1a Const2 Digests Article IV V Xiii Xiv

1870
Spouses Dacudao v. SOJ

G.R. No. 188056; January
8, 2013
Article III Sec. 22 Expost Facto Law and Bills of Attainder
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his
associates after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture. Thereafter, the DOJ
Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in the country to
forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the
secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate action. However, in a separate order which is
Memorandum dated March 2009, it was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos
Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not be sent
anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of
petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila.
Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
assailing to the respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
department Order and the Memorandum, which according to the violated their right to due
process, right to equal protection of the law and right to speedy disposition of the cases. The
petitioners opined that orders were unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases
already filed and pending at the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They
contended that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles,
Jr., et al, not those already being investigated. They maintained that DO
182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect.
HELD: Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However,
exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The
reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does
not create new rights or take away vested rights but operates only in furtherance of the
remedy or the confirmation already existing rights. The retroactive application is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, no vested right
generally attaches to or arises from procedural law.
Prepared by: Kazel Celeste

1874
Valles vs. COMELEC

Aug. 9, 2000
G.R. No. 137000
Citizenship
FACTS:
Rosalind Lopez was born in Australia on May 16, 1934 to a Filipino father and an Australian
mother. In 1949, when she was fifteen years old, she left Australia and migrated to the
Philippines. Eventually, she married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but also as a candidate. In 1998, she applied for an Alien Certificate
of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an
Australian passport. During the 1998 elections, she ran for governor of Davao Oriental but
Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian
citizen.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
2. Whether she renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an
Australian passport.
HELD:
1. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect
and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic
acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1,
1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also
known as the Jones Law. Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be
Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in
Daet, Camarines Norte. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo
Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws
in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship. So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue
of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus,
the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to
a Filipino father. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of
his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on
the basis of place of birth. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing
her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claimAustralian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
2. Respondent did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation of citizenship must be express.
Applying for ACR, ICR, and Australian passport are not enough to renounce citizenship. They
are merely acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the
same.
Prepared by: Nae Bainto

ONG CHIA V REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 127240
March 27, 2000
Citizenship
FACTS:
Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, when he was nine years
old, he arrived in the Philippines boarded on a vessel named “Angking”. Ever since then, he
stayed in the Philippines where he found employment/business, married a Filipina, & had four
children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be a Filipino citizen
under C.A. No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Law).
On August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed
contending that petitioner: (in violation of the requirements of C.A. No. 473)
1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known
- Petitioner failed to state in this present petition for naturalization his other name,
"LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his previous application under
Letter of Instruction No.270.
2) failed to state all his former places of residence
- Petitioner failed to disclose that he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and
"Alimodian, Iloilo" which appears on his Immigrant Certificate of Residence
3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay
in the Philippines
- Petitioner lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of
wedlock. Petitioner claimed that he had been married twice, once before a judge in
1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without
the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. The 1977
marriage contract and a Joint-Affidavit shows that no marriage license had been
required in accordance with Art.76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona
Villaruel (wife) had been living together as husband and wife since 1953.
4) Petitioner has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have
been insufficient or misdeclared.
- The income tax returns allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 show that his
net income could hardly support himself and his family.
5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court &
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA gravely abused its discretion in ruling that in naturalization cases, the appellate
court can deny an application for Philippine citizenship on the basis of documents not presented
before the trial court and not forming part of the records of the case.
Prepared by: Roxanne Marion Balisnomo 1

HELD:
NO
The Court ruled that the naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. C.A. No. 473 (Revised
Naturalization Law) clearly provides the requirements to be complied with in order for
Naturalization to work. Therefore, it is deemed that petitioner should’ve submitted the following
information which he failed to do so: (1) state all the names by which he is or had been known
(2) state all his former places of residence (3) documents to conduct himself in a pr oper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines (4) documents to establish that he
has known lucrative trade or occupation.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in considering the documents annexed
by the State for not having been presented and formally offered as evidence that under Rule 132
§34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence, which has not been
formally offered. The Court finds this contention to be of no merit since petitioner failed to note
Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, which provides the exception: “These rules shall not apply to
land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.” The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) is
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. A fina l favorable
judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
The rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner’s
argument of “substantial compliance” with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization
Law.

Gatchalian v. Board of Commissioners
G.R. Nos. 95122-23
May 31, 1991
Article IV Section 1. Children of Filipino fathers or mothers
Facts:
Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother,
Marciana Gatchalian. Thereafter on June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old
minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all
surnamed Gatchalian. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of
Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
They had with them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine
Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated
July 6, 1961, admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens. As a
consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the
immigration authorities on August 16, 1961.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the
proceedings had in the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered
the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian.
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent
William Gatchalian.
Petitioners, insists that respondent is an alien. In support of their position,
petitioners point out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as
well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok,
likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other than their own self-serving
testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. It is the postulate
advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it should
have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China, wherein it is said to be
contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot be
considered valid.
Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship of their
mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the
Francisco's marriage not having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the
citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge
dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54214. For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein
will be referred to in the order the petitions were filed.
Issue:
1) Whether William Gatchalian is an alien
Held:
1) No.
In Miciano vs. Brimo it was held that in absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws
on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines . In the case
at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the
presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law. Records show that Santiago was
not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to
marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage
Prepared by: Juan Paolo P. Bañadera

Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was
Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board o f Special
Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian
before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages,
birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence
as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of
pedigree.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment
or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (See also Art. 172 of the Family
Code)
Given that the evidence was rendered valid it should also be noted that the Philippine law,
follows the rule of lex loci celebrationis, wherein a marriage formally valid where it is
celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the
Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed
outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country. "In case of
doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of
law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage.
Thus it could be said that Francisco is a Filipino being the son of Santiago, who (the
latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized
by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960. In turn William is
also a Filipino citizen given that he is a legitimate child of the Francisco.
Furthermore it could be held that William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino
citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1)Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo cited by petitioners cannot be used given that parties therein
testified to have been married in China by a village leader, which undoubtedly is not
among those authorized to solemnize marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code
(now Art. 7, Family Code).

TECSON v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161434
March 3, 2004
Article IV – Citizenship / FPJ Case, Illegitimate Son of a Filipino
FACTS:
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (hereinafter “FPJ”), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be “Fernando, Jr.,” or “Ronald Allan”
Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition before the Commission on
Elections (“COMELEC”) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier,
his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father,
Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,
petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ,the latter being an illegitimate child o f an alien mother. Petitioner
based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions:
1. Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage
to Bessie Kelley and,
2. Even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelley only a
year after the birth ofrespondent.
In the hearing before the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his
claim, presented several documentary exhibits—
1. A copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ,

2. A certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez
attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bes sie Kelley,
3. An English translation of the affidavit aforesaid,
4. A certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe,
5. A certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office,
attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe
or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and
6. A certification from the Officer-in-Charge of the Archives Division cf the National
Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the
National Archives regarding thebirth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more
significant ones being:
1. A certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan
F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan
2. A certification issued by the Officer-inCharge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be found,
3. A certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe,
4. Original Certificate of Title of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in
the name of Lorenzo Pou,
5. Copies of Tax Declaration in the name of Lorenzo Pou,
6. Copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou
7. A copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and
8. A certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating
that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946
were totally destroyed during World War II.
23 January 2004, the COMELEC case for lack of merit. Three days later, Fornier filed his
motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en
banc.
Thus this appeal.
ISSUE:
• As to whether FPJ was a Filipino Citizen
HELD:
• Yes. The court stated that:
Lecture Part:
“Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office. Aristotle saw its significance if only to
determine the constituency of the “State”, which he described as being composed of such
persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.
The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which
qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to
deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the
other. In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit
his private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century,
the concept was limited, by and large, tocivil citizenship, which established the rights necessary
for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. Its meaning
expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to
participate in the exercise of political power. The 20th century saw the next stag e of the
development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic
wellbeing and social security. The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern
welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development,
in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship."
Main Ratio:
"In ascertaining whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not espondent FPJ is a natural-
born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo ould have been born sometime in
the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
“en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respo ndent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children
are legitimate or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on and still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentatio n in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, only be material, but also deliberate and willful."
In short, the citizenship of an illegitmate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother is Filipino,
if paternity is clear, because of Jus Sanguinis, which makes no distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate children.
PETITION DISMISSED.
1879
GONZALES v. RENNISI
G.R. No. 169958
March 5, 2010
Art. IV
FACTS:
Michael Alfio Pennisi (respondent) was born on 13 March 1975 in Queensland, Australia
to Alfio Pennisi, an Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos (Quintos), allegedly a Filipino
citizen. In March 1999, respondent filed a petition for recognition as Filipino citizen before the
Bureau of Immigration (BI). On 17 February 2000, BI Associate Commissioner Alan Roullo
Yap issued an order granting respondent’s petition for recognition as Filipino citizen. In a 2nd
Indorsement dated 28 February 2000, the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
disapproved the order. However, upon respondent’s submission of additional documents, BI
Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez granted the order as per Recognition Order No. 206679 dated
3 March 2000. In a 2nd Indorsement dated 8 March 2000, the DOJ affirmed Recognition Order
No. 206679. Thereafter, respondent was drafted and played for the Red Bull, a professional
basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA). On 7 August 2003, the Senate
Committees on Games, Amusement and Sports and on Constitutional Amendments (Senate
Committees) jointly submitted Committee Report No. 2565 (Committee Report) recommending,
among other things, that (1) the BI conduct summary deportation proceedings against several
Filipino- foreign PBA players, including respondent; and (2) the DOJ Secretary conduct an
immediate review of all orders of recognition. Respondent was included in the list on the basis of
the following findings of the Senate Committees:
“F. Michael Alfio Pennisi was able to present before the BI and the committees, the documents
required in granting recognition of Philippine citizenship, particularly the birth certificat e of his Filipino
mother, Anita Tomeda Quintos; However, a verification on the authenticity of the above documents reveals
highly suspicious circumstances. His alleged mother and other relatives, specifically the parents of the
former, namely: Felipe M. Quintos and Celina G. Tomeda, who were mentioned in his application for
recognition of Philippine citizenship in the BI, are not known and have never existed in Panabingan, San
Antonio, Nueva Ecija. According to the affidavits executed by Barangay Captain Ra mon Soliman and
Barangay Treasurer Condrado P. Peralta of the abovementioned place, there are no Quintoses or Tomedas
that have lived or have resided in the said barangay. Both barangay officials further claimed that even in
their census or master list of voters, the family names of Quintos or Tomedas do not exist. His mother’s
certificate of birth in the civil registrar of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija was issued on the basis of an
application for late registration, which is ten (10) years after the date of bir th.”
In its 30 September 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. The Court
of Appeals noted that respondent’s citizenship was previously recognized by the BI and DOJ and
it was only after four years that the BI and DOJ reversed themselves in view of the finding in the
Committee Report. The Court of Appeals ruled that the “highly suspicious circumstances” stated
in the Committee Report referred to the affidavits of Barangay Captain Ramon Soliman
(Soliman) and Barangay Treasurer Condrado P. Peralta (Peralta) that there were no Quintoses or
Tomedas in the birthplace of respondent’s mother and that no such surnames appeared in the
census or master list of voters. The Court of Appeals ruled that apart from the affidavits, no other
evidence was presented to prove that Quintos was not a Filipino citizen or that her birth
certificate was false or fraudulently obtained. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent’s
documentary evidence before the BI and DOJ have more probative value and must prevail o ver
the allegations of Soliman and Peralta. The CA further noted that among the documents
presented by respondent did the Commonwealth of Australia attesting that Quintos consistently
Prepared by: Betty Belle Irene S. Fabe 1

1879
presented herself to be a Filipino citizen issue authenticated documents . The CA ruled that the
authenticity of the documents issued by the Australian government was never questioned nor put
in issue. The CA further ruled that the fact that the Quintoses and Tomedas were not included in
the census or master list of voters did not automatically render Quintos’ birth certificate invalid.
The CA ruled that unless a public document is declared invalid by competent authority, it should
be presumed valid and binding for all intents and purposes.
ISSUES:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in finding that respondent is a
Filipino citizen.
HELD:
No. In this case, respondent, prior to his deportation, was recognized as a Filipino citizen.
He manifested his intent to return to the country because his Filipino wife and children are
residing in the Philippines. The filing of the petitions before the Court of Appeals and before this
Court showed his intention to prove his Filipino lineage and citizenship, as well as the error
committed by petitioners in causing his deportation from the country. He was precisely
questioning the DOJ’s revocation of his certificate of recognition and his summary deportation
by the BI. DISMMISED.

1881
CO v. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and ONG

G.R. No. 92191-92 (199 SCRA 692)
July 30, 1991
Art. IV, Sec. 1. Citizenship; Paragraph 3; election of citizenship – positive acts
FACTS:
Respondent Ong’s grandfather, Ong Te, moved to the Philippines from China in 1895.
He established his residence in Laoang, Northern Samar. The father of respondent, Jose Ong
Chuan, was born in China but was brought to the Philippines by Ong Te in 1915. Jose Ong
Chuan spent his childhood in Samar and married a natural born Filipina, Agripina Lao, in
1932. The couple bore eight children, one of whom is respondent Ong.
The father of respondent, unsure of his legal status, applied for naturalization in 1954. In
1955, the CFI of Samar declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino and in 1957, allowed him to take
his Oath of Allegiance. At that time, respondent was 9 years old.
Respondent grew up in their house in Laoang, Northern Samar. Their house got burned
down twice and they always rebuilt a new on in its place despite the catastrophes. He went to
Manila to pursue higher education and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
In 1971, respondent’s full brother, Emil Ong, status as a natural born citizen was
challenged in the Constitutional Convention. Emil was declared a natural born Filipino.
In 1984, respondent registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Northern Samar. In 1987,
petitioners Co and Balinquit, together with respondent Ong, all vied for the position of
representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar. Ong was proclaimed the duly
elected representative. Petitioners filed an election protest claiming that Ong was not a natural
born citizen of the Philippines and that he was not a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared that respondent Ong
was a natural born citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The
HRET ruled as follows:
“when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a
naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to
him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had
already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such.” (emphasis supplied)
Petitioners are herein questioning said decision by the HRET.
ISSUE:
Whether the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling in favor of respondent Ong
HELD:
No.
“The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of
Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.”
The Court found that this should be made to apply retroactively and to make the
provision prospective from February 3, 1987 would be a narrow interpretation and would result
in an inequitable situation.
“A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operatio n and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should
Prepared by: Krisppina Krissanta A. Caraan 1

1881
prevail over the letter thereof.”

Also, the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. Ong, as the
Court ruled, did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He clearly established his life
here in the Philippines.
“For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate
choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in
public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public
office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestatio ns of choice
for these persons.” (emphasis supplied)
Other than the positive acts of establishing his life in the country (exercising right to
suffrage, having profession, etc.), the Court also found that respondent traces his natural born
citizenship from his mother.
“The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent
‘chose’ to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother
and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless
he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other
persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he
could possibly have chosen.” (emphasis supplied)
Petitions dismissed. Decision of HRET affirmed.

1882
REPUBLIC v. SAGUN
666 SCRA 321
15 February 2012
Section 1, Par. 3
FACTS
Respondent in this case is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese
national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in
Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty.
Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and registered with the
Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her
application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation
on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she
sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the
Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth
certificate.
In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino, speaks
Ilocano and Tagalog fluently and attended local schools in Baguio City, including Holy
Family Academy and the Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed that despite her
part-Chinese ancestry, she always thought of herself as a Filipino. She is a registered
voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in Baguio City and had voted
in local and national elections as shown in the Voter Certification 5 issued by Atty.
Maribelle Uminga of the Commission on Elections of Baguio City.
She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected
Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to
entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on April
3, 2009 granting the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen. Hence, this
petition by the Solicitor General.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding respondent as having duly
elected Philippine citizenship since her purported election was not in accorda nce with the
procedure prescribed by law and was not made within a “reasonable time.” Petitioner
points out that while respondent executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public,
there was no affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of
allegiance which was not registered with the nearest local civil registry was executed
when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of majority.
Accordingly, it was made beyond the period allowed by law.
ISSUE
Whether respondent failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid
and effective election of Philippine citizenship – YES
HELD

1882
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of
the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973
Constitution when it provided that “those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five” are citizens of the
Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the
1987 Constitution which states that “those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority” are
Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional
provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by
the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the
old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who
is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It
is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father a nd that
illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality. An illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon
him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically
becomes a citizen himself. But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a
Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of
election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the
Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the
nearest civil registry. Records of the case at bar undisputably show that respondent failed
to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had
not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only
documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged
election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of
majority, which was unregistered, which was clearly not within a reasonable time, which
is 3 years from reaching the age of majority.
The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take
the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed
to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when
clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.

1883
So v. Republic
513 SCRA 267
January 29, 2007
Art. IV § 1– paragraph 4
FACTS:
On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a petition for
Naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473 (C.A. No. 473). He stated that he was born on
February 17, 1982, a Chinese citizen; single, and living in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo since
birth. He is able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog and previously studied in a
school recognized by the Government where Philippine history, government and culture are
taught. He has an average annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and
other benefits. He is a person of good moral and character and believes in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution. He mentions that he has all the qualifications provided
under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 4 73.1
After publication in Official Gazette on May 20, 200210 and May 27, 2002,11 and in
Today, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila, on May 25, 2002 and June 1,
2002, there was no one who disagrees with the naturalization of Edison So. A hearing was
conducted where Atty. Adasa, Jr. and Mark Salcedo testified on the qualifications of Edison So.
Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal
consultant and adviser of the So family’s business. He would usually attend parties and other
social functions hosted by petitioner’s family. He knew petitioner to be obedient, hardworking,
and possessed of good moral character, including all the qualifications mandated by C.A 473 and
not disqualified under C.A. No. 473 to become a Filipino citizen. 2
Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten years where they first met at
a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the University of Santo Tomas
who took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and mingled well
with friends. Salcedo further testified that he saw petitioner twice a week, and during fiestas and
special occasions he would be in the petitioner’s house. He also testified/enumerated that Edison
So possess the qualification under Section 2 also without giving detail.
The petitioner submitted further documents proving he can be naturalized under the law. 3
The RTC granted his petition. The OSG, however, appealed to the Court of Appeals stating that
the petitioner is not qualified to be a Filipino Citizen. The OSG states that the witness is not
credible as they only enumerated the qualifications under CA No. 473. They did not give specific
details to such. The OSG also asserts that Edison So does not meet the age requirement as CA
No. 473 requires the age to be 21 (he was yet 21 even to the filing of this case). The petitioner
counters the age requirement by stating that R.A No. 9193 had relaxed most of the qualifications
of C.A. No. 473 (he was at least 18 when he filed for the petition for Naturalization).
ISSUE:
1. Whether R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for naturalization by judicial act .
2. Whether the witnesses presented by petitioner are “credible” in accordance with the
jurisprudence and the definition and guidelines set forth in C.A. No. 473.
1 See Annex A for the list of qualifications and disqualifications. Edison So only enumerated the items under it.
2 See Annex A. The witness just enumerated what is written in the qualification and disqualification.
3 See Annex C for the documents he submitted.
Prepared by: Raymond John Cheng 1

1883
HELD:
1. No.
. First, C.A. No. 473 which is a judicial proceeding covering all aliens regardless of class.
Congress decided to liberalize the naturalization law in which they enacted R.A No. 9139. The
Court stated that the legislature merely prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine
citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. It cannot be inferred that C.A. No.
473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139.
Theoretically, R.A. No. 9139 implies that a native born alien has the choice to apply for
judicial (C.A. No. 473) or administrative (R.A No. 9139) naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications under both laws. In this case, the petitioner applied for
naturalization by judicial act, though at the time of the filing of his petition, even if the
administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available. Consequently, the
Court stated that his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473 because he applied for
naturalization in a judicial proceeding.
Second, if the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable even
to judicial naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply
even to aliens who are not native born. It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to
aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been residing here.
Third, one of the qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born
in the Philippines and should have been residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here
but left the country, though resided for more than ten (10) years from the filing of the appli cation
is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the
two laws, an alien who is not qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.A.
No. 473.
2. No.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own
good moral character but also the good moral character of his or her witnesses, who must be
credible persons.
The Court stated that credibility is not the declaration made but the person making it. It
implies that such person 1) must have a good standing in the community; 2) known to be honest
and upright; 3) reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and 4) his word may be taken on its face
value, as a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness. The Court stated that the records do not
show that the character witnesses of petitioner met the requisites as stated.
Furthermore, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts of the
petitioner. They did not elaborate on his traits. The witnesses’ testimonies consisted mainly of
general statements in answer to the leading questions propounded by his counsel. The Court
finds that the witnesses only conveniently enumerated the qualifications as set forth in the law
without giving specific details. The Court stated that it was not convinced that they personally
know petitioner well and are therefore in a position to vouch for his qualifications.
Based on the statements of Atty. Adasa it can be inferred that he is close with the
petitioner’s family, but not specifically to petitioner. His statements were mere observations of
the family’s practice and not the petitioner in particular. Nothing in his testimony suggests that
he was close to petitioner and knew him well enough to vouch for his qualifications.
Thus, the petitioner cannot be said to have met the qualifications under C.A No. 473.

1883
Annex A – CA 473
Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person having the following
qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the
petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than
ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with th e
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal
Philippine languages; and
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private Education1 of the
Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed
as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen.
Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
a. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
b. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
c. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
d. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
e. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
f. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
g. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at
war, during the period of such war;
h. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States whose laws do not
grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Annex B – R.A No. 9139

Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of the succeeding section, any person
desiring to avail of the benefits of this Act must meet the following qualifications:
(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of filing of his/her
petition;

1883
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying principles of
the Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his/her entire period of residence in the Philippines in his relation with the duly
constituted government as well as with the community in which he/she is living;
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public
school or private educational institution dully recognized by the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as
part of the school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or
nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must have
enrolled them in similar schools;
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation, from
which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she is married and/or has
dependents, also that of his/her family:Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants
who are college degree holders but are unable to practice their profession because they are
disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the
Philippines; and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.
Section 4. Disqualifications, - The following are not qualified to be naturalized as Filipino

citizens under this Act:
(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association of group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially
with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war; and
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to be
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
Annex C.
(1) Certificate of Live Birth; (2) Alien Certificate of Registration; (3) Immigrant Certificate of
Residence; (4) Elementary Pupil’s and High School Student’s Permanent Record issued by
Chang Kai Shek College; (5) Transcript of Record issued by the University of Santo Tomas; (6)
Certification of Part-Time Employment dated November 20, 2002; (7) Income Tax Returns and
Certificate of Withholding Tax for the year 2001; (8) Certification from Metrobank that
petitioner is a depositor; (9) Clearances that he has not been charged or convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude; and (10) Medical Certificates and Psychiatric Evaluation issued.

1884
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago
January 24, 1989
169 Scra 364
FACTS:
The controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court seeking
the release from detention of herein petitioner Yu, which was denied. Subsequently, petitioner
filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order. A temporary restraining order
was issued by the Court, which was opposed by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID), basing it on a summary judgment of deportation against the petitioner.
Acting on the motions filed by the petitioner, the Court gave him 3 days to explain why he
should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a
Portuguese passport. He stated that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid
for 5 years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese
consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen in the year 1978, he was still
issued a Portuguese passport in 1981 by the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. The Portuguese
Embassy certified that his Portuguese passport already expired in the year 1986, but it was also
stated that as a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced upon his naturalization any
allegiance and fidelity, he still declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents
he signed specifically those filed in Hongkong sometime in the year 1980.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner has renounced his Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization.
HELD:
1. Yes.
The Court, considering the facts stated ruled that the acts of the petitioner constitute an
express renunciation of petitioner’s Philippine citizenship through naturalization. Express
renunciation means renunciation made known distinctly and explicitly, and not that which is
implied. After having acquired Philippine citizenship, with full knowledge, petitioner resumed
his prior status as a Portuguese citizen by applying for a renewal of his Portuguese passport, and
representing himself as a Portuguese in official and commercial documents. The Court found that
such acts are grossly inconsistent with the maintenance of petitioner’s Philippine citizenship.
The Court stated that normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his
Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, but
this would now be unnecessary due to the facts stated and which are not even disputed by the
petitioner. A rehearing with the CID would only be superfluous, and the petitioner was already
given the opportunity to show proof of his continued Philippine citizenship but he failed. The
Court emphasized that Philippine citizenship is not a commodity to be displayed when required
and suppressed when convenient.
SEPARATE OPINIONS (GENERAL):

The dissenting opinions emphasized that although Mr. Yu is far from being a desirable
kind of Filipino, due process must still have been observed and the process of denaturalization
must have been done through a full-blown trial. The dissenting justices stated that express
Prepared by: Jo-Anne D. Coloquio

1884
renunciation means renunciation which is distinct and explicit, and not that merely from
interference or implication, and the evidence on record are not sufficient to explicitly and
distinctly prove renunciation. Considering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the
correct procedures must have complied with.

1887
LABO, JR. v. COMELEC

176 SCRA 1
August 1, 1989
Art. IV. Sec 1 – loss of citizenship
FACTS:
Ramon Labo, Jr. was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. There are
two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was
rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be a
citizen of the Philippines. The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the
Philippines.
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with
Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan
concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's
citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." The second decision was unanimously rendered
by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is important to observe that in the proceeding
before the COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had been formally
naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely
inferred from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport,
and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this country in 1980. On the other
hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the Australian
Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was
still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976.
Petitioner does not question the authenticity of the evidence. Neither does he deny that he
obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the Philippines in
1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as
such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. He later asked for the change of his
status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant
Certificate of Residence No. 223809. He also categorically declared that he was a citizen of
Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and even sought to avoid the
jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner.
ISSUE:
Whether Labo is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
No. The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that
did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the members
joined in this finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered
person who was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted
by counsel when he performed these acts.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine
of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of
citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. Moreover, it does not appear that it was
Prepared by: Janine Ysabel A. Guzman 1

1887
properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked
only when the petitioner filed his reply to the private respondent's comment. Besides, one of the
requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did
not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or
finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a
citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process,
simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such
naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear
true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his
duties "as an Australian citizen."
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a
dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument
cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the
petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the
present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest an d shall be
dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that
circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of
Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted
country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine
citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The
possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not
mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not
appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship
by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any
statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has
complied with PD No. 725, providing that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after
which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. (Em phasis
supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for
the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny
his present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.

1888
LABO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 105111
July 3, 1992
Article IV: Citizenship; Modes of Acquiring Citizenship
FACTS:
This is the second time that the Court is called upon to rule on the citizenship of Ramon
Labo, Jr. (Labo) who, believing that he is a Filipino citizen launched his candidacy for mayor of
Baguio City in the last May 11, 1992 elections by filing his certificate of candidacy on March 23,
1992. After Labo filed his certificate of candidacy, his opponent Ortega filed disqualification
proceeding against him before COMELEC seeking to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the
ground that he made a false representation when he stated therein that he is a "natural-born"
citizen of the Philippines.
Labo was proclaimed mayor of Baguio City. His citizenship was in question and the
court found administrative decisions regarding this, which were rendered by COMELEC and the
other by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID). COMELEC held that he is a
citizen of the Philippines while CID unanimously found him to be otherwise. The CID took into
account the official statement of the Australian Government through its consul that the petitioner
was still an Australian citizen by reason of his naturalization in 1976. Thro ugh his marriage to an
Australian citizen, Labo was granted citizenship by Sydney. Because of this he was required to
take an oath of allegiance or an affirmation of allegiance.
Labo does not question the authenticity of the evidence above and neither do es he dent
that he obtained an Australian Passport which he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980.
He was registered as and Alien but later he asked to change his status from immigrant to
returning former Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant certificate. He also declared
himself as an Australian citizen in a number of sworn statements. He alleges that this issue has
already been decided and that it is therefore banned by the doctrine of Res judicata but the court
held that the doctrine of Res judicata do not apply in questions of citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether Labo is an Australian citizen?
HELD: Yes
The following are the modes which Philippine citizenship may be lost:
1. Naturalization in a foreign country
2. Express renunciation of citizenship
3. Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign
country
All of the above applies to petitioner. Although he contends that his marriage to the Australian
citizen was declared void for being bigamous, this did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship.
Prepared by: Katrina S. Diploma 1

1888
Under CA No. 63, as amended by P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
by a direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the
record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of
these methods. The petitioner was therefore not a citizen of the Philippines on the election day
and was therefore not qualified to be elected into office. Ramon Labo, Jr. is disqualified fr om
continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City and is ordered to vacate his office.
Prepared by: Katrina S. Diploma 2

1889
AZNAR v. OSMENA
GR NO 83820
MAY 25, 1990
FACTS:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy
with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988
local elections. On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent
Provincial Chairman filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent
on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a ci tizen of the United States of
America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the
then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private
respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and
Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958,
respectively. (Annex "B-1"). During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained that
he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and
son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine
Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the
Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has
been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification
for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino
citizen. Hence, the petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship?

HELD:
SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELEC’s decision. The petitioner failed to present
direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the mode s provided for
under C.A. No. 63. these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
Philippine citizenship.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken th e oath of allegiance of the
United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously
participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as
a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship
cannot be presumed.
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that
he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of
Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino,
possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of
Prepared by: Liz Angela A. Intia
1889
Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When we
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to
reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either
"'express" or "implied".

MERCADO v. MANZANO
G.R. No. 135083
May 26, 1999
Art. IV
FACTS:
On the May 11, 1998 elections for vice-mayoralty of Makati City, three candidates
competed for the post: Eduardo B. Manzano, Ernesto S. Mercado, and Gabriel V. Daza III.
Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was suspended due to a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril alleging that Manzano was an American
citizen (he was born September 4, 1955 in San Francisco, California, USA to Filipi no parents).
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as “disqualified from running
for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship.” This provision is
incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.
On May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of
candidacy of Manzano on the grounds of his dual-citizenship, which disqualifies him according
to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration.
Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Manzano opposed the motion to
intervene. The motion was unresolved. But on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc (with 1
commissioner abstaining) reversed the Second Division’s ruling on the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy and directing the proclamation of Manzano as winner, saying:
Manzano, being born in the USA, obtained US citizenship by operation of the US
constitution and laws under principle of jus soli (basis is place of birth).Yet, by being born to
Filipino parents, Manzano natural born Filipino citizen, by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution and laws under principle jus sanguinis (the right of blood).
Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and holds
and American passport, he has not lost his Filipino citizenship since he has not renounced it and
has not taken an oath of allegiance to the USA. Manzano, after the age of majority, registered
himself as a voter and voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998 Philippine elections which effectively
renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US
citizenship.Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati City.
ISSUES:
Whether respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if so, whether he is disqualified
from being a candidate for vice-mayor in Makati City.
HELD:
No. The Court said that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of circumstances of birth or marriage, where a
person is recognized to be a national by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a result of a
person’s volition; it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. In Sec.5 Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship, the
concern was not with dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maint ain
allegiance to their countries of origin even after naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual
citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be

understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy, such persons with dual
citizenships have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In
private respondent’s certificate of candidacy, he made these statements under oath on
March 27, 1998: “I am a Filipino citizen…Natural-born”. “I am not a permanent resident of,
or immigrant to , a foreign country.” “I am eligible for the office I seek to be electe d. I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto…” The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual-
citizen. Manzano’s oath of allegiance, together with the fact he has spent his life here,
received his education here, and practiced his profession here, and has taken part in past
Philippine elections, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

1891
TABASA v CA
G.R. No. 12593
August 29, 2006
Art. IV
FACTS:
The records show that petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. In 1968,when petitioner was seven years old,his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became
a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from
that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization), petitioner also
acquired American citizenship.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a
“balikbayan” for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained byagent Wilson
Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay,
Malay, Aklan; subsequently, he was brought to the BIDDetention Center in Manila.
Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and
Investigation Division of the BID on May 28, 1996; and on the same day, Tabasa was accused of
violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge
sheet which alleged: is an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be summarily deported
pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by then Commissioner Miriam
Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation.
The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued on June
10, 1994 in San Francisco, California under the name of Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, born
on February 21, 1959 in the Philippines. Mr. Tabasa’s passport has been revoked because he is
the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest issued on January 25, 1996 by the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, for violation of Section 1073, “Unlawful
Flight to Avoid Prosecution,” of Title 18 of the United States Code. He is charged with one
count of a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of California Penal Code, Section
12021(A)(1), and one count of sexual battery, in violation of California Penal Code, Section
243.4 (D).
The BID ordered petitioner’s deportation to his country of origin, the United States,
on May 29, 1996, in a summary deportation order. By reason thereof, and on the strength of
Mission Order No. LIV-96-72, Intelligence operatives apprehended the respondent in Aklan
on 23 May 1996.
Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order on May 29, 1996, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
40771. Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for
deportation may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is made;
that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is
entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non -quota immigrant because
he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his
derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father,
Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.
Prepared by: Chloe Chrysilla A. Laxa 1

1891
At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old.On May 30, 1996, the
CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner on June 3, 1996 and
show the cause of petitioner’s detention, and restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting
him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA; and on June 6, 1996, the CA
granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their memoranda, after which the case
would be considered submitted for decision.Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Immigration
granted the petitioner’s temporary release on bail on a PhP 20,000.00 cash bond.
However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had
acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA
8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the
respondent Bureau.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171.
HELD:
No.
RA 8171, “An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost
Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos,” was enacted
on October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons,
viz:Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-
born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on
account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through
repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:(1) Person opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing
organized government;(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas;(3) Person convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude; or (4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases.
Petitioner Tabasa does not qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is
available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a
parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later
decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children
according to the law.

1892
MAQUILING v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 195469
April 16, 2013
Article IV: Section 1—Loss of Citizenship
FACTS:
Respondent Rommel Arando is a natural born Filipino citizen but was naturalized as a
citizen of the Unites States. Respondent then applied for repatriation under R.A. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA at July 10, 2008. The same day an
Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition and subsequently renounced
his foreign citizenship. The next year, Respondent filed his certificate of Candidacy for Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Another mayoralty candidate, Linog C. Balua, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado or cancel his CoC. He supports his petition by contending his residency of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by
the Bureau of Immigration—indicating his nationality as “USA-American”. They also presented
a computer generated travel record indicating that he has been using his US Passport. Armando
failed to answer petition but still garnered the highest number of votes and subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor. After his proclamation, Arando filed his answer
presenting numerous pieces of evidence 1 . Comelec first division dismissed Balua’s petition
regarding his residency and citizenship since he did not present any evidence to support his
contention. But the court disagreed with Arnados’ claim that he is a Filipino citizen because of
his continued use of his US passport. Armando filed a motion of reconsideration that was
intervened by petitioner Maquiliing, another mayoralty candidate that garnered the second
highest votes. He argued that while the COMELEC first division correctly disqualified Arnado,
the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this
case. Consequently, he claims that the cancellation of Arnado’s CoC and nullification of
proclamation makes him, Maquiling, the legitimate candidate who obtaine d the highest number
of votes as the winner. The COMELEC en banc granted Arando’s Motion for Reconsideration,
hence, petitioner Maquiling filed this petition to assail this decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC erred in declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office
despite his continued use of the US passport.
11. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009; 2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May
2010 of Engr. Virgil
Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of
Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his familyÊs ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide
resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Kaus wagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado,
Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03
April 2009
Prepared by: FAJARDO, Reniel Kian 1

1892
HELD:
Yes, the court erred in their judgment. It is of no question that Arnado took all the
necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the (1) Oath of allegiance and (2 )
Renounced his foreign citizenship and that by doing these acts respondent performed the
requirement needed for his to become eligible to run under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 of the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; He took the Oath of Allegiance twice
when (1) he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco (2) By taking the Oath to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship.
He became a dual citizen—since he also possesses an American citizenship. After which,
renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation thus making him
eligible to run for public office. His renunciation made him solely a Filipino citizen, regardless
of renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. But it does not end here, the citizen
performs positive acts showing continued possession of a foreign citizenship. Between April 3,
2009 9date of renunciation) and November 3, 2009 (date he filed his CoC), he used his forei gn
passport four times that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. His
using of his foreign passport positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American to the
immigration authorities. The renunciation of citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professes at any time; it requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Even if the use of foreign passport is not the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it nevertheless an act, which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation, required for a former Filipino citizen. When he used his
passport, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation.
The COMELEC en banc is correct in ruling that such act of using a foreign passport does
not divest Arando of his Filipino citizenship but reverted him back to his dual citizenship status.
It took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his passport
and imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. By the time he filed
his certificate of candidacy, Arnado was a dual citizen and was qualified to vote but not qualified
to run under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. The citizenship requirement for
elective public office is a continuing one.
Petition is DENIED

1892
MAQUILING v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 195469
April 16, 2013
Article IV: Section 1—Loss of Citizenship
FACTS:
Respondent Rommel Arando is a natural born Filipino citizen but was naturalized as a
citizen of the Unites States. Respondent then applied for repatriation under R.A. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA at July 10, 2008. The same day an
Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition and subsequently renounced
his foreign citizenship. The next year, Respondent filed his certificate of Candidacy for Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Another mayoralty candidate, Linog C. Balua, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado or cancel his CoC. He supports his petition by contending his residency of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by
the Bureau of Immigration—indicating his nationality as “USA-American”. They also presented
a computer generated travel record indicating that he has been using his US Passport. Armando
failed to answer petition but still garnered the highest number of votes and subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor. After his proclamation, Arando filed his answer
presenting numerous pieces of evidence 1 . Comelec first division dismissed Balua’s petition
regarding his residency and citizenship since he did not present any evidence to support his
contention. But the court disagreed with Arnados’ claim that he is a Filipino citizen because of
his continued use of his US passport. Armando filed a motion of reconsideration that was
intervened by petitioner Maquiliing, another mayoralty candidate that garnered the second
highest votes. He argued that while the COMELEC first division correctly disqualified Arnado,
the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this
case. Consequently, he claims that the cancellation of Arnado’s CoC and nullification of
proclamation makes him, Maquiling, the legitimate candidate who obtaine d the highest number
of votes as the winner. The COMELEC en banc granted Arando’s Motion for Reconsideration,
hence, petitioner Maquiling filed this petition to assail this decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC erred in declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office
despite his continued use of the US passport.
11. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009; 2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May
2010 of Engr. Virgil
Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of
Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his familyÊs ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide
resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Kaus wagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado,
Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03
April 2009

1892
HELD:
Yes, the court erred in their judgment. It is of no question that Arnado took all the
necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the (1) Oath of allegiance and (2 )
Renounced his foreign citizenship and that by doing these acts respondent performed the
requirement needed for his to become eligible to run under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 of the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; He took the Oath of Allegiance twice
when (1) he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco (2) By taking the Oath to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship.
He became a dual citizen—since he also possesses an American citizenship. After which,
renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation thus making him
eligible to run for public office. His renunciation made him solely a Filipino citizen, regardless
of renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. But it does not end here, the citizen
performs positive acts showing continued possession of a foreign citizenship. Between April 3,
2009 9date of renunciation) and November 3, 2009 (date he filed his CoC), he used his forei gn
passport four times that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. His
using of his foreign passport positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American to the
immigration authorities. The renunciation of citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professes at any time; it requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Even if the use of foreign passport is not the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it nevertheless an act, which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation, required for a former Filipino citizen. When he used his
passport, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation.
The COMELEC en banc is correct in ruling that such act of using a foreign passport does
not divest Arando of his Filipino citizenship but reverted him back to his dual citizenship status.
It took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his passport
and imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. By the time he filed
his certificate of candidacy, Arnado was a dual citizen and was qualified to vote but not qualified
to run under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. The citizenship requirement for
elective public office is a continuing one.
Petition is DENIED

1813
VILANDO v. HRET
G. R. No. 192147 & 192149
August 23, 2011
Article 4 Section 1: No Collateral Attack
FACTS:
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Because of this,
her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against
Limkaichong. They alleged that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the P hilippines
because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino
citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father.
During the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC, election day
came and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras.
COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Few days after the counting
of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days
however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued
a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This
is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the
proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without
prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered
the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’
petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which has
the jurisdiction over the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Limkaichong is qualified to hold a position in the government.
HELD:
1. YES. Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To
prove his point, he refers to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalizati on of Limkaichong’s
father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship
of the father. Under Philippine law, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done
through a direct action for its nullity.
Records also disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959.
The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore,
correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and S eptember 21, 1959
Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and
declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent
Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father
acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission
through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with
the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished
voter's affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad,
Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case
Prepared by: Jerrick M. Lim

1813
of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions

indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had informally elected
citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens
of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution.
The present petition filed by Vilando was DISMISSED. The Court affirms the March 24, 2010
Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.

1894
BENGSON v. HRET
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
Art. IV, Section 2
FACTS:
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac,
on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applica ble was the 1935
Constitution. In 1985, he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section
1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, “rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” He was also naturalized as a
U.S. citizen, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, he reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under R.A. 2630.
He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
1998 elections. He won by 26,671 votes over petitioner Bengson, who was then running for
reelection.
Bengson filed a case for quo warranto with the HRET claiming that Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural -born
citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. The HRET dismissed the
petition and declared Cruz the duly elected Representative.
Bengson thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision . He
asserts that Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacq uire the same
by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 expressly states that natural-born citizens
are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect such citizenship.
Cruz on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural -born citizen
when he was repatriated since the phrase “from birth” in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the
innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural -born citizen.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still
be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
HELD:
Yes. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural -born
citizen, and the naturalized citizen. Natural-born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto 1

1894
citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in
Commonwealth Act No. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists
of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said
oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Arme d
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural -born
citizen.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he
had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As to persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it, they would either be natural-born or naturalized
depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-
born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member
of the House of Representatives.
Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto 2

1852
1895 Cordora v. COMELEC

580 SCRA 12
Art. IV Sec. 2
FACTS:
Petitioner Cordora filed a complaint before the COMELEC Law Department against Gustavo
Tambunting, asserting that the latter made false assertions in his certificate of candidacy for
the 2001 and 2004 elections. Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for public
office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.
Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration, which stated that, in two
instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American. According to Cordora, Tambunting
acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on December 2,
2000.
Tambunting maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of
candidacy and asserted that he is a natural-born Filipino. Tambunting presented a copy of his
birth certificate, which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American Father.
The COMELEC EN Banc ruled for the dismissal of Cordora’s complaint for the failure of
substantiating the charges against Tambunting.
ISSUE:
Whether there is probable cause to hold tambunting for the trial for having committed an
Election Offense.
HELD:
No. There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC’s ruling. Probable cause
constitutes those facts and circumstances, which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed. Tambunting does not deny that he is born
of a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting claims that because of his parents’
differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand,
insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.
The court agrees with the COMELEC’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship.
Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to
undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship.
Furthermore, the court stated that dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from
running for any elective local position. dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance,
such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state, which adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship.
Prepared by: Juan Samuel Ismael Loyola 1

1896
REYES v. COMELEC
GR NO. 207264
October 22, 2013
Art. IV, Sec. 4
FACTS:
On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition to
Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, on the
ground that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen. On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC cancelled the
certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013,
COMELEC en banc denied her MR.
However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections.
On June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the
same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon
of June 30, 2013. According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she
was duly proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the
HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications” of the Members of the House of Representatives.
However, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy - that before the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally
disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution
dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any
pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC still has jurisdiction over Reyes’ eligibility
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has
exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives. That
the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional provision. It is, however
unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at present. The COMELEC
never ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such member ship.
Indeed, the action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is
the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in
the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally decided by
the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to
decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's
ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to
petitioner's proclamation. The bar remained when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner
from the Supreme Court within five days from 14 May 2013.
As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship,
the COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:

1896
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office,
the law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is
no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, COMELEC submitted records of the
Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is
that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her
the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she
has reacquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 (Rules Governing
Philippine Citizenship). Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural -born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any
proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner
admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-
American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to
the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012.
Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit "if only to show her desire and zeal to serve
the people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity." We cannot, however, subscribe to
petitioner's explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit "if only to comply with the rules,"
then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her.
Moreover, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, to
this effect: "This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office as
Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of reacquisition of natural -
born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference to the
taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the records and
evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact
that was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC.” This statement raises a lot of
questions - Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino
status? If she did, why did she not present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC?
And is this an admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225,
petitioner contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment
as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a
natural born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. Said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance
with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine
Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules)
and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus,
petitioner's oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of
allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.

1897
AASJS-CALILUNG v. DATUMANONG
GR NO. 160869
MAY 11, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner filed this petition to prevent Justice Secretary Datumanong from implementing R.A. 9225 or
the arguing that R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution which
states that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
ISSUE: (1) Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional (2) Whether the court has jurisdiction to pass upon
the issue of dual allegiance.
HELD:
R.A. 9225 is constitutional and the Court has no jurisdiction yet to pass upon the issue of dual
allegiance. The court held that that the intent of the legislature in drafting Republic Act No. 9225 is to
do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship
from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.
What Republic Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have
lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face,
it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the
burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Republic Act No. 9225.
Moreover, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-
executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the
status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what
really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

MACALINTAL v. COMELEC
GR 157013
July 10, 2002
Art. V. Suffrage (Absentee voting)
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case
in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed
the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number of
citizens. The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever the
petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the
Filipino people.
The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is further buttressed
by the fact that it is now more than fifteen years since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
requiring Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. Thus,
strong reasons of public policy demand that the Court resolves the instant petition and determine
whether Congress has acted within the limits of the Constitution or if it had gravely abused the
discretion entrusted to it.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit
expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
HELD:
No.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article
V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for
at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding an election. Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political
exercise; if that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the
Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or
alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote.He claims that the
right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not
possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
Respondent COMELEC refrained from comment.The Solicitor General filed his comment
for all public respondents. He contraposes that the constitutional challenge to Section 5(d) must
fail because of the absence of clear and unmistakable showing that said provision of law is
repugnant to the Constitution. He stresses: All laws are presumed to be constitutional; by the
doctrine of separation of powers, a department of government owes a becoming respect for the

acts of the other two departments; all laws are presumed to have adhered to constitutional
limitations; the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law.Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution is a verbatim reproduction of those provided for in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions.
Thus, he cites Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives wherein the
Court held that the term “residence” has been understood to be synonymous with “domicile”
under both Constitutions. He further argues that a person can have only one “domicile” but he
can have two residences, one permanent (the domicile) and the other temporary; and that the
definition and meaning given to the term residence likewise applies to absentee voters.
Invoking Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC which reiterates the Court’s ruling in Faypon vs.
Quirino,the Solicitor General maintains that Filipinos who are immigrants or permanent residents
abroad may have in fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile.
He maintains that through the execution of the requisite affidavits, the Congress of the
Philippines with the concurrence of the President of the Republic had in fact given these
immigrants and permanent residents the opportunity, pursuant to Section 2, Article V of the
Constitution, to manifest that they had in fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile; that
indubitably, they would have formally and categorically expressed the requisite intentions, i.e.,
“animus manendi” and “animus revertendi;” that Filipino immigrants and permanent residents
abroad possess the unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage under Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution upon approval of their registration, conformably with R .A. No. 9189.
The seed of the present controversy is the interpretation that is given to the phrase,
“qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad” as it appears in R.A. No. 9189, to wit:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the prime duty of the State to provide a system of honest
and orderly overseas absentee voting that upholds the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot. Towards this end, the State ensures equal opportunity to all qualified citizens of the
Philippines abroad in the exercise of this fundamental right.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act:
a) “Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines
abroad, exercise their right to vote;
f) “Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register
and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of
elections.
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffra ge may be
exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least
eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an
immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country unless he/she
executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration under said Act.
The provisions of Section 2 empowers Congress to provide a system for absentee voting
by qualified Filipinos abroad.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same
time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and the countless
pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his
residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile.

The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.

1899
NICOLAS-LEWIS v. COMELEC
497 SCRA 649
August 4, 2006
Article 5 Section 2: Absentee voters/ Dual Citizens
FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or
dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under
the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9225), be allowed to avail
themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A.
9189 or OAVL) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to
allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225, sought registratio n and
certification as “overseas absentee voters” however they were advised by the Philippine Embassy
in the US that as per a COMELEC letter to DFA dated September 23, 2003, they have no right
yet to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed
by Sec. 1, Art. 5 of the Constitution. When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis clarified on said
requirement, the COMELEC replied its position that the OAVL was not enacted for the
petitioners and that they are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of
residency under the Constitution. COMELEC denied their request on the ground that the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 was not enacted for their benefit and that they are
considered as regular voters, as such required to comply with all the requirements, including
residence.
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections, petitioners filed
on a petition for certiorari and mandamus due to COMELEC's refusal to include them in the
National Registry of Absentee Voters. A little over a week before Election Day, COMELEC
filed a Comment praying for the denial of the petition. Consequently, petitioners were not able to
register let alone vote in said elections. On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a stating that “all
qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage,
may do so,” observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the
petition moot and academic.
ISSUES:
1. Whether dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of 1 -
year residency requirement.
HELD:
1. Yes. As said by the courts, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law (R.A. 9225)
requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first
before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit
acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1)
the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
As stated in the ruling of Macalintal, it cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims to
enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements
exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Congress enacted
RA 9189 pursuant to Art. 5 Sec. 1 and 2 of the Constitution, identifying in its Section 4 of the
said Act who can vote under it, among others, are Filipino immigrants and permanent residents

1899
in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule under the Section
5(d) of the same Act. (Look at notes)
By applying the doctrine of necessary implication, Constitutional Commission provided for
an exception to actual residency requirement of Art. 5 Sec. 1 of the Constitution, with respect to
qualified Filipinos abroad. This can be seen in Art. 5 Sec. 2 of the Constitution. Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents in another country may be allowed to vote even
though they do not fulfill the residency requirement of said Art. 5 Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.
NOTES:
RA 9189: Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
Section 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not
otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of
elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.
Section 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from
voting under this Act:
xxxx
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the
host country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for
the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval
of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she
has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the
cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from
the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification
to vote in absentia.
RA 9225: the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing
laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must
meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as “The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003” and other existing laws;
“Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroa d
exercise their right to vote;
“Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and
vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections;

1901
Romualdez v. RTC
G.R. Nos. 104960
September 14, 1993
Art. V, Suffrage
FACTS:
Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen of the Philippines, the son of the former
Governor of Leyte, Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez, and nephew of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos. Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in consonance with his decision to
establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, caused the construction of his
residential house therein. He soon thereafter also served as a Barangay Captain of the place. In
the 1984 Batasan Election and 1986 “snap” Presidential Election, Romualdez acted as the
Campaign Manager of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) in Leyte where he voted.
When the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th of February, 1986, came or were about
to come to a close, some relatives and associates of the deposed President, fearing for their
personal safety, whether founded or not, “fled” the country. Petitioner Romualdez, for one,
together with his immediate family, left the Philippines and sought “asylum” in the United States
which the United States (U.S.) government granted. While abroad, he took special studies on the
development of Leyte-Samar and international business Finance. In the early part of 1987,
Romualdez attempted to come back to the Philippines to run for a congressional seat in Leyte.
On 23 March 1987, he finally decided to book a flight back to the Philippines but the flight was
somehow aborted.
On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received a letter from Mr. Charles Cobb, District
Director of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, informing him that he should depart
from the U.S. at his expense on or before 23 August 1992. Otherwise, failure to depart may
result in the withdrawal of voluntary departure and action being taken to effect deportation. He is
required to depart from the US on or before August 23, 1992.
When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines, he did not delay his return to his residence at
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. During the registration of voters conducted by the Commission on
Elections on 01 February 1992 for the Synchronized National and Local Election scheduled for
11 May 1992, petitioner registered himself anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte. The Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors, who had known Romualdez to be a
resident of the place and, in fact, an elected Barangay Chairman of Malbog in 1982, allowed him
to be registered.
Private respondent Advincula filed a petition praying that Romualdez be excluded from
the list of voters alleging that Romualdez was a resident of Massachusetts, USA; that his
profession and occupation was in the USA; that he had just recently arrived in the Philippines;
and that he did not have the required one-year residence in the Philippines and the six-month
residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. On
25 February 1992, Romualdez filed an answer, contending that he has been a resident of Tolosa,
Leyte, since the early 1980’s, and that he has not abandoned his said residence by his physical
absence therefrom during the period from 1986 up to the third week of December 1991.
The trial court upheld Romualdez’s residence and qualified him to register as a voter.
Prepared by: Mary Louise M. Ramos 1

1901
ISSUE:
Whether Romualdez’s voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence thereby
not qualified to be a registered voter
RULING:
No.
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus:
“(t)he term “residence” as used in the election law is synonymous with “domicile”, which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.” “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established during the early 1980’s to be
at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting
another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at
the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
The political situation brought about by the “People’s Power Revolution” must have truly
caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and
welfare of the members of their immediate families. Their going into self -exile until conditions
favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden
departure from the country cannot be described as “voluntary”, or as “abandonment of
residence” at least in the context that these terms are used in applying the concept of “d omicile
by choice.”
We have closely examined the records, and we find not that much to convince us that the
petitioner had, in fact, abandoned his residence in the Philippines and established his domicile
elsewhere.
It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a
bounden duty of every citizen, enabling and requiring him to participate in the process of
government so as to ensure that the government can truly be said to derive its power solely from
the consent of the governed. We, therefore, must commend respondent Advincula for spending
time and effort even all the way up to this Court, for as the right of suffrage is not to be abridged,
so also must we safeguard and preserve it but only on behalf of those entitled and bound to
exercise it.

1902
AKBAYAN v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066
March 26, 2001
Art. V Sec. 2
FACTS:
Petitioners in this case represent the youth sector and they seek to seek to direct COMELEC to
conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18
to 21. According to them, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December
27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC. However, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 3584 disapproving the request for additional registration o f voters on the ground
that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty days before a regular election and that the Commission has
no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed before the SC the instant which seeks to set aside and
nullify respondent COMELEC’s Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189
unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners
and others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for
registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the
May 14, 2001 General Elections.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the SC can compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new
voters during the period between the COMELEC’s imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the
May 14, 2001 general elections.
HELD:
1. No.
We rule that the COMELEC, in denying the request of petitioners to hold a special registration,
acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter --Section 8 of RA 8189.
In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional
task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, inter
alia, questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely
exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls within the proper
sphere of its constitutionally-mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the
exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters’ registration,
pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the absence of clear
showing of grave abuse of power of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC, this Court
may not validly conduct an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of
respondent COMELEC– a body accorded by no less than the fundamental law with
independence.
Prepared by: Rafayelle A. Regis 1

1902
As to petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, we hold that this Court
cannot, in view of the very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the same without
transgressing the time-honored principles in this jurisdiction.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of
discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment
in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be
exercised and not that of the court.
Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the
present case, we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this
Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel
respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters. For the determination of
whether or not the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible, possible or practical
within the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves the exercise of discretion
and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.

1903
International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisimbing

GR 128845
Art. XIII – Social Justice and Human Rights
Policy to Remove Inequities; Salary Difference between Foreign and Local Hires
FACTS:
The case at bar involves the petition of the local hires of International School Alliance of
Educators (ISAE) saying their salaries are less than their counterparts hired abroad.
ISAE, pursuant to P.D. 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the
School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of
instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching
and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other
nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations
attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of
employees. Aforementioned, the school employs both foreign and local hires as members of its
faculty. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be
classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire, they consider the employees domicile, where one’s
home economy is, to which country he owes economic allegiance, and was the individual hired
abroad to specifically work in the school. Should the answer to any of these queries point to the
Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a
foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires
are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two
"significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation
factor" and (b) limited tenure. The school explains that the compensation scheme is the
school’s measure to remain competitive in the international level in terms of employing
competent professionals.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
(2) Whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.
There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-
hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public
policy. The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of
work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace — the factory, the office or
the field — but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees. The

1903
Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
Likewise, the Labor Code frowns upon discrimination, particularly in terms of wages. The
School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the
distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.
(2) No. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the
Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities."
A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all
of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best
suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law."
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the
employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as
substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions
(Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of
employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or
not it is fundamentally the combination, which will best assure to all employees the exercise of
their collective bargaining rights.
It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with
local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School
also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure;
local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the
same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not
granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes,
and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and
justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit
with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective
bargaining rights.

1904
EAGLE SECURITY AGENCY V. NLRC

GR. No. 81314
May 18, 1989
Art. 8, Sec. 3
FACTS:
Petitioners Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., (PTSI) and Eagle Security Agency, Inc.
(Eagle) entered into a "Contract for Security Services". Eagle agreed to provide security services
in PTSI’s premises, from November 1979 to July 1985. Pursuant to this, private respondents
were assigned by Eagle to PTSI as security guards. In 1985, private respondents filed a case
against PTSI and Eagle for unpaid wage and allowance increases with interest plus damages and
attorney's fees. In 1987, the labor arbiter rendered its decision, holding PTSI and Eagle solidarily
liable in paying respondents their unpaid wages and allowances.
PTSI alleges that payment of the wage and allowance increases under Wage Order Nos.
2, 3, 5 and 6 should be borne exclusively by Eagle, pursuant to the following provision in the
Contract for Security Services: “AGENCY hereby binds itself to pay its employees in
accordance with the provisions of the New Labor Code, as amended, Eight -Hour Labor Law, the
Minimum Wage Law, and other laws, and/or decrees governing security agency. AGENCY
shall be solely responsible for the payment of all indemnities to its employees.”
Opposing this, petitioner EAGLE invokes the following provision common to Wage
Order Nos. 3, 5 and 6 to support its theory that PTSI should be held liable for the increases: “In
case of contracts for construction projects and for security, janitorial and similar services, the
increase in the minimum wage and allowance rates of the workers shall be borne by the principal
or client of the construction/service contractor and the contract shall be deemed amended
accordingly”
ISSUE/S:
Whether PTSI and Eagle are solidarily liable for unpaid wages
HELD:
Yes. NLRC acted correctly in ordering the two petitioners to jointly and severally pay the
wage and allowance increases to the security guards. Petitioners' solidary liability for the
amounts due the security guards is supported by the Labor Code. Article 106 provides that in the
event that the contractor or suncontracator fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance
with the Labor Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or
subcontractor to such employees to the extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by
him. Article 107 provides that the provisions in Art. 106 shall likewise apply to any person,
partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an
independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project. Article 109
provides that every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor
or subcontractor for any violation of the Labor Code. For purposes of determining the extent of
the civil liability, they shall be considered as direct employers.
This solidarity liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated by the Labor Code
to assure compliance of the provisions therein including the statutory minimum wage . The
contractor is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer. The principal, on the other
hand, is made the indirect employer of the contractor's employees for purposes of paying the
Prepared by: Yvette V. Perez

1904
employees their wages should the contractor be unable to pay them. This joint and several
liability facilitates and guarantees payment of the workers' performance of any work, task, job or
project, thus giving the workers ample protection as mandated by the Constitution .
It is undisputed that the security guards are employees of Eagle, that they were assigned
to guard the premises of PTSI, and that neither of these two entities paid their wage and
allowance increases under the subject wage orders. Thus, the Labor Code provisions stated
above are appropriate.
The security guards’ immediate recourse for the payment of the increases is with their
direct employer, Eagle. However, in order for the security agency to comply with the new wage
and allowance rates, the Wage Orders made specific provisions to amend existing contracts for
security services by allowing the adjustment of the consideration paid by the principal to the
security agency concerned. What the Wage Orders require, is the amendment of the contract as
to the consideration to cover the service contractor's payment of the increases mandated. In the
end, therefore, ultimate liability for the payment of the increases rests with the principal.
In light of this, the security guards should claim the amount of the increases from Eagle.
Under the Labor Code, in case the agency fails to pay them the amounts claimed, PTSI should be
held solidarily liable with Eagle. Should Eagle pay, it can claim an adjustment from PTSI for an
increase in consideration to cover the increases payable to the security guards.
PTSI provides another argument. It claims that it is exempt from liability because it is a
public sector employer while the Wage Orders cover only employers and employees in the
private sector. he definition of a public sector employer relied upon by PTSI is relevant only for
purposes of coverage under the Employees' Compensation. Under the Labor Code, the term
"employer" includes "the Government and all its branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities, all
government-owned or controlled corporations and institutions.
Prepared by: Yvette V. Perez

#1905
SSS Employees v. CA
G.R. No. 85279
July 28, 1989
Art. XIII, Sec. 3 – labor
FACTS:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on
June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the
entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and
SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the
strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The
complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the
strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the S SSEA went on strike after
the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions
of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues;
payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of
temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and
permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to
other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after
the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed
acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices
ISSUES:
Whether or not the employees of the SSS have the right to strike.
HELD:
Art. XIII, Sec. 3 of the Constitution provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. By itself, this provision would
seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those in the public sector, to
strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article
on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)].
Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the
Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silen t as to whether
such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Prepared by: Franchesca Marie S. Señeres 1

#1905
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes? The Court is of the
considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec.
.2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as
"government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with
an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.
This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

1906
DE VERA v. NLRC
G.R. No. 93070
August 9, 1991
Art. XIII Sec. 3 Labor
FACTS:
Petitioner Norman de Vera was an Assistant Cashier at the Taft Avenue Branch of the
respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI, for brevity), when he was placed under
preventive suspension then subsequently dismissed. By then, he had served the respondent bank
for a total of twenty five (25) years, more or less. The petitioner's predicament started on May
28, 1987, when the representatives of ASB Realty Corporation (ASB, for brevity) presented to
the BPI Taft Avenue Branch a P10-million RCBC Manager's Check payable to BPI for the time
deposit account of ASB. The branch manager, Rebecca Dizon, asked the petitioner to present the
check to the drawee bank for special clearing which the latter did. RCBC cleared the P10-million
check and a Special Clearing Receipt was subsequently issued to the petitioner, which receipt
was in turn given to Branch Manager Dizon.
On August 3, 1987, the petitioner received a Notice of Termination dated July 10, 1987,
terminating his services on the ground of fraud or willful breach of trust and setting forth therein
the transgressions he had allegedly committed.
Aggrieved, the petitioner, on August 6, 1987, commenced this proceeding by filing a c ase
with the NLRC. On December 7, 1988, Labor Arbiter Evangeline Lubaton rendered a decision
on the sole basis of the pleadings presented and the evidence attached thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a violation petitioner’s rights
HELD:
Employer is mandated to furnish the employee sought to be dismissed two notices, the
written charge, and the notice of dismissal, if, after hearing, dismissal is indeed warranted. No
written charge was ever furnished the petitioner in this case.
"Loss of confidence", as a ground for dismissal, must rest on "some basis". Here, none
has been established, for the plain reason that the petitioner was never investigated or heard in
his defense. It can not be said therefore that he is guilty to justify management's claim of loss of
trust. To that extent, this case must be distinguished from PLDT v. NLRC, 17 where "theft" was
established clearly and convincingly and no question of due process was involved.
Prepared by: Aaron S. Sopungco 1

1907
REPUBLIC v. CA
G.R. No. 87676
December 20, 1989
Art. XIII
FACTS:
National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) was originally created in 1963 under
Executive Order No. 30, as the Executive Committee for the development of the Quezon
Memorial, Luneta and other national parks, and later renamed as the National Parks
Development Committee under Executive Order No. 68, on September 21, 1967, it was
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a nonstock and nonprofit
corporation, known as “The National Parks Development Committee, Inc.” However, in August,
1987, the NPDC was ordered by the SEC to show cause why its Certificate of Registration
should not be suspended for: (a) failure to submit the General Information Sheet from 1981 to
1987; (b) failure to submit its Financial Statements from 1981 to 1986; (c) failure to register its
Corporate Books; and (d) failure to operate for a continuous period of at least five (5) years since
September 27, 1967. On August 18, 1987, the NPDC Chairman, Amado Lansang, Jr., informed
SEC that his Office had no objection to the suspension, cancellation, or revocation of the
Certificate of Registration of NPDC. By virtue of Executive Order No. 120 dated January 30,
1989, the NPDC was attached to the Ministry (later Department) of Tourism and provided with a
separate budget subject to audit by the Commission on Audit. On September 10, 1987, the Civil
Service Commission notified NPDC that pursuant to Executive Order No. 120, all appointments
and other personnel actions shall be submitted through the Commission. Meanwhile, the Rizal
Park Supervisory Employees Association, consisting of employees holding supervisory positions
in the different areas of the parks, was organized and it affiliated with the Trade Union of the
Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) under Certificate No. 1206.
On June 15,1987, two collective bargaining agreements were entered into between NPDC
and NPDCEA (TUPAS local Chapter No. 967) and NPDC and NPDCSA (TUPAS Chapter No.
1206), for a period of two years or until June 30, 1989. On March 20,1988, these unions staged a
strike at the Rizal Park, Fort Santiago, Paco Park, and Pook ni Mariang Makiling at Los Banos,
Laguna, alleging unfair labor practices by NPDC. On March 21, 1988, NPDC filed in the
Regional Trial Court in Manila, Branch LII, a complaint against the union to declare the strike
illegal and to restrain it on the ground that the strikers, being government employees, have no
right to strike although they may form a union.
ISSUE:
1. Whether National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a government agency,
or a private corporation.
2. Whether its employees has a right to strike.
HELD:
1. NPDC is a government agency. Its employees are covered by civil service rules and
regulations (Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). Its employees are civil service
employees (Sec. 14, Executive Order No. 180). The National Parks Development
Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963,
Prepared by: Solomon Michael P. Vardeleon 1

1907
for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks
(Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the National Parks Development
Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9,1966, Mrs.
ImeldaR. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-
Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of
Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter
of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27,
1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated
July 27, 1981). Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as
a regular government agency under the Office of the President and allotments for its
maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPD.
2. While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and
join unions of their choice, there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of
a labor dispute between the employees and the government, Section 15 of Executive
Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987 provides that the Public Sector LaborManagement
Council, not the Department of Labor and Employment, shall hear the dispute.
Clearly, the Court of Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that the labor
dispute between the NPDC and the members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the
Department of Labor and Employment.

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8
MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (MPSTA) vs. LAGUIO

G.R. No. 95445 & 95590
August 6, 1991
Art. XIII, Section 3 (Labor)
FACTS:
Together with other teachers embracing the Teachers and Employees Consultative
Council (TECC) and the Alliance of Concerned Teachers, the petitioners, in accordance with
their Constitution and By-Laws, resolved to engage in mass concerted actions, after peaceful
dialogues with the heads of the Department of the Budget and Management, Senate and House of
Representatives in public hearings as well as after exhausting all administrative remedies, to
press for, among other things, the immediate payment of due chalk, clothing allowances, 13th
month pay for 1989 arising from the implementation of the Salary Standardization Law, the
recall of DECS Order 39 s. 1990 directing the oversizing of classes and overloading of teachers
pursuant to the cost-cutting measures of the government, the hiring of 47,000 new teachers to
ease the overload of existing teachers, the return of the additional 1% real property taxes
collected by local government units to education purposes to be administered by the Local
School Boards, and consequent recall of DBM Circulars Nos. 904 and 9011 and local budget
circular No. 47 consistent with RA 5447 and the new Constitution mandating that education shall
enjoy the highest budgetary priority in the national budget, and other equally important demands;
The dialogues and conferences initiated by the petitioners and other teacher organizations were
as early as March 14, 1989, March 14, 1990, April 23, 1990, May 28, 1990, June 5, 1990,
September 3, 1990 and September 14, 1990 with the Civil Service Commission, the Senate and
House of Representatives, Department of Budget and Management and the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, but all these did not result in the granting of the demands of the
petitioners, leaving them with no other recourse but to take direct mass action such as the one
they engaged in three weeks ago.
On the record, what did happen was that, based on reports submitted by the principals of
the various public schools in Metro Manila, the respondent Secretary of Education had filed
motu proprio administrative complaints against the teachers who had taken part in the mass
actions and defied the return-to-work order on assorted charges like grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law, absence without official leave, etc., and
placed them under 90-day preventive suspension. The respondents were served copies of the
charge sheets and given five (5) days to submit answer or explanation. Later, on October 8, 1990,
the respondent Secretary constituted an investigating committee of four (4) to dete rmine and take
the appropriate course of action on the formal charges and designated the special prosecutors on
detail with the DECS to handle their prosecution during the formal hearings.
On October 11, 1990, the respondent Secretary of Education rendered the first of his now
questioned decisions on the administrative complaints. In Case No. DECS 90 -002, he found
twenty (20) respondent teachers guilty of the charges preferred against them and dismissed them
from office, effective immediately. In the other investigations that followed and as of December
3, 1990, 658 teachers were dismissed, 40 were suspended for one (1) year, 33 for nine (9)
months, and 122 for six (6) months; 398 were exonerated.
The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the petitioners have a right to
strike, which it is clear they do not, however justifiable their reasons, nor whether or not there
Prepared by: Maria Luisa S. Villarin 1

1
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8
was in fact such a strike, it being equally evident from the pleadings that there was, and there
being no dispute about this.
ISSUE:
1. Whether any rights of the petitioners under the due process clause of the Constitution as
it applies to administrative proceedings were violated in the initiation, conduct, or disposition of
the investigations complained of.
HELD:
1. No.
There are insuperable obstacles to the Court's taking up that issue and resolving it in these
cases. Said issue is not ripe for adjudication by this Court in the exercise of its review
jurisdiction; and this, for the obvious reason that it is one of fact. The petiti ons and subsequent
pleadings of the petitioners allege facts and circumstances which, it is claimed, show denial of
due process, citing as supposedly "representative samples."
Petitioners in G.R. No. 95545 and G.R. No. 95590 admit having received the charge
sheets and notices of preventive suspension wherein they were given five days from receipt of
the charges within which to file their answers. The striking teachers were given a period of five
days to file their Answers in line with Sec. 8, Rule III of Rules on Administrative Disciplinary
Cases in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 46, s. 1989. The motion for extension of time to file
Answer was denied by DECS Task Force because it was dilatory the alleged reason being that
Atty. Fabros is handling 2,000 cases of teachers. The DECS was constrained by Sec. 38(d) of
P.D. 807 and Sec. 8 of the Memorandum Circular mentioned which mandate that administrative
cases must be decided within 30 days from the filing of the charges. Another reason was that
many refused to receive the notice of charges. Also, to delay the resolution of the cases was to
their disadvantage.
Moreover, another reason was that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila still had to
act on the petition before it. However, the Motion was filed after the RTC Manila had already
dismissed the Petition. Nevertheless, answers to the administrative complaints started pouring in
at the DECS, as prepared personally by the striking teachers or by their lawyers.
Parties-litigant are duty bound to observe the proper order of recourse through the
judicial hierarchy; they by-pass the rungs of the judicial ladder at the peril of their own causes.
23 This Court is a court of last resort. Its review jurisdiction is limited to resolving questions of
law where there is no dispute of the facts or the facts have already been determined by lower
tribunals, except only in criminal actions where capital penalties have been imposed.
WHEREFORE, both petitioners are DISMISSED, without prejudice to any appeals, if
still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the
matters complained of. The motions to withdraw, supra, are merely NOTED, this disposition
rendering any express ruling thereon unnecessary. No pronouncement as to costs.

1909
UNION V. NESTLE
G.R. Nos. 88710-13
December 19, 1990
Article 13 Section 3
FACTS: On June 22, 1988, the petitioner Union of the Filipro Employees, the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of Nestle Philippines, (private respondent) filed
a Notice of Strike at the DOLE raising the issues of CBA deadlock and unfair labor practice.
Private respondent assailed the legal personality of the proponents of the said notice of strike to
represent the Nestle employees, before the NCMB. This notwithstanding, the NCMB proceeded
to invite the parties to attend the conciliation meetings and to which private respondent failed to
attend contending that it will deal only with a negotiating panel duly constituted and mandated in
accordance with the UFE Constitution and By-laws. Thereafter, Company terminated from
employment all UFE Union officers, and all the members of the negotiating panel for instigating
and knowingly participating in a strike staged at the Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan de
Oro on September 11, 1987 without any notice of strike filed and a strike vote obtained for the
purpose. The union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA upheld the validity of the
dismissal; NLRC en banc affirmed. Subsequently, company concluded separate CBAs with the
general membership of the union at Cebu/Davao and Cagayan de Oro units; Assailing the
validity of these agreements, the union filed a case of ULP against the company with the NLRC-
NCR Arbitration Branch Efforts to resolve the dispute amicably were taken by the NCMB but
yielded negative result. Petitioner filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over the dispute of deadlock in collective bargaining between the parties. On October
28, 1988, Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon “certified” to the NLRC the said dispute between the
UFE and Nestle, Philippines.. which reads as follows: xxx “The NLRC is further directed to call
all the parties immediately and resolve the CBA deadlock within twenty (20) days from
submission of the case for resolution.” Second Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution
granting wage increase and other benefits to Nestle’s employees, ruling on non-economic issues,
as well as absolving the private respondent of the Unfair Labor Practice charge. Petitioner finds
said resolution to be inadequate and accordingly, does not agree therewith. It filed a motion for
reconsideration, denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: NO.
At the outset, UFE questions the power of the Secretary of Labor under Art. 263(g) of the
Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute tainted with national interests, or to
certify the same for compulsory arbitration. UFE contends that Arts. 263 and 264 are based on
the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 9 of Art. II thereof, the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Sec. 9. x x x. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration." (p. 801, Rollo) UFE argues
that since the aforecited provision of Sec. 9 is no longer found in the 1987 Constitution, Arts.
263(g) and 264 of the Labor Code are now "unconstitutional and must be ignored." We are not
persuaded. We agree with the Solicitor General that on the contrary, both provisions are still
applicable. We quote: "Article 7 of the New Civil Code declares that: 'Article 7. Laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. x x x.' "In the case at bar, no law has ever been
Prepared by: Maria Paula S. Villarin

1909
passed by Congress expressly repealing Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code. Neither may the
1987 Constitution be considered to have impliedly repealed the said Articles considering that
there is no showing that said articles are inconsistent with the said Constitution. Moreover, no
court has ever declared that the said articles are inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution. "On the
contrary, the continued validity and operation of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code has
been recognized by no less than the Congress of the Philippines when the latter enacted into law
R.A. 6715, otherwise known as Herrera Law, Section 27 of which amended paragraphs (g) and
(i) of Article 263 of the Labor Code.
UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in Art. 264(g) on the
settlement of labor disputes and this is, that assumption and certification orders are executory in
character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any
petition questioning their validity. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is
aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopa rdizing
national interests. Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the
striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this
authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They
cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the
company, to justify their actions.
A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or
certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second
paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended (Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. v.
NLRC, G.R. 82088, October 13, 1989; 178 SCRA 482). The Union officers and members, as a
result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an
illegal act.

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JACINTO v. COURT OF APPEALS

281 SCRA 657
November 14, 1997
Art XIII, Section 3; Labor
FACTS:
Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila. Between the
period September 17 to 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the
mass actions then staged; and on September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño
immediately issued a return-to-work order.
The directive was ignored by petitioners. Consequently, on separate dates, Secretary Cariño
issued formal charges and preventive suspension orders against them. They were
administratively charged with gross misconduct; gross neglect of duty, etc. for joining
unauthorized mass actions; ignoring report-to-work directives; unjustified abandonment of
teaching posts; non-observance of Civil Service law, rules and regulations; non-compliance with
reasonable office rules and regulations; and incurring unauthorized absences without leave,
etc. An investigation committee was then created by Sec. Cariño to look into the
matter. However, during the investigation, petitioners did not file their answers or controvert the
charges against them. As a consequence, Sec. Cariño, in his decisions found them guilty as
charged and imposed the penalty of dismissal, except with respect to petitioners Merlinda Jacinto
and Adelina Agustin who were meted only six (6) months suspension.
The decisions were appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which dismissed
the appeals for lack of merit and then to the Civil Service Commission which set aside the
Orders of the MSPB in the contested resolutions. The Civil Service Commission, in separate
resolutions, found the petitioners (except Merlinda Jacinto) guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service; imposed upon them the penalty of six (6) months suspension without
pay; and automatically reinstated them to the service without payment of back salaries x x x. In
the case of Petitioner Merlinda Jacinto, the CSC found her guilty of Violation of Reasonable
Office Rules and Regulations; imposed upon her the penalty of reprimand; and automatically
reinstated her in the service without payment of back salaries x x x.
In the case of Merlinda Jacinto, Respondent Court found no error on the part of the CSC in
finding her guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. Neither did it find the
petitioners entitled to backwages for the period of their preventive suspension, as they were “not
exonerated of the charges against them.”
ISSUES:
Whether or not there was an error when the trial court considered the aggravating circumstance
of use of illegal firearms?
HELD:
Petitioners, who are public schoolteachers and thus government employees, do not seek to
establish that they have a right to strike. Rather, they tenaciously insist that their absences during
certain dates in September 1990 were a valid exercise of their constitutional right to engage in
Prepared by: Dominic Loren R. Agatep 1

1910
peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances. They claim that their
gathering was not a strike; therefore, their participation therein did not constitute any
offense. MPSTA vs. Laguio[36] and ACT vs. Cariño,[37] in which this Court declared that “these
‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers’ duty to perform,
undertaken for essentially economic reasons,” should not principally resolve the present case, as
the underlying facts are allegedly not identical.
It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners resulted in the non -
holding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding peri od. Petitioners do not
dispute that the grievances for which they sought redress concerned the alleged failure of public
authorities -- essentially, their “employers” -- to fully and justly implement certain laws and
measures intended to benefit them materially,
Moreover, the petitioners here, except Merlinda Jacinto, were not penalized for the exercise of
their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service for having absented themselves without proper authority, from
their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in the mass protest, their absence
ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of
education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their free time
-- recess, after classes, weekends or holidays -- to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue
with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one -- not the DECS, the CSC or even
this Court -- could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally
guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity
necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition
against strikes by government workers. Their act by its nature was enjoined by the Civil Service
law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made answerable.
Petitioners’ demand for backwages cannot be granted, for they had given cause for their
suspension -- their unjustified abandonment of classes to the prejudice of their
students. Although they were eventually found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and not grave misconduct or other offense warranting their dismissal from
the service, they were not fully innocent of the charges against them.
We find the case of Petitioner Jacinto different, however. The Civil Service Commission found
her culpable only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, for not having asked
permission from school authorities to leave the school premises and seek medical attention and
for not filing an application for sick leave for approval by the school authorities. There was no
proof that she joined the mass actions which caused prejudice to the school system .

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REPUBLIC vs. DESIERTO

G.R. No. 143604
June 20, 2003
Art. XIII, §3: Labor
FACTS:
Petitioners were the complainants in RAB CASES NO. 10030023398, 10030023498, and
10040025498. These were consolidated cases for alleged illegal dismissal with money claims
against sister companies Resin Industrial Chemical Corp., (RICC) and Philippine Iron
Construction and Marine Works, Inc., (PICMW) and their security services provider, Amethyst
Security and General Services, Inc. (formerly Calmar Security Agency). The Labor Arbiter in a
decision dated November 27, 1998 found in favor of complainants (herein petitioners).
Respondents herein filed their appeal with the NLRC. And the NLRC in a resolution dated
March 19, 1999 reversed and set aside the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. Then in a resolution dated
October 29, 1999, the NLRC denied herein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
One of the conditions of the service contracts between Amethyst and RICC/PICMW was
for Amethyst to supply the latter companies with security guards who must be between 25 to 45
years of age. The aforesaid condition was maintained with every renewal of the service
contracts. Per payrolls submitted by Amethyst, the petitioners who signed therein were paid the
minimum wage and benefits provided for by law, to wit: regular wage, nightshift differentials, 5-
day incentive leave pay, cost of living allowance, overtime pay, and holiday pay.
When RICC/PICMW renewed their service contract with Amethyst in January 1998,
respondent Amethyst issued an order directing all security guards to submit copies of their
respective Birth Certificates. Petitioners who were at that time over 45 years of age
received Memorandum/Relief Orders relieving them from their existing postings as
security guards of Amethyst with RICC/PICMW, effective February 1, 1998. Petitioners
were instructed to report to the main office of Amethyst for reassignment. The order further
stated that the failure of petitioners to comply with the directive would be construed as a
manifestation of their lack of interest to continue working as security personnel and Amethyst
would consider them absent without official leave (AWOL).
Then, Amethyst issued a Detail Order informing petitioners to report to one Jose Pitas,
Detachment Head of RICC/PICMW for their new assignment as firewatch guards. Petitioners
were again warned that failure to report to Pitas on May 1, 1998, would mean that they were no
longer interested in working as security guards and would be considered AWOL.
The respondents alleged that the petitioners chose neither option but instead failed to
report for work on February 1, 1998. Thereafter, petitioners filed on March 23, 1998 and April 2,
1998, their separate complaints for illegal dismissal.
On November 27, 1998, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioners had been
constructively dismissed from their employment. He stated that the change of assignments
from security guards to firewatch guards was tantamount to a demotion, as the latter
posting was of a lower category with corresponding diminution in pay. He also opined that
although no employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and respondents
RICC/PICMW, the latter were considered indirect employers of petitioners, and thus, solidarily
liable with respondent security agency pursuant to Article 107 of the Labor Code.
Prepared by: Natassia Marie N. Austria

1912
ISSUE:
1. Whether there is a violation of security of tenure (illegal dismissal)
HELD:
No.
Security of tenure, although provided in the Constitution, does not give an employee
an absolute vested right in a position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to
change their assignment or transfer them where they will be most useful. When a transfer is
not unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to an employee; and it does not involve a
demotion in rank or diminution of his pay, benefits, and other privileges, the employee may not
complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.
Case law recognizes the employer’s right to transfer or assign employees from one area
of operation to another, or one office to another or in pursuit of its legitimate business interest,
provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits and other privileges and
not motivated by discrimination or made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or
demotion without sufficient cause. This matter is a prerogative inherent in the employer’s right
to effectively control and manage the enterprise.
Although technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves, they are necessary, however,
for an effective and expeditious administration of justice. It is settled that a party who seeks to
avail of certiorari must observe the rules thereon and non-observance of said rules may not be
brushed aside as “mere technicality.” While litigation is not a game of technicalities, and that the
rules of procedure should not be enforced strictly at the cost of substantial justice, still it does not
follow that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of th e
orderly presentation, assessment and just resolution of the issues. Procedural rules should not be
belittled or dismissed simply because they may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantial
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for compelling reasons.
Resort to judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC, a quasi-judicial body, under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is confined only to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction and grave
abuse of discretion resulting thereto, on the part of the tribunal rendering them.
Prepared by: Natassia Marie N. Austria

AGABON V NLRC
G.R. No. 158693
November 17, 2004
Labor
FACTS:
Virgilio and Jenny Agabon worked for respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. as
gypsum and cornice installers from January 1992 until February 1999. Their employment was
terminated when they were dismissed for allegedly abandoning their work. Petitioners Agabon
then filed a case of illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the spouses and ordered Riviera Inc. to pay them their
money claims. The NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, finding that the Agabons
were indeed guilty of abandonment. The CA modified the decision by NLRC by ruling that there
was abandonment but ordering Riviera to pay the Agabons’ money claims. The arguments of
both parties are as follows:
The Agabons claim, among others that Riviera Inc. violated the requirements of notice and
hearing when the latter did not send written letters of termination to their addresses. Riviera Inc.
admitted to not sending the Agabons letters of termination to their last known addresses because
the same would be futile, as the Agabons do not reside there anymore. However, it also claims
that the Agabons abandoned their work. More than once, they subcontracted installation
works for other companies. They already were warned of termination if the same act was
repeated; still, they disregarded the warning.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Agabons were illegally dismissed
HELD:
NO
The Court ruled that that petitioners’ dismissal was for a just cause because they had
abandoned their employment and were already working for another employer.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination by the
employer:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or the latter’s representative in connection with the employee’s work;
(b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
his duly authorized representative;
(d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The Court considered abandonment as a form of neglect of duty. Therefore, it is a just
cause for termination of employment by the employer. There are two factors that should be
present for a valid finding of abandonment: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship,
with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it

may be deduced that the employees has no more intention to work.
The Agabons were frequently absent from work for having performed installation work
for another company, despite prior warning given by Riviera Inc. This clearly establishes an
intention to sever the employer-employee relationship between them, and which constitutes
abandonment.
Further, as the law imposes many obligations on the employer, the law also recognizes
the right of the employer to expect from its workers not only good performance, adequate work
and diligence, but also good conduct and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled to
continue to employ such persons whose continuance in the service may be detrimental to the
business.

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The Province of Camarines Norte v. Gonzales

G.R. No. 185740
July 23, 2013
Article 13 Section 3: Labor: Security of Tenure
Facts:
Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines
Norte by then Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr. on April 1, 1991. Her appointment was on a
permanent capacity. On March 8, 1999, Governor Jess B. Pimentel sent Gonzales a
memorandum directing her to explain in writing why no administrative charges should be filed
against her for gross insubordination/gross discourtesy in the course of official duties, and
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; this was later on captioned as
Administrative Case No. 001. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation
Committee found her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to Governor Pimentel
that she be held administratively liable. On September 30, 1999, Governor Pimentel adopted the
Ad Hoc Investigation Committee’s recommendation and dismissed Gonzales
Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentel’s decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The CSC issued Resolution No. 0014186 modifying Governor Pimentel’s decision, finding
Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspending her for six months. Gonzales then filed a
motion for execution and clarification of Resolution No. 001418, in which she claimed that she
had already served her six-month suspension and asked to be reinstated. The CSC issued
Resolution No. 002245, which directed Gonzales’ reinstatement. Governor Pimentel reinstated
Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12, 2000, but terminated her services the next
day for lack of confidence. Gonzales wrote a letter to the CSC regarding her dismissal. The CSC
responded through Resolution No. 030008, which again directed Gonzales’ reinstatement as
provincial administrator.
The CSC based their decision on Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No.
[RA] 7160) which made the provincial administrator position coterminous and highly
confidential in nature. This conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who were already
issued permanent appointments as administrators prior to the new law’s effectivity. The
conversion of the provincial administrator position from a career to a non-career service should
not jeopardize Gonzales’ security of tenure guaranteed to her by the Constitution. CA upheld the
decision of CSC.
Issue:
1) Whether Congress has re-classified the provincial administrator position from a career
service to a primarily confidential, noncareer service position
2) Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of
the Province of Camarines Norte.
Held:
1) Yes
First, prior to RA 7160, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the old Local Government
Code (LGC), did not include a provincial administrator position among the listing of
mandatory provincial officials, but empowered the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to create
such other offices as might then be necessary to carry out the purposes of the provincial
government RA 7160 made the position mandatory for every province. Thus, the creation
of the provincial administrator position under the old LGC used to be a prerogative of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Second, in introducing the mandatory provincial
administrator position, RA 7160 also amended the qualifications for the provincial
administrator position. While Section 48027 of RA 7160 retained the requirement of civil
service eligibility for a provincial administrator, together with the educational
requirements, it shortened the six-year work experience requirement to five years. It also

1915
mandated the additional requirements of residence in the local government concerned,

and imposed a good moral character requirement.
Thus third, RA 7160 made the provincial administrator position coterminous
with its appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-career service position that is
primarily confidential. As the CSC correctly noted in Resolution No. 0001158, the
administrator position demands a close intimate relationship with the office of the
governor (its appointing authority) to effectively develop, implement and administer the
different programs of the province. The administrator’s functions are to recommend to the
Sanggunian and to advise the governor on all matters regarding the management and
administration of the province, thus requiring that its occupant enjoy the governor ’s full
trust and confidence. Thus it is clear the intent of Congress to make the provincial
administrator position primarily confidential under the non-career service category
of the civil service.
2) Yes
The arguments presented by the parties and ruled upon by the CA reflect a
conceptual entanglement between the nature of the position and an employee’s right to
hold a position. These two concepts are different. The nature of a position may change
by law according to the dictates of Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other
hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional and statutory guarantee, but may itself change
according to the nature of the position.
In the current case, Congress, through RA 7160, did not abolish the provincial
administrator position but significantly modified many of its aspects. It is now a primarily
confidential position under the non-career service tranche of the civil service. This
change could not have been aimed at prejudicing Gonzales, as she was not the only
provincial administrator incumbent at the time RA 7160 was enacted. Rather, this change
was part of the reform measures that RA 7160 introduced to further empower local
governments and decentralize the delivery of public service. Thus, Gonzales’ permanent
appointment as provincial administrator prior to the enactment of RA 7160 is immaterial
to her removal as provincial administrator. For purposes of determining whether
Gonzales’ termination violated her right to security of tenure, the nature of the position
she occupied at the time of her removal should be considered, and not merely the nature
of her appointment at the time she entered government service.
Additionally we cannot countenance the rationale of the dissenting opinion which
cites as authority Executive Order No. (EO) 503 which provided certain safeguards
against the termination of government employees affected by the implementation of RA
7160. According to the dissenting opinion, EO 503 is an obvious indication of the
executive department’s intent to protect and uphold both the national government and the
local government employees’ security of tenure. ALTHOUGH the big problem with
EO 503 is that it does not apply to employees of the local government affected by RA
7160’s enactment. A reading of EO 503’s whereas clauses confirms that it applies
only to national government employees whose functions are to be devolved to local
governments.
To be sure, both career and non-career service employees have a right to
security of tenure. All permanent officers and employees in the civil service,
regardless of whether they belong to the career or non-career service category, are
entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except for cause
provided by law and after procedural due process. The concept of security of tenure,
however, labors under a variation for primarily confidential employees due to the
basic concept of a “primarily confidential” position. Serving at the confidence of the
appointing authority, the primarily confidential employee’s term of office expires
when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the
confidential employee is not “removed” or “dismissed” from office; his term merely
“expires” and the loss of trust and confidence is the “just cause” provided by law

1915
that results in the termination of employment. In the present case where the trust
and confidence has been irretrievably eroded, we cannot fault Governor Pimentel’s
exercise of discretion when he decided that he could no longer entrust his confidence
in Gonzales.

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ABBOT LABORATORIES v. ALCARAZ

G.R. No. 192571
July 23, 2013
Article XIII – Social Justice and Human Rights / Section 1 – Labor
FACTS:
On June 27, 2004, petitioner Abbott Laboratories, Philippines (Abbott) caused the
publication in a major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Medical and Regulatory Affairs
Manager (Regulatory Affairs Manager) who would: (a) be responsible for drug safety
surveillance operations, staffing, and budget; (b) lead the development and implementation of
standard operating procedures/policies for drug safety surveillance and vigilance; and (c) act as
the primary interface with internal and external customers regarding safety operations and
queries.
Alcaraz — who was then a Regulatory Affairs and Information Manager at Aventis
Pasteur Philippines, Incorporated (another pharmaceutical company like Abbott) — showed
interest and submitted her application on October 4, 2004.
On December 7, 2004, Abbott formally offered Alcaraz the abovementioned position
which was an item under the company’s Hospira Affiliate Local Surveillance Unit (ALSU)
department.
In Abbott’s offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a probationary
basis. Later that day, she accepted the said offer and received an electronic mail (e-mail) from
Abbott’s Recruitment Officer, petitioner Teresita C. Bernardo (Bernardo), confirming the same.
Attached to Bernardo’s e-mail were Abbott’s organizational chart and a job description of
Alcaraz’s work.
On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract which stated, inter alia,
that she was to be placed on probation for a period of six (6) months beginning February 15,
2005 to August 14, 2005. The said contract was also signed by Abbott’s General Manager,
petitioner Edwin Feist (Feist):
On March 3, 2005, petitioner Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa (Misa), Abbott’s Human
Resources (HR) Director, sent Alcaraz an e-mail which contained an explanation of he procedure
for evaluating the performance of probationary employees and further indicated that Abbott had
only one evaluation system for all of its employees. Alcaraz was also given copies of Abbott’s
Code of Conduct and Probationary Performance Standards and Evaluation PPSE) and
Performance Excellence Orientation Modules Performance Modules) which she had to apply in
line with her task of evaluating the Hospira ALSU staff.
Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates that the job performance of a probationary employee
should be formally reviewed and discussed with the employee at least twice: first on the third
month and second on the fifth month from the date of employment. The necessary Performance
Improvement Plan should also be made during the third-month review in case of a gap between
the employee’s performance and the standards set. These performance standards should be
discussed in detail with the employee within the first two (2) weeks on the job. It was equally
required that a signed copy of the PPSE form must be submitted to Abbott’s Human Resources
Department (HRD) and shall serve as documentation of the employee’s performance during
his/her probationary period.
This shall form the basis for recommending the confirmation or termination of the
probationary employment.
Prepared by: JM Buenagua

1916
During the course of her employment, Alcaraz noticed that some of the staff had
disciplinary problems. Thus, she would reprimand them for their unprofessional behaviour such
as non-observance of the dress code, moonlighting, and disrespect of Abbott officers. However,
Alcaraz’s method of management was considered by Walsh to be “too strict.” Alcaraz
approached Misa to discuss these concerns and was told to “lie low” and let Walsh handle the
matter. Misa even assured her that Abbott’s HRD would support her in all her management
decisions.
On April 12, 2005, Alcaraz received an e-mail from Misa requesting immediate action on
the staff’s performance evaluation as their probationary periods were about to end. This Alcaraz
eventually submitted.
On April 20, 2005, Alcaraz had a meeting with petitioner Cecille Terrible (Terrible),
Abbott’s former HR Director, to discuss certain issues regarding staff performance standards. In
the course thereof, Alcaraz accidentally saw a printed copy of an e-mail sent by Walsh to some
staff members which essentially contained queries regarding the former’s job performance.
Alcaraz asked if Walsh’s action was the normal process of evaluation. Terrible said that it was
not.
On May 16, 2005, Alcaraz was called to a meeting with Walsh and Terrible where she
was informed that she failed to meet the regularization standards for the position of Regulatory
Affairs Manager. Thereafter, Walsh and Terrible requested Alcaraz to tender her resignation,
else they be forced to terminate her services. She was also told that, regardless of her choice, she
should no longer report for work and was asked to surrender her office identification cards. She
requested to be given one week to decide on the same, but to no avail.
Alcaraz felt that she was unjustly terminated from her employment and thus, filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against Abbott and its officers, namely, Misa,
Bernardo, Almazar, Walsh, Terrible, and Feist.
She claimed that she should have already been considered as a regular and not a
probationary employee given Abbott’s failure to
ISSUE:
1. As to whether the security of tenure of the respondent was violated
HELD:
1. No. The court stated that:
“A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases
of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional
ground is provided under Article 295 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may
also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable
standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement. Thus, the
services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any
of the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.

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SME BANK, INC., A. SAMSON, O. SAMSON and VILLAFLOR, JR. v. DE GUZMAN,

AGUSTIN, GASPAR, GASPAR, JR., ROSETE, ESPIRITU, ESPIRITU, JR. and
MANGOBA
G.R. No. 184517 (707 SCRA 35)
October 8, 2013
Art. XIII, Sec. 3. Labor; Security of Tenure
FACTS:
Respondents were employees of Small and Medium Enterprise Bank, Incorporated (SME
Bank / petitioner). To remedy the situation, the bank officials proposed its sale to Abelardo
Samson (Samson). Negotiations ensued until a formal offer was made to Samson.
Agustin and De Guzman accepted the terms and conditions proposed by Samson and
signed the conforme portion of the Letter Agreements. Espiritu, then the general manager of
SME Bank, held a meeting with all the employees of the head office and of the Talavera and
Muñoz branches of SME Bank and persuaded them to tender their resignations, with the promise
that they would be rehired upon reapplication. His directive was allegedly done at the behest of
petitioner Olga Samson. Relying on their representation All of them tendered their resignation,
Eufemia first tendered resignation then after tendered retirement.
As per Letter Agreements, they sold over 86% of the shares of stock of SME Bank to
spouses Samson and they then became principal shareholders of SME Bank. There were
employees who were not rehired as promised. These employees aggrieved, they filed a case with
the NLRC. The ruling was that the buy of the enterprise was not obligated to absorb them on the
premise of a promise of the previous management.
ISSUE:
Whether the employees were illegally dismissed
HELD:
No.
Petitioner argues that not all employees were entitled to return and that such employees
were validly dismissed. In the case at bar, as the Court found, involves that of selling stocks.
More than 86% of the stocks have been transferred and the employees thereof was not part of the
deal.
“The right to security of tenure guarantees the right of employees to continue in their
employment absent a just or authorized cause for termination. This guarantee proscr ibes a
situation in which the corporation procures the severance of the employment of its employees –
who patently still desire to work for the corporation – only because new majority stockholders
and a new management have come into the picture.”
“We therefore see it fit to expressly reverse our ruling in Manlimos insofar as it upheld
that, in a stock sale, the buyer in good faith has no obligation to retain the employees of the
selling corporation; and that the dismissal of the affected employees i s lawful, even absent a just
or authorized cause.”
Petition partially granted.

1918
GMA v. Pabriga
G.R. 176419
November 27, 2013
Article XIII Sec 3. Security of Tenure
FACTS:
Respondents are television technicians assigned to the following tasks: Manning of

Technical Operations Center, transmitter/VTR men, maintenance staff, acting as
cameramen. On July 19, 1999 due to the miserable working conditions private
respondents, television technicians, were forced to file a complaint against GMA before
the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII Cebu City. On August 4, 1999, GMA
received a notice of hearing of the complaint. The following day, petitioner’s Engineering
Manager, Roy Villacastin, confronted the private respondents about said complaint. On
August 9, 1999, private respondents were summoned to the office of GMA’s Area
Manager, Mrs. Susan Alino, and they were made to explain why they filed the complaint.
The next day, private respondents were barred from entering and reporting for work
without any notice stating the reasons therefor.
On August 13, 1999, private respondents, through their counsel, wrote a letter to Alino,
requesting that they be recalled back to work. On August 23, 1999, a reply from Mr.
Bienvenido Bustria, GMA’s head of Personal and Labor Relations Division, admitted the
non-payment of benefits but did not mention the request of private respondents to be
allowed to return to work. On 15 September 1999, private respondents sent another letter
to Mr. Bustria reiterating their request to work but the same was totally ignored. On 8
October 1999, private respondents filed an amended complaint raising the following
additional issues: 1) Unfair Labor Practice; 2) Illegal dismissal; and 3) Damages and
Attorney’s fees. On 23 September 1999, a mandatory conference was set to amicably
settle the dispute between the parties, however, the same proved to be futile. As a result,
both of them were directed to file their respective position papers. On 10 November
1999, private respondents filed their position paper and on 2 March 2000, they received a
copy of petitioner’s position paper. The following day, the Labor Arbiter issued an order
considering the case submitted for decision. LA dismissed the complaint for illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice, but held petitioner liable for 13 th month pay.
Respondents appealed to NLRC. NLRC reversed LA, saying a) All complainants are
regular employees with respect to the particular activity to which they were assigned,
until it ceased to exist. As such, they are entitled to payment of separation pay computed
at one (1) month salary for every year of service; b) They are not entitled to overtime pay
and holiday pay; and c) They are entitled to 13th month pay, night shift differential and
service incentive leave pay. For purposes of accurate computation, the entire records are
REMANDED to the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin which is hereby directed to
require from respondent the production of additional documents where necessary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the requisites of a valid fixed term employment are met.
HELD: Yes.

1918
The decisive determinant in fixed-term employment is not the activity that the employee
is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the
commencement and termination of the employment relationship. Cognizant of the
possibility of abuse in the utilization of fixed-term employment contracts, we emphasized
that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to
preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down as
contrary to public policy or morals. We thus laid down indications or criteria under which
"term employment" cannot be said to be in circumvention of the law on security of
tenure, namely:
o 1) The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances
vitiating his consent; or
o 2) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with
each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised
by the former or the latter
It could not be supposed that private respondents KNOWINGLY and VOLUNTARILY

agreed to the 5-month employment contract. Cannery workers are never on equal terms
with their employers. Almost always, they agree to any terms of an employment contract
just to get employed considering that it is difficult to find work given their ordinary
qualifications. Their freedom to contract is empty and hollow because theirs is the
freedom to starve if they refuse to work as casual or contractual workers. Indeed, to the
unemployed, security of tenure has no value. It could not then be said that petitioner and
private respondents "dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no mora l
dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter.
Similarly, in the case at bar, we find it unjustifiable to allow petitioner to hire and rehire
workers on fixed terms, ad infinitum, depending upon its needs, never attaining regular
employment status. To recall, respondents were repeatedly rehired in several fixed term
contracts from 1996 to 1999. Respondents are regular employees of petitioner. As regular
employees, they are entitled to security of tenure and therefore their services may be
terminated only for just or authorized causes. Since petitioner failed to prove any just or
authorized cause for their termination, we are constrained to affirm the findings of the
NLRC and the Court of Appeals that they were illegally dismissed. Respo ndents entitled
to separation pay, night shift differentials.

1919
Diamond Taxi v. Llamas

G.R No. 190724
March 12, 2014
Art. XII § 3– Labor
FACTS:
Llamas worked as a taxi driver for petitioner Diamond Taxi, owned and operated by
petitioner Bryan Ong. On July 18, 2005, Llamas filed before the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint
for illegal dismissal against the Diamond Taxi. In their position papers, Diamond Taxi claims
that Llamas has been dismissed because of his absence without leave for two weeks, several
traffic violations in the year 2000-2005 and refusal to heed to management instruction. Diamond
Taxi argues that these acts constitute grounds for termination of Llamas employment.
Llamas failed to seasonably file his position paper because his previous counsel, despite
repeated demands, deferred compliance with the LA‘s orders for its submission. Llamas further
claims that Bryan Ong‘s brother and head of operations, Aljuver Ong, refused to give him the car
keys unless he signs a resignation letter.
The LA stated that it is dismissed for lack of merit. The LA declared that Llamas was not
dismissed, legally or illegally, hence, he left his job and had been absent for several days without
leave.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissed the position as due to the
failure of Llamas to attach the required certification for non-forum shopping as required under
Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules. Llamas moved for reconsideration, but this time
attaching the required certification. The NLRC denied it again for mere technicality.
The CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC. CA found equitable grounds to brush aside the
mandatory requirement. It ruled that non-compliance with the requirement of filing a
certification for non-forum shopping, while mandatory, may be excused upon showing of
manifest equitable grounds proving compliance. Additionally, in order to determine if cogent
reasons exist to suspend the rules of procedure, the court must first examine the substantive
aspect of the case.
Diamond Taxi failed to clearly prove that Llamas did intend to abandon his work.
Furthermore, the CA brushed aside the petitioners’ claim that Llamas committed several
infractions that warranted his dismissal. The CA declared that the petitioners should have
charged Llamas for these infractions to give the latter an opportunity to explain his side which is
required to a valid dismissal.
CA awarded Llamas full backwages and other benefits. Separation pay is also awarded
instead of reinstatement because of the strained working relationship between Llamas and Bryan
Ong.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly found that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Llamas‘ appeal on purely technical grounds.
HELD:
Yes.
The Court ruled that a “the dismissal of an employee’s appeal on purely technical ground
is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate on protection to labor.” Under the Constitution

1919
and the Labor Code, the State is bound to protect labor and assure the rights of workers to
security of tenure — tenurial security being a preferred constitutional right that, under these
fundamental guidelines, technical infirmities in labor pleadings cannot defeat.
In this case, Llamas’ action against the petitioners concerned his job, his security of
tenure. This is a property right.
Under Article 221 (now Article 227) of the Labor Code, “the Commission and its
members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in
the interest of due process.” The Court has consistently emphasized that “rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. A strict and rigid application which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice should
not be allowed.
No procedural rule is sacrosanct if such shall result in subverting justice.” Ultimately,
what should guide judicial action is that a party is given the fullest opportunity to e stablish the
merits of his action or defense rather than for him to lose life, honor, or property on mere
technicalities.
Faced with these circumstances, i.e., Llamas‘ subsequent compliance with the
certification-against-forum-shopping requirement; the utter negligence and inattention of
Llamas‘ former counsel to his pleas and cause, and his vigilance in immediately securing the
services of a new counsel; Llamas‘ filing of his position paper before he learned and received a
copy of the LA‘s decision; the absence of a meaningful opportunity for Llamas to present his
case before the LA; and the clear merits of his case, the NLRC should have relaxed the
application of procedural rules in the broader interests of substantial justice.
The decision of CA is AFFIRMED. Court found that Llamas has been constructively
dismissed.

1920
Assn. of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform

G.R. Nos. 78742, 7977, 79310, 79744
July 14, 1989
Art. XIII, § 4 Agrarian Reform
FACTS:
This is a petition with four (4) consolidated cases because they involve common legal
questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of several measures such as R.A.
No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code); P.D. No. 27 promulgated along with martial law, to
provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant -farmers
and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.
First case: G.R. No. 78742 (Assn. of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform)
The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of retention
granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are
cultivating on intend to cultivate the same. Their respected lands do n ot exceed the statutory
limits but are occupied by tenants who re actually cultivating such lands.
Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural land primarily devoted
to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm holding until such time as the
respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the land owners shall have been determined, they
petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the IRR, as
they could not eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention.
Second case: G.R. No. 7977 (Manaay v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform)

Nicolas Manaay and his wife owned a 9-hectare Riceland; while Agustin Hermano Jr.
owned 5. They both have four tenants, each on their respective landholdings, who were declared
full owners of the said land by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The Manaays and
Hermano questioned the constitutionality of PD 27 and EOs 228 and 229.
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and
229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program
and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only
courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under
the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their
land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always
been in the form of money and not in bonds.
Third case: G.R. No. 79310 (Planters’ Committee v. Presidential Agrarian Reform)
Landowners and sugar planters in the Victoria Mills District in Negros as well as
Planters’ Committee, Inc., seek to prohibit the implementation of the PP 131 and EO 229 for
being violative of the Constitutional provisions on just compensati on, due process and equal
protection.
Subsequently, the National Federation of Sugar Planters (NASP), Manuel Barcelona and
Prudencio Serrano filed their own petitions, which also assailed the abovementioned statutes.

1920
Fourth case: G.R. No. 79744 (Pabico v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform)

Inocentes Pabico alleges that then DAR Secretary placed his landholding under the
coverage of OLT, in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation.
Certificates of land transfer were subsequently issued to tenants, who then refused to pay lease
rentals to him. He then protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under OLT and
asked for the recall and cancellation of the said CLT, which was denied without hearing.
Although he filed an MR, EO Nos. 228 and 229 were issued, rendering his MR moot and
academic because the said EOs directly affected the transfer of his land to his farmer -tenants.
ISSUES:
First case:
1. Whether the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.
2. Whether the content and manner of just compensation provided for the CARP is violative
of the Constitution.
3. Whether the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well-accepted principle of eminent domain
by divesting the land owner of his property even before actual payment to him in full of
just compensation
Second case:
1. Whether there was a violation of the equal protection clause
2. Whether there is a violation of due process
3. Whether just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash
Third case:
Whether the CARP fund provision in PP No.131 conforms to the requirements of a valid
appropriation
Fourth case:
1. Whether PP No. 131 and EO No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide
for retention limits.
2. Whether the assailed statutes violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
First case:
1. Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution
itself, which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject. However, objection is raised
to the manner fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is judicia l prerogatives.
However, there is no arbitrariness in the provision as the determination of just compensation
by DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts
will still have the right to review with finality the said determination.
2. No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no
other, what is being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the power and eminent
domain. This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere millions of
pesos. The initially intended amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully
available at the time. The invalidation of the said section resulted in the nullification of the
entire program.
3. No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full
owners of the land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full payment of just

1920
compensation. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on the receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds
with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.
Second case:
1. No. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other
properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be reje cted.
There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible
except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event,
the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is
abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right
in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from
determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by
the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both
parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the
landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely
preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the
final determination.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have
to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient
money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just
compensation.
Third case:
No. PP No.131 is not an appropriation measure even if it provide for the creation of the
said fund, for that is not the principal purpose. Appropriation law is one where the primary and
specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The
creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is
agrarian reform.
Fourth case:
1. No. This argument is no longer tenable because RA 6657 does not provide for such limits
now in Section 6 of the law. As such, landowners who were unable to exercise their rights to
retention under PD 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by RA 6657 under the
condition therein prescribed.
2. No. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to
different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of their

1920
properties must be rejected. There is substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.

1921
Tanaka v. Japan
7 Minshui 1523
1953
FACTS:
A Special law was enforced, creating landed-farmers. In pursuant to this the government
decided to expropriate the farm land of herein plaintiff, Tanaka, at a price listed in a catalog and
notified him of this decision. The plaintiff assailed this decision by suing the state, stating that
the special law failed to consider major changes in the economy in determining the price for the
expropriation of the land. As argued, compensation prices stated in the law wer e unrealistically
low and should instead be based on a landed-farmer’s rents from his tenants, subtracting the
various taxes and charges.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the official prices must be adjusted.
HELD:
1. No.
The Supreme Court held that the compensation set is neither inadequately low nor unjust for
the farm land of the petitioner. Just compensation for land reform in Japan is usually dictated by
law to be less than the market value, for expropriation for land reform is not considered an
exercise of the power of eminent domain but rather an exercise of police power, which
necessarily results to loss on the part of those regulated.

1922
LUZ FARMS v. SEC OF AGRARIAN REFORM

G.R. No. 86889
December 4, 1990
Art. XIII Sec. 4 (agriculture does not include poultry and livestock)
FACTS:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of
R.A. No. 6657.
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and
Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry
business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected
by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32
of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657
promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof
as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining
order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made
to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the inclusion of poultry and livestock in CARL is proper
HELD:
1. Yes.
Luz Farms argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the
Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage. Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the
primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total
investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of
residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial
livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing
corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Lands support the buildings and
other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but
not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry. Including backyard
raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five hectares
or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms.

1922
On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is emb raced in
the term "agriculture". He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954),
defines the following words:
"Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and
harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock,
tillage, husbandry, farming.”
The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in
the adoption of the Constitution.
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of
the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally -
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of
R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds,
fishponds, idle and abandoned land.
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture."
Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of
agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands an d residential properties
because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal,
however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are
limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial,
industrial and residential land.
In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado posed several questions:
I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up

a piggery or a poultry project and for that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these
farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or ultimately or
collectively, the land on which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed.
(Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, p. 618).
x x x
The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then

Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:
x x x

1922
"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan.

Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural
worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang
inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock
workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition
of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are
made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to
include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A.
6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and
implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings)
whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten
percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for
being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process

1923
Natalia Realty, Inc. and Estate Developer and Investors Corp vs DAR
GR No 103302
August 12, 1993
Art XIII Sec 4 Agrarian Reform
FACTS:
Natalia is the owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an area of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205
hectares and 2.7080 hectares or a total of 125.0078 hectares, which are covered by TCT No.
31527. Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land as townsite areas to
absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan
Townsite. The Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation.
Since private landowners were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing
subdivisions with the reservation, petitioner EDIC as developer of Natalia applied for and was
granted preliminary approval and location clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission, which Natalia thereafter became Antipolo Hills Subdivision. On June 15 1988, Ra
6657 went to effect. Respondent issed a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of
Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia and EDIC immediately registered its objection to the notice
of coverage and requested the cancellation of the Notice of Coverage.
Natalia and EDIC both argued that the properties ceased to be agricultural lands when they were
included in the areas reserved by Presidential Proclamation for the townsite reservation. DAR
then contended that the permits granted were not valid and binding since they did not comply
with t he implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of PD 957 (The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), and that there was no valid conversion of the
properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not lands not classified for agricultural use, as approved by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board and its agencies prior to June 15, 1988 covered by RA 6657.
HELD: No, Sec. 4 of RA 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. And agricultural
lands is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forst,
residential, commercial or industrial land. Thus, the underdeveloped portions of the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision cannot be considered as agricultural lands for this land was intended for
residential use. They ceased to be agricultural land by virtue of the Presidential Proclamation No.
1637.
Prepared by Micaela de Guzman

1925
DAEZ v CA
G.R. No. 133507
February 17, 2000
Art. XIII
FACTS:
Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay
Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente,
Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The
said land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 27 as amended by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474. Thus, the then Ministry
of Agrarian Reform acquired the subject land and issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) on
December 9, 1980 to private respondents as beneficiaries. However, respondents signed an
affidavit, allegedly under duress, stating that they are not share tenant s but hired laborers. Armed
with such document, Eudosia Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of
P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private
respondents. Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, declared ownership over 41.8064 hectares of
agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and 14 hectares of riceland, 16 hectares of
forestland, 10 hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential lands in Penaranda, Nueva
Ecija. Included in their 41.8064-hectare landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare
riceland in Meycauayan. DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order denying Eudosia
Daez’s application for exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered unde r LOI No.
474, petitioner being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares.
Eudosia Daez wrote a letter to DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong requesting for reconsideration
of Undersecretary Medina’s order. Secretary Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding
private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the subject land. Secretary Leong disregarded
private respondents’ May 31, 1981 affidavit for having been executed under duress because he
found that Eudosia’s son, Adriano, who was then the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Meycauayan,
pressured private respondents into signing the same. Eudosia Daez brought her case to the CA.
The CA, sustained the order of Secretary Leong in a decision dated April 29, 1992. Eudosia
pursued her petition before this court but we denied it in a minute resolution dated September 18,
1992. We also denied her motion for reconsideration. DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to
private respondents. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the corresponding TCTs.
Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied her,
Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland, this time under R.A.
No. 6657. DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to retain
the subject riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to retain three (3)
hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof as
required by law. Aggrieved, they appealed to the DAR. DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, set
aside the order of Regional Director Bernardo in a Resolution. Eudosia Daez filed a MOR but it
was denied. She appealed Secretary Garilao’s decision to the Office of the President, which
ruled, in her favor. Respondents sought from the CA, a review of the decision of the Office of
the President. On January 28, 1999, the said Decision of the Office of the President was reversed.
ISSUES:
Whether petitioner heirs of Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject riceland

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HELD:
Yes. Petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over the
subject 4.1685 riceland. The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is
subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land
acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementing the
doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A
retained area, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner’s dominion, thus
sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner
afterwards, which would be a pointless process. In the landmark case of Association of Small
Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that landowners who
have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention
rights under R.A. No. 6657. We disregarded the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT. However, if a
landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had previously filed
the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the retention limit
of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No.27. Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five (5) hectares
under R.A. No. 6657. The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or
contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner. Provided, however, That in case the area
selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to
choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural
land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the
retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a
beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another
agricultural land, he loses his right as a lease-holder to the land retained by the landowner.
The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner
manifests his choice of the area for retention. In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or
farmworkers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be respected. Upon the effectivity
of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of possession of private
lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and void;
Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with
the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act.
Thereafter, all Register of Deeds shall inform the DAR within thirty (3) days of any transaction
involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.” defines the nature and incidents of a
landowner’s right of retention. For as long as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous
and it does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner’s choice of the area
to be retained, must prevail. Moreover, Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991, which
supplies the details for the exercise of a landowner’s retention rights, likewise recognizes no
limit to the prerogative of the landowner, although he is persuaded to retain other lands instead to
avoid dislocation of farmers. Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over
tenanted land despite even the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer
beneficiaries. What must be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either
stay on the land chosen to be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another
agricultural land with similar or comparable features. GRANTED.

HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 109992
March 7, 2000
Article 4 – Section 4
FACTS
The subject of the controversy is a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levied
on execution by the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24, 1989. In
accordance with said levy on execution, the subject land was sold at public auction on September
20, 1990 with Herman Rey Santos, now substituted by his heirs represented by his widow
Arsenia Garcia Vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50.
Santos registered the Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on October 15, 1990,
after private respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the
reglementary period. As a result, Ex-Officio Sheriff Carmelita Itapo executed a Final Deed of
Sale dated October 18, 1991 in favor of Santos which was registered with the Registry of Deeds
of Bulacan on November 7, 1991.
On April 1, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an
application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as DARAB Case No. 369-BUL '92, praying that
petitioner be enjoined from preventing private respondent from gathering the mango fruits lest
they "over-mature and become useless."
The Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an order on April 3, 1992,
allowing the gathering of the mango fruits and directing that the proceeds thereof be deposited
with the Adjudication Board.
Subsequently, on April 27, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Consignation before the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt to redeem his land. This petition was
dismissed. Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992 a motion to intervene5
with the DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and interests as the party who tended
and had the mango trees bear fruits this season."
On May 7, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and
Document, Redemption with Damages and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey
Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
Thereafter, on July 1, 1992, the Adjudication Board suspended the hearing on Pantaleon
Antonio's motion for intervention pending the resolution of the ownership issue raised in the
above-mentioned complaint.
On July 8, 1992, intervenor Pantaleon Antonio filed with the DARAB a Motion to Withdraw
Intervenor's deposited share.8 [Annex "L", Records, p. 107.] The motion was granted and
intervenor Pantaleon Antonio was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of P174,600.00 harvest

proceeds in an Order dated November 18, 1992.9 [Annex "P", Records, p. 118.] Corollarily, the
DARAB recognized Pantaleon Antonio as the duly constituted agricultural tenant of the subject
land.
As adverted to above, the Court of Appeals affirmed the April 3, 1992 Order of the DARAB
ordering the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing with the Board the proceeds thereof,
and the November 18, 1992 Order allowing the withdrawal of intervenor's share in the proceeds
and recognizing him as the duly constituted agricultural tenant.
Petitioner alleges that since private respondent's ownership of the subject land is in issue before
the lower court, his right to harvest the mango fruits is still questionable.
ISSUE
1. As to whether the case at hand is in violation of Article 4, Section 4.
HELD
The court stated that:
We find merit in the petition.
"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as:
Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of f arm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for the
ownership of the subject property.
In the case of Morta v. Occidental, et al.,10 [G.R. No. 123417, June 10, 1999.] this Court held:
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the
parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to
establish all its indispensable elements to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is
to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee. In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held

that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a)
adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of
agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the
conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial,
industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.
The issue of who can harvest the mangoes and when they can be harvested is an incident
ancillary to the main petition for injunction. As such, it is dependent on the main case. Inasmuch
as the DARAB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy between the parties,
necessarily, the motion for intervention loses the leg on which it can stand. This issue, after all,
can be resolved by the trial court, which has the jurisdiction to order the gathering of the mango
fruits and depositing the proceeds with it, considering that an action has already been filed before
it on the specific issue of ownership.

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PADUNAN v. DARAB
GR NO. 132163
JANUARY 28, 2003
FACTS:
Angelina R. Rodriguez was the original beneficiary under PD 27 of three parcels of land in Nueva
Ecija. On July 21, 1981, Angelina waived her rights over the said landholdings in favor of Marcos
Rodriguez by virtue of the Sinumpaang Salaysay duly executed and thumbmarked by her. On July 21,
1988, Marcos Rodriguez obtained a loan from Padunan with the subject landholdings as collateral.
On January 10, 1990, Emancipation Patents covering the subject three parcels of land were issued to
Angelina. Thus, on October 9, 1990, Angelina executed, for the second time, a waiver of rights by way
of sale in favor of Padunan. Claiming ownership over the land, Padunan started constructing thereon a
house and a warehouse. Objecting to the construction made by Padunan, Marcos Rodriguez filed a
case for injunction before the PARAD of Nueva Ecija.
The PARAD decided in favor of Marcos Rodriguez, declaring him the lawful tenant-beneficiary of the
subject land, directing the issuance of the corresponding EPs in his name and ordering Padunan to
vacate the premises upon payment of the mortgage debt. Padunan appealed to the DARAB but the
latter affirmed in toto the decision of PARAD. Thus, petitioner Padunan elevated the cas e to the CA
which was dismissed for lack of merit.
Not satisfied with the decision of the CA, Padunan filed the instant Petition for Review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that the conclusion of the CA that the
DARAB possessed jurisdiction to rule on the validity of Emancipation patents is not in accord with the
law and with applicable jurisprudence.
ISSUE: Whether DARAB has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the subject Emancipation Patents.
HELD:
It must be stated at the outset that it is the law that confers jurisdiction and not the rules. Jurisdiction
over a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law and rules of procedure yield to
substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law.
With this well-established principle on jurisdiction, it is therefore incorrect for the private respondent
Marcos Rodriguez to argue that the DARAB derives its jurisdiction from the DARAB Rules of
Procedure. The DARAB derives its jurisdiction from RA 6657 or popularly known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.

#1930
Hacienda Luisita v. PARC

GR 171101
July 5, 2011
Art. 13, Sec. 3 – Agrarian Reform
FACTS:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed
by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan
(SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of t he Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6 -
5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly
ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle,
give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want
to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects,
consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in
secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be,
over their printed names.” The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for rec onsideration of the Court
decision.
ISSUES:
1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares
allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the
4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21,
1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999
(since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and
thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties,
whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
HELD:
The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the
option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI,
which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified
FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land
distribution to the qualified FWBs.
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the
suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to
decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the
nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is
on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the
operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only
were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were
also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

#1930
The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657,
reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the
case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of
acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of t he
Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443
hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.
Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves
4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the
4,915.75 has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the
agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by
Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive –
considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly -
owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per
FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be
awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution
of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws ar e within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is
the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda
Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51 -
hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC
resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500 -hectare
converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.
For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC
approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands
in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock
distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such ap proval is akin to a
notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice
Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is
determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases
cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the
instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and
is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the
RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality
the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on
May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda
Luisita to third parties.
Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the
issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA).
Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10 -year
prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoni ng point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and
not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed
the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian r eform would be rendered
nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled t o land distribution
under CARP.

#1930
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to re main as
stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.
The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the
present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is
[just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders,
which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at
least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the
number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares
divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC
substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.

1931
HEIRS OF SANDUETA v. ROBLES

G.R. No. 203204
November 20, 2004
Art. IV
FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of Romulo and Isabel Sandueta (Sps. Sandueta) who died intestate in
1987 and 1996, respectively, and accordingly inherited several agricultural lands situated in Dipolog
City, Zamboanga del Norte, with a total land area of 18.7433 hectares (has.). One of these parcels of
land is Lot No. 3419, with an area of 13.7554 has. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-5988.The 4.6523-hectare riceland portion (subject portion) of the foregoing lot was tenanted by
Eufrecena Galeza, Teodoro Aban, and Domingo Pableo(tenants) who were instituted as such by the
original owner, Diosdado Jasmin, prior to its sale to Sps. Sandueta.
The subject portion was placed under the government’s Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 and consequently awarded to the above-named
tenants who were issued the corresponding Emancipation Patents (EPs). Petitioners are the heirs of
Romulo and Isabel Sandueta (Sps. Sandueta) who died intestate in 1987 and 1996, respectively, and
accordingly inherited several agricultural lands situated in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte, with a
total land area of 18.7433 hectares (has.). One of these parcels of land is Lot No. 3419, with an area of
13.7554 has. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5988. The 4.6523-hectare riceland
portion (subject portion) of the foregoing lot was tenanted by Eufrecena Galeza, Teodoro Aban, and
Domingo Pableo(tenants) who were instituted as such by the original owner, Diosdado Jasmin, prior to
its sale to Sps. Sandueta.
The subject portion was placed under the government’s Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 and consequently awarded to the above-named
tenants who were issued the corresponding Emancipation Patents (EPs).
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to avail of any retention right under Section 6 of RA
6657.
HELD:
No.
The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the Constitution, balances the effects of
compulsory land acquisition by granting the landowner the right to choose the area to be retained
subject to legislative standards.Necessarily, since the said right is granted to limit the effects of
compulsory land acquisition against the landowner, it is a prerequisite that the land falls under the
coverage of the OLT Program of the government. If the land is beyond the ambit of the OLT Program,
the landowner need not – as he should not – apply for retention since the appropriate remedy would be
for him to apply for exemption. As explained in the case of Daez v. CA(Daez):
Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts.P.D. No. 27, which
implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The
requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice
or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either
requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these requisites is absent, the
land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership
over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.

1931
If the land is covered by the OLT Program which hence, renders the right of retention operable,
PD 27 – issued on October 21, 1972 – confers in favor of covered landowners who cultivate or intend
to cultivate an area of their tenanted rice or corn land the right to retain an area of not more than seven
(7) has. thereof. Subsequently, or on June 10, 1998, Congress passed RA 6657 which modified the
retention limits under PD 27. In particular, Section 6 of RA 6657 states that covered landowners are
allowed to retain a portion of their tenanted agricultural land not, however, to exceed an area of five
(5) has. and, further thereto, provides that an additional three (3) has. may be awarded to each child of
the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age;
and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm
In this case, records reveal that aside from the 4.6523-hectare tenanted riceland covered
by the OLT Program, i.e. the subject portion, petitioners predecessors-in-interest, Sps. Sandueta,
own other agricultural lands with a total area of 14.0910 has. which therefore triggers the
application of the first disqualifying condition under LOI 474 as above-highlighted. As such,
petitioners, being mere successors-in-interest, cannot be said to have acquired any retention
right to the subject portion. Accordingly, the subject portion would fall under the complete
coverage of the OL T Program hence, the 5 and 3-hectare retention limits as well as the
landowner s right to choose the area to be retained under Section 6 of RA 6657 would not apply
altogether.

1933
Reyes v. NHA
GR 147511 January 20, 2003
Urban Land Reform
FACTS:
National Housing Authority (NHA) filed separate complaints for the expropriation of
sugarcane lands, particularly Lot Nos. 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A and 6199 of the cadastral survey
of Dasmarinas, Cavite belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the
expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate the
squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered
judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The
expropriation was affiremed, NHA was ordered to immediately pay the defendants, the
amounts stated in the Writ of Execution as the adjudicated compensation of their expropriated
properties, in the amount of P322,123.05, as sustained by their contract as gleaned from the
records, with no other deduction, paying on its own account, the necessary legal expenses
incident to the registration or issuance of new certificates of title, pursuant to the provisions of
the Property Registration Law (PD 1529).
NHA failed to comply with the above order, petitioners filed on April 28, 1992 a complaint for
forfeiture of rights. They alleged that respondent NHA had not relocated squatters from the
Metropolitan Manila area on the expropriated lands in violation of the stated public purpose
for expropriation and had not paid the just compensation fixed by the court. They prayed that
respondent NHA be enjoined from disposing and alienating the expropriated properties and
that judgment be rendered forfeiting all its rights and interests under the expropriation
judgment. NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial amount to herein petitioners and
that the expropriation judgment could not be executed in view of several issues raised by
respondent NHA before the expropriation court concerning capital gains tax, registration fees
and other expenses. Petitioners contend that respondent NHA violated the stated public
purpose for the expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the
squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the
trial court which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied.
ISSUE:
Whether the expropriation should be withdrawn on the ground that it is not in accord with
justice and equity.
HELD:
No. The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain
over private properties upon payment of just compensation. More specifically, section 9, Article
III states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The
constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.
Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the
Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated
public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to

1933
traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear
cases of "use by the public" has been abandoned. The term "public use" has now been held to be
synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience.
Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in
cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing
which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and
homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. When land has been acquired for
public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned,
or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former owner."

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MACASIANO v. NHA
G.R. No. 107921
July 1, 1993
Art. XIII Sec. 10 Urban land reform and housing
FACTS:
This case is about a petition which seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional
Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992. Macasiano is a consultant of DPWH pursuant to a contract of consultancy
on “Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain”
and is a taxpayer.
He contends that the assailed sections of the said law serve as a drawback to his tasks and
duties regarding demolition of illegal structures. Because of these sections, he was unable to
continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out i n the
past.
He maintains that these sections are unconstitutional because of:
1. Depriving the government and private owners of property without due process and
compensation;
2. Rewarding what the Court has categorically declare as unlawful acts;
3. Taking away one’s property to be given to plain interlopers or intruders
4. Sweeping over police power of the State; and
5. Encroaching upon judicial power
Respondent avers that Section 28 merely provides for the "humanitarian approach"
towards less privileged, citizens and does not in fact prohibit but merely discourages eviction or
demolition, while Section 44 only covers program beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed sections are unconstitutional
HELD:
Constitutional.
Questions on Constitutionality of a law cannot be addressed unless they are properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases. The issue of Constitutionality must be the very lis
mota presented. The essential requisites are:
1. Actual case or controversy involving conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination
2. Locus standi or a proper party
3. Must be raised at the earliest opportunity
4. Resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of the
case
A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury
as a result of the acts or measures complained of.
The first two requisites are absent. There is no actual case or controversy. Even if the
petition in reality is a petition for declaratory relief, it would not prosper because actual case or
controversy is an essential element for declaratory relief.

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The petitioner is not a proper party because as a consultant of DPWH, he is not vested
with any authority to demolish obstructions and encroachments on properties. He can only
organize and train personnel of DPWH and can only provide advice to the Secretary and other
officials regarding where to conduct demolitions and how to develop techniques. Being a
taxpayer is not always accepted since far as a taxpayer's suit s concerned, the Court is not devoid
of the discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained.

1936
FILSTREAM v. CA
G.R. No. 125128
January 23, 1998
Art. XIII, § 10 Urban Land Reform and Housing
FACTS:
Petitioner, Filstream International, Inc., is the registered owner of the properties subject
of this dispute consisting of adjacent parcels of land situated in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II,
Manila, with a total area of 3,571.10 square meters and covered by T.C.T. Nos. 20393 7, 203936,
169198, 169199, 169200 and 169202 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed an ejectment suit before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila (Branch 15) against the occupants of the abovementioned parcels of on the grounds of
termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered by the
MTC on September 14, 1993 ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back
rentals to petitioner. Not satisfied, private respondents appealed the decision to the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, which in turn affirmed the decision of the MTC in its decision dated
February 22, 1994. Still not content, private respondents proceeded to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for review. The result however remained the same as the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC in its decision dated August 25, 1994.2 Thereafter, no further action was taken by the
private respondents, as a result of which the decision in the ejectment suit became final and
executory.
However, it appeared that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private
respondents filed on May 25, 1993, a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against
petitioner Filstream which was docketed before the RTC of Manila. It was at this stage that
respondent City of Manila came into the picture when the city government approved Ordinance
No. 78133 on November 5, 1993, authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the acquisition by
negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means certain parcels of land which formed
part of the properties of petitioner then occupied by private respondents. Subsequently, the City
of Manila approved Ordinance No. 78554 declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land
situated along Antonio Rivera and Fernando Ma. Guerrero streets in Tondo, Manila which were
owned by Mr. Enrique Quijano Gutierrez, petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest. The said
properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land
Use Development Program of the City of Manila.
Pursuant to the complaint filed by respondent City of Manila, the trial court issued a Writ
of Possession in favor of the former which ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed
premises to the City of Manila.
At this juncture, petitioner Filstream filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent
domain as well as a motion to quash the writ of possession. The motion to dismiss was premised
on the following grounds: no valid cause of action; the petition does not satisfy the requirements
of public use and a mere clandestine maneuver to circumvent the writ of execution issued by the
RTC of Manila, in the ejectment suit; violation of the constitutional guarantee against non -
impairment of obligations and contracts; price offered was too low hence violative of the just
compensation provision of the constitution and the said amount is without the certification of the
City Treasurer for availability of funds. Respondent City of Manila filed its opposition to
petitioner Filstream’s two motions and to which petitioner accordingly filed a reply.

1936
The RTC of Manila denied Filstream’s motion to dismiss and the motion to quash the
Writ of Possession. Meanwhile, owing to the finality of the decision in the ejectment sui t the
MTC of Manila issued a Writ of Execution as well as a Notice to Vacate the disputed premises
and an order of demolition. Upon respondents’ motion, the RTC of Manila issued a TRO
enjoining the execution of the writ. On appeal to CA, the TRO was sustained. Hence this petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal in the expropriation proceedings based on purely
procedural and technical grounds is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law (CA dismissed the petition for non-compliance with Sec. 2(a) of Rule 6 of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals by failing to attach to its petition other
pertinent documents and papers and for attaching copies of pleadings whi ch are blurred and
unreadable)
2. Whether the City of Manila validly expropriated petitioner Filstream's properties
RULING:
1. YES. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in this case would defeat
rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the violatio n of the substantial rights of
petitioner. At stake in the appeal filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their
property rights over the disputed premises which have been expropriated and have in fact been
ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect, the dismissal of their appeal in the
expropriation proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds is tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law as it would automatically validate the expropriation
proceedings which the petitioner is still disputing. It must be emphasized that where substantial
rights are affected, as in this case, the stringent application of procedural rules may be relaxed if
only to meet the ends of substantial justice.
2. NO. The Court found nothing that would indicate that respondent City of Manila
complied with Sec. 9 and Sec. 10 of R.A. 7279. Petitioner Filstream's properties were
expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort
to the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently,
there was a violation of petitioner Filstream's right to due process which must accordingly be
rectified.
Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its
power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to
expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the
interest of private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the
individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in
mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process
extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance over
compliance with the due process requirements is in order.
We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount task in
view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas particularly in Metro Manila.
Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious dilemma, local government units are not given an
unbridled authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to
these problems. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: “no person shall

1936
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws; private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation (Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution).” Thus, the exercise by local
government units of the power of eminent domain is not without limitations.

1937
PEOPLE v. LEACHON, Jr.

G.R. Nos. 10872526
September 25, 1998
Art. XII Sec. 10
FACTS:
The Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro, and the private complainant,
Farmers’ Cooperative Marketing Association (FACOMA), brought this special civil action for
certiorari and mandamus, to annul the orders of Presiding Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, who dismissed Criminal Case Nos. R 2877
and R2828
On August 7, 1990, pursuant to the Resolution of the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate
informations for violation of P.D. 772, otherwise known as the AntiSquatting Law, against Noli
Hablo, Edmundo Mapindan and Diego Escala, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. R2877 and R-
2828, before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro presided over by respondent judge.
The cases proceeded to trial. After presenting its evidence, the prosecution rested the cases,
sending in a written offer of evidence on November 14, 1991. On August 18, 1992, almost a year
after the prosecution had rested, the respondent Judge issued an Order dismissing the said cases
motu proprio on the ground of “lack of jurisdiction.” From the aforesaid order of di smissal,
petitioners appealed to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, which
was referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. On December 24, 1992, the 12th
Division of the Court of Appeals came out with a decision reversing the appealed Order of
dismissal, ordering continuation of trial of subject criminal cases.
On January 19, 1993, instead of conducting the trial, as directed by the Court of Appeals,
the respondent judge dismissed the cases motu proprio, once more, opining that P.D. 772 is
rendered obsolete and deemed repealed by Sections 9 and 10, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provide that “urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their
dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.”
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration interposed on January 29, 1993, having been denied by
the respondent Judge on February 4, 1993, petitioners found their way to this court via the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing subject criminal cases for violation of the Anti Squatting Law,
and in declaring the said law as repugnant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
Presidential Decree No. 772, otherwise known as the AntiSquatting Law, enjoys
this presumption of constitutionality. At the time the respondent Judge rendered the questioned
Decision and issued the orders of dismissal in 1993, Presidential Decree No. 772, AntiSquatting
Law, was still effective. Neither has this Court declared its unconstitutionality, notwithstanding
the social justice provision of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, specifically on urban land
reform and housing.

1937
In dismissing subject criminal cases for antisquatting, respondent Judge ratiocinated that
“if all the accused in these cases were convicted and ordered evicted, it will run counter to the
said specific constitutional provisions because the conviction and ev iction will not be in a just
and humane manner as the government has not yet undertaken the resettlement of urban and
rural dwellers (referring to all accused in the cases at bar) and neither has the government
consulted all the accused as to where they should be relocated.
The Court holds that the respondent judge did not err in so construing the aforecited
constitutional provision. Under the Constitution, what makes the eviction and demolition of
urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful is when the same are not done in accordance with
law and in a just and humane manner.
However, respondent Judge erred in predicating the validity or legality of eviction on the
existence of a resettlement plan and area. The constitutional requirement that the evicti on and
demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean
that the validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of a
resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government. What is meant by “in accordance
with law” and “just and humane manner” is that the person to be evicted be accorded due process
or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the
property involved is unlawful or against the will of the landowner; that should the illegal or
unlawful occupation be proven, the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or
demolition is done; and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or
damage to properties.
In the case at bar, the respondent Judge dismissed subject cases motu proprio, after the
prosecution had rested the same and without giving the three accused an opportunity to present
their evidence. What is more, there is no showing that the issue of constitutionality of P.D. 772
was ever posed by the accused. Consequently, such an issue cannot be given due course for the
simple reason that it was not raised by the proper party at the earliest opportunity. But the
foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding, the petition cannot now prosper
because on October 27, 1997, Republic Act No. 8368, entitled “An Act Repealing Presidential
Decree No. 772 Entitled ‘Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts’ ” was enacted. Section 3
of the said Act provides that “all pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act.” WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby
DISMISSED, without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

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COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION (CHREA) vs.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (CHR)
G.R. No. 155336
July 21, 2006
Art. XIII, Section 17, Par. 4 (Budget; Fiscal Autonomy)
FACTS:
This is a Resolution issued in response to a Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent on the Decision rendered on November 25, 2004 ruling that respondent is not among
the constitutional bodies clothed with fiscal autonomy.
The case arose when on February 14, 1998 Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522,
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions
Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article
XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR. These special provisions state:
1. x x x the Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective
offices, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their
personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in their personal
services itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new
positions in their respective offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose
positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be granted retirement
gratuities and separation pay in accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable
from any unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective
offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation hereof shall be in accordance
with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation
standardization laws.
2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal
autonomy are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective appropriations for: x x
x (e) payment of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses, commutable representation
and transportation allowances, and fringe benefits for their officials and employees as
may be authorized by law; and (f) other official purposes, subject to accounting and
auditing rules and regulations.
On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-
047 on September 4, 1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected
positions in the Commission. Subsequently, on October 19, 1998, the CHR issued Resolution
No. A98-055 providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grade of some positions in the
Commission. Moreover, Resolution No. A98-062 dated November 17, 1998 was promulgated by
the CHR where they “collapsed” vacant positions in the commission to provide additional source
of funding for the staffing modifications mentioned in the other resolutions.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) with a request for its approval, but the DBM secretary
Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the following justification:
. . . Based on the evaluations made the request was not favorably considered as it
effectively involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services .

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In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the
CSC-National Capital Region Office recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA requested the CSC-Central office to affirm
the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the
DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve
matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial
and the Supreme Court (SC) reversed it.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the SC erred in holding that the CHR is not among the constitutional bodies
clothed with fiscal autonomy.
HELD:
1. No, but there is a slight modification in the Decision.
As discussed in the past Decision, the Court maintains that although the CHR is
constitutionally mandated, it is not in the strict sense a constitutional commission. Article IX of
the 1987 Constitution entitled “Constitutional Commissions,” identifies only the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. The mandate for the
creation of the respondent is found in Section 17 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution on
Human Rights. Thus, the respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX of the 1987
Constitution on constitutional commissions for its benefit.
Taking a closer look in the constitutional provisions providing for fiscal autonomy of the
Judiciary (art. VIII, § 3), the constitutional commissions (art. IX, Part A, § 5), and the
Ombudsman (art. XI, § 14), each consists of two sentences stating that: (1) The government
entity shall enjoy fiscal autonomy; and (2) its approved annual appropriation shall be
automatically and regularly released. The respondent anchors its claim to fiscal autonomy on the
fourth paragraph of Article XIII, Section 17, which, as compared to those mentioned, only
contains the second sentence. Question now arises as to the significance of such a difference in
the way the said provisions are worded.
To settle the ambiguity, the Court visited the records of the Constitutional Commission
(ConCom). Here, it was found that the omission of the first sentence for the CHR was deliberate.
The autonomy actually intended for the CHR is the automatic and regular release of the
appropriations, and nothing more.
As defined by the Court in Bengzon v. Drilon, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the
Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch
that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix
rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and
pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or
prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. Fiscal autonomy means
freedom from outside control.
In the deliberations of the ConCom on the meaning of fiscal autonomy, it was found that
what is granted to the CHR is only limited fiscal autonomy, that which only pertains to the

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automatic and regular release of appropriations when approved. It does not include the other
rights contemplated in the fiscal autonomy mentioned in the first sentence.
The Court also points out that the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), to
which respondent avers membership, defined the term “fiscal autonomy” in its Joint Resolution
No. 49. The definition contains this sentence: “It does not mean mere automatic and regular
release of approved appropriations.” As a signatory to this Joint Resolution, the CHR is bound
by the definition held therein.
Moreover, the Administrative Code of 1987 also acknowledges the differences in the
fiscal autonomy of the constitutional commissions, the Office of the Ombudsman and the
respondent by the phraseology used in the following provisions:
Book II, Chapter 5, Section 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional
Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Book V, Title II, Subtitle B, Section 4. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Office of the
Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Book V, Title II, Subtitle A, Section 6. Annual Appropriations. – The approved
annual appropriations of the Commission on Human Rights shall be automatically and
regularly released.
It should be noted that while Book II, Chapter 5, Section 26 (on constitutional
commissions) and Book V, Title 2, Subtitle B, Section 4 (on the Office of the Ombudsman) of
the Code are entitled “Fiscal Autonomy,” Book V, Title 2, Subtitle A, Section 6 (on re spondent)
bears the title “Annual Appropriations.” Further, the provisions on the constitutional
commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman in the Administrative Code of 1987, just like in
the 1987 Constitution, are composed of two sentences: (1) The government entity shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy; and (2) Its approved annual appropriation shall be automatically and regularly
released. The provision on respondent in the same Code is limited only to the second sentence.
On the main issue of whether or not the approval by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) is a condition precedent to the enactment of an upgrading, reclassification,
creation and collapsing of plantilla positions in the CHR, this Court staunchly holds that as
prescinding from the legal and jurisprudential yardsticks discussed in length in the assailed
Decision, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any
reclassification or upgrading of positions in government.
Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy, this Court shares the
stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices
must, all the same, succumb to the Salary Standardization Law.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of this Court dated 25 November 2004 is hereby MODIFIED, declaring the
respondent CHR as a constitutional body enjoying limited fiscal autonomy, in the sense that it is
entitled to the automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations; nonetheless, it
is still required to conform to the Salary Standardization Law. Accordingly, its entire
reclassification scheme remains subject to the approval of the DBM.

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CARIÑO V CHR1
G.R. No. 96681
December 2, 1991
Article 13 Section 18 (No Adjudicating Power, No Contempt)
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance
of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass actions to encourage the public authorities to act
upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter’s attention. The mass actions
consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in
peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass
actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or
face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal
proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives
notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the
days that followed. 2
Among those who participated in the mass actions were the 8 private respondents herein,
teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, who had agreed to support the non-political
demands of the MPSTA. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants
were administratively charged on the basis of the principal’s report and given 5 days to answer
the charges. They were also preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to Section 41 of P.D.
807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the
charges in accordance with P.D. 807. The cases eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary
Cariño, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for 9
months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.
Respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to the CHR to complain that while they
were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their rep lacements as
teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
Their complaints were docketed as “Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90–775."
In connection therewith, CHR scheduled a “dialogue” on October 11,1990, and sent a
subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein. On the day of the “dialogue,” it
was not certain whether Sec. Cariño received the subpoena, which was served at his office, the
CHR, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C.
Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case. The CHR thereafter issued an Order requiring Sec. Cariño,
of the DECS, Superintendent Lolarga, and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, to
appear before the CHR en banc and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the
allegations.
Through the OSG, Sec. Cariño sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss
the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted alleging as grounds therefor, that the complaint
states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case .
On December 28,1990, CHR denied Sec. Cariño’s motion to dismiss and required him
and Superintendent Lolarga to submit their counter-affidavits within 10 days after which the
1
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture 6, Sports, DR. ERLINDA
LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL
CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
2
Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Cariño, G.R. 95445, Aug. 6, 1991.

1939
CHR shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents
counter affidavit. It held that the “striking teachers were denied due process of law; they should
not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been a
violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investi gate;
and while expressing its utmost respect to the Supreme Court the facts before it are different
from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court.”
ISSUE: Whether CHR adjudicatory powers over certain specific type of cases.
HELD: NO. The Court declares the CHR to have no such power; and that it was not meant by
the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the auth ority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided
or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. CHR does not have this function.
The CHR was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. It grants to the CHR
the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. But it
cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi -
judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the
technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
“Investigate” commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or
probe into, research on, study. The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out,
to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of “investigate” is essentially the same: to follow
up step by step by patient inquiry or observation, to trace or track; to search into; to examine and
inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry. Investigation being in turn described as an administrative function, the
exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing.
“Adjudicate,” commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. And “adjudge” means “to decide or rule upon as a
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy. In the legal sense, “adjudicate” means: “to settle in the exercise of judicial
authority.
Hence it is that the CHR, having merely the power “to investigate,” cannot and should
not “try and resolve on the merits”

1940
EPZA v. CHR
G.R. No. 101476
April 14, 1992
Art. XIII Sec. 18
FACTS:
Valles, Aedia and Ordonez filed with CHR a joint complaint against EPZA for allegedly
violating their human rights when EPZA Project Engineer Damondamon along with 215 th PNP
Company tried to level the area occupied by complainants.
The same parcel of land was reserved and allocated for purpose of development into Cavite
Export Processing Zone which was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation and was later sold to
EPZA. CHR issued an order of injunction for EPZA and company to desist from committing
further acts of demolition, terrorism and harassment until further order.
2 weeks later the group started bulldozing there and CHR reiterated its order of injunction,
including the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to desist from doing work on the area.
EPZA filed a motion to life the order with CHR for lack of authority and said motion was
dismissed. EPZA filed the case at bar for certiorari and prohibition alleging that CHR acted in
excess of its jurisdiction in issuing a restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private
respondents have no clear and positive right to be protected by an injunction; and that CHR
abused its discretion in entertaining the complaint.
EPZA’s petition was granted and a TRO was issued ordering CHR to cease and desist from
enforcing/implementing the injunction orders. CHR commented that its function is not limited to
mere investigation (Art. 13, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution)
ISSUE:
1. Whether the CHR has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against
supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts
complained of
HELD:
1. No.
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may
not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law".
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer
to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR
may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a
court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary

1940
injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending or by a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court.

1941
SIMON VS. CHR

229 SCRA 117
January 5, 1994
No Injunctive Power
Facts: The case all started when a "Demolition Notice, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers
Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the
private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of 3 days within which
to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice,
the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed
to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque
Fermo, filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Simon, Jr., of
Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and
carinderia along North EDSA. TheCHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters'
complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as
well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that the petitioners carried out the
demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, the CHR directed the
petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would
lead to a citation for contempt and arrest."
During the hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement. A supplemental motion to dismiss
was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as
being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the
rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their pri vilege to
engage in business."
In an Order, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist.On 1 March 1991. The CHR
issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss. The
CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a
paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a
quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to decide and issue an order to desist
on the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents
Held: No. The issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of
the CHR. Article XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to

1941
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation,
involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it does
not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures
and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining
order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said
so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in w hich the action is
pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
In its Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the
members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. This view,
however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human
Rights, the Court, through Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the
enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but
that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself.
The Commission on Human Rights was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi -judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

#1942
Meyer v. Nebraska
262 U.S. 390
June 4, 1923
Art. IV, Sec. 1 – natural and primary rights of parents
FACTS:
In 1919 Nebraska passed a law prohibiting anyone from teaching any subject in any other
language except English. In addition, foreign languages could be taught only after the child had
passed the eighth grade. Meyer, a teacher at Zion Parochial School school, used a German bible
as a text for reading. According to him, this served a double purpose: teaching German and
religious instruction. After being charged with violating Nebaraska's statute, he took his case to
the Surpeme Court, claiming that his rights and the rights of parents were violated.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the law violated people's liberty, as protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment
HELD:
Although the Constitution does not specifically grant parents the right to teach their children a
foreign language, Justice McReynolds stated in the majority opinion that: The Court has never
attempted to define, with exactness, the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Certainly education and the pursuit of knowledge should be encouraged. Mere knowledge of the
German language cannot be looked upon as harmful. Meyer's right to teach, and the right of
parents to hire him so to teach were within the liberty of this Amendment.
Although the Court accepted that the State may have justification in fostering unity among the
populace, they ruled that this particular attempt reached too far into liberty of parents to teach
what they wanted to their children.

1943
PIERCE v. SOCIETY OF SISTERS

262 US 510
June 1, 1925
Art. Art. XIV Sec. 1 Natural and primary right of parents
FACTS:
Appellee private primary schools filed actions against appellant public officials,
challenging the constitutionality of the Compulsory Education Act (Act), 1922 Or. Laws § 5259,
under U.S. Const. amend. XIV and seeking to enjoin its enforcement. The Act mandated that all
normal children aged 8 to 16 years old attend public school. Appellees asserted that their
enrollments were declining as a result of the Act. The district court entered an order enjoining
appellants from enforcing the Act and appellants sought review in consolidated appeals. The
court affirmed, ruling that the inevitable practical result of enforcing the Act was the destruction
of appellees' primary schools and perhaps all other private primary schools for normal children
within the state. The Act unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of their children. Although appellees were corporations, they
could claim constitutional protection for their business and property. They sought protection
against a present and real threat of injury from the arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful
interference with their patrons and injunctive relief was proper.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a violation of the Constitution
HELD:
The court affirmed the order enjoining appellant public officials from enforcing an
act that required children to attend public schools in appellee private primary schools'
actions contesting the constitutionality of the law. The legislation unreasonably interfered
with parental rights and appellees' business interests. An injunction was an appropriate
remedy to prevent the present threat of irreparable harm to appellees.

1944
WISCONSIN v. YODER
406 U.S. 205
May 15, 1972
Art. XIV
FACTS:
Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish
Mennonite Church, were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law
(which requires a child's school attendance until age 16) by declining to send their children to
public or private school after they had graduated from the eighth grade. The evidence showed
that the Amish provide continuing informal vocational education to their children de signed to
prepare them for life in the rural Amish community. The evidence also showed that respondents
sincerely believed that high school attendance was contrary to the Amish religion and way of
life, and that they would endanger their own salvation and that of their children by complying
with the law. The State Supreme Court sustained respondents' claim that application of the
compulsory school attendance law to them violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The State advances two arguments. First, it notes that some degree of education is
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political
system. Second, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants
in society. The State attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance from which children
must be protected by the State and attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance fr om
which children must be protected by the State.
ISSUE:
Whether the application of the compulsory attendance law violate respondent’s rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
HELD:
The application of the law is unconstitutional as applied to the Amish.
The Amish object to the high school education because the values taught there are in marked
variance from the Amish values and way of life. It places Amish children in an environment
hostile to their beliefs and takes them away from their community during a crucial period in their
life. The Amish do not object to elementary education. Expert Dr. Hostetler testified that the
compulsory attendance could result in not only great psychological harm to Amish children b ut
ultimately the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community.
The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of
basic education. Previous precedent has held that this power must yield to the right of parents to
provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. The State’s power is subject to a
balancing test when it impinges on fundamental rights such as those protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the
religious upbringing of their children.
In order for Wisconsin to compel such attendance, it must follow that either the State
does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement or that there is a state
interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free

1944
Exercise Clause. This Court determines that the Amish objection to the attendance is rooted in
religious beliefs that directly conflict with the compulsory school attendance law.
The State advances two arguments. First, it notes that some degree of education is
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political
system. Second, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants
in society. We accept these propositions. However, the evidence adduced shows that an
additional one or two years of formal high school would do little to serve those interests. Such
education may be necessary for preparation for the modern society in which we live, but is not
for the separated agrarian community of the Amish faith.
The State attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance from which children must
be protected by the State. However, the record shows that the Amish community has been a
highly successful social unit within our society, producing productive and law -abiding citizens.
The State also supports its position on the possibility that some children will choose to leave the
Amish community. This argument is highly speculative on the record, and the practical
agricultural training and habits of industry would support children that did choose to leave.
The requirement for compulsory high school education is a fairly recent development, designed
to not only provide educational opportunities, but also to avoid child labor or forced idleness. In
these terms, Wisconsin’s interest in compelling school attendance is less substantial for Amish
children than for children generally.
The State attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance from which children must
be protected by the State. On this record there is no need to decide an issue in which the Amish
parent’s are preventing children who wish to further their education from attending school.

1
9
4
5
GINSBERG vs. NEW YORK

390 U.S. 629
April 22, 1968
Art. XIV, Section 1 (Natural and Primary Right of Parents)
FACTS:
Appellant and his wife operate "Sam's Stationery and Luncheonette" in Bellmore, Long
Island. They have a lunch counter, and, among other things, also sell magazines including some
so called "girlie" magazines. Appellant was prosecuted under two Informations, each in two
counts, which charged that he personally sold a 16 year old boy two "girlie" magazines on each
of two dates in October 1965, in violation of 484-h of the New York Penal Law. The conviction
was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Term, Second Department, of the Supreme Court.
Appellant was denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals and then appealed to
this Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Court erred in convicting appellant in violation of 484-h of the New York
Penal Law.
HELD:
1. No.
The well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate, and, in our view, two interests justify the limitations in 484 -h upon the
availability of sex material to minors under 17, at least if it was rational for the legislature to find
that the minors' exposure to such material might be harmful. First of all, constitutional
interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society. The
legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have this
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid
discharge of that responsibility. The State also has an independent interest in the well-being of its
youth.
To sustain state power to exclude material defined as obscenity by 484-h requires only
that we be able to say that it was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material
condemned by the statute is harmful to minors.
Judgment is affirmed.

1946
DECS v SAN DIEGO

180 SCRA 534
December 21, 1989
Art. XIV, Section 1 (quality and assessment of educational system; failed NMAT thrice,
power to regulate admission)
FACTS:
Petitioner Roberto Ray San Diego was a graduate of the University of the East with a degree in
Zoology. He took the NMAT (National Medical Admission Test) thrice and failed thrice as well.
In a fourth attempt to apply for the NMAT, petitioner was rejected by DECS. In his original
petition, he assailed the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, series of 1972 for providing
that those applying for medical school can only take the NMAT three times. Public respondent
Judge Capulong held that San Diego was deprived of his right to pursue medical education
through arbitrary exercise of police power.
ISSUES:
Whether MECS Order No. 12 is unconstitutional for enabling arbitrary exercise of police power
and for violating private respondent’s right to quality education
HELD:
No. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the said order/rule. The Court invokes the ruling in
Tablarin v Gutierrez, which upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT, anchored on the objective
of the State to regulate and to “upgrade the selection of applicants into medical schools” and to
“improve the quality of medical education in the country.” The ruling of this case emphasized
the fact that there’s a reasonable relation between prescribing of passing the NMAT and in
securing the health and safety of the community as was held in the Tablarin case. Respondent
Judge alleged that the Tablarin case merely upheld the NMAT and said nothing about the “three -
flunk rule”. This Court, however, stated that it sees no reason why the Tablarin doctrine cannot
apply to the case at hand since “the issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the
applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more
reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in
the regulation of the medical profession.” Also, the three-flunk rule as a regulation was held to
be within the ambit of police power given that there’s a lawful purpose and reasonable means of
implementing this purpose.
The assailed order is likewise not violative of the respondent’s right to quality education. “The
right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution
also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject
to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. The private respondent
must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where even those who
have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is
all the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.”
Prepared by: Nicolene S. Arcaina 1

1947
NON V. JUDGE DAMES

G.R. No. 89317
May 20, 1990
Article 14 Section 1
FACTS: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines
Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading
or participating in student massactions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject
of theprotests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school,
but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in
Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived
their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted,
signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89, which states
that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and
attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the
institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the
college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of
conduct and discipline.
ISSUE: Whether students’ rights were violated.
HELD: YES.
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Moreover, the penalty imposed must be
proportionate to the offense committed.
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the “termination of contract” theory. But it
must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions.
Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools, which provides that “when a student registers in a school, it is
understood that he is enrolling . . . for the entire semester for collegiate courses,” which the
Court in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the
ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired. The “termination
of contract” theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that
a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wher ein tuition fees
are collected and paid on an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the down payment

1947
upon enrollment and the balance before examinations. Thus, even if a student does not complete
the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks, he may be
required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given his credentials for
transfer.
On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the
manner expressed in Guzman, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear
from the pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a
mere afterthought. It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the
student mass actions conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by
petitioners. Certainly, excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action
taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of
due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play.
With regard to petitioner Emmanuel Barba who respondents claim has enrolled in Ago
Foundation, such fact alone, if true, will not bar him from seeking readmission in respondent
school. Same; Same; Same; Penalty to be imposed on student for breach of discipline must be
commensurate to offense committed. But the penalty that could have been imposed must be
commensurate to the offense committed and, as set forth in Guzman, it must be imposed only
after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with. This is explicit from
the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145 that “no penalty
shall be imposed upon any student, except for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the
school’s rules and regulations duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been
conducted.” But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative
sanctions have become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or
re-enrollment and who have been effectively excluded from respondent school for four (4)
semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they
might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that, according to
respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary
proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained
relations between petitioners and the officials of respondent school which necessarily resulted
from the heated legal battle here, in the Court of Appeals and before the trial court.

MIRIAM COLLEGE V CA
G.R. No. 127930
December 15, 2000
Duty of Institutions
FACTS:
The September-October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of Miriam College’s school paper
(Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho) were found to be obscene,
vulgar, indecent, gross, sexually explicit, injurious to young readers, and devoid of all moral
values.
Following its publication, Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College Discipline
Committee, sent a letter to the members of the editorial board (all students of Miriam College) to
inform them that letters of complaint were filed against them by members of the Miriam
Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student. Consequently, they were required to
submit a written statement in answer to the charge/s but instead of doing so they wrote to the
Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the
issue. Dr. Sevilla again required the students to file their written answers. In res ponse, Atty.
Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for the students, submitted a letter to the Discipline Committee
reiterating his clients’ position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over them. He also
argued that “what applies is Republic Act No. 7079 (The Campus Journalism Act) and its
implementing rules and regulations.”
The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. After a review of the
Discipline Committee’s report, the Discipline Board imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the
students. The students were suspended, dismissed, expelled, one was withheld graduation
privileges, including diploma.
The students filed before the court for prohibition & certiorari with preliminary
injunction before the RTC. RTC denied the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order.
Thereafter, the students filed a Supplemental Petition and Motion for Reconsideration. RTC then
granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Disciplinary Committee to impose the
disciplinary sanctions also from disallowing the students from taking tests or exams. Five out of
the eleven students was not included in the said order but one of which was granted to receive
her diploma but deprived of the privilege of walking on the graduation stage. Both parties moved
for a reconsideration regarding the matter raised by both parties that it is the DECS which has
jurisdiction. RTC dismissed the case and all orders it issued are recalled and set aside. The CA
issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Miriam College from enforcing the disciplinary
sanctions, but it eventually declared the RTC Order, as well as the students’ suspension and
dismissal, void. Hence, this petition by Miriam College.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Miriam College has the jurisdiction over the complaints against the students.
HELD:
YES
The Court held that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases
filed against respondent students. The school has the power to impose disciplinary sanction
among its students because it is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of

higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution
guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This freedom allows the school
to set its own objectives, aims, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
The right of the school to discipline its students is apparent in the academic freedom,
“how it shall be taught.” Rules and regulations set by the school are deemed necessary for the
maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment
conducive to learning.
The Constitution imposes such duty to develop discipline in its students. [Section 3
(2), Article XIV]
[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human
rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and
duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline,
encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational
efficiency.
It is within the interest of the school to teach its students discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. It certainly follows that the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the
freedom "what to teach." It is through discipline that the school helps the students to “grow and
develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community.”(Angeles vs.
Sison)
The right to discipline is also evident in the academic freedom, "who may be admitted to
study." If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, it is logical to conclude that it
also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser
sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.
The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule
out disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. In addition, Sec. 7 of the
of the Campus Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student
solely on the basis of the articles they write except when such article materially disrupts
class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore, the
Court ruled in favor of Miriam College having the authority to hear and decide the cases against
the respondent students and impose disciplinary sanctions upon them.

Note: Here’s the list of the articles considered obscene, vulgar, indecent, gross & sexually explicit.
1. Kaskas written by one Gerald Garry Renacido
-Kaskas, written in Tagalog, treats of the experience of a group of young, male, combo players who, one
evening, after their performance went to see a bold show in a place called “Flirtation”. This was the way
the author described the group’s exposure during that stage show:
“Sige, sa Flirtation tayo. Happy hour na halos…. he! he! he! sambit ng kanilang bokalistang kanina pa di
maitago ang pagkahayok sa karneng babae na kanyang pinananabikan nuong makalawa pa, susog
naman ang tropa.
"x x x Pumasok ang unang mananayaw. Si ‘Red Raven’ ayon sa emcee. Nakasuot lamang ng bikining
pula na may palamuting dilaw sa gilid-gilid at sa bandang utong. Nagsimula siya sa kanyang pag-giling
nang tumugtog na ang unang tono ng “Goodbye” ng Air Supply. Dahan-dahan ang kanyang mga
malalantik at mapang-akit na galaw sa una. Mistulang sawa na nililingkis ang hangin, paru-parong
padapo-dapo sa mga bulaklak na lamesa, di-upang umamoy o kumuha ng nektar, ngunit para
ipaglantaran ang sariling bulaklak at ang angkin nitong malansang nektar.
“Kaskas mo babe, sige … kaskas.”
Napahaling ang tingin ng balerinang huwad kay Mike. Mistulang natipuhan, dahil sa harap niya’y
nagtagal. Nag-akmang mag-aalis ng pangitaas na kapirasong tela. Hindi nakahinga si Mike, nanigas sa
kanyang kinauupuan, nanigas pati ang nasa gitna ng kanyang hita. Ang mga mata niya’y namagnet sa
kayamanang ngayo’y halos isang pulgada lamang mula sa kanyang naglalaway na bunganga. Naputol-
putol ang kanyang hininga nang kandungan ni ‘Red Raven’ ang kanyang kanang hita. Lalo naghingalo
siya nang kabayuhin ito ng dahan-dahan… Pabilis ng pabilis.’
The author further described Mike’s responses to the dancer as follows (quoted in part):
x x x Nagsimulang lumaban na ng sabayan si Mike sa dancer. Hindi nagpatalo ang ibong walang
pakpak, inipit ng husto ang hita ni Mike at pinag-udyukan ang kanyang dibdib sa mukha nito.
“Kaskas mo pa, kaskas mo pa!”
Palpakan at halagpakan na tawanan ang tumambad sa kanya ng biglang halikan siya nito sa labi at
iniwang bigla, upang kanyang muniin ang naudlot niyang pagtikim ng karnal na nektar. Hindi niya
maanto kung siya ay nanalo o natalo sa nangyaring sagupaan ng libog. Ang alam lang niya ay nanlata
na siya.”
After the show the group went home in a car with the bokalista driving. A pedestrian happened to cross
the street and the driver deliberately hit him with these words:
“Pare tingnan natin kung immortal itong baboy na ito. He! He! He! He! Sabad ng sabog nilang
drayber/bokalista.”
The story ends (with their car about to hit a truck) in these words: … “Pare… trak!!! Put….!!!!
2. “Libog at iba pang tula”- Magasing Pampanitikan, October, 1994 issue
a. Poem entitled “Linggo” by Jerome Gomez
may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang –
mga putang biyak na sa gitna,
‘di na puwedeng paglabhan,
‘di na maaaring pagbabaran…”
b. “Libog at iba pang Tula.”
The poem dealt on a woman and a man who met each other, gazed at each other, went up close and
“Naghalikan, Shockproof.” The poem contained a background drawing of a woman with her two
mamaries and nipples exposed and with a man behind embracing her with the woman in a pose of
passion-filled mien.
c. Virgin Writes Erotic
“At zenith I pull it out and find myself alone in this fantasy.” Opposite the page where this poem appeared
was a drawing of a man asleep and dreaming of a naked woman (apparently of his dreams) lying in bed
on her buttocks with her head up (as in a hospital bed with one end rolled up). The woman’s right nipple
can be seen clearly. Her thighs were stretched up with her knees akimbo on the bed.
d. “Naisip ko Lang” by Belle Campanario
It was about a young student who has a love-selection problem: “…Kung sinong pipiliin: ang teacher
kong praning, o ang boyfriend kong bading.” This poem also had an illustration behind it: of a young girl
with large eyes and sloping hair cascading down her curves and holding a peeled banana whose top the
illustrator shaded up with downward-slanting strokes. In the poem, the girl wanted to eat banana topped
by peanut butter.

e. “Malas ang Tatlo”
“Na picture mo na ba no’ng magkatabi tayong dalawa sa pantatluhang sofa—
ikaw, the legitimate asawa at ako, biro mo, ang kerida?
tapos, tumabi siya, shit!
kumpleto na: ikaw, ako at siya
kulang na lang, kamera.”
3. “Sa Gilid ng Itim” by Gerald Renacido in the Chi-Rho broadsheet
-spoke of a fox (lobo) yearning for “karneng sariwa, karneng bata, karneng may kalambutan…. isang
bahid ng dugong dalaga, maamo’t malasa, ipahid sa mga labing sakim sa romansa’ and ended with
‘hinog na para himukin bungang bibiyakin.”

Garcia v. Faculty Admission, Loyola School of Theology
G.R. No. L-40779
November 28, 1975
Article XIV, Section 5: Academic Freedom of “institutions of higher learning”
Facts:
In summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in
Theology; However on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for
the first semester of year 1975-76, Respondent told her about the letter he had written her,
informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission in their school. The reason
stated in the letter was without any legal ground or indications that she violated a regulation 1.
Petitioner still tried to achieve a compromise for her admission, Respondent however insist that
their decision is final and that she should seek admission instead at UST Graduate School.
The problem is that in order to pursue her graduate studies for an M.A. in Theology at
UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, she had to fulfill first their requisite of completing a Baccalaureate
in Philosophy — which would entail about four to five years more of studies — whereas in the
Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail
only about two years more.
It was recorded that she did not manage to address her grievances to the administrative
authorities given that President of her school (Ateneo), Fr. Jose Cruz, was at a First Couple's
entourage in Red China while the Secretary of Education was busy at this time of the year. Thus
Petitioner decided, considering that time was of the essence in her case to enroll as a special
student at said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she would not thereby be credited with any
academic units for the subject she would take. Petitioner then files a writ of mandamus for the
purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester and allowed cross-enrollment and that
the units she is currently taking are to be credited to her.
Respondents on the other hand claim that Loyola School of Theology allows some lay
students to attend its classes and/or take courses in said Loyola School of Theology but the
degree, if any, to be obtained from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de Manila University
and not by the Loyola School of Theology; For the reason above given, lay students admitted
to the Loyola School of Theology to take up courses for credit therein have to be officially
admitted by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of the Ateneo de Manila University
in order for them to be considered as admitted to a degree program. Given that the Petitioner was
not accepted by the Assistant Dean of Graduate School, her courses will not be credited.
Furthermore, Respondent claims that there was no fee exacted from Petitioner during her
studies. Lastly, Respondent claims that it is the discretion of the Loyola School of Theology thru
its Faculty Admission Committee, to admit students since academic or intellectual traits are not
the only basis for admission but personality traits are also considered.
Issue:
1) Whether Petitioner is deemed possessed of such a right to be admitted
Held:
1) Yes
1
THE LETTER: The faculty had a meeting after the summer session and several members are strongly opposed to having you
back with us at Loyola School of Theology. In the spirit of honesty may I report this to you as their reason: They felt that your
frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class; they
felt you could have tried to give the presentation a chance and exerted more effort to understand the point made before
immediately thinking of difficulties and problems. The way things are, I would say that the advisability of your completing a
program (with all the course work and thesis writing) with us is very questionable. That you have the requisite intellectual
ability is not to be doubted. But it would seem to be in your best interests to work with a faculty that is more compatible with
your orientation. I regret to have to make this report, but I am only thinking of your welfare.

Mandamus is not a remedy for respondent has no clear duty to so admit the
petitioner. The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood. Petitioner is
admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a
woman. And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that she is qualified to study for the
priesthood, there is still no duty on the part of respondent to admit her to said studies,
since the school has clearly the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to
limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and component
considerations. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of
petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right.
The recognition in the Constitution of institutions of “higher learning” enjoying
academic freedom is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue
his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of
his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his
conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the
political, economic, or academic establishments.
Another aspect of academic freedom is the right given to “institutions h igher
learning.” Such institution is given the right to decide for itself its aims and objectives
and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference EXCEPT
when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of
autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students.
As noted by the Queen's University in Belfast, Sir Eric Ashby: "'The internal
conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff should have
de facto control of the following functions: (i) the admission and examination of students;
(ii) the curricula for courses of study; (iii) the appointment and tenure of office of
academic staff; and (iv) the allocation of income among the different categories of
expenditure. It is not an easy matter then to disregard the views of persons
knowledgeable in the field, to whom cannot be imputed lack of awareness of the
need to respect freedom of thought on the part of students and scholars. Education,
especially higher education, belongs to a different, and certainly higher, category.

BME V JUDGE ALFONSO
G.R. No. 88259
August 10, 1989
Academic Freedom
FACTS:
Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine Foundation, Inc. was founded on 1981
for the purpose of producing physicians who will emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old
attitudes of health. However, because of the unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao, the
college was established in Antipolo, Rizal, given a temporary permit to operate instead of the
originally proposed location in Zamboanga City. Antipolo was adopted as its permanent site and
the name was changed to Rizal College of Medicine.
In 1985, DECS & BME authorized the Commission on Medical Education to conduct a
study of all Medical Schools in the Philippines. The report showed that the college fell very
much short of the minimum standards set for medical schools. Further, the team of inspectors
cited the different grounds among others.
The school claims these findings as biased and discriminatory and requested BME for re-
evaluation. The second team confirmed the previous findings and recommended the phase-out of
the school. There were third and fourth evaluations but the college failed both and was rendered
inadequate in all aspects.
DECS recommended the college for closure but somehow the college succeeded to have
the Board form yet another team of inspectors but although the findings show that there were
major efforts to improve the college, it is still rendered inadequate and recommended for closure
with provisions to disperse its students to other medical schools.
Mr. Victor Sumulong (chairman of BOT), upon learning the same proposed a gradual
phase-out so as not to dislocate the students and minimized financial losses. It allowed the
college to operate until May 1989. The college appealed the decision to the Office of the
President, but the Executive Secretary found no reason to disturb the contested decision.
The college filed civil case No. 1385 applying for a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain its implementation. It was approved by Judge Alfonso holding that there were no
evidence supporting the findings in the June 18, 1988 report, and that contrary to the findings,
the laboratory and library areas were big enough and operations in the base hospital was going
smoothly. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the college could resort to the court to obtain a reversal of the determination by
the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
HELD:
NO
The Court ruled that resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination
by the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports that the College is unfit to continue its
operations is in this case clearly unavailing. There is no law authorizing an appeal from
decisions or orders of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or any other
Court. The, only authority the Court has in the matter is the determination of whether or not the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted him by

law and the Constitution. Any decision rendered by him should not and will not be subject to
review and reversal by any court if he has acted within the limits of his power.
The Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports exercises the power to enjoin compliance
with the requirements laid down for medical schools and to mete out sanctions where he finds
that violations thereof have been committed. The decision of the Department has more bearing
since they have more special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their
jurisdiction. Therefore, they are in a better position to pass judgment than Respondent Judge who
gravely abused his discretion in substituting his judgment for theirs.

1951
Lupangco v. CA
G.R. No. 77372
April 29, 1988
160 SCRA 848
Art III XIV Sec 5
FACTS:
In 1986, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105, which
prohibited the examinees in accountancy from attending review classes, receiving handout
materials, tips or the like 3 days before the date of the exam.
As reviewees preparing to take the licensure exam in accountancy that year, Lupangco et al filed
with the RTC of Manila a complaint for injunction against the PRC and for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of the said Resolution.
PRC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review and
entertain the case, since both entities are co-equal bodies. To further strengthen its contention, it
cited BP 129, Sec. 9 (3), which states that the CA has the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all final judgments, decisions, resolutions... of the RTC and quasi-judicial agencies...."
ISSUE
W/N the RTC and the PRC are co-equal bodies, with the latter having quasi-judicial power
HELD NO. In order to invoke Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, there has to be a final order or ruling,
which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi -
judicial functions.
Quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion etc of public administrative
officers or bodies required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature. It is a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or
order, which applies to a specific situation. This does NOT cover rules and regulations of general
applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purel y administrative policies
and functions like Resolution No. 105, which was adopted by the PRC as a measure to preserve
the integrity of licensure exams.
As to the constitutionality of the Resolution, the Court held that although it was adopted for a
commendable purpose--to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure exams, it is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being unreasonable in that the examinee cannot even attend any
review class or receive any handout etc. It is even more unreasonable that one who is cau ght
violating this prohibition is barred from taking future examinations conducted by the PRC.
Furthermore, the Resolution infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution. PRC has NO authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare
themselves for the licensure exams. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps
needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. The Resolution

1951
also violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the
conduct of review that these schools believe would best enable their enrollees to meet the
standards required before becoming a full fledged public accountant.
It is an axiom in administrative law that admin authorities should NOT act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must
be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view.

1953
ABBOT LABORATORIES v. ALCARAZ

G.R. No. 82499
October 13, 1989
Article XIV – Education, Science, and Technology / Section 5 – Academic Freedom of
Institutions of Higher Learning
FACTS:
On December 2, 1987, fifteen (15) students and parents purporting to represent the 900
students of the CMCC filed a class suit (Civil Case No. 52429) against “Capitol Medical Center
College” and petitioner Dr. Clemente, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for the
reopening of the Capitol Medical Center College which had been closed effective at the end of
the first semester of the school year 1987-1988.
At bottom, the only issue in this case is whether a schothat, after due notice to the
Secretary of EducatioCulture and Sports, closed at the end of the first s emestof the school year
1987-1988, because its teachers astudents declared a strike, refusing to hold classes and take
examinations, may be forced to reopen by the courts at the instance of the striking students.
Some fourteen (14) years ago, the petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc. (or CMCI), a
hospital corporation, organized, opened, and operated the Capitol Medical Center College
(CMCC or “the College”) beside its hospital, the Capitol Medical Center (hereafter “the
Hospital”) in Quezon City. It offered a four-year nursing course, a two-year midwifery course,
and a two-year medical secretarial course. In the first semester of the school year 1987-88, 900
students were enrolled in various courses in the college.
Halfway through the first semester in 1987, the college faculty, led by the Dean of
Nursing, demanded that they be granted vacation and sick leave privileges similar to those
enjoyed by hospital personnel. Dialogues were held but no agreement was reached between the
faculty and the school administration, headed by the president, Dr. Thelma Navarette-Clemente,
who was concurrently also the chairman of the CMCI Board.
At a meeting of the CMCI Board on September 15, 1987, Dr. Clemente reported the
deteriorating relationship between the CMCC administration and the teachers, which, from a
simple disagreement, had degenerated into open hostility. She feared that the situation may give
rise to mass action by the students, because the faculty, exercising their moral influence over the
students, had enlisted the latter’s sympathy and support for their cause.
The Board resolved to authorize her, as president of the College, to close it at the end of
the first semester if the antagonism of the faculty and students toward the college administration
should become uncontrollable.
During the next thirty (30) days, the rift between the administration and the faculty
aggravated. The school administration scheduled the holding of the final semestral examinations
on October 14 to 19, 1987, but the teachers defiantly and unilaterally “postponed” them. On the
scheduled dates for the examinations, the students joined their teachers in a noisy demonstration
in front of the hospital. As the demonstrations disturbed the peace and quiet of the hospital and
fearful of possible subversive action by hostile student nurses which might endanger the safety
and lives of the patients in the hospital, an emergency special meeting was held by the CMCI
Board on October 17, 1987. It unanimously resolved “to close the school effective at the end of
the first semester of this school year, 1987-88.”

1953
ISSUE:
1. As to whether the school has the right to refuse admission.
HELD:
1. Yes. The court stated that:
“If in Alcuaz, this Court recognized the right of the school to refuse admission to students guilty
of breaches of discipline, and of the peace, its right to close when the entire faculty and student
population have boycotted their classes, may not be denied. The irony for the school in this case
is that it was forced to close by student action, and is now being forced to reopen by student
action also, assisted by the lower court. We cannot sanction the order of the lower court which
gave aid and comfort to the students who paralyzed the operation of the school by their mass
actions forcing it to shut down altogether. We cannot approve a situation which would place a
school at the mercy of its students.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated May 15, 1988 of the Court
of Appeals in CAG.R.SP No. 13626 is hereby set aside. The order and writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil
Case No. Q52429 are hereby annulled and set aside. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

1954
REYES v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 96492 (194 SCRA 402)
November 26, 1992
Art. XIV, Sec. 5. Academic Freedom of “institutions of higher learning”
FACTS:
Petitioner is questioning the respondent court’s decision, which affirmed with
modification the agrarian court’s decision, which ordered them to restore possession of the
disputed landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. Juan Mendoza, father of
defendant Olympio, is the owner of farm lots in Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pam panga. Devoted to the
production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by now deceased Julian dela Cruz,
husband of plaintiff Eufrocina.
Eufrocina alleged that her husband’s death, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the
subject lots; that Olympio, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter
Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and
working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the instant case, defendants had
refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore
prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction in the meantime.
Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing
between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter’s farm lots
and asked for the dismissal of the case, moral damages and attorney’s fees. Mendoza however
claims abandonment.
ISSUE:
Whether the court erred in deciding that petitioners can be held liable
HELD:
No.
The evidence presented before the trial court and CA served as basis in arriving at their
findings of fact. The Supreme Court will not analyze such evidence all over again because settled
is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent the exceptions which do not obtain in the instant case.
In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more than substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is
contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its
own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of
evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.
Petition partially granted.

1955
Tan v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 97238
January 8, 2013
Article XIV sec. 5 – Academic freedom
FACTS:
FACTS: Julia Tan is an 84 yearold widow who is the Principal of Grace Christian High
School (the school); Petitioner Tan is the Administrative Consultant.
The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) approved the application of the
school’s tuition fee increase by 15% for the school year 1986-87. Meanwhile a group of
parents whose children were enrolled in the school, were alarmed despite the period ic fee
increases and academic standards and physical facilities of the school; they formed the
Grace Christian High school Parents-Teachers Association (Association)
From February 23 to March 5 1987, the association, petitioners included, staged a rally
outside the school gates. Banners and placards critical of the school’s administration were
set up. The already adversarial relation between the school and the association
deteriorated when the administrators heard several preschool students chanting slogan s
against the school and its teachers. Because of this, petitioners were individually and
personally informed through a letter by the principal that, as they were severely critical of
the school’s policies, it would be best for all concerned if their children enrolled in some
other school. Petitioners felt that their children were being singled out. They proceeded to
the MECS for advise. MECS advised the school to enroll petitioners children, but the
school refused.
Two separate petitions for Mandamus were filed with the RTC Quezon City. The courts
granted the petition and ordered the enrollment of the subject children. While the cases
were pending, the children were allowed to continue their studies. However during, the
enrollment period of the school year 1989, enrollment was refused in the first year high
school of Carmella Ang See, Micheal Robert Ang, Karen Gay Dipasupil and Vonette Uy
of the group that the school was under no legal duty to still accept them in the high school
after graduating them from the elementary courses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the students who graduated from the elementary department of
the school has a right to enroll in the high school department of the same school.
HELD: NO. Our ruling the related case of Yap Chin Fah v CA states “It is true that
private schools, unlike public utilities and other private corporations whose businesses
impinge on the public interest- are subject to reasonable regulation and supervision of the
State. At the same time, however, private school have the right to establish reasonable
rules and regulations for the admission, discipline, and promotion of students; this right
extents as well as to parent-teacher associations, as parents are under social and moral
obligation to assist and cooperate with the school.
On the other hand, where relations between parents and students with the teachers and
administrators have deteriorated to the level here exhibited, a private school may, in the

1955
interest of the student body and the faculty and management as a whole, require the
affected children to be enrolled elsewhere. The maintenance of a morally conducive and
orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the circumstances
of this case, the school is forced to admit petitioners’ children and to reintegrate them to
the student body.
No thinking person can dispute the fact that our country is suffering from the effects of a
serious deterioration of academic and other standards in our educational system. This
court is disturbed by the big number of candidates taking the bar examination who after 6
year in the elementary grades, 4 in high school, and 8 in college appear to be functionally
semi-illiterate judging from the answers they give to bar examination questions. The
same is true of other disciplines, professions and occupations. A drastic upgrading of
educational standards, especially in the elementary and high school levels is imperative.
It is for the above reason that government should uphold and encourage schools and
colleges which endeavor to maintain the highest standard of education. Educators who
insist on high standards and who enforce reasonable rules of discipline deserve support
from courts of justices and other branches of government.

1956
Camacho v. Coresis
G.R. No. 134372
March 18, 2002
Art. XIV § 5– Academic freedom of “institutions of higher learning”
FACTS:
During the first semester of 1994-1995, respondents, Aida Agulo, Norma Tecson and
Desiderio Alaba enrolled in Dr. Daleon’s (also respondent) subject Ed.D. 317 which is a Seminar
in Curriculum Development. Instead of attending regular classes, Dr. Daleon gave them a special
program of self-study with reading materials, once a week tutorial meetings, quizzes, and term
papers.
On June 1995, several doctoral students complained to petitioner, Dean Manuel Camucho
that there were “ghost students” in the Ed.D. 317 class of Dr. Daleon who were given a passing
grade despite their failure to attend class.
After the failure of Dr. Daleon to furnish the photocopies of exams, term paper and
record of attendance of the students involved to the petitioner, the latter r aised the in a university
council meeting where it was agreed that the University President, Dr. Edmundo Prantilla, would
create a committee to investigate the complaint.
In a letter dated August 10, 1995, Dr. Daleon apologized for the delay in responding to
petitioner’s letter-request dated June 15, 1995. Dr. Daleon admitted that he made special
arrangements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson regarding their course without petitioner’s
approval.
Thereafter, petitioner wrote Dr. Prantilla recommending that Agulo, Tecson and Alaba be
required to attend regular classes in school year 1995-1996 and comply with the course
requirements in Ed.D. 317. Dr. Prantilla approved the recommendations. On December 1, 1995,
Dr. Prantilla entertained the appeal of Agulo for the validation of the grades given by Dr. Daleon
to the three of them. On December 23, 1995, the Board of Regents passed its Resolution No.
2432 Series of 1995, upholding the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo.
Consequently, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit against Dr. Daleon before the
Ombudsman. On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr., graft
investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, dismissing the administrative and
criminal complaints against respondents.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit in an
Order dated September 10, 1997. Being denied by the Ombudsman, petitioner now appeals to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Dr. Daleon has the academic freedom to choose on how his subject is taught?
HELD:
Yes.
Institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for
itself, its aims and objectives and the methods on how best to attain them, free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint.

1956
It encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” The right of the
school to confirm and validate the teaching method of Dr. Daleon is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., “how it shall be taught.”
As applied to the case at bar, academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the widest
latitude to innovate and experiment on the method of teaching which is most fitting to his
students (graduate students at that), subject only to the rules and policies of the university.
Considering that the Board of Regents, whose task is to lay down school rules and policies of the
University of Southeastern Philippines, has validated his teaching style, we see no reason for
petitioner to complain before us simply because he holds a contrary opinion on the matter.

1958
Civil Service Commission v. Sojor

G.R. No. 168766
May 22, 2008
FACTS:
Herein respondent, Henry Sojor, is the president of Central Visayas Polyteching College
in Dumaguete. He was appointed by the president, subsequently reappointed to the board of
trustees to govern as a body for the college. Eventually Sojor was charged with (1) Dishonesty,
Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Document; (2) Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct , and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; and (3) Nepotism, filed by employees of
the college with the petitioner, the Civil Service Commission. Sojor argued that the CSC has no
jurisdiction over him since he was appointed by the president, and he further stated that he
cannot be removed from his position by any body or official, for according to RA 8292, only the
board of trustees can remove university officials. Despite this, the CSC ordered resolutions
suspending the respondent and proceeding with the investigation. Respondent then sought
remedy by appealing to the CA, who then ruled in his favor stating that the resolutions passed by
the CSC are void, permanently enjoining the latter from proceeding with the investigation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the petitioner has no jurisdiction in issuing
the subject resolutions.
HELD:
1. Yes.
The Court ruled that the Constitution itself grants to the CSC administration over the entire
civil service. This embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. The CSC rules state
that except as otherwise provided by any law or the constitution, the CSC shall have the fin al
authority to decide upon the removal, suspension or separation of all officers and employees in
the civil service, involving matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such
officers. The respondent argues that the academic freedom of the college is infringed on, for only
the board of trustees has the power to remove university officials. This was however found
untenable by the Court since the CSC has concurrent jurisdiction with the board, when it comes
to disciplining officials of the civil service. The CSC has jurisdiction over the case since the
respondent violated civil service rules, for which he is directly answerable to the CSC.

1958
Regino v. Pangasinan
G.R. No. 156109
Nov. 18 2004
Art III XIV Sec 5
FACTS:
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent
Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went
to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives. During the second semester of
school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle
A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the “Rave Party and Dance
Revolution,” the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school’s tennis and
volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the pr ice of P100 each. The
project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with
additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to
take the final examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and
celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the
scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers -- Respondents
Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from taking the
tests. According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates
were taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that
she was not permitting petitioner and another student to take their statistics examinations for
failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner’s pleas
ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions
as compliance with PCST’s policy.
On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint [5] for damages against
PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. In her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages;
P500,000 as moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual
damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorney’s fees.
On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss [6] on the ground of petitioner’s failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the
determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should
have been initiated before the proper administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education
(CHED).
In her Comment to respondents’ Motion, petitioner argued that prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies was unnecessary, because her action was not administrative in nature,
but one purely for damages arising from respondents’ breach of the laws on human relations. As
such, jurisdiction lay with the courts.
On July 12, 2002, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may use academic freedom as a defense.

1958
HELD: NO.
According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an

academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it
shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.
In Garcia v. the Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, the Court upheld the
respondent therein when it denied a female student’s admission to theological studies in a
seminary for prospective priests. The Court defined the freedom of an academic institution thus:
“to decide for itself aims and objectives and how best to attain them x x x free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.”
In Tangonan v. Paño, the Court upheld, in the name of academic freedom, the right of the school
to refuse readmission of a nursing student who had been enrolled on probation, and who had
failed her nursing subjects. These instances notwithstanding, the Court has emphasized that once
a school has, in the name of academic freedom, set its standards, these should be meticulously
observed and should not be used to discriminate against certain students.
After accepting them upon enrollment, the school cannot renege on its contractual obligation on
grounds other than those made known to, and accepted by, students at the start of the school
year. In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action against
respondents, and that it should not have been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is
not holding respondents liable for the acts complained of. That will have to be ruled upon in due
course by the court a quo.

1a Const2 Digests Article IV V Xiii Xiv

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1870

Spouses Dacudao v. SOJ

Prepared by: Kazel Celeste

Valles vs. COMELEC

Prepared by: Nae Bainto

Prepared by: Roxanne Marion Balisnomo 1

Prepared by: Roxanne Marion Balisnomo 2

Prepared by: Juan Paolo P. Bañadera

Prepared by: Juan Paolo P. Bañadera

1. A copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ,

Thus this appeal.

• Yes. The court stated that:

Prepared by: Betty Belle Irene S. Fabe 1

Prepared by: Betty Belle Irene S. Fabe 2

CO v. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and ONG

Prepared by: Krisppina Krissanta A. Caraan 1

prevail over the letter thereof.”

Petitions dismissed. Decision of HRET affirmed.

Prepared by: Krisppina Krissanta A. Caraan 2

Prepared by: Kazel Celeste

Prepared by: Kazel Celeste

Prepared by: Raymond John Cheng 1

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Annex B – R.A No. 9139

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Section 4. Disqualifications, - The following are not qualified to be naturalized as Filipino

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SEPARATE OPINIONS (GENERAL):

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LABO, JR. v. COMELEC

Prepared by: Janine Ysabel A. Guzman 1

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ISSUE: Whether Labo is an Australian citizen?

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ISSUE: Whether respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship?

Prepared by: Liz Angela A. Intia

Prepared by: Betty Belle Irene S. Fabe 1

Prepared by: Betty Belle Irene S. Fabe 2

Prepared by: Chloe Chrysilla A. Laxa 1

Prepared by: Chloe Chrysilla A. Laxa 2

Prepared by: FAJARDO, Reniel Kian 1

Prepared by: FAJARDO, Reniel Kian 2

Prepared by: FAJARDO, Reniel Kian 1

Prepared by: FAJARDO, Reniel Kian 2

Prepared by: Jerrick M. Lim

of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions

Prepared by: Jerrick M. Lim

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto 1

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto 2

1895 Cordora v. COMELEC

Prepared by: Juan Samuel Ismael Loyola 1

Prepared by: Janine Ysabel A. Guzman 1

Prepared by: Janine Ysabel A. Guzman 2

Prepared by: Liz Angela A. Intia

Prepared by: Chloe Chrysilla A. Laxa 1

Prepared by: Chloe Chrysilla A. Laxa 2

Prepared by: Chloe Chrysilla A. Laxa 3

Prepared by: Jerrick M. Lim

RA 9225: the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003

Prepared by: Jerrick M. Lim

Prepared by: Mary Louise M. Ramos 1