Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-60403 August 3, 1983

ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS (AGW); PNB-FEMA BANK EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION (AGW); KAISAHAN AT KAPATIRAN NG MGA MANGAGAWA AT KAWANI NG
MWSS (AGW); BALARA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); GSIS WORKERS ASSOCIATION
(AGW); SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW); PVTA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (AGW);
NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF TEACHERS AND OFFICE WORKERS (AGW); , petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
(PNB); METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS and SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS); GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS); SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS); PHILIPPINE
VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION (PVTA) PHILIPPINE NORMAL COLLEGE (PNC);
POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (PUP), respondents.

The Solicitor General for MOLE, PNB, SSS, PNC and PUP.

Oliver Gesmundo for petitioners.

Jesus C. Gentiles for petitioner SSSEA-AGW.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Are the branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the Government, including
government owned or controlled corporations included among the 4 "employers"" under Presidential
Decree No. 851 which are required to pay an their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than
P1,000.00 a month, a thirteenth (13th) month pay not later than December 24 of every year?

Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor federation while the other
petitioners are its affiliate unions with members from among the employees of the following offices,
schools, or government owned or controlled corporations:

1. Philippine National Bank (PNB) Escolta Street, Manila

2. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) Katipunan Road, Balara,

Quezon City

3. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Arroceros Street, Manila

4. Social Security System (SSS) East Avenue, Quezon City

5. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) Consolacion Building, Cubao,

Quezon City
 6. Philippine Normal College (PNC) Ayala Boulevard, Manila

7. Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) Hippodromo Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila

On February 28, 1983, the Philippine Government Employees Association (PGEA) filed a motion to
come in as an additional petitioner.

Presidential Decree No. 851 provides in its entirety:

WHEREAS, it is necessary to further protect the level of real f wages from the ravage of
world-wide inflation;

WHEREAS, there has been no increase case in the legal minimum wage rates since
1970;

WHEREAS, the Christmas season is an opportune time for society to show its concern
for the plight of the working masses so they may properly celebrate Christmas and New
Year.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, by virtue of the powers vested in me

by the Constitution do hereby decree as follows:

SECTION 1. All employers are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving a
basic salary of not more than Pl,000 a month, regardless of the nature of their
employment, a 13th-month pay not later than December 24 of every year.

SECTION 2. Employers already paying their employees a 13th-month pay or its

equivalent are not covered by this Decree.

SECTION 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately. Done in the City of Manila, this
16th day of December 1975.

According to the petitioners, P.D. No. 851 requires all employers to pay the 13th-month pay to their
employees with one sole exception found in Section 2 which states that "(E)mployers already paying
their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree. " The petitioners
contend that Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851
included other types of employers not exempted by the decree. They state that nowhere in the decree
is the secretary, now Minister of Labor and Employment, authorized to exempt other types of employers
from the requirement.

Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 provides:

Section 3. Employers covered — The Decree shall apply to all employers except to:

a) Distressed employers, such as (1) those which are currently incurring substantial
losses or 112) in the case of non-profit institutions and organizations, where their income,
whether from donations, contributions, grants and other earnings from any source, has
consistently declined by more than forty (40%) per cent of their normal income for the last
two (2) )years, subject to the provision of Section 7 of this issuance.
 b) The Government and any of its political subdivisions, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, except)t those corporation, operating essentially as private,
,subsidiaries of the government;

c) Employers already paying their employees 13th-month pay or more in a calendar year
or its equivalent at the of this issuance;

d) Employers of household helpers and persons in the personal service of another in

relation to such workers: and

e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or task basis and
those who are paid a fixed for performing a specific work, irrespective of the time
consumed in the performance thereof, except where the workers are paid an piece- rate
basis in which case the employer shall be covered by this issuance :insofar ab such
workers are concerned ...

The petitioners assail this rule as ultra vires and void. Citing Philippine Apparel Workers'Union v. NIRC
et al., (106 SCRA 444); Teoxon v. Members of the Board of' Administators (33 SCRA 585); Santos u.
Hon. Estenzo et al., (109 Phil. 419); Hilado u. Collector of Internal Revenue (100 Phil. 288), and Olsen
& Co. Inc. v. Aldanese and Trinidad (43 Phil. 259), the petitioners argue that regulations adopted under
legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. They state that a legislative act cannot be amended by a rule
and an administrative officer cannot change the law. Section 3 is challenged as a substantial
modification by rule of a Presidential Decree and an unlawful exercise of legislative power.

Our initial reaction was to deny due course to the petition in a minute resolution, however, considering
the important issues propounded and the fact, that constitutional principles are involved, we have now
decided to give due course to the petition, to consider the various comments as answers and to resolve
the questions raised through a full length decision in the exercise of this Court's symbolic function as
an aspect of the power of judicial review.

At the outset, the petitioners are faced with a procedural barrier. The petition is one for declaratory
relief, an action not embraced within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. (Remotigue v.
Osmena,, Jr., 21 SCRA 837; Rural Bank of Olongapo v. Commission of Land Registration, 102 SCRA
794; De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294). There is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for the
petitioners' statement that the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory
relief suits where only questions of law are involved. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The petitioners
have not pointed to any provision of the Constitution or statute which sustains their sweeping assertion.
On this ground alone, the petition could have been dismissed outright.

Following similar action taken in Nacionalista Party v. Angelo Bautista(85 Phil. 101) and Aquino v.
Commission on Elections (62 SCRA 275) we have, however, decided to treat the petition as one for
mandamus. The petition has far reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved.
Have the respondents unlawfully excluded the petitioners from the use and enjoyment of rights to which
they are entitled under the law?

An analysis of the "whereases" of P.D. No. 851 shows that the President had in mind only workers in
private employment when he issued the decree. There was no intention to cover persons working in
the government service. The decree states:

xxx xxx xxx

 WHEREAS, there has been no increase in the legal minimum wage rates since 1970;

xxx xxx xxx

As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his comment for the Minister of Labor and Employment, the
Social Security System the Philippine Normal College, and Polytechnic University, the contention that
govermment owned and controlled corporations and state colleges and universities are covered by the
term "all employers" is belied by the nature of the 13- month pay and the intent behind the decree.

The Solicitor General states:

"Presidential Decree No. 851 is a labor standard law which requires covered employers to pay their
employees receiving not more than P1,000.00 a month an additional thirteenth-month pay. Its purpose
is to increase the real wage of the worker (Marcopper Mining Corp. v. Ople, 105 SCRA 75; and National
Federation of Sugar Workers v. Ovejera, G.R. No. 59743, May 31, 1982) as explained in
the'whereas'clause which read:

WHEREAS, it is necessary to further protect the level of real wages from

the ravage of world-wide inflation;

WHEREAS, there has been no increase in the legal minimum wage rates
since 1970; 11

WHEREAS, the Christmas season is an opportune time for society to show

its concern for the plight of the working masses so they may celebrate the
Christmas and New Year.

xxx xxx xxx

What the P.D. No. 851 intended to cover, as explained in the prefatory statement of the
Decree, are only those in the private sector whose real wages require protection from
world-wide inflation. This is emphasized by the "whereas" clause which states that 'there
has been no increase in the legal minimum wage rates since 1970'. This could only refer
to the private sector, and not to those in the government service because at the time of
the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 851 in 1975, only the employees in the private
sector had not been given any increase in their minimum wage. The employees in the
government service had already been granted in 1974 a ten percent across-the-board
increase on their salaries as stated in P.D. No. 525, Section 4.

Moreover, where employees in the government service were to benefit from labor
standard laws, their coverage is explicitly stated in the statute or presidential enactment.
This is evident in (a) Presidential Decree No. 390, Sec. 1 which granted emergency cost
of living allowance to employees in the national government; (b) Republic Act No. 6111,
Sec. 10 on medicare benefits; (c) Presidential Decree No -442, Title II, Article 97 on the
applicable minimum wage rates; (d) Presidential Decree No. 442, Title 11, Article 167 (g)
on workmen's compensation; (e) Presidential Decree No. 1123 which provides for
increases in emergency allowance to employees in the private sector and in salary to
government employees in Section 2 thereof; and (f) Executive Order No. 752 granting
government employees a year-end bonus equivalent to one week's pay. Thus, had the
intention been to include government employees under the coverage of Presidential
Decree No. 851, said Decree should have expressly so provided and there should have
been accompanying yearly appropriation measures to implement the same. That no such
 express provision was provided and no accompanying appropriation measure to was
passed clearly show the intent to exclude government employees from the coverage of
P. D. No. 85 1.

We agree.

It is an old rule of statutory construction that restrictive statutes and acts which impose burdens on the
public treasury or which diminish rights and interests, no matter how broad their terms do not embrace
the Sovereign, unless the Sovereign is specifically mentioned. (See Dollar Savings Bank v. United
States, 19 Wall (U.S.) 227; United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 265). The
Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, cannot be covered by a general term like "employer" unless
the language used in the law is clear and specific to that effect.

The issue raised in this petition, however, is more basic and fundamental than a mere ascertainment
of intent or a construction of statutory provisions. It is concerned with a revisiting of the traditional
classification of government employment into governmental functions and proprietary functions and of
the many ramifications that this dichotomous treatment presents in the handling of concerted activities,
collective bargaining, and strikes by government employees to wrest concessions in compensation,
fringe benefits, hiring and firing, and other terms and conditions of employment.

The workers in the respondent institutions have not directly petitioned the heads of their respective
offices nor their representatives in the Batasang Pambansa. They have acted through a labor federation
and its affiliated unions. In other words, the workers and employees of these state firms, college, and
university are taking collective action through a labor federation which uses the bargaining power of
organized labor to secure increased compensation for its members.

Under the present state of the law and pursuant to the express language of the Constitution, this resort
to concerted activity with the ever present threat of a strike can no longer be allowed.

The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms and conditions of employment in
the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law"
(Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D.
No. 442, as amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure
concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that
industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers
and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of
wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government
employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements.

At the same time, the old Industrial Peace Act excepted employees and workers in proprietary functions
of government from the above compulsion of law. Thus, in the past, government employees performing
proprietary functions could belong to labor organizations imposing the obligation to join in strikes or
engage in other concerted action. (Section 11, R.A. 875, as amended). They could and they did engage
in concerted activities and various strikes against government owned and controlled corporations and
other government institutions discharging proprietary functions. Among the institutions as falling under
the exception in Section 11 of the Industrial Peace Act were respondents Government Service
Insurance System (GSISEA v. Alvendia, 108 Phil. 505) and Social Security System (SSSEA v. Soriano,
7 SCRA 1016). And this Court has supported labor completely in the various strikes and concerted
activities in firms and agencies discharging proprietary functions because the Constitution and the laws
allowed these activities.

The exception, however belongs to the past.

The petitioners state in their counter comment filed July 23, 1982 that the 1973 Constitution is
categorical about the grant of the rights to self- organization and collective bargaining to all workers and
that no amount of stretched interpretation of lesser laws like the Labor Code and the Civil Service Act
can overturn the clear message of the Constitution with respect to these rights to self-organization and
collective bargaining.

These statements of the petitioners are error insofar as government workers are now concerned.

