TORTS AND DAMAGES

Atty. Cherry Dane A. Farinas-Agustin

School of Law, University of Baguio
Feb. 13, 2017 SOURCES OF CIVIL LIABILITY
(based on Negligent torts)
 Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
 If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.
 Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising
from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient
to prove the act complained of.
 Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 1159-1162
 Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
(1091a)

 Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the

provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII, of this Book. (n)

 Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed
by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of Article 2177, and of the
pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations,
and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. (1092a)

 Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the

provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws.
(1093a)
PERSON CIVILLY LIABLE FOR
FELONIES
 Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony.
— Every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.
RULE 111 - PROSECUTION OF CIVIL
ACTION


Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –

 (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
 The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
 When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in
the complaint or information, the filing fees therefore shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment awarding such damages.
 Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court.
 Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.
 No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action.
 (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such
civil action separately shall be allowed.
 Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where
the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts
are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded
by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.
 Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not
yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2
of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
 Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
 If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted,
the latter shall be suspended in whatever state it may be found before judgment on
the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits rendered in the civil action, the
same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal
action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence
already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in
the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine
the witness presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties
to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be
tried and decided jointly.
 During the pendency of the criminal action, the running period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
 The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Kinds of Negligence

 Arising from Crime

 Arising from Contract
 Arising from Tort
Arising from Crime

 People of the Philippines vs. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994,
236 SCRA 239)

 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People of the Philippines

 Employee: in a reckless imprudence case: jump bail during pendency
of the case (employer was made to answer civil liability if the
accused cannot/fails to comply)
 Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the
defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the accused.
 No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court
may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its
pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the
rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they
abscond.
 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified
what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal
prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Arising from Contract

 Air France vs. Carascoso, et al

Violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in
kind and degree from any other contractual relations.
Because its business is mainly with the travelling public. It
invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it
offers. The contract of air carriage generates a relation
attended with a public duty.
neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employees,
naturally could give ground for an action for damages.
February 22, 2017
Arising from Tort
 Andamo, et al vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al
 Facts:
Spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of
land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of
private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and
eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the
lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
Consequently, petitioners instituted a criminal action, for destruction by means
of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. Subsequently,
petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, but this this
time, a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the same court.
 Issue:
 Whether or not a corporation, which has built through
its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation
and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly
liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting
civil case can proceed independently of the criminal
case?
 Decision:
Yes.
 A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint
shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
 All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
 Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths
and contrivances built by respondent corporation
are alleged to have inundated the land of
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a
causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by
petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for the recovery
of damages.
 Basis:
 Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil
liability on a person for damage caused by his act
or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
 Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Castro vs. People of the Philippines

 Facts:
 Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tan's son, Justin Albert
(then a Grade 12 student), for violating the terms of his disciplinary
probation.Upon Tan's request, RIS reconsidered its decision but
imposed "non-appealable" conditions such as excluding Justin Albert
from participating in the graduation ceremonies.
 Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education
(Dep-Ed) for violation of the Manual of Regulation of Private
Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the Civil
Code against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of his son was
undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation. After
investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS' code violation point system
allowed the summary imposition of unreasonable sanctions (which
had no basis in fact and in law). The system therefore violated due
process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified it
 Meanwhile, Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any
condition. Thus, he was able to graduate from RIS and participate in
the commencement ceremonie.
 After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow
parent at RIS. In the course of their conversation, Tan intimated that
he was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their
personal capacities, including petitioner who was the assistant
headmaster.
 Ching telephoned petitioner him that Tan was planning to sue the
officers of RIS in their personal capacities, that he shouls be careful
of Tan as he is a dangerous person. Tan, feeling insulted on remark,
filed a complaint for grave oral defamation.
 Petitioner was charged with grave oral defamation in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
CULPA AQUILANA/CULPA
CONTRACTUAL/CULPA CRIMINAL
 Kinds of Negligence:
 1. Culpa Contractual (contractual negligence)
 Governed by CC provisions on Obligations and
Contracts, particularly Arts. 1170 to 1174 of the
Civil Code.
 2. Culpa Aquiliana (quasi-delict)
 Governed mainly by Art. 2176 of the Civil Code
 3. Culpa Criminal (criminal negligence)
 Governed by Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code

