AZNAR v.

GARCIA (1963) Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens
FACTS: (will of Edward Christensen)
In 1875, Edward E. Christensen was born in NY, USA, migrated to California, and had visits to
the Philippines (domicile) until his stay here and execution of a will in 1951 and his death in 1953. In a
special proceeding, the court approved the final accounts of the executor (Adolfo Aznar) of the will,
reimbursement to Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to
Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator.
The court ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions
in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right
to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable.
Helen (acknowledged natural child) opposed as she was deprived of her just share in the
inheritance. She maintained that under the renvoi doctrine, the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
disposition of the distribution of the estate of the deceased should be governed by the laws of the Philippines.
residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad.
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of
the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court
must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should
be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile.
* reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides.

ISSUE:

What law should govern the distribution of Edward’s estate

RULING: LAW OF THE DOMICILE

The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question
before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of
laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe.

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has
died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of
Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he
finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the
English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.

Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. The principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the
State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions - the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the
owner.
 HASEGAWA v. KITAMURA (2007)
FACTS:
In 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd (Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and
management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign governments) entered into an Independent
Contractor Agreement (ICA) with Minoru Kitamura (Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines).
Under the same, Kitamura was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting on April 1, 1999.
Kitamura worked as project manager twice. However, in 2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa (Nippon’s gen
manager for its International Division) informed Kitamura that the company had no more intention of automatically
renewing his ICA. Despite Kitamura’s request for negotiation conference, Nippon insisted that the contract was
only for a term that has already expired. This prompted Kitamura to file a case for specific performance and
damages. Hasegawa & Nippon moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction as the ICA had been perfected in
Japan & executed by and between Japanese nationals. Also, the claim for improper pre-termination of
respondent's ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex
loci celebrationis and lex contractus. RTC denied the motion to dismiss (law prevailing at the place of
performance) & MR.
CA affirmed: lex loci celebrationis was inapplicable, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity
of the written agreement put in issue - lex loci solutionis properly applied. (defective certification of non-forum
shopping: dismissal w/o prejudice)
ISSUE:
W/N the Philippine court has jurisdiction over the contract between Japanese nationals
RULING: premature invocation of choice-of-law rules
The ICA subject of the litigation was entered into and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese nationals, and written
wholly in the Japanese language. The court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory when they
elevated the case to the appellate court. in the motion to dismiss filed with the trial court, petitioners never contended that the
rtc is an inconvenient forum. they merely argued that the applicable law which will determine the validity or invalidity of
respondent's claim is that of japan, following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. while not abandoning
this stance in their petition before the appellate court, petitioners on certiorari significantly invoked the defense of forum non
conveniens. on petition for review before this court, petitioners dropped their other arguments, maintained the forum non
conveniens defense, and introduced their new argument that the applicable principle is the [state of the] most significant
relationship rule.
To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction,
choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. corresponding to these phases are the following questions: (1)
where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) which law will the court apply? and (3) where can the resulting judgment be
enforced?
Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause
a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which
will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. the power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state
constitutional authority to apply forum law. while jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the minimum
contacts for one do not always provide the necessary significant contacts for the other. the question of whether the law of a
state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a
judgment.
For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the
petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving
property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners
are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes
and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations
of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its
motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the
court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most significant relationship rule.The court finds the invocation of
these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the law of the place where a
contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the law of the place where a
contract is executed or to be performed. It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may
pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly.
Under the state of the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the
court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a
case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be
performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into
account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue to be resolved.
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they
are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in
resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of
jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Before determining which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring
the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper
rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of
lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal
law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or
States. The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose
to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal
agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.
 BANK OF AMERICA v. CA (2003) The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because
Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled that
FACTS: while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so
only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance;
In 1993, Litonjuas (Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr. and Aurelio J. Litonjua) filed a complaint for accounting &
and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
damages against Bank of America NT&SA and Bank of America International, Ltd. They were engaged in the
determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense.
shipping business & owned 2 vessels Don Aurelio and El Champion. They deposited their revenues from their
business & other funds with the banks in UK & Hongkong up to 1979. Said banks induced them to increase their
ships & offered easy loans for this. Their new vessels were placed in the possession of the banks. They claimed
that the banks as trustees did not render an account of the income.