Under the present Constitution, govemment-owned or controlled corporations are specifically

mentioned as embraced by the civil service. (Section 1, Article XII-B, Constitution). The inclusion of the
clause "including every government owned or controlled corporation" in the 1973 amendments to the
Constitution was a deliberate amendment for an express purpose. There may be those who disagree
with the intent of the framers of the amendment but because it is fundamental law, we are all bound by
it. The amendment was intended to correct the situation where more favored employees of the
government could enjoy the benefits of two worlds. They were protected by the laws governing
government employment. They could also engage in collective bargaining and join in strikes to secure
higher wages and fringe benefits which equally hardworking employees engaged in government
functions could only envy but not enjoy.

Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines has implemented the 1973
Constitutional amendment. It is categorical about the inclusion of personnel of government-owned or
controlled corporations in the civil service and their being subject to civil service requirements:

SECTION 56. Government- owned or Controlled Corporations Personnel.—All

permanent personnel of government- owned or controlled corporations whose positions
are now embraced in the civil service shall continue in the service until they have been
given a chance to qualify in an appropriate examination, but in the meantime, those who
do not possess the appropriate civil service eligibility shall not be promoted until they
qualify in an appropriate civil service examination. Services of temporary personnel ma
be y terminated any time.

Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations are now part of the civil service. It would
not be fair to allow them to engage in concerted activities to wring higher salaries or fringe benefits from
Government even as other civil service personnel such as the hundreds of thousands of public school
teachers, soldiers, policemen, health personnel, and other government workers are denied the right to
engage in similar activities.

To say that the words "all employers" in P.D. No. 851 includes the Government and all its agencies,
instrumentalities, and government-owned or controlled corporations would also result in nightmarish
budgetary problems.

For instance, the Supreme Court is trying its best to alleviate the financial difficulties of courts, judges,
and court personnel in the entire country but it can do so only within the limits of budgetary
appropriations. Public school teachers have been resorting to what was formerly unthinkable, to mass
leaves and demonstrations, to get not a 13th-month pay but promised increases in basic salaries and
small allowances for school uniforms. The budget of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports has
to be supplemented every now and then for this purpose. The point is, salaries and fringe benefits of
those embraced by the civil service are fixed by law. Any increases must come from law, from
appropriations or savings under the law, and not from concerted activity.

The Government Corporate Counsel, Justice Manuel Lazaro, in his consolidated comment * for
respondents GSIS, MWSS, and PVTA gives the background of the amendment which
includes every government-owned or controlled corporation in the embrace of the civil service:

Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention show that in the deliberations held relative
to what is now Section 1(1) Article XII-B, supra the issue of the inclusion of government-
owned or controlled corporations figured prominently.

The late delegate Roberto S. Oca, a recognized labor leader, vehemently objected to the
inclusion of government-owned or controlled corporations in the Civil Service. He argued
that such inclusion would put asunder the right of workers in government corporations,
recognized in jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution, to form and join labor unions for
purposes of collective bargaining with their employers in the same manner as in the
private section (see: records of 1971 Constitutional Convention).

In contrast, other labor experts and delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention
enlightened the members of the Committee on Labor on the divergent situation of
government workers under the 1935 Constitution, and called for its rectification. Thus, in
a Position Paper dated November-22, 1971, submitted to the Committee on Labor, 1971
Constitutional Convention, then Acting Commissioner of Civil Service Epi Rev
Pangramuyen declared:

It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of

the public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must
necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as
not applying to public employees and civil service employees. It has been
stated that the Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the
interests of all people in the public service, and that accordingly, such
conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations could not exist
in the relations between government and those whom they employ.

Moreover, determination of employment conditions as well as supervision

of the management of the public service is in the hands of legislative bodies.
It is further emphasized that government agencies in the performance of
their duties have a right to demand undivided allegiance from their workers
and must always maintain a pronounced esprit de corps or firm discipline
among their staff members. It would be highly incompatible with these
requirements of the public service, if personnel took orders from union
leaders or put solidarity with members of the working class above solidarity
with the Government. This would be inimical to the public interest.

Moreover, it is asserted that public employees by joining labor unions may

be compelled to support objectives which are political in nature and thus
jeopardize the fundamental principle that the governmental machinery must
be impartial and non-political in the sense of party politics.' (see: Records
of 1971 Constitutional Convention).
 Similarly, Delegate Leandro P. Garcia, expressing support for the inclusion of
government-owned or controlled corporations in the Civil Service, argued:

It is meretricious to contend that because Govermnent owned or controlled

corporations yield profits, their employees are entitled to better wages and
fringe benefits than employees of Government other than Government-
owned and controlled cor orations which are not making profits. There is no
gainsaying the fact that the capital they use is the people's (see Records of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention).

Summarizing the deliberations of the 1971 Constitutional Convention on the inclusion of

Government owned or controlled corporations, Dean Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ., of the
Ateneo de Manila University Professional School of Law, stated that government-owned
corporations came under attack as milking cows of a privileged few enjoying salaries far
higher than their counterparts in the various branches of government, while the capital of
these corporations belongs to the Government and government money is pumped into
them whenever on the brink of disaster, and they should therefore come under the strick
surveillance of the Civil Service System. (Bernas, The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes
and Cases, 1974 ed., p. 524).

The Government Corporate Counsel cites the precedent setting decision in Agricultural- Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations
and Offtces CUGCO et al., 30 SCRA 649) as giving the rationale for coverage of government-owned
or controlled corporations by the civil service. We stated ACCFA v. CUGCO that:

... The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary
functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as
"constituent" (as distinguished from 'ministrant'), [Bacani vs. National Coconut
Corporation, G.R. No. L-9657, Nov. 29,1956, 53 O.G. p. 2800] such as those relating to
the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and
property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of
political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations.
Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State
as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is
optional on the part of the government.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The
areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government
was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,"
(Malcolm, The Government of the Philippines, pp. 19-20; Bacani vs. National Coconut
Corporation, supra) continue to lose their well- defined boundaries and to be absorbed
within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to
meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the
tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces, Here of
course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the
Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.
Chief Justice Fernando, then an Associate Justice of this Court, observed in a concurring opinion that
the traditional classification into constituent and ministrant functions reflects the primacy at that time of
the now discredited and repudiated laissez faire concept carried over into government. He stated:

The influence exerted by American constitutional doctrines unavoidable when the

Philippines was still under American rule notwithstanding, an influence that has not
altogether vanished even after independence, the laissez faire principle never found fun
acceptance in this jurisdiction, even during the period of its full flowering in the United
States. Moreover, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that our
fundamental law embodies a policy of the responsibility thrust on government to cope
with social and economic problems and an earnest and sincere commitment to the
promotion of the general welfare through state action. It would thus follow that the force
of any legal objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights or to
statutes organizing public corporations that may engage in competition with private
enterprise has been blunted. Unless there be a clear showing of any invasion of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, their validity is a foregone conclusion. No fear need be
entertained that thereby spheres hitherto deemed outside government domain have been
encroached upon. With our explicit disavowal of the 'constituent-ministrant' test, the ghost
of the laissez-faire concept no longer stalks the juridical stage."

Our dismissal of this petiti/n should not, by any means, be interpreted to imply that workers in
government-owned and controlled corporations or in state colleges and universities may not enjoy
freedom of association. The workers whom the petitioners purport to represent have the right, which
may not be abridged, to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law. (Constitution,
Article IV, Section 7). This is a right which share with all public officers and employees and, in fact, by
everybody living in this country. But they may not join associations which impose the obligation to
engage in concerted activities in order to get salaries, fringe benefits, and other emoluments higher
than or different fr•m that provided by law and regulation.

The very Labor Code, P.D. No. 442 as amended,, which governs the registration and provides for the
rights of legitimate labor organizations states:

ART. 277. Government employees.— The terms and conditions of employment of all
government employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled
corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Their
salaries shall be standardized by the National Assembly as provided for in the new
constitution. However, there shall be no reduction of existing wages, benefits, and other
terms and conditions of employment being enjoyed by them at the time of the adoption of
this code.

Section 6, Article XII-B of the Constitution gives added reasons why the government employees
represented by the petitioners cannot expect treatment in matters of salaries different from that
extended to all others government personnel. The provision states:

SEC. 6. The National Assembly shall provide for the standardization of compensation of
government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualifications required for the positions concerned.

It is the legislature or, in proper cases, the administrative heads of government and not the collective
bargaining process nor the concessions wrung by labor unions from management that determine how
much the workers in government-owned or controlled corporations may receive in terms of salaries,
13th month pay, and other conditions or terms of employment. There are government institutions which
can afford to pay two weeks, three weeks, or even 13th-month salaries to their personnel from their
budgetary appropriations. However, these payments must be pursuant to law or regulation. Presidential
Decree No. 985 as amended provides:

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.— It is hereby declared to be the policy, of the national

government to provide equal pay for substantially, equal work and to base differences in
pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification
requirements of the positions. In determining rates of pay, due regard shall be given to,
among others, prevailing rates in private industry for comparable work. For this purpose,
there is hereby established a system of compensation standardization and position
classification in the national government for all departments, bureaus, agencies, and
officers including government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions:
Provided, That notwithstanding a standardized salary system established for all
employees, additional financial incentives may be established by government
corporations and financial institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their
corporate funds and for such technical positions as may be approved by the President in
critical government agencies.

The Solicitor-General correctly points out that to interpret P.D. No. 851 as including government
employees would upset the compensation levels of government employees in violation of those fixed
according to P.D. No. 985.

Here as in other countries, government salaries and wages have always been lower than salaries,
wages, and bonuses in the private sector. However, civil servants have no cause for despair. Service
in the government may at times be a sacrifice but it is also a welcome privilege. Apart from the emotional
and psychic satisfactions, there are various material advantages. The security of tenure guaranteed to
those in the civil service by the Constitution and statutes, the knowledge that one is working for the
most stable of employers and not for private persons, the merit system in appointments and promotions,
the scheme of vacation, sick, and maternity leave privileges, and the prestige and dignity associated
with public office are only a few of the joys of government employment.

Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 is, therefore, a
correct interpretation of the decree. It has been implemented and enforced from December 22, 1975 to
the present, The petitioners have shown no valid reason why it should be nullified because of their
petition filed six and a half years after the issuance and implementation of the rule.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 146528.February 6, 2001]

JAIME SORIANO, et al. vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

EN BANC

Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB 6 2001.

G.R. No. 146528(Jaime N. Soriano, Philip Emmanuel C. Penaflor, Cesar B. Chavez, Sal G.
Dumabok, Samuel Julius B. Garcia, Sandra P. Torresyap, Cherrie B. Belmonte, Mario S.
Araos, Rodylyn Tingzon-Manzano, Fidelino A. Austria, Angelito M. Villanueva, Isabelo M.
Banez III, Paul Y. Chua and Cesar C. Villariba, all officers and members of the Movement
for National Security Advancement (MNSA), vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada.)

G.R. No. 146549 (In the Matter of the Declaration of her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as the constitutionally instituted 14th President of the Republic of the Philippines;
Eduardo B. Inlayo, petitioner.)

G.R. No. 146579 (Concerned Citizens for effective and responsible Government, Inc.;
SulongBayan Movement Foundation, Inc.; Institute of Continuing Legal Studies and
Education Inc.; Eliseo P. Ocampo; Editha A. Santos; and Armando A. Ricarte, Jr.,
petitioners.)

G.R. No. 146631 (Oliver O. Lozano vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.)

These cases pertain to the oath-taking on 20 January 2001 of then Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines.The Court ordered these consolidation
because they involve the same subject matter.