 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under

the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.
 Fabre, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
 Facts: Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a
1982 model Mazda minibus. They used the bus principally
in connection with a bus service for school children which
they operated in Manila. The couple had a driver, Porfirio J.
Cabil, whom they hired after trying him out for two weeks.
His job was to take school children to and from the St.
Scholastica's College in Malate, Manila.
 Private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc.
(WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33
members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union
and back in consideration of which private respondent paid
petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.
 Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus. The usual route to
Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the
bridge at Carmen was under repair, sot hat petitioner Cabil, who
was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip to La Union),
was forced to take a detour through the town of Baay in
Lingayen, Pangasinan. However, petitioner Cabil came upon a
sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to east direction.
The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus,
which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid
to the left road shoulder.
 The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along
the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano,
then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to
a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came
to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell
on it and smashed its front portion.
 Several passengers were injured. A case wasfiled and
the Court rendered judgment against defendants Mr. &
Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil y Jamil
pursuant to articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines and said defendants are ordered to
pay the amont of damages, jointly and severally to the
victims/plaintiffs.
 Issue:
 Whether or not award of damages can be had on the basis of quasi-delict.
 Decision:
 Yes. Indeed, it was admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it was raining,
and as a consequence, the road was slippery, and it was dark. He averred these
facts to justify his failure to see that there lay a sharp curve ahead. However, it
is undisputed that Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour
and only slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters
ahead. By then it was too late for him to avoid falling off the road. Given the
conditions of the road and considering that the trip was Cabil's first one outside
of Manila, Cabil should have driven his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is
testimony that the vehicles passing on that portion of the road should only be
running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at 50 kilometers per hour, Cabil was
running at a very high speed.
 Considering the foregoing — the fact that it was raining and the road was
slippery, that it was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when
even on a good day the normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that
he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent and should be
held liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent Amyline Antonio.
 Pursuant to Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
his negligence gave rise to the presumption that his
employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the
selection and supervisions of their employee.
 As already stated, this case actually involves a contract
of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be
engaged in the business of public transportation for the
provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to
apply to them. As this Court has held:
 Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
 The above article makes no distinction between one
whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom,
as "a sideline").
 Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any
distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis
and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic
or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the
"general public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general
population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately
refrained from making such distinctions
 As common carriers, the Fabres were found to exercise
"extraordinary diligence" for the safe transportation of the
passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused
by proof that they exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
As Art. 1759 of the Code provides:
 Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the
former's employees although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.
 This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof
that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

 Facts:
 Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tan's son, Justin Albert
(then a Grade 12 student), for violating the terms of his disciplinary
probation.Upon Tan's request, RIS reconsidered its decision but
imposed "non-appealable" conditions such as excluding Justin Albert
from participating in the graduation ceremonies.
 Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education
(Dep-Ed) for violation of the Manual of Regulation of Private
Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the Civil
Code against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of his son was
undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation. After
investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS' code violation point system
allowed the summary imposition of unreasonable sanctions (which
had no basis in fact and in law). The system therefore violated due
process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified it
 Meanwhile, Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any
condition. Thus, he was able to graduate from RIS and participate in
the commencement ceremonie.
 After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow
parent at RIS. In the course of their conversation, Tan intimated that
he was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their
personal capacities, including petitioner who was the assistant
headmaster.
 Ching telephoned petitioner him that Tan was planning to sue the
officers of RIS in their personal capacities, that he shouls be careful
of Tan as he is a dangerous person. Tan, feeling insulted on remark,
filed a complaint for grave oral defamation.
 Petitioner was charged with grave oral defamation in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
 Issue
 Whether or not petitioner should be liable for damages.
 Decision:
 At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under
Article 26 of the Civil Code:
 Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention
and other relief:
 (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
 Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a
role model for the youth. As such, he should always act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

