Section 2, Article III of the Constitution - The right of the people to warrant was returned, executed and filed
nd filed by the police with the issuing
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Exclusionary Rule - Article III, Section 3(2), that "any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
Plain View Doctrine - Objects in the plain view of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence.
9. People v. CA
Facts: On August 13, 1992, PNP-Special Investigation Service Command
(PNP-CISC) were conducting a surveillance of suspected drug-pushing
activities at the Regine Condominium, Makati Avenue, Makati City.
Among their targeted suspects was Valentino “Toto” Ortiz. Police officers
saw Ortiz from his Cherokee jeep and noticed that he had a suspiciously
bulging pants pocket thus the police officers immediately moved in and
accosted him. An unlicensed .25 caliber “Raven” automatic pistol with one
magazine and seven rounds of live .25 caliber ammunition was obtained
from Ortiz. Also, the police officers searched Ortiz’s vehicle which resulted
in the retrieval of a sealed cellophane packet of “shabu” from the
compartment. The police then took private respondent into custody. Soon
after Ortiz’s arrest, a search warrant was obtained from the MTC of
Parañaque commanding the PNP officers “to make an immediate search
at any reasonable hour of day or night of the house/s, closed receptacles
and premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession” of
the property subject of the offense. The search warrant was supported by
the statements of two police officers who affirms that they had personal
knowledge that private respondent was keeping in his residence at 148-D
Peru Street, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila,
unlicensed firearms specifically mentioned in the search warrant. (Baby
armalite M-16; Shotgun, 12 g; pistol cal. 9mm; pistol cal. 45 and with
corresponding ammunitions). Armed with the warrant, the PNP CISC
team, accompanied by a representative of the MTC judge and a brgy.
security officer, went to Ortiz’s residence at about 7:30 P.M to search said
premises. Ortiz’s wife and their child’s nanny were both present during the
search, but neither consented to be a witness to the search. The search
resulted in the seizure unlicensed firearms and ammunition. After Ortiz’s
wife signed a receipt for the seized firearms and ammunition, the search
court. At the preliminary investigation, the prosecutor ruled the
warrantless search done with Ortiz’s person and jeep in Makati is invalid
for violating his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. However, the prosecutor found the search conducted in
Parañaque is valid. Ortiz moved for reinvestigation. Ortiz alleged that the
dismissal of the charges against him in Makati also applies to the search
conducted in his house in Parañaque. However, the trial court denied
Ortiz’s contention so he filed for reconsideration and deferral of
arraignment, but said motions were likewise denied. Ortiz moved to quash
the search warrant on the grounds that he was not present when his house
was searched since he was then detained at Camp Crame; that the search
warrant was not shown to his wife; and that the search was conducted in
violation of the witness-to-search rule. Again, the trial court ruled in
negative, denied the motion to quash of Ortiz for lack of merit. And
charged Ortiz with illegal possession of firearms. The CA reversed trial
court’s decision, holding as inadmissible in evidence the seized firearms
and ammunition.
ISSUE: WON the CA make a mistake in holding that the firearms and
ammunition seized from Ortiz’s house are inadmissible as evidence for
being the fruits of an illegal search.
HELD: YES. In this case, there is no illegal search.
The general rule is that search warrants must be served in the daytime.
However, when the application asserts that the property is on the person
or place ordered to be searched, a search at any reasonable hour of the day
and night can be ordered. As to whether the time during which the search
was executed was unreasonable or not, the Supreme Court stated that the
exact time of the execution of the warrant should be left at the discretion
of the law enforcement officers. Judicial notice may be taken not just from
the realities of law enforcement but also the prevailing conditions in the
place to be searched. As such, the SC deemed that 7:30 PM was a
reasonable time, taking notice that said time in a suburban subdivision in
Metro Manila in an hour at which the residents are still up and about.
“Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence
of two witnesses. – No search of a house, room, or any other
premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.”
Ortiz’s wife and their child’s nanny were both present during the search
despite respondent’s absence. Hence, the search conducted by the police
officers are legal.

10. PEOPLE vs LEANGSIRI
FACTS: Accused Leangsiri was arrested at the arrival area of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA). He was in the act of bringing into
the country 8,225.31 grams of heroin hidden under the false bottom of a
black suitcase. He informed the authorities that he was to deliver the
contraband to three (3) people at the Las Palmas Hotel in Manila. The
team and agents of the Bureau of Customs proceeded to the Las Palmas
Hotel, where they allowed Leangsiri to check into Room 504 with the
confiscated black suitcase containing the heroin.
At around eight oclock in the evening, two hours after checking in,
Leangsiri received a telephone call from his contact. Leangsiri was told
that the black suitcase would be picked up at about ten oclock that night.
Thereupon, the two NARCOM agents positioned themselves inside the
washroom, with its door opened a fraction to give them visual access to the
rest of the hotel room.