In G.R. No. 146528, petitioners Jaime N. Soriano, et al., ask the Court to enjoin Joseph
Ejercito Estrada "from exercising the powers and authority of the President under the
Constitution" and "to yield the Presidency to his constitutional successor, Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo."

In G.R. No. 146549, petitioner Eduardo Inlayo prays that the Court declare that "the
occupation of the office of [the President] of the Philippines by Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is constitutional and legal with the full support of the Filipino people
and other foreign countries."

In G.R. No. 146579, petitioner ask the Court to issue a "definitive ruling on whether or
not Joseph Estrada is still the President" and is "exempt from all criminal suits."

In G.R. No. 146631, petitioner Oliver Lozano prays "that the proclamation and oath-taking
of Madame Arroyo" be declared null and void or that she be "declared acting President
and President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, President-on-leave."

All four Petitions are plainly without merit.

First, the four Petitions are essentially for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court
had no original jurisdiction. 1Remotigue v. Osmeña, 21 SCRA 837 [1967]; Rural Bank of
Olongapo, Inc. v. Commissioner of Land Registration, 102 SCRA 794 [1981]; Sundiang v.
Estrada and the Philippine Senate, G.R. No. 146131, 16 January 2001.Under Section 19
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this special civil action falls under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts and is not within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. 2 Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA
1 [1983].

Although the Petition in G.R. No. 146528 is captioned as a "Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus," it fails to allege, much less show, lack or excess jurisdiction, or grave abuse
of jurisdiction on the part of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, which Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court requires to be alleged and proved before the extraordinary writ of prohibition may
be issued.Neither have petitioner sufficiently alleged, much less shown, that respondent
or anyone else unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty, to entitle them to the writ of mandamus.In any case, petitioners
themselves admit that their plea is really one for declaratory relief, (par. 6.1. of Petition)
and that they "fully understand the well-settled doctrine that this Honorable Court is bereft
of jurisdiction to entertain cases for declaratory relief."

Second, petitioners have no legal standing to file the suits.They have not shown any direct
and personal injury as a result of President Arroyo's oath-taking. 3 See Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato, 246 SCRA 540, 562-563 [1995]; Miranda v. Aguirre 314 SCRA 603
[1999].Specifically, Petitioner Lozano's alleged interest as a taxpayer is far too detached
from the ultimate objective of his Petition, i.e., to nullify the oath-taking of Arroyo and
declare Estrada as "President-on-leave." The other petitioners have not even alleged, not
to say shown, any prima facie legal interest to qualify them as proper parties.Kibitzers,
however well-meaning, have no locus standi.

Third, none of the Petitioners can be treated as actions for quo warranto.Under Rule 66 of
the rules of Court, a plea for quo warranto may be commenced by (1) the solicitor general,
(2) a public prosecutor, or (3) a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.None of the petitioners qualify in law
to commence the action.Their Petitioner do not even remotely allege that they are.

At bottom, the Court stands by its Resolution in A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC, promulgated on 22
January 2001, which reads as follows:

A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC. - In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to take
her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the ChiefJustice.
- Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in
as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and
confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as
an administrative matter, the Court resolved unanimously to CONFIRM the authority
given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on
January 20, 2001 to administer the Oath of Office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.

This Resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case which
may be filed by a proper party.

Clearly, the herein Petitions have miserably failed to present justiciable controversies
brought by the proper parties to deserve further considerations by this Court.The
appropriate case for the resolution of the issues raised by petitioners may be G.R. Nos.
146710-15 entitled H.E. Joseph E. Estrada vs. Honorable Aniano Desierto, etc., et al., filed
on 05 February 2001.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions at bar are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

FIRST DIVISION

[G. R. No. 135913. November 4, 1999]

VICTORIANO B. TIROL, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICES CIPRIANO A. DEL
ROSARIO, NARCISO S. NARIO, and ANACLETO D. BADOY (SB 3rd Division), HON.
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LEONARDO P. TAMAYO, HON. PROSECUTOR PELAGIO S.
APOSTOL, and COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), Region VIII, REPRESENTED BY ITS
DIRECTOR, LEYTE GOVERNMENT CENTER, CANDAHUG, PALO, LEYTE, respondents.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The case is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the following orders of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

1. Order dated September 22, 1998 denying petitioners motion to suspend trial in SB Criminal Case No.
23785;[1] and

2. Order dated October 13, 1998 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said denial. [2]

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In May 1993, based on a complaint filed by members of two groups, the Federated PTA Organization and
the Teachers and Employees Union, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a general audit of the
transactions of the Lalawigan National High School, Lalawigan, Borongan, Eastern Samar between January 1,
1990 and April 30, 1993. On October 19, 1993, the COA audit team reported that the acquisition of equipment
costing P80,000.00 was made through negotiated contract, and not by public bidding in violation of COA Circular
85-55A, and resulted in overpricing amounting to P35,100.00. On December 1, 1994, COA Regional Director
Santos M. Alquizalas recommended to Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) Arturo C. Mojica the filing of criminal and
administrative charges against the responsible personnel, namely: petitioner Victoriano B. Tirol, Jr., Conchita C.
Devora and Maria A. Alvero.
The three accused participated in the transaction as follows: Conchita C. Devora, a Secondary School
Principal I, approved the transaction, countersigned the check and requisitioned the items; Maria A. Alvero, as
Bookkeeper, signed box no. 4 of the voucher; petitioner Tirol, as Director III, signed the checks and approved the
Requisition and Issue Voucher (RIV).
After conducting preliminary investigation, on March 20, 1997, Graft Investigation Officer III Virginia
Palanca-Santiago, with the approval of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, found
the existence of probable cause for the indictment of petitioner Tirol, now Regional Director, DECS V, Legaspi
City, and his two co-accused for violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. On the same
date, March 20, 1997, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an information for violation of Section 3 (g)
of R. A. No. 3019 against the three accused.
Upon motion of petitioner Tirol for permission to travel abroad on official business, on September 17, 1997,
the Sandiganbayan conditionally arraigned Tirol, without prejudice to the filing of a motion for reconsideration
with the Ombudsman. Petitioner Tirol, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.
On January 2, 1998, petitioner Tirol filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for leave to seek
reconsideration/reinvestigation by the Ombudsman. On January 5, 1998, the Sandiganbayan ordered all the
accused to file with the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, their motion for
reconsideration of the finding of probable cause, within ten (10) days therefrom. The court directed the prosecutor
to re-evaluate his findings and conclusions within thirty (30) days from receipt of the motion.
On March 5, 1998, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. On May 22, 1998, the Ombudsman approved the recommendation.
On July 17, 1998, petitioner Tirol filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari,[3] pursuant
to Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989).Petitioner averred that the Ombudsman
gravely abused his discretion in concluding that the approval of the requisition and issue voucher (RIV) and
signature in the check made petitioner liable for the overpricing.
Upon arraignment on August 24, 1998, accused Devora and Alvero pleaded not guilty to the information.
On September 2, 1998, petitioner Tirol filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to reset trial and
manifestation. He sought to reset the scheduled hearing on September 17 and 18, 1998, pending resolution of the
petition for review on certiorari (G. R. No. 133954) filed with the Supreme Court.
On September 4, 1998, the Sandiganbayan in open court denied the motion to reset trial. On September 22,
1998, the Sandiganbayan reduced the ruling in writing by an order nunc pro tunc. The court ordered the pretrial
conference to proceed as scheduled. The Sandiganbayan ruled that an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court
under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, refers only to administrative cases decided by the Ombudsman, and not
to judicial cases filed with the court.
On September 14, 1998, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the court denied in an order dated
October 13, 1998.
Hence, this petition.[4]
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to defer/suspend the trial in SB Criminal Case No. 23785, pending
the disposition of the earlier petition for review filed with this Court.Petitioner avers that continuing with the trial
in Criminal Case No. 23785, without awaiting the decision in the aforesaid petition would render the petition
moot and academic. Petitioner cites Section 27, R. A. No. 6770, which provides that:

x x x. In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision of denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner avers that all orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in both administrative and
criminal cases are appealable to the Supreme Court. Petitioner submits that to restrict the applicability of review
or appeal to administrative cases, and afford no relief of appeal by certiorari in criminal cases, is absurd and
illogical considering that criminal cases are more afflictive to the concerned individual.
At the same time, petitioner contends that limiting the applicability of Section 27 to administrative cases
would restrict the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court of all acts by government agencies which are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 The Solicitor General, in his comment, maintains that Section 27, R.A. No. 6770, providing an appeal
by certiorari to the Supreme Court, applies only to administrative cases. The Solicitor General invokes the ruling
in Fabian v. Desierto,[5] which states that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only when an appeal
by certiorari, under Rule 45, is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken
into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review,
such as from an incident in a criminal action.
The Solicitor General also contends that, contrary to petitioners averment, a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 is available to petitioner whenever he believes that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
his determination of the existence of probable cause.
However, in this case, since all the accused have been properly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and the case
has passed the pre-trial stage and is ready for trial, the remedy available now to the accused is to proceed to trial,
await judgment and appeal the decision in the event that it is unfavorable to them.
We resolve to dismiss the petition.
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 provides that orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases are appealable to the Supreme Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, in Fabian
v. Desierto,[6] we declared that Section 27 is unconstitutional since it expanded the Supreme Courts jurisdiction,
without its advice and consent, in violation of Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution. Hence, all appeals from
decision of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
True, the law is silent on remedy of an aggrieved party in case the Ombudsman found sufficient cause to
indict him in criminal or non-administrative cases. We cannot supply such deficiency if none has been provided
in the law. We have held that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law.[7] Hence, there must be a law expressly
granting such privilege The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from
orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. As we ruled in Fabian,
the aggrieved party is given the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such right of appeal is not granted to
parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding probable cause to
indict accused persons.
However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman as to the existence
of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction. An
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
At any rate, it should be stressed that there is pending before this Court a petition for review under Rule 45
questioning the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman. What is at issue in this petition for certiorari is the
propriety of the Sandiganbayans denial of the motion to suspend trial pending resolution of the certiorari case.
We find that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to suspend
trial in SB Criminal Case No. 23785. We have held that as a rule, criminal prosecution may not be restrained or
stayed by injunction, preliminary or final[8]. While we recognized exceptions to this rule in Brocka v. Enrile,[9] we
find that this case does not fall within the exceptions to warrant restraining the criminal prosecution.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying petitioners motion to suspend trial.
WHEREFORE, the court hereby DISMISSES the petition.
No. costs. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53724-29 June 29, 1988

ROLANDO R. MANGUBAT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Amadeo D. Seno for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

This petition involves the separate appeal interposed by Rolando Mangubat from the decision of
respondent Sandiganbayan in six (6) criminal cases thereof, Nos. 195, 196, 197,198, 199 & 200. We
had earlier disposed of the appeals of the other accused in these three petitions namely:

a) Valentino G. Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 52352-57, June 30, 1987;

b) Jose C. Bagasao vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 53813-18, October 28, 1987;

c) Isidoro Recamada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 53694-99, November 5, 1987;

wherein We upheld the decision of the Sandiganbayan.

In fact in G.R. Nos. 52872-52997 involving Rolando R. Mangubat himself, which We decided early last
year (January 30, 1987), the accused was convicted.

