear that
complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he committed dishonesty.
Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua spouses, into
turning over to him the owners copy of his mothers title upon the misrepresentation that he
would, in four months, have a deed of sale executed by his mother in favor of complainants,
he likewise committed dishonesty.
BATAC V. CRUZ, JR
FACTS: Complainants are among the petitioners, while respondent is one of the respondents,
in a case pending before the Securities and Exchange Commission. As the petitioners in the
SEC case were to present respondent as an adverse party witness, they, on several occasions,
requested the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum/duces tecum upon him. Thus, acting
on complainants request, the SEC Hearing Panel (hearing panel) issued on February 4, 1998,
March 19, 1998, June 4, 1998, June 11, 1998 subpoenas ad testificandum to respondent but
he failed to attend for various reasons which was accepted by the sec panel.
By letter of July 24, 1998, respondent informed the hearing panel that he had just been
appointed by President Estrada as the new Commissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission and in his capacity as such, he was on July 21, 1998 in
conference with certain officials and representatives of the Philippine Electronics and
Telecoms Federation and Institute of Electronics Engineers of the Philippines; and that he
was scheduled to meet with Messrs. Raul Concepcion and Bobby Estenblar of Concepcion
Telecoms and Informatics Philippines, Inc., respectively, in the morning of July 28, 1998, thus
rendering him unable to testify before the hearing panel on said date.
By Order of July 28, 1998, the hearing panel directed respondent to file a manifestation
stating the dates of his availability to appear as witness. Pursuant to said order, respondent,
in a Manifestation dated August 4, 1998, informed that he was available on October 28, 29
and 30, 1998 all at 10:00 a.m. Conformably to said manifestation, the hearing panel, by Order
of September 29, 1998, set the hearing of the SEC case on October 28 and 29 1998 at 10:00
a.m. During the October 28, 1998 hearing, however, respondent failed to attend. His absence
was explained by his counsel, Atty. Eric Paul I. Fetalino. (Reason: Travel abroad)
On February 25, 1999, the hearing panel again issued a subpoena ad testificandum to
respondent for the March 4, 1999 hearing at 2:00 p.m., which subpoena was received at
respondents law office on February 25, 1999. However, by letter of March 3, 1999,
respondent informed the hearing panel that he would not be in Manila on the March 4, 1999
scheduled hearing as he was scheduled to attend the hearing of LRC Case No. 633, In re
Application for Registration, Associacion Benevola de Cebu (Benevola case), pending before
Branch 6 of RTC Cebu City. Based on a Certification dated March 5, 1999 issued by Atty.
Myrna Valderrama-Limbaga, Branch Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 6, Cebu City, the Benevola
principal case was not scheduled for hearing on March 4, 1998, and that what was scheduled
for hearing on said date was an incident thereof in which respondent was neither a counsel
of record nor had he entered his appearance in representation of any of the parties.
By motion[21] dated April 12, 1999, complainants charged before the SEC respondent and his
counsel Atty. Fetalino with several counts of indirect contempt to which they filed a
comment/opposition[22] on May 20, 1999. In a later move, complainants filed on April 15,
1999 their Affidavit - basis of the institution of the complaint at bar against respondent.
In respondents Counter-Affidavit dated October 13, 1999 to which he annexed his opposition
to the motion to cite him in contempt which had, at the time, been unresolved, he
contended that his failure to attend the hearings on February 4, March 18, June 4, 11 and 28,
1998 was due to valid grounds duly communicated to and noted and accepted by the hearing
panel. Blaming the ugly side of politics, respondent claimed that his detractors within the
government succeeded in blocking his travel order. He, however, maintained that on October
28, 1998, he was of the bona fide belief that Secretary Cardenas earlier decision had already
been reconsidered and that there were already instructions of the President for him to
proceed to Minneapolis, hence, he could not be faulted or punished for his failure to attend
the hearing scheduled on that date. As to the March 4, 1999 hearing, respondent stood by
his manifestation made through his counsel that he was supposed to be in Cebu City to
attend to the Benevola case. He claimed that the Certification of the Branch Clerk of Court
hardly revealed the whole picture as he was indeed scheduled to proceed to the RTC Cebu as
early as March 3, 1999 for a very urgent task of filing with said court a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) which was expected to be issued by the Court of Appeals, in connection with the
petition for certiorari he, in collaboration with another counsel, filed to assail the refusal of
the trial judge to stay the execution of the judgment in the Benevola case; but as the Court of
Appeals issued the TRO only on March 5, 1999, he left for Cebu only on March 5, 1999.
IBP Decision: We cannot help but take note of the fact that for a little more than a year
respondent did not appear in any of the ten hearings set by the SEC Hearing Panel requiring
him to testify therein. Whatever the reasons cited, respondent to our mind did not show an
attitude of cooperation with the SEC Hearing Panel so as not to at least unduly delay the
case.