Because of the banks’ breach & negligence, Litonjuas experiences decline in the revenue & loss due to
the foreclosure of the loans. The banks filed a motion to dismiss due to forum non conveniens & lack of cause of
action. DENIED. CA affirmed.

The banks insist that while the application of forum non conveniens is discretionay upon the Court, said
discretion is limited by the guidelines pertaining to the private as well as public interest factors in determining
whether plaintiffs choice of forum should be disturbed. They maintain that the law of England should be applied
and its difficulty may be avoided by dismissing the case due to forum non conveniens.

ISSUE:

W/N the case should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens

RULING: NO.

The doctrine of forum non-conveniens, literally meaning the forum is inconvenient, emerged in private
international law to deter the practice of global forum shopping, that is to prevent non-resident litigants from
choosing the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for malicious reasons, such as to secure
procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more
friendly venue. Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction
where it is not the most convenient or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere.

Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon
the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the
following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2)
that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. Evidently, all these requisites are present in
the instant case.
 RAYTHEON INTERNAT’L v. ROUZIE, JR (2008)
FACTS:
In 1980, Brand Marine Services, Inc (BMSI: State of Connecticut, USA) & Stockton Rouzie, Jr.
(American citizen) entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired him as a representative to negotiate the sale of
services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross
receipts. In 1992, Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the Phils on BMSI’s behalf for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient
to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion
of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.

In 1994, Rouzie filed before NLRC a case against BMSI, RUST, Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G.
Browning for alleged non-payment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract. LA
ruled in his favor. NLRC reversed & dismissed the case on ground of lack of jurisdiction. Rouzie elevated the case
to SC but was dismissed and became final & executory in 1998.

In 1999, Rouzie, then a respondent of La Union, filed an action for damages against Raytheon
International, BMSI, & RUST. He essentially reiterated his claims BMSI verbally employed respondent to
negotiate the sale of services in government projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions due him
from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI
and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.

Raytheon denied. Also, the case should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens & lack of
cause of action as pursuant to "Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the parties
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. RTC however denied the same as the principle of
forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a
foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