The following are our factual findings in these three petitions which We now incorporate as an integral
part of this decision —

xxx xxx xxx

In the original level, the requisition of funds for public works purposes, especially in the
matter of road and bridge repairs, involves a graduated series of steps. As found by the
respondent Sandiganbayan, it begins with the Sub-Allotment Advices (SAAs), as well as
the Advices of Cash Disbursement Ceilings (ACDCs), issued by the Ministry of Public
Highways in favor of its Highways Regional Offices. These serve as the Regional Offices"
authority to obligate and disburse funds. In turn, these become the sources of funds of
the various Engineering Districts apportioned throughout each region.

The Engineering District then requests for the release of these funds from the Regional
Director through a Program of Work. The Regional Finance Officer issues a Letter of
Advice of Allotment (LAA), certified as to availability of funds by the Regional Accountant,
countersigned by the Regional Director, and addressed to the District (or City, as the case
may be) Engineer. At the same time, he (the Regional Finance Officer) prepares a Sub-
Advice of Cash Disbursement Ceiling (SADC) for the Regional Director.

The LAA and SACDC are subsequently entered in a logbook.The funds requested are
then released.
 On the strength of such LAA and SACDC, the District then prepares a Requisition for
Supplies or Equipment (RSE) as well as Request for Obligation of Allotment (ROA,
pursuant to the Program of Work. Both are likewise certified as to availability of funds by
the Regional Accountant and approved by the Regional Director.

Thereafter, the Property Custodian or the Purchasing Officer, as the case may be,
addresses Requests for Sealed Quotations to various suppliers, usually through
newspaper advertisements or notices posted in conspicuous places in the District
concerned. After ten days, the Sealed Quotations are submitted to the Price Verification
Committee which determines the lowest bid in the presence of representatives of the
District Engineer and the Auditor. An Abstract of Sealed Quotations is then signed by the
members of the Committee as well as the said local representatives. Thereafter, and
subject to the approval of the District Engineer, the proper award is made in favor of the
lowest bidder. On the basis thereof, the Property Custodian issues a Purchase Order
(PO) in favor of the winning bidder, again subject to the approval of the District Engineer
and certified as to availability of funds by the Regional Accountant.

The supplies thus to be delivered are thereafter inspected (through Request for
Inspection) by the Property Custodian. The deliveries themselves are recorded in a Tally
Sheet after which a Record of Inspection, certified by the Property Custodian, is prepared
by the representative of the Auditor and the Property Custodian.

Payment of the supplier is evidenced by a General Voucher (GV) among others, the GV
contains five parts (1) a certification of receipt of supplies to be accomplished by the
Property Custodian; (2) a certification of correctness, that is, that the expenses are
necessary and lawful and that the prices are not in excess of the current rates in the
locality to be accomplished by the Project Engineer; (3) approval by the District Engineer;
(4) a certification, to be accomplished by the Auditor, that the GV has been properly
approved, its account codes proper, and that it is supported by the proper documents;
and (5) a certification that the GV has undergone pre-audit, to be accomplished by the
Auditor.

The GV itself must carry with it the following: the RSE, ROA, Program of Work, Detailed
Estimates, Request for Quotations, Abstract of Sealed Quotations, PO, Delivery Receipts,
Request for Inspection, Record of Inspection, Test Reports, and Tax Clearance of the
supplier.

The process winds up with the issuance of the check by the Cashier in the name of the
supplier. Like the GV, the check is pre-audited and then released.

The District Accountant thereafter prepares a Report of Obligation Incurred (ROI) and a
Report of Checks Issued (RCI) to be submitted to the Regional Office and entered in the
journals and the General Ledger thereof. On the basis thereof, the Regional Accountant
prepares a trial balance to be recommended by the Finance Officer and approved by the
Regional Director. The same is then submitted to the Ministry of Public Highways.

xxx xxx xxx

(Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan, 151 SCRA 434-436)

It appears that from May through June, 1978, the Tagbilaran City Engineering Office (CEO) embarked
on certain projects involving the restoration of various roads and bridges in Tagbilaran City. Pursuant
to five LAAs addressed to the Ministry of Public Highways purportedly issued by the Seventh Regional
Highways Office on behalf of the Tagbilaran CEO, more specifically described as follows:

LAA Date Amount

No.

107- April P150,000.00

780- 29,
05-78 1978

107- No 26,000.00
0780- date
07-78

107- April 48,100.00

780- 24,
012- 1978
78

107- April 150,000.00

780- 24,
014- 1978
78

107- No 100,000.00
780- date
011-
78

TOTAL P474,100.00

and six SACDCS, as follows:

SACDC Amount
No.

022-78 P 26,000.00

167-78 100,000.00

180-78 48,000.00

193-78 150,000.00

222-78 150,000.00

086-78 225,830.00

TOTAL P699,930.00
The Tagbilaran CEO prepared RSEs and ROAs for the procurement of materials and supplies,
specifically, anapog binder, for the projects aforementioned. All five LAAs were certified as to availability
of funds by Rolando Mangubat, allegedly on behalf of Angelina Escano, 1Finance Officer of the
Seventh Regional Highways Office (Mangubat signed over her typewritten name) and countersigned
by Jose Bagasao. The six SACDs were likewise signed by Mangubat for the Regional Director. The
materials requisitioned were supplied by JV Sand & Gravel & Construction Supply, a private
contractorship owned by James Tiu. Six GVs were prepared therefor, as follows:

GV No. Program of Amount

Work

01- Restoration P 49,980.00

780601 of Shoulders,

Tagbilaran
North Road

(TNR),
Junction
TNR-Airport

Road,
Junction
TNR-Wharf

Road (TCSR)

01- Restoration 49,980.00

780606 of Shoulders,

Tagbilaran
North Road

(TNR),
Junction
TNR-Wharf

Road

01- Restoration 49,980.00

780641 of Shoulders,

Tagbilaran-
Corella-
Sikatuna

Road

01- Restoration, 49,980.00

780682 Totulan-Ubos
 Dauis Bridge
Approaches

01- Restoration, 49,980.00

780684 Totulan

Ubos-Dauis
Bridge
Approaches

01- Restoration, 49,980.00

780694 Junction

Tagbilaran
East Road
Dauis

Panlao
Central Road
Shoulders

and Bridge
Approaches

TOTAL P299,880.00

representing partial payments in favor of JV Sand & Gravel & Construction Supply, which had been
named as a creditor therein. The GVs themselves were accompanied by various supporting papers,
among them, the RSEs and ROAs earlier referred to. (Valentino G. Castillo vs. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, supra).

As we found in the cases of Castillo, Bagasao & Recamadas, the aforesaid projects turned out to be
"ghost" projects since they did not carry the imprimatur of the then Public Highways Ministry, the various
requisition papers having been falsified to enable the accused to acquire the necessary funding.
Furthermore, the supplies ordered were either short-delivered or not delivered at all. As a result, the
government suffered losses in the total sum of P240,058.00.

The Tanodbayan seasonably brought six (6) suits for estafa complexed with falsification of public and
commercial documents against all thirteen public officials and two private individuals on the basis of
conspiracy. The Sandiganbayan, after due trial, rendered judgment acquitting only two, Jose Sayson,
Budget Examiner II of the Seventh Regional Highways Office, and Engracio Quiroz, an employee of
James Tiu, a private contractor, and convicting the rest, including the petitioner.

As We earlier stated, We upheld the Sandiganbayan in the three earlier cases involving the same
transactions. We see no reason why we should not sustain respondent court with respect to this
particular appeal.

Petitioner impugns the decision of respondent Sandiganbayan on both legal and factual grounds.
On the legal issue, petitioner assails the constitutionality of the law creating the Sandiganbayan
contending that the same violates his rights under the equal protection, due process and ex-post
factoclauses of the Constitution.

On this point, We held in the other cases involving the same petitioner (Rolando R. Mangubat vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 52872-52997, January 30, 1987, 147 SCRA 483) that —

Petitioner's aforesaid contention is devoid of merit. These are the same legal issues
raised in the case of Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan, Nos. L-50581-50617, January 30, 1982,
111 SCRA 433, which was the first case to put to the most severe test the constitutionality
of the decree creating the Sandiganbayan. Speaking thru former Chief Justice Fernando,
this Court held that the decree creating the Sandiganbayan is constitutional and it does
not violate the equal protection, due process and ex-post facto clauses of the
Constitution. This doctrine was reiteratde in the cases of Calubaquib vs. Sandiganbayan,
Nos. L-54272-73, September 30, 1982, 177 SCRA 493; De Guzman v. People, 119
SCRA 337; Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 120 SCRA 659; Bayot v. Sandiganbayan,126
SCRA 383; Alviar v. Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63.

The question of fact raised by petitioner refers to the sufficiency of evidence upon which he was
convicted. He claims that:

a) On the basis of the admitted facts, the respondent Sandiganbayan erroneously

concluded that the LAAs are fake;

b) The finding of respondent Sandiganbayan that the falsity of the LAAs is confirmed no
less than by petitioner Mangubat himself through his own testimony is an inference which
is manifestly mistaken and absurd, a finding which conflicts with the evidence on record,
and is clearly based on a misapprehension of facts; and

c) The finding of the Sandiganbayan that Mangubat was a party to the conspiracy to
defraud the government in the amounts stated in the six informations is based purely on
surmises and speculations and is clearly predicated on a grave misapprehension of facts.

The falsity as well as the fraudulent issuance of the documents in question particularly the subject
LAAs, the SACDs and the JVs is now a settled issue. We have in the earlier mentioned cases of Castillo,
Bagasao and Recamadas (supra) held that all these documents were falsified and were fraudulently
issued.

Anent the participation of petitioner Mangubat in all these falsifications and fraudulent transactions, the
evidence on record indubitably shows that as Chief Accountant of the Ministry of Public Highways, he
signed all the fake LAAs. He was likewise the author of the fake SACDCs and the falsified JVs which
were the very vehicle with which the illegal disbursement were sought to be concealed. The issuance
of the fake LAAs initiated the commission of the crime. With all these, there is no question that
petitioner's role in the said irregularities was indispensable. He is therefore very much a part of the
conspiracy to defraud the government.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the Petition is DISMISSED.
Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-40004 January 31, 1975

BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., TRINIDAD HERRERA, BISHOP FRANCISCO CLAVER, S.J., BISHOP
ANTONIO NEPOMUCENO, BISHOP JESUS VALERA, BISHOP FELIX ZAFRA, BISHOP TEOTIMO
PACIS, EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR., SERGIO OSMEÑA, III, ANTONIO ARANETA, ANTONIO MIRANDA,
RAUL GONZALES, JOKER ARROYO, and EMILIO DE PERALTA, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Renato E. Tañada and Wigberto E. Tañada for petitioners
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,
Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza & Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for
respondents.

DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:p
I
This petition for prohibition, which was filed on January 21, 1975, seeks the nullification of Presidential
Decrees Nos. 1366, 1366-A, calling a referendum for February 27, 1975, Presidential Decrees Nos.
629 and 630 appropriating funds therefor, and Presidential Decrees Nos. 637 and 637-A specifying the
referendum questions, as well as other presidential decrees, orders and instructions relative to the said
referendum.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed their comment on January 28, 1975. After the oral
argument of over 7 hours on January 30, 1975, the Court resolved to consider the comment as answer
and the case submitted for decision.
The first ground upon which the petition is predicated states that President Ferdinand E. Marcos does
not hold any legal office nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the 1973
Constitution and therefore has no authority to issue the questioned proclamations, decrees and orders.
This challenges the title of the incumbent President to the office of the Presidency and therefore is in
the nature of a quo warranto proceedings, the appropriate action by which the title of a public officer
can be questioned before the courts. Only the Solicitor General or the person who asserts title to the
same office can legally file such a quo warranto petition. The petitioners do not claim such right to the
office and not one of them is the incumbent Solicitor General. Hence, they have no personality to file
the suit (Castro vs. Del Rosario, Jan. 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 197; City of Manila & Antonio Villegas vs.
Abelardo Subido, et. al., May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 231-232, 235-236; Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista,
85 Phil. 101; and Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil. 127). It is established jurisprudence that the
legality of the appointment or election of a public officer cannot be questioned collaterally through a
petition for prohibition which assails the validity of his official acts.
The foregoing governing legal principles on public officers are re-stated in order to avert any
misapprehension that they have been eroded by Our resolution in the instant petition.
Because of the far-reaching implications of the herein petition, the Court resolved to pass upon the
issues raised.
II
This Court already ruled in the Ratification Cases “that there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect.” As Chief Justice Makalintal stressed in the Habeas
Corpus cases, the issue as to its effectivity “has been laid to rest by Our decision in Javellanaversus
Executive Secretary (L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 141), and of course by the existing
political realities both in the conduct of national affairs and in our relation with countries” (Aquino, Jr.
vs. Enrile and 8 companion cases, L-35546, L-35538-40, L-35538-40, L-35547, L-35556, L-35571 and
L-35573, Sept. 17, 1971, 59 SCRA 183, 241).
III
In the aforesaid Habeas Corpus cases, We affirmed the validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081
issued on September 22, 1972 by President Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance
of said proclamation pursuant to the 1935 Constitution that the factual bases had not disappeared but
had even been exacerbated; that the question is to the validity of the Martial Law proclamation has
been foreclosed by Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides that “all
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent
President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even
after the lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this Constitution …”; and that “any inquiry by this
Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation
of Martial Law, has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum of July
27-28, 1973. The question propounded to the voters was: “Under the (1973) Constitution, the President,
if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want President Marcos to continue beyond
1973 and finish the reforms be initiated under Martial Law?” The overwhelming majority of those who
cast their ballots, including citizens beyond 15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the proposal. The
question was thereby removed from the area of presidential power under the Constitution and
transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the exercise of that power
by the President in the beginning — whether or not purely political and therefore non-justiciable — this
Court is precluded from applying its judicial yardstick to the act of the sovereign.” (Aquino, Jr. vs.
Enrile, supra, 59 SCRA 183,
240-242).
Under the 1935 Constitution, President Ferdinand E. Marcos was duly reelected by the vote of the
sovereign people in the Presidential elections of 1969 by an overwhelming vote of over 5,000,000
electors as against 3,000,000 votes for his rival, garnering a majority of from about 896,498 to
1,436,118 (Osmeña vs. Marcos, Presidential Election Contest No. 3, Jan. 8, 1973). While his term of
office under the 1935 Constitution should have terminated on December 30, 1973, by the general
referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign people expressly authorized him to continue in office
even beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly ratified on January 17, 1973 by the
sovereign people) in order to finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law; and as aforestated, as
this was the decision of the people, in whom “sovereignty resides … and all government authority
emanates …,” it is therefore beyond the scope of judicial inquiry (Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile, et. al., supra,
p. 242).
The logical consequence therefore is that President Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic of
the Philippines.
IV
The next issue is whether he is the incumbent President of the Philippines within the purview of Section
3 of Article XVII on the transitory provisions of the new or 1973 Constitution. As heretofore stated, by
virtue of his reelection in 1969, the term of President Marcos tinder the 1935 Constitution was to
terminate on December 30, 1973. The new Constitution was approved by the Constitutional Convention
on November 30, 1972, still during his incumbency. Being the only incumbent President of the
Philippines at the time of the approval of the new Constitution by the Constitutional Convention, the
Constitutional Convention had nobody in mind except President Ferdinand E. Marcos who shall initially
convene the interim Assembly. It was the incumbent President Marcos alone who issued Martial Law
Proclamation No. 1081 on September 22, 1972 and issued orders and decrees as well as instructions
and performed other acts as President prior to the approval on November 30, 1972 of the new
Constitution by the Constitutional Convention and prior to its ratification on January 17, 1973 by the
people. Consequently, since President Marcos was the only incumbent President at the time, because
his term under the 1935 Constitution has yet to expire on December 30, 1973, the Constitutional
Convention, in approving the new Constitution, had in mind only him when in Section 3(2) of Article
XVII of the new Constitution it provided “that all the proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and
acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and
shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this
Constitution, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or
repealed by the regular National Assembly.”
The term incumbent President of the Philippines employed in Section 9 of the same Article XVII likewise
could only refer to President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
This conclusion is further buttressed by Section 10 of the same Article XVII which provides that
“the incumbent members of the Judiciary may continue in office until they reach the age of 70 years
unless sooner replaced in accordance with the preceding section hereof.” There can be no dispute that
the phrase “incumbent members of the Judiciary” can only refer to those members of the Judiciary who
were already Justices and Judges of the various courts of the country at the time the Constitutional
Convention approved the new Constitution on November 30, 1972 and when it was ratified.
Because President Ferdinand E. Marcos is the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of the
transitory provisions of the 1973 Constitution, he can “continue to exercise the powers and prerogatives
under the nineteen hundred and thirty five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the
Prime Minister under this Constitution until he calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect
the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then exercise their legislative powers
vested by this Constitution (Sec. 3[l], Art. XVII, 1973 Constitution).
Under the 1935 Constitution, the President is empowered to proclaim martial law. Under the 1973
Constitution, it is the Prime Minister who is vested with such authority (Sec. 12, Art. IX, 1973
Constitution).
WE affirm the proposition that as Commander-in-Chief and enforcer or administrator of martial law, the
incumbent President of the Philippines can promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the
period of Martial Law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the
political and social liberties of the people and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of
rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide
recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including highly developed
countries (Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 1948 Ed., pp. 7, 303; see also Chief Justice Stone’s
Concurring Opinion in Duncan vs. Kahanamoku, 327 US 304).
To dissipate all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by the President during the period
of Martial Law, Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the New Constitution expressly affirms that all the
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts he promulgated, issued or did prior to the
approval by the Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972 and prior to the ratification by the
people on January 17, 1973 of the new Constitution, are “part of the law of the land, and shall remain
valid, legal, binding and effective even after the lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this
Constitution, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and specifically modified or
repealed by the regular National Assembly.”
The entire paragraph of Section 3(2) is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such
power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law.
Dr. Jose M. Aruego, noted authority in Constitutional Law as well as delegate to the 1935 and 1971
Constitutional Conventions, shares this view, when he states thus:
108. … — These Presidential Proclamations, order, decrees, instructions, etc. had been issued by the
incumbent President in the exercise of what he consider to be his powers under martial law, in the
same manner that the lawmaking body had enacted several thousand statutes in the exercise of what
it consider to be its power under the Organic Laws. Both these classes of rules of law — by the
President and by the lawmaking body — were, under general principles of constitutional law, presumed
to be constitutional until declared unconstitutional by the agency charged with the power and function
to pass upon constitutional law question — the Judiciary, at the apex of which is the Supreme Court.
Hence, the inclusion of both group of rules — President rules and legislative rules — in the new
Constitution for the people to approve or disapprove in the scheduled plebiscite. (Aruego, The New
Constitution, 1973 Ed., p. 230).
Delegate Arturo Pacificador, a Floor Leader of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, in explaining
Section 3(2) of Article XVII, underscores this recognition of the legislative power of the incumbent
President as Commander-in-Chief during martial Law, thus:
The second paragraph sets forth the understanding of the Convention of the nature, extent and scope
of the powers of the incumbent President of the Philippines, under martial law. It expressly recognizes
that the commander-in-chief, under martial law, can exercise all necessary powers to meet the perils
of invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof. This provision complements Section 7,
Article XVII of the Constitution that “all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly.”
The second paragraph is an express recognition on the part of the framers of the new Constitution of
the wisdom of the proclamations, orders, decrees and instructions by the incumbent President in the
light of the prevailing conditions obtaining in the country. (Montejo, New Constitution, 1973 Ed., p. 314,
emphasis supplied).
The power under the second clause of Section 3(2) is not limited merely to modifying, revoking or
superseding all his proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or other acts promulgated, issued or
done prior to the ratification of the 1973 Constitution. But even if the scope of his legislative authority
thereunder is to be limited to the subject matter of his previous proclamations, orders, decrees or
instructions or acts, the challenged Proclamations Nos. 1366 and 1366-A, as well as Presidential
Decrees Nos. 629, 630, 637 and 637-A are analogous to the referenda of January, 1973 and July 27-
28, 1973.
The actions of the incumbent President are not without historical precedents. It should be recalled that
the American Federal Constitution, unlike the 1935 or 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, does not
confer expressly on the American President the power to proclaim Martial Law or to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus. And yet President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, and President Roosevelt
during the Second World War, without express constitutional or statutory authority, created agencies
and offices and appropriated public funds therefor in connection with the prosecution of the war. Nobody
raised a finger to oppose the same. In the case of President Roosevelt, the theater of war was not in
the United States. It was thousands of miles away, in the continents of Europe and Africa and in the
Far East. In the Philippines, military engagements between the government forces and the rebels and
secessionists are going on, emphasizing the immediacy of the peril to the safety of the Republic itself.
There is therefore greater reason to affirm this law-making authority in favor of the incumbent President
during the period of Martial Law.
Petitioners further argue that the President should call the interim National Assembly as required of him
by Section 3(1) of Article XVII, which National Assembly alone can exercise legislative powers during
the period of transition.
It should be stressed that there is a distinction between the existence of the interim Assembly and its
organization as well as its functioning. The interim Assembly already existed from the time the new
Constitution was ratified; because Section 1 of Article XVII states that “there shall be an interim National
Assembly which shall exist immediately upon the ratification of this Constitution and shall continue until
the members of the regular National Assembly shall have been elected and shall have assumed office
…” However, it cannot function until it is convened and thereafter duly organized with the election of
its interim speaker and other officials. This distinction was clearly delineated in the case of Mejia, et. al.
vs. Balolong, et. al. where We held that from the phrase “the City of Dagupan, which is hereby created,
…,” Dagupan City came into existence as a legal entity upon the approval of its Charter; but the date
of the organization of the city government was to be fixed by the President of the Philippines, and
necessarily was subsequent to the approval of its organic law (81 Phil. 486, 490-492).
Petitioners likewise urge that the President should have convened the interim Assembly before the
expiration of his term on December 30, 1973. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly,
consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. This was revealed by no
less than Delegate Jose M. Aruego himself, who stated:
109. Convening the interim National Assembly. — The Constitutional Convention could have fixed the
date when the interim National Assembly should convene itself as it did with respect to the regular
National Assembly. There would not have been any need for any Presidential call as there is none, with
respect to the regular National Assembly.
But considering that the country had been already placed under martial law rule the success of which
was conditioned upon the unity not only of planning but also in the execution of plans, many delegates
felt that the incumbent President should be given the discretion to decide when the interim National
Assembly should be convened because he would need its counsel and help in the administration of the
affairs of the country.
And in the event that it should convene, why did the interim National Assembly not fix its tenure, and
state expressly when the election of the members of the regular National Assembly should be called?
Many of the delegates felt that they could not be sure even of the proximate date when the general
conditions of peace and order would make possible orderly elections, … (The New Philippine
Constitution by Aruego, 1973 Ed., p. 230).
This was also disclosed by Delegate Arturo F. Pacificador, who affirmed:
Under the first paragraph of this section, the incumbent President is mandated to initially convene
the interim National Assembly.
Note that the word used is “shall” to indicate the mandatory nature of the desire of the Constitutional
Convention that the interim National Assembly shall be convened by the incumbent President. The
Constitutional Convention, however, did not fix any definite time at which the incumbent President shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly. This decision was deliberate to allow the incumbent
President enough latitude of discretion to decide whether in the light of the emergency situation now
prevailing, conditions have already normalized to permit the convening of the interim National
Assembly. (Montejo, The New Constitution, 1973 Ed., p. 314).
It is thus patent that the President is given the discretion as to when he shall convene
the interim National Assembly after determining whether the conditions warrant the same.
His decision to defer the initial convocation of the interim National Assembly was supported by the
sovereign people at the referendum in January, 1973 when the people voted to postpone the convening
of the interim National Assembly until after at least seven (7) years from the approval of the new
Constitution. And the reason why the same question was eliminated from the questions to be submitted
at the referendum on February 27, 1975, is that even some members of the Congress and delegates
of the Constitutional Convention, who are already ipso facto members of the interim National
Assembly, are against such inclusion; because the issue was already decided in the January, 1973
referendum by the sovereign people indicating thereby their disenchantment with any Assembly as the
former Congress failed to institutionalize the reforms they demanded and had wasted public funds
through the endless debates without relieving the suffering of the general mass of citizenry.
Petitioners likewise impugn the scheduled referendum on the ground that there can be no true
expression of the people’s will due to the climate of fear generated by Martial Law and that the period
of free discussion and debate is limited to two weeks from February 7 to 21, without right of rebuttal
from February 22 until the day of the referendum.
The first objection is not tenable because during the senatorial elections in 1951 and 1971, the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended, during which period of suspension there was fear of arrest
and detention. Yet the election was so free that a majority of the senatorial candidates of the opposition
party were elected and there was no reprisal against or harassment of any voter thereafter. The same
thing was true in the referendum of July 27-28, 1973, which was done also through secret ballot. There
was no Army, PC, or police truck, bus or other mode of transportation utilized to transport the voters to
the various precincts of the country. There was no PC, Army or police personnel assigned to each
election precinct or voting booth. And such assignment would be impossible; because the combined
membership of the police, PC, and Army was then as now very much less than the number of precincts,
let alone the number of voting booths. And no one would be left to fight the rebels or to maintain peace
and order. And as heretofore stated, the voting was done in secrecy. Only one voter at a time entered
the voting booth. The voting was orderly. There was no buying of votes or buying the right not to vote.
And as opined by the Solicitor General, every qualified voter who fails to register or go to the polling
place on referendum day is subject to prosecution; but failure to fill up the ballot is not penalized.
In the Habeas Corpus cases, We declared that the result of the referendum on July 27-28, 1973 was a
decision by the sovereign people which cannot be reviewed by this Court. Then again, it is too late now
for petitioners to challenge the validity of said referendum.
Moreover, as stressed by the Solicitor General, the previous referenda of January and July, 1973, were
a lot more free than the elections under the Old Society previous to the proclamation of Martial Law,
where the will of the voter was subverted through “guns, goons and gold”, as well as through fraud. All
modes of transportation were utilized by the candidates and their leaders to transport the voters to the
precinct. The voters were likewise wined and dined and so prostituted that they refused to vote until
the required monetary persuasion was proffered, if they were not being subjected to various forms of
intimidation. In some areas, the ballots were filled up and the election returns were accomplished before
election day. Even animals and dead persons voted. The decisions in the electoral contests filed after
every election under the Old Society attest to this very unflattering fact in our history.
The second objection that the two-week period for free debate is too short, is addressed to the wisdom
of the President who may still amend the proclamation to extend the period of free discussion.
At any rate, such a brief period of discussion has its counterpart in previous plebiscites for constitutional
amendments. Under the Old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette of the women’s suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the
scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as
ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski Act of the US Federal Congress to the 1935
Constitution was published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to
the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act No. 492). For the 1940 constitutional amendments providing for the
bicameral Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice-President, and the creation of the
Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was
fixed (Com. Act No. 517).And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting
the economy as well as the independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues
of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73).
The period of 14 days for free discussion can compare favorably with the period required for publication
of the proposed amendments under the Old Society.
WHEREFORE, PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS IS HEREBY DECLARED DE
JURE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATIONS NOS. 1366 AND 1366-
A AND PRESIDENTIAL DECREES NOS. 629,630, 637 AND 637-A ARE HEREBY
DECLARED VALID, AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITHOUT COSTS.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 134102. July 6, 2000]