ISSUE: WON Atty Cruz violated PRC or his lawyer’s oath
HELD: Yes, Atty Cruz is Suspended for 6 mos. Citing the lawyer’s oath; I will support its
Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood; I will delay no man for money or malice. Without doubt,
respondent had exhibited a blatant disrespect for legal orders and processes. Respondent
fully knew that several hearings had been postponed due to his unavailability, and they were
reset on dates to adjust to his availability. The least he could have done was, as correctly
pointed out by the IBP, to take steps to cooperate and accommodate in his schedule the
hearings set by the hearing panel. Respondent cannot deny the importance of his would-be
testimony as shown by the continuous request of the petitioners in the SEC case for his
appearance. It was thus very inconsiderate, to say the least, on his part not to have taken
time off from what he wanted to convey to be a hectic schedule. His last minute motions and
manifestations that he be excused from the scheduled hearings confirm his indifference to
the orders of the SEC hearing panel.
PEDRO LINSANGAN V. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
FACTS: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced
his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To induce them to hire his
services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. Complainant presented
the sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to
sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in
exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondent’s calling card.
Respondent Tolentino: denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation
of the said calling card
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of IBP: respondent had encroached on the professional
practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases
for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138[12] of
the Rules of Court.
Penalty – stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty
ISSUE: (1)
(2) WON the penalty is proper – NO.
HELD: for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of CPR and Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year
effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
RATIO:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their
talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or
skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation
and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every
member of the bar is called.
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY
TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.[16]
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE
ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business
by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a
measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the
very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could
produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and
Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
(other issues)
Rule 8.02 of the CPR- a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to
retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer
lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a
matter that he is handling for the client.
JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID RTC 51 SORSOGON V. ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA
FACTS: Atty Dealca was the counsel of a criminal case entitled “People v. Arsenault” which
was pending in the RTC presided by petitioner Judge Jose Madrid. Atty Dealca moved to re-
raffle the case to another RTC branch , "considering the adverse incidents between the
incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where" he does not appear before the
incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the
undersigned” but his motion to re-raffle was denied. Subsequently, complainant Presiding
Judge has had enough of the respondent for engaging in the unethical practice of filing
frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the courts because the Atty.
Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against this Presiding Judge which
were all dismissed by the Supreme Court for utter lack of merit. This is why he should not
have accepted this particular case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in this Court
with his baseless motions for inhibition. It is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a client
in a case but not to appear for a client to remove a case from the Court. Hence, the
complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of
gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and
Recommendation finding respondent Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and criminal
complaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law for
one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and
was grounded on purely personal whims. Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the
administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges and court personnel, including Judge
Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute cases
against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel.
ISSUE:
(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and
court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility? –YES.
RULING:
Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of
vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or
undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint
of insincerity or self interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not
advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid
has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruismin
the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness
and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed
out,16 his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the
Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his
side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because
neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting tothe appropriate
legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to
render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.17
The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation
thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary
action.18 The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift
and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.19
As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to
initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied in
Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thuswise:
Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims
and caprices ofhis clients and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate,20 so must he
equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the
Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth behindcharges against judges and lawyers,
it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass
them, among other things.21
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper
administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded
complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the Judiciary.
Although no person should be penalized for the exercise ofthe right to litigate, the right must
nonetheless be exercised in good faith.22 Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the numerous
administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers
did not evince any good faith on his part, considering that he made allegations against them
therein that he could not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and
unworthy of the Court’s precious time and serious consideration.
RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL KHO
CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND
CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or
the oppressed.
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to
render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the
latter's rights.
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.
Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless
the circumstances so warrant.
IN RE SORIANO
N RE SORIANO FACTS: Atty. Clemente Soriano entered his appearance in the case People’s
Homesite vs Mencias and Tiburcio et al. He sought to represent Marcelino Tiburcio. The thing
is that, when he entered his appearance before the Supreme Court, the case has long been
decided by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then directed Atty. Soriano to show cause
why he should not be subjected to disciplinary actions. Atty. Soriano, in his defense, stated
that he merely relied on the assurance made by one Atty. Dalangpan who assured him that
the case is still pending with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Soriano should
be suspended. HELD: No. But he is severely censured. The only reason why he’s not
suspended is that he exhibited candor before the Supreme Court in acknowledging his
mistake and apologized for it. He has been negligent in his duty and this violates his duty to
be diligent on his responsibility to his client. He should have checked with the former lawyer
of Tiburcio as to the status of the case. If not, he could have simply checked with the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court instead of relying upon the assurances of Atty. Dalangpan (who
even denied before the Supreme Court that he made such assurances).
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS V. BAYOT
ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC, INC
KHAN, JR. V. SIMBILLO
FACTS:
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads: “Annulment
of Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up
the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty.
Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within
4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation of property and custody of children. It
appears that similar advertisements were also published. An administrative complaint was
filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved
to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1 year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo did not
appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him but argued that he
should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against
advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any way by the prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01.
HELD:
Yes. The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is
public service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to
public service and administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate
their primary interest. Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he
erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in
fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of
business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be compatible with the
dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name appears must
be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish in a daily
paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of
which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.