W/N the case should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens

RULING: NO

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State
of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are
precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question
whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The
choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is,
after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions
on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
 SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES v. CA (1998)
FACTS:
In 1988, SAUDIA hired Milagros Morada as a flight attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah. In 1990,
while on a lay-over in Jakarta, she went to a disco dance w/ her fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and
Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. They agreed to have breakfast together at Thamer’s room. Allah left on
some pretext. Thamer attempted to rape Morada. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard
her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi,
the latter as an accomplice.
When she returned to Jeddah, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident &
requested her to return to Jakarta to help arrange the release of the two guys. She refused & declined to sign a
blank paper & a written document written in the local dialect. She was allowed to return to Jeddah but was barred
from Jakarta flights. Meanwhile, the two guys were released & returned to work. In 1990, Morada was transferred
to Manila.
In 1992, she was brought to the police where her passport was taken from her and she was questioned
about the Jakarta incident. Its return was conditioned on her making a statement dropping the case against the
two. In one of her flights in 1993, instead of boarding the plane, she was brought to the court and was made to
sign a document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and
Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. She then
returned to Manila. Later, to her surprise, a decision was rendered sentencing her to 5 months imprisonment &
286 lashes. Only then that she realized that she was tried together w/ the two guys for adultery, going to disco,
dancing & listening to music in violation of Islamic laws, & socializing w/ male crews in violation of Islamic tradition.
SAUDIA denied her assistance. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed
the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was
terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause. She filed a complaint for
damages vs. SAUDI & Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country manager. SAUDIA filed MD: (1) that the
Complaint states no cause of action against Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3)
that the claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and
(4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case. MD DENIED. CA ruled that the Philippines is an
appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the
Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court.
SAUDIA insisted that Phil courts had no jurisdiction over the case since the proper law applicable is the
law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this case involves what is known in private international law as a
"conflicts problem". the lex loci delicti commissi rule
ISSUE: W/N RTC is the proper forum despite the case involving foreign element
RULING:
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to
contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals
and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine
national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the
petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders,
particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise.
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with
private respondent's assertion that violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the
municipal forum. Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC
Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is
obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of
an inconvenient forum, "vex", "harass", or "oppress" the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or
disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it
refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have
caused a fundamental unfairness to her. Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should
be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint
and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the
Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact"
could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts
case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working
here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of
its duties, "act with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she
claimed.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules
on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the
modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship" rule, which in
our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case.
 PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION v. V.P. EUSEBIO
CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
et al (2004)
FACTS:
In 1980, a construction project (Institute of Physical Therapy–Medical Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad,
Iraq) was awarded to Ajyal Trading and Contracting Company. In 1981, it entered into a Joint Venture Agreement w/ Sps.
Eduardo and Iluminada Santos, in behalf of respondent 3-Plex International, Inc. (local contractor) w/ 4% commission of the
contract price. Since 3-Plex was not accredited by/registered w/ the Philippine Overseas Construction Board (POCB), it
assigned its rights to VPECI (construction and engineering firm duly registered with the POCB). It was later agreed upon that
3-Plez & VPECI will jointly manage the execution of the project.
For the bond requirement, they applied for the issuance of a guarantee w/ PhilGuarantee – a government financial
institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino contractors to secure the performance of approved service
contracts abroad. PhilGuarantee approved the application but the bond was not accepted by SOB as it required a letter-
guarantee from Rafidian Bank (Iraq’s govt bank). The bank issued a performance bond w/ the condition that a different foreign
bank will issue counter-guarantee – Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait, w/c required a similar counter-guarantee – PhilGuarantee.
In 1981, SOB, VPECI & Ajyal executed a service contract for the construction of the Center, wherein the joint
venture contractor undertook to complete the Project within a period of 547 days or 18 months. Under the Contract, the Joint
Venture would supply manpower and materials, and SOB would refund to the former 25% of the project cost in Iraqi Dinar and
the 75% in US dollars at the exchange rate of 1 Dinar to 3.37777 US Dollars. The construction, which was supposed to start
on 2 June 1981, commenced only on the last week of August 1981. Because of this delay and the slow progress of the
construction work due to some setbacks and difficulties, the Project was not completed on 15 November 1982 as scheduled.
But in October 1982, upon foreseeing the impossibility of meeting the deadline and upon the request of Al Ahli Bank, the joint
venture contractor worked for the renewal or extension of the Performance Bond and Advance Payment Guarantee. It was
indeed renewed & extended.
As of March 1986, the status of the Project was 51% accomplished, meaning the structures were already finished.
The remaining 47% consisted in electro-mechanical works and the 2%, sanitary works, which both required importation of
equipment and materials.
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the petitioner demanding full payment of its performance bond counter-
guarantee. Upon receiving a copy of that telex message on 27 October 1986, respondent VPECI requested Iraq Trade and
Economic Development Minister Mohammad Fadhi Hussein to recall the telex call on the performance guarantee for being a
drastic action in contravention of its mutual agreement with the latter that (1) the imposition of penalty would be held in
abeyance until the completion of the project; and (2) the time extension would be open, depending on the developments on the
negotiations for a foreign loan to finance the completion of the project. In 1987, Al Ahli Bank demanded reimbursement.
Nevertheless, PhilGuarantee paid & later demanded full payment from respondents on the basis of their
undertaking & surety bond (joint & solidary), but they failed to pay, so PhilGuarantee filed a case for collection of sum of
money. RTC, as CA affirmed, ruled in favor of VPECI, et al – no cause of action, guarantee already expired, no valid
extension.
ISSUE:
What law should apply in determining w/n the contractor has defaulted in the performance of its
obligations under the service contract
RULING: PHIL LAWS (PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION)
The question of whether there is a breach of an agreement, which includes default or mora, pertains to
the essential or intrinsic validity of a contract. No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly
provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most legal systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of a
contract must be governed by the lex contractus or "proper law of the contract." This is the law voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci
intentionis). The law selected may be implied from such factors as substantial connection with the transaction, or
the nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts would do well to adopt the first and most basic rule in
most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select the law applicable to their contract, subject to the
limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or public policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear a
substantive relationship to the transaction.
It must be noted that the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express choice of the
law that would govern it. In the United States and Europe, the two rules that now seem to have emerged as
"kings of the hill" are (1) the parties may choose the governing law; and (2) in the absence of such a choice, the
applicable law is that of the State that "has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the
parties." Another authority proposed that all matters relating to the time, place, and manner of performance and
valid excuses for non-performance are determined by the law of the place of performance or lex loci solutionis,
which is useful because it is undoubtedly always connected to the contract in a significant way.
In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction, since one of the parties is
the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether respondent VPECI
defaulted in its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq. However, since that foreign law was not
properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as the processual
presumption, comes into play. Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.
As found by both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the delay or the non-completion of the Project
was caused by factors not imputable to the respondent contractor. It was rather due mainly to the persistent
violations by SOB of the terms and conditions of the contract. Indeed, where one of the parties to a contract does
not perform in a proper manner the prestation which he is bound to perform under the contract, he is not entitled
to demand the performance of the other party. A party does not incur in delay if the other party fails to perform the
obligation incumbent upon him. BUT PHILGUARANTEE NOT ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT, KNOW FULLY
WELL OF THE VIOLATIONS & DID NOT BENEFIT THE DEBTOR
 DILWEG v. PHILLIPS (1964)