ENGR. TEODOTO B. ABBOT, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE HILARIO I. MAPAYO, Presiding Judge,
RTC-Br. 19, Digos, Davao del Sur and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

We are tasked to resolve in this petition the issue of which tribunal - the Sandiganbayan or the Court
of Appeals - has jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition filed by petitioner
Teodoto B. Abbot in the Court of Appeals. Petitioner claims that jurisdiction is vested in the Court of
Appeals; on the other hand, the Court of Appeals together with the Office of the Solicitor General holds
that the Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition falls properly within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner Teodoto B. Abbot, Chief of the Irrigation System, Mal-River Project, National Irrigation
Administration, Manga, Matanao, Davao del Sur, was charged with Malversation Thru Falsification of
Public Document. In an Information[1] lodged before the Sandiganbayan, it was alleged that Abbot
falsified the Viability Incentive Grant payroll by making it appear that each of the seven (7) complaining
witnesses received P4,500.00 when in fact four (4) of them received only P1,500.00 each while the
other three (3) received P2,000.00 each, thereby enabling petitioner to obtain P19,500.00 which he
misappropriated to his personal use.

The case was eventually transferred to the Regional Trial Court by virtue of RA 7975. [2] On arraignment
petitioner pleaded not guilty. During the trial petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that there was no malversation to speak of because the money supposed to have
been misappropriated ceased to be part of the public fund when cashier Catalino P. Cordero indorsed
the check to petitioner who thereafter encashed and received the proceeds thereof for payment to the
intended beneficiaries.[3]

On 29 October 1996 the Regional Trial Court-Br. 19, Digos, Davao del Sur, denied the Omnibus
Motion.[4] On 12 February 1997 petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.[5]

Petitioner assailed the 29 October 1996 and 12 February 1997 orders of the Regional Trial Court before
the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition[6] arguing that the trial court
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it did not dismiss
the Information filed against him. He insisted that the Information was patently quashable on its face as
the facts stated therein did not constitute an offense and the stipulation of facts made during the pre-
trial rendered the case dismissible.
The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting on the petition, opined that the Court of Appeals was
without jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition as jurisdiction thereof was
already vested in the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Office of the
Solicitor General and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction,[7] and likewise denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.[8] Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari with petitioner
insisting that the Court of Appeals and not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the Petition for
Certiorari with Prohibition.

PD 1606[9] created the Sandiganbayan. In Sec. 4 thereof the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
delineated -

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: (a) Exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving: (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, of the Revised Penal Code; (2) Other offenses or felonies
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years
or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction: (1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions
or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally decided by them in their
respective territorial jurisdictions; (2) By petition for review, from the final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate
jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdictions x x x x

This law was applied in Garcia, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[10] where the principal issue was the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan over special civil actions for prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto. This
Court held that the Sandiganbayan was a court with only special and limited jurisdiction, hence, could
not exercise jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto filed by
petitioner; thus -

It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,

and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law. In Garcia v. De Jesus,this Court stated: In the
Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such authority has always been
expressly conferred, either by the Constitution or by law. As a matter of fact, the well-
settled rule is that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is never
derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some
instances conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the
particular courts which have such power are expressly designated.

Thus, our Courts exercise the power to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative enactments. To
enumerate: (1) Section 5[1], Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution conferred upon this Court
such jurisdiction; (2) Section 9[1] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary
 Reorganization Act of 1980, to the Court of Appeals (then Intermediate Appellate Court);
(3) Section 21[1] of the said Act, to the Regional Trial Courts; (4) Section 5[1] of Republic
Act No. 6734, or the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to the
newly created Shariah Appellate Court; and, (5) Article 143[e], Chapter I, Title I, Book IV
of Presidential Decree No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Law, to Shariah District
Courts.

With respect to petitions for quo warranto and habeas corpus, original jurisdiction over
them is expressly conferred in this Court by Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
and to the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts by Section 9(1) and Section
21(1), respectively, of B.P. Blg. 129.

In the absence then of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said
extraordinary writs, the Sandiganbayan, as a court with only special and limited
jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over the petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto filed by petitioner.[11]

After the promulgation of the Garcia, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan decision herein cited, Congress enacted RA
7975, An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan,
Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, which took effect 6 May 1995.
In Sec. 4(c) thereof, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was expanded to include petitions for the
issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus -

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - (c) x x x The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original

jurisdiction over petitions for issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibitions, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction: Provided: That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of
the Supreme Court.

In effect, our ruling in Garcia, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[12] was supplanted in RA 7975 which was the law
already in force at the time of the commission of the offense charged. Hence, both the Court of Appeals
and the Office of the Solicitor General are correct in concluding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has
jurisdiction over the questioned Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition. No grave abuse of discretion
could therefore be imputed to the Court of Appeals in refusing to take cognizance of the oft-
mentioned Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 11 November 1997 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition as well as its Resolution
dated 14 May 1998 denying reconsideration is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-63271-74 August 30, 1983

PEÑAFLOR PEÑAVERDE, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63833-36 August 30, 1983

MELECIO C. HERMITA petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

L-63271-74:

Reus Juan Lagunzad & Fajardo Law Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

L-63833-36:

Luis P. Bisaria Sr. for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

RESOLUTION

RELOVA, J.:

Petitioners Peñaflor Peñaverde and Melecio Hermits seek to set aside the decision of respondent
Sandiganbayan, convicting them of the crimes of falsification of public documents and malversation of
public funds on three (3) counts. The informations filed against them read, as follows:

Criminal Case No. 2135— For

Falsification of Public Document

That on or about November 18, 1978, in the Municipality of Minalabac Camarines Sur
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Penaflor Penaverde, a public
officer and discharging his official functions as Barangay Captain of Barangay Manapao
Minalabac, Camarines Sur and accused Melecio C. Hermits, likewise a public officer
discharging his official function as Kagawad in the Sangguniang Bayan of Minalabac,
Camarines Sur, taking advantage of their official positions and committing and said acts
in relation to their office, conspiring, conniving and confederating with each other, in order
to conceal their misappropriation of the amount of P500.00 earmarked for labor expenses,
then and there wilfully my. unlawfully and feloniously falsify the Certificate of Project
Completion and Turn-Over by making it appear that the Foot-Path Project of Barangay
Manapao was completed and turned over to the barangay people on said date when in
truth and in fact it was not so which fully knew thereby causing damage and prejudice to
the public service.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 2136—For