At about ten p.m., Amidus co-appellants, Omogbolahan and Bhola,
arrived at the hotel. As Amidu flashed a thumbs up sign to them, they all
headed for the elevator and went up to the fifth floor of the hotel. They
knocked on the door of Room 504. Leangsiri stood up from the bed in
which he sat, opened the door, and let the three appellants in. Leangsiri
took the black suitcase and brought it to the dining area of the room where
appellants stood in full view of NARCOM agents Gapiangao and Balneg.
Leangsiri opened the suitcase and displayed its contents to his visitors.
Appellants briefly examined the black suitcase and two (2)
transparent plastic bags which contained the heroin. After the
examination, Leangsiri closed the suitcase and handed it over to
appellants. Appellants started to leave the hotel room with the contraband
when Gapiangao and Balneg barged out of the washroom, identified
themselves as NARCOM agents, and made the arrest.
Appellant Amidu, on the other hand, merely said she was staying
in Room 413 of the same hotel. Accompanied by the hotels owner and
security officer, Samala searched appellant Amidus room. Tucked within
the pages of her telephone and address book was a piece of paper with the
name SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI written on it. The paper and Amidus other
possessions were confiscated
ISSUE: WON the piece of paper found in Amidus hotel room, with the
name SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI written on it, should not have been
admitted as an evidence.
RULING: YES. The Revised Rules of Court provide that (a) person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. To absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who
is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of an incident to his or
her arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense. Such warrantless search obviously
cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest.
The Court held that the warrantless search made by the authorities
on the accused apartment which was located a few blocks away from where
she was arrested was illegal for being an untenable violation, if not
nullification, of the basic constitutional right and guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and the premises
under his immediate control admits of an exception. The exception obtains
when the Plain View Doctrine applies.
The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
The extension of the original justification is legitimate only where
it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.
In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las
Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiris name was obtained
through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel, and found
tucked within the pages of appellant Amidus telephone and address
book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the piece of paper
bearing Leangsiris name cannot be admitted as evidence against
appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however,
exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecution’s case
against appellants. The remaining evidence still established their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
11. VALEROSO vs CA
FACTS: The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP
Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to board
a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting officers bodily
searched him, and they found One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver
bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo without first having
secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.
The defense, on the other hand, insists that Valeroso was arrested
inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the warrant of
arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police officers
searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they
discovered the subject firearm.
ISSUE: WON Valeroso’s constitutional right against illegal search and
seizure was violated.
RULING: YES. Keeping in mind that substantial rights must ultimately
reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. From this constitutional
provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the procurement
of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize
the person, house, papers, or effects of any individual. To underscore the
significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an individual
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly
declares in Article III, Section 3(2), that "any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose in any proceeding."
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are
the well-recognized instances where searches and seizures are allowed
even without a valid warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire,
sanitary and building regulations.
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to
effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose
of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident
to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are
governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without
a search warrant.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter
might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right
of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on
the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the
latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or
within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of
his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting
officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that
the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance
from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their control by
pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his
hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was
locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within his immediate
control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy
any evidence that could be used against him.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s right
against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence
obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence against him.
12. LUZ vs. PEOPLE
FACTS: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-
Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially
testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he
saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive
and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a
helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a
municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet
(sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come
inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused
is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused
to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a
weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents
of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container
about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one
(1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said
container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened
the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and
that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the
container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the
two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu.
On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the
defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure of the alleged subject shabu is illegal.
RULING: First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he
was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso
facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person
into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of
the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the
part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the
offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter:
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation
ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was
no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his
liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the
period during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court,
PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police
sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of
that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were
waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which
was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding
a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a
warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed
for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that
neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic
violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer
to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the
former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket
negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be
the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the
arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons
shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against
them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional
requirements were complied with by the police officers
only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he
was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket,
then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second
time after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugs as he was
already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless
search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are
the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view;
(iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and
emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed
inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence
was not immediately apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently
given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the
prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3
Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent
consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely told to take out
the contents of his pocket.
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant
to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded
location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no
incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is
the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony,that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was
alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several
police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of
valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While
the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or
unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be
afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons.
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he
may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest
opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however,
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening the
constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.
13. MARTINEZ vs PEOPLE
FACTS: At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29, 2007, the police
officers assigned to the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Section of the
Malate Police Station 9 (Police Station 9), conducted a routine foot patrol
along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the process, they heard a man
shouting "Putangina mo! Limangdaan na ba ito?" For purportedly
violating Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila
(Manila City Ordinance) which punishes breaches of the peace, the man,
later identified as Ramon, was apprehended and asked to empty his
pockets. In the course thereof, the police officers were able to recover from
him a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance suspected to be shabu. Consequently, Ramon was charged with
possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11(3), Article II of RA 9165
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his version of the
incident. He narrated that on December 29, 2007, at around 4:00 in the
afternoon, while walking along Balingkit Street to borrow a welding
machine from one Paez Garcia, a man in civilian clothing approached and
asked him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his identity, he was
immediately handcuffed by the man who eventually introduced himself as
a police officer. Together, they boarded a tricycle (sidecar) where the said
officer asked him if he was carrying illegal drugs. Despite his denial, he
was still brought to a precinct to be detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soque
propositioned Ramon and asked for ₱20,000.00 in exchange for his
release. When Ramon’s wife, Amalia Goco, was unable to produce the
₱20,000.00 which PO2 Soque had asked for, he (Ramon) was brought to
the Manila City Hall for inquest proceedings.
ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest of Ramon justifies a subsequent body
search.
RULING: NO. The body search as well as the warrantless arrest is not
lawful. A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one
that is carried out under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court which requires that the apprehending officer must have
been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante
delicto. To be sure the term probable cause has been understood to mean
a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. Specifically with
respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. In this light, the
determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a
re-examination of the factual incidents.

As found in jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are customs
searches, searches of moving vehicles, seizure of evidence in plain view,
consented searches, "stop and frisk" measures and searches incidental to a
lawful arrest. This last-mentioned exception is of particular significance to
this case and thus, necessitates further disquisition.
To determine if the body search is lawful we must first determine if the
arrest was lawful. To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in
a thickly-populated place, with many people conversing with each other
on the street, would constitute any of the acts punishable under Section
844 of the Manila City Ordinance as above-quoted. Ramon was not
making or assisting in any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of
the peace; he was not assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon
another; and, the words he allegedly shouted – "Putanginamo!
Limangdaannabaito?" –are not slanderous, threatening or abusive, and
thus, could not have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot considering
that at the time of the incident, Balingkit Street was still teeming with
people and alive with activity.
Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested the
warantless search that resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the
subject shabu purportedly seized from Ramon is inadmissible in evidence
for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree as mandated by the
above discussed constitutional provision. In this regard, considering that
the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicit of the crime charged,
Ramon's acquital should therefore come as a matter of course.
14. RILEY vs. CALIFORNIA
FACTS: Riley was stopped for a traffic violation, which eventually led to
his arrest on weapons charges. An officer searching Riley incident to the
arrest seized a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket. The officer accessed
information on the phone and noticed the repeated use of a term
associated with a street gang. At the police station two hours later, a
detective specializing in gangs further examined the phone’s digital
contents. Based in part on photographs and videos that the detective
found, the State charged Riley in connection with a shooting that had
occurred a few weeks earlier and sought an enhanced sentence based on
Riley’s gang membership. Riley moved to suppress all evidence that the
police had obtained from his cell phone. The trial court denied the motion,
and Riley was convicted. The California Court of Appeal affirmed.
Wurie was arrested after police observed him participate in an
apparent drug sale. At the police station, the officers seized a cell phone
from Wurie’s person and noticed that the phone was receiving multiple
calls from a source identified as “my house” on its external screen. The
officers opened the phone, accessed its call log, determined the number
associated with the “my house” label, and traced that number to what they
suspected was Wurie’s apartment. They secured a search warrant and
found drugs, a firearm and ammunition, and cash in the ensuing search.
Wurie was then charged with drug and firearm offenses. He moved to
suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the apartment. The
District Court denied the motion, and Wurie was convicted. The First
Circuit reversed the denial of the motion to suppress and vacated the
relevant convictions.
ISSUE: WON the police can, with a warrant, search digital information
on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.
RULING: NO. A warrantless search is reasonable only if it falls within a
specific exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The
well-established exception at issue here applies when a warrantless search
is conducted incident to a lawful arrest.
Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon
to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape. Officers
may examine the phone’s physical aspects to ensure that it will not be used
as a weapon, but the data on the phone can endanger no one.
Although an individual’s privacy rights are diminished once
arrested, it should not be treated as a complete deprivation. The Court
then distinguishes the search of a cigarette pack from the privacy invasion
at issue regarding a search of a cell phone or residence and determines
such a search is not constitutional. The search of the data on a cell phone
is a major invasion of privacy due to the quality and quantity of
information stored on phones.
The Court also concludes the government’s assertion that
under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), a warrantless search of a cell
phone is justified when the cell phone is reasonably believed to contain
evidence of the crime of arrest, applies to the search of vehicles and is
inapplicable to a cell phone. Absent a warrant or demonstration of exigent
circumstances, the government may not conduct a search of a cell phone
incident to arrest.
But the Court’s holding is not that the information on a cell phone
is immune from search; it is that a warrant is generally required before a
search. The warrant requirement is an important component of the Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and warrants may be obtained with
increasing efficiency. In addition, although the search incident to arrest
exception does not apply to cell phones, the continued availability of the
exigent circumstances exception may give law enforcement a
justification for a warrantless search in particular cases.