FACTS:

In 1958, Lavern Dilweg (non-resident American), thru counsel, filed a case vs. Robert O. Phillips,
Inocentes G. Dineros, and Isaac S. Esceta, claiming civil damages arising out of alleged libelous and defamatory
statements uttered and published in the Philippines by the latter. Phillips & Dineros filed MD but was denied. MR
claiming that the judgt will not be enforced as Dilweg was not in the Phils. GRANTED. RTC said:

This action is one for damages by reason of alleged libelous statements uttered in the Philippines by the defendants
against the plaintiff. In otherwords, it is an action based on a tort or act, which under the law of the Philippines, is
defined as a criminal offense. At the time the said libelous statements were uttered, the plaintiff was in Washington
D.C. where he was and has always been a resident. There is no allegation in the complaint that plaintiff has ever
been in the Philippines or has resided at anytime therein.

As there are no doctrines in this jurisdiction covering the issue raised by the defendants, this Court is bound to rely
on American doctrines for the reason that our rules on jurisdiction have been copied and patterned upon American
laws and statutes.

The Court has come to the conclusion that in order that the court may validly try a case, it must have
jurisdiction not only over the persons of the parties and over the subject matter and that plaintiff must be a
resident within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in order that jurisdiction over his person can be
acquired, otherwise the Court will not be able to render a valid judgment against him

.ISSUE:

W/N Philippine courts can rightfully refuse to assume jurisdiction over a personal action instituted by a
nonresident alien who is not within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts

RULING: NO

In refusing to assume jurisdiction over this case, the court below upheld defendants' contention that in a
personal action it can only acquire jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff if he resides within our territorial
jurisdiction. We believe and hold that the trial court is in error in this point. In fact, this Court only recently has
upheld the right of non-residents to maintain personal actions against our residents in Philippine courts.