Malversation of Public Funds
That on or about October 7, 1978, in the Municipality of Minalabac, Camarines Sur and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Penaflor V. Penaverde being then
a public officer and discharging his official function as the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Manapao, Minalabac, Camarines Sur and therefore accountable for Barangay
Improvement and Development Assistance (BIDA) funds collected and received by him
by reason of such position and accused Melecio C. Hermita, likewise a public officer then
Kagawad in the Sangguniang Bayan of Minalabac Camarines Sur, taking advantage of
their official positions and conspiring, conniving and confederating with each other, did
then and there y, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently misappropriate, embezzle and
take away from said funds for winch they are both accountable, the total sum of THREE
HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00), Philippine Currency, which they appropriated and
converted to their own personal use and benefit, which amount represents a part of the
BIDA funds allotted for Barangay Manapao to the damage and prejudice of the
government t in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 2137 — For

Malversation of Public Funds

That on or about December 27, 1978, in the Municipality of Minalabac Camarines Sur
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Penaflor V. Penaverde being
then a public officer and discharging his official function as the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Manapao Minalabac Camarines Sur and therefore accountable for Barangay
Improvement and Development Assistance (BIDA) funds collected and received by him
by reason of such position and accused Melecio Hermits, likewise a public officer then
Kagawad in the Sangguniang Bayan of Minalabac, Camarines Sur, taking advantage of
their official positions and conspiring, conniving and confederating with each other, did
then and there y, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently misappropriate, embezzle and
take away from said funds for which they are both accountable, the total sum of FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00), Philippine Currency which they appropriated and
converted to their own personal use and benefit, which amount represents part of the
BIDA funds allotted for Barangay Manapao, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 2138-For

Malversation of Public Funds

That on or about October 11, 1978 in the Municipality of Minalabac, Camarines Sur and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Penaflor V. Penaverde being then
a public officer and discharging his official function as the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Manapao, Minalabac, Camarines Sur and therefore accountable for Barangay
Improvement and Development Assistance (BIDA) funds collected and received by him
by reason of such position and accused Melecio C. Hermits, likewise a public officer then
Kagawad in the Sangguniang Bayan of Minalabac, Camarines Sur, taking advantage of
their official positions and conspiring, conniving and confederating with each other, did
then and there y, unlawfully, feloniously and' fraudulently misappropriate, embezzle and
take away from said funds for which they are both accountable, the total sum of ONE
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN PESOS (P1,897.00), Philippine
Currency, winch they appropriated and converted to their own personal use and benefit,
 which amount represents a part of the BIDA funds allotted for Barangay Manapao, to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (pp. 89-91, Rollo)

After trial, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision in the four (4) cases, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the two accused Penaflor V. Penaverde and Melecio C. Hermits,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Falsification of Public Document, in
Criminal Case No. 2135, and in three counts of Malversation of Public Funds in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2136, 2137, and 2138, without mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences each of them to
suffer the following penalties.

1. In Criminal Case No. 2135 for Falsification of Public Document, each of them shall
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prison mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00);

2. In Criminal Case No. 2136 for Malversation of Public Funds involving the amount of
P300.00, each of them shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of from TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision orreccional, as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify jointly and
severally the Barangay of Manapao, Minalabac, Camarines Sur, the amount of P300.00
representing the amount malversed and not restituted;

3. In Criminal Case No. 2137, for Malversation of Public Funds involving the amount of
P11500.00, each of the two accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prison
correccional, as maximum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prison mayor, as
maximum, and to indemnify jointly and severally the Barangay of Manapao, Minalabac,
Camarines Sur, the amount of P500.00 which is the amount embezzled and not restituted;

4. In Criminal Case No. 2138, for Malversation of Public funds involving the amount of
P1,897.00, each of the two accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prison
correccional, as minimum, to SEVEN (7) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prison mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify jointly and severally the Barangay of
Manapao, Minalabac, Camarines Sur, the sum of P1,897.00 which is the amount
malversed and not restituted; and

5. With accessory penalties provided by law.

The accused are entitled to full credit of the preventive imprisonment they have
undergone, if any, in accordance with Art. 29, as amended by Republic Act No. 6127, of
the Revised Penal Code.

With costs against the two accused in all cases.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 10-11, Rollo)

Petitioners filed separate motions for was, which, however, were denied. Hence, the present petitioners
alleging that respondent Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors in convicting petitioners
Peñaverde and Hermita of the cranes charged and presenting for resolution the following issues:

(1) Whether or not serious doubts exist as to the probability of the commission of the offenses imputed
to herein petitioners.

(2) Whether or not there is conspiracy between petitioner Peñaflor Peñaverde and his co-accused
Melecio C. Hermits to commit the offenses.

Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that Peñaflor V. Peñaverde as Barangay Captain of Manapao
Minalabac Camarines Sur, is not an accountable officer; that the BIDA finds in the amount of P5,000.00
to which Barangay Manapao is entitled was not entrusted to his custody but to the custody and control
of Provincial Development Officer Adolfo Badiola, who issued the checks for the purchase of
construction materials and for the cost of labor; and that since Badiola is the accountable officer and
not petitioner Peñaverde he (Peñaverde) cannot therefore be guilty of the crane of malversation of
public funds. Further, they argue that assuming, without admitting, that there was malversation of public
funds, the taking of the amount from the P5,000.00 in three (3) different occasions constitutes one (1)
crime only.

In his comment to instant petitions, the Solicitor General admits that petitioners may not be convicted
of malversation because they were not accountable officers. Adolfo Badiola, the Provincial
Development Officer, admitted that he has been the accountable officer for the BIDA funds.

Q Do I understand Mr. Badiola that you were the one who issued these
Exhibits A and A-1, these checks?

A Yes, sir.

Q You were the one who issued these checks because you were the one in
charge of disbursing this amount of P5,000.00 BIDA finds in your capacity
as Provincial Development Officer?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you are the accountable officer insofar as that fund is concerned?

A Yes, sir. (tsn. p. 28, May 14, 1981)

However, the Solicitor General alleged that in Criminal Cases Nos. 2136 and 2138 petitioners conspired
to induce Rito Sultan, the owner of the Sulu Hardware which was granted the award for materials, to
part with the remaining balance of P4,500.00, in the amount of P300.00 and P1,897.00, on two (2)
different occasions on the pretext that the said amount was for the repair of the school. After receiving
the balance, they misappropriated it. Thus, they were properly charged in two separate guilty of Estafa
a lesser offense (Delfin vs. Court of Appeals, 13 SCRA 366).

Again, in Criminal Case No. 2137, petitioners conspired to induce Municipal Development Officer
Filomeno Olano to give them a check for P500.00, the amount allegedly awarded for labor, by
misrepresenting through a picture that the footpath project was already completed. They eventually
encashed the check and misappropriated it, for the third occasion, to the damage of the government.
With respect to the allegation that there was error on the part of respondent Sandiganbayan in
concluding that petitioners conspired in the commission of the offense, suffice it to say that the basis of
its finding was the credibility of witnesses. Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, in
relation to Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are entitled
to great respect and only questions of laws may be raised to the Supreme Court. Besides, well settled
is the rule that the findings of trial court on credibility of witnesses win not be disturbed unless such
findings overlook certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect results of case.

In Criminal Cases Nos. 2136, 2137 and 2138, We find that the crimes committed by the herein
petitioners are estafa, not malversation as charged in the information.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of petitioners by respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2135
is hereby AFFIRMED. However, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2136,2137 and 2138, petitioners Peñaflor
Peñaverde and Melecio C. Hermits are guilty of estafa and each is sentenced as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 2136 - one(1)month and one(1) day of arrests mayor, as minimum, to one (1)
year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum;

2. In Criminal Case No. 2137 - one (1) month and one (1) day of arrests mayor, as minimum to one (1)
year and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum; and

3. In Criminal Case No. 2138 - one (1) month and one (1) day of arrests mayor, as minimum to one (1)
year and one (1) day of prision correccional, as. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21727 May 29, 1970

CRISPINA SALAZAR, petitioner,

vs.
GUILLERMO GUTIERREZ, and DAMASO MENDOZA, respondents.

Jaime L. Guerrero and Renato B. Bercades for petitioner.

Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon and Jose P. Santillan for respondents.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Civil Case No. 2269) in favor of the
plaintiff, Crispina Salazar, now petitioner; on appeal by the defendants, Guillermo Gutierrez and
Damaso Mendoza, the Court of Appeals reversed (CA-G.R. No. 19489-R); and the plaintiff elevated
the case to us for review by certiorari.

Crispina Salazar is owner of a piece of land (Lot 436 of the Cadastral Survey of Balanga) situated in
Tuyo, Balanga, Bataan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title 1578 issued by the Register of Deeds
of the said province, and acquired by her from the Municipality of Balanga on May 4, 1949. The lot is
bounded on the northeast by Lot 361, on the southeast by Sapang Tuyo, on the southwest by Lot 435,
and on the northwest by Lot 433.

Lot 433 was registered under the Torrens system on July 23, 1923, with Original Certificate of Title
2162. Ownership passed to respondent Guillermo Gutierrez by inheritance in 1927, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1059 was issued in his name on June 11, 1928. No annotation of any lien or
encumbrance affecting the land appears on either title.

Before the present controversy arose, Lot 436 and some of the surrounding estates, including Lot 433,
were irrigated with water from Sapang Tuyo, a public stream, flowing through a dike that traversed Lots
431, 434, 433 and 461. The portion of this dike that passed through Lot 433 branched near the
boundary between this lot and Lot 434 into a canal which ran across the rest of Lot 433 up to Lot 436.
It was with the water flowing through this canal that Lot 436 used to be irrigated.

On February 24, 1953 respondent Damaso Mendoza, a lessee of Lot 433, demolished the said canal,
thereby stopping the flow of the water and depriving Crispina Salazar's Lot 436 of the irrigation facilities
which it had formerly enjoyed. Her requests that the canal be rebuilt and the water flow restored having
been turned down, Salazar commenced the present suit on March 2, 1953, praying that these reliefs
be granted her by the Court and that the defendants be ordered to pay her actual damages in the sum
of P900, moral damages in the sum of P5,000, and P1,000 for attorney's fees, plus costs.

The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff, ordering the
defendants to restore the demolished portion of the canal and to refrain from again demolishing the
same pending trial, but the writ was dissolved on March 9, 1953, upon a counterbond filed by the
defendants. The latter answered with their own counterclaim for damages, denied the substantial
averments of the complaint and put up a number of affirmative defenses.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Bataan, finding that the demolished canal had been in existence
for more than thirty years and that the big dike from which it extended had been constructed for the use
of Lot 436 as well as several other lots belonging to different owners, rendered judgment on April 10,
1956, ordering the defendants to restore at their expense the canal in question, to connect it with the
canal found in Lot 436 and to cause the corresponding annotation of the encumbrance on Transfer
Certificate of Title 1059 covering Lot 433; and ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P1,360 annually beginning the agricultural year 1956-1957 until the restoration of the canal, P4,700 as
actual damages, P5,000 as moral damages and P1,000 as attorney's fees, plus costs.

On July 26, 1963, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and held
that since the easement of aqueduct over Lot 433 for the benefit of Lot 436 was a voluntary one, the
same was extinguished when Lot 433 was registered on July 23, 1923 and the corresponding certificate
of title was issued without the annotation of said easement as a subsisting encumbrance.

The respondents have raised a preliminary procedural question, alleging that Section 1 of Rule 46 (now
Section 1 of Rule 45), requiring proof of service of a copy of the petition upon the Court of Appeals,
was not complied with. Such omission, however, is not of jurisdictional import. In an appeal
by certiorari upon a question of law, as distinguished from an original petition for certiorari under Rule
65, the Court of Appeals is merely a nominal party respondent. The original parties in the trial court are
the same parties in the appeal.

