117 143 169

117

Philippine merchant marine school vs ca

Villar vs tip

Tablarin vs guittierez

Guingona vs carague

Philconsa vs emnriquez

Prc vsde guzman

143 people vs jalosjos

International school alliance of educatiors vs quisumbing

Gsis vs montercarlos

Re request of assistant court admin

Biraogo vs phil truth com

Jesus Garcia vs hon ray drilon

169

People vs peralta

Callanta vs Villanueva

Bagcal vs cillaraza

People vs dural

Cojuangco vs sandiganbayan

Francisco larranaga vs ca

De Garcia vs locsn
International school alliance of educatiors vs quisumbing

Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel
selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being
exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that
have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local
teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a
salary rate 25% more than local-hires.

When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and
the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in
salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires
should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the
parties.

ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached
the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane
conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the
office or the field – but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In
Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State has the
right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely
contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining
agreements included, must yield to the common good.

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3)
prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped
together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the
School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure;
local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same
working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-
hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These
benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former
from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either
group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
Gsis vs montercarlos

FACTS: Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process and equal
protection clause. When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension. GSIS
denied claim, it said surviving spouse has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.

HELD: There is denial of due process when it outrightly denies the claim for survivorship. There is
outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving her an opportunity to be heard.
There is also violation of equal protection. A proviso requiring certain number of years of togetherness
in marriage before the employee’s death is valid to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary
gains. Here, it is 3 years before pensioner qualified for the pension. Under this, even if the dependent
spouse married the pensioner more than 3 years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse
would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within 3 years before the
pensioner qualified for pension. The object of prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose intended.

Biraogo vs phil truth com

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has
no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission”
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD
No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing
is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right”
in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds
reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers
of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in
the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.

Jesus Garcia vs hon ray drilon

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support
and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the
said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO
should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted
the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise
the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to
annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was
not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity
of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process
clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the
family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an
undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial
court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all
that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the
class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause
by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s
defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that
the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a
subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the
power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is
an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

People vs Peralta, et al.

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!

People vs Amadeo Peralta, et al.

G.R. No. L-19069

October 29, 1968

Facts:

On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known warring gangs
inside the New Bilibid Prison as “Sigue-Sigue” and “OXO” were preparing to attend a mass at 7 a.m.
However, a fight between the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the plaza where the prisoners
were currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved where led away to the investigation
while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their respective quarters.

In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, “OXO” members, Amadeo Peralta, Andres
Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two
defendants charged therein with multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons by
virtue of final judgments.

They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident premeditation
and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
killed “Sigue-Sigue” sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined
in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised
weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which
directly caused their deaths.

Issues

(a) Whether of not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple murder?

(b) Whether or not an aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the commission of the
crime?
Held:

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime unless when the law specifically
provides a penalty thereof as in treason, rebellion and sedition. However, when in resolute execution of
a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy
assumes a pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an express
or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent
and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.

The collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action
of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership,
and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable. However, in
order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he
performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual
commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them
to executing the conspiracy.

Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special
instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, do not include robbery.

Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission
of the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court can safely say that
there are several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was planned. First, all
the deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of “Sigue-Sigue” gang (OXO members were
from either Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing has been
planned. Second, the accused were all armed with improvised weapons showing that they really
prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with team work precision going
from one brigade to another and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for
liquidation and lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz.

In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstances of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six
accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison
by virtue of convictions by final judgments that penalty for each offense must be imposed in its
maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the RPC. Hence, severe
penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of the perversity and incorrigibility of the
crime.
Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora,
Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three
separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them
shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of
P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the costs.

CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA [77 SCRA 377; G.R. NOS. 24646 & L-24674; 20 JUN 1977]

Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City Judge of
Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints. Thus, petitioner Callanta
brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner questions the validity of the issuance of
warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should have conducted the preliminary
investigation. According to petitioner’s counsel, there was jurisdictional infirmity. After the issuance of
the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted the bail bond, thus obtaining her
provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree with the judge’s investigation, and agreed
with the complaints filed.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s contentions are to be given merit.

Held: Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, “where the accused has filed bail and
waived the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary
examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest”. In the case at bar, it is futile for
the petitioner to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, because she posted the
bail bond. Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary
investigation. According to the Charter of the City of Dagupan, “the City Court of Dagupan City may also
conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishment, and may
release, or commit and bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before
the proper court”. Petition for certiorari is denied. Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set
aside.
0 comments:

Post a Comment

Google

Custom Search

Blog Advertising - Get Paid to Blog

Enter your email address:

Delivered by FeedBurner

RECENT POSTS

Jun 11 - formula feeding

Jun 08 - lactose intolerance

May 16 - love letter technique

Apr 30 - giving
Apr 29 - passion

Recent Posts Widget by ReviewOfWeb

CATEGORIES

Animal Kingdom (2)

Bar Examination (8)

Body Talk (13)

Career/Workplace/Jobs (17)

Case Digests (459)

Commercial Law (21)

Computer (1)

Criminal Law (30)

Economy (14)

Education (6)

Fashion (2)

Food (16)

Great Place and Destinations (1)

Growth and Development (26)

Health (22)

Home (12)

Household (12)

How to (5)

Internet (4)

Kitchen (13)

Labor Law (86)

Legal Ethics (32)

Legal Matters (1)

Lifestyle (7)

Love/Relationships (26)
Parenting (9)

Pleasing Personality (4)

Political Law (247)

Pregnancy (4)

Science (4)

Taxation (43)

Technology (5)

Tips (59)

Uncategorized (11)

Pinoy Bloggers Society (PBS) PinoyBlogoSphere.com

StatCounter - Free Web Tracker and Counter

View My Stats

Personal - Top Blogs Philippines

BAGCAL v. VILLARAZA J. Abad-Santos (1983)  This case stemmed from a petition for the issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Corpus by herein petitioner Jose BAGCAL in Oct 1982, who alleged that he was illegally
arrested and detained  The Court issued said Writ returnable to the Executive Judge of the CFI Cagayan
de Oro (Judge Rosete) for proper hearing on the petition for release  The FACTS are as follows: BAGCAL
was arrested on Feb 28, 1982, by the Philippine Constabulary. The arrest was without warrant. He has
been detained at Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, since his arrest to the present  On Aug 6, the City
Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro filed an “information” for murder against petitioner Bagcal with the MTC of
Cagayan de Oro presided by herein respondent Judge Rolando VILLARAZA  Said “information” was
accompanied by the several affidavits from different persons. However, said affidavits were not
subscribed before Judge VILLARAZA who did not ask the affiants to ratify their oaths nor did he ask them
searching questions  Also, the “information” submitted before the MTC has no certification by the City
Fiscal that he had conducted a preliminary investigation  Indeed, if preliminary investigation was duly
conducted, the information should have been filed in the CFI (not MTC) which had jurisdiction to try the
case on its merits  From the forgoing, it is quite obvious that the information was filed with Judge
VILLARAZA so that he would conduct the preliminary examination and thereafter issue a warrant of
arrest  Ultimately, Judge VILLARAZA issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioner BAGCAL  As a result
of the issuance of said warrant of arrest, taken together with BAGCAL’s actuations in response thereto,
Executive Judge Rosete (tasked to hear BAGCAL’s petition for release pursuant to the writ of habeas
corpus previously issued) was constrained to rule that BAGCAL should remain in custody pending
hearing and resolution for bail  BAGCAL now questions the legality of such warrant under the attendant
circumstances, raising the same as the sole issue of this petition – WON issuance of warrant of arrest
cured the illegality of his previous warrantless arrest meriting his immediate release from detention
HELD/RATIO: NO! At the outset, it must be stressed that herein respondent Judge VILLARAZA should not
have issued the subject warrant of arrest to begin with. Judge Rosete and BAGCAL are in agreement, and
now, the Court as well, on this point. As provided in the records, it was never refuted that Judge
VILLARAZA did not “personally” examine the witnesses of the prosecution before issuing the questioned
warrant of arrest. This is a glaring mark of the irregularity in Judge VILLARAZA’s actuations. But does this
mean that, under the attendant circumstances, BAGCAL should be released?  NO. The above discussion
notwithstanding, the denial of BAGCAL’s petition for release is hereby UPHELD. As provided in Judge
Rosete’s decision in the petition for release (pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus issued), although the
warrant of arrest was irregularly issued, any infirmity attached to it was cured when petitioner
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by applying for bail, submitting a memorandum in
support thereof, and filing a motion for reconsideration when his application was denied6 DISPOSITIVE:
 Judge Rosete’s decision is affirmed with modification that the hearing for bail be heard by him, the
Executive Judge of CDO RTC and not by Judge VILLARAZA of the CDO MTC. If evidence of guilt is strong,
the petition for bail should be denied, otherwise, the same must be granted.

People vs Dural (direct assault)

RTC ruling: WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused ROLANDO DURAL
otherwise known RONNIE JAVELON and BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR. y BALDERAS beyond reasonable doubt,
this Court finds both accused GUILTY of the crime of DOUBLE MURDER, qualified by treachery with
ASSAULTS UPON AGENTS OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of double RECLUSION PERPETUA

Facts:

At about 12 o'clock in the afternoon of January 31, 1988 both of them (prosecution witnesses Rener
Ramos and Dennis Santos) were at the Macaneneng Street in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City as they were
supposed to go a (sic) "tupadahan" however, they were not able to arrive at the tupadahan because
while on their way or from a distance of twelve (12) arms-length they heard successive gunfires (sic) so
they run (sic) and hid themselves in a concrete fence near a store; from the place they were hiding or
from a distance of ten (10) arms-length they saw three (3) men each of them armed with .45 (sic) pistol,
firing upon at (sic) the two Capcom soldiers on board a Capcom mobile car which was then on a full stop
although its engine was still running; two of the gunmen positioned themselves beside each of the side
of the mobile car while the third gunman whom they identified as accused Rolando Dural otherwise
known as Ronnie Javelon (Dural for brevity) claimed the hood of the mobile car and positioned himself
in front of the car; after the two Capcom soldiers were immobilized, the gunman standing near the
driver's seat opened the left front door of the car and got the .45 (sic) service pistol and armalite of the
Capcom soldiers; thereafter, the three gunmen left; during the shooting incident they also noticed the
presence of two persons, one was inside an owner jeep while the other one whom they identified as
accused Bernardo Itucal, Jr. (Itucal for brevity) was standing near the scene of the incident with one of
his arm (sic) raised while one of his hand (sic) was holding a .45 caliber pistol; immediately after the
three (gunmen) who fired at the Capcom soldiers left; (sic) the man who was riding on the owner jeep
told accused Itucal that he was leaving and instructed Itucal to take care of everything; witness Dennis
Santos even quoted the very word (sic) of the man on board the owner jeep Pare, bahala ka na diyan;
after that, the accused Itucal walked away; two days after the incident or on February 3, 1988
eyewitnesses Ramos and Santos voluntarily went at (sic) the Capcom headquarters at Dagat-Dagatan,
Caloocan City to narrate what they have witnessed, consequently the investigator brought them at (sic)
the Capcom headquarters at Bicutan then at (sic) Camp Panopio Hospital; at the said hospital, they saw
one of the three gunmen (referring to accused Dural) who shot the two Capcom soldiers; then they
went back at (sic) Bicutan headquarters where they gave their respective statements

w/n there was direct assault upon an agent in authority?

Yes

There is no doubt in Our minds that appellant Dural and the two (2) other gunmen knew that the
victims, T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Mangligot, were members of the Philippine Constabulary
detailed with the CAPCOM as they were then in uniform and riding an official CAPCOM car. The victims,
who were agents of persons in authority, were in the performance of official duty as peace officers and
law enforcers. For having assaulted and killed the said victims, in conspiracy with the other two (2)
gunmen, appellant Dural also committed direct assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The
crimes he committed, therefore, are two (2) complex crimes of murder with direct assault upon an
agent of a person in authority. Pursuant then to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum of
the penalty for the more serious crime which is murder, should be imposed. The maximum of the
penalty prescribed for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is death penalty, 34 the
proper imposable penalty would be reclusion perpetua.

The prosecution has failed to successfully discharge that burden in this case, leaving this Court
unconvinced, due to reasonable doubt, of the guilt of Itucal

SC ruling: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1) AFFIRMING, insofar as accused-appellant ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) is
concerned, the Decision of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City in Criminal Case No.
C-30112, subject to the above modification of the death penalty.

(2) ACQUITTING, on the ground of reasonable doubt, accused-appellant BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR.; and

(3) Ordering accused-appellant ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) to pay one-half (1/2)
of the costs.

SO ORDERED.

IMELDA O. COJUANGCO et al. v. SANDIGANBAYAN et al.

586 SCRA 790 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

While the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, one of
which is where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the
decision.

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed before the Sandiganbayan a "Complaint for
Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages," of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses which have been invested in the Philippine Long Distance Telecommunication Corporation
(PLDT). Ramon and Imelda Cojuangco (Spouses Cojuangco) were subsequently impleaded. The
Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint with respect to the recovery of the PLDT shares. The Republic
appealed to the Supreme Court, and the same issued a favorable ruling.

The Republic thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution,
praying for the cancellation of the shares of stock registered in the name of Prime Holdings and the
annotation of the change of ownership on PTIC‘s Stock and Transfer Book. The Republic further prayed
for the issuance of an order for PTIC to account for all cash and stock dividends declared by PLDT in
favor of PTIC from 1986 up to the present including compounded interests. The Sandiganbayan granted
the same, except its prayer for accounting of dividends.

The Republic moved for reconsideration with respect to the denial of accounting of dividends, which the
Sandiganbayan granted. The Cojuangcos protested, alleging that the SC‘s decision did not include in its
dispositive portion the grant of dividends and interests accruing to the shares adjudicated in favor of the
Republic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic is entitled to the dividends and interests accruing to the shares
despite its non-inclusion in the dispositive portion of the decision

HELD: The Cojuangcos insist on a literal reading of the dispositive portion of the SC‘s Decision, excluding
the dividends, interests, and earnings accruing to the shares of stock from being accounted for and
remitted.

The SC, in directing the reconveyance to the Republic of the 111,415 shares of PLDT stock owned by
PTIC in the name of Prime Holdings, declared the Republic as the owner of said shares and, necessarily,
the dividends and interests accruing thereto.

Ownership is a relation in law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is completely
subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another.
Its traditional elements or attributes include jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing that it
produces.
Contrary to the Cojuangcos‘ contention, while the general rule is that the portion of a decision that
becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, viz: (a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the
opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment, because the dispositive part of a
decision must find support from the decision‘s ratio decidendi; and (b) where extensive and explicit
discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision.

In the Decision, although the inclusion of the dividends, interests, and earnings of the 111,415 PTIC
shares as belonging to the Republic was not mentioned in the dispositive portion of the Court‘s Decision,
it is clear from its body that what was being adjudicated in favor of the Republic was the whole block of
shares and the fruits thereof, said shares having been found to be part of the Marcoses‘ illgotten wealth,
and therefore, public money.

346 Phil. 241

PUNO, J.:

On October 1, 1997, petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamuswith writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction seeking to annul the
information for kidnapping and serious illegal detention against her minor son, Francisco Juan
Larranagga alias Paco, filed in the RTC[1] of Cebu City as well as the warrant of arrest issued as a
consequence thereof. Petitioner as an alternative remedy prays for the annulment of the order[2] of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu denying Larranagga's motion for a regular preliminary investigation
and that it be conducted by a panel of prosecutors from the office of the State Prosecutor, Department
of Justice. On October 6, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition praying for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus to relieve her son from his alleged illegal confinement or to grant him bail.

It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to the Center for Culinary Arts
located at 287 Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City to arrest Francisco Juan Larranaga.
Larranaga, thru his lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Armovit remonstrated against the warrantless arrest. The,
police did not carry out the arrest on the assurance that Larranaga would be brought to Cebu City by his
lawyer on September 17, 1997 for perlominary investigation.

On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of
the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that his client be given a regular preliminary
investigation. He also requested for copies of all affidavits and documents in support of the complaint
against his client and that he be granted a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days from their receipt
to file the defense affidavit. The motion was denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that Larranaga
should be treated as a detention prisoner, hence entitled only to an inquest investigation. Atty. Armovit
was ordered to present Larranaga in person. He was warned that his failure would be treated as waiver
of his client's right to a preliminary investigation and he would be proceeded against pursuant to section
7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Armivit's verbal motion for reconsideration was denied by the
city prosecutor.

On September 19, 1997, Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to the Court of Appeals assailing the actuations
of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.[3] However,
Larranaga's effort to stop the filing of a criminal information against him failed. It turned out that on
September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had filed an information with the RTC of Cebu charging
Larranaga with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The prosecutors recommended no bail. On
September 22, 1997, counsel filed a Supplemental Petition with the Court of Appeals impleading the
RTC of Cebu City to prevent petitioner's arrest. The move again proved fruitless as Larranaga was
arrested on the night of September 22, 1997 by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Executive
Judge of the RTC of Cebu City, the Honorable Priscila Agana. A second Supplemental Petition was filed
by Larranaga's counsel in the Court of Appeals bringing to its attention the arrest of Larranaga. On
September 25, 1997 the Court of Appeals' dismissed Larranaga's petitions, hence, the case at bar.

On October 8, 1997, we ordered the Solicitor General to file a consolidated comment on the petition
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days. On October 16, 1997, we temporarily restrained the
presiding judge of Branch 7 of the RTC of Cebu from proceeding with the case to prevent the issues from
becoming moot.

On October 20, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and motion in lieu of
Consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General submitted that "x x x it is within petitioner's constitutional
and legal rights to demand that a regular preliminary investigation rather than a mere inquest be
conducted before resolving the issue of whether or not to file informations against him". He asked that
"x x x the petition be given due course and petitioner be accorded his right to preliminary investigation."
He further recommended that "x x x during the pendency thereof, petitioner be released from
detention."

We agree.

Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular preliminary investigation.
Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioner's inquest investigation. Said section clearly
provides that "when a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court, the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or
fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting officer or person."

The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested". For one, the petitioner was not
arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting officers that he would instead
be presented in the preliminary investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on September 17, 1997. For
another, the arresting officers had no legal authority to make a warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a
crime committed some two (2) months before. So we held in Go vs. Court of Appeals, viz:[4]

"Secondly, we do not belie that the warrantless 'arrest' or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls
within the terms of Section 5 of the Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.

Petitioner's 'arrest' took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The 'arresting' officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the 'arrest effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected 'when (the shooting had) in fact just been committed' within the meaning of Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the 'arresting' officers had any personal knowledge' of facts indicating that petitioner
was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived
from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was the
gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to
be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute 'personal
knowledge.'
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning
of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that section 7 of Rule 112 is not applicable. x x x When the police
filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately
scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguna. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded
under the erroneous supposition that section 7 of the Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner
to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a
preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since
petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released
forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation."

It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular preliminary investigation pursuant to section 3 of
Rule 112 cannot stand any diminution. Petitioner, a minor, is charged with a capital offense kidnapping
and serious illegal detention. Its filing in court means his arrest and incarceration as in all probability he
would not be allowed bail. His conviction will bring him face to face with the death penalty. Thus,
petitioner's counsel was fart from being unreasonable when he demanded from the city prosecutors
that he be furnished copies of the affidavits supporting the complaint and that he be given a non-
extendible period of twenty (20) days to submit defense affidavit. As well pointed of his motion "x x x
prevented petitioner from preparing and submitting the affidavits of some forty (40) classmates,
teachers, proctors and security guards who had previously made known their willingness to testify that:

"- during the whole day of July 16 and again on July 17 petitioner and his classmates were all in their
school at Quezon City; in fact in the afternoon of July 16 and 17, 1997, petitioner and his classmates
took their mid-term exams;

- following their exams on July 16 they had partied together first at petitioner's Quezon City apartment
until about 9 o' clock in the evening, and then repaired to a Quezon City restaurant at Katipunan Avenue
where they stayed on until 3 o'clock in the morning of July 17; they even had pictures taken of their
party;

- indeed petitioner's July 16 examination papers and that of a classmates are ready for submission as
evidence, along with petitioner's grades for the term's end in September 1997;

- two of their teachers, also a proctor, and a security guard actually remember seeing petitioner at their
Quezon City school on July 16 and 17;

- petitioner was duly registered and attended classes starting June 1997 until term's end in September
1997;
- petitioner had also been logged to have been in his Quezon City apartment since June 1997,
particularly including July 16 and 17;

- petitioner only went to Cebu late afternoon of July 17 on board PAL flight No. PR833, as shown by his
plane ticket and boarding pass".

Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a capital offense case should
have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. In Webb vs. de Leon,[5] we emphasized that "attuned
to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary investigation. Instead,
Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is
to be fair and impartial. As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, 'the right to have a
preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense and hence
formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a
substantive right.' A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage."

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves: (1) to set aside the inquest investigation of petitioner and to
order the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a regular preliminary investigation of the
petitioner in accord with section 3, Rule 112; (2) to annul the order for Detention During The Pendency
of the Case issued by Executive Judge Priscilla Agana against the petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303
and 45304; (3) to order the immediate release of petitioner pending his preliminary investigation and (4)
to order the Presiding Judge of Br. VII, RTC of Cebu City to cease and desist from proceeding with the
arraignment and trial of petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304, pending the result of
petitioner's preliminary investigation.

SO ORDERED.

Pasion Vda. De Garcia vs. Locsin

Posted on April 2, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard

65 Phil 68 (1938)

ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses

Facts: Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of
Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of the
petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, for “certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers
relating to her activities as usurer.” The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said
Almeda.

On the same date, the said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine
Constabulary, went to the office of the petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search
warrant to the petitioner’s bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without the presence of the petitioner who
was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof

The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board
and thereafter were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed six separate
criminal cases against the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.

The legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal cases
and the devolution of the documents demanded. The respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion
for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the
petitioner.

HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search
warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination
of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to
be searched and persons or things to be seized.

In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the
applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not
decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even
accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the
receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not
delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law.

Instead, they were turned over to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against
petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued, there was no case pending against the
petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without
basis.