 Facts:
 Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool
at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
 On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio
Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney.
As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga then filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other
hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu
truck.
 The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and
absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who
was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No.
3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, held Salva and
his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
 On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the
lower court was reversed on the ground that Sunga's
cause of action was based on a contract of carriage,
not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to
exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code.
The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint
against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for
damages to Sunga.
 Issues:
 Whether or not Salva and his driver Verena are liable for quasi-
delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney.
 Whether or not petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
 Decision:
 presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers.
 In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove
that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers.
 Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care
and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art.
1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner's
contention.
 First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly
parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad
shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
 Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more
passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the
jeepney, a violation of §32(a) of the same law. It provides:
 Exceeding registered capacity. — No person operating any
motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or
cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
 The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat"
placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was
petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually
negligent in transporting passengers.
 Culpa contractual vs. Culpa Aquiliana

Culpa Contractual Culpa Aquiliana

The foundation of the liability of It is a separate source of obligation
the defendant independent of contract
is the contract
In breach of contract committed In quasi-delict the presumptive
through the negligence of responsibility for the negligence of his
employee, the employer cannot servants can be rebutted by proof of the
erase his primary and direct exercise of due care in their selection and
liability by invoking exercise of supervision.
diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and
supervision of the employee.
 Culpa Aquiliana vs. crime
Culpa Aquiliana Crime
Only involves private concern Affect the public interest

The Civil Code by means of indem- The Revised Penal Code punishes or
nification merely repairs the damage corrects criminal act

Includes all acts in which any kind of Punished only if there is a penal law
fault or negligence intervenes clearly covering them

Liability of the employer of the actor-

Liability is direct and primary in quasi- employee is subsidiary in crimes
delict
March 23, 2017
 Concept of Negligence:
 Picart vs. Smith, Jr. (37 Phil 809)
 WHAT MUST BE PROVED
1. Negligence: In quasi delict: plaintiff must prove
negligence of defendant.
1. (except: in cases where negligence is presumed or imputed
by law (rebuttable-violation of traffic rules, dangerous
weapons/substance), principle of res ipsa loquitor)
2. Damage/ Injury
3. Causal connection between negligence and damage
 Causal connection between negligence and damage
 To be actionable
 Defendant’s negligence must be the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the plaintiff to enable plaintiff to
recover.
 Thus, if plaintiffs own conduct is the cause of the injury there
can be no recovery.
 If plaintiff’s negligence is only contributory:
 He is considered partly responsible only.
 May plaintiff still recover?
 Yes, but must be reduced by the court in proportion to his
own negligence.
Concept of PROXIMATE


CAUSE:

 Theadequate and efficient cause which in

the natural order of events and under the
particular circumstances surrounding the case,
would naturally produce the event.
DEFENSES:

1. Contributory Negligence
2. Concurrent Negligence
3. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
4. Emergency Rule
5. Doctrine of Assumption of Risk
6. Due Diligence
7. Fortuitous Event
8. Damnum Absque Injuria
9. Law
10. Exercise of Diligence
11. Prescription
12. Act or Omission is not the Proximate Cause of the Damage
13. Other grounds: Motion to Dismiss
Contributory Negligence

 The theory here is:

Plaintiff was also negligent
together with the defendant:
To constitute as a defense,
proximate cause of injury/damage
must the negligence of the
defendant.
Concurrent Negligence

The theory here is:

Both parties are equally
negligent; the courts will
leave them as they are; there
can be no recovery.
Last Clear Chance
 Even though a person’s own acts may have placed
him in a position of peril and an injury results, the
injured is entitled to recover if the defendant thru
the exercise of reasonable care and prudence
might have avoided injurious consequences to the
plaintiff.
 NOTE: This defense is available only in an action by
the driver or owner of one vehicle against the driver
or owner of the other vehicle involved.
Last Clear Chance
 Elements:
a. Plaintiff was in a position of danger by his own
negligence;
b. Defendant knew of such position of the Plaintiff;
c. Defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident by exercise of ordinary care but failed to
exercise such last clear chance; and
d. Accident occurred as proximate cause of such
failure
Last Clear Chance
 Who may invoke?:
 Plaintiff

 Inapplicable to:
 1. Joint tortfeasors
 2. Defendants concurrently negligent

 As against 3rd persons

Emergency Rule
 A person is not expected to exercise the same degree
of care when he is compelled to act instinctively under a
sudden peril because a person confronted with a
sudden emergency may be left with no time for thought
and must make a speedy decision upon impulse or
instinct.
 When applicable?
 Only to situations that are sudden and unexpected such as
to deprive actor of all opportunity for deliberation.
 Action must still be judged by the standard of the ordinary
prudent man
 Absence of forseeability
Assumption of Risk
 Volenti non fit Injuria
 Intentional exposure to a known danger
 One who voluntarily assumed the risk of an injury
from a known danger cannot recover in an action
for negligence or an injury is incurred.
 Plaintiffs acceptance of risk ( by
law/contract/nature of obligation) has erased
defendant’s duty so that his negligence is not a
legal wrong
 Applies to all known danger
Due Diligence
 Diligence required by law/ contract/ depends on
circumstances of persons, place, things

 (contract:Exercise of extraordinary diligence [in

contract of carriage],Force Majeure, quasi-delict:
Exercise of diligence of good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of employees)
Fortuitous Event
 No person shall be responsible for those events
which cannot be foreseen, or which though foreseen
were inevitable

 Exeption:
 Assumption of risk
Damnum Absque Injuria
 A principle that involves damage without injury,
therefore no liability is incurred;
 There is no legal injury
Law
 Specific provision of law
Exercise of Diligence of Good Father of Family
in Selection and supervision of employees
Prescription
 Injury to right of plaintiff/quasi-delict
4 years
 Defamation
1 year
Proscription Against Double Recovery

 Responsibility for fault or negligence under quasi-

delict is entirely separate and distinct from civil
action arising from the RPC but plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.
Act or Omission is NOT the Proximate
Cause of the Damage
Other grounds: Motion to Dismiss
 Lack of Jurisdiction:
 over the person of the defendant
 Over the subject matter
 Venue improperly laid
 Plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue
 There is another action pending between same parties for some
cause
 Cause of action is barred by prior judgement/ statute of limitations
 Pleading asserting claim states no cause of action
 Claim set forth in pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned,
extinguished
 Claim is unenforceable uner the provision of statute of fraud
 Condition precedent for filing claim has not been complied with
March 27, 2017
 Persons liable for Quasi-delict

 1. Tortfeasor
 2. Persons Vicariously Liable

 3. Persons expressly made liable by the law

Persons liable for Quasi-delict
 TORTFEASOR

 Art.2176.
 Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being no fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage
done
Persons liable for quasi-delict
 Persons Vicariously Liable
 The obligation imposed in Art. 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own act or omission BUT ALSO for those persons
for whom one is responsible (Art. 2180)
 Vicarious liability
 Law imputed negligence;
 A person who himself is not guilty of negligence is made
liable for conduct of another.
 Reason:
 Public policy: capacity to pay/ deeper pocket
 Violation of duty on account of relationship
 Persons Vicariously liable:
 1. Parent/s
 2. Guardians

 Owners and managers of establishment/enterprise

 3. Employers

 4. State

 5. Schools, Administrator, Teacher

PARENTS:
 Rule:
 Thefather, and in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother are responsible for damaged caused by:

 Minorchild/ren; and
 Who live in their company

 NOTE: Father and Mother shall jointly exercise parental authority

over common children.
GUARDIAN/S:
 Are liable for damages caused by the minor or
incapacitated persons who are:

 Under their authority; and

 Live in their company
OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF
ESTABLISHMENTS/ENTERPRISE:
 Owners and managers of establishment or
enterprise are responsible for damages caused by
their employees:

 In the service of the branches in which the employee/s

is /are employed;
 In occasion of their function
EMPLOYERS
 Employers shall be liable for damages caused by
their employees and household helpers.
 Acting within the scope of their assigned task
 Even though the employer/s is/are not engaged in any
business or industry
 Defenses available to employers:
 Exercise of due diligence in selection and supervision of
employees
 Act/omission was made outside working hours and in violation of
company’s rules and regulations
STATE:
 The state is responsible when it acts through a
special agent,

 but not when the same is caused by an official to

whom task done properly pertains in which case
art. 2176 is applicable.
SCHOOLS, ADMINISTRATOR, TEACHER

 Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and

trades shall be liable for damages caused by their:
 Pupils,students and apprentices
 As long as they remain in their custody
 NOTE:
 Family Code Art. 218: The school, its administration and teachers
or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall
have special parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child under their supervision, instruction or custody.
 Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution.
 Family Code, Art. 219:

 Those given the authority and responsibility shall be

solidarily and principally liable for damages caused by
act/omission of the unemancipated minor: (parents,
judicial guardian or person exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
liable)
Issues/questions:
 Whether or not school are liable?
 If culprit is a teacher
 Sue the school as employer
 If culprit is a stranger
 Sue the school based on contract
 If culprit is a student
 Apply art. 2180 (vicarious liability)
 Basis of liability of teacher: principle of loco parentis (stand
in place of parents)
Persons expressly made liable by law
(even without fault)
 1. Possessor of animal or whoever makes use of them even if
the animal is lost or escaped
 2. Owner of motor vehicle
 3. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet
articles and similar goods
 4. Defendant in possession of dangerous weapons or
substances, such as firearms and poison
 5. Provinces, cities, & municipalities
 6. Proprietor of building or structure
 7. Engineer, Architect or contractor
 8. Head of family that lives in a building or part thereof
Persons expressly made liable by law
(even without fault)
 1. Possessor of animal or whoever makes use of
them even if the animal is lost or escaped
 Except:
 Force Majeure
 Fault of the injured/damaged person

 Owner of Motor Vehicle

 Inmotor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable
with the driver if:
 He was in the vehicle; and
 Could have through due diligence prevented the misfortune
 Manufacturers & Processors of Foodstuffs, drinks, toilet
articles and similar goods
 Liable for death an injuries caused by any or harmful
substances used although no contractual relation exists
between them and the consumers
 Defendant in possession of Dangerous Weapons or
substance, such as firearms and poison
 There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part
of the defendant if death or injury results from such
possession
 Exception: The possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business
 Provinces, Cities and Municipalities
 Liable for the death or injuries suffered by any person
by reason of defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under
their control or supervision.
Proprietor of Building or Structure

 Responsible for the damages resulting from any of the

following:
 total or partial collapse of building or structure if due to lack of
necessary repairs
 Explosion of machinery which has not been taken cared of with
due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which
have not been kept in a safe and adequate place
 By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property
 By falling of trees situated or near highways or lanes, if not
caused by force majeure
 By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers, or deposits of infectious
matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place
 Engineer, Architect or Contractor
 If damage of building or structure is caused by defect
in construction which happens within 15 years from
construction; action must be brought within 10 years
from collapse
 Head of Family that Lives in a Building or part
thereof
 Liable for damages caused by things thrown of falling
from the same.
SPECIAL TORTS
 1. Art. 19, 20, 21 (NCC)
 2. Unjust enrichment
 3. Ostentatious Display of Wealth
 4. Violation of Right of Privacy and Family Relations
 5. Dereliction of Official Duty of Pubic Officers
 6. Unfair competition
 7. Malicious Prosecution
 8. Violation of Rights and Liberties of Another person
 9. Nuisance
SPECIAL TORTS
 1. Art. 19, 20, 21 (NCC)
 A. Abuse of Rights (Art. 19)
 There is a legal right or duty
 Which is exercised in bad faith
 For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
 General Sanction (Art. 20)
 For all other provisions of law which do not especially provide their
own sanction
 Elements:
 In the exercise of his legal right or duty
 Willfully or negligently causes damage to another
 Contra Bonus Mores (Art. 21)
 Elements:
 There is an action which is legal
 But which is contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public policy
 And it is done with intent to injure
 Unjust enrichment
 Arts. 22, 23, 2142 & 2143