As a personal action, sounding in tort, it was transitory in its nature, following the person of the
defendant. It is not indispensable for a foreigner to establish residence, nor need he be physically present in a
state of which he is not a resident or citizen in order that he may initiate or maintain a personal action against a
resident or citizen of that other state for rights of action arising in, or for violations of laws committed within, the
territorial jurisdiction of that other state. In this jurisdiction, no general law has come to our knowledge or notice
which restricts the right of non-resident aliens to sue in our courts. It is not disputed that plaintiff's causes of action
arose in, and that the defendants are within, our territorial jurisdiction. It is conceded by both parties that the law
under which the instant case falls is silent on the matter of the right of an alien to sue in our courts.
 LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. DUPO
FACTS:
LWV (domestic corp-recruiter) hired Marcelo Dupo as Civil Structural Superintendent to work
in Saudi Arabia for its principal, Mohammad Al-Mojil Group/Establishment (MMG). In 1992, Dupo signed his overseas
employment contract, renewable after a year – renewed 5x (1993, 1994, 1996, 1997,1998). All were fixed-period
contracts for one year. The sixth and last contract stated that his employment starts upon reporting to work and ends
when he leaves the work site. He left Saudi Arabia on April 30, 1999 and arrived in the Philippines on May 1, 1999.
On May 28, 1999, respondent informed MMG, through LWV, that he needs to extend his vacation
because his son was hospitalized. He also sought a promotion with salary adjustment. MMG replied that his
promotion is subject to management’s review; that his services are still needed; that he was issued a plane ticket
for his return flight to Saudi Arabia on May 31, 1999; and that his decision regarding his employment must be
made within seven days, otherwise, MMG will be compelled to cancel [his] slot.
On July 6, 1999, Dupo resigned: I am aware that I still have to do a final settlement with the company
and hope that during my more than seven (7) [years] services, as the Saudi Law stated, I am entitled for a long
service award. Upon follow up, MMG did not respond.
In 2000, Dupo filed a complaint w/ the NLRC for payment of service award, claiming that under the Law
of Saudi Arabia, an employee who rendered at least five (5) years in a company within the jurisdiction of Saudi
Arabia, is entitled to the so-called long service award which is known to others as longevity pay of at least one half
month pay for every year of service. In excess of five years an employee is entitled to one month pay for every
year of service. In both cases inclusive of all benefits and allowances. LWV offered payment & prescription as
defences. MMG pays its workers their Service Award or Severance Pay every conclusion of their Labor Contracts
pursuant to Article 87 of the [Saudi Labor Law]. Article 13 of the Saudi Labor Law: the action to enforce payment
of the service award must be filed within one year from the termination of a labor contract for a specific period. (1
yr & 7 mos).
LA ruled in Dupo’s favor. NLRC affirmed. CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE:
W/N Dupo is entitled to payment of long service award under the Saudi Labor Law
RULING: YES, BUT ALREADY PAID – NOT YET PRESCRIBED
Respondent’s service award for the sixth contract is equivalent only to half-months pay plus the
proportionate amount for the additional nine days of service he rendered after one year. Respondent’s
employment contracts expressly stated that his employment ended upon his departure from work. Each year he
departed from work and successively new contracts were executed before he reported for work anew. His service
was not cumulative.
On the matter of prescription, however, we cannot agree with petitioner that respondents action has
prescribed under Article 13 of the Saudi Labor Law. What applies is Article 291 of our Labor Code which reads:
ART. 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from
the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
Article 291 covers all money claims from employer-employee relationship and is broader in
scope than claims arising from a specific law. It is not limited to money claims recoverable under the
Labor Code, but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed
either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when
the country of the forum has a borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute
of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). A borrowing statute directs the
state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel,
Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action barred
by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not
run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure
is of this kind. Said Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also
barred in the Philippine Islands.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums public policy x x x. To
enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would
contravene the public policy on the protection to labor. Thus, in our considered view, respondents complaint was
filed well within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of our Labor Code. This point, however, has
already been mooted by our finding that respondents service award had been paid, albeit the payroll termed such
payment as severance pay.
 BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA v. AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION & CA (1999) Incidentally, BANTSA alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the governing law
with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil
FACTS: actions for sums of money. WRONG!