The main issue as set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals is the nature of the easement of
aqueduct claimed by the petitioner. If voluntary, according to the said Court, the easement was
extinguished upon the registration of Lot 433 in 1923, pursuant to Section 39 of Act No. 496, which
provides:

But if there are easements or other rights appurtenant to a parcel of registered land which
for any reason have failed to be registered, such easements or rights shall remain so
appurtenant notwithstanding such failure and shall be held to pass with the land until cut
off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate, or in any other manner.
(Emphasis supplied).

In arriving at the conclusion that the easement in question was voluntary and not legal or compulsory,
the Court of Appeals took into consideration the provisions of Articles 557 and 558 of the Spanish Civil
Code, now Articles 642 and 643 of the new Civil Code respectively, as follows:

ART. 642. Any person who may wish to use upon his own estate any water of which he
can dispose shall have the right to make it flow through the intervening estates, with the
obligation to indemnify their owners, as well as the owners of the lower estates upon
which the waters may filter or descend.

ART. 643. One desiring to make use of the right granted in the preceding article is obliged:

(1) To prove that he can dispose of the water and that it is sufficient for the use for which
it is intended;

(2) To show that the proposed right of way is the most convenient and the least onerous
to third persons;

(3) To indemnify the owner of the servient estate in the manner determined by the laws
and regulations.

Specifically the appellate court held that there is no evidence to show that the petitioner has complied
with the three requisites laid down in Article 643 in order to entitle her to claim a legal easement of
aqueduct under Article 642. It bears repeating that the finding thus made, although apparently factual
in character, is premised upon supposed absence of evidence, and therefore is reviewed by this Court
if the premise is clearly contradicted by the record or unjustified upon other considerations which
logically lead to a different conclusion, but which the decision under review did not take into account.

On the first requisite of Article 643 — that the petitioner must prove that he can dispose of the water
and that it is sufficient for the use for which it is intended — there is the statement of the trial court that
the disputed canal had been in existence since the Spanish regime, or at least prior to the original
registration of Lot 433 in 1923, and that of the Court of Appeals itself confirmatory of this second
alternative finding. If, as thus found, the petitioner had been using water from Sapang Tuyo to irrigate
Lot 436 since she acquired said lot in 1949, as the Municipality of Balanga had been doing before her,
and that such use had lasted continuously for at least thirty years, it is a fair presumption that she had
a right to do so and that the water she could dispose of was sufficient for the purpose. Indeed it would
be a superfluity to require her to produce a permit from the proper authorities, for even without it the
right had already become vested both under Article 194 of the Spanish Law of Waters and under Article
504 of the Civil Code, which respectively state:

ART. 194. Any person who has enjoyed the use of public waters for a term of twenty
years without objection on the part of the authorities or of any third person, shall continue
in its enjoyment, even though he may not be able to show that he secured proper
permission.
 ART. 504. The use of public waters is acquired:

(1) By administrative concession;

(2) By prescription for ten years.

The extent of the rights and obligations of the use shall be that established, in the first case, by the
terms of the concession, and, in the second case, by the manner and form, in which the waters have
been used.

The third requisite of Article 643 of the Civil Code refers to the matter of indemnity to the owner of the
servient estate. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner it would be nigh impossible now to present
actual proof that such indemnity has been paid, considering the number of years that have elapsed
since the easement had first come into existence and the subsequent changes in ownership of the lots
involved. It stands to reason, however, that if the easement had continued for so long in fact, not only
before Lot 433 was registered in 1923 but for thirty years thereafter, until cut off by the respondents in
1953 the legal requirement in question must have been complied with.

The other requisite of Article 643 is that "the proposed right of way is the most convenient and the least
onerous to third persons." The Court of Appeals stated that the petitioner has not established this fact,
and that "her own evidence reveals that her lot is abuttingSapang Tuyo on its southern boundary, where
from she can easily and directly draw the water necessary to irrigate her land." This statement is an
oversimplification. Proximity or abutment of a piece of land to a stream does not necessarily carry with
it the conclusion that water may conveniently be drawn directly therefrom for irrigation. In the first place,
the petitioner has pointed out in her brief, without contradiction by the respondents, that the portion of
her land which abuts Sapang Tuyo is precipice. Secondly, the trial court made an ocular inspection of
the premises and observed that the eastern and northeastern portions of Lot 436 are lower than the
southwestern, western and northwestern (the point where Lot 436 adjoins Lot 433) portions of the
same. Finally, it would appear from the observation made by the same court that the demolished canal
is part of a system of conduits used to irrigate the lands of the petitioner and the respondents as well
as the surrounding estates belonging to other owners, and that this system of conduits is of a permanent
nature. The trial court's description bears repeating:

At the ocular inspection conducted on September 22, 1953, it was found that the eastern
and northeastern portions of Lot No. 436 are lower than the southern, western and
northwestern portions of the same; that about one-fourth (¼) only of the lot is planted to
palay and this palay is yellowish, scarce and could hardly merit attention to produce any
substantial quantity of palay; that this palay is planted in the eastern portion of the same;
that the palay planted on the land of defendant Gutierrez and on the lot east of the land
of the plaintiff is luxuriant green and had all the earmarks of producing a good harvest;
that the "pinitak" on the northwestern portion of the land of the plaintiff is higher than the
rest of the land; that on this portion is found a canal about one and a half (1-½) meters
deep which canal runs south and parallel to the boundary line of Lot 436 owned by the
plaintiff and Lot No. 435 and is one and a half (1-½) meters from this boundary; that along
the southern boundary of Lot No. 433 that separates it from Lot No. 436 is a "minangon"
or a dike and water flows continuously from one 'pinitak' to another of said Lot No. 433
up to a point between points "15" and "14" of said lot as shown on Exhibit "A" ... that this
water passes from one "pinitak" to another through openings made on the "pilapils" or
small dikes that separate the several "pinitaks" on this Lot No. 433; that the western side
of the canal that was demolished is located on the boundary line of Lots Nos. 433 and
434 and this boundary line is higher and some trees are found therein; that the new canal
... is short and the old canal from point "13" to about point "7" of Lot No. 433 on this exhibit
 is still in use although it is not clean; that Lot No. 434 owned by Antonio Mendoza is
irrigated by two (2) pipes coming from Lot No. 431 and by a canal that comes from Lot
No. 431 and by a canal that comes from the main irrigation canal located on the boundary
line of these two (2) lots 431 and 434; that this main irrigation canal is the canal that goes
through Lot No. 443 ... which canal ends farther east of Lot 448 ...; that this canal begins
from the dam farther west of these Lots Nos. 431, 434, 433 and 436.

xxx xxx xxx

The boundary line of the two (2) lots Nos. 433 and 434 shows that it is a "minangon", a
dike. It is extraordinarily high. From this situation, it can be concluded that the canal along
this boundary line must be big. To irrigate the southern part of Lot No. 433 would not
require a big and permanent canal if the same was used to irrigate the southern part of
Lot No. 433. Canal marked "W" which is a substitute canal is small and shallow. From the
remnants of the old and demolished canal, it is safe to assume that the canal has been
in existence for a long time as shown by some big trees on the high "minangon." If it were
to water only the southern part of the lot as claimed by defendants, it would have been
the same in size as the new canal mark "W" on Exhibit "A." The construction of the new
canal marked 'W' on the exhibit is a feeble attempt to justify the alleged purpose of the
old canal, but this attempt at coverage is laid bare by the existence of the old canal that
crossed Lot No. 433 ... Considering that the southern portion of said lot is lower than the
rest of the same, the Court believes that the openings on the dike of the old canal would
be sufficient to let water flow to the southern portions of this lot. The western portion of
this lot could have been watered from the old canal ("X") or from the existing canal ("Z")
on Exhibit "A". That being so, there is only one explanation why the old canal ("X") is in
existence and that is for the use of Lot No. 436 and other lots farther east of Lot No. 436.

It is a reasonable conclusion from the foregoing that the demolished canal supplying water to Lot 436
of the petitioner was merely extension of the system of conduits established long ago, considering that
in view of the topography of the area and the proximity of the said lot to the main dike in Lot 433 it was
more convenient to make the connection therewith than to draw water directly from Sapang Tuyo.
Article 118 of the Spanish Law of Waters allows the creation of a compulsory easement of aqueduct
for the purpose of establishing or extending an irrigation system, and there is nothing to the contrary in
the Civil Code.

In any case the respondents are hardly in a position to avail of the registration of Lot 433 in 1923 without
the corresponding registration of the easement on the title as an excuse to summarily terminate it thirty
years thereafter. The original registered owner allowed the easement to continue in spite of such non-
registration: the least that can be said is that he either recognized its existence as a compulsory
servitude on his estate or voluntarily agreed to its establishment and continuance. And the respondent
Guillermo Gutierrez, as the successor-in-interest to the, said owner by inheritance, is not an innocent
third person who could plead the absence of annotation on the title. Not only was he aware of the
existence of the easement when he inherited the property in 1927, but he likewise allowed it to continue
for twenty-six years after he acquired title. He is bound both by the act of his predecessor and by his
own.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside, and that of the Court of First Instance
of Bataan affirmed, with costs against the respondents.

Today is Friday, March 02, 2018

Republic of
SUPREME
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999

LEO
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Cou
that:

1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certa
debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward w
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law im
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repe
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his sign

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a cop
No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary an
death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial
did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public res
and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents
where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regu
7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal stan

We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.

First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its j
be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as
of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitle

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to

8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (
Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably
Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is h

Manila, Philippine.

Clerk of Court

By: (SGD) TE

Acting Chief

Judicial Recor

The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin
On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has cau
mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this C
Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized
follows: 2

xxx xxx xxx

the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor th
to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the c
judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after th

In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed o
 This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitu
jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has b
of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that
writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial autho

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of exe
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the da
of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law
reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If
performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if
as to whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed wh

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the
important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where sup
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of cont
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be e
mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It be
alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a l

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no juri
jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court prom
courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process of exe
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to thi
their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this C
to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or su

Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure a
or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the adm

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re Cuna
as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 a
judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar cand
executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear u
law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive c
or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practic

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Cons
by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

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(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, an

Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive p

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary b
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enh

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enfo

rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive proced
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective u

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Co
by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution
power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to con
November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the juris
true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day
relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching t

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5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation h

information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as w
relief.

6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respon

Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative
mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the execution o

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information a

Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a
to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitu

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the

Philippine Constitution which read:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public co

as basis for policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subjec

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the Sta

9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "th

to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental r
for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon
Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limita
of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commissio
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray w
public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisd
15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now estopped

II

Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having be
which is an executive function." 14 Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the

concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.

The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public responden
provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights c
Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from exe
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same — the temporary suspens
The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the im
powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exc
courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arg
accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the thr

III

Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its prope
1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds,viz: (1) that his execution has been set on Janu
that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that c
would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of c

When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only
Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due t
are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should no
in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congres
that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In c
verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, t
15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it s
of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights
legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considera

The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of
that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follo

xxx xxx xxx

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of th
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature a

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House
provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive D
The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session y
by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does
heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as

A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishme
unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably bl
than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord d
the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution —
the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to b
rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and

The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court,
ORDERED.