15. BIRCHFIELD vs. NORTH DAKOTA
BACKGROUND: To fight the serious harms inflicted by drunk drivers,
all States have laws that prohibit motorists from driving with a blood
alcohol concentration (BAC) exceeding a specified level. BAC is typically
determined through a direct analysis of a blood sample or by using a
machine to measure the amount of alcohol in a person’s breath. To help
secure drivers’ cooperation with such testing, the States have also enacted
“implied consent” laws that require drivers to submit to BAC tests.
Originally, the penalty for refusing a test was suspension of the motorist’s
license. Over time, however, States have toughened their drunk-driving
laws, imposing harsher penalties on recidivists and drivers with
particularly high BAC levels. Because motorists who fear these increased
punishments have strong incentives to reject testing, some States,
including North Dakota and Minnesota, now make it a crime to refuse to
undergo testing.
FACTS: In these cases, all three petitioners were arrested on drunk-
driving charges. The state trooper who arrested petitioner Danny
Birchfield advised him of his obligation under North Dakota law to
undergo BAC testing and told him, as state law requires, that refusing to
submit to a blood test could lead to criminal punishment. Birchfield
refused to let his blood be drawn and was charged with a misdemeanor
violation of the refusal statute. He entered a conditional guilty plea but
argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibited criminalizing his refusal to
submit to the test. The State District Court rejected his argument, and the
State Supreme Court affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests
and warrantless blood tests incident to arrests for drunk driving.
In the absence of a warrant, can a state with an implied consent law
make it a crime for a driver to refuse to take a breath or blood test to detect
alcohol or drugs in the driver’s blood?
RULING: The Court held that the Fourth Amendment permits
warrantless breath tests upon arrests for drunk drinking, but does not
permit warrantless blood tests. The decision noted the different impacts
of both tests on an individual’s privacy. The majority said that breath tests
do not raise privacy concerns because there is barely a physical intrusion.
People must breathe to stay alive. So, requiring an arrestee to exhale into
a machine is not inconvenient or embarrassing, nor does it leave any DNA
samples with the government. Given the small impact on privacy, and the
government’s strong interest in keeping highways safe, the Fourth
Amendment allows warrantless breath tests when someone is arrested on
suspicion of driving while intoxicated.
However, the Court said, blood tests are different. They are
significantly more invasive than breathing into a tube. They require
piercing the skin and extracting a part of a person’s body. A blood sample
can be preserved and gives law enforcement a DNA sample. This supplies
much more information than a breath test, which shows someone’s BAC
(blood-alcohol content) level. The Court decided that the government’s
interest in stopping drunk driving does not outweigh the privacy concerns
of blood tests. Therefore, police must get a warrant before drawing blood
from someone who has been arrested on suspicion of driving drunk.
Therefore, motorists may be criminally punished for refusing to
take a breath test based on implied-consent laws, but not for blood tests.
Birchfield was charged with refusing a blood test, and this criminal charge
is reversed.
16. PEOPLE VS. SALANGUIT  Plain View Doctrine
 The search warrant authorized the seizure of shabu, not marijuana
 Seizure of the latter (marijuana) is being justified by the “plain view
doctrine” of the searching party which is being contested by accused-
appellant, Salanguit
Prior justification and Discovery by Inadvertance
 Once a valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain
view doctrine can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other
items subsequently found
 The location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant, thus known to
the police operatives = reasonable to assume that police found the
shabu first before the marijuana (and the marijuana bricks are
packed/wrapped in newspaper)
Apparent Illegality of the evidence
 Marijuana bricks were wrapped in newspaper = could not have been
readily discernible as marijuana = hence an inadmissible evidence
 Nonetheless, confiscation of the drug must be upheld
17. TERRY VS. OHIO  Stop and Frisk Exception
 A policeman of 30 years in service patrol (McFadden) observed 2
strangers (Terry and Chilton) along with a another man walking back
and forth on a street corner, passing by a store for about 24 times 
McFadden approached the 2 for their suspicious behavior (day light
robbery which may involve use of weapon)  McFadden asked their
names and the two answered mumbling  officer (McFadden) patted
down their outside clothes, found but unable to remove a pistol and
 ordered the two to get inside a store and again ordered them to face
the wall, the officer seized a revolver from Chilton’s outer garments
 ISSUES: Is the right to personal security violated by an unreasonable
search and seizure? Whether there was justification for McFadden’s
invasion of Terry’s personal security by searching him for weapons in
the course of that investigation?