BANTSA (California, licensed to do business in the Phils); ARC (domestic); BAIL (International Ltd – In the case at bench, Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to
England). On several occasions, BANTSA & BAIL granted 3 major multi-million US Dollar loans to Liberian prove the English law on the matter.
Transport Navigation, S.A.; El Challenger S.A. and Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., all of which are existing under In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no
and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of ARC. judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
Due to default, the borrowers & BANTSA entered into restructuring agreements. As addl security, ARC local or domestic or internal law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
as 3P mortgagor executed real estate mortgages over parcels of land in Bulacan & improvements thereon. The
borrowers still defaulted. BANTSA filed civil actions before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan (2x Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
England, 2x Hongkong). In these cases, ARC as 3p mortgagor was not impleaded as party-defendant. forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
In 1992, BANTSA filed an app for extrajudicial foreclosure of REM. In 1993, there was a public auction, object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
where Integrated Credit and Corporation Services Co. (ICCS) was the highest bidder. ARC filed an action for promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
damages vs. BANTSA for foreclosing extrajudicially the real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits
before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan. BANTSA defended that the rule prohibiting the The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
mortgagee from foreclosing the mortgage after an ordinary suit for collection has been filed, is not applicable in proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
the present case. Under English Law, which is the governing law under the principal agreements, the mortgagee
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
does not lose its security interest by filing civil actions for sums of money.
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment
or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Meanwhile, ICCS sold its properties to Stateland Investment Corporation. RTC ruled in ARC’s favor -
declaring that the filing in foreign courts by the defendant of collection suits against the principal debtors operated
as a waiver of the security of the mortgages. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
W/N BANTSA’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan
before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure
RULING: YES
The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an
ordinary action to recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of
the debtor, including the subject matter of the mortgage x x x, subject to the qualification that if he fails in the
remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue further the remedy he has waived. Anent real properties in particular,
the Court has laid down the rule that a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a
personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage.
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not
cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is
deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for
foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to
extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not
with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.
 PAULA LLORENTE v. CA & ALICIA LLORENTE (2000)
FACTS:
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10,
1927 to September 30, 1957.
In 1937, Lorenzo & Paula were married. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the
United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo
was admitted to United States citizenship. Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945,
Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He
discovered that his wife was pregnant & is an adulterous relationship w/ his brother Ceferino.
In 1945, Paula gave birth to his son whose birth certificate stating that he was an illegitimate child & father’s
name was left blank. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In 1946, they have agreed upon in writing
that allowance shall be suspended, they will later dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial
proceedings & would make a separate agreement on their conjugal properties. The agreement was witnessed by
Paula’s parents & notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.
In 1951, Lorenzo returned to USA & filed for & was granted a divorce decree. Paula, as represented by
counsel, actively participated.
In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia who knew nothing about the first marriage. They had 3 children. In 1981,
Lorenzo made a will & bequeathed all his properties to Alicia & their 3 children. In 1983, Lorenzo filed a petition for
the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate – denied, still alive eh. Lorenzo died before the proceedings could be terminated. In
1985, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Alicia filed a petition for
the issuance of letters testamentary. Trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition – divorce decree was void &
inapplicable in the Philippines, marriage to Alicia is likewise void.
ISSUE:
Who are entitled to inherit from Lorenzo
RULING: REMANDED
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. While the substance of the foreign
law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court
called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in
this case, Philippine law.
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only
within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident. Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New
York State law.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly
executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.
VALID DIVORCE: In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. The divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter
of comity.
VALID WILL: The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not
covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity. Whether the will is
intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded
and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
 In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix
FLUEMER v. HIX (1930)
FACTS: HA???
According to AW Fluemer, the alleged will was executed in in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3,
1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated, by
Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library.
CFI, however, denied the probate of the same.
ISSUE:
W/N the will should be admitted to probate
RULING: NO.
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine
Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson
[1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was printed or published
under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor
was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of
the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced
to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be
found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was
acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the
supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the
petitioner to prove execution by some other means.
It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and
not establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in
beginning administration proceedings orginally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by
attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands.
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo
MICIANO v. BRIMO (1927)
FACTS:
Juan Miciano filed a scheme of partition opposed by Andre Brimo, one of the (Joseph)
testator’s brothers. However, the court approved it. It was declared that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this
cause. Brimo maintains that the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to
Pietro Lanza should be postponed until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
Brimo posited that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which
are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation
or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated.
ISSUE:
W/N the testamentary proceedings & partition are valid
RULING: scheme of partition is valid
Brimo did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws,
inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the
absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an
error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain
testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It
is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity
to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is,
therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed.
TESTAMENTARY COND as to T’s desire to dispose of the estate according to Phil laws, ow, annulled –
INVALID: contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of
the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
OTHER CLAUSES VALID
 In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY
Silvino SUNTAY (2nd m solo) v. Federico SUNTAY (1st m)(1954)

FACTS:

In 1934, Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in Amoy, Fookien, China,
leaving real & personal properties in the Philippines & a house in Amoy. He had children w/ both the first & second
marriage. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Phils & letters of admin were issued to Apolonio Suntay.
When Apolonio died, Federico was appointed as admin.

The surviving widow Maria Natividad Lim Billian filed a petition for the probate of a will purportedly
executed by Jose in 1929 – DENIED due to the loss of the will after filing & insufficiency of evidence to establish
such loss. SC reversed. There was a commission for taking the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the
will, still, the petition was dismissed. Pacific War supervened. After liberation, claiming that he had found among
the files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed
by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district
court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the
probate of the 1929 will or 1931 will.

Federico opposed, maintaining that Maria & Silvino are estopped from asking for the probate of the lost
will or of the foreign will because of the transfer/assignment of their share, right, title & interest in Jose’s estate.
CFI disallowed probate.

ISSUE:

W/N the Amoy will can be validly probated in the Philippines

RULING: NO.

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must be proved. The law of
China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the
execution of the will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on
these points.

Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the
purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district
court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will.

The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to probate or allow the will
which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said
to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in
the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the
municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate of
allowance of a will and therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent
court of this country.
 TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duly to do. The law of Nevada, being a
PHIL TRUST CO v. BOHANAN (1960) foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules:

FACTS:
CO Bohanan was, at the time of his death, a citizen of US & Nevada. His last will & testament
is full in accordance w/ the laws of the state of Nevada & was admitted to probate. PhilTrustCo was named as the
executor in the will. Letters testamentary was issued in its favor. It later filed a project of partition:
(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several mining companies; (2)
the other half of the residuary estate to the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and
share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to those given to testator's
grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to
be paid in three yearly installments; (4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000;
Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000
SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy tested by the officer having the legal
custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during
the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share,
the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. was introduced in evidence by appellant's
(herein) counsel as Exhibits "2" (See pp. 77-79, VOL. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance).
Again said laws presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the
hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (se Records, Court of First Instance, Vol.
1).

It can be seen that the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of
several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent
P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000. The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by
the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them. Magdalena alleged that she was deprived of
her share & that the Reno divorce should be invalidated. The court below refused to recognize the claim of the
widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of
his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.

ISSUE:

W/N the failure old the testator to give his children two-thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his
death, in accordance with the laws of the forum is valid

RULING: YES, CAN BE TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE

The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly
provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question. Says the law on this point:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old
Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)

In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator was a
citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. It is not
disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied
Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at time of the hearing of the project of partition, the above-
 SPS. ZALAMEA v. CA (1993)

FACTS:

Sps. Cesar & Suthira Zalamea & their daughter Liana purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila
agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. Sps’ tickets
are purchased at 75% discount, while their daughter’s is of full fare. All represented confirmed reservations. While
in NY, they received a notice for reconfirmation. On the appointed date, they checked-in an hour later but was
placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all
the seats available on the flight. Cesar, holding the full fare ticket was allowed to board the plane, but his wife &
daughter, having the discounted ticket were denied boarding.

Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be
accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and
purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.

Upon arrival in the Phils, they filed a case for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage. The
lower court ruled in their favor. CA deleted moral damages – no bad faith.

Sps insisted that there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow
petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or
regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor
can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.6 Written law may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be
made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer
service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board allows overbooking.

ISSUE:

W/N TWA is liable for damages notwithstanding the Code of Federal Regulations

RULING:

Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case
at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the
airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the
forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline.8 Since the tickets were sold and issued in the
Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.

Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers
concerned to an award of moral damages. In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of
contract of carriage amounts to bad faith. BF IN NOT INFORMING THE PASSENGERS
 WILDVALLEY SHIPPING v. CA (2000)
FACTS:
In 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Phil President Lines, Inc., arrived in
Venezuela to load iron ore. The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque
Channel at mile 172. The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration
was a result of the shallowness of the channel. It ran aground in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress &
egress of vessels. As a result, Malandrino, a vessel owned by Wildvalley was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz
that day.
Wildvalley filed a case in RTC against PPLI & Pioneer Insurance Co. for damages. RTC ruled in its
favor. CA reversed. Wildvalley question, as the CA disregarded the Venezuelan law despite it having been
substantially proved in the trial court w/o objection from PPLI & whose objection was interposed belatedly on
appeal.
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of
Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who
had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and
authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be
found in the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best
evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires
that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of the foreign
law, its import and legal consequence on the event or transaction in issue.

ISSUE:

W/N the Venezuelan law is applicable

RULING: NO. WRITTEN LAWS WERE NOT PROVEN IN ACCORDANCE W/ R 132 S 24

It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law. The former falls
under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted
hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of expert witnesses is
admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It
must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be
accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or
consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter requirement is not a mere
technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign
country.