 Ostentatious Display of Wealth

 Art.25; Thoughtless extravagance for pleasure or
display during a period of public want or emergency
 Violation of Right of Privacy and Family Relations
 Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons.
 following acts may not constitute a criminal offense, only
produce a cause of action for DAMAGES, prevention and
other relief:
 Prying into the privacy of another’s residence
 Meddling with or disturbing the private life of family relations of
another
 Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends
 Vexing or humiliating another on account of hid religious beliefs,
lowly station in life. Place of birth, physical defect, or other
personal condition.
 Dereliction of Official Duty of Public Officers
 May be brought by any person suffering from material or
moral loss because a public servant refuses or neglects,
without just cause to perform his official duty (Art. 27)
 Requisites:
 Defendant is a public officer charged with the performance of a
duty in favor of the plaintiff
 He refused or neglected without just cause to perform such duty
(ministerial)
 Plaintiff sustained material or moral loss as consequence of such
non-performance
 The amount of such damages, if material
 Unfair competition
 Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation,
deceit. Machinations or other unjust, oppressive method (Art. 28)
 Malicious Prosecution
 Elements:
 That the defendant was himself the prosecutor/instigated its
commencement
 That it finally terminates in his acquittal
 That in bringing it the prosecutor acted without probable cause, and
 That he was actuated by legal malice, that is, by improper and sinister
motive
 Violation of Rights and Liberties of Another Person
 Nuisance
 Any act, omission, establishment, condition of property,
or anything else which:
 Injuresor endangers the health or safety of others; or
 Annoys or offends the senses; or
 Shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality; or
 Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or streets, or any body of water; or
 Hinders or impairs use of property
Kinds of nuisance
 Nuisance per se
 Denounced as nuisance by common law or by statute
 Nuisance per accidens
 Those which are in their nature not nuisances, but may
become so by reason of their locality, surroundings, or the
manner in which they may be conducted, managed, etc
 Public
 Affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable
number of persons
 Private
 Affects an individual or a limited number of individuals only
Remedies against Public Nuisances
 Prosecution under the RPC or any local ordinance
 Civil Action
 Abatement, without Judicial Proceedings
 Who may avail of Remedies:
 Public Officers
 Private Persons
 If nuisance is specially injurious to himself
 Steps:
 Demand be first made upon owner or possessor of the property
to abate the nuisance
 That such demand has been rejected
 That the abatement be approved by the district health officer
and executed with the assistance of the local Police
 That the value of the destruction does not exceed Php 3,000
 Remedies against private nuisances
 Civil
action
 Abatement without Judicial Process
 Who may avail of remedies:
 Public officers
 Private persons
 If nuisance is specially injurious to himself

 Steps:

 Same with public nuisance

Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance
 A class of cases within the general rule that one is
liable for injury resulting to another from failure to
exercise the degree of care commiserate with the
circumstances:
 The attractiveness of the premises or of the dangerous
instrumentality to children of tender years is to be
considered as an implied invitation, which takes the
children who accepted it out of the category of a
trespasser and puts them in the category of invitees
towards whom the owner of the premises or
instrumentality owes the duty of ordinary care.