 “it is urged that distinctions should be made between a "stop" and an
"arrest" (or a "seizure" of a person), and between a "frisk" and a
"search." Thus, it is argued, the police should be allowed to "stop" a
person and detain him briefly for questioning upon suspicion that he
may be connected with criminal activity. Upon suspicion that the
person may be armed, the police should have the power to "frisk" him
for weapons. If the "stop" and the "frisk" give rise to probable cause
to believe that the suspect has committed a crime, then the police
should be empowered to make a formal "arrest," and a full incident
"search" of the person. This scheme is justified in part upon the notion
that a "stop" and a "frisk" amount to a mere "minor inconvenience
and petty indignity," which can properly be imposed upon the citizen
in the interest of effective law enforcement on the basis of a police
officer's suspicion. (explanation nung doctrine used in the case)
 The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer
McFadden's taking steps to investigate petitioner's suspicious
behavior, but, rather, whether there was justification for McFadden's
invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him for weapons in
the course of that investigation. We are now concerned with more
than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in
addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in
taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing
is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require
that police officers take unnecessary risks in the
performance of their duties. American criminals have a long
tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law
enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more
are wounded. Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of
the injuries are inflicted with guns and knives.
 In view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law
enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective
victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause
for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the
individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at
close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer
or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to
deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to
determine whether the person is, in fact, carrying a weapon
and to neutralize the threat of physical harm
 The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with McFadden's
hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery --
which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of
weapons -- and nothing in their conduct from the time he first noticed
them until the time he confronted them and identified himself as a
police officer gave him sufficient reason to negate that hypothesis.
 The scope of the search in this case presents no serious problem in light
of these standards. Officer McFadden patted down the outer clothing
of petitioner and his two companions. He did not place his hands in
their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he had
felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns.
He never did invade Katz' person beyond the outer surfaces of his
clothes, since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have
been a weapon. Officer McFadden confined his search strictly to what
was minimally necessary to learn whether the men were armed and to
disarm them once he discovered the weapons. He did not conduct a
general exploratory search for whatever evidence of criminal activity
he might find.
20. CABALLES VS. CA  Search of Moving Vehicle
 About 9:15 p.m. 2 policemen, while on a routine patrol in Barangay
Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep.
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the
jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged
down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what
was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer; he appeared pale and
nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor
wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). The
conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45. Noceja
asked appellant where the wires came from and appellant answered that
they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from
Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage
wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took
pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were
turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
 Routine inspection- does not violate of an individual’s right against
unreasonable search
 Extensive Search- warrantless search is only valid if there is probable
cause
 Vehicle looking suspicious because of it being covered with kakawati
leaves = does NOT constitute probable cause which could justify the
conduct of a search without warrant
 + there was no tip or confidential report about an incident carrying of
stolen cable wires
 Caballes acquitted of the crime of charged (theft).
22. PEOPLE VS. JOHNSON  Airport Searches ->
authorized by law
 Johnson was about to fly back to US after a visit in Calamba, Ramirez
(lady frisker @ the airport NAIA gate 16) frisked her after feeling
something hard on Johnson’s abdominal area
 Johnson: need to wear 2 panty girdles because underwent operation
for an ectopic pregnancy  Ramirez not satisfied, told her superiors
 directed Johnson to the ladies’ room, found 3 plastic packs of shabu
 Johnson: Gross violation of her constitutional rights, hence the plastic
packs of shabu found are inadmissible evidence = NO MERIT
 Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or properties to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Travelers are often notified through airport public address
systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances
are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
23. New Jersey vs TLO
FACTS: In a New Jersey high school, a teacher found two girls smoking
in the bathroom and took them to the principal's office. One girl admitted
to smoking but the other, known as T.L.O., denied it. The principal
demanded to see the girl's purse and found evidence that she was also
selling marijuana at school. T.L.O. was taken to the police station where
she admitted to selling marijuana. Based on her confession and the
evidence in her purse, the state of New Jersey brought charges against her.
In a juvenile court, T.L.O. argued that her Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated. The court
sided with the school, and T.L.O. took her case to the New Jersey Supreme
Court, which later found that the search was unreasonable, and the
evidence could not be used. The state of New Jersey appealed the decision
to the United States Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Does the exclusionary rule apply to searches conducted by school
officials in public schools?
HELD: After the original oral argument in March of 1984, the Supreme
Court restored the case to the calendar for reargument. In addition to the
previously argued question, the Court requested that the parties brief and
argue the additional question of whether the assistant principal violated the
Fourth Amendment in opening T.L.O.'s purse.
The Court heard reargument on October 02, 1984. The Court held that
while the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures applies to public school officials, they may conduct reasonable
warrantless searches of students under their authority notwithstanding the
probable cause standard that would normally apply to searches under the
Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was
reasonable under the circumstances.
24. VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT VS ACTON
FACTS: An official investigation led to the discovery that high school
athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use.
School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-
related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon
adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random
urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was
denied participation in his school's football program when he and his
parents refused to consent to the testing.
ISSUE: Does random drug testing of high school athletes violate the
reasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment?
HELD: No. The reasonableness of a search is judged by "balancing the
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests." In the case of high school
athletes who are under State supervision during school hours, they are
subject to greater control than over free adults. The privacy interests
compromised by urine samples are negligible since the conditions of
collection are similar to public restrooms, and the results are viewed only
by limited authorities. Furthermore, the governmental concern over the
safety of minors under their supervision overrides the minimal, if any,
intrusion in student-athlete’s privacy.
25. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS DANGEROUS DRUGS
BOARD
FACTS: In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with
certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing
the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national
and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-
election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution;
and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five
(5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member
of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by
requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant,
among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified
as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification
requirements of candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36(g) of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are
constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and
has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government
have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon
the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test” is not
tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise
of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.
HOWEVER, SEC 36 (c ) and (d) are constitutional.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized
drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the
quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.
Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as
contained in the school’s student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x
x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private
offices. Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected
to undergo a random drug test as contained in the
company’s work rules and regulations, x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous
drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be
a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and
pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
“the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for
officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable. The Court
notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting
almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable,
an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,] has failed to
show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under
Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes
unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the
Constitution.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to
privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s
person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities. And while there has
been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against
unwarranted search, translation of the abstract prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures into workable broad guidelines for the
decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to borrow from C. Camara
v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy
yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the states
exercise of police power.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched
and as has been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the
reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-
mandated intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest against the
promotion of some compelling state interest. In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employees
and students for that matter under RA 9165 is in the nature of
administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as swift
and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause standard is not
required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on
the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of
the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search
within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this
case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the
privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug
testing requirement. The employee’s privacy interest in an office is to a
large extent circumscribed by the company’s work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered by management and the bargaining
unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and
efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such
privacy has been upheld.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions
calculated to protect as much as possible the employee’s privacy and
dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure
shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in
the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-
controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of
custody.] In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to
the drug results shall be on the need to know basis; that the drug test result
and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted
practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results. Notably, RA 9165
does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting
agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation
of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employee’s
privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively
minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug
in the country and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the
youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to
achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and
resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a
mandatory random drug test. To the Court, the need for drug testing to at
least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the
individual’s privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider
that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social-
economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture,
or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an
investors dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any
of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial
law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer
assume a laid-back stance with respect to this modern-day scourge. Drug
enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an
effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in
private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than
other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and
enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to
be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold
that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of
the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions
imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if
RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the
more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the
people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency
26. DELA CRUZ VS PEOPLE (2014)
FACTS: Petitioner Jaime D. Dela Cruz was charged with violation of
Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation
and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas, in an
Information dated 14 February 2006, which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having been duly
appointed and qualified to such public position as Police Officer 2 of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned in the Security Service Group
of the Cebu City Police Office, after having been arrested by agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was
found positive for use of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE
commonly known as "Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test
conducted on said accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal
RTC RULING (CA AFFIRMED): The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch
58 of Cebu City, in its Decision dated 6 June 2007, found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a
period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate
Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City.
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the
result of the urine test despite its dubiousness having been admitted inspite
of the lack of legal basis for its admission. First, he alleges that the forensic
laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact that he was not
assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional right. Secondly,
he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the
lack of sufficient basis to convict him.
HELD: No. The drug test can be made upon who were apprehended or
arrested under the situations listed in Art 2 of RA 9165. It must be noted
that the accused was arrested in the alleged act of extortion. Extortion is
not listed in Art 2 of RA 9165.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment and raises the issue only now before this tribunal;
hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. However, "a
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest”
“The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and
tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was
adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because
he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances.
27. LUCAS VS LUCAS
FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with
a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who
got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also
submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth;
(b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma,
showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with
a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same
school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from
different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment
manifesting that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent
Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in
form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a
mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case
and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural
aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba
namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the
child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC
granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on
the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in
favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant
aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA
testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a
prima facie case.
ISSUE: Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can
issue a DNA testing order
HELD: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case
vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been
presented by petitioner.
RATIO:
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four
significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties
have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A
party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when
the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings,
when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s
observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is therefore
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by
mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions
that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing.
It states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or
on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and
notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological
sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was
not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii)
was previously subjected to DNA
testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The
DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has
the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any,
which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or
integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing,
without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This
does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter
of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must
be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court
order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable
cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case,
or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of
a finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions
have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made
before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the
court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party
must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action
refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be
held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for
blood testing The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus,
during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.”
28. MARYLAND VS KING
FACTS: The Maryland DNA Collection Act (MDCA) allows state and
local law enforcement officers to collect DNA samples from individuals
who are arrested for a crime of violence, an attempted crime of violence,
burglary, or attempted burglary. Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested on first
and second-degree assault charges. While under arrest, but prior to
conviction, King's DNA was collected and logged in Maryland's DNA
database. That database matched King's DNA to a DNA sample from an
unsolved rape case. This sample was the only evidence linking King to the
rape. The trial judge denied King's motion to suppress the DNA evidence
and he was convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison.
King appealed the conviction, arguing that the MDCA was an
unconstitutional infringement of his Fourth Amendment privilege against
warrantless searches. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding
that the MDCA was unconstitutional. The court held that King's
expectation of privacy was greater than Maryland's interest in using the
DNA for identification purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Fourth Amendment allows states to collect and
analyze DNA from people arrested, but not convicted, of serious crimes.
HELD: Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4
majority. The Court held that conducting a DNA swab test as a part of the
arrest procedure does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the test
serves a legitimate state interest and is not so invasive so as to require a
warrant. The routine administrative procedures that occur during a booking
for an arrest do not require the same justification and the search of a
location. The Court held that ascertaining an arrestee's identity and criminal
history is a crucial part of the arrest procedure and that a DNA test is just
as valid and informative as fingerprinting. Determining an arrestee's
criminal history also serves the legitimate state interest of determining what
level of risk the individual poses to the public and what conditions should
be set on his/her release from custody.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Fourth
Amendment categorically prevents searching a person for evidence of a
crime without cause. Because the majority's opinion allows for DNA tests
to be conducted in the absence of evidence linking the arrestee to a specific
DNA-related crime, these tests fall within the boundaries of the British
"general warrants" the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit. He
also argued that the procedural safeguards on the DNA evidence make it
an ineffective and redundant identification tool. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the
dissent.
Ople v Torres G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.
Facts: Ople seeks for the invalidation of Administrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two constitutional grounds (1) it is a usurpation of the power
of Congress to legislate, and (2) it impermissibly intrudes protected
zone of privacy (violates right to privacy).
Issue: Whether or not the assailed administrative order violates right to
privacy.
Ruling: Yes. AO 208 is unconstitutional for violating the right to privacy,
protected by the bill of rights enshrined in the constitution.
In view of the issue: whether or not the issuance of the assailed
issue by the president usurps the legislative powers of the
Congress
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government.
It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The court
holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be
covered by an administrative order. The contention of the dissenters that
the assailed order is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty,
affords no protection, and creates no office is not correct because the said
order it forces the citizens to avail the identification card in order for the
citizens to transact business with the government. Without the ID, a
citizen will have a difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his
privileges. Hence, the contention that the order gives no right and imposes
no duty cannot stand. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President to issue.
". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that
administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-
making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although
administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to
prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to
make laws." – Fisher
In view of the issue: whether or not the assailed order violates
the right to privacy
The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone”. In Morfe vs. Mutuc,
the court ruled that there is a constitutional right to privacy that deserves
constitutional protection. This right is expressly recognized in section 3(1)
of the bill of rights.
It is the burden of the government to show that the assailed administrative
order is justified. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1)
the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to
reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable
whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of
A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness,
the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our
people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a
Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to
establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of
"Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No.
308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does
not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information
alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that
the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for development planning." Clearly, the
indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the authority to
store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification
of the individual through his PRN. The lack of proper safeguards in this
regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode
and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also
enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies
access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against
leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of
the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of
sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or
worse, manipulate the data stored within the system. It is plain and we
hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information
which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this
regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode
and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also
enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and
misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated
when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read
or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded.
They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does
not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to
stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public
service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly
focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into
the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined
standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.
"the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an
unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is
that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign
capacity to forget." – Kalvin Jr.
Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director-General, NEDA
Facts: This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the nullification of Executive Order No. 420, which requires all
government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations
to streamline and harmonize their ID system, on the ground that it
constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of
the government and that it infringes on right to privacy (by allowing access
to personal confidential data without the owner’s consent)
Issue: Whether or not EO 420 usurps legislative power by the president
and whether or not it violates right to privacy
Ruling:
In view of the issue whether or not the issuance of the order
constitutes a usurpation of the legislative powers by the
president
EO 420 does not constitute a usurpation of legislative power by the
President
The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce
costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide
convenience to the people served by government entities.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the
uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, which are the usual data
required for personal identification by the government entities. In fact, EO
420 will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in the ID
databases of the government entities. In fact, some government entities
collect and record more data than what EO 420 allows; the Supreme Court
ID contains far more data than the proposed uniform ID for government
entities under EO 420.
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in
either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities
can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems
uniform. Second, the President may by executive or administrative order
direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a
uniform ID data collection and format, as provided under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution. Under this constitutional power of control,
the President can direct all government entities to adopt a uniform ID data
collection. However, this power of control is limited to the Executive
branch of government only. This shows that EO 320 does not establish a
national ID system because a legislation is needed to establish a single ID
system that is compulsory for all branches of government.
Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to
promulgate. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal
any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. What require
legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system;
(1) when the implementation requires a special appropriation, (2) when it
is compulsory on all branches of government, and (3) when it requires the
collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or
usually required. All of these requirements are not present in the assailed
order.
On the issue of whether or not the assailed order violates right
to privacy
All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government
entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their
governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that
the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. The
data collected and stored for the unified ID system under EO 420 will be
limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself will show only eight
specific data. The data collection, recording and ID card system under EO
420 will even require less data collected, stored and revealed than under
the disparate systems prior to EO 420. EO 420 further provides strict
safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast
to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative
safeguards. The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable
ID systems by government entities.
In Whalen v. Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New
York law that required doctors to furnish the government reports
identifying patients who received prescription drugs that have a potential
for abuse. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the privacy claim, and declared
that disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital
personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health agencies are often
an essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may
reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient.Compared to the
personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State in
Whalen, the 14 specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine
government under EO 420 are far less sensitive and far less personal.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but
makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS,
SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-
friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive
issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control over
government entities in the Executive department, as well as under the
Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Petitions are DISMISSED. EO 420 is declared VALID.
Gamboa vs. Chan
Facts: Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued A.O. 275, which
provides for the creation of an independent commission to address the
alleged existence of private armies in the country. Zeñarosa Commission
was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in
the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010
elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon the
conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and
submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report.
Gamboa alleges that PNP–Ilocos Norte classified her as someone who
keeps a PAG and without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos
Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of
individuals maintaining PAGs. ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news
program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the
politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her
association with a PAG also appeared on print media. Thus, she was
publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the
unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered. Gamboa
claims that her right to privacy was violated.
Issue: Whether or not Gamboa’s right to privacy was violated.
Ruling: No. Gamboa’s right to privacy was not violated.
"Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from
unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is
to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the
beginning of all freedom." – Justice Douglas. Right to privacy is “the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men” –
Justice Bradeis. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate
Committee on Banks, the Supreme Court underscored that the right to
privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest. Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a
competing state objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions.
In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to
privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state
interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
On the issue of habeas data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed
to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right
to the truth and to informational privacy. It must be emphasized that in
order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty
or security on the other.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies
and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.
It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in
scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a
national police commission. Hence, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275
articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of
PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission
without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the
opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or
threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial
component of intelligence-gathering and investigation. However, to
accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in
existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary
to caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must
observe strict confidentiality. In this case, respondents admitted the
existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature. It is clear
from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs
far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa,
especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information
against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of
the writ of habeas data must be denied.
Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College
Facts: Julia Daluz and Julienne Suzara were graduating high school
students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. In January 2012, while
changing into their swimsuits for a beach party, Julia and Julienne took
photos of themselves in their undergarments. These pictures were then
uploaded by Angela Tan on FB.
Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department,
learned from her students about the pictures. Escudero asked about the
students and Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among
others, were identified.
Escudero’s students showed her photos of the identified students, which
include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking
cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu
wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black
brassieres.
Escudero showed the photos to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate
action. When the students reported to the office, they were castigated and
verbally abused by STC officials. There were also barred from joining the
graduation ceremony. A week before the graduation, Angela’s and Julia’s
mothers filed a petition before the RTC. Despite the issuance of TRO, STC
still barred the sanctioned students from graduating.
Issue: Whether or not there was an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy.
Ruling: No; there was no actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
individual’s right to informational privacy. It was defined as "a procedure
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age." The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the writ
requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Hence, there
must be an evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right
to privacy.
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
Justice Puno’s three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or
situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.
Of the three, what is relevant in the present case is the right to
informational privacy – right of individuals to control information about
themselves.
The question now though is up to what extent is the right to privacy
protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves
personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is
socializing––sharing a myriad of information, some of which would have
otherwise remained personal. To address concerns about privacy, but
without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy
tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as
information uploaded by the user. However, these privacy settings are not
foolproof. Utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber
world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Hence, the determination of the extent that the images in question were
visible to other Facebook users is necessary in resolving the issue whether
the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn
account that her students showed her the photos using their own Facebook
accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to view
the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,
and that it is reasonable to assume that the photos were viewable either by
(1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large. Considering that
the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public," it can be surmised that act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of
of the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection the aggrieved party.” The petition must adequately show that there exists
attached to the right to informational privacy. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the right to life, liberty or security on the other. On the same hand, the
minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence
students who showed the images to Escudero. Had it been proved that the showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through liberty or security of the victim.
the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
The Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right
screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the
result may have been different. to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the
supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex
STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its video. The Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that
students to be responsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated
particularly in OSNs, when it enforced the disciplinary actions specified in through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the
the Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in the process, it violated subject sex video. The petition would equally be dismissible due to the
the students’ rights. inadequacy of the evidence presented.
Lee vs. Ilagan Nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any
overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty
Facts: In 2011, Ilagan visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for
or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to
a while and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve
that his digital camera was missing. Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s unlawful ends. Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason
office regarding a purported sex video she discovered from the camera
why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same
involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against
demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail. During the
Ilagan. Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the
confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside habeas data petition.
his office and walked away. Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as
evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan. Ilagan claimed that
Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute
the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the
internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but
also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas
data in his favor is warranted.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ
of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
Ruling: No; the RTC erred in extending the privilege of the writ of habeas
data in favor of Ilagan.
Habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful