CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 1

TITLE 3: CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC Section 3. Chapter One, Title Three of the
ORDER Revised Penal Code is hereby further amended by
adding a new article as follows:
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How
committed. — The crime of rebellion or "Art. 134-A. Coup D′ÉTAT. – How committed. –
The crime of coup D′ÉTAT is a swift attack
insurrection is committed by rising publicly and
taking arms against the Government for the accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, directed against duly
purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
constituted authorities of the Republic of the
Government or its laws, the territory of the
Philippines, or any military camp or installation,
Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body
communications networks, public utilities or other
of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the
facilities needed for the exercise and continued
Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
possession of power, singly or simultaneously
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. (As
amended by R.A. 6968). carried out anywhere in the Philippines by any
person or persons, belonging to the military or
Republic Act No. 6968 October 24, 1990 police or holding any public office or employment,
with or without civilian support or participation, for
AN ACT PUNISHING THE CRIME OF COUP the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power."
D′ÉTAT BY AMENDING ARTICLES 134, 135
AND 136 OF CHAPTER ONE, TITLE THREE OF Section 4. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code
ACT NUMBERED THIRTY-EIGHT HUNDRED is hereby amended to read as follows:
AND FIFTEEN, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER "Art. 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or
PURPOSES coup D′ÉTAT. – Any person who promotes,
maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:: "Any person merely participating or executing the
commands of others in a rebellion or insurrection
Section 1. The heading of Chapter One, Title shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.
Three of the Revised Penal Code is hereby
amended to read as follows: "REBELLION, COUP "Any person who leads or in any manner directs or
D′ÉTAT, SEDITION AND DISLOYALTY". commands others to undertake a coup D′ÉTAT
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Section 2. Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code
is hereby amended to read as follows: "Any person in the government service who
participates, or executes directions or commands
"Article 134. Rebellion or insurrection – How of others in undertaking a coup D′ÉTAT shall suffer
committed. – "he crime of rebellion or insurrection the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
is committed by rising and taking arms against the period.
Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the "Any person not in the government service who
territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any participates, or in any manner supports, finances,
part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other abets or aids in undertaking a coup D′ÉTAT shall
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their period.
powers or prerogatives."
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"When the rebellion, insurrection, or coup D′ÉTAT G.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995
shall be under the command of unknown leaders,
any person who in fact directed the others, spoke PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
for them, signed receipts and other documents appellee,
issued in their name, or performed similar acts, on vs.
behalf of the rebels shall be deemed a leader of ELIAS LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-
such rebellion, insurrection, or coup D′ÉTAT." appellant.

Section 5. Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code KAPUNAN, J.:

is hereby amended to read as follows:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was
"Art. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga,
D′ÉTAT, rebellion or insurrection. – The Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked
conspiracy and proposal to commit coup D′ÉTAT beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist,
shall be punished by prision mayor in its minimum aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and
period and a fine which shall not exceed eight fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other
thousand pesos (P8,000.00). companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen
policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After
"The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion taking the latter's gun, the man and his
or insurrection shall be punished, respectively, by companions boarded a tricycle and fled.1
prision correccional in its maximum period and a
fine which shall not exceed five thousand pesos The incident was witnessed from a distance of
(P5,000.00), and by prision correccional in its about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year
medium period and a fine not exceeding two old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that
thousand pesos (P2,000.00)." he knew both the victim and the man who fired the
fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at
Section 6. Repealing Clause. – All laws, the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his
executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part nephew (appellant's father was his first cousin)
thereof inconsistent herewith are deemed and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact
repealed or modified accordingly. that the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.

Section 7. Separability Clause. – If for any Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss
reason, any section or provision of this Act, or any from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the
part thereof, or the application of such section, chest, and other parts of the body.2 On autopsy,
provision, or portion is declared invalid or the municipal health officer established the cause
unconstitutional, the remainder thereof shall not be of death as hypovolemic shock.3
effected by such declaration.
As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial
Section 8. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect prosecutor of Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an
upon its approval and publication in at least two (2) Information charging accused-appellant Elias
newspapers of general circulation. Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Information reads:

That on or about the 27th day of July,

1992, at more or less 5:30 o'clock in
the afternoon, at Burgos Street,
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Municipality of Daraga, Province of
Albay, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, together
with Gilberto Longasa, who is
already charged in Crim. Case No.
5931 before RTC, Branch I, and
three (3) others whose true identities
are at present unknown and remain
at large, conniving, conspiring,
confederating and helping one
another for a common purpose,
armed with firearms, with intent to kill
and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS
LUCILO, a member of the Daraga
Police Station, inflicting upon the
latter multiple gunshot wounds
causing his death, to the damage
and prejudice of his legal heirs.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder. The dispositive portion of said decision,
dated September 24, 1993 states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing considerations, this Court
finds the accused ELIAS
LOVEDIORO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal, acting
in conspiracy with his co-accused
who are still at large, of the crime of
murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with all the accessories
provided by law; to pay the heirs of
the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo
through the widow, Mrs. Remeline
Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos representing
the civil indemnity for death; to pay
the said widow the sum of Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos
representing reasonable moral
damages; and to pay the said widow
the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five
Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00)
Pesos, representing actual
damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment however, in case of
insolvency on the part of the said
accused.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue
interposed is that portion of trial court decision
finding him guilty of the crime of murder and not
rebellion.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's
principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting
his claim that he should have been charged with
the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he
asseverates that Armenta, a police informer,
identified him as a member of the New People's
Army. Additionally, he contends that because the
killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance
of subversive ends,"4 (said killing) should have
been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion
under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal
shot but merely acted as a look-out in the
liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have
been charged merely as a participant in the
commission of the crime of rebellion under
paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code and should therefore have been meted only
the penalty of prison mayor by the lower court.
Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted
appellant of the crime of murder, the Solicitor
General avers that the crime committed by
appellant may be considered as rebellion only if
the defense itself had conclusively proven that the
motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was
for "political and subversive ends."5 Moreover, the
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Solicitor General contends that even if appellant crimes as may be committed to

were to be convicted of rebellion, and even if the
trial court had found appellant guilty merely of
being a participant in a rebellion, the proper
imposable penalty is not prision mayor as
appellant contends, but reclusion temporal,
because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by
Republic Act
No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law,
prescribes reclusion temporal as the penalty
imposable for individuals found guilty as
participants in a rebellion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime
committed was murder and not rebellion.
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6968, rebellion is
committed in the following manner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government for the
purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its
laws, the territory of the Republic of
the Philippines or any part thereof, of
any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature wholly
or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.6
achieve a political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive.
If a crime usually regarded as
common, like homicide, is
perpetrated for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance "to the
Government the territory of the
Philippine Islands or any part
thereof," then it becomes stripped of
its "common" complexion, inasmuch
as, being part and parcel of the crime
of rebellion, the former acquires the
political character of the latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any
ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different
color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion,
which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of
murder. In deciding if the crime committed is
rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for
our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was
done in furtherance of a political end. The political
motive of the act should be conclusively
demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating
political motive falls on the defense, motive, being
a state of mind which the accused, better than any
individual, knows. Thus, in People
10
v. Gempes, this court stressed that:

The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed Since this is a matter that lies
public uprising against the government.7 By its peculiarly with (the accused's)
very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of knowledge and since moreover this
masses or multitudes involving crowd action, is an affirmative defense, the burden
which cannot be confined a prioriwithin is on them to prove, or at least to
predetermined bounds.8 One aspect noteworthy in state, which they could easily do
the commission of rebellion is that other acts personally or through witnesses, that
committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed they killed the deceased in
in the crime itself because they acquire a political furtherance of the resistance
character. This peculiarity was underscored in the movement.
case of People v. Hernandez,9 thus:
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is
In short, political crimes are those not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly
directly aimed against the political proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential
order, as well as such common components of the crime. With either of these
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elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally Noting the importance of purpose in cases of
does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act rebellion the court in Enrile vs. Amin further
complained of were committed simultaneously underscored that:
with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing,
robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private [I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor.
purposes or profit, without any political motivation, If Senator Ponce Enrile is not
it has been held that the crime would be separately charged with rebellion and he
punishable as a common crime and would not be harbored or concealed Colonel
absorbed by the crime rebellion.11 Honasan simply because the latter is
a friend and former associate, the
Clearly, political motive should be established motive for the act is completely
before a person charged with a common crime — different. But if the act is committed
alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible with political or social motives, that is
imposable penalty — could benefit from the law's in furtherance of rebellion, then it
relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. should be deemed to form part of the
Instructive in this regard is the case of Enrile v. crime of rebellion instead of being
12
Amin, where the prosecution sought to charge punished separately.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D.
No. 1829,13 for allegedly harboring or concealing It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is
in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the established and proved, the accused should be
senator's knowledge that Honasan might have convicted of the common crime and not of
committed a crime. This Court held, against the rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to
prosecution's contention, that rebellion and the act, and mere membership in an organization
violation of P.D 1829 could be tried dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not,
separately14 (on the principle that rebellion is by and of itself, suffice.
based on the Revised Penal Code while P.D. 1829
is a special law), that the act for which the senator The similarity of some of the factual circumstances
was being charged, though punishable under a of People v. Ompad, Jr.,16 to the instant case is
special law, was absorbed in the crime of rebellion striking. Two witnesses, both former NPA recruits
being motivated by, and related to the acts for identified the accused Ompad, alias "Commander
which he was charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as having led
Nos. 92163 and 92164) a case decided on June 5, three other members of the NPA in the liquidation
1990. Ruling in favor of Senator Enrile and holding of Dionilo Barlaan, a military informer, also in a
that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829 rebel infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an
cannot prosper because a separate prosecution NPA hitman, Ompad was merely charged with and
for rebellion had already been filed and in fact convicted of murder, not rebellion because political
decided, the Court said: motive was neither alleged nor proved.

The attendant circumstances in the
instant case, however constrain us to
rule that the theory of absorption in
rebellion cases must not confine
itself to common crimes but also to
offenses under special laws which
are perpetrated in furtherance of the
political offense.15
As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the
act committed was impelled by a political motive
lies on the accused. Political motive must be
alleged in the information.17 It must be established
by clear and satisfactory evidence. In People
v. Paz and Tica we held:
That the killing was in pursuance of
the Huk rebellion is a matter of
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 6

mitigation or defense that the duly constituted government. It is

accused has the burden of proving therefore not hard to comprehend
clearly and satisfactorily. The lone that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was
uncorroborated assertion of committed as a means to or in
appellant that his superiors told him furtherance of the subversive ends of
of Dayrit being an informer, and his the NPA.22
suspicion that he was one such, is
neither sufficient or adequate to By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously
establish that the motivation for the argues for a different result in the case at bench.
killing was political, considering He states that accused-appellant's belated claims
appellant's obvious interest in to membership in the NPA were not only
testifying to that effect.18 insubstantial but also self serving23 an averment to
which, given a thorough review of the
Similarly, in People v. Buco,19 the Court stressed circumstances of the case, we fully agree. He
that accused in that case failed to establish that the states:
reason for the killing of their victim was to further
or carry out rebellion. The evidence adduced by [In the case cited] the appellants,
the defense therein simply showed that appellant admittedly members of the NPA,
Francisco Buco was ordered by Tomas clearly overcame the burden of
Calma, alias "Commander Sol" to kill municipal proving motive or intent. It was
mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence shown that the political motivation for
likewise showed that Calma was induced by an the killing of the victim was the fact
acquaintance, a civilian, to order the killing on that Ragaul was suspected as an
account of private differences over a ninety (90) informer for the PC. The perpetrators
hectare piece of land. The court attributed no even left a letter card, a drawing on
political motive for the killing, though committed by the body of Ragaul as a warning to
known members of the Hukbalahap movement.20 others not to follow his example. It is
entirely different in the case at bar
People v. Dasig21 has a factual milieu almost where the evidence for the appellant
similar to the instant case. There, the Court held merely contains self-serving
that "the act of killing a police officer, knowing too assertions and denials not
well that the victim is a person in authority is a substantial enough as an indicia of
mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act political motivation in the killing of
done in furtherance of a rebellion." In Dasig the victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo.24
Court however noted that the accused, who was
charged with murder, not only admitted his In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by
membership with the NPA but also executed an counsel, admitted in his extrajudicial confession to
extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a having participated in the killing of Lucilo as
member of an NPA "sparrow unit," a fact to which follows:
even the Solicitor General, in his brief therein was
in agreement. The Solicitor General's brief Q What was that
in Dasig which this Court favorably quoted, noted incident if any, please
that: narrate?

[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation A July 27, 1992 at

squad of the New People's Army with more or less 12:00
the objective of overthrowing the noon. I am at home,
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 7

three male person a TINAMPO PALUWAS"

certain alias ALWIN, A (This is the place
LIAS SAMUEL and the towards the
other one unknown to poblacion), so, I placed
me, fetched me and myself just ahead of a
told me to go with small store, my three
them, so I asked them (3) companions
where, Alwin handed continue walking
me a hand gun and towards poblacion,
same he stopped/call a later on a policeman
passenger jeepney sporting white T-shirt
and told me board on and a khaki pant was
said jeepney. (sic) walking towards me,
while the said
Q Please continue. policeman is nearly
approaching me,
A Upon reaching ALWIN shot the said
Daraga, Albay fronting policeman in front of
Petron Gasoline the small store, when
Station, we alighted on the said policeman fell
said jeep, so we walk on the asphalted road,
towards Daraga ALWIN took the
Bakery we stopped service firearm of the
walking due to it is said policeman, then
raining, when the rain we ran towards the
stopped we continue subdivision, then my
walking by using the two (2) companions
road near the bakery. commanded a tricycle
(sic) then we fled until we
reached a hill wherein
Q When you reached there is a small bridge,
Daraga bakery, as you thereafter Ka Samuel
have said in Q. 7 you took the handgun that
used the road near the was handed to me by
bakery where did you them at Pilar,
proceed? Sorsogon. (sic)

A I am not familiar with Q Do you know the

that place, but I and my policeman that was
companion continue killed by your
walking, at more less companion?
4:30 P.M. July 27,
1992 one of my A I just came to know
companion told us as his name when I
to quote in Bicol reached home and
dialect, to wit: "AMO heard it radio, that he is
NA YADI AN JESUS LUCILO. (sic)
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Q What is your the gun wielder, by the testimony of the appellant

participation in the himself.
group?
In any case, appellant's claim regarding the
A Look-out sir. political color attending the commission of the
crime being a matter of defense, its viability
Q I have nothing more depends on his sole and unsupported testimony.
to asked you what He testified that, upon the prodding of aliasAlwin
else, if there is any? and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of
(sic) the organization's
31
goals. He claimed that his two companions shot
A No more sir.25 Lucilo because he "had offended our
organization,"32 without, however, specifying what
It bears emphasis that nowhere in his the "offense" was. Appellant claimed that he had
entire extrajudicial confession did appellant ever been a member of the NPA for five months before
mention that he was a member of the New the shooting incident.33
People's Army. A thorough reading of the same
reveals nothing which would suggest that the As correctly observed by the Solicitor General,
killing in which he was a participant was motivated appellant's contentions are couched in terms so
by a political purpose. Moreover, the information general and non-specific34 that they offer no
filed against appellant, based on sworn explanation as to what contribution the killing
statements, did not contain any mention or allusion would have made towards the achievement of the
as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of NPA's subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a
SPO3 Lucilo.26 Even prosecution eyewitness mere policeman, was never alleged to be an
Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to
sworn statement of October 19, 1992. 27 have offended the NPA. Against appellant's
attempts to shade his participation in the killing
As the record would show, allegations relating to with a political color, the evidence on record leaves
appellant's membership in the NPA surfaced the impression that appellant's bare allegations of
almost merely as an afterthought, something membership in the NPA was conveniently infused
which the defense merely picked up and followed to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him. It is of
through upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's judicial notice that in many NPA infested areas,
testimony on cross-examination that he knew crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the
appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of
however, in the same testimony, Armenta admitted political color for the purpose of mitigating the
that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as an imposable penalty when in fact they are no more
NPA member.28The logical result, of course, was than ordinary crimes perpetrated by common
that the trial court did not give any weight and criminals. In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice
credence to said testimony. The trial court, after all, Narvasa aptly observed:
had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a
witness' testimony while upholding the rest of The existence of rebellious groups in
29 our society today, and of numerous
it. While disbelieving the portion of Armenta's
testimony on appellant's alleged membership in bandits, or irresponsible or deranged
the NPA, the trial court correctly gave credence to individuals, is a reality that cannot be
his unflawed narration about how the crime was ignored or belittled. Their activities,
30 the killings and acts of destruction
committed. Such narration is even corroborated
in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity of and terrorism that they perpetrate,
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 9

unfortunately continue unabated WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the

despite the best efforts that the
Government authorities are exerting,
although it may be true that the
insurrectionist groups of the right or
the left no longer pose a genuine
threat to the security of the state. The
need for more stringent laws and
more rigorous law-enforcement,
cannot be gainsaid.35
trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993,
sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby
AFFIRMED, in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima,
Jr., JJ., concur.

In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence

pointing to a political motive for the killing of SPO3
Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court
correctly convicted appellant of the crime of
murder.36 It is of no moment that a single
eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it
is settled that the testimony of one witness, if
credible and positive, is sufficient to
37
convict. Against appellant's claims that he acted
merely as a look-out, the testimony of one witness,
his blood relative, free from any signs of
impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict
the accused.38Moreover, neither may lack of
motive be availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack
or absence of motive for committing a crime does
not preclude conviction, there being a reliable
eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified
appellant as the perpetrator of the felony. 39 In the
case at bench, the strength of the prosecution's
case was furthermore bolstered by accused-
appellant's admission in open court that he and the
eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.
against each other.40
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the appellee,
court below. The attack delivered by appellant was vs.
sudden, and without warning of any kind.41 The RODRIGO DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @
killing having been qualified by treachery, the ARMAND; EDWIN NUÑEZ Y TABANAS @
crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the MABI; ALVIN DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN; ROGER
Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any DOE @ KA JAMES @ KA PEPE; TUDING
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial ANDRINO @ KA ERMI @ KA ROEL @ KA
court was correct in imposing the penalty GRINGO MONTAYRE; RUBEN DOE @ KA
of reclusion perpetua together with all the RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO ECHAVEZ;
accessories provided by law. ANASTACIO BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND
CARLITO MAGASIN @ BOBBY, accused,
RODRIGO DASIG, accused-appellant.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 10

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. victim is a person in authority is a mere component
or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
Kinaadman and Archival for accused-appellant. furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a
basis of a separate charge.
SYLLABUS
3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, SENTENCE LAW (R.A. 4203). — The
AS A RULE, ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION; NOT Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The settled persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203),
jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General.
admissible until the accused successfully proves Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the
that it was given as a result of violence, penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
intimidation, threat or promise of reward or P20,000.00 to any person who promotes,
leniency. Appellant relies on the much abused maintains, or heads a rebellion.
claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally
defective and hence, should not have been DECISION
admitted and considered by the trial judge. This
accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere NOCON, J p:
refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to
avoid criminal liability, he now questions the Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead
integrity of the police authorities and the reputation the reversal of his conviction by the Regional Trial
of the lawyer who stood by him during the Court, Branch 28, Mandaue City finding him guilty
investigation. Indubitably established and now a of Murder with Direct Assault.
matter of record is the fact that appellant was
assisted by Atty. Parawan who even signed the He was charged together with Edwin Nuñez and 6
former's sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter others who are still at large, in an information which
of record that before appellant made his extra- reads:
judicial confession, he was first asked if he was
amenable to the services of Atty. Parawan to which "That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in
query he answered affirmatively. Finally, the the city of Mandaue, of this Honorable Court, the
alleged use of force and intimidation has not been aforenamed accused, conspiring and
substantiated by evidence other than his self- confederating together and helping one another,
serving testimony. as has been pointed out, such with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation,
allegation is another naive effort of appellant to abuse of superior strength and use of motor
back track from his prior voluntary admission of vehicle, all armed with unlicensed firearms, did
guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
confession was done with regularity and legality. attack, assault and shoot one Redempto Manatad,
a police officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion
2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE which caused his death soon thereafter, knowing
CRIME OF DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN beforehand that the victim was a policeman who
FURTHERANCE THEREOF. — The crime of was then in the performance of his official duties."
rebellion consists of may acts. It is a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nuñes
and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the
rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed prosecution had presented its first witness,
absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act accused Nuñes changed his plea of "not guilty" to
of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the "guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 11

the promulgation of a judgment against said and Edwin Nuñes trying to escape. The team of
accused until the prosecution had finished Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nuñes and
presenting its evidence. While trial was still confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3
ongoing, Nuñez died on March 10, 1989, thereby magazines and ammunitions, while the group of
extinguishing his criminal liability. Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a
grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left
The facts surrounding this case show that in the upper arm and subsequently apprehended. A .38
afternoon of August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto caliber revolver with 17 live ammunitions were
Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene confiscated from him.
Catamora were tasked by their commanding
officer to assist in canning the traffic at M.N. Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for
Briones and Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue City. treatment, while Nuñes was turned over to the
Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting facility; Pfc. Metrodiscom for investigation. Meanwhile, Dasig
Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora was interrogated by M/Sgt. Ariston Ira of the PC
acted as back-up and posted himself at Norkis Criminal Investigation Service on August 19, 1987
Trading building. at his hospital bed at the Lapulapu Army Hospital
in Cebu City. Assisting Dasig during the
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. interrogation was Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the
Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom Creer Law Office, who was requested by the
he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously. military to represent appellant who did not have a
He noticed one of them giving instructions to two lawyer. Before the start of the interrogation, Atty.
of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed Parawan asked appellant whether he was willing
the two, but sensing that they were being followed, to avail of his services, to which appellant agreed.
they immediately proceeded to the middle of the M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of his
road and engaged Pfc. Catamora to a gun battle. constitutional rights. The interrogation was
At that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a series of conducted in Cebuano upon appellant's request.
shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc.
Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being out- Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin
numbered and to save his own life, Pat. Catamora Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted
sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where that he and Nuñes were members of the sparrow
he saw two (2) persons take Pfc. Manatad's gun unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and
and again fired at him to make sure that he is dead "Mabi," respectively. The extra-judicial confession
while the rest of the group including Nuñes acted of appellant marked as Exhibit "J" 2 was signed by
as back up. Thereafter, the Nuñes group him on every page thereof with the first page
commandeered a vehicle and fled from the scene containing a certification likewise signed by him,
of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that which states: "I hereby certify that the herein
he can identify accused-appellant Nuñes because statement is free and voluntary, and that I am
of a mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye assisted by my counsel in the course of this
which he noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3 investigation" followed by the signed conformity of
meters in front of him together with his Atty. Parawan. The extra-judicial confession was
companions. subscribed and sworn to before Cebu City Asst.
Fiscal Salvador Solima.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers
were tasked to conduct surveillance on a In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the
suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow procedure by which his extra-judicial confession
unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon was taken was legally defective, and contrary to
reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig his Constitutional rights. He further contends that
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 12
assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. A No.
Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple
rebellion and not murder with direct assault. xxx xxx xxx
Appellant also claims that the custodial
interrogation was done while he was still very sick
and consequently, he could not have fully
appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a
serious offense. That even with the presence of
counsel, his extra-judicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence as said counsel did not
actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In
effect, his presence was merely to give a
semblance of legality to the proceedings and not
to protect appellant against possible abuses of the
investigator. Dasig, likewise questions the sincerity
of Atty. Parawan in protecting his rights
considering that the latter is a known anti-
Communist advocate and that the law firm to which
he belongs has represented high ranking officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador
Solima in his certification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated
that he had personally examined the affiant and
that he is convinced that the latter's statement was
free and voluntary and that the affiant signed the
same in his presence and swore under oath as to
the veracity of everything therein. Atty. Fortunato
L. Parawan also testified that he assisted the
affiant from the start of the investigation up to its
termination. Atty. Parawan testified thus:
"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?
A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the
whereabout of Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced
myself as a lawyer. So they informed me the room
of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time I introduced myself
as a lawyer who came to assist the person of
Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had a confrontation with
Rodrigo Dasig, I asked him whether he was willing
to get me as his lawyer in that investigation. Then
he told me yes.
Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his Q Was that reduced to writing?
own choice?
Q In other words he accepted your services as
counsel in connection with that investigation which
was about to be made?
A Yes.
Q Who are the persons present at that time?
A There were guards outside and inside. There
was a man from the CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira,
myself and Dasig.
Q What happened after that?
A The CIS started the investigation.
Q You mean this Ariston Ira?
A Yes.
Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation
was Dasig informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent, to counsel and if he chooses to
testify or say something, that statement of his will
be used against or in his favor in the court of
justice?
A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that
investigation.
Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights
what transpired next?
A The investigation started.
Q Were you present at the very start of that
investigation?
A Yes. I was present from the start until it was
finished.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 13

A Yes. would be amenable to be assisted by him as his

counsel of his own choice.
xxx xxx xxx
"The prosecution's evidence further show that Atty.
Q You said you were present during the entire Fortunato Parawan after consenting to be his
investigation. Were the answers of the accused, counsel was with him when his extra-judicial
Rodrigo Dasig, to the questions propounded by the confession or sworn statement was subscribed
investigator voluntary? and sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal
Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office
A Yes, they voluntary. who, before accused has actually affixed his
signature on each and every pages of his extra-
Q After the investigation was finished what judicial confession, has informed him (accused) of
transpired next? his constitutional rights and has explained the
contents of his extra-judicial confession.
A After the investigation, I think that was already
past 3:00 or 4:00, we proceeded to the office of the "Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City
City Fiscal at F. Ramos St., Cebu City and then we Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's
proceeded to the Office of Fiscal Solema (sic) and Office, clearly shows that accused in executing the
then it was subscribed there before Fiscal Solema same has done so voluntarily and after having
(sic). understood the contents thereof which is in the
visayan language, a language known to him, found
Q Were you present during the proceeding? on the last page thereof now marked as Exhibit "J-
7-B."
A I was also present."
"Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused
We do not find any reason to doubt the factual Dasig is collaborated by the sworn statement of his
findings and conclusions of the trial court that the co-accused Edwin Nuñes dated August 18, 1987
extra-judicial confession of the appellant was which is sworn and subscribed to before City Fiscal
voluntarily made. Said the trial court: Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal's Office of Cebu
City."
"The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that
herein accused during his investigation was The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a
properly informed and appraised of his confession is admissible until the accused
constitutional right to remain silent and to have a successfully proves that it was given as a result of
competent and independent counsel preferably of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward
his own choice but since at that time he did not or leniency. 5 The case of People of the Philippines
signify his intention to retain a lawyer of his own v. Parojinog is four square to the case at bar. In
choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the Parojinog this court had this to say:
person of Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer
Law Office who was available at that time, to assist "Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his
him during the custodial investigation conducted choice, Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987
by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospital bed at Camp Constitution provides:
Lapulapu Army Station Hospital, Cebu City where
he was confined after being hit on his upper left 'Sec. 12(1). — Any person under investigation for
arm and in fact, Atty. Parawan only consented to the commission of an offense shall have the right
assist herein accused after the latter has answered to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
in the affirmative to his question as to whether he have competent and independent counsel
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 14

preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot taking of his extra-judicial confession was done
afford the services of counsel he must provided with regularity and legality.
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.' Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's
argument that granting he is guilty, what he
"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that committed was a political crime of simple rebellion,
a person under investigation for the commission of and hence he should not be convicted of murder
an offense may choose his own counsel but if he with direct assault.
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. While the initial choice of the The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-
lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the appellant on this point as manifested in the
police investigators, the accused really has the People's brief, which We quote:
final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen
for him and ask for another one. In the instant "However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the
case, the records show that no objection was lower court erroneously convicted him of Murder
voiced by the accused throughout the entire with Assault Upon a Person in Authority, instead of
proceedings of the investigation and afterwards Rebellion.
when he subscribed to its veracity before City
Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently "Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against
acquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He the government, among other means. (Article 135,
complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was Revised Penal Code). In this case, appellant not
not his choice only during trial. Thus it was too only confessed voluntarily his membership with the
late." sparrow unit but also his participation and that of
his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad while
Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the
extra-judicial confession was legally defective and afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice
hence, should not have been admitted and that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the
considered by the trial judge. This accusation is New People's Army with the objective of
whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is
appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of
criminal liability, he now questions the integrity of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in
the police authorities and the reputation of the furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.
lawyer who stood by him during the investigation. Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of
Indubitably established and now a matter of record rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a
is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. person in authority."
Parawan who even signed the former's sworn
declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a
before appellant made his extra-judicial vast movement of men and a complex net of
confession, he was first asked if he was amenable intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance
to the services of Atty. Parawan to which query he of rebellion though crimes in themselves are
answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion.
fore and intimidation has not been substantiated 9 The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well
by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. that the victim is a person in authority is a mere
As has been pointed out, such allegation is component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done
another naive effort of appellant to back track from in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a
his prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the basis of a separate charge.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 15

Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 SO ORDERED.

We held that where the accused who was charged
with murder admitted his membership with the Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla and Regalado, JJ ., concur.
NPA and the killing of a suspected PC informer,
the crime committed is not murder but rebellion
punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code.

As to the proper imposable penalty, the

Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to
persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203),
contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General.
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00 to any person who promotes,
maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the
case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that
appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a
matter of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by
Pfc. Catamora as the person giving instructions to
the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.

Appellant merely participated in committing the G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991
act, or just executed the command of an unknown
leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,
prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA,
likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL,
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
indemnity. vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE
Premises considered, We uphold the findings of VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
the trial court that the extra-judicial confession was GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
legally obtained. However, appellant being a
confessed member of the sparrow unit, the G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
liquidation squad of the New People's Army whose
objective is to overthrow the duly constituted AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO
government, the crime committed is simple BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
rebellion and not murder with direct assault. vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON
WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found MONTANO, respondents.
guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8)
years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.
indemnity. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 16

T. ANONUEVO and RAMON Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos.

CASIPLE, petitioners, 84581-82
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in
VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL. REX G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES,
S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No.
Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp 85727.
Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
RESOLUTION
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA PER CURIAM:p
AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A.
OCAYA, petitioners, Before the Court are separate motions filed by the
vs. petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. reconsideration of the Court's decision
HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for
MARIANO, respondents. brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the
following dispositive part:
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.
FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for
ESPIRITU, petitioner, petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby
vs. ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO P10,000.00. No costs.
REYES, respondents.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991 ruling a begins with the statement that the decision
did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do —
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party
HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. or New People's Army member is a valid ground
NAZARENO: ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner, for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the
vs. decision merely applied long existing laws to the
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE factual situations obtaining in the several petitions.
MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar
MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI organizations and penalizing membership therein
SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this
AROJADO,respondents. connection, if these laws no longer reflect the
thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 as the elected representative of the people — not
and G. R. No. 83162. the Court — that should repeal, change or modify
them.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 17

In their separate motions for reconsideration, legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is
petitioners, in sum, maintain: illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit
released.
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding
the validity of the questioned arrests made
without warrant, and in relying on the
provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the
Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court
the fact that such arrests violated the before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990,
constitutional rights of the persons arrested; looked into whether their questioned arrests
without warrant were made in accordance with
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance
Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned; with law, would follow that the detention resulting
from such arrests also in accordance with law.

3. That the decision erred in considering the

admissions made by the persons arrested There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no
as to their membership in the Communist peace officer or person has the power or authority
Party of the Philippines/New People's to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except
Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The
firearms, ammunitions and subversive law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is
documents found in their possession at the found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
time of arrest, inasmuch as those which states the grounds upon which a valid
confessions do not comply with the arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
requirements on admissibility of
extrajudicial admissions; In the present cases, the focus is understandably
on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said
4. That the assailed decision is based on a Rule 113, which read:
misappreciation of facts;
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) — A peace officer or a private person
should not be deemed moot and academic. may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he

arrested has committed, is actually
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration. committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for committed, and he has personal knowledge
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by of facts indicating that the person to be
petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ arrest has committed it; and
of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful . . . (Emphasis supplied).
restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special
proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 18
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the
arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without
warrant is justified it can be said that, within the
contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural)
was committing an offense, when arrested
because Dural was arrested for being a member of
the New People's Army, an outlawed organization,
where membership penalized, 7 and for
subversion which, like rebellion is, under the
doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8a continuing offense,
thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and other crimes and
offenses committed in the furtherance (sic)
on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto,
or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all
in the nature of continuing offenses which
set them apart from the common offenses,
aside from their essentially involving a
massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the
CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not
cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he
was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several
persons who the day before his arrest, without
warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2)
CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural
had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as
part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member)
did not end there and then. Dural, given another
opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other
policemen anywhere as agents or representatives
of organized government. It is in this sense that
subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is
perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike
other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery,
murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are
anchored on an ideological base which compels
the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded
on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was
based on "probable cause," as supported by actual
facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it
may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case,
that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5,
paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt
without warrant: first, that the person to be
arrested has just committed an offense,
and second, that the arresting peace officer or
private person has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested is the one
who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule
113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without
warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts"
acquired by the arresting officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of
facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in
the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officers making
the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil
case and in the other cases at bar.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 19
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on
1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes
Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify
a confidential information which was received by
their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member)
who had been admitted to the said hospital with a
gunshot wound; that the information further
disclosed that the wounded man in the said
hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows"
who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the
day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00
o'clock noon, before a road hump along
Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City;
that based on the same information, the wounded
man's name was listed by the hospital
management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two
(22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City
Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the
arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA
member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a
gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed
reasonable and with cause as it was based on
actual facts and supported by circumstances
sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member
was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts
supported by circumstances are: first — the day
before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario,
Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including
Dural; second — a wounded person listed in the
hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually
then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a
gunshot wound; third — as the records of this case
disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address
entered in the hospital records were fictitious and
the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante
arresting officers merited their immediate attention delicto which justified their outright arrests without
and action and, in fact, it was found to be true.
Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential
information of the arresting officers to the effect
that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes
Hospital was actually received from the attending
doctor and hospital management in compliance
with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore,
came from reliable sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also
be coupled with acts done in good faith by the
officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that
the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed
to have conducted the same in good faith,
considering that law enforcers are presumed to
regularly perform their official duties. The records
show that the arresting officers did not appear to
have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is
therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of
Dural was made in compliance with the
requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section
5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a
few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an
information charging double murder with assault
against agents of persons in authority was filed
against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He
was thus promptly placed under judicial custody
(as distinguished fro custody of the arresting
officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of
the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on
appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-
84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their
arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They
were searched pursuant to search warrants issued
by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed
firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 20

warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. subversive documents and live ammunitions, and
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a she admitted then that the documents belonged to
few davs after their arrests without warrant, her. 18
informations were filed in court against said
petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial 4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13
mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by August 1988, when they arrived at the said house
announcing to this Court during the hearing of of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date;
these petitions that he had chosen to remain in that when the agents frisked them, subversive
detention in the custody of the authorities. documents, and loaded guns were found in the
latter's possession but failing to show a permit to
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the possess them. 19
"in flagrante" cases are:
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested,
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May
information imparted by a former NPA about the 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito
operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the
and that a certain house occupied by one Renato CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a
Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time
Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-
Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions
view of this information, the said house was placed and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
under military surveillance and on 12 August
1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by
court, a search of the house was conducted; that
when Renato Constantine was then confronted he It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque,
could not produce any permit to possess the Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that
firearms, ammunitions, radio and other the reason which compelled the military agents to
communications equipment, and he admitted that make the arrests without warrant was the
he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16 information given to the military authorities that two
(2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato
Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon)
were being used by the CPP/NPA for their
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at operations, with information as to their exact
the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of location and the names of Renato Constantine and
12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
courier and he had with him letters to Renato
Constantine and other members of the rebel And at the time of the actual arrests, the following
group. circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple),
which confirmed the belief of the military agents
that the information they had received was true
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia and the persons to be arrested were probably
Roque was a consequence of the arrest of guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first:
Buenaobra who had in his possession papers search warrant was duly issued to effect the
leading to the whereabouts of Roque;17 that, at search of the Constantine safehouse; second:
the time of her arrest, the military agents found found in the safehouse was a person named
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 21

Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a
ranking member of the CPP, and found in his
possession were unlicensed firearms and
communications equipment; third: at the time of
their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed
firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive
documents, and they admitted ownership thereof
as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And
then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively
identified by their former comrades in the
organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of
these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said
arrested persons. The records also show that, as
in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant
made by the military agents in the Constantino
safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house,
do not appear to have been ill-motivated or
irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing
before, during and after the arrest of the afore-
named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque,
Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can
say that it would have been better for the military
agents not to have acted at all and made any
arrest. That would have been an unpardonable
neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary
action against the peace officers involved.
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines
not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty
of committing the crime for which they were
arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable
cause" is the reason that can validly compel the
peace officers, in the performance of their duties
and in the interest of public order, to conduct an
arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers
more than what the law requires of them. Under
the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the
arrested persons are later found to be innocent
and acquitted, the arresting officers are not
liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the
said conditions, the arresting officers can be held
liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November
1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis
of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988,
at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and
Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at
a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he
said, among other things:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa

magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest
lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of and that the police authorities were present during
executive and judicial authorities upon whom the press conference held at the National Press
devolves the duty to investigate the acts Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu
constituting the alleged violation of law and to called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus
prosecute and secure the punishment drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was
therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any
an administrative measure. The power to arrest "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-
without warrant is without limitation as long as the quoted language which, in the perception of the
requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest
in peace and order in our communities. Many persons may differ as to the validity of such
perception and regard the language as falling
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution.
is conducted in accordance with the conditions set But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist,
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 22

during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he promptly, even without warrant, (after the police
was just exercising his right to free speech were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen
regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it (14) days to prevent possible flight.
was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers
to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the As shown in the decision under consideration, this
words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of
another thing. In the balancing of authority and Nazareno noted several facts and events
freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:
times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale
in favor of authority but only for purposes of the . . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his
arrest(not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court
arrest without warrant), an information charging
has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2)
reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed
wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Let it also be noted that supervening events have Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal
made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For Case No. 731.
Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a
quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a
appear. Because of this development, the defense motion to post bail but the motion was denied by
asked the court a quo at the resumption of the the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989,
hearings to dismiss the case. Case against even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his
Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the
provisionally dismissed and his bail bond same trial court.
cancelled.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the
Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00 to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court
Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and
arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as thereafter resolve the petition.
one of his companions during the killing of Bunye
II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February
1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
without warrant, for investigation. 29 Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution
denying the petition for habeas corpus, it
appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the
custody of the respondents by reason of an
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 information filed against him with the Regional
December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad
warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact,
14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso
Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of
that the police authorities came to know that the evidence against him).
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the
killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 23

This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a
of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of
informations against them were filed in court. The the case on the merits.
arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on
probable cause and supported by factual As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs.
circumstances. They complied with conditions set Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be abandoned,
forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not this Court finds no compelling reason at this
arbitrary or whimsical arrests. time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of
prevailing conditions where national security and
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that liability are still directly challenged perhaps with
Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is
quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion important is that everv arrest without warrant be
perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of tested as to its legality via habeas
conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look
pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still into — and all other appropriate courts are
undocketed). enjoined to do the same — the legality of the arrest
without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec.
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this
ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall
of an extrajudicial admission. forthwith be ordered released; but if such
conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be
made to languish in his detention but must be
promptly tried to the end that he may be either
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as
he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On the warranted by the evidence.
other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she
admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, A Final Word
ammunition and subversive documents found in
her possession during her arrest, belonged to her. This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that
mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
The Court, it is true, took into account the member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground
admissions of the arrested persons of their for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their Court predicated the validity of the questioned
ownership of the unlicensed firearms, arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on
ammunitions and documents in their possession. mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on
But again, these admissions, as revealed by the compliance with the conditions set forth in Section
records, strengthen the Court's perception that 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law,
truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers and which, for stress, are probable
based their arrests without warrant, are supported cause and good faith of the arresting peace
by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the
were probably guilty of the commission of certain records show, the actual facts and
offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 circumstances supporting the arrests. More than
of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, the allure of popularity or palatability to some
on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon
which their warrantless arrests were predicated.
The task of determining the guilt or innocence of
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 24

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration

of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED.
This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, [G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956.]
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.

RESOLUTION

CONCEPCION, J.:

This refers to the petition for bail filed

by Defendant Appellant Amado Hernandez on
June 26, 1954, and renewed on December 22,
1955. A similar petition, filed on December 28,
1953, had been denied by a resolution of this court
dated February 2, 1954. Although not stated in
said resolution, the same was due mainly to these
circumstances: The prosecution maintains that
Hernandez is charged with, and has been
convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders,
arsons and robberies, for which the capital
punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed,
although the lower court sentenced him merely to
life imprisonment. Upon the other hand, the
defense contends, among other things, that
rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson,
or robbery. Inasmuch as the issue thus raised had
not been previously settled squarely, and this court
was then unable, as yet, to reach a definite
conclusion thereon, it was deemed best not to
disturb, for the time being, the course of action
taken by the lower court, which denied bail to the
movant. After mature deliberation, our considered
opinion on said issue is as follows:

The first two paragraphs of the amended

information in this case read:

“The undersigned accuses (1) Amado V.

Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman alias Amado
alias AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 25

Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G. in fact synchronized the activities of the CLO with
Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias the rebellious activities of the HMB and other
Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo Saulo agencies, organs and instrumentalities of the
alias Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5) Communist Party of the Philippines and have
Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro otherwise master- minded or promoted the
de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio alias Arong, cooperative efforts between the CLO and HMB
(7) Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano and other agencies, organs, and instrumentalities
Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny of the P.K.P. in the prosecution of the rebellion
2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William, (10) Jacobo against the Republic of the Philippines, and being
Espino, (11) Amado Racanday, (12) Fermin then also high ranking officers and/or members of,
Rodillas, and (13) Julian Lumanog alias Manue, of or otherwise affiliated with, the Communist Party of
the crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively
and robberies committed as follows: engaged in an armed rebellion against the
Government of the Philippines through acts
“That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some therefor committed and planned to be further
time before the said date and continuously committed in Manila and other places in the
thereafter until the present time, in the City of Philippines, and of which party the ‘Hukbong
Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ (HMB), otherwise or
chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious formerly known as the ‘Hukbalahaps’ (Huks), is the
activities in the different parts of the Philippines, armed force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
the said accused, conspiring, confederating, and and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain,
cooperating with each other, as well as with the cause, direct and/or command the ‘Hukbong
thirty-one (31) Defendants charged in criminal Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ (HMB) or the
cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270, 14315, and ‘Hukbalahaps’ (Huks) to rise publicly and take
14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or
(decided May 11, 1951) and also with others otherwise participate in such armed public
whose whereabouts and identities are still uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory
unknown, the said accused and their co- of the Philippines from the allegiance to the
conspirators, being then officers and/or members government and laws thereof as in fact the said
of, or otherwise associated with the Congress of ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ or
Labor Organizations (CLO) formerly known as the ‘Hukbalahaps’ have risen publicly and taken arms
Committee on Labor Organization (CLO), an to attain the said purpose by then and there
active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the making armed raids, sorties and ambushes,
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), with attacks against police, constabulary and army
central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as
or associated labor unions and other ‘mass a necessary means to commit the crime of
organizations’ in different places in the Philippines,rebellion, in connection therewith and in
and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, furtherance thereof, have then and there
fully cooperates in, and synchronizes its activities committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder,
with the rebellious activities of the ‘Hukbong arson, and planned destruction of private and
Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other organs, public property to create and spread chaos,
agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the
Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby assure, accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as
facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent follows, to wit:
success of the armed rebellion against the
Republic of the Philippines, as the “Then follows a description of the murders, arsons
herein Defendants and their co-conspirators have and robberies allegedly perpetrated by the
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 26

accused “as a necessary means to commit the 4. “exacting contributions or”

crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof.” 5. “diverting public funds from the lawful purpose
for which they have been appropriated”.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:
Whether performed singly or collectively, these
“When a single act constitutes two or more grave five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense,
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a and no more, and are, altogether, subject to only
necessary means for committing the other, the one penalty — prision mayor and a fine not to
penalty for the most serious crime shall be exceed P20,000. Thus for instance, a public officer
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum who assists the rebels by turning over to them, for
period.” use in financing the uprising, the public funds
entrusted to his custody, could neither be
It is obvious, from the language of this article, that prosecuted for malversation of such funds, apart
the same presupposes the commission of two (2) from rebellion, nor accused and convicted of the
or more crimes, and, hence, does not apply when complex crime of rebellion with malversation of
the culprit is guilty of only one crime. public funds. The reason is that such malversation
is inherent in the crime of rebellion committed by
Article 134 of said code reads: him. In fact, he would not be guilty of rebellion had
he not so misappropriated said funds. In the
“The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed imposition, upon said public officer, of the penalty
by rising publicly and taking arms against the for rebellion it would even be improper to consider
Government for the purpose of removing from the the aggravating circumstance of advantage taken
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the by the offender of his public position, this being an
territory of the Philippine Islands or any part essential element of the crime he had perpetrated.
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed Now, then, if the office held by said offender and
forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the the nature of the funds malversed by him cannot
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their aggravate the penalty for his offense, it is clear that
powers or prerogatives.” neither may it worsen the very crime committed by
the culprit by giving rise, either to an independent
Pursuant to Article 135 of the same code “any crime, or to a complex crime. Needless to say, a
person, merely participating or executing the mere participant in the rebellion, who is not a public
commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the officer, should not be placed at a more
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.” disadvantageous position than the promoters,
maintainers or leaders of the movement, or the
The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a public officers who join the same, insofar as the
fine not to exceed P20,000 for “any person who application of Article 48 is concerned.
promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or
insurrection or who, while holding any public office One of the means by which rebellion may be
or employment, takes part therein”: committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by
“engaging in war against the forces of the
1. “engaging in war against the forces of the government” and “committing serious violence” in
government”, the prosecution of said “war”. These expressions
imply everything that war connotes, namely; chan
2. “destroying property”, or roblesvirtualawlibraryresort to arms, requisition of
property and services, collection of taxes and
3. “committing serious violence”, contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 27
property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the
hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in
its wake — except that, very often, it is worse than
war in the international sense, for it involves
internal struggle, a fight between brothers, with a
bitterness and passion or ruthlessness seldom
found in a contest between strangers. Being within
the purview of “engaging in war” and “committing
serious violence”, said resort to arms, with the
resulting impairment or destruction of life and
property, constitutes not two or more offense, but
only one crime — that of rebellion plain and simple.
Thus, for instance, it has been held that “the crime
of treason may be committed ‘by executing either
a single or similar intentional overt acts, different
or similar but distinct, and for that reason, it may
be considered one single continuous offense.
(Guinto vs. Veluz, 77 Phil., 801, 44 Off. Gaz.,
909.)” (People vs. Pacheco, 93 Phil., 521.)
Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135
constitute, we repeat, one single crime, it follows
necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for the
application of Article 48, which requires therefor
the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence,
this court has never in the past, convicted any
person of the “complex crime of rebellion with
murder”. What is more, it appears that in every one
of the cases of rebellion published in the Philippine
Reports, the Defendants were convicted of simple
rebellion, although they had killed several persons,
sometimes peace officers (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3
Phil., 472; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs.
Baldello, 3 Phil., 509, U. S. vs. Ayala, 6 Phil.,
151; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryLeague vs.
People, 73 Phil., 155).
Following a parallel line are our decisions in the
more recent cases of treason, resulting from
collaboration with the Japanese during the war in
the Pacific. In fact, said cases went further than the
aforementioned cases of rebellion, in that the
theory of the prosecution to the effect that the
accused in said treason cases were guilty of the
complex crime of treason with murder and other
crimes was expressly and repeatedly rejected
therein. Thus, commenting on the decision of the
People’s Court finding the accused in People vs.
Prieto (80 Phil., 138, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329) “guilty
of cralawthe crime of treason complexed by
murder and physical injuries” and sentencing him
to death, and on the contention of the Solicitor
General that Prieto had committed the “complex
crime of treason with homicide”, this court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Tuason, said:
“The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects
mentioned in these counts and the infliction of
physical injuries on others are not offenses
separate from treason. Under the Philippine
treason law and under the United States
constitution defining treason, after which the
former was patterned, there must concur both
adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and
comfort. One without the other does not make
treason.
“In the nature of things, the giving of aid and
comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of
action. Its very nature partakes, of a deed or
physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical
activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision.
Even so, when the deed is charged as an element
of treason it becomes identified with the latter
crime and cannot be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason
to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code provides. Just as one cannot be
punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for
smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be
held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in
a prosecution for robbery, because possession of
opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not
a Defendant be made liable for murder as a
separate crime or in conjunction with another
offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason. Where murder or
physical injuries are charged as overt acts of
treason they cannot be regarded separately under
their general denomination.” (Italics supplied.)
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 28

Accordingly, we convicted the accused of simple In People vs. Vilo 82 Phil., 524, 46 Off. Gaz., 2517,
treason and sentenced him to life imprisonment. we held:

In People vs. Labra, 81 Phil., 377, 46 Off. Gaz., “The People’s Court, however, erred in classifying
Supp. No. 1, p. 159, we used the following the crime as treason with murder. The killing of
language: Amado Satorre and one Segundo is charged as an
element of treason, and it therefore becomes
“The lower court found Appellant guilty not only of identified with the latter crime, and cannot be the
treason, but of murder, for the killing of Tomas subject of a separate punishment or used in
Abella, and, following the provisions of Article 48 combination with treason to increase the penalty
of the Revised Penal Code sentenced him to as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.”
death, the maximum penalty provided by article (People vs. Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz. 3329. See,
114. also People vs. Labra, L-886, 46 Off. Gaz., [Supp.
to No. 1], 159.)” (Italics supplied.)
“The lower court erred in finding Appellant guilty of
the murder of Tomas Abella. The arrest and killing To the same effect was our decision in People vs.
of Tomas Abella for being a guerilla, is alleged in Roble 83 Phil., 1, 46 Off. Gaz., 4207. We stated
count 3 of the information, as one of the elements therein:
of the crime of treason for which Appellant is
prosecuted. Such element constitute a part of the “The court held that the facts alleged in the
legal basis upon which Appellant stands convicted information is a complex crime of treason with
of the crime of treason. The killing of Tomas Abella murders, with the result that the penalty provided
cannot be considered as legal ground for for the most serious offense was to be imposed on
convicting Appellant of any crime other than its maximum degree. Viewing the case from the
treason. The essential elements of a given crime standpoint of modifying circumstances, the court
cannot be disintegrated in different parts, each one believed that the same result obtained. It opined
stand as a separate ground to convict the accused that the killings were murders qualified by
of a different crime or criminal offense. The treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of
elements constituting a given crime are integral evident premeditation, superior strength, cruelty,
and inseparable parts of a whole. In the and an armed band.
contemplation of the law, they cannot be used for
double or multiple purposes. They can only be “We think this is error. The tortures and murders
used for the sole purpose of showing the set forth in the information are merged in and
commission of the crime of which they form part. formed part of the treason. They were in this case
The factual complexity of the crime of treason does the overt acts which, besides traitorous intention
not endow it with the functional ability of worm supplied a vital ingredient in the crime.” (Italics
multiplication or amoeba reproduction. Otherwise, supplied.)
the accused will have to face as many
prosecutions and convictions as there are The accused in People vs. Delgado 83 Phil., 9, 46
elements in the crime of treason, in open violation Off. Gaz., 4213, had been convicted by the
of the constitutional prohibition against double People’s Court of “the crime of treason complexed
jeopardy.” (Italics supplied.) with the crime of murder” and sentenced to the
extreme penalty. In our decision, penned by Mr.
The same conclusion was reached in People vs. Justice Montemayor, we expressed ourselves as
Alibotod 82 Phil., 164, 46 Off. Gaz., 1005, despite follows:
the direct participation of the Defendant therein in
the maltreatment and killing of several persons.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 29

The Appellant herein was and is a Filipino citizen. “we find merit in the contention
His adherence to the Japanese forces of that Appellant should have not been convicted of
occupation and giving them aid and comfort by the so called ‘Complex crime of treason with
acting as their spy, undercover man, investigator, murder, robbery, and rape.’ The killings, robbery,
and even killer when necessary to cow and compel and raping mentioned in the information are
the inhabitants to surrender their firearms and therein alleged not as specific offenses but as
disclose information about the guerrillas has been mere elements of the crime of treason for which
fully established. His manner of investigation and the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in
maltreatment of some of his victims like Tereso and identified with the general charged they
Sanchez and Patricio Suico, was so cruel, brutal cannot be used in combination with the treason to
and inhuman that it is almost unbelievable that a increase the penalty under Article 48 of the
Filipino can commit and practice such atrocities Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto, L-399,
especially on his own countrymen. But, evidently, January 29, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz.,
war, confusion and opportunism can and do 3329.) Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty
produce characters and monster unknown during of treason only.” (Italics supplied.)
peace and normal times.
In People vs. Suralta, 85 Phil., 714, 47 Off. Gaz.,
“The People’s Court found the Appellant guilty of 4595, the language used was:
treason complexed with murder. The Solicitor
General, however, maintains that the offense “But the People’s Court erred in finding
committed is simple treason, citing the doctrine the Appellant guilty of the complex crime of
laid down by this court in the case of People vs. treason with murder, because murder was an
Prieto, (L-399, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329) but ingredient of the crime of treason, as we have
accompanied by the aggravating circumstance heretofore held in several cases. (Italics supplied.)
under Article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised
Penal Code, and not compensated by any This was reiterated in People vs. Navea, 87 Phil.,
mitigating circumstance, and he recommends the 1, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 12, p. 252:
imposition of the penalty of death. We agree with
the Solicitor General that on the basis of the ruling “The Solicitor General recommends that
of this court in the case of People vs. Prieto, supra, the Appellant be sentenced for the complex crime
the Appellant may be convicted only a treason, of treason with murder. We have already ruled,
and that the killing and infliction of physical injuries however, that where, as in the present case, the
committed by him may not be separated from the killing is charged as an element of treason, it
crime of treason but should be regarded as acts ‘becomes identified with the latter crime and
performed in the commission of treason, although, cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or
as stated in said case, the brutality with which the used in combination with treason to increase the
killing or physical injuries were carried out may be penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
taken as an aggravating circumstance.” (Italics provides.” (Italics supplied.)
supplied.)
The question at bar was, also, taken up in the case
and reduced the penalty from death to life of Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos (94 Phil.,
imprisonment and a fine of P20,000. 477), decided on February 26, 1954. The facts and
the rule therein laid down are set forth in our
Identical were the pertinent features of the case of unanimous decision in said case, from which we
People vs. Adlawan, 83 Phil., 194, 46 Off. Gaz., quote:
4299, in which, through Mr. Justice Reyes (A), we
declared:
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 30
“The Petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the
USAFFE during the last world war and at the time
of the filing of the present petition a lieutenant
colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was
on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under
Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code in an
information filed in the People’s Court. But before
the accused could be brought under the
jurisdiction of the court, he was on January 13,
1947, indicted for violations of Commonwealth Act
No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War,
before a military court created by authority of the
Army Chief of Staff, the indictment containing three
charges, two of which, the first and third, were
those of treason consisting in giving information
and aid to the enemy leaving to the capture of
USAFFE officers and men and other persons with
anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members
of the USAFFE to surrender and cooperate with
the enemy, while the second was that of having
certain civilians filled in time of war. Found
innocent of the first and third charges but guilty of
the second, he was on May, 8, 1947, sentenced by
the military court to life imprisonment.
“With the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic
Act No. 311 abolishing the People’s Court, the
criminal case in that court against
the Petitioner was, pursuant to the provisions of
said Act, transferred to the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga and there the charges of treason
were amplified. Arraigned in that court upon the
amended information, Petitioner presented a
motion to quash, challenging the jurisdiction of the
court and pleading double jeopardy because of his
previous sentence in the military court. But the
court denied the motion and, after Petitioner had
pleaded not guilty, proceeded to trial, whereupon,
the present petition for certiorari and prohibition
was filed in this court to have the trial judge desistmay be complexed with murder, when the former
from proceeding with the trial and dismiss the
case.
“It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in January 29, 1948.
the military court different from that charged in the
civil court and that even granting that the offense
was identical the military court had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the same because the
People’s Court had previously acquired jurisdiction
over the case with the result that the conviction in
the court martial was void. In support of the first
point, it is urged that the amended information filed
in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
contains overt acts distinct from those charged in
the military court. But we note that while certain
overt acts specified in the amended information in
the Zamboanga court were not specified in the
indictment in the court martial, they all are
embraced in the general charge of treason, which
is a continuous offense and one who commits it is
not criminally liable for as many crimes as there
are overt acts, because all overt act ‘he has done
or might have done for that purpose constitute but
a single offense.’ (Guinto vs. Veluz, 44. Off. Gaz.,
909; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs.
Pacheco, L-4750, promulgated July 31, 1953.) In
other words, since the offense charged in the
amended information in the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga is treason, the fact that the said
information contains an enumeration of additional
ovart acts not specifically mentioned in the
indictment before the military court is immaterial
since the new alleged overt acts do not in
themselves constitute a new and distinct offense
from that of treason, and this court has repeatedly
held that a person cannot be found guilty of
treason and at the same time also guilty of overt
acts specified in the information for treason even if
those overt acts, considered separately, are
punishable by law, for the simple reason that those
overt acts are not separate offenses distinct from
that of treason but constitute ingredients thereof.”
(Italics supplied.)
Thus, insofar as treason is concerned, the opinion
of this court, on the question whether said crime
was committed through the latter, and it is so
alleged in the information, had positively and
clearly crystalized itself in the negative as early as
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 31

We have not overlooked the decision in People vs. Code) specifically mentions the act of engaging in
Labra (L-1240, decided on May 12, 1949), the war and committing serious violence among its
dispositive part of which partly reads: essential elements — thus clearly indicating that
everything done in the prosecution of said war, as
“Wherefore, the verdict of guilty must be affirmed. a means necessary therefor, is embraced therein
Articles 48, 114 and 248 of the Revised Penal — unlike the provision on treason (Article 114,
Code are applicable to the offense of treason with Revised Penal Code) which is less explicit
murder. However for lack of sufficient votes to thereon.
impose the extreme penalty, the Appellant will be
sentenced to life imprisonment..” It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a
person in authority or an agent of a person in
Although it mentions Articles 48 and 248 of the authority may be committed with physical injuries
Revised Penal Code and “the offense of treason (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil., 162), homicide (People
with murder,” it should be noted that we affirmed vs. Lojo, 52 Phil., 390) and murder (U. S. vs.
therein the action of the People’s Court, which, Ginosolongo, 23 Phil., 171; chan
according to the opening statement of our roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil.,
decision, convicted Labra of “treason aggravated 385), and rape may be perpetrated with physical
with murder”. Besides, the applicability of said injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya, 34 Phil., 690), then
articles was not discussed in said decision. It is rebellion may, similarly, be complexed with
obvious, from a mere perusal thereof, that this murder, arson, or robbery. The conclusion does
court had no intention of passing upon such not follow, for engaging in war, serious violence,
question. Otherwise, it would have explained why physical injuries and destruction of life and
it did not follow the rule laid down in the previous property are inherent in rebellion, but not in assault
cases of Prieto, Labra (August 10, 1948), Alibotod, upon persons in authority or agents of persons in
Vilo, Roble, Delgado and Adlawan (supra), in authority or in rape. The word “rebellion” evokes,
which the issue was explicitly examined and not merely a challenge to the constituted
decided in the negative. Our continued adherence authorities, but, also, civil war, on a bigger or lesser
to this view in the subsequent cases of Suralta, scale, with all the evils that go with it, whereas,
Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo, without even a neither rape nor assault upon persons in authority
passing reference to the second Labra case, connotes necessarily, or even generally, either
shows that we did not consider the same as physical injuries, or murder. 1
reflecting the opinion of the court on said question.
At any rate, insofar as it suggests otherwise, the In support of the theory that a rebel who kills in
position taken in the second Labra case must be furtherance of the insurrection is guilty of the
deemed reversed by our decisions in said cases of complex crime of rebellion with murder, our
Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo. attention has been called to Article 244 of the old
Penal Code of the Philippines, reading:
It is true that treason and rebellion are distinct and
different from each other. This does not detract, “Los delitos particulares cometidos en una
however, from the rule that the ingredients of a rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, seran
crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are castigados respectivamente segun las
absorbed by the same and cannot be punished disposiciones de este Codigo.
either separately therefrom or by the application of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Besides “Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores seran
there is more reason to apply said rule in the crime penados como tales los jefes principales de la
of rebellion than in that of treason, for the law rebelion o sedicion.”
punishing rebellion (Article 135, Revised Penal
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 32

and to the following observations of Cuello Calon 2. “Impedir la celebracion dc las elecciones para
(Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 110), in relation thereto: Diputados a Cortes o Senadores en todo el Reino,
o la reunion legitima de las mismas.
“Se establece aqui que el en una rebelion o
sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, comete otros 3. “Disolver las Cortes o impedir la deliberacion
delitos (v.g., roba, mata o lesiona), sera de alguno de los Cuerpos Colegisladores o
responsable de estos ademas de los delitos de arrancarles alguna resolucion.
rebelion o sedicion. La dificultad consiste en estos
casos en separar los accidentes de la rebelion o 4. “Ejecutar cualquiera de los delitos previstos en
sedicion de los delitos independientes de estas, y el articulo 165.
como las leyes no contienen en este punto
precepto alguno aplicable, su solucion ha quedado 5. “Sustraer el Reino o parte de el o algun cuerpo
encomendada a los tribunales. La jurisprudencia de tropa de tierra o de mar, o cualquiera otra clase
que estos han sentado considera como accidentes de fuerza armada, de la obediencia del Supremo
de la rebelion o sedicion — cuya criminalidad Gobierno.
queda embedida en la de estos delitos, y, por
tanto, no son punibles especialmente — los 6. “Usar y ejercer por si o despojar a los Ministros
hechos de escasa gravedad (v.g., atentados, de la Corona de sus facultades constitucionales, o
desacatos, lesiones menos graves); chan impedirles o coartarles su libre ejercicio. (Articulo
roblesvirtualawlibrarypor el contrario, las 167, Codigo Penal de 1850. — Veanse las demas
infracciones graves, como el asesinato o las concordancias del articulo 181.)”
lesiones graves, se consideran como delitos
independientes de la rebelion o de la sedicion.” Thus, the Spanish Penal Code did not specifically
declare that rebellion includes the act of engaging
It should be noted, however, that said Article 244 in war against the forces of the Government and of
of the old Penal Code of the Philippines has not using serious violence for the purposes stated in
been included in our Revised Penal Code. If the Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. In view of
applicability of Article 48 to rebellion was this express statutory inclusion of the acts of war
determined by the existence of said Article 244, and serious violence among the ingredients of
then the elimination of the latter would be indicative rebellion in the Philippines, it is clear that the
of the contrary. distinction made by Cuello Calon between grave
and less grave offenses committed in the course
Besides, the crime of rebellion, referred to by of an insurrection cannot be accepted in this
Cuello Calon, was that punished in the Spanish jurisdiction. Again, if both classes of offenses are
Penal Code, Article 243 of which provides: part and parcel of a rebellion, or means necessary
therefor, neither law nor logic justifies the
“Son reos de rebelion los que se alzaren exclusion of the one and the inclusion of the other.
publicamente y en abierta hostilidad contra el In fact, Cuello Calon admits that “the difficulty lies
Gobierno para cualquiera de los in separating the accidents of rebellion or sedition
objetossiguientes: from the offenses independent therefrom.” Ergo,
offenses that are not independent therefrom, but
1. “Destronar al Rey, deponer al Regente o constituting an integral part thereof committed,
Regencia del Reino, o privarles de su libertad precisely, to carry out the uprising to its successful
personal u obligarles a ejecutar un acto contrario conclusion — are beyond the purview of Article
a su voluntad. 244. Indeed, the above quoted statement of Cuello
Calon — to the effect that grave felonies
committed in the course of an insurrection are
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 33
independent therefrom — was based upon a
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 5, 1872, which we find reported in the
Codigo Penal de Filipinas, by Jose Perez Rubio,
as follows:
“El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia en sentencia de
5 de Febrero de 1872, tiene declarado: Que segun
los articulos 184 del Codigo Penal de 1830, y 259
del reformado (1870), los delitos particulares
cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion o con motivo
de ellas se castigan respectivamente segun las
disposiciones de los mismos Codigos; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryy con arreglo al decreto de
amnistia de 9 de Agosto de 1876 estan solo
comprendidos en aquella gracia las personas
sentenciadas, procesadas o sujatas a noviembre 1906; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryla
responsabilidad por delitos politicos de cualquiera
especie -cometidos desde el 29 de Septiembre de
1868; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryQue el asesinato
del Gobernador Civil de Burgos no fue resultado
de movimiento alguno politico, sino de un mero
tumulto que imprimio el fanatismo, y cuya unica
aparente tendencia era impedir que aquel
funcionario inventariase ciertos objetos artisticos
que se decian existentes en la Catedral: Que esto
lo demuestran las salvajes voces de muerte
proferidas por los asesinos contra la persona del
Gobernador; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarysin que al
ejecutar en el mismo recinto del templo los
horrorosos hechos que aparecen en la causa,
alzasen bandera politica alguna ni dieran otro grito
que el, en aquel momento sacrilego e impio, de
‘Viva la religion:’ Que la apreciar la Sala
sentenciadora los hechos referentes al
Gobernador Civil de delito de asesinato, penarlo
con arreglo al Codigo y declarar inaplicable el
citado Decreto de Amnistia, no ha cometido el
error de derecho señalado en los casos 1.° 3.° del
articulo 4.° de la ley sobre establecimiento de la
casacion criminal, ni infringido los articulos 250 y
259 del Codigo Penal de 1870.” (Page 239; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryItalics supplied.) (See, also,
“El Codigo Penal”, by Hidalgo Garcia, Vol. I, p.
623.)’
It is apparent that said case is not in point. There
was no issue therein on whether murder may be
complexed with rebellion or sedition. The question
for determination was whether the killers of the
victim were guilty of the common crime of murder,
or should have been convicted only of rebellion or
sedition. The court adopted the first alternative, not
because of the gravity of the acts performed by the
accused, but because they had no political
motivation. Moreover, the Endnote: to said
quotation from Cuello Calon reads:
“Los atentados desacatos y lesiones a la autoridad
u otros delitos contra el orden publico cometidos
en la sedicion o con motivo de ella, no son delitos
distintos de la sedicion, 3 octubre 1903, 19
resistencia o acometimiento a la fuerza publica por
los sediciosos es accidente de la rebelion, 23
mayo 1890.
“El asesinato de un gobernador cometido en el
curso de un tumulto debe penarse como un delito
comun de asesinato, 5 febrero 1872. Sin embargo,
la jurisprudencia, tratandose de ciertos delitos, es
vacilante; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryasi, v. g., el
acometimiento al teniente de alcalde se ha
declarado en un fallo independiente de la
perturbacion tumultuaria promovida para impedir
al alcalde el cumplimiento de sus providencias, 16
marzo 1885, mientras que un hecho analogo se ha
considerado en otra sentenda ya citada como
accidente de la rebelion, 3 Octubre 1903. El
acometimiento de los sediciosos a la fuerza
publica es accidente de la sedicion y no uno de los
delitos particulares a que se refiere este articulo,
23 de mayo 1890. Entre estos delitos a que alude
el precepto se hallan las lesiones que puedan
causar los sediciosos, 19 noviembre 1906.”
(Endnote: 21, II Cuelo Calon, Derecho Penal, pp.
110-111.) (Italics supplied.)
Thus in a decision, dated May 2, 1934, the
Supreme Court of Spain held:
“Considerando que la nota deferencial entre los
delitos de rebelion y sedicion, de una parte, y el de
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 34

atentado, esta constituida por la circunstancia de sea licito el dividir este hecho y calificarlo de
alzamiento publico que caracteriza a los primeros, atentado respecto a las personas que agredieron
los cuales, por su indole generica, absorben a los a dicho alcalde, porque el acometimiento fue un
de atentado y demas infracciones que durante su accidente de la sedicion, de la cual eran todos
comision y con su motivo se cometan, y responsables, ya se efectuara por los agrupados
afirmandose como hecho en la sentencia recurrida en conjunto o por uno solo, por ser comun el objeto
que el procesado Mariano Esteban Martinez que se proponian y no individual; chan
realizo, en union de otros, el atendado que se le roblesvirtualawlibraryy al calificar y penar este
imputa sin alzarse publicamente, cae por su base hecho la Audencia de Gerona, de
el recurso fundado en supuesto distinto.” atentado cralaw, ha incurrido en error de derecho
(Jurisprudencia Criminal, Tomo 130, p. 551.) e infringido los articulos 250 y siguientes del
(Italics supplied.) Codigo Penal, por no haberlos aplicado, y el 263,
numero 2.°, en relacion con el 264, numeros 1.° y
To the same effect are, likewise, the following: 3.°, por su aplicacion cralaw” (Sent. 3 octubre
1903. — Gac. 12 Diciembre) (Enciclopedia
“La provocacion y el ataque a la Guardia Civil por Juridica Española, Tomo xxviii p. 250).
paisanos alzadoz tumultuariamente para impedir
al Delegado de un Gobernador civil el These cases are in accord with the text of said
cumplimiento de sus providencias, no pueden Article 244, which refers, not to all offenses
estimarse constitutivos de un delito distinto del de committed in the course of a rebellion or on the
sedicion, ni ser, por tanto, perseguidos y penados occasion thereof, but only to “delitos particulares”
separadamente. or common crimes. Now, what are “delitos
particulares” as the phrase is used in said article
“La resistencia o el acometimiento de los 244? We quote from Viada:
sublevados a la fuerza publica constituye, en su
caso, una circunstancia o accidente de la sedicion “Las disposicion del primer parrafo de este articulo
y no es delito de los que el Codigo Penal en este no puede ser mas justa; chan
articulo (formerly Article 244, now Article 227) roblesvirtualawlibrarycon arreglo a ella, los delitos
supone que pueden cometerse en ella o con su particulares o comunes cometidos en una rebelion
motivo, los cuales denomina delitos particulares, y er sedicion no deberan reputarse como accidentes
manda que se penen conforme a las disposiciones inherentes a estas, sino como delitos especiales,
del propio Codigo. (S. 23-5-890; chan a dicha rebelion y sedicion ajenos, los que
roblesvirtualawlibraryG. 23-6-890; chan deberan ser respectivamente castigados con las
roblesvirtualawlibraryt. 44; chan penas que en este Codigo se las señalan. Pero,
roblesvirtualawlibrarypagina 671)” (II Doctrina que delitos deberan considerarse como comunes,
Penal del Tribunal Supremo, p. 2411.) (Italics y cuales como constitutivos de la propia rebelion o
supplied.) sedicion? En cuanto a la rebelion, no ofrece esta
cuestion dificultad alguna, pues todo hecho que no
“La Audiencia condeno como autores de atentado este comprendido en uno y otro de los objetos
a dos de los amotinados que agredieron al alcalde, especificados en los seis numeros del articulo 243
e interpuesto recurso de casacion contra la sera extraño a la rebelion, y si se hallare definido
sentencia, el Tribunal Supremo la casa y anula, en algun otro articulo del Codigo, con arreglo a
teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto en el articulo 250 este debera ser castigado como delito particular.
(numero 3.°) del Codigo Penal; Pero tratandose de la sedicion, comprendiendose
como objetos de la misma, en los numeros 3.°, 4.°
‘Considerando que el acto llevado a cabo por el y 5.° del articulo 250, hechos que constituyen otros
grupo constituye una verdadera sedicion, sin que tantos ataques a las personas o a la propiedad,
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 35

cuales se consideran como accidentes inherentes
a la propria sedicion, y cuales deberan reputarse
como delitos particulares o comunes? En cuanto a
los casos de los numeros 4.° y 5.°, estimanos que
el objeto politico y social que se requiera para la
realizacion de los actos en aquellos comprendidos
es el que debe servirnos de norma y guia para
distinguir lo inherente a la sedicion de lo que es
ajeno o extraño a ella. Cuando no exista ese
objeto politico y social, el acto de odio o venganza
ejercido contra los particulares o cualquiera clase
del Estado, y el atentado contra las propiedades
de los ciudadanos o corporaciones mentados en
el numero 5.° del articulo 250, no seran
constitutivos del delito de sedicion, sino que
deberan ser apreciados y castigados como delitos
comunes, segun las disposiciones respectivas de
este Codigo — y por lo que toca a los actos de
odio o venganza ejercidos en la persona o bienes
de alguna Autoridad o sus agentes, estimamos
que deberan reputarse como delitos comunes
todos aquellos hechos innecesarios 2 para la
consecucion del fin particular que se propusieran
los sediciosos — y como esenciales, constitutivos
de la propia sedicion todos aquellos actos de odio
o venganza que sean medio racionalmente
necesario para el logro del objeto especial a que
se encaminaran los esfuerzos de los sublevados.
Asi, en el caso de la Cuestion 1 expuesta en el
comentario del articulo 258, es evidente que el fin
que se propusieron los sediciosos fue no pagar el
impuesto a cuya cobranza iba a proceder el
comisionado; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarypero
para lograr este objeto, como lo lograron, fue
preciso hacer salir del pueblo al ejecutor, y a este
efecto, lo amenazaron, lo persiguieron y llegaron
hasta lesionarle. Esas amenazas y lesiones no
pudieron apreciarse, ni las aprecio tampoco la
Sala sentenciadora, como delito comun, sino
como accidente inherente a la misma sedicion, por
cuanto fueron un medio racionalmente necesario
para la consecucion del fin determinado que se
propusieron los culpables.
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed
“Pero cuando tal necesidad desaparece, cuando against the political order, as well as such common
se hiere por herir, cuando se mata por matar, el crimes as may be committed to achieve a political
hecho ya, no puede ser considerado como un purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive.
accidente propio de la sedicion, sino como un
delito especial, al que debe aplicarse la pena al
mismo correspondiente.” (III Viada, pp. 311-312.)
(Italics supplied.)
Cuello Calon is even more illuminating. He says:
“La doctrina cientifica considera los delitos
llamados politicos como infracciones de un
caracter especial distintas de los denominados
delitos comunes. De esta apreciacion ha nacido la
division de los delitos, desde el punto de vista de
su naturaleza intrinseca, en delitos politicos y
delitos comunes o de derecho comun.
“Se reputan delitos comunes aquellos que
lesionan bienes juridicos individuales (v. gr., los
delitos contra la vida, contra la honestidad, contra
la propiedad, etc.)
“La nocion del delito politico no parece tan clara.
Desde luego revisten este caracter los que atentan
contra el orden politico del Estado, contra su orden
externo (independencia de la nacion, integridad
del territorio, etc.), o contra el interno (delitos
contra el Jefe del Estado, contra la forma de
Gobierno, etc.). Pero tambien pueden ser
considerados como politicos todos los delitos,
cualesquiera que sean incluso los de derecho
comun, cuando fueron cometidos por moviles
politicos. Deben, por tanto, estimarse como
infracciones de esta clase, no solo las que
objetivamente tengan tal caracter por el interes
politico que lesionan, sino tambien las que,
apreciadas subjetivamente, manifiestan una
motivacion de caracter politico.
“Asi podria formulares esta definicion: es delito
politico el cometido contra el orden politico del
Estado, asi como todo delito de cualquiera otra
clase determinado por moviles politicos.” (Cuello
Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo I, pp. 247-249.)
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 36
If a crime usually regarded as common like
homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance “to the Government
the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part
thereof,” then said offense becomes stripped of its
“common” complexion, inasmuch as, being part
and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former
acquires the political character of the latter.
Conformably with the foregoing, the case of
murder against the Defendant in U. S. vs.
Lardizabal (1 Phil., 729) — an insurgent who killed
a prisoner of war because he was too weak to
march with the retreating rebel forces, and could
not be left behind without endangering the safety
of the latter — was dismissed upon the ground that
the execution of said prisoner of war formed part
of, and was included in, the crime of sedition,
which, in turn, was covered by an amnesty, to the
benefits of which said Defendant was entitled.
True, in U. S. vs. Alfont (1 Phil., 115), the
commander of an unorganized group of insurgents
was, pursuant to Article 244 of our old Penal Code,
convicted of homicide for having shot and killed a
woman who was driving a vehicle. But the complex
crime of rebellion with homicide was not
considered in that case. Apart from this, the
accused failed to established the relation between
her death and the insurrection. What is more, it
was neither proved nor alleged that he had been
prompted by political reasons. In other words, his
offense was independent from the rebellion. The
latter was merely the occasion for the commission
of the former.
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned decisions
of this court and the Supreme Court of Spain in
cases of treason, rebellion and sedition, are in line
with the trend in other countries, as well as in the
field of international relations. Referring to the
question as to what offenses are political in nature,
it was said in In re Ezeta (62 Fed. Rep., 972):
“What constitutes an offense of a political
character has not yet been determined by judicial
authority. Sir James Stephens, in his work, History
of the Criminal Law of England (Volume 2, p. 71),
thinks that it should be ‘interpreted to mean that
fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for
extradition crimes if those crimes were incidental
to and formed a part of political disturbances.’ Mr.
John Stuart Mill, in the house of commons, in 1866,
while discussing an amendment to the act of
‘extradition, on which the treaty between England
and France was founded, gave this definition: Any
offense committed in the course of or furthering of
civil war, insurrection, or political commotion.’
Hansard’s Debates Vol. 184, p. 2115. In the
Castioni Case, supra, decided in 1891, the
question was discussed by the most eminent
counsel at the English bar, and considered by
distinguished judges, without a definition being
framed that would draw a fixed and certain line
between a municipal or common crime and one of
political character. ‘I do not think,’ said Denman, J.,
‘it is necessary or desirable that we should attempt
to put into language, in the shape of an exhaustive
definition, exactly the whole state of things, or
every state of things, which might bring a particular
case within the description of an offense of a
political character.’ In that case, Castioni was
charged with the murder of one Rossi, by shooting
him with a revolver, in the town of Bellinzona, in
the canton of Ticino, in Switzerland. The
deceased, Rossi, was a member of the state
council of the canton of Ticino. Castioni was a
citizen of the same canton. For some time previous
to the murder, much dissatisfaction had been felt
and expressed by a large number of inhabitants of
Ticino at the mode in which the political party then
in power were conducting the government of the
canton. A request was presented to the
government for a revision of the constitution of the
canton and, the government having declined to
take a popular vote on that question, a number of
the citizens of Bellinzona, among whom was
Castioni, seized the arsenal of the town, from
which they took rifles and ammunition, disarmed
the gendarmes, arrested and bound or handcuffed
several persons connected with the government,
and forced them to march in front of the armed
crowd to the municipal palace. Admission to the
palace was demanded in the name of the people,
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 37

and was refused by Rossi and another member of
the government, who were in the palace. The
crowd then broke open the outer gate of the
palace, and rushed in, pushing before them the
government officials whom they had arrested and
bound. Castioni, who was armed with a revolver,
was among the first to enter. A second door, which
was locked, was broken open, and at this time, or
immediately after, Rossi, who was in the passage,
was shot through the body with a revolver, and
died, very soon afterwards. Some other shots were
fired, but no one else was injured. Castioni fled to
England. His extradition was requested by the
federal council of Switzerland. He was arrested
and taken before a police magistrate, as provided
by the statute, who held him for extradition.
Application was made by the accused to the high
court of justice of England for a writ of habeas
corpus. He was represented by Sir Charles
Russell, now lord chief justice. The attorney
general, Sir Richard Webster, appeared for the
crown, and the solicitor general, Sir Edward
Clarke, and Robert Woodfal, for the federal council
of Switzerland. This array of distinguished counsel,
and the high character of the court, commends the
case as one of the highest authority. It appeared
from an admission by one of the parties engaged
in the disturbances ‘that the death of Rossi was a
misfortune, and not necessary for the rising.’ The
opinions of the judges as to the political character
of the crime charged against Castioni, upon the
facts stated, is exceedingly interesting, but I need
only refer to the following passages. Judge
Denman says:
“The question really is whether, upon the facts, it
is clear that the man was acting as one of a
number of persons engaged in acts of violence of
a political character with a political object, and as
part of the political movement and rising in which
he was taking part.’
“Judge Hawkins, in commenting upon the
character of political offenses, said: “I am not aware that any part of this Code has been
made the basis of treaty stipulations between any
‘I cannot help thinking that everybody knows there of the American nations, but the article cited may
are many acts of a political character done without be at least accepted as expressing the wisdom of
reason, done against all reason; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut at the same time one
cannot look too hardly, and weigh in golden scales
the acts of men hot in their political excitement. We
know that in heat, and in heated blood, men often
do things which are against and contrary to
reason; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut none the
less an act of this description may be done for the
purpose of furthering and in furtherance of a
political rising, even though it is an act which may
be deplored and lamented, as even cruel and
against all reason, by those who can calmly reflect
upon it after the battle is over.’
“Sir James Stephens, whose definition as an
author has already been cited, was one of the
judges, and joined in the views taken as to the
political character of the crime charged against
Castioni. The prisoner was discharged. Applying,
by analogy, the action of the English court in that
case to the four cases now before me, under
consideration, the conclusion follows that the
crimes charged here, associated as they are with
the actual conflict of armed forces, are of a political
character.
“The draft of a treaty on International Penal Law,
adopted by the congress of Montevideo in 1888,
and recommended by the International American
Conference to the governments of the Latin-
American nations in 1890, contains the following
provisions (Article 23):
‘Political offenses, offenses subversive of the
internal and external safety of a state or common
offenses connected with these, shall not warrant
extradition. The determination of the character of
the offense is incumbent upon the nations upon
which the demand for extradition is made; its
decision shall be made under and according to the
provisions of the law which shall prove to be most
favorable to the accused:’
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 38
leading jurists and diplomats. The article is
important with respect to two of its features: (1)
provides that a fugitive shall not be extradited for
an offense connected with a political offense, or
with an offense subversive of the internal or
external safety of the state; (2) the decision as to
the character of the offense shall be made under
and according to the provisions of the law which
shall prove most favorable to the accused. The first
provision is sanctioned by Calvo, who, speaking of
the exemption from extradition of persons charged
with political offenses, says:
‘The exemption even extends to acts connected
with political crimes or offenses, and it is enough,
as says Mr. Fuastin Helio; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat a common crime be
connected with a political act, that it be the
outcome of or be in the outcome of or be in the
execution of such, to be covered by the privilege
which protects the latter’ Calvo, Droit Int. (3me ed.)
p. 413, section 1262.
“The second provision of the article is founded on
the broad principles of humanity found everywhere
in the criminal law, distinguishing its administration
with respect to even the worst features of our
civilization from the cruelties of barbarism. When
this article was under discussion in the
international American conference in Washington,
Mr. Silva, of Colombia, submitted some
observations upon the difficulty of drawing a line
between an offense of a political character and a
common crime, and incidentally referred to the
crime of robbery, in terms worthy of some
consideration here. He said:
‘In the revolutions, as we conduct them in our
countries, the common offenses are necessarily
mixed up with the political in many cases. A
colleague General Caamaño (of Ecuador) knows
how we carry on wars. A revolutionist needs
horses for moving, beef to feed his troops,
etc.; since he does not go into the public markets
to purchase these horses and that beef, nor the
arms and saddles to mount and equip his forces,
he takes them from the first pasture or shop he find
at hand. This is called robbery everywhere, and is
a common offense in time of peace, but in time of
war it is a circumstance closely allied to the
manner of waging it.’ International American
Conference, Vol. 2, p. 615.” (Italics supplied.)
We quote the following from Endnote: (23) on
pages 249-250, Vol. I, of Cuello Calon’s aforesaid
work on “Derecho Penal.”
“En algunos Codigo y leyes de fecha proxima ya
se halla una definicion de estos delitos. El Codigo
penal ruso, en el articulo 58, define como ‘delitos
contra revolucionarios’ los hechos encaminados a
derrocar o debilitar el poder de los Consejos de
trabajadores y campesinos y de los gobiernos de
la Union de Republicas socialistas sovieticas, a
destruir o debilitar la seguridad exterior de la Union
de Republicas Sovieticas y las conquistas
economicas, politicas y nacionales fundamentales
de la revolucion proletaria.’ El Codigo Penal
italiano de 1930 considera en eu articulo 8.° como
delito politico ‘todo delito que ofenda un interes
politico del Estado o un derecho politico del
ciudadano.’ Tambien se reputa politico el delito
comun deteminado, en todo o en parte por motivos
politicos. En la ley alemana de extradicion de 25
diciembre 1929 se definen asi: ‘Son delitos
politicos los atentados punibles directamente
ejecutados contra la existencia o la seguridad del
Estado, contra el jefe o contra un miembro del
gobierno del Estado como tal, contra una
corporacion constitucional, contra los derechos
politicos las buenas relaciones con el extranjero.’
parrafo 3.°, 2.
“La 6a. Conferencia para la Unificacion del
Derecho penal (Copenhague, 31 agosto — 3
septiembre 1935) adopto la siguiente nocion del
delito politico:
“1. Por delitos politicos se entienden los dirigidos
contra la organizacion y funcionamiento del
Estado o contra los derechos que de esta
organizacion y funcionamiento provienen para el
culpable.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 39
“2. Tambien se consideran como delitos politicos
los delitos de derecho comun que constituyen
hechos conexos con la ejecucion de los delitos
previstos en seccion 1.°: como los hechos
dirigidos a favorecer la ejecucion de un delito
politico o a permitir al autor de este delito
sustraerse a la aplicacion de la ley penal.
“3. No se consideraran delitos politicos aquellos a word of Rodriguez Navarro:
los que su autor sea inducido por un motivo
egoista y vil.
“4. No se consideraran delitos los que creen un del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en
peligro para la comunidad o un estado de terror.” el principio pro reo.” (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
(Italics supplied.)
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and
jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the
proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of
their character as “common” offenses and assume
the political complexion of the main crime of which
they are mere ingredients, and, consequently,
cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty.
There is one other reason — and a fundamental
one at that — why Article 48 of our Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder
were not complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately (assuming that
this could be done), the following penalties would
be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the
crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000
and prision mayor, in the corresponding period,
depending upon the modifying circumstances
present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision
mayor; (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death,
depending upon the modifying circumstances
present. In other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty
could not be imposed upon him. However, under
Article 48, said penalty would have to be meted out
to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution,
would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted
for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of
sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that
which would be proper if the several acts
performed by him were punished separately. In the
“La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso
de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75
Supremo de España, p. 2168.) 3
We are aware of the fact that this observation
refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal
Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as
amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
“Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son
aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho
constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de
ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
“En estos casos solo se impondra la pena
correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado
maximo, hasta el limite que represente la suma de
las que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.
“Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este
limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado.”
(Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrino Penal del Tribunal
Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163.)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the
qualification inserted in said amendment,
restricting the imposition of the penalty for the
graver offense in its maximum period to the case
when it does not exceed the sum total of the
penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt
with separately. The absence of said limitation in
our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect
substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if
one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 40
be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than
that prescribed for each one of said offenses put
together. In directing that the penalty for the graver
offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum
period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose
than to prescribe a penalty lower than the
aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if
imposed separately. The reason for this
benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible.
When two or more crimes are the result of a single
act, the offender is deemed less perverse than
when he commits said crimes thru separate and
distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each
crime independently from the other, he must suffer
the maximum of the penalty for the more serious
one, on the assumption that it is less grave than
the sum total of the separate penalties for each
offense.
Did the framers of Article 48 have a different
purpose in dealing therein with an offense which is
a means necessary for the commission of
another? To begin with, the culprit cannot, then, be
considered as displaying a greater degree of
malice than when the two offenses are
independent of each other. On the contrary, since
one offense is a necessary means for the
commission of the other, the evil intent is one,
which, at least, quantitatively, is lesser than when
the two offenses are unrelated to each other,
because, in such event, he is twice guilty of having
harbored criminal designs and of carrying the
same into execution. Furthermore, it must be
presumed that the object of Article 48, in its
entirety, is only one. We cannot assume that the
purpose of the lawmaker, at the beginning of the
single sentence of which said article consists, was
to favor the accused, and that, before the sentence
ended, the former had a change of heart and
turned about face against the latter. If the second
part of Article 48 had been meant to be
unfavorable to the accused — and, hence, the
exact opposite of the first part — each would have
been placed in, separate provisions, instead of in
one single article. If the first part sought to impose,
upon the culprit, a penalty less grave than that
which he would deserve if the two or more offenses
resulting from his single act were punished
separately, then this, also, must be the purpose of
the second part, in dealing with an offense which
is a necessary means for the commission of
another.
The accuracy of this conclusion is borne out by the
fact that, since 1850, when the counterpart of our
Article 48 was inserted in the Penal Code of Spain,
or for over a century, it does not appear to have
been applied by the Supreme Court thereof to
crimes of murder committed in furtherance of an
insurrection.
Incidentally, we cannot accept the explanation that
crimes committed as a means necessary for the
success of a rebellion had to be prosecuted
separately under the provisions of Article 259 of
the Penal Code of Spain, which is the counterpart
of Article 244 of our old Penal Code. To begin with,
these articles are part of a substantive law. They
do not govern the manner or method of
prosecution of the culprits. Then again, said
precepts ordain that common crimes committed
during a rebellion or sedition, or on the occasion
thereof, “shall be respectively punished according
to the provisions of this Code.” Among such
provisions was Article 90 (later Article 71, then
Article 75) of the Spanish Penal Code, and Article
89 of our old Penal Code, of which Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code of the Philippines is a
substantial reproduction. Hence, had the Supreme
Court of Spain or the Philippines believed that
murders committed as a means necessary to
attain the aims of an uprising were “common”
crimes, the same would have been complexed
with the rebellion or sedition, as the case may be.
The cases of People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 64) and
People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 82) have not escaped
our attention. Those cases involved members of
the constabulary who rose publicly, for the purpose
of performing acts of hate and vengeance upon the
police force of Manila, and in an encounter with the
latter, killed some members thereof. Charged with
and convicted of sedition in the first case, they
were accused of murder in the second case. They
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 41

pleaded double jeopardy in the second case, upon other offenses is that “war” — within the purview of
the ground that the facts alleged in the information the laws on rebellion and sedition — may be
were those set forth in the charge in the first case, “waged” or “levied” without killing. This premise
in which they had been convicted. This plea was does not warrant, however, the conclusion —
rejected upon the ground that the organic law drawn therefrom — that any killing done in
prohibited double jeopardy for the same offense, furtherance of a rebellion or sedition is
and that the offense of sedition is distinct and independent therefrom, and may be complexed
different from that of murder, although both were therewith, upon the ground that destruction of
the result of the same act. human life is not indispensable to the waging or
levying of war. A person may kill another without
The question whether one offense was inherent in, inflicting physical injuries upon the latter, such, for
or identified with, the other was not discussed or instance, as by poisoning, drowning, suffocation or
even considered in said cases. Besides, the lower shock. Yet it is admitted that he who fatally stabs
court applied, in the murder case Article 89 of the another cannot be convicted of homicide with
old Penal Code — which is the counterpart of physical injuries. So too, it is undeniable that
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code — but this treason may be committed without torturing or
Court refused to do so. Again, simply because one murdering anybody. Yet, it is well-settled that a
act may constitute two or more offenses, it does citizen who gives aid and comfort to the enemy by
not follow necessarily that a person may be taking direct part in the maltreatment and
prosecuted for one after conviction for the other, assassination of his (citizen’s) countrymen, in
without violating the injunction against double furtherance of the wishes of said enemy, is guilty
jeopardy. For instance, if a man fires a shotgun at of plain treason, not complexed with murder or
another, who suffers thereby several injuries, one physical injuries, the later being — as charged and
of which produced his death, may he, after proven — mere ingredients of the former. Now
conviction for murder or homicide, based upon then, if homicide may be an ingredient of treason,
said fatal injury, be accused or convicted, in a why can it not be an ingredient of rebellion? The
separate case, for the non-fatal injuries sustained proponents of the idea of rebellion complexed with
by the victim? Or may the former be convicted of homicide,. etc., have not even tried to answer this
the complex crime of murder or homicide with question. Neither have they assailed the wisdom
serious and/or less serious physical injuries? The of our aforementioned decisions in treason cases.
mere formulation of these questions suffices to
show that the limitation of the rule on double
The Court is conscious of the keen interest
jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same
displayed, and the considerable efforts exerted, by
offense does not constitute a license for thethe Executive Department in the apprehension and
separate prosecution of two offenses resulting
prosecution of those believed to be guilty of crimes
from the same act, if one offense is an essential
against public order, of the lives lost, and the time
element of the other. At any rate, as regards this
and money spent in connection therewith, as well
phase of the issue, which was not touched in the
as of the possible implications or repercussions in
Cabrera cases, the rule therein laid down must
the security of the State. The careful consideration
necessarily be considered modified by our given to said policy of a coordinate and co-equal
decision in the cases of People vs. Labra (46 Off.
branch of the Government is reflected in the time
Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159) and Crisologo vs. consumed, the extensive and intensive research
People and Villalobos (supra), insofar as work undertaken, and the many meetings held by
inconsistent therewith. the members of the court for the purpose of
elucidating on the question under discussion and
The main argument in support of the theory of settling the same.
seeking to complex rebellion with murder and
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 42
The role of the judicial department under the
Constitution is, however, — clear — to settle
justiceable controversies by the application of the
law. And the latter must be enforced as it is — with
all its flaws and defects, not affecting its validity —
not as the judges would have it. In other words, the
courts must apply the policy of the State as set
forth in its laws, regardless of the wisdom thereof.
It is evident to us that the policy of our statutes on
rebellion is to consider all acts committed in
furtherance thereof — as specified in Articles 134
and 135 of the Revised: Penal Code — as
constituting only one crime, punishable with one
single penalty — namely, that prescribed in said
Article 135. It is interesting to note, in this
connection, that the penalties provided in our old
Penal Code (Articles 230 to 232) were much stiffer,
namely:
1. Life imprisonment to death — for the
promoters, maintainers and leaders of the
rebellion, and, also, for subordinate officers who
held positions of authority, either civil or
ecclesiastical, if the purpose of the movement was
to proclaim the independence of any portion of the
Philippine territory;
2. Reclusion temporal in its maximum period —
for said promoters, maintainers and leaders of the
insurrection, and for its subordinate officers, if the
purpose of the rebellion was any of those
enumerated in Article 229, except that mentioned
in the preceding paragraph;
3. Reclusion temporal: (a) for subordinate officers
other than those already adverted to; (b) for mere
participants in the rebellion falling under the first
paragraph of No. 2 of Article 174; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand
4. Prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period — for participants
not falling under No. 3.
After the cession of the Philippines to the United
States, the rigors of the old Penal Code were
tempered. Its aforementioned provisions were
superseded by section 3 of Act No. 292, which
reduced the penalty to imprisonment for not more
than ten (10) years and a fine not exceeding
$10,000, or P20,000, for “every person who
incites, sets on foot, assists or engages in any
rebellion or insurrection or who gives aid and
comfort to any one so engaging in such rebellion
or insurrection.” Such liberal attitude was adhered
to by the authors of the Revised Penal Code. The
penalties therein are substantially identical to
those prescribed in Act 292. Although the Revised
Penal Code increased slightly the penalty of
imprisonment for the promoters, maintainers and
leaders of the uprising, as well as for public officers
joining the same, to a maximum not exceeding
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, it reduced the
penalty of imprisonment for mere participants to
not more than eight (8) years of prision mayor, and
eliminated the fine.
This benign mood of the Revised Penal Code
becomes more significant when we bear in mind it
was approved on December 8, 1930 and became
effective on January 1, 1932. At that time the
communists in the Philippines had already given
ample proof of their widespread activities and of
their designs and potentialities. Prior thereto, they
had been under surveillance by the agents of the
law, who gathered evidence of their subversive
movements, culminating in the prosecution of
Evangelista, Manahan (57 Phil., 354; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary57 Phil., 372), Capadocia (57
Phil., 364), Feleo (57 Phil., 451), Nabong (57 Phil.,
455), and others. In fact, the first information
against the first two alleged that they committed
the crime of inciting to sedition “on and during the
month of November, 1930, and for sometime prior
and subsequent thereto.”
As if this were not enough, the very Constitution
adopted in 1935, incorporated a formal and
solemn declaration (Article II, section 5)
committing the Commonwealth, and, then the
Republic of the Philippines, to the “promotion of
social justice”. Soon later, Commonwealth Act No.
103, creating the Court of Industrial Relations, was
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 43

passed. Then followed a number of other statutes dejo de apreciarse con los severos criterios de
implementing said constitutional mandate. It is not antaño quedando sometida a un regimen penal,
necessary to go into the details of said legislative por regla general suave y benevolo.
enactments. Suffice it to say that the same are
predicated upon a recognition of the fact that a “El origen de este cambio se remonta, segun
good many of the problems confronting the State opinion muy difundida, a la revolucion que tuvo
are due to social and economic evils, and that, lugar en Francia en el año 1830. El gobierno de
unless the latter are removed or, least minimized, Luis Felipe establecio una honda separacion entre
the former will keep on harassing the community los delitos comunes y los politicos, siendo estos
and affecting the well-being of its members. sometidos a una penalidad mas suave y sus
autores exceptuados de la extradicion. Irradiando
Thus, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, a otros paises tuvieron estas tan gran difusion que
since the beginning of the century, has been one en casi todos los de regimen liberal-individualista
of decided leniency, in comparison with the laws se ha llegado a crear un tratamiento desprovisto
enforce during the Spanish regime. Such policy de severidad para la represion de estos hechos.
has not suffered the slightest alteration. Although No solo las penas con que se conminaron
the Government has, for the past five or six years, perdieron gran parte de su antigua dureza, sino
adopted a more vigorous course of action in the qua en algunos paises se creo un regimen penal
apprehension of violators of said law and in their mas suave para estos delicuentes, en otros se
prosecution the established policy of the State, as abolio para ellos la pena de muerte. Tan profundo
regards the punishment of the culprits has contraste entre el antiguo y el actual tratamiento
remained unchanged since 1932. It is not for us to de la criminalidad politica en la mayoria de los
consider the merits and demerits of such policy. paises solo puede ser explicado por las ideas
This falls within the province of the policy-making nacidas y difundidas bajo los regimenes politicos
branch of the government the Congress of the liberalesacerca de estos delitos y delincuentes.
Philippines. However, the following quotation from Por una parte se ha afirmado que la criminalidad
Cuello Calon indicates the schools of thought on da estos hechos no contiene la misma inmoralidad
this subject and the reason that may have que la delincuencia comun, que es tan solo
influenced our lawmakers in making their choice: relativa, qua depende del tiempo, del lugar, da las
circumstancias, de las instituciones del pais. Otros
“Durante muchos siglos, hasta tiempos invocan la elevacion de los moviles y sentimientos
relativamente cercanos, se reputaban los hechos determinantes de estos hechos, el amor a la
que hoy llamamos delitos politicos como mas patria, la adhesion ferviente a determinadas ideas
graves y peligrosos que los crimenes comunes. Se o principios, el espiritu de sacrificio por el triunfo
consideraba que mientras estos solo causan un de un ideal.
daño individual, aquellos producen profundas
perturbaciones en la vida collectiva llegando a “Contra su trato benevolo, del que no pocas veces
poner en peligro la misma vida del Estado. En se han beneficiado peligrosos malhechores, se ha
consonancia con estas ideas fueron reprimidos iniciado hace algun tiempo una fuerte reaccion
con extraordinaria severidad y designados con la (vease Cap. XV, 3.°, b), que llego a alcanzar
denominacion romana de delitos de lesa majestad considerable severidad en las legislaciones de tipo
se catalogaron en las leyes penales como los autoritario, y que tambien ha hallado eco, en forma
crimenes mas temibles. mas suave, en las de otros paises de constitucion
democratica en los que, especialmente en los
“Pero desde hace poco mas de un siglo se ha ultimos años, la frecuencia de agitaciones politicas
realizado en este punto una transformacion y sociales ha originado la publicacion de
profunda merced a la cual la delincuencia politica numerosas leyes encaminadas a la proteccion
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 44

penal del Estado.” (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, “to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of
Tomo 1, pp. 250-252.) guilt is strong; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryit must
also appear that in case of conviction
Such evils as may result from the failure of the the Defendant’s criminal liability would probably
policy of the law punishing the offense to dovetail call for a capital punishment. No clear or
with the policy of the law enforcing agencies in the conclusive showing before this Court has been
apprehension and prosecution of the offenders are made.”
matters which may be brought to the attention of
the departments concerned. The judicial branch In fact, in the case at bar, Defendant Amado V.
cannot amend the former in order to suit the latter. Hernandez was sentenced by the lower court, not
The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation to the extreme penalty, but to life imprisonment.
without violating the principle of separation of Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too
powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of transcendental and vital in a republican state, like
our republican system. In, short, we cannot accept ours, to be denied upon mere general principles
the theory of the prosecution without causing much and abstract consideration of public safety.
bigger harm than that which would allegedly result Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major
from the adoption of the opposite view. preoccupation of our political system that, not
satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of
of the amended information against Defendant- Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted
Appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13),
arsons and robberies described therein are mere (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom.
committed by said Defendants, as means Thus, in line with the letter and spirit of the
“necessary” 4 for the perpetration of said offense fundamental law, we said in the aforementioned
of rebellion; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the case of Montano vs. Ocampo:
crime charged in the aforementioned amended
information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the “Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, exception to the otherwise absolute right
arsons and robberies; chan guaranteed by the constitution, the natural
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the maximum penalty tendency of the courts has been toward a fair and
imposable under such charge cannot exceed liberal appreciation, rather than otherwise, of the
twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of evidence in the determination of the degree of
P20,000; that, in conformity with the policy of this proof and presumption of guilt necessary to
court in dealing with accused persons amenable to warrant a deprivation of that right.”
a similar punishment, said Defendant may be
allowed bail. xxx xxx xxx

It is urged that, in the exercise of its discretion, the
Court should deny the motion under consideration,
because the security of the State so requires, and
because the judgment of conviction appealed from
indicates that the evidence of guilt of Amado V.
Hernandez is strong. However, as held in a
resolution of this court, dated January 29, 1953, in
the case of Montano vs. Ocampo (G.R. L-6352):
“In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of
flight is one other important factor to be taken into
account. The sole purpose of confining accused in
jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to
secure his presence at the trial. In other words, if
denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is
only on the theory that the proof being strong,
the Defendant would flee, if he has the
opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 45

Hence, the exception to the fundamental right to

be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the
extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution.

“The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in

mind the Defendant’s official and social standing
and his other personal circumstances, seem
remote if not nil.”

This view applies fully to Amado V. Hernandez,

with the particularity that there is an additional
circumstance in his favor — he has been detained
since January 1951, or for more than five (5) years,
and it may still take some time to dispose of the
case, for the same has not been, and is not in a
position to be, included, as yet, in our calendar,
inasmuch as the briefs for some Appellants —
other than Hernandez — as well as the brief for the
Government, are pending submission. It should be
noted, also, that the decision appealed from the
opposition to the motion in question do not reveal
satisfactorily and concrete, positive act of the
accused showing, sufficiently, that his provincial
release, during the pendency of the appeal, would
jeopardize the security of the State.

Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail

of Defendant- Appellant Amado V. Hernandez is
hereby granted and, upon the filing of a bond, with
sufficient sureties, in the sum of P30,000, and its
approval by the court, let said Defendant-
Appellant be provisionally released. It is SO
ORDERED.

Paras, C.J., Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo and

Reyes. J.B.L., JJ., concur.

Bengzon, J., concurs in the result.

 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 46
[G.R. No. L-8936. October 23, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. FEDERICO GERONIMO alias
Cmdr. OSCAR, ET AL., Defendants, FEDERICO
GERONIMO alias Cmdr. OSCAR, Defendant-
Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
In an information filed on June 24, 1954 by the
provincial Fiscal in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, Appellant Federico Geronimo,
together with Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias
Tony, alias Tony Collante alias Taoic, alias Mang
Pacio, alias Bonny Abundio Romagosa alias
David, Jesus Polita alias Rex, Jesus Lava alias
Jessie alias NMT, alias Balbas, alias Noli, alias
Noli Metangere, alias NKVD, Juan Ocompo alias
Cmdr. Bundalian, alias Tagle, Rosendo Manuel
alias Cmdr. Sendong, alias Ruiz, Ernesto Herrero
alias Cmdr. Ed, alias Rene, alias Eddy, Santiago
Rotas alias Cmdr. Jessie, Fernando Principe alias
Cmdr. Manding, Alfredo Saguni alias Godo, alias
Terry, alias Terpy, Andres Diapera alias Maclang,
alias Berto, alias Teny, Lorenzo Saniel alias
Wenny, Silvestre Sisno alias Tomo, alias Albert,
Teodoro Primavera alias Nestor, Lorenzo Roxas
alias Argos, Vivencio Pineda alias Marquez, Pedro
Anino alias Fernandez, Mauro Llorera alias Justo,
Richard Doe alias Cmdr. Danny and John Doe
alias Cmdr. Berion, alias Mayo, alias Cmdr. Paulito
and many others, were charged with the complex
crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnapping committed as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
“That on or about May 28, 1946 and for sometime
prior and subsequent thereto continuously up to
the present time in the province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court and in other municipalities, cities
and provinces and other parts of the country where
they have chosen to carry out their rebellious
activities, the above-named accused being then
ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise
affiliated with the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya
Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise known as the
Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed
force of said Communist Party of the Philippines
(CCP) having come to an agreement and decide
to commit the crime of Rebellion, and therefore,
conspiring together and confederating among
themselves with all of the thirty-one accused in
criminal case Nos. 14071, 14282, 14315, 14270,
15344 and with all the accused in criminal case No.
19166 of the Court of First Instance of Manila with
the other members, officers and/or affiliates of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan and with many
others whose identities and whereabouts are still
unknown, acting in accordance with their
conspiracy and in furtherance thereof, and
mutually helping one another, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, help, support,
promote, maintain, direct and/or command the
Hukbalahaps (HUKS) or the Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB), to rise publicly
and take arms against the government of the
Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise
participate in such public armed uprisings for the
purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines
from the allegiance to the government and laws
thereof as in fact the said ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya
Ng Bayan (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps’ (HUKS)
pursuant to such conspiracy, have risen publicly
and taken arms against the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines to attain said purpose,
by then and there making armed raids, sorties, and
ambuscades, attacks against the Philippine
Constabulary, the civilian guards, the Police and
the Army Patrols and other detachments as well as
upon innocent civilians, and as a necessary means
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 47
to commit the crime of Rebellion, in connection
therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then
and there committed wanton acts of murder,
pillage, looting, plunder, kidnapping and planned
destructions of private and public property and
plotted the liquidation of government officials, to
create and spread disorder, terror, confusion,
chaos and fear so as to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, among
which are as follows, to wit:
‘1. That on or about April 28, 1949 at Kilometer 62
at Barrio Salubsob, municipality of Nueva Ecija, an
undetermined number of HUKS led by
Commanders Viernes, Marzan, Lupon and Mulong
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously ambush, assault, attack and fired upon
the party of Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon and her PC
escort whom they considered as their enemies
resulting in the killing of Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon,
Baby Quezon, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon City,
Major P. San Agustin, Lieutenant Lasam, Philip
Buencamino III, and several soldiers and the
wounding of General Jalandoni and Captain
Manalang.
‘2. That on or about August 26, 1950 in Santa
Cruz, Laguna, about one hundred armed HUKS
with intent to gain and for the purpose of securing
supplies and other materials for the support and
meintenance of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan (HMBS) did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and forcibly bringing the
Cashier of the Provincial Treasury, Mr. Vicente
Reventar from his house to the Provincial Capitol
and at the point of guns forced him to open the
Treasury Vault and took therefrom Eighty
Thousand Pesos (P80,000) consisting of various
denominations and including Fifty, One hundred
and Five-Hundred Peso Bills and also took away
with them type- writers and other Office supplies
which they found in the Provincial Capitol Building,
burning and looting private buildings in towns.
‘3. That on or about the years 1951 to 1952 in the
municipality of Pasacao, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, a group of Armed Huks under
Commander Rustum raided the house of one
Nemesio Palo, a police sergeant of Libmanan,
Camarines Sur and as a result, said HUKS were
able to capture said Nemesio Palo and once
captured, with evident premeditation, treachery
and intent to kill, stab, shot and cut the neck of said
Nemesio Palo thereby causing the instantaneous
death of Nemesio Palo.
‘4. That on or about January 31, 1953, at barrio of
Santa Rita, Del Gallego, Camarines Sur a group of
HMBS with Federico Geronimo alias Commander
Oscar ambushed and fired upon an Army Patrol
headed by Cpl. Bayrante, resulting in seriously
wounding of Pfc. Paneracio Torrado and Eusebio
Gruta a civilian.
‘5. That on or about February 1954 at barrio
Cotmo, San Fernando, Camarines Sur, a group of
four HMBS led by accused Commander Oscar
with evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously killed one Policarpio Tipay a barrio
lieutenant.’“ (Appellee’s brief, pp. 1-8)
Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of
not guilty to the information. When the case was
called for trial on October 12, 1954, however, he
asked the permission of the court to substitute his
original plea with one of guilty, and was allowed to
change his plea. On the basis of the plea of guilty,
the fiscal recommended that the penalty of life
imprisonment be imposed upon the accused, his
voluntary plea of guilty being considered as a
mitigating circumstance. Geronimo’s counsel, on
the other hand, argued that the penalty imposable
upon the accused was only prision mayor, for the
reason that in his opinion, there is no such complex
crime as rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnapping, because the crimes of murders
robberies, and kidnapping being the natural
consequences of the crime of rebellion, the crime
charged against the accused should be
considered only as simple rebellion. On October
18, 1954, the trial court rendered judgment finding
the accused guilty of the complex crime of rebellion
with murders, robberies, and kidnappings; giving
him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 48
voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of
P10,000, to indemnify the heirs of the various
persons killed, as listed in the information, in the
sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the proportionate
costs of the proceedings. From this judgment,
accused Federico Geronimo appealed, raising the
sole question of whether the crime committed by
him is the complex crime of rebellion with murders,
robberies, and kidnappings, or simple rebellion.
After mature consideration, a majority of seven
justices 1 of this Court are of the opinion that the
issue posed by Appellant has been already
decided in the recent resolution of this Court in the
case of People vs. Hernandez et al., (99 Phil.,
529; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary21 Lawyers
Journal, No. 7 [July 31, 1956], p. 316). As in
treason, where both intent and overt act are
necessary, the crime of rebellion is integrated by
the coexistence of both the armed uprising for the
purposes expressed in article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence
described in the first paragraph of article 135. That
both purpose and overt acts are essential
components of one crime, and that without either
of them the crime of rebellion legally does not exist,
is shown by the absence of any penalty attached
to article 134. 2 It follows, therefore that any or all
of the acts described in article 135, when
committed as a means to or in furtherance of the
subversive ends described in article 134, become
absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and cannot be
regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in
themselves. In law they are part and parcel of the
rebellion itself, and cannot be considered as giving
rise to a separate crime that, under article 48 of the
Code, would constitute a complex one with that of
rebellion.
The terms employed in the first paragraph of article
135 of the Revised Penal Code to describe the
component of violence in the crime of rebellion are
broad and general. The Spanish text (which is the
one controlling, People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665)
states that the acts of the rebels may consists of
—
“Sosteniendo combate 3 con la fuerza leal,
causando estragos en las propiedades, ejerciendo
violencia grave, exigiendo contribuciones, o
distroyendo caudales publicos de su inversion
legitima.”
If all the overt acts charged in the information
against herein Appellant were committed for
political ends or in furtherance of the rebellion, they
come within the preceding description. Thus, count
4 (ambushing and firing upon army patrol)
constitutes engaging in combat with the loyal
troops; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarycount 2 (taking
funds and equipment from the Provincial Treasury
of Laguna) is diverting public funds from their
ligitimate purpose; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarywhile the killings outlined in
the other counts (1, 3 and 5) are instances of
committing serious violence.
The majority of the Court found no cogent reason
for limiting “commission of serious violence” in
article 135 to hostilities against the Government’s
armed forces exclusively; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryfor in that case, the former
expression would be redundant and mere
duplication of “engaging in combat” with loyal
troops, also described in the same article. If the
infliction of “serious violence” was separately
expressed in the law, it is because the violence
referred to is that inflicted upon civilians. Again, to
restrict “serious violence” to acts short of homicide,
is to unwarrantedly assume that the broad term
“violencia grave” is used in the limited sense of
“lesiones graves”, which in our Penal Code has a
specialized signification. In truth, if physical injuries
constitute grave violence, so would killing
necessarily be, if not more. Additionally, it may be
observed that rebellion is by nature a crime of
masses or multitudes, involving crowd action, that
cannot be confined a priori within predetermined
bounds. (People vs. Hernandez, supra; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Almazan, C. A.,
31 Off. Gaz. 1932). Hence the broad terms
employed by the statute.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 49
The prosecution insists that the “more serious”
crime of murder cannot be justifiably regarded as
absorbed by the lesser crime of rebellion. In the
first place, it is not demonstrated that the killing of
an individual is intrinsically less serious or less
dangerous to society than the violent subversion of
established government, which emperils the lives
of many citizens, at least during the period of the
struggle for superiority between rebels and
loyalists. If, on the other hand, murder is punished
by reclusion perpetua to death, and rebellion only
by prision mayor, this leniency is due to the political
purpose that impels every rebellious act. As noted
by Groizard (“Codigo Penal de 1870”, Vol. 3, p.
239) —
“El analisis de toda clase de delitos politicos ofrece
para el jurisconsulto un resultado precioso, pues
pone de relieve las diferencias cardinales que
existen entre esta clase de hechos y los delitos
comunes; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryentre los
reos de aquellos crimenes y los reos de estos
otros. Para los delitos comunes, la sociedad tiene
una constante y energica reprobacion que no
atenua ni el trascurso de tiempo ni el cambio de
las ideas. Para los delitos politicos, no. Quien se
atrevera si de honrado se precia, a hacer alarde
de la amistad de un hombre condenado por robo
o por asesinato? Y quien no ha tendido la mano
cariñosa sin perder nada de respetabilidad, a
algun reo de un delito politico en la serie
continuada de revoluciones y contrarevoluciones
que constituyen desgraciadamente los ultimos
periodos de nuestra historia? La consumacion del
delito y el exito de la rebelion, ya lo hemos dicho,
para el reo politico, es mas que la impunidad, es
el triunfo, es el poder, es el Gobierno, es casi la
gloria. Pero no sucede lo mismo tratandose de
delitos comunes: la consumacion del delito ni
apaga el remordimiento, ni aleja del criminal el
peligro de la pena, ni mejora en nada su condicion
respecto de la justicia. Hay, pues, entre el delito
comun y el delito politico, entre las personas
responsables de unos y otros diferencias
sustanciales, y el mayor error que en el estado
actual de los estudios juridicos puede cometer el
legislador es no apreciar eses diferencias, sobre
todo en la aplicacion de las penas.”
And our history of three centuries of uninterrupted
rebellions against sovereign Spain, until she was
finally driven from our shores, suffices to explain
why the penalty against rebellion, which stood at
reclusion temporal maximum to death in the
Spanish Penal Code of 1870, was reduced only
prision mayor in our revised Penal Code of 1932.
In addition, the government counsel’s theory that
an act punished by more serious penalty cannot be
absorbed by an act for which a lesser penalty is
provided, is not correct. The theory is emphatically
refuted by the treatment accorded by the Penal
Code to the crime of forcible abduction, for which
the law imposes only reclusion temporal (article
342), notwithstanding that such crime necessarily
involves illegal detention of the abducted woman
for which article 267 of the same Penal Code fixes
the penalty of reclusion temporal, in its maximum
period, to death. The same situation obtains in the
crime of slavery defined in article 272, whereby the
kidnapping of a human being for the purpose of
enslaving him is punished with prision mayor and
a fine of not more than P10,000.00, when
kidnapping itself is penalized by article 267 with a
much higher penalty.
And we have already pointed out in the Hernandez
resolution that to admit the complexing of the crime
of rebellion with the felonies committed in
furtherance thereof, would lead to these
undesirable results: (1) to make the punishment
for rebellion heavier than that of treason, since it
has been repeatedly held that the latter admits no
complexing with the overt acts committed in
furtherance of the treasonous intent, and, in
addition, requires two witnesses to every overt act
which is not true in the case of rebellion; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) to nullify the policy
expressed in article 135 (R.P.C.) of imposing
lesser penalty upon the rebel followers as
compared to their leaders, because under the
complexing theory every rebel, leader or follower,
must suffer the heavier penalty in its maximum
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 50
degree; (3) to violate the fundamental rule of
criminal law that all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the accused: “in dubiis reus est
absolvendus”; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary“nullum
crimen, nulla poena, sine lege.”
Of course, not every act of violence is to be
deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely
because it happens to be committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the
rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done for
private purposes or profit, without any political
motivation, the crime would be separately
punishable and would not be absorbed by the
rebellion. But ever then, the individual misdeed
could not be taken with the rebellion to constitute
a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and
intent would be unrelated to each other; the
individual crime would not be a means necessary
for committing the rebellion as it would not be done
in preparation or in furtherance of the latter. This
appears with utmost clarity in the case where an
individual rebel should commit rape; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarycertainly the latter felony
could not be said to have been done in furtherance
of the rebellion or facilitated its commission in any
way. The ravisher would then be liable for two
separate crimes, rebellion and rape, and the two
could not be merged into a juridical whole.
It is argued that the suppression in the present
Penal Code of article 244 of the old one (article 259
of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870) indicates the
intention of the Legislature to revive the possibility
of the crime of rebellion being complexed with the
individual felonies committed in the course thereof,
because the suppressed article prohibited such
complexing. The text of the suppressed provision
is as follows:
“ART. 244. Los delitos particulares cometidos en
una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas,
seran castigados respectivamente segun las
disposiciones de este codigo.
Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores, seran
penados como tales los jefes principales de la
rebelion o sedicion.”
The first paragraph is to the effect that the “delitos
particulares” (meaning felonies committed for
private non-political ends, as held by the
commentators Cuello Calon and Viada, since the
Penal Code does not classify crimes into “general”
and “particular”) are to be dealt with separately
from the rebellion, punishment for each felony to
be visited upon the perpetrators thereof. This
paragraph has no bearing on the question of
complex crimes, but is a mere consequence of the
fact that the delicts committed for private ends bear
no relation to the political crime of rebellion (other
than a coincidence of time) and therefore must be
separately dealt with. This is so obvious that, as
Groizard pointed out (Vol. 3, p. 650), such action
(their punishment as a private misdeed) would be
taken by the courts even if this first paragraph of
article 244 had not been written.
Far more significant, in the opinion of the majority,
is that our Revised Penal Code of 1932 did not
revive the rule contained in the second paragraph
of article 244 of the old Penal Code (Article 259 of
the Spanish), whereby the rebel leaders were
made criminally responsible for the individual
felonies committed during the rebellion or on
occasion thereof, in case the real perpetrators
could not be found. In effect that paragraph
established a command responsibility; in
suppressing it, the Legislature plainly revealed a
policy of rejecting any such command
responsibility. It was the legislative intent,
therefore, that the rebel leaders (and with greater
reason, the mere followers) should be held
accountable solely for the rebellion, and not for the
individual crimes (delitos particulares) committed
during the same for private ends, unless their
actual participation therein was duly established.
In other words, the suppression of article 244 of
the old Penal Code virtually negates the contention
that the rebellion and the individual misdeeds
committed during the same should legally
constitute one complex whole. Whether or not
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 51

such policy should be maintained is not for the alleged the necessary connection between the
courts, but for the Legislature, to say. overt acts and the political ends pursued by the
accused, but in addition, it failed to charge that
But while a majority of seven justices 4 are agreed the Appellant was impelled by private motives.
that if the overt acts detailed in the information Wherefore, such overt acts must be taken as
against the Appellant had been duly proved to essential ingredients of the single crime of
have been committed “as a necessary means to rebellion, and the accused pleaded guilty to this
commit the crime of rebellion, in connection crime alone. Hence, there being no complex crime,
therewith and in furtherance thereof”, then the the Appellant can only be sentenced for the lone
accused could only be convicted of simple crime of rebellion. Even more, the minority
rebellion, the opinions differ as to whether his plea contends that under the very theory of the majority,
of guilty renders the accused amenable to the circumstances surrounding the plea are such
punishment not only for rebellion but also for as to at least cast doubt on whether the accused
murder or other crimes. clearly understood that he was pleading guilty to
two different crimes or to only one; chan
Six justices 5 believe that conceding the absence roblesvirtualawlibraryso that in fairness and
of a complex crime, still, by his plea of guilty the justice, the case should be sent back for a
accused-Appellant has admitted all the acts rehearing by the Court of origin, to ascertain
described in the five separate counts of the whether or not the accused fully realized the import
information; that if any of such counts constituted of his plea (U.S. vs. Patala, 2 Phil., 752; chan
an independent crime committed within the roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. Agcaoili, 31 Phil.,
jurisdiction of the lower court as seems to be the 91; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. Jamad, 37
case under the facts alleged in Count No. 5 (the Phil., 305).
killing of Policarpio Tibay), then the avertment in
the information that it was perpetrated in In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed
furtherance of the rebellion, being a mere from is modified and the accused convicted for the
conclusion, cannot be a bar to Appellant’s simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under
conviction and punishment for said offense, he article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for
having failed, at the arraignment, to object to the the crime of murder; considering the mitigating
information on the ground of multiplicity of crimes effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-
charged. Hence, the acts charged in Counts 1 to 4 Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced
cannot be taken into consideration in this case, to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine
either because they were committed outside the of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment
territorial jurisdiction of the court below (Count 1), pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the
or because the allegations do not charge rebellion; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand, as
the Appellant’s participation (Count 3), or else the above explained, for the murder, applying the
acts charged are essentially acts of rebellion, with Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10
out private motives (Counts 2 and 4). years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more
than 18 years of reclusion temporal; chan
Five justices, 6 on the other hand, hold that by his roblesvirtualawlibraryto indemnify the heirs of
plea of guilty, the accused avowed having Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; and to pay
committed the overt acts charged in all five the costs. SO ORDERED.
counts; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut that he only
admitted committing them in fact “as a necessary
means”, “in connection and in furtherance of the
rebellion”, as expressly alleged by the prosecution. G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
This is not only because the information expressly
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 52
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br.
103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO
TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR
DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the
Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND
ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL
CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E.
PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON,
AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL,
and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our
criminal jurisprudence, People
1 alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional
Hernandez once more takes center stage as the
focus of a confrontation at law that would re-
examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits
of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening
period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took
issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of
success-but none, it would Beem, where season
and circumstance had more effectively conspired
to attract wide public attention and excite
impassioned debate, even among laymen; none,
certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range
of arguments that are now brought to bear on the
same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of
February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of
the National Bureau of Investigation on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch
103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant
had issued on an information signed and earlier
that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed
of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe,
State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and
Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr.,
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with
the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed during the
period of the failed coup attempt from November
29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was
taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail,
none having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrest warrant.
The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City
where he was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District,
Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator
Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition
for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a
vs. supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal
offense which does not exist in the
statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in
an information for which no
complaint was initially filed or
preliminary investigation was
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 53

conducted, hence was denied due from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00
process; (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the
Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that
(c) denied his right to bail; and it was issued without prejudice to a more extended
resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of
(d) arrested and detained on the the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing
strength of a warrant issued without upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four
the judge who issued it first having Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail
personally determined the existence to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail
of probable cause. 4 to the Panlilios.

The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable
March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on
March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor
General filed a consolidated return 6 for the
respondents in this case and in G.R. No.
92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but
separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-
accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return
urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within
the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it
very simply-the information in Hernandezcharged
murders and other common crimes committed as
a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion, whereas the information against Sen.
Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder
committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance,
of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor
General would distinguish between the complex
crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense
being a necessary means for committing another,
which is referred to in the second clause of Article
48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of
the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime
("delito compuesto") arising from a single act
constituting two or more grave or less grave
offenses referred to in the first clause of the same
paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
concerned and to which, therefore, it should not
apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as
scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court
issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting
Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as
they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's
petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the
Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt
the minority view expressed in the
main dissent of Justice Montemayor
in said case that rebellion cannot
absorb more serious crimes, and
that under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code rebellion may properly
be complexed with common
offenses, so-called; this option was
suggested by the Solicitor General in
oral argument although it is not
offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only
to offenses committed in
furtherance, or as a necessary
means for the commission, of
rebellion, but not to acts committed
in the course of a rebellion which
also constitute "common" crimes of
grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying
to make rebellion absorb all other
offenses committed in its course,
whether or not necessary to its
commission or in furtherance
thereof.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 54
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the
Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two
(2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-
examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the
ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical
bases have withstood all subsequent challenges
and no new ones are presented here persuasive
enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view
is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the
incumbent President, exercising her powers under
the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal,
among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the
former regime which precisely sought to nullify or
neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision
(Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the
effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion,
of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter
(Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts
which constitute offenses upon which graver
penalties are imposed by law are committed, the
penalty for the most serious offense in its
maximum period shall be imposed upon the
offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect
by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding
doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no
less than accord it the same recognition, absent
any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously
voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or
should be, limited in its application to offenses
committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion and that the ruling should
not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of
rebellion with other common crimes committed on
the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While
four Members of the Court felt that the proponents'
arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the
consensus was that they were not sufficient to
overcome what appears to be the real thrust
of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed in its
course under either of the aforecited clauses of
Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt
from the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a
fundamental one at that-why Article
48 of our Penal Code cannot be
applied in the case at bar. If murder
were not complexed with rebellion,
and the two crimes were punished
separately (assuming that this could
be done), the following penalties
would be imposable upon the
movant, namely: (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding
P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending
upon the modifying circumstances
present, but never exceeding 12
years of prision mayor, and (2) for
the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to
death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. in
other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the
extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under
Article 48 said penalty would have to
be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision,
if construed in conformity with the
theory of the prosecution, would
be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48
was enacted for the purpose
of favoring the culprit, not of
sentencing him to a penalty more
severe than that which would be
proper if the several acts performed
by him were punished separately. In
the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de
penas en los casos de
concurso de delitos a
que hace referencia
este articulo (75 del
Codigo de 1932), esta
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 55

basado francamente said amendment, restricting the

en el principio pro reo.' imposition of the penalty for the
(II Doctrina Penal del graver offense in its maximum period
Tribunal Supremo de to the case when it does not exceed
Espana, p. 2168.) the sum total of the penalties
imposable if the acts charged were
We are aware of the fact that this dealt with separately. The absence
observation refers to Article 71 (later of said limitation in our Penal Code
75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the does not, to our mind, affect
counterpart of our Article 48), as substantially the spirit of said Article
amended in 1908 and then in 1932, 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two
reading: or more offenses, there can be no
reason to inflict a punishment graver
Las disposiciones del than that prescribed for each one of
articulo anterior no son said offenses put together. In
aplicables en el caso directing that the penalty for the
de que un solo hecho graver offense be, in such case,
constituya dos o mas imposed in its maximum period,
delitos, o cuando el Article 48 could have had no other
uno de ellos sea medio purpose than to prescribe a
necesario para penalty lower than the aggregate of
cometer el otro. the penalties for each offense, if
imposed separately. The reason for
En estos casos solo se this benevolent spirit of article 48 is
impondra la pena readily discernible. When two or
correspondiente al more crimes are the result of a single
delito mas grave en su act, the offender is deemed less
grado maximo, hasta perverse than when he commits said
el limite que crimes thru separate and distinct
represents la suma de acts. Instead of sentencing him for
las que pudieran each crime independently from the
imponerse, penando other, he must suffer the maximum
separadamente los of the penalty for the more serious
delitos. one, on the assumption that it is less
grave than the sum total of the
Cuando la pena asi separate penalties for each
12
computada exceda de offense.
este limite, se
sancionaran los delitos The rejection of both options shapes and
por separado.determines the primary ruling of the Court, which
(Rodriguez Navarro, is that Hernandezremains binding doctrine
Doctrina Penal del operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion
Tribunal Supremo, Vol. with any other offense committed on the occasion
II, p. 2163) thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an
and that our Article 48 does not activity that constitutes rebellion.
contain the qualification inserted in
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 56

This, however, does not write finis to the case.
Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired
into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court
to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely
provides a take-off point for the disposition of other
questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints
about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of
the recourse he has taken.
books, while technically correct so far as the Court
has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with
other offenses committed on the occasion thereof,
must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of
rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the
information does indeed charge the petitioner with
a crime defined and punished by the Revised
Penal Code: simple rebellion.

The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that
the information filed against the petitioner does in
fact charge an offense. Disregarding the
objectionable phrasing that would complex
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, that indictment is to be read as
charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the
Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under
the allegations of the amended
information against defendant-
appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
murders, arsons and robberies
described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion
allegedly committed by said
defendants, as means "necessary"
(4) for the perpetration of said
offense of rebellion; that the
crime charged in the
aforementioned amended
information is, therefore, simple
rebellion, not the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies; that the
maximum penalty imposable under
such charge cannot exceed twelve
(12) years of prision mayor and a
fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in
conformity with the policy of this
court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar
punishment, said defendant may be
allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
with a crime that does not exist in the statute not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint
having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows
otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for
simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the
strength of said complaint a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the respondent
prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the
questioned information. 14There is nothing
inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing
against a respondent an indictment for an offense
different from what is charged in the initiatory
complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed
during the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge
issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personallydetermining the existence of
probable cause by examining under oath or
affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in
violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the
Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled,
however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the
judge to make such a personal examination, it
being sufficient that he follows established
procedure by personally evaluating the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor.16Petitioner claims that the warrant of
arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes
after the case was raffled off to the respondent
Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time
to personally go over the voluminous records of the
preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said
respondent had what some might consider only a
relatively brief period within which to comply with
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 57

single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in
presumption that official duty has been regularly dealing with the charges against him, were
performed. originally justiciable in the criminal case before
said Judge and should have been brought up there
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the instead of directly to this Court.
right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, There was and is no reason to assume that the
and of the logical and necessary corollary that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond
information against him should be considered as the ability or competence of the respondent Judge-
charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which indeed such an assumption would be demeaning
is bailable before conviction, that must now be and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever
accepted as a correct proposition. But the question to hold them to be of such complexity or
remains: Given the facts from which this case transcendental importance as to disqualify every
arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this court, except this Court, from deciding them; none,
Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right in short that would justify by passing established
to bail or vindicating its denial? judicial processes designed to orderly move
litigation through the hierarchy of our courts.
The criminal case before the respondent Judge Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote
was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's of four Members of the Court against the grant of
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should
judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny not thus be precipitately ousted of its original
bail rested with said respondent. The correct jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in
course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its
by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a error. It makes no difference that the respondent
right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail.
the evidence against him. Only after that remedy Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
was denied by the trial court should the review prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail,
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and though it may be perceived as the better course for
even then, not without first applying to the Court of the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where
Appeals if appropriate relief was also available a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in any event,
there. incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has
been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength
by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges or weakness of the evidence against him.
a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on
the same basis that it charges more than one It is apropos to point out that the present petition
offense, would not excuse or justify his improper has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties
choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the in a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue
obvious recourse would have been a motion to from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy
quash brought in the criminal action before the of seeking recourse in the regular manner just
respondent Judge. 18 outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only
contributed to the delay that the petitioner may
There thus seems to be no question that All the have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this
grounds upon which petitioner has founded the Court.
present petition, whether these went into the
substance of what is charged in the information or Not only because popular interest seems focused
imputed error or omission on the part of the on the outcome of the present petition, but also
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 58
because to wash the Court's hand off it on
jurisdictional grounds would only compound the
delay that it has already gone through, the Court
now decides the same on the merits. But in so
doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the
view that said petition interdicted the ordered and
orderly progression of proceedings that should
have started with the trial court and reached this
Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by
the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of
Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court
will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift
to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit
the judicial process and burden it with the
resolution of issues properly within the original
competence of the lower courts. What has thus far
been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of
the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No.
92164) which is virtually Identical to that of
petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore
determinable on the same principles already set
forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly
pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against
them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal
Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared
before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of
March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and
detained without bail on the strength of said
warrants in violation-they claim-of their
constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events,
the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany
quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency
with which it is regarded and punished by law, that
present-day rebels are less impelled by love of
country than by lust for power and have become
no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not
even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand
in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so
underscores this aberration as the rash of
seemingly senseless killings, bombings,
kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the
news these days, as often perpetrated against
innocent civilians as against the military, but by
and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-
called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is
no exception-that not even the crowded streets of
our capital City seem safe from such unsettling
violence that is disruptive of the public peace and
stymies every effort at national economic recovery.
There is an apparent need to restructure the law
on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or
to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it
cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for
every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name.
The Court has no power to effect such change, for
it can only interpret the law as it stands at any
given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive
the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on
the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed
against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be
read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said
petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier
grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional
in character, the proceedings in both cases are
ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to
fix the amount of bail to be posted by the
petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent
for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail
bond flied with this Court shall become functus
oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took
no part in G.R. No. 92163.
Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 59

G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135,
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL
COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor
AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor
FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City
Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 60

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Offices for petitioner. Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the
Information on the grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
(b) The respondent court's finding of probable
Together with the filing of an information charging cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed
rebellion complexed with murder 1 with the (c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government with murder and frustrated murder against Senator
prosecutors filed another information charging him Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan,
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with on the basis of their alleged meeting on December
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for
information reads: harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same
occasion under PD 1829.
That on or about the 1st day of
December 1989, at Dasmariñas On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an
Village, Makati, Metro Manila and order denying the motion for reconsideration for
within the jurisdiction of this alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's
Honorable Court, the above-named arraignment to May 30, 1990.
accused, having reasonable ground
to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to
committed a crime, did then and lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the
there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the
and knowingly obstruct, impede, information on the following grounds, to wit:
frustrate or delay the apprehension
of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" I. The facts charged do not constitute
Honasan by harboring or concealing an offense;
him in his house.
II. The alleged harboring or
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col.
Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a Honasan in a supposed meeting on
warrant of arrest pending personal determination 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or
by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss is a component element of, the
the case and expunge the information from the "complexed" rebellion presently
record. charged against Sen. Enrile as
alleged co-conspirator of Col.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Honasan on the basis of the same
Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge meeting on 1 December 1989;
Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus
motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) III. The orderly administration of
probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Justice requires that there be only
Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829." one prosecution for all the
component acts of rebellion;
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 61

IV. There is no probable cause to complexing of rebellion with any

hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged other offense committed on the
violation of Presidential Decree No. occasion thereof, either as a means
1829; to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that
V. No preliminary investigation was commutes rebellion. (Emphasis
conducted for alleged violation of supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 1829. The
preliminary investigation, held only This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a
for rebellion, was marred by patent person can not be charged with the complex crime
irregularities resulting in denial of of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied,
due process. neither can he be charged separately for two (2)
different offenses where one is a constitutive or
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary component element or committed in furtherance of
restraining order enjoining the respondents from rebellion.
conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court. The petitioner is presently charged with having
violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c)
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the which states:
petitioner could be separately charged for violation
of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case SECTION 1. The penalty of prison
earlier filed against him. correccional in its maximum period,
or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of pesos or both, shall be imposed
violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the upon any person who knowingly or
rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the wilfully obstructs, impedes,
theory that the former involves a special law while frustrates or delays the
the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a apprehension of suspects and the
general law. investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases by committing any of
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew the following acts:
to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515
[1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated xxx xxx xxx
in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce
Enrile v. Judge Salazar,(G.R. Nos. 92163 and (c) harboring or concealing, or
92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this facilitating the escape of, any person
Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing he knows, or has reasonable ground
proscription against splitting the component to believe or suspect has committed
offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to any offense under existing penal
separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in laws in order to prevent his arrest,
the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared: prosecution and conviction.

The rejection of both options shapes xxx xxx xxx

and determines the primary ruling of
the Court, which The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that
that Hernandez remains binding the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col.
doctrine operating to prohibit the Honasan by giving him food and comfort on
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 62

December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in
Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan.
Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan,
Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing
of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the
Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of crime of rebellion thus constitute a component
Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829. thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or
resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in in People v. Hernandez, supra:
Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed
by three (3) employees of the Silahis International In short, political crimes are those
Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio directly aimed against the political
"Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers order, as well as such common
attended the mass and birthday party held at the crimes as may be committed to
residence of the petitioner in the evening of achieve a political purpose. The
December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. decisive factor is the intent or
3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 motive. (p. 536)
December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan
conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is
accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel described as a vast movement of men and a
soldiers wearing white armed patches". The complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v.
prosecution thereby concluded that: Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us
that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion
In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's though crimes in themselves are deemed
talking with rebel leader Col. absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People
house in the presence of about 100 v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v.
uniformed soldiers who were fully Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava,
armed, can be inferred that they 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of
were co-conspirators in the failed harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a
December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act
65; Emphasis supplied) done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot
therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138
supporting the rebellion charge constitute or [1948]) is instructive:
include the very incident which gave rise to the
charge of the violation under Presidential Decree In the nature of things, the giving of
No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice aid and comfort can only be
resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one accomplished by some kind of
crime of rebellion complexed with murder and action. Its very nature partakes of a
multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 deed or physical activity as opposed
separate and independent prosecutions for to a mental operation. (Cramer v.
harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other U.S., ante) This deed or physical
armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of activity may be, and often is, in itself
component elements is readily apparent. a criminal offense under another
penal statute or provision. Even so,
when the deed is charged as an
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 63
element of treason it becomes
Identified with the latter crime and
can not be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination
with treason to increase the penalty
as article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code provides. Just as one can not
be punished for possessing opium in
a prosecution for smoking the
Identical drug, and a robber cannot
be held guilty of coercion or trespass
to a dwelling in a prosecution for
robbery, because possession of
opium and force and trespass are
inherent in smoking and in robbery
respectively, so may not a defendant
be made liable for murder as a
separate crime or in conjunction with
another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive
ingredient of treason.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending
that harboring or concealing a fugitive is
punishable under a special law while the rebellion
case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence,
prosecution under one law will not bar a
prosecution under the other. This argument is
specious in rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the
prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale
remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable
under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in
furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime
of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged
as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from
the rule that the ingredients of a
crime form part and parcel thereof,
and hence, are absorbed by the
same and cannot be punished either
separately therefrom or by the
application of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. ... (People v.
Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention
common crimes as absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of
violence such as murder, arson, robbery,
kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal
Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant
case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory
of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine
itself to common crimes but also to offenses under
special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance
of the political offense.
The conversation and, therefore, alleged
conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel
Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly
harboring and concealing Honasan for practically
the same act to form two separate crimes of
rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.
Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or
concealing which was based on his acts of
conspiring with Honasan was committed in
connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and
must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in,
and Identified with the crime of rebellion punished
in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
Thus, national, as well as
international, laws and jurisprudence
overwhelmingly favor the proposition
that common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as
"common" offenses, and assume the
political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and
consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense,
or complexed with the same, to
justify the imposition of a graver
penalty. (People v.
Hernandez, supra, p. 541)
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 64
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960],
the accused, after having pleaded guilty and
convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an
independent prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms. The Court ruled:
An examination of the record,
however, discloses that the crime
with which the accused is charged in
the present case which is that of
illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition is already absorbed as a
necessary element or ingredient in
the crime of rebellion with which the
same accused is charged with other
persons in a separate case and
wherein he pleaded guilty and was
convicted. (at page 662)
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he conclusion is inescapable that
the crime with which the accused is
charged in the present case is
already absorbed in the rebellion
case and so to press it further now
would be to place him in double
jeopardy. (at page 663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga,
(G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the
Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly
similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas,
an alleged member of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), was charged with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of
subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his
motion to quash the information, the petitioner
based his arguments on
the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the
doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The
Court, however, clarified, to wit:
... in the present case, petitioner is In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be
being charged specifically for the tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his
qualified offense of illegal being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this
possession of firearms and
ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS
NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF
SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
NEITHER IS HE BEING
SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR
SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
Thus, the rulings of the Court
in Hernandez, Geronimo and
Rodriguez find no application in this
case.
The Court in the above case upheld the
prosecution for illegal possession of firearms
under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution
for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The
prosecution must make up its mind whether to
charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone
or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with
murder and multiple frustrated murder and also
violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion
in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati.
It should be noted that there is in fact a separate
prosecution for rebellion already filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a
case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829
can not prosper.
As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive
is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not
charged with rebellion and he harbored or
concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the
latter is a friend and former associate, the motive
for the act is completely different. But if the act is
committed with political or social motives, that is in
furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed
to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of
being punished separately.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 65

ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon

the other issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is
QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction,
enjoining respondent Judges and their successors
in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court
of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen.
Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further
proceedings therein is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Medialdea, J., took no part.

Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004]

SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista,

and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA,
represented by REP. RENATO
MAGTUBO petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO
REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA,
DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES
EBDANE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 159103. February 3, 2004]

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS)

OFFICERS/MEMBERS namely, SAMSON
S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S.
ALBANO, RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D.
MAPILE, petitioners, vs. HON.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 66

ROMULO, HON. SECRETARY OF awesome powers exercised by the U.S. President

JUSTICE SIMEON DATUMANONG, HON. during moments of crisis1 and that these powers
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE are also available to the Philippine
ANGELO REYES, and HON. 2
President. Although the limits cannot be precisely
SECRETARY JOSE LINA, defined, the majority concluded that there are
JR., respondents. enough "residual powers" to serve as the basis to
support the Presidential declaration of a "state of
rebellion".3 The majority, however, emphasized
that the declaration cannot diminish or violate
[G.R. No. 159185. February 3, 2004] constitutionally protected rights.4 They affirmed
the legality of warrantless arrests of persons who
REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, REP. CARLOS M. participated in the rebellion, if circumstances so
PADILLA, REP. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, warrant5 with this clarification: "[i]n other words, a
REP. HUSSIN U. AMIN, REP. ABRAHAM person may be subjected to a warrantless arrests
KAHLIL B. MITRA, REP. EMMYLOU J. for the crime of rebellion whether or not the
TALINO-SANTOS, and REP. GEORGILU President has declared a state of rebellion, so long
R. YUMUL- as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are
HERMIDA, petitioners, vs. PRESIDENT present."6
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. If the requisites for a warrantless arrests must still
ROMULO, respondents. be present for an arrest to be made, then the
declaration is a superfluity. I therefore shudder
when a blanket affirmation is given to the President
[G.R. No. 159196. February 3, 2004] to issue declarations of a "state of rebellion" which
in fact may not be the truth or which may be in
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of affect even after the rebellion has ended.
the Senate, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY
ALBERTO ROMULO, AS EXECUTIVE Proclamation No. 427 was issued at 1:00 p.m. on
SECRETARY; SECRETARY ANGELO July 27, 2003, at the height of the occupation of the
REYES, AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center,
DEFENSE; GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, Makati City, by 323 junior officers and enlisted men
7
AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED (Oakwood Incident), which began in the early
8
FORCES; SECRETARY JOSE LINA, et morning of July 27, 2003. Shortly after, the
al.,respondents. President issued General Order No. 4, ordering
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Philippine National Police to use reasonable force,
and pay due regard to constitutional rights, in
9
The fundamental issue in the petitions is the putting down the rebellion. The Oakwood incident
legality of Proclamation No. 427 issued by the ended peacefully that same evening when the
President on July 27, 2003 declaring a "state of militant soldiers surrendered after negotiations.
rebellion".
From July 27 to August 1, 2003, "search and
The majority affirmed the declaration is legal recovery" operations were conducted. Throughout
because the President was only exercising a the Oakwood Incident, searches were conducted
10
wedding of the "Chief Executive" and in the non-occupied areas, and, with the
"Commander-in-Chief" powers. U.S. jurisprudence recovery of evidence, staging points for the
and commentators are cited discussing the Oakwood Incident were found in Cavite, Makati
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 67

and Mandaluyong.11 After the soldiers left at
around 11:00 in the evening of July 27, a search
was conducted around the Oakwood
12
premises. These searches expanded in scope
on the basis of recovered evidence.13
Ramon Cardenas, Assistant Executive Secretary
in the previous administration, was arrested,
presented to the media in handcuffs and brought
for inquest proceedings before the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") in the morning of July 28.14 He was
initially detained at the Office of the Anti-Organized
Crime Division of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group ("CIDG"), and brought to the DOJ
in the afternoon of July 28.15 Cardenas was later
charged with the crime of rebellion,16 but as of this
writing has been allowed bail.
On July 31, 2003, 4 days after the militant group
had surrendered peacefully, an official
spokesperson from the DOJ declared that the
President's "indefinite" imposition of the "state of
rebellion" would make "warrantless arrests" a valid
exercise of executive power.
Enrile,17which overturned the landmark doctrine in
Lansang v. Garcia.18 In Lansang, the Supreme
Court upheld its authority to inquire into the factual
bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and held that this inquiry raises
a judicial rather than a political question. In Garcia-
Padilla, on the other hand, the ponencia held that
Lansang was no longer authoritative, and that the
President's decision to suspend the privilege is
final and conclusive upon the courts and all other
persons.
These two cases were decided prior to the 1987
Constitution, which requires this Court not only to
settle actualcontroversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also
to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government.19 This provision in
the 1987 Constitution was precisely meant to
check abuses of executive power. Martial Law was
still fresh in the minds of the delegates in
1987!lawphi1.nêt

The Court can take judicial notice that the police The majority ignored the fact that the "state of
authorities were releasing to media "evidence rebellion" declared by the President was in
found" purporting to link personalities in the effect five days after the peaceful surrender of the
political opposition, the most prominent of whom militant group.
was Senator Gringo Honasan. Even Senator Loi
Ejercito and Mayor JV Ejercito's names were being The President's proclamation cites Section 18,
linked to the attempted uprising. Article VII of the Constitution as the basis for the
declaration of the "state of rebellion.".
On August 1, 2003, the President issued
Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the Armed Section 18 authorizes the President, as
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Commander-in-Chief, to call out the Armed
National Police had effectively suppressed and Forces, in order to suppress one of three
quelled the rebellion, and, accordingly, that the conditions: (1) lawless violence, (2) rebellion or (3)
"state of rebellion" had ceased on that date. invasion.20 In the latter two cases, i.e., rebellion or
invasion, the President may, when public safety
The majority discussed only the abstract nature of requires, also (1) suspend the privilege of the writ
the powers exercised by the Chief Executive, of habeas corpus, or (2) place the Philippines or
without considering if there was sufficient factual any part thereof under martial law.
basis for the President's declaration of a "state of
rebellion" and when it ended. In taking this The majority made it clear that exercise of the
position, the majority is returning, if not expanding, President's Commander-in-Chief powers does not
the doctrine enunciated in Garcia-Padilla v. require the declaration of a "state of rebellion" or a
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 68

declaration of a "state of lawless violence" or a support or participation, for the purpose of seizing
"state of invasion". When any of these conditions or diminishing state power.
exist, the President may call out the armed forces
to suppress the danger. Under these provisions, the crime of rebellion or
insurrection is committed only by "rising publicly or
Thus, the declaration of a "state of rebellion" does taking up arms against the Government". A coup
not have any legal meaning or consequence. This d' etat, on the other hand, takes place only when
declaration does not give the President any extra there is a "swift attack accompanied by violence."
powers. It does not have any good purpose. Once the act of "rising publicly and taking up arms
against the Government" ceases, the commission
If the declaration is used to justify warrantless of the crime of rebellion ceases. Similarly, when
arrests even after the rebellion has ended, as in the "swift attack" ceases, the crime of coup d' etat
the case of Cardenas, such declaration or, at the is no longer being committed.
least, the warrantless arrests, must be struck
down. Rebellion has been held to be a continuing
crime,21 and the authorities may resort to
Clearly defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal warrantless arrests of persons suspected of
Code is the crime of rebellion or insurrection, to rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of
wit: the Rules of Court.22 However, this doctrine should
be applied to its proper context – i.e., relating to
ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection – How subversive armed organizations, such as the New
committed. – The crime of rebellion or insurrection People's Army, the avowed purpose of which is the
is committed by rising publicly and taking up arms armed overthrow of the organized and established
against the Government for the purpose of government. Only in such instance should
removing from the allegiance to said Government rebellion be considered a continuing crime.
or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the
Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, When the soldiers surrendered peacefully in the
naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief evening of July 27, the rebellion or the coup d' etat
Executive or the legislature, wholly or partially, of ended. The President, however, did not lift the
any of their powers or prerogatives. declaration of the "state of rebellion" until 5 days
later, on August 1, 2003.
On the other hand, a coup d' etat is defined as
follows: After the peaceful surrender, no person suspected
of having conspired with the soldiers or
ART. 134-A. Coup d' etat. – How committed. – The participated in the Oakwood incident could be
crime of coup d' etat is a swift attack accompanied arrested without a warrant of arrest. Section 5,
by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
directed against the duly constituted authorities of governs arrest without warrant, provides as
the Republic of the Philippines, or any military follows:
camp or installation, communications networks,
public utilities or other facilities needed for the SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A
exercise and continued possession of power, peace officer or a private person may, without a
singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in warrant, arrest a person:
the Philippines by any person or persons,
belonging to the military or police or holding any (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
public office or employment, with or without civilian arrested has committed, is actually
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 69

committing, or is attempting to commit an the validity of the presidential issuances. This can
offense; serve as a blank check for other issuances and
open the door to abuses. The majority cite the
(b) When an offense has just been exercise of strong executive powers by U.S.
committed and he has probable cause to President Andrew Jackson. Was it not President
believe based on personal knowledge of Jackson who is said to have cynically defied the
facts or circumstances that the person to be U.S. Supreme Court's ruling (under Chief Justice
arrested has committed it; and Marshall) against the forcible removal of the
American Indians from the tribal lands by saying:
xxxxxxxxx "The Chief Justice has issued his Decision, now let
him try to enforce it?" Others quote Madison as
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) having gone further with: "With what army will the
above, the person arrested without a warrant shall Chief Justice enforce his Decision?"
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in WHEREFORE, I vote for Proclamation No. 427
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. and General Order No. 4, issued on July 27, 2003
by Respondent President Gloria Macapagal-
Rule 113, Section 5, pars. (a) and (b) of the Rules Arroyo, to be declared NULL and VOID for having
of Court are exceptions to the due process clause been issued with grave abuse of discretion
in the Constitution. Section 5, par. (a) relates to a amounting to lack of jurisdiction. All other orders
situation where a crime is committed or attempted issued and action taken based on those
in the presence of the arresting officer. issuances, especially after the Oakwood incident
ended in the evening of July 27, 2003, e.g.,
Section 5, par. (b), on the other hand, presents the warrantless arrests, should also be declared null
requirement of "personal knowledge", on the part and void.
of the arresting officer, of facts indicating that an
offense had "just been committed", and that the
person to be arrested had committed that offense.

After the peaceful surrender of the soldiers on July

27, 2003, there was no crime that was being
"attempted", "being committed", or "had just been
committed." There should, therefore, be no
occasion to effect a valid warrantless arrest in
connection with the Oakwood Incident.

The purpose of the declaration and its duration as

far as the overeager authorities were concerned
was only to give legal cover to effect warrantless
arrests even if the "state of rebellion" or the
instances stated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Rules are absent or no longer exist.

Our history had shown the dangers when too much

power is concentrated in the hands of one person.
Unless specifically defined, it is risky to concede
and acknowledge the "residual powers" to justify
CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 70

SEDITION

G.R. No. 17748 March 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE

ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.

Vicente Sotto for appellants.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee

MALCOLM, J.:

As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of

certain members of the Philippine Constabulary to
inflict revenge upon the police of the city of Manila,
charges of sedition were filed in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila against the
participants in the public disturbance. Convicted in
the trial court of a violation of Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission, and sentenced either to
the maximum penalty or a near approach to the
maximum penalty provided by the punitive
provisions of that law, all of the defendants have
perfected an appeal to this court. A statement of
the case and of the facts, an opinion on the
pertinent issues, and a judgement, if no reversible
error be found, regarding the appropriate penalty,
will be taken up in the order named.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 71

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day,
FACTS December 15, 1920, corporal Ingles of the Fourth
Company approached private Nicolas Torio who
On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of was then the man in charge of quarters, and asked
Manila arrested a woman who was a member of him to let the soldiers out through the window of
the household of a Constabulary soldier stationed the quarters of the Fourth Company. Private Torio
at the Santa Lucia Barracks in this city. The arrest was easily persuaded to permit private Francisco
of the woman was considered by some of the Garcia of the Second Company to saw out the
Constabulary soldiers as an outrage committed by window bars of the quarters, in his charge, and to
the policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction allow soldiers to escape through the window with
between members of Manila police department rifles and ammunition under the command of their
and member of the Philippine Constabulary. sergeants and corporals. When outside of the
quarters, these soldiers divided into groups for
The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a attack upon the city police force.
policemen named Artemio Mojica, posted on Calle
Real, in the District of Intramuros, city of Manila, One platoon of Constabulary soldiers apparently
had an encounter with various Constabulary numbering about ten or twelve, on Calle Real,
soldiers which resulted in the shooting of private Intramuros, fired in the direction of the intersection
Macasinag of the Constabulary. Private of Calles Real and Cabildo where an American
Macasinag was seriously, and as afterwards policeman named Driskill was stationed, and was
appeared, mortally wounded. taking with a friend named Jacumin, a field clerk in
the United States Army. These two men were shot
The encounter between policemen Mojica and and died soon afterwards. To the credit of
other companions of the Manila force and private policeman Driskill be it said, that although in a
Macasinag and other companions of the dying condition and in the face of overwhelming
Constabulary, with its grave consequences for a odds, her valiantly returned the fire with his
Constabulary soldier endangered a deep feeling of revolver. Jacumin was killed notwithstanding that
resentment on the part of the soldiers at Santa in response to the command of Constabulary,
Lucia Barracks. This resentment was soon "Hands up!," he elevated both arms.
converted into a desire for revenge against the
police force of the city of Manila. The officers of the A street car happened to stop at this time at the
Constabulary appear to have been aware of the corner of Calles Real and Cabildo. Without
state of excitement among the soldiers the considering that the passengers in the car were
shooting of private Macasinag, Captain Page, the innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad fired
commanding officer of the Barracks, increased the a volley into the car, killing instantly the passenger
number of guards, and confined all the soldiers in named Victor de Torres and gravely wounding
the Barracks. three other civilian passengers, Gregorio Cailes,
Vicente Antonio, and Mariano Cortes. Father Jose
During the afternoon of the next day, December Tahon, a priest of the Cathedral of Manila, proved
15, 1920, a rumor spread among the soldiers in himself a hero on this occasion for, against the
Santa Lucia Barracks to the effect that policeman command of the Constabulary, he persisted in
Mojica was allowed to continue on duty on the persuading them to cease firing and advanced in
streets of Intramuros and that private Macasinag order that he might administer spiritual aid to those
had died as a consequence of the shot he received who had been wounded.
the night before. This rumor contributed in no small
degree in precipitating a movement for reprisal by The firing on Calle Real did not end at that time.
the Constabulary soldiers against the policemen. Some minutes later, Captain William E. Wichman,
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 72

assistant chief of police of the city of Manila, riding

events of the night before. He first ordered that all
in a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks at that time,
arrived at the corner of Calles Real and numbering some one hundred and eighty, be
Magallanes in Intramuros, and a volley of shorts by assembled on the parade ground and when this
Constabulary soldiers resulted in the
was done, the soldiers were separated into their
instantaneous death of Captain Wichman and the respective companies. Then Colonel Sweet,
death shortly afterwards of patrolman Saplala. speaking in English with the assistance of Captain
Silvino Gallardo, who interpreted his remarks into
About the same time, a police patrol came from the Tagalog, made to all of the soldiers two
Meisic police station. When it was on Calle Real statements.
near Cabildo, in Intramuros, it was fired upon by
Constabulary soldiers who had stationed What occurred on the occasion above described
themselves in the courtyard of the San Agustin can best be told in the exact language of Colonel
Church. This attack resulted in the death of Sweet: "I assembled all four companies in Santa
patrolmen Trogue and Sison. Lucia Barracks and asked them to tell me which
ones had been out the night before and which ones
Another platoon of the Constabulary, between had participated in the shooting, which they did,
thirty and forty in number, had in the meantime, and to tell me the names of those who were with
arranged themselves in a firing line on the Sunken them and who were not then present, which they
Gradens on the east side of Calle General Luna did. I think there were seventy-two (seventy-three)
opposite the Aquarium. From this advantageous present and they named five (four) others." Again
position the Constabulary fired upon the the witness said: "At first I asked all those who
motorcycle occupied by Sergeant Armada and went out on the previous night for any purpose
driven by policeman Policarpio who with whatever to signify the fact by stepping forward
companions were passing along Calle General and gave them five minutes to think it over before
Luna in front of the Aquarium going in the direction, doing so. To those who stepped forward that had
of Calle Real, Intramuros. As a result of the gone out for any purpose whatever I asked those
shooting, the driver of the motorcycle, policeman who took part in the shooting the night before that
Policarpio, was mortally wounded. This same in justice to themselves and to the other men who
platoon of Constabulary soldiers fired several had not taken part in it, and for the good of all
volleys indiscriminately into the Luneta police concerned, that they step forward and they did."
station, and the office of the secret service of the The names of the four who took part (not five as
city of Manila across Calles General Luna and stated by Colonel Sweet), but ho were taken to
Padre Burgos, but fortunately no one was injured. present, were noted by Captain Gallardo.

General Rafael Crame, Chief of the Constabulary, The statements of the seventy-seven soldiers
and Captain Page, commanding officer of the were taken in writing during the afternoon of the
Santa Lucia Barracks, and other soldiers in the same day, December 16. The questionnaire
streets of Manila, and other soldiers one after prepared by the fiscal of the city of Manila was in
another returned to the Barracks where they were English or Spanish. The questions and answers
disarmed. No list of the names of these soldiers were, however, when requested by the soldiers,
was, however, made. translated not their dialects. Each statement was
signed by the soldier making it in the presence of
In the morning of the next day, December 16, either two or three witnesses.
1920, Colonel, Lucien R. Sweet of the
Constabulary officers, and later by the fiscals of the Although the answers to the questions contained
city of Manila, commenced an investigation of the these statements vary in phraseology, in
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 73
substance they are the same. One of them, the first
in numerical order, that of Sergeant Graciano L.
Cabrera, taken in Spanish and interpreted into
Tagalog, may be selected into Tagalog, may be
selected as typical of the rest, and is here literally
transcribed:
1. Give your name, age, status, occupation,
and residence. — Graciano I. Cabrera, 254
years of age, single, sergeant of the first
company of the General Service of the
Constabulary, residing in Santa Lucia
Barracks.
2. To what company of the Philippine
Constabulary do you belong? — First
Company, General Service of the
Constabulary.]
3. Where were you garrisoned yesterday
afternoon December 15,
1920? — In the Santa Lucia Barracks.
4. Did you leave the barracks at about 7
o'clock yesterday evening? — Yes, sir.
5. For what reason, and where did you go?
— We went in search of the policemen and
secret service men of Manila. It has been
sometime now since we have been having
standing grudge against now since we have
been having a standing grudge against the
police of Manila. The wife of one of our
comrades was first arrested by the
policemen and then abused by the same;
and not content with having abused her,
they gave this woman to an American; after
this incident, they arrested two soldiers of
the Constabulary, falsely accusing them of
keeping women of bad reputation; after this
incident, came the shooting of Macasinag,
a shooting not justified, because we have
come to know that Macasinag did nothing
and the policemen could have arrested him
if they desired. Moreover, the rumor spread
among us that the police department of
Manila had given orders to the policemen to
fire upon any Constabulary soldier they
found in the streets, and we believe that the
rumor was not without foundation since we
noticed that after the Macasinag affair, the
policemen of Manila, Contrary to the usual
practice, were armed with carbines or
shotguns. For this reason we believe that if
we did not put an end to these abuses of the
policemen and secret service men, they
would continue abusing the constabulary.
And as an act of vengeance we did what we
had done last night.
6. How did you come to join your
companions who rioted last night? — I saw
that almost all the soldiers were jumping
through the window and I was to be left
alone in the barracks and so I followed.
7. Who asked you to join it? — Nobody.
8. Do you know private Crispin Macasinag,
the one who was shot by the Manila police
the night before last on Calle Real? — Yes,
Sir, I know him because he was our
comrade.
9. Were you offended at the aggression
made on the person of said soldier? —
Indeed, yes, not only was I offended, but my
companions also were.
10. State how many shots you fired, if nay,
during the riot last night. — I cannot tell
precisely the number of shots I fired
because I was somewhat obfuscated; all I
can assure you is that I fired more than
once.
11. Do you know if you hit any policeman or
any other person?-If so state whether the
victim was a policeman or a civilian. — I
cannot tell whether I hit any policeman or
any civilian.
12. State the streets of the city where you
fired shots. — I cannot given an exact
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 74

account of the streets where I fired my gun.
I had full possession of my faculties until I
reached Calle Victoria; afterwards, I
became aware that I was bathed with
perspiration only upon reaching the
barracks.
13. What arms were you carrying and how
much ammunition or how many cartidge did
you use? — I Carried a carbine; I cannot tell
precisely the number of cartridges I used;
however, I placed in my pocket the twenty
cartridges belonging to me and I must have
lost.
later, after the first witness for the prosecution had
testified, the accused who had pleaded guilty were
permitted, with the consent of the court, to
substitute therefor the plea of not guilty. the
prosecution, in making out it case, presented the
seventy-seven confession of the defendants,
introduced in evidence as Exhibits C to C-76,
conclusive, and with the exception of those made
by Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Gamus, and
Venancio Mira, all were identified by the respective
Constabulary officers, interpreters, and typists who
intervened in taking them. The prosecution further
relied on oral testimony, including eyewitness to
the uprising.

14. How did you manage to leave the
barracks? — By the window of the quarter
of the Fourth Company, through the grating
which I found cut off.
15. Are the above statements made by you,
voluntarily, freely, and spontaneously
given? — Yes, sir.
16. Do you swear to said statements
although no promise of immunity is made to
you? — Yes, sir; I confirm them, being true.
(Sgd.) G. L. CABRERA.
Witnesses:
The attorneys for the accused presented two
defenses. The first defense was in favor of all the
defendants and was based on the contention that
the written statements Exhibits C to C-76 were not
freely and voluntarily made by them. The second
defense was in favor of the defendants Vicente
Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Roberto Palabay,
Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Roque
Ebol, Francisco Garcia, Benigno Tagavilla,
Paciano Caña, Juan Abarques, Genaro Elayda,
Hilario Hibabar, P. E. Vallado, Patricio Bello, Felix
Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Nemesio Deceña,
Venancio Mira, Baldomero Rodriguez, Juan
Noromor, Maximo Perlas, and Victor Atuel, and
was to the effect these men did not take part in the
riot.

S. GALLARDO. The court overruled the special defenses and

LAURO C. MARQUEZ. found that the guilt of the accused had been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the
The defendants were charged in one information defendants were sentenced to serve the maximum
filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of imprisonment of ten years provided by section 6 of
Manila with the crime of sedition, and in another Act No. 292. The court, however, distinguished
information filed in the same, court, with the crimes fines from that of a defendants Francisco Garcia,
of murder and serious physical injuries. The two a private and the eight corporals E. E. Agbulos,
cases were tried separately before different judges Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan
of first instance. Abarques, Pedro V. Matero, Juan Regalado,
Hilario Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, upon each of
All of the accused, with the exception of eight, whom a fine of P5,000 was imposed, and of the
namely, Francisco Ingles, Juan Noromor, P. E. three sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual
Vallado., Dionisio Verdadero, and Paciano Caña, Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, upon each of
first pleased guilty to the charge of sedition, but whom a fine of P10,000 was imposed. The costs
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 75

were divided proportionately among the discussion of this question falls more appropriately
defendants. under consideration of assignment of error No. 4,
relating to the conspiracy between the accused.
For the statement of the cases and the facts which
has just been made, we are indebted in large Assignment of error No. 3, relating to the finding of
measure to the conspicuously fair and thoughtful the trial court that it had not been shown that the
decisions of the Honorable George R. Harvey who policemen were not aware of the armed attack of
presided in the sedition case and of the Honorable the Constabulary, However, we find that the
Carlos Imperial who presided in the murder case. evidence supports this conclusion of the trial court.
As stipulated by the Attorney-General and counsel
for the defendants, the proof is substantially the The three pertinent issues in this case relate to: (1)
same in both cases. the Admission of Exhibits C to C-76 of the
prosecution (assignment of error No. 2, murder
In all material respects we agree with the findings case); (2) the conspiracy between the accused
of fact as made by the trial court in this case. The (assignment of error No. 4, sedition case;
rule is again applied that the Supreme Court will assignment of error No. 3, murder case); and (3)
not interfere with the judgement of the trial court in the conviction of the accused of a violation of the
passing upon the credibility of the opposing Treason and Sedition Law (assignment of error
witnesses, unless there appears in the record No. 5, sedition case).
some fact or circumstances of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the 1. The admission of exhibits C to C-76
significance of which has been misinterpreted. (U.
S. vs. Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil., 295; Appellants claim that fraud and deceit marked the
U. S. vs. Remegio [1918], 37 Phil., 599.) In the preparation of the seventy seven confessions. It is
record of the case at bar, no such fact or alleged that some of the defendants signed the
circumstance appears. confessions under the impression that those who
had taken part in the affray would be transferred to
OPINION Mindanao, and that although they did not in fact so
participate, affirmed that they because of a desire
An assignment of five errors is made by counsel to leave Manila; that other stepped forward "for the
for the defendants and appellants. Two the good of the service" in response to appeals from
assignment of error merit little or no consideration. Colonel Sweet and other officers; while still others
Assignment of error No. 2 (finding its counterpart simply didn't understand what they were doing, for
in assignments of error 5 and 6 in the murder the remarks of Colonel Sweet were made in
case), in which it is attempted to establish that English and only translated into Tagalog, and their
Vicente Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Paciano declarations were sometime taken in al language
Caña, Juan Abarquez, Mariano Garcia, Felix Liron, which was unintelligible to them. Counsel for the
Bonifacio Eugenio, Patricio Bello, Baldomero accused entered timely objection to the admission
Rodriguez, Roberto Palabay, Juan Noromor, in evidence of Exhibits C to C-76, and the Attorney-
Roque Ebol, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Cipriano General is worn in stating otherwise.
Lizardo, Francisco Garcia, Genaro Elayda, Hilario
Hibalar, P. M. Vallado, Maximo Perlas, and Section 4 of Act No. 619, entitle "An Act to promote
Benigno Tagavilla, did not leave the Santa Lucia good order and discipline in the Philippines
Barracks in the night of the tragedy, is predicated Constabulary," and reading: "No confession of any
on the special defense raised in the lower court for person charged with crime shall be received as
these defendants and three other and which was evidence against him by any court of justice unless
found untenable by the trial court. Any further be first shown to the satisfaction of the court that it
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 76
was freely and voluntarily made and not the result
of violence, intimidation, threat, menace or of
promises or offers of reward or leniency," was
repealed by the first Administrative Code. But the
same rule of jurisprudence continues without the
law. As he been repeatedly announced by this and
other courts, "the true test of admissibility is that
the confession is made freely, voluntarily, and
without compulsion or inducement of any sort". If
the confession is freely and voluntarily made, it
constitutes one of the most effectual proofs in the
law against the party making it. (Wilson vs. U.
S.[1896], 162 U. S. 613.)The burden of proof that
he confession was not voluntarily made or was
obtained by undue pressure is on the accused. (U.
S. vs Zara [1912, 42 Phil., 308.)
What actually occurred when the confessions were
prepared is clearly explained in the records. The
source of the rumor that the defendant would be
transferred to Mindanao if they signed the
confession is not established. One the contrary it
is established that before the declaration were
taken, Lieutenant Gatuslao in response to a query
had shown the improbability of such a transfer.
With military orders given in English and living in
the city of Manila where the dialect is tagalog, all
of the defendants must have understood the
substantial part of Colonel Sweet's remarks. What
is more important, there could be no
misunderstanding as to the contents of the
confessions as written down. In open court, sixty-
nine of the defendants reiterated their guilt. The
officers who assisted in the investigation were of
the same service as the defendants in their own
men.
It must also be remembered that each and
everyone of the defendants was a member of the
Insular Police force. Because of the very nature of
their duties and because of their practical
experience, these Constabulary soldiers must
have been aware of the penalties meted out for
criminal offenses. Every man on such a
momentous occasion would be more careful of his
actions than ordinarily and whatever of credulity
there is in him, would for the moment be laid aside.
Over and above all desire for a more exciting life,
over and above the so called esprit de corps, is the
instinct of self preservation which could not but be
fully aroused by such stirring incidents too recent
to be forgotten as had occurred in this case, and
which would counsel prudence rather than
rashness; secretiveness rather than garrulity.
These confessions contain the statements that
they were made freely and voluntarily without any
promise of immunity. That such was the case was
corroborated by the attesting witnesses whose
credibility has not been successfully impeached.
We rule that the trial court did not err in admitting
Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution.
2. The conspiracy between the accused
The contention of the appellants is that evidence is
lacking of any supposed connivance between the
accused. Counsel emphasizes that in answer to
the question in the confession, "who asked you to
join the riot," each of the accused answered,
"Nobody." The argument is then advanced that the
appellants cannot be held criminally responsible
because of the so called psychology of crowds
theory. In other words, it is claimed that at the time
of the commission of the crime the accused were
mere automatons obeying the insistent call of their
companions and of their uniform. From both the
negative failure of evidence and the positive
evidence, counsel could deduce the absence of
conspiracy between the accused.
The attorney-General answers the argument of
counsel by saying that conspiracy under section 5
of Act No. 292 is not an essential element of the
crime of sedition. In this law officer for the people
may be on solid ground. However, this may be,
there is a broader conception of the case which
reaches the same result.
It is a primary rule that if two or more persons
combine to perform a criminal act, each is
responsible for all the acts of the other done in
furtherance of the common design; and " the result
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 77
is the same if the act is divided into parts and each
person proceed with his part unaided." (U. S. vs
Maza [1905], 5 Phils., 346; U. S. vs. Remegio
[1918] 37 Phil., 599; decision of supreme court of
Spain of September 29, 1883; People vs. Mather
[1830], 4 Wendell, 229.)
Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of
indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances
which vary according to the purposes to be
accomplished. It be proved that the defendants
pursued by their acts the same object, one
performing one part and another part of the same,
so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment
of that same object, one will be justified in the
conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy
to effect that object. (5 R. C. L., 1088.) Applied to
the facts before us, it is incontestable that all of the
defendants were imbued with the same purpose,
which was to avenge themselves on the police
force of the city of Manila. A common feeling of
resentment animated all. A common plan evolved
from their military training was followed.
The effort to lead the court into the realm of
psychology and metaphysics is unavailing in the
face of actualities. The existence of a joint assent
may be reasonably inferred from the facts proved.
Not along are the men who fired the fatal shots
responsible, not along are the men who admit firing
their carbines responsible, but all, having united to
further a common design of hate and vengeance,
are responsible for the legal consequences
therefor.
We rule that the trail court did not err in declaring
that there a c conspiracy between the accused.
3. The conviction of the accused of a violation of
the Treason and Sediton Law
Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising
of commotions or disturbances in the State. The
Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes
all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside
of legal methods any one of vie objects, including
that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon
the person or property of any official or agent of the
Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal
Government. The trial court found that the crime of
sedition, as defined and punished by the law, had
been committed, and we believe that such finding
is correct.
Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a
violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No.
292 it is and necessary that the offender should be
a private citizen and the offended party a public
functionary, and that what really happened in this
instance was a fight between two armed bodies of
the Philippine Government, is absolutely without
foundation. Subdivison 3 of section 5 of the
Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction
between the persons to which it applies. In one
scene there was a fights between two armed
bodies of the Philippine Government, but it was an
unequal fight brought on by the actions of the
accused.
We rule that the trial court did not err in convicting
the accused of the violation of section 5, paragraph
3, of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
JUDGEMENT
The Treason and Sedition Law provides as a
penalty for any person guilty of sedition as defined
in section 5 of the law, punishment by fine of not
exceeding P10,000 or by imprisonment not
exceeding ten years, or both. In this connection, it
will be recalled that the court sentenced each of
the private soldiers Salvador Gregorio, Juan
Noromor, Patricio Bello, Nemesio Deceña,
Baldomero Rodriguez, P. E. Vallado, Pedro
Layola, Felix Liron (Cenon), Dionisio Verdadero,
Lorenzo Tumboc, Casiano Guinto, Victor Atuel,
Venancio Mira, Benigno Tagavilla, Masaway,
Quintin Desierto, Teofilo Llana, Timoteo
Opermaria, Maximo Perlas, Cornelio Elizaga,
Roberto Palabay, Roque Ebol, Benito Garcia,
Honorio Bautista, Crisanto Salgo, Francisco
Lusano, Marcelino Silos, Nicanor Perlas, Patricio
Rubio, Mariano Aragon, Silvino Ayngco, Guillermo
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 78

Inis, Julian Andaya, Crispin Mesalucha, Prudencio
Tasis, Silvino Bacani, Petronilo Antonio, Domingo
Peroche, Florentino Jacob, Paciano Caña,
Domingo Canapi, Arcadio San Pedro, Daniel
Coralde, Nemesio Camas, Luis Borja, Severino
Elefane, Vicente Tabien, Marcos Marquez,
Victorino Merto, Bernabe Sison, Eusebio Cerrudo,
Julian Acantilado, Ignacio Lechoncito, Pascual
Dionio, Marcial Pelicia, Rafael Nafrada, Zacarias
Bayle, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Juan
Miranda, Graciano Zapata, Felisardo Favinal,
Gaspar Andrade, Felix Lamsing, and Vicente
Casimiro, to suffer imprisonment for ten years, and
to pay one seventy-seventh part of the costs; the
private Francisco Garcia, who sawed the bars of
the window through which the defendants passed
from Santa Lucia Barracks and each of the
corporals E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles,
Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarquez, Pedro V.
Mateo, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and Genaro
Elayda, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to
pay a fine of P5,000 and one seventy-seventy of
the costs; and each of the sergeants Graciano L.
Cabrera, Pascual Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio,
to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a
fine of P10,000 and one seventy-seventy of the
costs. The trial judge appears to have made a
reasonable exercise of the discretion which the law
reposes in him.
cause, and in disregard of the
consequences to themselves and their
innocent loved ones, and using the means
furnished to them by the Government for
the protection of life and property, they
sought by force and violence and outside of
legal methods to avenge a fancied wrong by
an armed and tumultuous attack upon
officials and agents of the government of
the city of Manila.
Although in view of the sentence which is being
handed down in the murder case, affecting these
same defendants and appellants, it would seem to
be a useless formality to impose penalties in this
case, yet it is obviously our duty to render
judgement appealed from, with one seventy-
seventh of the costs of this instance against each
appellant. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J. Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor,
Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

We cannot bring to a close this disagreeable duty

without making our own the pertinent observations
found in the decision of the trial court in this case.
Therein, along toward the closed of his learned
opinion, Judge Harvey said:

Rarely in the history of criminality in this

country has there been registered a crime
so villainous as that committed by these
defendants. The court is only concerned in
this case with crime of sedition. The
maximum penalty prescribed by Act No.
292, imprisonment for ten year and a fine
P10,000, is not really commensurate with
the enormity of the offense. Impelled by
hatred, employing their knowledge of
military sciences which is worthy of a better
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 79

Rafael Palma and Gibbs and Kincaid for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for
appellee.

CARSON, J.:

Aurelio Tolentino, the appellant in this case, was

convicted upon an information charging him with
the crime of "uttering seditious words and writings,
publishing and circulating scurrilous libels against
the Government of the United States and the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands,
committed as follows: That said Aurelio Tolentino,
on or about the 14th day of May, 1903, in the city
of Manila, Philippine Islands, did unlawfully utter
seditious words and speeches and did write,
publish, and circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, which tend
to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States
and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands in the execution of their offices, and which
tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together
for unlawful purposes, and which suggest and
incite rebellious conspiracies and riots, and which
tend to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community and the safety and order of the
Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, which said
seditious words and speeches are false and
inflammatory, and tend to incite and move the
people to hatred and dislike of the government
established by law within the Philippine Islands,
and tend to incite, move, and persuade great
numbers of the people of said Philippine Islands to
insurrection, riots, tumults, and breaches of the
public peace; which said false, seditious, and
inflammatory words and scurrilous libels are in
Tagalog language in a theatrical work written by
said Aurelio Tolentino, and which was presented
INCITING TO SEDITION by him and others on the said 14th day of May,
1903, at the "Teatro Libertad," in the city of Manila,
G.R. No. L-1451 March 6, 1906 Philippine Islands, entitled 'Kahapon Ñgayon at
Bukas' (Yesterday, To-day, and To-morrow). An
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, exact translation of the said drama is included in
vs. AURELIO TOLENTINO,Defendant-Appellant. the information, and various parts thereof are
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 80

specially assigned, which, in the opinion of the The complaint appears to be framed upon the
prosecution, were more especially in violation of theory that a writing, in order to be punishable as
the statute in such cases made and provided. a libel under this section, must be of a scurrilous
nature and directed against the Government of the
It was proven at the trial beyond a reasonable United States or the Insular Government of the
doubt that the accused did in fact write the drama Philippine Islands, and must, in addition, tend to
and the announcement thereof, substantially as some one of the results enumerated in the section,
set out in the information, and did, with other the article in question being described in the
members of a theatrical company, of which he was complaint as "a scurrilous libel against the
director, utter and publish the same substantially in Government of the United States and the Insular
manner and form as charged, and as we Government of the Philippine Islands, which tends
understand it, the only question for decision is to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States
whether, in writing, publishing, and uttering the and the Insular Government of the Philippine
drama, the accused was in fact guilty of a violation Islands in the execution of their offices, and which
of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine tends to instigate others to cabal and meet
Commission, upon which the information was together for unlawful purposes, and which
based. suggests and incites rebellious conspiracies, and
which tends to stir up the people against the lawful
This section is as follows: authorities, and which disturbs the safety and
order of the Government of the United States and
Every person who shall utter seditious words or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands."
speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous But it is a "a well-settled rule in considering
libels against the Government of the United States indictments that where an offense may be
or the Insular Government of the Philippine committed in any of several different modes, and
Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to
lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend have been committed in two or more modes
to instigate others to cabal or meet together for specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense
unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite committed in any one of them, provide that it be
rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir such as to constitute the substantive offense."
up the people against the lawful authorities or to (Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick. Mass. 206, 215), and
disturb the peace of the community, the safety and the defendants may, therefore, be convicted if any
order of the Government, or who shall knowingly one of the substantive charges into which the
conceal such evil practices, shall be punished by a complaint may be separated has been made out.
fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in Several allied offenses or modes of committing the
the discretion of the court. same offense are define in that section, viz: (1) The
uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2) the
Counsel discussed at some length the question writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels
whether the drama or any part of it was of a against the Government of the United States or the
"scurrilous" nature in the legal acceptation of the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands; (3)
word, but for the purposes of this decision we do the writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which
not deem it necessary to make a finding on this tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
point. In the case of the United States vs. Fred L. executing his office; (4) or which tend to instigate
Dorr and Edward F. O'Brien, 1 decided May 19, others to cabal or meet together for unlawful
1903, this court said: purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 81

the peace of the community, the safety and order dangerous insurrection were not yet entirely
of the Government; (7) knowingly concealing such extinguished, and here and there throughout the
evil practices. Islands occasional outbreaks still required the use
of the armed forces of the Government for their
In accordance with the principles laid down in the suppression. A junta in the city of Hongkong,
preceding paragraph the judgment of conviction in composed of persons whose announced purpose
this case must be sustained, if it appears from the and object in organizing was the overthrow of the
evidence in the record that the accused was guilty present Government, was actively engaged in the
as charged of any one of those offenses. We are endeavor to keep the people of these Islands from
all agreed that the publication and presentation of peaceably accepting the authority of that
the drama directly and necessarily tend to instigate Government, and this junta, acting with
others to cabal and meet together for unlawful confederates in the Philippines, was still able to
purposes, and to suggest and incite rebellious keep alive a certain spirit of unrest and uncertainty
conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people which it hoped to fan into open revolt and rebellion
against the lawful authorities and to disturb the at the first favorable opportunity.
peace of the community and the safety and order
of the Government. The manner and form in which the drama was
presented at such a time and under such
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, conditions, renders absurd the pretense that it was
in view of the time, place, and manner of its merely or even principally a literary or artistic
presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and production, and the clumsy devices, the allegorical
enmity against the American people and the figures, the apparent remoteness, past and future,
Government of the United States in the of the events portrayed, could not and in fact were
Philippines, and we are satisfied that the principal not intended to leave the audience in doubt as to
object and intent of its author was to incite the its present and immediate application, nor should
people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed they blind this court to the true purpose and intent
resistance to the constituted authorities, and to of the author and director of the play.
induce them to conspire together for the secret
organization of armed forces, to be used when the It is further contended that even though the
opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of accused were in fact guilty as charged, the court
overthrowing the present Government and setting erred in imposing an excessive and unjust penalty,
up another in its stead. and in fixing the amount of the fine in dollars
instead of Philippine currency. As to the latter
Counsel for the appellant insists that the intent of objection it is sufficient to say that the use of the
the accused to commit the crime with which he is word "dollars" was in strict conformance with the
charged does not appear from the evidence of words of the statute, and that the equivalent of that
record, and that the drama is, in itself, a purely word in Philippine currency is fixed by law. The
literary and artistic production wherein the penalty was within the limits prescribed by law, and
legendary history of these Islands and their future, we are not prepared to hold that the trial court
as imagined by the author, are presented merely erred in the exercise of its discretion in imposing it.
for the instruction and entertainment of the public.
The judgment and sentence appealed from is
This contention can not be maintained. The public affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So
presentation of the drama took place in the month ordered.
of May, 1903, less than two years after the
establishment of the Civil Government. The Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and
smouldering embers of a wide-spread and Willard, JJ., concur.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 82

Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes

those who shall write, publish or circulate
scurrilous libels against the Government of the
Philippines or any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir
up the people againts the lawful authorities or to
disturb the peace of the community.

The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was,

after trial, convicted in the Court of First Instance
of Bohol of a violation of the above article. The
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
because according to said court.

"About the time compromised between June 9 and

June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of
Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza
had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he
were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope
suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth
and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel
(Exhibit A, C-I). After securing copies of his
photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to
several newspapers and weeklies of general
circulation (Exhibit C, F, G, H, I), not only in the
Province of Bohol but also throughout the
Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a
suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear
that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto
Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed
wife translation of which letter or note in hereunder
G.R. No. L-2990 December 17, 1951 reproduced:

OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner, Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters
vs. deep. Over my grave don't plant a cross or put
THE PEOPLE OF THE floral wreaths, for I don't need them.
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me
Carlos P. Garcia, Cosme P. Garcia and B.E. in the Catholic cemetery. Although I have
Enerio for petitioner. committed suicide, I still have the right to burried
Office of the Solicitor Jesus A. Avanceña for among Christians.
respondent.
But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and
BENGZON, J.: don't feel sorry. Wipe me out of your lives.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 83

My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the
committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was security of the government or to weaken the
not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell confidence of the people in the government are
the whole world about this. against the public peace, and are criminal not only
because they tend to incite to a breach of the
And if they ask why I did not like the administration peace but because they are conducive to the
of Roxas, point out to them the situation in Central destruction of the very government itself (See 19
Luzon, the Leyte. Am. Law Rep. 1511). Regarded as seditious libels
they were the subject of criminal proceedings
Dear wife, write to President Truman and since early times in England. (V op. cit.).
Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our
government is infested with many Hitlers and As explained by Paterson, 3 ". . . the great factors
Mussolinis.lawphil.net of government, consisting of the Sovereign, the
Parliament, the ministers of state, the courts of
Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and justice, must be recognized as holding functions
when they come across one. founded on sound principles and to be defended
and treated with an established and well-nigh
I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our unalterable respect. Each of these great
government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my institutions has peculiar virtues and peculiar
brows to the world with this dirty government. weaknesses, but whether at any one time the
virtue or the weakness predominates, there must
I committed suicide because I have no power to be a certain standard of decorum reserved for all.
put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people Each guarded remonstrance, each fiery invective,
now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self. each burst of indignation must rest on some basis
of respect and deference towards the depository,
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the for the time being, of every great constitutional
note or letter above quoted and caused its function. Hence another limit of free speech and
publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, writing is sedition. And yet within there is ample
the Bisayas, Lamdang and other local periodicals room and verge enough for the freest use of the
and that he had impersonated one Alberto tongue and pen in passing strictures in the
Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in judgment and conduct of every constituted
said note or letter and posed himself as Alberto authority."
Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he was
shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb Naturally, when the people's share in the
of a tree." government was restricted, there was a disposition
to punish even mild criticism of the ruler or the
The latter is a scurrilous libel against the departments of government. But as governments
Government. 1 It calls our government one of grew to be more representative, the laws of
crooks and dishonest persons (dirty) infested with sedition became less drastic and freedom of
Nazis and a Fascistis i.e. dictators. expression strife continue to be prohibited.

And the communication reveals a tendency to
produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible
with the disposition to remain loyal to the
government. 2
The United States punished seditious utterances
in the act of July 14, 1798 containing provisions
parallel to our own article 142. Analogous
prohibitions are found in the Espionage Act of June
1917 and the seditious libel amendment thereto in
May, 1918.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 84

Of course such legislation despite its general merit sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not
is liable to become a weapon of intolerance a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's
constraining the free expression of opinion, or simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom
mere agitation for reform. But so long as there is a and what with is failure to particularize. When the
sufficient safeguard by requiring intent on the part use irritating language centers not on persuading
of the defendant to produce illegal action-such the readers but on creating disturbances, the
legislation aimed at anarchy and radicalism rationable of free speech cannot apply and the
presents largely a question of policy. Our speaker or writer is removed from the protection of
Legislature has spoken in article 142 and the law the constitutional guaranty.
must be applied.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the
In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to entire governmental structure but only President
be given to the fundamental right to freedom of Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142
speech. Yet the freedom of speech secured by the punishes not only all libels against the Government
Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to but also "libels against any of the duly constituted
speak or publish without responsibility whatever authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the
one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that Government obviously refer of least to the
gives immunity for every possible use of language President, his Cabinet and the majority of
and prevents the punishment of those who abuse legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and
this freedom. 4" So statutes against sedition have Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score
guaranty, although they should not be interpreted alone the conviction could be upheld. 6
so as to agitate for institutional changes. 5
As heretofore stated publication suggest or incites
Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up
to criticize his government officials and to submit people against the constituted authorities, or to
his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" and to plead provoke violence from opposition who may seek to
for its acceptance in "the competition of the silence the writer. 7 Which is the sum and
market." However, let such criticism be specific substance of the offense under consideration.
and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered,
and not a contemptuous condemnation of the The essence of seditious libel may be said to its
entire government set-up. Such wholesale attack immediate tendency to stir up general discontent
is nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to
government. In the article now under examination induce people to resort to illegal methods other
one will find no particular objectionable actuation than those provided by the Constitution, in order to
of the government. It is called dirty, it is called a repress the evils which press upon their minds. 8
dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular
omissions or commissions are set forth. Instead "The idea of violence prevades the whole letter"
the article drip with male-violence and hate says Justice Paredes of the Court of Appeals. "The
towards the constituted authorities. It tries to mere fact that a person was so disgusted with his
arouse animosity towards all public servants "dirty government" to the point of taking his own
headed by President Roxas whose pictures this life, is not merely a sign of disillusionment; it is a
appellant would burn and would teach the younger clear act to arouse its readers a sense of
generation to destroy. dissatisfaction against its duly constituted
authorities. The mention made in said letter of the
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio
consequences the article cannot fail to impress Guillen and the banditry in Leyte, which are
thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of instances of flagrant and armed attacks against
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 85

the law and the duly constituted authorities cannot Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His
but be interpreted by the reading public as an official position, like the President of the United
indirect justification of the open defiance by the States and other high office, under form of
Hukbalahaps against the constituted government, government, instead of affording immunity from
the attempt against the life of President Roxas and promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite
the ruthless depredations committed by the abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on
bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a state on the President passes the furthest bounds of free
lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would be very speech and common decency. More than a figure
much better than the maladministration of said of speech was intended. There is a seditious
President and his men. tendency in the words used, which could easily
produce disaffection among the people and a state
To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain
that he committed suicide because he had "no loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws."
power to put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas
people now in power." Knowing, that the The accused must therefore be found guilty as
expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary charged. And there being no question as to the
layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision
arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended will be affirmed with costs.
by the appellant to be conveyed was no other than
bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the
government from the administration of Roxas and
his men.

The meaning, intent and effect of the article

involves maybe a question of fact, making the
findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon
us. 9

Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the

decapitation or assassination of all Roxas officials
(at least members of the Cabinet and a majority of
Legislators including the Chief Executive himself).
And such suggestion clinches the case against
appellant.

In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing

political matter with several persons in a public
place uttered theses words: "Filipinos must use
bolos for cutting off Wood's head" — referring to
the them Governor-General, Leonard Wood.
Perez was found guilty of inciting to sedition in a
judgment of this court published in Volume 45 of
the Philippine Reports. That precedent is
undeniably opposite. Note that the opinion was
penned by Mr. Justice Malcolm probably of
speech. Adopting his own words we could say,
"Here the person maligned by the accused is the
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 86

Estanislao A. Fernandez, Amelito Mutuc,

Reynaldo Villar, Alberto K. Jamir Anacleto Badoy,
Jr., Emmanuel Santos, Sedfrey Ordoñez, Antonio
Tupaz, Arturo Pacificador, Dominador F. Carillo,
Antonio Borromeo, Augusto Cesar Espiritu, Dandy
K. Tupaz and Eugene A. Tan for petitioner Manuel
Martinez Y Festin.

Remulla, Perez and Estrella, Fernando P. Cabato

and Gaudencio N. Floresca for petitioner
Fernando Bautista Sr.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio,

Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P. Pardo,
Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A. de Leon and
Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza for respondents
Judges.

Kaulayao V. Faylona, Manuel Imbong, Jacobo

Gonzales, Fernando P. Camaya, Jose Tablizo,
Romeo Kahayon and Tomas P. Matic, Jr. for
respondents Pulido and Tamayo.

FERNANDO, J.:p

The question raised in

these certiorari proceedings, one to which no
authoritative answer has been yielded by past
VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY decisions, is the scope to be accorded the
IMMUNITY constitutional immunity of senators and
representatives from arrest during their attendance
at the sessions of Congress and in going to and
G.R. No. L-34022 March 24, 1972
returning from the same except in cases of
treason, felony and breach of the
MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN petitioner, 1 2
peace. Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and
vs.
Fernando Bautista, Sr.,3 as delegate of the present
THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE
Constitutional Convention would invoke what they
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, and
consider to be the protection of the above
THE CITY WARDEN OF MANILA, respondents.
constitutional provision, if considered in
connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal
G.R. Nos. L-34046-7 March 24, 1972
Code penalizing a public officer or employee who
shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or
FERNANDO BAUTISTA, SR., petitioner,
search any member thereof, except in case such
vs.
member has committed a crime punishable under
HON. FRANCISCO MA. CHANCO, Presiding
[such] Code by a penalty higher than prision
Judge, Court of First Instance of Baguio and
mayor."4 For under the Constitutional Convention
Benguet, Second Judicial District, Branch III, et
Act,5delegates are entitled to the parliamentary
al., respondents.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 87
immunities of a senator or a representative.6 Both
petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, the
information filed against petitioner Manuel
Martinez y Festin for falsification of a public
document and two informations against petitioner
Fernando Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised
Election Code. The Solicitor General, on behalf of
the respondent Judges in the above
7
proceedings, would dispute such a contention on
the ground that the constitutional provision does
not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an
exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical
inference being that insofar as a provision of the
Revised Penal Code would expand such an
immunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very
least inoperative. A careful study of the above
constitutional provision, in the light of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention,
adopting the then well-settled principle under
American law and of the purposes to be served by
such an immunity, persuade us that the stand
taken by the Solicitor General is correct.
These certiorari proceedings cannot prosper.
The facts in both petitions for certiorari are not in
dispute. Petitioner Martinez y Festin8 alleged that
on June 10, 1971, an information against him for
falsification a public document was filed. Its basis
was his stating under oath in his certificate of
candidacy for delegate to that Constitutional
Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945,
when in truth and in fact he knew that he was born
on June 20, 1946. There was on July 9, 1971, a
special appearance on his part questioning the
power of respondent Judge to issue a warrant of
arrest and seeking that the information be
quashed. On the same day, there was an order
from the lower court suspending the release of the
warrant of arrest until it could act on such motion
to quash. Then came on July 22, 1971 an omnibus
motion from him, with previous leave of court, to
quash the information, to quash the warrant of
arrest, or to hold in abeyance further proceeding in
the case. It was not favorably acted on. On August
21, 1971, respondent Judge rendered an order
denying the petitioner omnibus motion to quash. In
his belief that the information and the warrant of
arrest in this case are null and void, the petitioner
did not post the required bond. He was arrested by
the City Sheriff in the afternoon of September 6,
1971. At the time of the filing of the petition he was
confined at the City Jail in the custody of
respondent City Warden of Manila. He was on his
way to attend the plenary session of the
Constitutional Convention. Such arrest was
against his will and over his protest. He was
arraigned on September 9, 1971. There was at
such a time a motion by petitioner to reconsider the
court's order of August 21, 1971. It was denied in
open court. On the very same day, he filed the
petition for certiorari and habeas corpus, but
having been released thereafter on bail on
September 11, 1971, the petition is now in the
nature solely of a certiorari proceeding.9
As for petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr., 10 it was
alleged that he is a duly elected and proclaimed
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
He took his oath of office and assumed the
functions of such office on June 1, 1971. He has
continued since then to perform the duties and
discharge the responsibilities of a delegate. Two
criminal complaints, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 146(57) and 148(58), were directly filed with
the Court of First lnstance of Baguio and Benguet
by a certain Moises Maspil, a defeated delegate-
aspirant who placed 15th in the order of votes
garnered against the petitioner, and his co-
accused for alleged violation of Section 51 of the
Revised Penal Code in that they gave and
distributed free of charge food, drinks and
cigarettes at two public meetings, one held in
Sablan and the other in Tuba, both towns being in
Province of Benguet. Respondent Presiding Judge
conducted the preliminary investigation of said
criminal complaints. Thereafter on August 7, 1971,
he issued an order for the filing of the
corresponding informations. Before a warrant of
arrest in said criminal cases could be issued,
petitioner in a motion of August 14, 1971 invoked
the privilege of immunity from arrest and search,
pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132,
otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Act, in relation to Sec. 15, Article VI of
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 88

the Constitution and Article 145 of the Revised analysis of the constitutional question presented,
Penal Code. Respondent Judge, on the very same was filed on behalf of respondent Judge Morfe by
day, issued an order, holding in abeyance the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, two Assistants
issuance of a warrant of arrest and setting the Solicitors General Bernardo P. Pardo and Rosalio
hearing of said Motion on August 23, 1971. As A. de Leon as well as Solicitor Vicente V.
scheduled on August 23, 1971, there was a Mendoza. A memorandum on behalf of President
hearing on such motion. Petitioner however did not Diosdado Macapagal of the Constitutional
prevail notwithstanding his vigorous insistence on Convention, who was given permission to submit
his claim for immunity, a warrant of arrest being such a pleading, was submitted on March 8, 1972
ordered on the same day. On September 11, 1971, by the Committee on Legal Affairs of the
there was a motion to quash such order of arrest Constitutional Convention. 14
filed by petitioner. He was unsuccessful,
respondent Judge, in an order of said date, As for the petitions of Bautista, Sr., the answer on
ordering his immediate arrest. His petition behalf of respondent Judge was filed on
for certiorari and prohibition was filed with this September 29, 1971. When the matter was heard
Court on September 15, 1971. 11 on October 14, 1971, he appeared through
counsel, Delegate Juanito R. Remulla, while
What is thus sought by petitioners Martinez y respondent Judge was represented by Assistant
Festin and Bautista, Sr. is that the respective Solicitor General Rosalio A. de Leon and Solicitor
warrants of arrest issued against them be quashed Vicente V. Mendoza. With the submission, on
on the claim that by virtue of the parliamentary October 30, 1971, of an able memorandum on
immunity they enjoy as delegates, ultimately behalf of respondent judge, again, by the same
traceable to Section 15 of Article VI of the counsel from the Office of the Solicitor General as
Constitution as construed together with Article 145 well as a carefully-prepared memorandum of
of the Revised Penal Code, they are immune from petitioner Bautista, Sr., on December 1, 1971, the
arrest. In the case of petitioner Martinez y Festin, matter was deemed submitted for adjudication.
he is proceeded against for falsification of a public
document punishable by prision mayor. 12 As for As noted at the outset, certiorari does not lie to
petitioner Bautista, Sr., the penalty that could bequash the warrants of arrest issued against
imposed for each of the Revised Election Code petitioner Martinez y Festin as well as petitioner
offense, of which he is charged, is not higher Bautista, Sr. Their reliance on the constitutional
than prision mayor. 13 provision which for them should be supplemented
by what was provided for in the Revised Penal
The respondents in the above petitions were Code is futile. There is no justification then for
required to answer by resolutions of this Court granting their respective pleas.
issued on September 10 and September 20, 1971,
respectively. An answer on behalf of respondent No other conclusion is allowable consistently with
Judge Jesus P. Morfe in the case of petitioner the plain and explicit command of the Constitution.
Martinez y Festin was filed on September 20, 1971 As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI, the
with an answer in intervention filed by respondent immunity from arrest does not cover any
Executive Sheriff of Manila and the Chief of prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the
Warrant Division likewise filed on the same date. peace. Treason exists when the accused levies
His petition was duly heard on September 14, war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies
1971, Delegate Estanislao A. Fernandez giving them aid and comfort. 15 A felony is act or
vehemently pressing his claim to immunity. omission punishable by law. 16 Breach of the
Thereafter on October 29, 1971, a memorandum, peace covers any offense whether defined by the
comprehensive in scope and persuasive in its Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 89
well-settled principle in public law that the public
peace must be maintained and any breach thereof
renders one susceptible to prosecution. Certainly
then from the explicit language of the Constitution,
even without its controlling interpretation as shown
by the debates of the Constitutional Convention to
be hereinafter discussed, petitioners cannot justify
their claim to immunity. Nor does Article 145 of the
Revised Penal Code come to their rescue. Such a
provision that took effect in 1932 could not survive
after the Constitution became operative on
November 15, 1935. As will be shown, the
repugnancy between such an expansion of the
congressional immunity and the plain command of
the Constitution is too great to be overcome, even
on the assumption that the penalty to which a
public officer will be subjected in the event that he
did arrest one entitled thereto for an offense
punishable by less than reclusion
temporal suffices to widen its scope. This is so
considering not only the history of such a
Constitutional grant of immunity but also its basic
purpose and objective.
1. Even if the provision granting the legislative
immunity of freedom from arrest were clothed in
language less clear, its history precludes any other
interpretation. As submitted to the Constitutional
Convention of 1934, the draft proposal was
worded as follows: "The Members of the National
Assembly shall in all cases except treason, open
disturbance of public order, or other offense
punishable by death or imprisonment of not less
than six years, be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the National
Assembly, and in going to and returning from the
same." On December 4, 1934, upon its being
considered by the Convention, an amendment was
proposed by Delegate Aldeguer so that it would
read: "The Members of the National Assembly
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of the
National Assembly, and in going and returning
from the same." What was sought by him was to
retain the provision of the Philippine Autonomy Act
of 1916, with phraseology identical to that found in
the American Constitution.
He defended his proposal thus: "My amendment is
not new. It is the same phrase granting
parliamentary immunity to the members of the
Parliament of England. It is the same phrase
granting parliamentary immunity to members of
Congress. It is the same phrase granting
parliamentary immunity to members of the various
state legislators of the Union. Now, in reading the
draft proposed by the Sub-Committee of Seven, I
found out that it is a broad rule. Mr. President, the
question is not whether we should grant privilege
of immunity to the members of the National
Assembly ... " 17 He was interrupted by a point of
order raised, but he was allowed to continue. He
went on: "As I was saying, Mr. President and
Gentlemen of the Convention, the draft gives to the
member of the National Assembly more privileges
than what the nature of the office demands. My
question is that if the members of the Congress of
the United States, if the members of the
Parliament, if the members of the various State
Legislatures were able to perform their functions
as members of law-making bodies with the
privileges and immunities granted by the phrase
"breach of peace." I wonder why the members of
the future National Assembly cannot perform their
duties with the same limitations and with the same
privileges. Mr. President and members the
Convention, the history of parliamentary immunity
shows that it was never intended to exempt
members of the National Assembly from criminal
arrest. When American sovereignty was implanted
into these Islands, a new theory of government
was implanted too. This theory of government
places every man equal before the eyes of the law.
The grant of certain privileges to any set of persons
means the abrogation of this principle of equality
before the eyes of the law. Another reason, Mr.
President and Members of the Convention, is this:
The State Legislature is the agent of the State. The
power or the right of the Legislature to claim
privileges is based on the right of self-preservation.
The right of the State to claim privileges is due to
the fact that it has the right to carry its function
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 90

without obstacle. But we must also remember that the matter being quite emphatic: "Now, as all
any Legislature is but the agent of the State. The crimes are offenses against the peace, the phrase
State is the principal. Any crime committed, "breach of the peace" would seem to extend to all
whether such crime is committed by a colorum or indictable offenses, as well those which are in fact
by a gangster, endangers the State. Giving more attended with force and violence, as those which
privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature, at are only constructive breaches of the peace of the
the expense of the principal, which is the State, is government, inasmuch as they violate its good
not a sound policy. So that, Mr. President, and order." 24
Members of the Convention, believing that under
the phrase "breach of peace", our future members As far as American constitutional law is concerned,
of the Assembly can very well perform the duties both Burdick 25 and Willoughby 26 could use
incumbent upon them. I submit my amendment for practically identical appraising such immunity, the
the consideration of this Convention." 18 former stating that it "is not now of great
importance" and the latter affirming that it "is of
Delegate Manuel Roxas on behalf of the sub- little importance as arrest of the person is now
committee of seven did not object. As a matter of almost never authorized except for crimes which
fact, he was for such amendment. He considered fall within the classes exempt from the priviledge."
it "well-founded" and was for such immunity The state of the American law on this point is aptly
complying "with the wording of the [Philippine summarizedby Cooley: "By common
Autonomy Act] in this particular." 19 The parliamentary law, the members of the legislature
Convention readily approved the amendment by are privileged from arrest on civil process during
acclamation. the session of that body, and for a reasonable time
before and after, to enable them to go to and return
It does not admit of doubt therefore that the from the same."27 A prosecution for a criminal
immunity from arrest is granted by the Constitution offense, is thus excluded from this grant of
was understood in the same sense it has in immunity. So it should be Philippine law, if
American law, there being a similar provision in the deference were to be paid to what was explicitly
American Constitution. 20 Its authoritative agreed upon in the Constitutional Convention.
interpretation in the United States was supplied by
the Williamson case, a 1908 decision. 21 2. Would it make a difference however in the
availability of the writs of certiorari sought by
According to the then Justice, later Chief Justice, petitioners considering that Article 145 of the
White who penned the opinion, "the term "treason, Revised Penal Code would impose upon any
felony and breach of the peace," as used in the public officer or employee who shall, while the
constitutional provision relied upon, excepts from Congress is in regular or special session, arrest or
the operation of the privilege all criminal offenses, charge any member thereof except in case such
... " 22 He traced its historical background thus: "A member has committed a crime punishable by
brief consideration of the subject of parliamentary penalty higher than prision mayor? 28 The
privilege in England will, we think, show the source assumption here indulged is that the effect of the
whence the expression "treason felony, and above in the Revised Penal Code was to expand
breach of the peace" was drawn, and leave no the grant of parliamentary immunity under the
doubt that the words were used in England for the Philippine Autonomy Act, although its literal
very purpose of excluding all crimes from the language does not go that far. It is to be
operation of the parliamentary privilege, and remembered, however, that it took effect on
therefore to leave that privilege to apply only to January 1, 1932 before the enforcement of the
prosecutions of a civil nature." 23 Story's treatise present Constitution in 1935. Considering that both
on the Constitution was likewise cited, his view on under the then organic law, the Philippine
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 91
Autonomy Act and equally so under the present
Constitution, such a more generous treatment
accorded legislators exempting them from arrest
even if warranted under a penal law, the question
as to whether it did survive becomes unavoidable.
It is our opinion that the answer must be in the
negative.
The Constitution is equally explicit on the following
point: "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall
continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such
laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent
with this Constitution until amended, altered,
modified, or repealed by the Congress of the
Philippines, and all references in such laws to the
government or officials of the Philippines shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this
Constitution." 29 In People v. Linsangan 30 decided
in December, 1935, barely a month after the
Constitution took effect, the continued applicability
of Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative
Code that would allow the prosecution of a person
who remains delinquent in the payment of cedula
tax, 31 this Court, in its opinion thru the pen of the
then Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos,
after setting forth that the Constitution prohibits the
imprisonment for debt on non-payment of poll
tax, 32 held: "It seems too clear to require
demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1,
clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution in that,
while the former authorizes imprisonment for non-
payment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids
it. It follows that upon the inauguration of the
Government of the Commonwealth, said section
2718 of the Revised Administrative Code became
inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be
based thereon." 33
So it was in De los Santos v. Mallare. 34 Again
under the provision of the Revised Administrative
Code the President could remove at pleasure any
of the appointive officials under the Charter of the
City of Baguio. 35 Relying on such a provision, the
then President Quirino removed petitioner De los
Santos who was appointed City Engineer Baguio
of on July 16, 1946, and chose in his place
respondent Gil R. Mallare. The Revised
Administrative Code was a legislation that dates
back to 1917, 36 eighteen years before the
Constitution prohibited any officer or employee in
the civil service being removed or suspended
except for cause as provided by law. 37 Again this
Court, in the light of aforecited provision in an
opinion of Justice Tuason, held: "So, unlike
legislation that is passed in defiance of the
Constitution, assertive and menacing, the
questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not need a positive
declaration of nullity by the court to put it out of the
way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent,
outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by
the Constitution itself by express mandate before
the petitioner was appointed." 38 In the language of
the constitutional provision then that portion of
Article 145 penalizing a public official or employee
who shall while the Congress is in regular or
special session arrest or search any member
thereof except in case he has committed a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code by a
penalty higher than prision mayor is declared
inoperative.
The above conclusion reached by this Court is
bolstered and fortified by policy considerations.
There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the
necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to
enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except
the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the
utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded
them. When it comes to freedom from arrest,
however, it would amount to the creation of a
privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense,
they would be considered immune during their
attendance in Congress and in going to and
returning from the same. There is likely to be no
dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a
delegate can perform his functions efficiently and
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 92

well, without the need for any transgression of the

criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event
come to pass, he is to be treated like any other
citizen considering that there is a strong public
interest in seeing to it that crime should not go
unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed
that the prosecuting arm of the government might
unjustly go after legislators belonging to the
minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the
safeguards thrown around an accused by the
Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an
attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of
course is that the judiciary would main
independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is
of the essence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and

habeas corpus by Delegate Manuel Martinez by
Festin in L-34022 and the petitions
for certiorari and prohibition by Delegate Fernando
Bautista, Sr. in L-34046 and L-34047 are hereby
dismissed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,

Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.

Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.

 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 93

Criminal Case No. 158- S. Likewise, Delfino

Beltran was charged with attempted murder in
Criminal Case No. 160-S.

After trial they were convicted and sentenced as

follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds all

the accused DELFINO BELTRAN
alias Minong, ROGELIO BUGARIN
alias Boy, CRESENCIO SIAZON
alias Ising, MANUEL PUZON alias
Noling, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ
alias Doming and CEFERINO
BELTRAN alias Ebing, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder for the death of VICENTE
QUIROLGICO. There being no
DIRECT ASSAULTS mitigating circumstance, the Court
has no other alternative than to
impose the maximum penalty
G.R. Nos. L-37168-69 September 13, 1985
provided for by law. Accused Delfino
Beltran, Rogelio Bugarin, Cresencio
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
Siazon, Manuel Puzon, Domingo
appellee,
Hernandez and Ceferino Beltran are
vs.
hereby sentenced to the maximum
DELFINO BELTRAN, alias Minong, DOMINGO
penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the
HERNANDEZ, alias Doming; CEFERINO
heirs of Vicente Quirolgico the sum
BELTRAN, alias Ebing; MANUEL PUZON alias
of P 12,000.00 for the loss of his life;
Noling; CRESENCIO SIAZON, alias Ising; and
P 75,000.00 as reimbursement for
ROGELIO BUGARIN, alias Boy, accused-
expenses covering medical funeral
appellants.
embalming mausoleum and burial
lot, and the further sum of P
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
50,000.00 for moral damages, jointly
and severally and to pay the costs,
Ernesto P. Pagayatan for accused-appellants.
without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, taking into
consideration the nature of the
principal penalty imposed.
RELOVA, J.:
The Court likewise finds all the
Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran, alias Minong;
accused guilty beyond reasonable
Rogelio Bugarin, alias Boy; Cresencio Siazon,
doubt of the crime of DOUBLE
alias Ising; Manuel Puzon, alias Noling; Domingo
ATTEMPTED MURDER WITH
Hernandez, alias Doming; and, Ceferino Beltran,
DIRECT ASSAULT and hereby
alias Ebing, were indicted for murder and double
imposes upon an of them the penalty
attempted murder with direct assault in the then
of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its
Court of First Instance of Cagayan, docketed as
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 94
medium period and orders them to
undergo a prison term ranging from
14 years, 8 months and 1 day as
minimum to 17 years and 4 months
as maximum and to pay the costs.
Under Crim. Case No, 160-S,
accused DELFINO BELTRAN is
hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and
hereby sentence him to undergo a
prison term ranging from 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 3 years, 6
months and 20 days of prision
correccional and to pay the costs.
(pp. 402-403, Record)
The People's evidence shows that in the evening
of January 11, 1972, between 9:00 and 10:00, in
Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was
bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep. Passing by
the Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran alias
Minong, shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of
your mother). They proceeded on their way and
ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought Urbi to
his house he went to the house of Mayor
Bienvenido Quirolgico and reported the matter.
The newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police
that something should be done about it.
They decided to go to the Puzon Compound with
the intention to talk to Delfino Beltran and his
companions to surrender considering that he knew
them personally as all of them were once working
for Congressman David Puzon When they came
near the compound, they saw appellants Delfino
Beltran, Rogelio Bugarin and Domingo Hernandez
and suddenly there was a simultaneous discharge
of gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente, who was with
them, cried: " I am already hit, Daddy." As he fell,
Vicente pushed his father and both fell down.
Mayor Quirolgico and Patrolman Rolando
Tolentino also suffered injuries. When the firing
had stopped, they decided to bring Vicente to the
hospital. As the jeep left the compound three (3)
men came out of the Puzon Compound and fired
at the fleeing vehicle. They were Cresencio
Siazon, Ceferino Beltran and Noling Puzon.
Likewise, Domingo Hernandez and Minong
Beltran and Boy Bugarin tried to give chase. After
a while, all the six men returned inside the
compound.
An hour after admission to the hospital Vicente
Quirolgico died. Autopsy examination on the
deceased Vicente Quirolgico showed the following
findings:
1. Gunshot wound. inlet wound at the
posterior portion of right Mid-axillary
line, at the level of the 5th costal ribs
at the back, traversing the right side
of the chest, harrowing the right lung,
and fracturing the four (4) postal ribs
on the right side front causing an
outlet wound almost six (6) inches
long over the right side of the chest
diagonally from above the right
nipple downward near the right mid-
axillary line. The inlet has almost one
(1) cm. diameter.
2. Gunshot, wound left knee inlet
wound at the exterior and posterior
side of the left knee. almost (1) cm.
diameter, directed towards the
medial side of the left knee,
fracturing the left knee and inlet
wound two (2) inches long.
3. Gunshot wound of the right thigh,
inlet wound, anterior on front side of
the right thigh at the middle thirds,
measuring almost one (1) cm.
diameter.
4. Gunshot wound at the internal
angle of the left eye inlet wound
almost one (1) cm. diameter,
directed downwards and medially
traversing the right side of the face.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 95

CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL and Delfino Beltran who both asked him about the
HEMORRHAGE secondary to gun reports. They just dismissed the incident as no
Gunshot wound of the chest and left one was hurt. Rogelio Bugarin played guitar while
eye. (Exh. "B", p. 10, Records). waiting for supper.

and the examination on Mayor Quirolgico shows Around 10:30 in the evening of the same date, or
the following injuries: after appellants had taken their supper at Puzon
Compound, they heard an unusual sound which
(1) Wound, gunshot, face right; appeared to be a six by six truck that was bumped.
(2) Wound, gunshot, upper lips right; Thereafter, at about 12:00 midnight of the same
(3) Wound, gunshot, leg, right; day, Delfino Beltran, posted himself as guard and
(4) Wound, gunshot, big toe, right; positioned himself in front of the gate of the Rural
(5) Wound, gunshot, 2nd toe, right Bank. While at the place he saw a group of
(Exh. "A-1", P. 22, Record) persons, numbering more than ten, along the road
in front of the Rural Bank. Among the group of
and on Patrolman Rolando Tolentino, the following armed men, he was able to recognize the Chief of
injuries: Police of Ballesteros, Gavino Collado, holding a
swinging flashlight, Gerry, Bundok Usita and Bunti
(1) Wound, gunshot, amper fated Pinzon. When the group reached the gate of
index, middle and ring fingers, right; Puzon Compound, he peeped and took hold of the
(2) Wound, lacerated, 1 cm. long, 1/3 gate with an iron chain. Accidentally, he dropped
cm. deep lumbar region, right; the chain and it created a sound which caused the
(3) Wound, lacerated 1/4 cm. long, group of armed men to fire upon his direction for
1/3 cm. deep forearm, left. about half an hour. In retaliation, he loaded his gun
(Exh. "A", p. 20, Record.) following which he saw a man falling down from
the fence. As the firing continued, he stealthily
On November 23, 1982, this Court, upon receipt of mounted his gun on top of the fence and fired the
the information of the death of appellant Cresencio same.
Siazon alias Ising on February 17, 1982 due to
"Cardio Respiratory Arrest Secondary to When the firing ceased, he proceeded to the
Carcinoma Liver, Pulmonary Tuberculosis," from residence of Congressman Puzon. In the sala, he
Mr. Ramon J. Liwag, Officer-in-Charge, New saw Boy Bugarin, Doming Hernandez, Ising
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, as well as the Siazon, Noling Puzon, Ebing Beltran and Floresida
Comment filed by the Solicitor General on the Amayon, conversing. Upon seeing him, his
aforesaid information, Resolved to dismiss the companions asked him what was that firing all
case insofar as the criminal liability of the about. He told them that he traded shots with a
deceased Cresencio Siazon alias Ising is group of armed men. Thereafter, they hid in the
concerned. basement of the residence of the Congressman,
staying there for one whole day. The following day,
Appellant Rogelio Bugarin claims that between Delfino Beltran surrendered to Captain Retuta,
5:00 and 5:30 in the afternoon of January 11, while the rest escaped but thereafter surrendered.
1972,, the armed men inside the passing jeep of
Mayor Quirolgico fired at Rogelio Bugarin, who The defense of appellant Delfino Beltran, alias
was then standing at the main gate of Puzon Minong, is self- defense; whereas appellants
Compound. After the armed men had passed by, Rogelio Bugarin, alias Boy, Ceferino Beltran, alias
Rogelio Bugarin proceeded to the office of Ebing, and Manuel Puzon, alias Noling denied
Congressman Puzon where he met Ebing Beltran having anything to do with the incident.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 96

In this appeal, appellants contend that the trial you bring out the guns
court erred in: (1) giving credence to the evidence now I have already
for the prosecution; (2) holding that conspiracy shot at the BRQ jeep
existed among them in the commission of the and they are sure to
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 158-S; (3) come back.
finding that treachery and evident premeditation
attended the commission of the crimes; (4) not xxx xxx xxx
finding that appellant Delfino Beltran acted in self-
defense; (5) finding appellants guilty of attempted Q Can you tell us what
murder with direct assault on Mayor Quirolgico and you saw at that time?
Pat. Rolando Tolentino; and (6) not appreciating in
favor of the appellants the mitigating circumstance A I saw these three
of voluntary surrender. persons, Minong
Beltran, Boy Bugarin
On the first assigned error, We reiterate the and Domingo
established doctrine that when the issue is one of Hernandez, sir.
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, xxx xxx xxx
considering that it is in a better position to decide
the question, having heard the witnesses Q What else did you
themselves and observed their deportment and see if any?
manner of testifying during the hearing, unless it
had overlooked certain facts of substance and A When these three
value that, if considered, might affect the result of persons came out,
the case. they were already

The judgment of conviction is not bereft of xxx xxx xxx

evidence to support the same. Hereunder are the
testimonies of the prosecution's eyewitnesses, Q Will you inform this
namely: Court what was that?

Carmelita Collado who declared the following:
Q Will you inform the
Honorable Court who
was that one shouting?
A Minong Beltran, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you inform the
Court what was that?
A I heard the voice of
Mr. Minong Beltran
saying, 'Cida, Cida,
A Upon coming out, Delfino Beltran
ordered Doming Hernandez to go to
the right side of the old office of
Congressman Puzon and he also
instructed Boy Bugarin to seek cover
to the Rural Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
Q During all these time that these
were happening, the going out of
Doming Hernandez, of Bugarin; the
ordering of Minong Beltran to the
two, did you see any other persons
inside the compound of
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 97
Congressman Puzon aside from the
three?
A After the three had placed
themselves in their respective
positions, I saw persons coming out
but I was not able to recognize them.
(tsn., pp. 5-7, 42-45, Nov. 18, 1972
hearing.)
Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico testified as follows:
Q And do you know what happened
after you walked a few steps to the
south? Patrolman Rolando Usita stated that:
A When I was looking very well
around the vicinity, at the southern
part of the Rural Bank about the
corner of their fence, and as I tried to
look intently, I recognized the face of
Minong Beltran.
xxx xxx xxx
Q At the precise moment, when you
saw Minong Beltran at the corner of
the Rural Bank, what else happened
if any?
A As I tried to look near them, that
was the time when there was a burst
of gun fire, the direction of which was
coming from the place where they
were staying.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you inform this Honorable
Court who the other men were at that
time?
A Boy Bugarin and Domingo
Hernandez.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And after the shooting, there was
the shout?
A At the lulling of the shooting, I
heard the shout.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And what were the words?
A 'Nala na si Mayor' (The mayor is
already hit). (tsn., pp. 20, 21, 31-32,
58-59, Nov. 17, 1972 hearing)
Q You said that as the mayor was
leaving the scene of the incident, you
saw three of the accused coming out
of the guardhouse, do you confirm
that?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And the persons who came out
from this point according to you are
the accused Ising Siazon, Ebing
Beltran and Noling Puzon, do you
confirm that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And after that the three other
accused named as Doming
Hernandez, Boy Bugarin and Minong
Beltran came out of the same
compound?
A No, sir. They came out from here.
(tsn., pp. 84, 87, February 19, 1973
hearing)
Chief of Police Gavino Collado also pointed out the
following:
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 98
Q May I see the sketch, your Honor?
A The mayor took this road in going
to the hospital (witness pointing to
the Bonifacio Cortez Street), and as
the jeep was going westward, and
reached this point, three men came
out from this part of the compound
and they fired at the vehicle in which
the mayor and his son rode on.
xxx xxx xxx
Q So that the Court would now
understand from your statement that
it was only after the jeep of the mayor
has left already the scene when
three persons came out from the
gate of the Puzon compound, that
you saw for the first time these
persons?
A Yes, sir.
Q And these persons were Identified the Puzon Compound. Vicente de Vera testified on
as Ebing Beltran, Cresencio Siazon direct examination, the following:
and Noling Puzon?
A Yes, sir. (tsn., pp. 59, 80, January
9, 1973 hearing)
The denial of appellants Rogelio Bugarin, Ceferino
Beltran and Manuel Puzon cannot, therefore,
prevail over their positive Identification, as the
perpetrators of the crime by the aforenamed
eyewitnesses who have not been shown to have
any evil motive to testify falsely against them.
Moreover, the physical evidence, as testified to by
Dr. Gregorio R. Farin, Municipal Health Officer of
Ballesteros, Cagayan, who conducted the post
mortem examination on the body of the deceased
Vicente Quirolgico, shows that several firearms
could have caused his wounds:
Q Considering the nature of the
injuries that were found on the body
of the deceased, could it be possible
that several firearms could have
caused these injuries?
A It is possible.
xxx xxx xxx
Q It is also possible that wounds
Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were caused by three
different bullets, 3 different guns,
different calibers?
A Yes, sir. It is possible. (tsn., pp. 65-
66, Nov. 17, 1972 hearing)
The foregoing testimony of Dr. Farin finds support
from the findings of witnesses Vicente de Vera, a
Ballistician, and Lt. Col. Crispin Garcia, Chief
Chemistry Branch, both of the Philippine
Constabulary Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, who conducted examinations on the
empty shells and on the firearms, respectively,
recovered from the premises of the Rural Bank and
Q Under your findings No. 1, will you
inform us your conclusion?
A My conclusion was that the 27 fired
cartridges marked as CIS-1 to 27
were fired from the firearm marked
as Exhibit 'R' (SIG Natu Rifle).
Q Your other findings, please tell the
Court.
A Under findings Nos. 2: Microscopic
examination and comparison of the
223 Cal. fired cartridge cases
marked as CIS 28 to CIS 154
revealed the non-congruency of
striations with the test cartridge
cases fired from the
abovementioned 223 caliber M16
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 99

Armalite rifle with Serial No. 527226. Q Supposing that there are three
They further revealed the following: SIG rifles of the same Serial number
and the fired cartridges from this
1. CIS 28 three guns have the same number of
to CIS 62 similar characteristics or congruency
were of striations?
fired
from one A They can have no similar
(1) characteristics.
firearm;
2. CIS 63 Q Do you mean to say that for every
to CIS 95 SIG rifle there is its own
were characteristics; that congruency of
fired striations?
from one
(l) A That is correct. (tsn., p. 36,
firearm; January 8, 1973 hearing)
3. CIS 96
to CIS whereas, Lt. Col. Crispin B. Garcia on the witness
102 were stand declared:
fired
from one Q With this request for examination
(1) of certain articles, what articles were
firearm; actually submitted to you for
examinations?
4. CIS
103 to A Well one (1) rifle SIG, Switzerland
CIS 154 made with SN-5721, the barrel group
were bearing Serial Number 15721; the
fired receiver group with SN-5720 and the
from one barrel link bearing SN-9641, and
(1) another firearm (Exh. 'R').
firearm
Q Colonel aside from this article,
Q May we know your conclusion of Exhibit 'R', what other articles or
this findings of yours? guns did you receive for
examination?
A My conclusion is that, the 223
Caliber fired cartridges marked as A One Armalite with Serial No.
CIS 28 to CIS 154 were fired from 527226. (Exhibit 'S')
four different firearms but not from
the above-entioned 223 Cal. M16 xxx xxx xxx
Armalite with SN-527226. (tsn., pp.
29-30, January 8, 1973 hearing) Q With reference to the first rifle
which you have mentioned, which is
and on cross-examination declared that: marked as Exhibit 'R', with different
serial numbers, in the barrel group,
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 100

receiver group, and the barrel link, attendant circumstances (People vs. Manalo, 133
will you inform this Honorable Court SCRA 626). Further, conspiracy does not require
your findings? an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence, as conspiracy legally exists if, at the
A I found that the barrel of the time of the offense, the accused had the same
Armalite is positive for the presence criminal purpose and were united in its execution.
of gunpowder, sir. Appellants' conduct and/or actuations before,
during and after the commission of the crime
xxx xxx xxx charged in Criminal Case No. 158-S are
circumstances proving conspiracy.
Q With reference to this Armalite,
M15, marked as Exhibit 'S', in this Conspiracy having established, the act of one is
particular case, will you tell us your the act of all. It is no longer necessary to
findings about the presence of specifically lay out the particular participation of
gunpowder? each participant.

A Exhibit 'S', the barrel is positive of Relative to the third assigned error, the trial court
gunpowder. (tsn., pp. 52, 55, 57, & properly appreciated the existence of the
58, January 8, 1973 hearing) aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery. From 9:00 in the
The above findings further confirm the truth of the evening to 12:00 midnight of the same day,
statements of eyewitnesses Gavino Collado, appellants had three (3) long hours to meditate
Patrolman Usita, Mayor Quirolgico and Carmelita and reflect on their evil design and they clung in
Collado that appellants traded shots with the their determination to kill the Mayor, which
Mayor's group, using long or high powered guns. fortunately failed.

Anent the second assigned error, We agree with
the trial court's finding on the existence of
conspiracy. In the case at bar, the sequence of
events that transpired in the evening of January
11, 1972, from the time Delfino Beltran first fired
upon the passing jeep of Mayor Bienvenido
Quirolgico, driven by witness Ernesto Alvarado at
around 9:00, the subsequent preparations for the
arrival of the Mayor as testified to by eyewitness
Carmelita Collado, the shooting on the other
passing jeepney to further provoke the Mayor, and
the simultaneous and sudden firing at the Mayor's
group which had just arrived at about 12:00
midnight in the scene of the crime; the final
shooting of the fleeing Mayor; and, the
simultaneous common retreat and escape of all
the accused, established the presence of
conspiracy. For conspiracy to exist, it is enough
that at the time the offense was committed, the
participants had the same purpose and were
united in its execution, as may be inferred from the
Premeditation is present where there
was a lapse of two hours from the
inception to execution.
The existence of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery was shown in the simultaneous and
sudden firing by the accused on the newly arrived
Mayor's group, without warning. We are convinced
that they employed means, methods or forms
which could have tended directly or insured the
accomplishment of their evil design against the
Mayor, with whom they have no personal grudge,
without risk to themselves arising from the defense
which the offended party had made. No one from
herein appellants sustained a scratch as they were
really prepared for the coming Mayor.
With respect to the fourth assigned error, the claim
of Delfino Beltran that he had just acted in self-
defense, suffice it to say, that the one invoking this
justifying circumstance must prove beyond
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 101

reasonable doubt that all the necessary requisites
of self-defense are present, namely: (1) Unlawful
aggression on the part of the offended party; (2)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and, (3) Lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. Delfino Beltran had not proved any one of
these. Thus, his claim of self-defense was properly
dismissed by the trial court.
prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 160-S, applying also the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed
to the accused Delfino Beltran is reduced to Six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum.

Regarding the fifth assigned error, considering that With costs.

Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat.
Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at the time SO ORDERED.
was in his uniform, and both were performing their
official duties to maintain peace and order in the Makasiar, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Abad
community, the finding of the trial court that Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
appellants are guilty of attempted murder with Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and
direct assault on the persons of Mayor Quirolgico Patajo, JJ., concur.
and Pat. Tolentino is correct.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Relative to the last assigned error, following Our
latest ruling in People vs. Nicolas Canamo, et al.,
G.R. No. 62043, promulgated on August 13, 1985,
We agree with appellants that they should be
credited with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, as they in fact presented
themselves voluntarily to the authorities. However,
this mitigating circumstance is offset by the
aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation.

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 158-S, with

the modifications that for lack of necessary votes,
the penalty imposed upon appellants Delfino
Beltran alias Minong, Rogelio Bugarin alias Boy,
Manuel Puzon alias Noling, Domingo Hernandez
alias Doming and Ceferino Beltran alias Ebing, for
the death of Vicente Quirolgico, is reduced to
Reclusion Perpetua, and that the indemnity to the
heirs of the deceased Vicente Quirolgico is
increased to P30,000.00, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED in an other respects.

For the double attempted murder with direct

assault, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the penalty imposed on the aforesaid appellants is
reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 102
June 30, 1987
G.R. No. 70639
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
PEDRO DOLLANTES, HAMLET DOLLANTES,
ALFREDO DOLLANTES, LAURO DOLLANTES,
MONICO DOLLANTES, SIDRITO LOKESIO,
MERLANDO DOLLANTES, HUGO GRENGIA,
DANNY ESTEBAN AND LEONILO
VILLAESTER, accused-appellants.
PARAS, J:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Dumaguete City, 7th Judicial Region,
Branch XL, in Criminal Case No. 5832, convicting
the nine (9) accused, Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet
Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes,
Sidrito Lokesio, Merlando Dollantes, Hugo
Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester, all
equally guilty of the complex crime of "Assault
upon a Person in Authority Resulting in Murder"
and sentencing the abovementioned accused to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased, jointly and
severally, the sum of P30,000.00 to pay attomey's
fees in the amount of P3,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
All of the accused were charged as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1983
at nighttime, in the Municipality of Tayasan,
Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and
helping one another with evident
premeditation and treachery, and with intent
to kill did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
Marcos Gabutero, Barangay Captain of
Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental, an
agent of a person in authority and which fact
accused had full knowledge, while the latter
was in the lawful performance of his official
duty or function as Barangay Captain or on
the occasion of such function, with a bolo
and hunting knives with which the accused
were then armed and provided, thereby
inflicting the following wounds in the victim,
viz:
1. Stab wound measuring three and
a half (3 1/2) cm. in length and half
(1/2) cm. in width, ten (10) cm.
depthness located at the left anterior
aspect of the trunk at the level of the
3rd intercostal space, 5 cm. away
from the anterior mid-line. The
wound was oriented horizontally and
directed vertically and slightly to the
back. Ventricle and lung tissue
penetrated.
2. Stab wound measuring four (4)
cm. in length, 1 cm. in width, eleven
and a half (11 1/2) cm. depthness,
located at the right anterior aspect of
the trunk, at the level of the 2nd
intercostal space about five (5) cm.
away from the anterior and midline,
the wound was oriented horizontally
and directed downward and slightly
to the back.
3. Incised wound five (5) cm. in
length, 1 cm. in width located at the
left anterior aspect of the trunk about
26 cm. below the left clavicle and
four (4) cm. away from the anterior
mid-line. The wound was oriented
obliquely.
4. Incised wound measuring two (2)
cm. in length and one (1) cm. in
width, located at the right anterior
aspect of the trunk about twenty-one
(21) cm. below the right clavicle and
eight (8) cm. away from the anterior
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 103
line. The wound was oriented
obliquely.
5. Incised wound measuring one and
a half (1 1/2) cm. in length, half (1/2)
cm. in width located at the anterior
aspect of the upper extremity about
nine (9) cm. above the wrist joint one
and a half (1 1/2) cm. away from the
anterior mid-line and medially. The
wound was oriented vertically.
6. Incised wound measuring four (4)
cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located
at the lateral aspect of the right upper
extreme about five (5) cm. above the
elbow joint and five (5) cm. away
from the posterior midline laterally.
The wound was oriented
horizontally.
7. Through and through stab wound
located at the left upper extremity the
wound of entrance measuring about
three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length
and one (1) cm. in width located at
the posterior aspect of the forearm
above five (5) em. below the elbow
joint, three (3) cm. away from the
anterior mid-line medially. The
wound was oriented vertically.
8. Incised wound measuring 3 cm. in
length half (1/2) cm. in width located
at the lateral aspect of the left upper
extremity about five (5) cm. below
the elbow joint and (5) cm. away
from the posterior mid-line. The
wound was oriented horizontally. The findings of facts of the trial court are as follows:
9. Stab wound measuring one and
one-half (1 1/2) cm. in width and four
(4) cm. depthness located at the left
anterior aspect of the trunk, about
seven and a half (7 1/2) cm. above
the ihac crest and twelve (12) cm.
away from the anterior mid-line. The
wound was oriented obliquely and
directed downward, slightly to the
right and posteriority, perforating part
of the intestine.
10. Stab wound measuring three (3)
cm. in length, one (1) cm. in width
and seven and a half (7) cm. in
depthness, located at the left
posterior of the trunk about three (3)
cm. above the lower angle of the
scapula, and seven (7) cm. away
from the posterior mid-line. The
wound was oriented obliquely and
directed downward and slightly to the
left.
11. Stab wound measuring three(3)
cm. in length, one (l) cm. in width and
twelve (12) cm. in depthness,
located at the left posterior aspect of
the trunk about thirteen (13) cm.
below the lower angle of the scapula
and six (6) cm. away from the
posterior mid-line. The wound was
oriented obliquely and directed
anteriority to the left.
12. Hemothorax on the left pleural
cavity, which wounds caused the
latter's untimely death.
Contrary to Art. 248, 148 and 48 of
the Revised Penal Code.
(Information, Original Record, pp. 3-
4)
That deceased Marcos Gabutero at the
time of his death was the Barangay Captain
of Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros
Oriental; that due to the approaching fiesta
of barangay Maglihe, a dance was held in
said barangay in the evening of April 21,
1983; that while the Barangay Captain was
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 104
delivering a speech to start the dance, the
accused Pedro Dollantes went to the middle
of the dancing floor, making a dance
movement known in the visayan as
"nagkorantsa", brandishing his knife and
challenging everyone as to who was brave
among the people present; the Barangay
Captain approached Pedro Dollantes and
admonished him to keep quiet and not to
disturb the dance. However, the accused,
instead of heeding to the advice of the
Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on the
left arm; that accused Hugo Grengia held
the left hand of accused Pedro Dollantes
and Dionilo Garol was able to get from the
hand of Pedro Dollantes the hunting knife.
Immediately thereafter, accused Hamlet
Dollantes, who rushed towards the
Barangay Captain, stabbed the Barangay
Captain at the back and the other co-
accused also took turns in stabbing the
Barangay Captain; the Barangay Captain at
that time was not armed. Except for the
accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban
and Leonilo Villaester who were merely
holding stones, the other co-accused
participated in the stabbing incident. When
the Barangay Captain fell to the ground and
died, the accused in this case took turns in
kicking the dead body of the Barangay
Captain and were dancing around said
dead body; that the Barangay Captain
suffered eleven (11) wounds in the different
parts of his body, two of which happened to
be at the back of his dead body. According
to the attending physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho
who examined the body of the deceased,
the victim died of "Severe hemorrhage and
cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds."
(Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo, p.
75).
The evidence for the prosecution consisted
principally of the testimonies of Dionilo Garol, From the aforementioned decision, all the accused
Bonifacio Cero, Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the appealed. Accused Hugo Grengia submitted a
deceased, Pat. Ricardo Barrera, Dr. Rogelio Kho separate brief.
who conducted the post mortem examination of
the deceased, Ponsimillo Balasabas, the
Municipal Treasurer of Tayasan, Negros Oriental
and Pat. Jose Amis of the Integrated National
Police.
On the other hand, the defense presented the
following witnesses: Accused: Hugo Grengia,
Leonilo Villaester, Danny Esteban, Alfredo
Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, and other witnesses:
Machim Dollantes and Tacio Fausto.After a careful
evaluation of the evidence, the trial court was
convinced that all the accused in this case
conspired in the commission of the crime.
Thus on February 20, 1985, the trial court rendered
its decision finding all the accused guilty of the
complex crime of assault upon a person in
authority resulting in murder. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having
proven the guilt of all the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court hereby finds
the accused Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet
Dollantes, Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro
Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito
Lokesia, Merlando Dollantes, Hugo
Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo
Villaester, guilty of the complex crime of
assault upon a person in authority resulting
in murder, and hereby sentences the
above-mentioned accused to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Marcos Gabutero,
jointly and severally, the sum of Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) PESOS, to pay
attorney's fees in the amount of Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, and to pay
the costs of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p.
79)
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 105

The appellant raised the following assignment of SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION
errors: PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY THE
HEIRS OF MARCOS GABUTERO,
FIRST ERROR JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, THE SUM OF
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING PESOS, and TO PAY THE COSTS OF THE
FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT TO THE PROCEEDINGS. (Brief for Accused-
BIASED, INCREDIBLE AND Appellant, Rollo, p. 62)
CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES In his separate brief, accused Hugo Grengia
DIONILO GAROL, BONIFACIO CERO assigns the following errors:
AND MARCIANA GABUTERO AND IN
NOT CONSIDERING AT LEAST THE 1. The lower court erred in not giving weight
UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY OF and credence to the admission of accused-
INDEPENDENT WITNESSES appellant Hamlet Dollantes that he was the
DOLLANTES AND TACIO FAUSTO. lone perpetrator of the alleged stabbing of
victim Marcos Gabutero.
SECOND AND THIRD ERRORS
2. The lower court erred in not considering
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT the testimonies of prosecution witnesses,
GIVING WEIGHT TO THE EXPERT namely: Patrolman Ricardo Barrera, Dr.
PROSECUTION WITNESS DR. ROGELIO Rogeho Kho which in effect buttressed the
R. KHO WHICH IN EFFECT theory of the defense.
CONTRADICTS THE THEORY OF THE
PROSECUTION AND THAT THE TRIAL 3. The lower court erred in not considering
COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THAT the entry in the police logbook of the
CONSPIRACY EXISTS. Tayasan Integrated National Police, dated
April 21, 1983, as testified to by Patrolman
FOURTH ERROR Jose Amis.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FROM NOT 4. The lower court erred in holding that
GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY conspiracy exist in perpetration of the
OF ACCUSED HUGO GRENGIA, felony.
LEONILO VILLAESTER alias "Laon,"
DANILO ESTEBAN, HAMLET 5. The lower court erred in holding that the
DOLLANTES, ALFREDO DOLLANTES case of People vs. Agag (L-64951, June 29,
AND THE TESTIMONY OF 1984) is applicable to the case at bar to
INDEPENDENT WITNESSES TACIO justify the conviction of the accused-
FAUSTO AND MCLEAN DOLLANTES. appellants.

FIFTH ERROR 6. The lower court erred in not giving weight

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF ASSAULT UPON A
PERSON IN AUTHORITY RESULTING TO
MURDER AND SENTENCING THEM TO
and credence to the testimony of the
defense witnesses.
7. Finally, the trial court erred in holding that
the accused-appellant herein is guilty of the
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 106

crime charged. (Brief for accusedappellant This testimony was fully corroborated by another
Hugo Grengia, pp. 1-2) prosecution eyewitness Bonifacio Cero who was
about three (3) meters away and whose narration
The appeal is without merit. tallied on all material ints with that of Dionilo Garol
as to what transpired that night. He stated further
The issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses. that when he saw the Barangay Captain being
stabbed he tried to approach the group but he was
The accused were positively identified by three (3) held by Danny Esteban who said "do not try to
prosecution eye witnesses. They were: Dionilo interfere, you are not a party to this. We have
Garol, Bonifacio Cero and Marciana Gabutero, the already gotten what we have been aiming for."
wife of the victim. Except for the latter, the two (TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983). Thereafter, he ran
other witnesses Garol and Cero are not related to away but Alfredo Dollantes, Pedro Dollantes and
the victim or the accused. The testimonies of these Danny Esteban stoned him because they intended
three (3) witnesses were subjected to a lengthy to kill him also. He also testified that when he
cross-examination and were found credible and returned to the crime scene, he saw Hugo Grengia,
free from material contradictions by the trial court Danny Esteban and companions simultaneously
(Rollo, p. 75). kicking the dead body and shouting "who is brave
among here. "
Dionilo Garol who was six (6) meters away, saw
clearly what happened. He testified that when the Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the victim funy
Barangay Captain started to deliver his speech, corroborated the testimonies of Garol and Cero.
the accused Pedro Dollantes brandishing a knife She also added that Hugo Grengia wanted to be a
shouted "Who is brave here?" (TSN, page 6, Oct. Barangay Captain and she happened to know that
7, 1983). The victim then approached to admonish as a fact, because he told the crowd not to long as
him t the latter stabbed the victim on the arm. Garol Barangay Captain. She also testified that the
immediately approached the accused Pedro accused Leonilo Villaester splashed one glass of
Dollantes and tried to wrest the knife away from tuba on the face of the deceased and that the
the hand of the accused. The accused Hugo victim had had a misunderstanding with the
Grengia also tried to grab the knife but it was Garol Dollantes on a theft case involving Hamlet
who succeeded. The accused Grengia then told Dollantes (Rollo, pp. 68-69).
him "Do not try to intervene because you might be
included in the plan." (TSN, page 8, Oct. 17, 1983). It will be noted that the above witnesses were
Then Grengia made some signs by nodding his categorical and straightforward when they stated
head and the accused Hamlet Dollantes and that they saw appellants stab the victim. They even
Alfredo Dollantes rushed to and attacked the victim specified the type of weapon used by each of said
followed by the other co-accused in this case who appellants.
also rushed at and stabbed the victim. He specified
that accused Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, There is no possibility that they could have been
Monico Dollantes and Sidrito Lokesio were mistaken in their Identification for apart from being
carrying knives while the accused Merlando near the crime scene which was well illuminated
Dollantes was carrying a bolo; and that they with two Petromax lamps (TSN, page 6, Oct. 19,
stabbed the victim one after another. He said that 1983), these witnesses are familiar with the
the accused Danny Esteban, Hugo Grengia appellants since they are all residents of the same
andLeonilo Villaester were all carrying stones locality. Furthermore, there is no showing that the
which they threw at the store of the victim's wife witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against
(TSN, pp. 7-10; Oct. 17, 1983). the appellants.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 107

In fact, under similar circumstances, the Court has victim's wife was stoned does not preclude the
held that where the scene of the stabbing was possibility that Bonifacio Cero was also stoned.
clearly lighted and no motive was shown why
prosecution witnesses would incriminate the Finally, appellants maintain that Bonifacio Cero
appellants, identification would be given full faith could not have seen with precision the stabbing of
and credit (People v. Escoltero, 139 SCRA 218). the victim while he was being hugged by Danny
Esteban and he had a feeling that he would be
The theory of the defense in this case is that it was killed by the group. Much less could it be
only the accused Hamlet Dollantes who stabbed possiblefor accused Danny Esteban, Leonflo
the victim while the other accused did not Villaester, Sidrito Lokesio and Alfredo Dollantes
participate in the stabbing incident (Rollo, pp. 75- who were at the store of Severina Cadillero, to join
76). in stabbing the victim, the appellants argued
(Rollo, pp. 73-74).
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial
court, appellants pointed out that there are certain The records show that Cero testified that he saw
inconsistencies that render the testimonies of appellants stab the deceased before he was
prosecution witnesses, incredible. embraced by appellant Danny Esteban who told
him "do not interfere you are not a party to this. We
For one thing they claim that Dionilo Garol could have already gotten what we have been aiming
not have een Hamlet Dollantes stab the victim for." (TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983). Clearly, the
because as Garol himself stated, when said language is unmistakable that in that at said point,
accused rushed towards the victim, he ran away. the stabbing and the killing being described by all
The evidence shows however, that Garol clearly the witnesses had already been accomphshed.
testified that he saw au of them stab the Barrio
Captain, one after another and it was only after the Indeed, if there be any inconsistency or
Barrio Captain fell to the ground that he ran contradictions in their testimonies, the same are
towards the municipal hall to report the incident to trivial and merely refer to minor matters which do
the police (TSN, page 11, Oct. 17, 1983). not affect credibility. They do not detract from the
essential facts or vital details of the crime
Another circumstance allegedly raising grave pinpointing their criminal responsibility (Appellee's
doubts on the credibility of Dionilo Garol was his Brief, p. 16). As held by this Court, discrepancies
failure to report to the police authorities the fact of in minor details are to be expected from an
stoning (Rollo, pp. 71-72). uncoached witness (People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA
31). Such minor variations would rather show the
However, the fact of stoning was not the means sincerity of the witnesses and the absence of
used to kill the victim and the omission of the same connivance between them to make their
in the narration in the report does not detract from testimonies tally in every respect (People v.
the established fact that the victim was stabbed Pielago, 140 SCRA 419, 423). Truth to tell, such
several times which caused his death. trivial differences constitute fail-safe reliability.

Accused Hugo Grengia claims that the trial court

It was also pointed out that Dionilo Garol testified
erred in not giving weight to the admission of
that the store of the victim's wife was stoned while
Bonifacio Cero also testified that he was the oneaccused Hamlet Dollantes that he was the lone
being stoned. perpetrator of the killing incident (Brief for
Accused-Appellant Hugo Grengia, p. 7). Thus the
There appears to be no inconsistency between the defense argues that the accused Pedro Dollantes,
two testimonies. The fact that the store of the Alfredo Dollantes, Merlando Dollantes, Lauro
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 108

Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio, Monico Dollantes and suffered by the victim, negates the accused's claim
Leonilo Villaester, did not stab the victim and were of self-defense. (People v. Tolentino, 54 Phil. 77).
not at the scene of the crime and that it was only In fact, the eleven (11) wounds suffered by "he
accused Hamlet Dollantes who stabbed the victim. victim are indicative of aggression (People v.
Somera, 83 Phil. 548; People v. Mendoza, L-
As found by the trial court, such claim is not 16392, Jan. 30, 1965).
supported by sufficient evidence. On the contrary,
an entry in the Police Logbook (Exhibit "D") of the Accused-appellant Hugo Grengia submits that the
Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros prosecution failed to prove the existence of
Oriental, shows that one Gloria Callao, wife of the conspiracy. Among others, he pointed out that he
accused Lauro Dollantes, turned over to the police was unarmed at the time of the incident, that his
two (2) hunting knives owned by the accused name was not mentioned in the report made by
Hamlet Dollantes and Alfredo Dollantes. Dionilo Garol to Patrolman Barrera as to the
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor perpetrators of the crime; that his name was not
General, such theory is behed by the Identification included in the entry in the police logbook of the
made by the prosecution witnesses and by the Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros
number and location of the victim's wounds which Oriental and that he had no participation in the
are mute evidence that several persons comn)itted commission ofthe felony except the alleged
the crime (People's Brief, p. 17). nodding of his head at a time when he was trying
to wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes which is
As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, the not an indication of conspiracy (Brief for Grengia,
claim of alibi by the accused cannot prevail over pp. 13-16).
positive Identification by credible witnesses
(People v. Tirol, 102 SCRA 58); more so where as While it is true that the accused Hugo Grengia,
in the case at bar, it was not demonstrated that it Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester did not
was physically impossible for the accused to have participate in the stabbing, the lower court finds
been at the scene of said crime at the time of its them equally liable as principals with the other
commission (People v. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232). accused in this case. They were found to be
holding stones which they threw at the store owned
On the other hand, the claim of Hamlet Dollantes by the victim and his wife; they participated in
of self-defense when he stabbed the victim is not kicking and dancing around the dead body of the
sustained by the records. As found by the trial Barangay Captain and although Grengia also tried
court, the victim was not armed at the time of the to wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes, he clearly
incident, so that there was no danger to the life and told Dionilo Garol when the latter succeeded in
limb of the accused. The latter claims that he had getting the knife and was holding the hands of
to stab the victim who boxed him and would not Pedro Dollantes, "do not try to intervene here
release his wounded hand (Rollo, p. 76). Apart because you might be included in the plan." (TSN,
from the obvious disproportion of the means used pp. 7-10, Octoer 17, 1983). Danny Esteban uttered
to repel the alleged attack, three witnesses of the the same statements to Bonifacio Cero, saying "do
prosecution testified that the accused Hamlet not try to interfere you are not a party to this. We
Dollantes rushed towards the victim and stabbed have already gotten what we have been aiming
the latter at the back. Said testimonies were or." (TSN, pp. 9-14, October 18,1983).
corroborated by the Post Mortem Examination
(Exhibit "A") and the Sketch (Exhibit "B") of the Furthermore, as previously stated, while the victim
human body of the victim which showed a stab was delivering a speech, Hugo Grengia was
wound at the back. Furthermore, the nature, telumg people not to listen to the victim as he will
character, location and extent of the wound not stay long as a Barangay Captain. It is also to
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 109

be noted that although he was a compadre of the wounds could be produced by a single bladed
victim, he never tried to help the former while he weapon with different sizes but not necessarily
was being stabbed and after the incident, he never only a single bladed weapon.
visited the victim's family.
Thus, the Doctor testified as follows:
Thus, the lower court found the existence of
conspiracy as follows: Atty. Jayme:

The accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Q Basing upon your physical

Esteban and Leonilo Villaester by their acts,
aimed at the same object, and their acts,
though apparently independent, are in fact
concerted and cooperative, indicating
closeness of personal association,
concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments. The conduct of the defendants,
before, during and after the commission of
the crime clearly shows that they acted in
concert. (People v. Emilio Agag, L-64951,
June 29, 1984, Justice Relova) There being
conspiracy, the Court finds them guilty of
Murder. (Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832,
Rollo p. 77)
In one case, this Court held "that while the acts
done by the petitioners herein vary from those of
their co-accused, there is no question that they
were all prompted and linked by a common desire
to assault and retaliate against the group..... Thus,
they must share equal liability for all the acts done
by the participants in the felonious undertaking."
(Pring v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 185-186
[1985]).
Appellant Hugo Grengia lays much stress on the
testimony of Dr. Rogeho Kho that it is possible that
all the stab wounds were inflicted by the same
weapon, in a desperate effort to show that only one
person committed the crime and that there is no
conspiracy.
The records show however, that said Doctor
merely replied to he questions propounded by the
defense lawyer as to the different possibilities on
how the wounds of the victim may have been
inflicted. But testifying specifically on the case at
bar, he categorically stated that actually the
findings, Doc, upon the victim
Marcos Gabutero, is it possible Doc,
that in accordance with your drawing
that the wounds inflicted was caused
by a single bladed weapon, is it
possible, Doctor, that this wound
was caused by a single bladed
weapon? Is it possible that this. I
repeat the question, your Honor.
Q According to your drawing which is
labelled "BS" which according to you
"blunt and sharp bladed weapon
which is practically single bladed
weapon, according to your physical
findings there is similarly in the
weapons used, could we say
practically, Doctor, that these stab
wounds as well as those incised
wounds may be caused by one
single-bladed weapon?
A Actually it could be produced by a
single bladed weapon with different
sizes but not necessarily only a
single bladed weapon.
Q According to you it was a single
bladed weapon with different or
several sizes, now, what is your
honest observation upon your
physical findings, what will be
themaximum weapon used? I have
here a zerox copy for your own
reference.
A With respect to the length of the
wound there are two wounds that
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 110

have three em. in length, it could be by surprise and did not have time to defend
possible that the same kind of himself.
weapon or instrument has been
used. This refers to Wounds Nos.10 Finally, the records show that the Barangay
and 11. By the way, Sir, this refers to Captain was in the act of trying to pacify Pedro
the stab wounds because the size of Dollantes who was making trouble in the dance
the incised wounds is difficult to hall when he was stabbed to death. He was
determine. therefore killed while in the performance of his
duties. In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA
Atty. Jayme: 113), this Court ruled that "As the barangay
captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and
Yes, the stab wounds only. ordinances within the barangay. If in the
enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his
A It's hard to determine Wound No. 9 people who thereafter treacherously slew him the
because the length is not indicated crime committed is murder with assault upon a
here, so it is possible that there are 3 person in authority."
or 4 kinds of instrument or weapons
being used. (TSN, pp. 26- 27, There is no qeustion that the trial court's
December 15, 1983) conclusions on credibilitY of witnesses are entitled
to great weight on appeal. (People v. Oliverio, 120
Appellant Hugo Garcia also emphasizes the SCRA 22). After a careful review of the records, no
testimony of Dr. Kho that the latter did not observe plausible reason could be found to disturb the
any contusions on the body of the deceased, findings of fact and of law of the lower court in this
obviously to disprove that appellants danceda case.
round and kicked the body after the victim was
slain. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision
is hereby AFFIRMED.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General,
"although the examining doctor failed to find any SO ORDERED.
contusion or abrasion on the cadaver of the victim,
nevertheless, such absence is not conclusive Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin
proof that appellants did not kick the deceased. It and Cortes, JJ., concur.
might be possible that kicks did not cause or
produce contusions or abrasions or that they were DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAILS
not noticed by the doctor." (Appellee's Brief, p. 22).
Moreover, the fact of dancing and kicking G.R. No. L-31839 June 30, 1980
complained of, is only one of the acts showing
conspiracy, without which, conspiracy cannot be EDMUNDO S. ALBERTO, Provincial Fiscal and
said not to have been established. BONIFACIO C. INTIA 1st Asst. Provincial
Fiscal, both of Camarines Sur, Petitioners,
The lower court also found that treachery was vs. HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
present in the commission of the crime, and that as Judge of the CFI of Camarines Sur and
the accused Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, ELIGIO ORBITA, Respondents.chanrobles virtual
Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio and Merlando law library
Dollantes are as equally guilty as principals by
direct participation. These accused took turns in CONCEPCION, J.:
stabbing the victim. In fact the victim was caught
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 111

Petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance

Gov. Armando Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda to
of a writ of preliminay injunction, to annul and setsend five men to work in the construction of a fence
aside the order of the respondent Judge, dated at his house at Taculod, Canaman, Camarines
January 26, 1970, directing the petitioners, Sur, then leased by the province and used as an
Provincial Fiscal and Assitant Provincial Fiscal of official guest house. Jose Esmeralda, declared,
Camarines Sur, to amend the information filed in however, that he could not remember who ahnded
Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First the note for him; that he was not sure as to
Instance of CamarinesSur, entitled: "The People of genuineness of the signature appearing therein
the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita, and that he was not preszent when the note was
accused," so as to include, as defendants, made and signed by Gov. Cledera. 2Beleiving that
Governor Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda, the escape of Pablo Denaque was made possible
assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur; as by the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda and
well as the order dated February 18, 1970, denying that Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of
the motion for the reconsideration of the said the offense for which tha accused Eligio Orbita had
order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual been charged, the defense cousel filed a motion in
law library court seeking the amendment of the information so
as to include Gov. cledera and Jose Esmeralda as
In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First defendants therein. 3chanrobles virtual law library
Instance of Camarines Sur, Eligio Orbita, a
Provincial guard, is prosecuted for the crime of Acting upon said motion, as well as the opposition
Infedelity in the Custody of Prisoner, defined and of the prosecution officers 4 and finding that "the
punished under Article 224 of the Revised Penal court cannot grant the motion or order the inclusion
Code, committed, as follows:chanrobles virtual law of Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda at this stage
library unless an investigation is made," the respondent
Judge directed the Fiscals office, within 15 days
That on or about the 12th day of September. 1968, from date, to cause the further investigation of the
in the barrio of Taculod, municipality of Canaman, case, taking into consideration the provisions of
province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Revised Penal Code in order to determine once
accused, being then a member of the Provincial and for all whether the Governor as jailer of the
Guard of Camarines Sur and specially charged Province and his assistant have any criminatory
with the duty of keeping under custody and participation in the circumstances of Pablo
vigilance detention prisoner Pablo Denaque, did Denaque's escape from judicial
then and there with great carelessness and custody. 5 chanrobles virtual law library
unjustifiable negligence leave the latter unguarded
while in said barrio, thereby giving him the In compliance with said order, the Fiscal set the
opportunity to run away and escape, as in fact said reinvestigation of the case for December 19, 1969.
detention prisoner Pablo Denaque did run away Summonses were issued to Gov. Cledera Jose
and escape from the custody of the said Esmeralda, Lorenzo Padua, the provincial warden,
accused. 1 chanrobles virtual law library and the accused Eligio Orbita to be present
thereat. 6 Dr. went thereat But, on the date set for
In the course of the trial thereof, or more the reinvestigation of the case, only Gov. Cledera
particularly during the cross-examination of Jose Esmeralda and Lorenzo Padua appeared.
prosecution witness Jose Esmeralda, assistant The accused Eligio Orbita did not appear. Neither
provincial warden of Camarines Sur, the defense was the note (Exhibit 2) produced. Since no
brought forht and confronted the witness with a additional evidence was presented, the Fiscal
note, marked as exhibit, purportedly written by manifested in Court on January 2, 1970 that "after
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 112

conducting a reinvestigation of the case and after the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the
a thorough and intelligent analysis of the facts and evidence at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable
law involved, no prima facie case against belief that a person committed an offense, is not
Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda exist, absolute and subject to judicial review, 13 it would
hence, they cannot be charged. 7 chanrobles be embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be
virtual law library compelled to prosecute a case when he is in no
position to do so because in his opinion, he does
On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita not have the necessary evidence to secure a
filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" praying "that conviction, or he is not convinced of the merits of
the Order of this Honorable Court dated December the case. The better procedure would be to appeal
11, 1969 be, in that instead of ordering the Fiscal the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice
to reinvestigate this case, on the basis of the and/or ask for a special prosecutor.
evidence already adduce during the trial of this
case, he be ordered to amend the information on Besides, it cannot be said that the Fiscal had
to include Cledera and Esmeralda it appearing the capriciously and whimsically refused to prosecute
on record that their inclusion is Cledera and Esmeralda.
8
warranted. chanrobles virtual law library
In his order directing the Fiscal's office to conduct
On January 26, 1970, the respondent Court issued a further reinvestigation of the case, the
the order complained of, the dispositive portion of respondent Judge candidly ad. muted that without
which reads, as follows: chanrobles virtual law a reinvestigation of the case, he cannot determine
library once and for all whether or not to include Gov.
Cledera and Jose Esmeralda in the information.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in the light of Pursuant thereto, a reinvestigation was conducted
the facts brought about by the prosecuting fiscal let by the fiscals office. Summonses were issued. But,
the charges be so amended by including in the no additional fact was elicited since Eligio Orbita
information the author or writer of Exhibit 2 and the did not appear thereat. Neither was the note (Exh.
person or persons who carried out the said orders 2) presented and produced. Gov. Cledera could
considering the provisions of Article 156 in relation not admit nor deny the genuineness of the
to Articles 223 and 224 of the Penal signature appearing in the note since it was not on
Code. 9 chanrobles virtual law library hand. Such being the case, the prosecuting
officers had reason to refuse to amend the
The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of information filed by them after a previous pre
said order, 10 but the motion was denied on examination and investigation.
February 18, 1970. 11 Hence, the instant recourse.
Moreover, there is no sufficient evidence in the
From the facts of the case, We are convinced that record to show a prima facie case against Gov.
the respondent Judge committed an error in Cledera and Jose Esmeralda. The order to amend
ordering the fiscal to amend the information so as the information is based upon the following
to include Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda facts: chanrobles virtual law library
as defendants in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. It is the 1. Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for
rule that a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under homicide, while working at the Guest House of
no compulsion to file a particular criminal Governor Cledera on September 12,
information where he is not convinced that he has 1968; chanrobles virtual law library
evidence to support the allegations
thereof. 12 Although this power and prerogative of
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 113

2. The Governor's evidence at that time is being rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his
15
rented by the province and its maintenance and escape. The offenders under this article is
upkeep is shouldered by the province of usually committed by an outsider who removes
Camarines Sur, chanrobles virtual law library from jail any person therein confined or helps him
escape. If the offender is a public officer who has
3. That neither Governor Cledera nor Lt. Jose custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for
Esmeralda was charged or entrusted with the duty infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and
of conveying and the detainee from the jail to the penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal
residence of the governor. Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the jailer
of the province, 16and Jose Esmeralda is the
4. That the de worked at the Governor Is by virtue assistant provincial warden, they cannot be
of an order of the Governor (Exhibit 2) which was prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque
tsn by Lt. Esmeralda; and chanrobles virtual law under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code.
library There is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant
their prosecution under Article 223 of the Revised
5. That it was the accused Orbita who himself who Penal Code, which reads, as follows: chanrobles
handpicked the group of Prisoners to work at the virtual law library
Governor's on 12, 1968. 14
ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to
Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code evasion. - Any Public officer who shall consent to
provides: chanrobles virtual law library the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge,
shall be punished chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jails. - The city
Of arrests mayor in its maximum period to prison 1. By prision correccional in its medium and
correccional in its minimum Period shall be maximum periods and temporary disqualification
imposed upon any person who shall remove from in its minimum period to perpetual special
any jail or penal establishment t any person disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been
confined therein or shall help the escape of such sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.
person, by means of violence, intimidation, or
bribery. 2. By prision correccional in its minimum period
and temporary special disqualification, in case the
If other means are used the penalty of arresto fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but
mayor shall be imposed. If the escape of the only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or
prisoner shall take place outside of said violation of law or municipal ordinance.
establishments by taking the guards by surprise,
the same penalties shall be imposed in their In order to be guilty under the aforequoted
minimum period. provisions of the Penal Code, it is necessary that
the public officer had consented to, or connived in,
The offenders may be committed in two ways: (1) the escape of the prisoner under his custody or
by removing a person confined in any jail or penal charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on
establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to the part of the person in charge is an essential
escape. To remove means to take away a person condition in the commission of the crime of
from the place of his confinement, with or without faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner. If the
the active compensation of the person released To public officer charged with the duty of guarding him
help in the escape of a Person confined in any jail does not connive with the fugitive, then he has not
or penal institution means to furnished that person violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. 17 For
with the material means such as a file, ladder, sure no connivance in the escape of Pablo
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 114

Denaque from the custody of the accused Eligio

Orbita can be deduced from the note of Gov.
Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for five men to
work in the guest house, it appearing that the notes
does not mention the names of the prisoners to be
brought to the guest house; and that it was the
accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to
compose the work party.

Neither is there evidence to warrant the

prosecution of Cledera and Esmeralda under
Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code. This article
punishes the public officer in whose custody or
charge a prisoner has escaped by reason of his
negligence resulting in evasion is definite
amounting to deliberate non- performance of
duty. 18 In the constant case, the respondent
Judge said:chanrobles virtual law library

We cannot, for the present be reconciled with the

Idea that the escape. of Denaque was facilitated
by the Governor's or . his assistants negligence.
According to law, if there is any negligence
committed it must be the officer who is charged
with the custody and guarding of the ... 19

We find no reason to set aside such findings. EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE

WHEREFORE, the orders issued on January 26, G.R. No. L-27191 February 28, 1967
and February 18, 1970 in Criminal Case No. 9414
of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, ADELAIDA TANEGA, petitioner,
entitled: "The People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs.
versus Eligio Orbita, accused are hereby annulled HON. HONORATO B. MASAKAYAN, in his
and set aside. The respondent Judge or any other capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance
judge acting in his stead is directed to proceed with of Rizal, Branch V, and the CHIEF OF POLICE
the trial of the case. Without costs. OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
SO ORDERED. Ramon V. Sison for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
Barredo (Chairman), Abad Santos and De
Castro, * JJ., concur. RESOLUTION
Republic of the Philippines SANCHEZ, J.:
SUPREME COURT
Manila Pressed upon us in this, an original petition
for certiorari and prohibition, is the problem of
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 115
when prescription of penalty should start to run.
The controlling facts are:
Convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon
City petitioner appealed. Found guilty once again
by the Court of First Instance,1 she was sentenced
to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify the
offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of
P100.00, with the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.2 We declined to review
on certiorari.3 Back to the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City, said court, on January 11, 1965,
directed that execution of the sentence be set for
January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion,
execution was deferred to February 12, 1965, at
8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner
failed to show up. This prompted the respondent
judge, on February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for
her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant
of arrest. Petitioner was never
arrested.1äwphï1.ñët
Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by
counsel, moved to quash the warrants of arrest of
February 15, 1965 and March 23, 1965.
Petitioner's ground: Penalty has prescribed.
On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge
ruled that "the penalty imposed upon the accused
has to be served", rejected the plea of prescription
of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of
another alias warrant of arrest. Hence, the present
petition.
Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a
light penalty.4 By Article 92 of the Revised Penal
Code, light penalties "imposed by final sentence"
prescribe in one year. The period of prescription of
penalties — so the succeeding Article 93 provides
— "shall commence to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence".5
What then is the concept of evasion of service of
sentence Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code
furnishes the ready answer. Says Article 157:
ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence.
— The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon any convict who shall evade
service of his sentence by escaping during
the term of his imprisonment 6 by reason of
final judgment. However, if such evasion or
escape shall have taken place by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows,
gates, walls, roofs or floors, or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit,
violence or intimidation, or through
connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, the
penalty shall be prision correccional in its
maximum period.
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1)
the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he
"is serving his sentence which consists in
deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of
sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence.7 This must be so. For, by the express
terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of
his sentence", by "escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That
escape should take place while serving sentence,
is emphasized by the provisions of the second
sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher
penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken
by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors,
windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or
intimidation, or through connivance with other
convicts or employees of the penal institution, ...
"8 Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another
expression of the term "jail breaking".9
A dig into legal history confirms the views just
expressed. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 in its
Article 134 — from whence Articles 92 and 93 of
the present Review Penal Code originated —
reads:
Las penas impuestas por sentencia firme
prescriben:
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 116

Las de muerte y cadena perpetua, a los condena pues que si no se hallare ya preso
veinte años. preventivamente, debera siempre
procederse a su encerramiento en el acto
xxx xxx xxx de serle notifirada personalmente la
sentencia.11
Las leves, al año.
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty
El tiempo de esta prescripcion comenzara of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to
a correr desde el dia en que se notifique commence to run, the culprit should escape during
personalmente al reo la sentencia firme, o the term of such imprisonment.
desde el quebrantamiento de la condena si
hubiera esta comenzado a cumplirse. x x x Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a
convict who — sentenced to imprisonment by final
Note that in the present Article 93 the words judgment — was thereafter never placed in
"desde el dia en que se notifique personalmente al confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does
reo la sentencia firme", written in the old code, not run in her favor.
were deleted. The omission is significant. What
remains reproduced in Article 93 of the Revised For the reasons given, the Court resolved to
Penal Code is solely "quebrantamiento de la dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
condena". And, "quebrantamiento" or evasion No costs. So ordered.
means escape.10 Reason dictates that one can
escape only after he has started service of Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala,
sentence. Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro,
JJ., concur.
Even under the old law, Viada emphasizes, where
the penalty consists of imprisonment, prescription
shall only begin to run when he escapes from
confinement. Says Viada: G.R. No. L-1960 November 26, 1948

El tiempo de la prescripcion empieza a THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

contarse desde el dia en que ha tenido
lugar la notificacion personal de la
sentencia firme al reo: el Codigo de 1850 no
expresaba que la notificacion hubiese de
ser personal, pues en su art. 126 se
consigna que el termino de la prescripcion
se cuenta desde que se notifique la
sentencia, causa de la ejecutoria en que se
imponga la pena respectiva. Luego ausente
el reo ya no podra prescribir hoy la pena,
pues que la notificacion personal no puede
ser suplida por la notificacion hecha en
estrados. Dada la imprescindible necesidad
del requisito de la notificacion personal, es
obvio que en las penas que consisten en
privacion de libertad solo porda existir la
prescripcion quebrantando el reo la
appellee,
vs.
FLORENTINO ABILONG, defendant-appellant.
Carlos Perfecto for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr.,
and Solicitor Manuel Tomacruz for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Manila with evasion of service of
sentence under the following information:
That on or about the 17th day of September,
1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, being then a convict
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 117
sentenced and ordered to serve two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
destierro during which he should not enter
any place within the radius of 100
kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue
of final judgment rendered by the municipal
court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No.
B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
evade the service of said sentence by going
beyond the limits made against him and
commit vagrancy.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, with the
accessory penalties of the law and to pay the
costs. He is appealing from that decision with the
following assignment of error:
1. The lower court erred in imposing a
penalty on the accused under article 157 of
the Revised Penal Code, which does not
cover evasion of service of "destierro."
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person
like the accused evading a sentence of destierro is
not criminally liable under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the
said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers
only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal
institution and completely deprived of their liberty.
He bases his contention on the word
"imprisonment" used in the English text of said
article which in part reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. — The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any convict who shall evade service of
his sentence by escaping during the term of
his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment.
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the
original text of the Revised Penal Code been in the
English language, then the theory of the appellant
could be uphold. However, it is the Spanish text
that is controlling in case of doubt. The Spanish
text of article 157 in part reads thus:
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia.
— Sera castigado con prision correccional
en sus grados medio y maximo el
sentenciado que quebrantare su condena,
fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo
privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; . .
..
We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch
as the Revised Penal Code was originally
approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish
text governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665,
668). It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used
in the English text is a wrong or erroneous
translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de
libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear
that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits
destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a
deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense
that as in the present case, the appellant by his
sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to
enter the City of Manila. This view has been
adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No.
36559 (July 26, 1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this
Court held, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor
General that "it is clear that a person under
sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his
liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the
penalty when he enters the prohibited area." Said
ruling in that case was ratified by this Court,
though, indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de
Jesus, (45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370) 1,
where it was held that one evades the service of
his sentence of destierro when he enters the
prohibited area specified in the judgment of
conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides
that its provisions do not apply to those who shall
have escaped from confinement or evaded
sentence.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 118

In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is The prosecution invokes the decision of this Court
guilty of evasion of service of sentence under in People vs. De Jesus, L-1411,2promulgated April
article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish 16, 1948, but said decision has no application
text), in that during the period of his sentence because in said case the legal question involved in
of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he the case at bar was not raised. The Supreme Court
was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he did not consider the question of interpretation of
entered said City. the wording of article 157. Undoubtedly, there was
occasion for considering the question, but the
Finding no reversible error in the decision Court nevertheless failed to do so. This failure to
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with see the question, at the time, is only an evidence
costs against the appellant. So ordered. that the tribunal is composed of human beings for
whom infallibility is beyond reach.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and
Tuason, JJ., concur. The prosecution maintains that appellant's
contention, supported by two authors who have
Separate Opinions considered the question, although tenable under
the English text of article 157, is not so under the
PERFECTO, J., dissenting: Spanish text, which is the one controlling because
the Revised Penal Code was originally enacted by
The legal question raised in this case is whether or the Legislature in Spanish.
not appellant, for having violated his judgment
of destierro rendered by the Municipal Court of There is no quarrel, therefore, that under the above
Manila, can be sentenced under article 157 of the quoted English text, the appellant is entitled to
Revised Penal Code which reads as follows: acquittal. The question now is whether or not the
Spanish text conveys a thing different from that
Evasion of service of sentence. — The which can be read in the English text. The Spanish
penalty of prision correccional in its medium text reads as follows:
and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any convict who shall evade service of ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia.
his sentence by escaping during the term of — Sera castigado con prision correccional
his imprisonment by reason of final en sus grados medio y maximo el
judgment. However, if such evasion or sentenciado que quebrantare su condena,
escape shall have taken place by means of fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, privacion de libertad por sentencia firme;
gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using pero si la evasion o fuga se hubiere llevado
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, a efecto con escalamiento, fractura de
violence or intimidation, or through puertas, ventanas, verjas, paredes, techos
connivance with other convicts or o suelos, o empleado ganzuas, llaves
employees of the penal institution, the falsas, disfraz, engano, violencia o
penalty shall be prision correccional in its intimidacion, o poniendose de acuerdo con
maximum period. otros sentenciados o dependientes del
establecimiento donde a hallare recluido la
Appellant invokes in his favor the negative opinion pena sera prision correccional en su grado
of author Guillermo Guevara (Revised Penal maximo.
Code, 1946, p. 322). This negative position is
supported by another author, Ambrosio Padilla The question boils down to the words "fugandose
(Revised Penal Code annotated, p. 474). mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 119
por sentencia firme," which are translated into
English "by escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment." The
prosecution contends that the words "privacion de
libertad" in the Spanish text is not the same as the
word "imprisonment" in the English text, and that
while "imprisonment" cannot include destierro,
"privacion de libertad" may include it.
The reason is, however, the result of a partial point
of view because it obliterates the grammatical,
logical, ideological function of the words
"fugandose" and "by escaping" in the Spanish and
English texts, respectively. There should not be
any question that, whatever meaning we may want
to give to the words "privacion de libertad," it has
to be conditioned by the verb "fugandose," (by
escaping). "Privacion de libertad" cannot be
considered independently of "fugandose."
There seems to be no question that the Spanish
"fugandose" is correctly translated into the English
"by escaping." Now, is there any sense in escaping
from destierro or banishment, where there is no
enclosure binding the hypothetical fugitive?
"Fugandose" is one of the forms of the Spanish
verb "fugar," to escape. The specific idea of
"evasion" or "escape" is reiterated by the use of
said words after the semi-colon in the Spanish text
and after the first period in the English text. Either
the verb "to escape" or the substantive noun
"escape" essentially pre-supposes some kind of
imprisonment or confinement, except figuratively,
and Article 157 does not talk in metaphors or
parables.
"To escape" means "to get away, as by flight or
other conscious effort; to break away, get free, or
get clear, from or out of detention, danger,
discomfort, or the like; as to escape from prison.
To issue from confinement or enclosure of any
sort; as gas escapes from the mains." (Webster's
New International Dictionary.)
"Escape" means "act of escaping, or fact or having
escaped; evasion of or deliverance from injury or
any evil; also the means of escape. The unlawful
departure of a prisoner from the limits of his
custody. When the prisoner gets out of prison and
unlawfully regains his liberty, it is an actual
escape." (Webster's New International Dictionary.)
"Evasion" means "escape." (Webster's New
International Dictionary.) .
The "destierro" imposed on appellant banished
him from Manila alone, and he was free to stay in
all the remaining parts of the country, and to go
and stay in any part of the globe outside the
country. With freedom to move all over the world,
it is farfetched to allege that he is in any
confinement from which he could escape.
The words "privacion de libertad" have been
correctly translated into the English
"imprisonment," which gives the idea exactly
conveyed by "privacion de libertad" in the Spanish
text. Undoubtedly, the drafters of the latter could
have had used a more precise Spanish word, but
the literary error cannot be taken as a pretext to
give to the less precise words a broader meaning
than is usually given to them.
"Privacion de libertad," literally meaning
"deprivation of liberty or freedom," has always
been used by jurist using the Spanish language to
mean "imprisonment." They have never given
them the unbounded philosophical scope that
would lead to irretrievable absurdities.
Under that unlimited scope, no single individual in
the more than two billion inhabitants of the world
can be considered free, as the freest citizen of the
freest country is subject to many limitations or
deprivations of liberty. Under the prosecution's
theory, should an accused, sentenced to pay a fine
of one peso, evade the payment of it, because the
fine deprives him of liberty to dispose of his one
peso, he will be liable to be punished under article
157 of the Revised Penal Code to imprisonment of
from more that two years to six years. The iniquity
and cruelty of such situation are too glaring and
violent to be entertained for a moment under our
constitutional framework.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 120

There is no gainsaying the proposition that to allow

the violation of a sentence of destierro without
punishment is undesirable, but even without
applying article 157 of the Revised Penal Code,
the act of the appellant cannot remain unpunished,
because his violation of the sentence
of destierro may be punished as contempt of court,
for which imprisonment up to six months is
provided.

It is deplorable that article 157 should not provide

for a situation presented in this case, but the gap
cannot be filled by this Court without encroaching
upon the legislative powers of Congress.
OTHER CASES OF EVASION OF
Perhaps it is better that evasions of sentence be SERVICE OF SENTENCE (VIOLATION
punished, as provided by the old Penal Code, by
an increased in the evaded penalty. This will be
OF CONDITIONAL PARDON)
more reasonable that the penalties provided by
G.R. No. 76872 July 23, 1987
article 157, which appear to be disproportionate
and arbitrary, because they place on equal footing
the evader of a sentence of one day of WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner,
imprisonment and a life-termer, one who commits vs.
an insignificant offense and one who perpetrates HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE
the most heinous crime. At any rate, this is a CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND
problem for Congress to solve. PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
PRISONS, respondents.
The appealed decision should be set aside.
FELICIANO, J.:
BRIONES, J., concurring:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed
I concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion, on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres, presently
because evidently the word "fugandose" in the confined at the National Penitentiary in
Spanish text refers to imprisonment, not Muntinlupa. We issued the writ and during the
to destierro. hearing and from the return filed by the
respondents through the Solicitor General, and
other pleadings in this case, the following facts
emerged:

1. Sometime before 1979 (no more specific

date appears in the records before this
Court), petitioner was convicted by the
Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime
of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced
to an aggregate prison term of from eleven
(11) years, ten (10) months and twenty-two
(22) days to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9)
months and one (1) day, and to pay an
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 121
indemnity of P127,728.75 (Criminal Cases
Nos. 68810, 91041 and F-138107). These
convictions were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 14773-CR and
17694-CR). The maximum sentence would
expire on 2 November 2000.1
2. On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon
was granted to the petitioner by the
President of the Philippines on condition
that petitioner would "not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should
this condition be violated, he will be
proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law."2 Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
3. On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons
and Parole (the "Board") resolved to
recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon
granted to the petitioner. In making its
recommendation to the President, the
Board relied upon the decisions of
this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of
Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939]) and Espuelas
vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol (108 Phil.
356 [1960]). The evidence before the Board
showed that on 22 March 1982 and 24 June
1982, petitioner had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756, which cases
were then (on 21 May 1986) pending trial
before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal
(Quezon City). The record before the Board
also showed that on 26 June 1985,
petitioner had been convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City)
of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No.
Q-22926; this conviction was then pending
appeal before the Intermediate Appellate
Court. The Board also had before it a letter
report dated 14 January 1986 from the
National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"),
addressed to the Board, on the petitioner.
Per this letter, the records of the NBI
showed that a long list of charges had been
brought against the petitioner during the last
twenty years for a wide assortment of
crimes including estafa, other forms of
swindling, grave threats, grave coercion,
illegal possession of firearms, ammunition
and explosives, malicious mischief,
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 772
(interfering with police functions). Some of
these charges were Identified in the NBI
report as having been dismissed. The NBI
report did not purport to be a status report
on each of the charges there listed and
Identified.
4. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister
of Justice wrote to the President of the
Philippines informing her of the Resolution
of the Board recommending cancellation of
the conditional pardon previously granted to
petitioner.
5. On 8 September 1986, the President
cancelled the conditional pardon of the
petitioner.
6. On 10 October 1986, the respondent
Minister of Justice issued "by authority of
the President" an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment against petitioner. The
petitioner was accordingly arrested and
confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.
Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of
Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did
not violate his conditional pardon since he has not
been convicted by final judgment of the twenty (20)
counts of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-19672 and Q-20756 nor of the crime of sedition
in Criminal Case No. Q-22926.3 Petitioner also
contends that he was not given an opportunity to
be heard before he was arrested and recommitted
to prison, and accordingly claims he has been
deprived of his rights under the due process clause
of the Constitution.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 122

The issue that confronts us therefore is whether or the terms under which the parole had been
not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a granted, Tesoro had in effect agreed that the
court is necessary before the petitioner can be Governor-General's determination (rather than
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of that of the regular courts of law) that he had
the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly breached one of the conditions of his parole by
to serve the balance of his original sentence. committing adultery while he was conditionally at
liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him. In
This issue is not novel. It has been raised before reaching this conclusion, this Court relied upon
this Court three times in the past. This Court was Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code
first faced with this issue in Tesoro Director of which empowered the Governor-General
Prison.4 Tesoro, who had been convicted of the
crime of falsification of public documents, was to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or
granted a parole by the then Governor-General. pardons, either plenary or partial,
One of the conditions of the parole required the conditional or unconditional; to suspend
parolee "not [to] commit any other crime and [to] sentences without parole, remit fines, and
conduct himself in an orderly manner."5 Two years order the discharge of any convicted person
after the grant of parole, Tesoro was charged upon parole, subject to such conditions as
before the Justice of the Peace Court of San Juan, he may impose; and to authorize the arrest
Rizal, with the crime of adultery said to have been and recommitment of any such person who,
committed with the wife of Tesoro's brother-in-law. in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the
The fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance the condition or conditions, of his pardon,
corresponding information which, however, was parole or suspension of sentence.
dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
The complainant then went before the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence and charged Tesoro with In Sales vs. Director of Prisons,7 the petitioner had
violation of the conditions of his parole. After been convicted of the crime of frustrated murder.
investigation by the parole officer, and on the basis After serving a little more than two years of his
of his report, the Board recommended to the sentence, he was given a conditional pardon by
President of the Philippines the arrest and the President of the Philippines, "the condition
recommitment of the petitioner. Tesoro contended, being that he shall not again violate any of the
among other things, that a "judicial pronouncement penal laws of the Philippines and that, should this
to the effect that he has committed a crime" is condition be violated, he shall be proceeded
necessary before he could properly be adjudged against in the manner prescribed by law."8 Eight
as having violated his conditional parole. years after the grant of his conditional pardon,
Sales was convicted of estafa and sentenced to
Addressing this point, this Court, speaking through three months and eleven days of arresto mayor.
then Mr. Justice Moran, held that the determination He was thereupon recommitted to prison to serve
of whether the conditions of Tesoro's parole had the unexpired portion of his original sentence.
been breached rested exclusively in the sound Sales raised before this Court two principal
judgment of the Governor-General and that such contentions. Firstly, he argued that Section 64 (i)
determination would not be reviewed by the courts. of the Revised Administrative Code had been
As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on repealed by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
parole upon the judgment of the power that had He contended, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was in
granted it, we held that "he [could not] invoke the any case repugnant to the due process clause of
aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings the Constitution (Article III [1], 1935 Constitution).
may be upon which his recommitment was This Court, through Mr. Justice Ozaeta speaking
ordered."6 Thus, this Court held that by accepting for the majority, rejected both contentions of Sales.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 123
Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code did not repeal Section 64 (i) Revised
Administrative Code. It was pointed out that Act
No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which
was enacted subsequent to the Revised Penal
Code, expressly preserved the authority conferred
upon the President by Section 64. The Court also
held that Article 159 and Section 64 (i) could stand
together and that the proceeding under one
provision did not necessarily preclude action under
the other. Sales held, secondly, that Section 64 (i)
was not repugnant to the constitutional guarantee
of due process. This Court in effect held that since
the petitioner was a convict "who had already been
seized in a constitutional was been confronted by
his accusers and the witnesses against him-, been
convicted of crime and been sentenced to
punishment therefor," he was not constitutionally
entitled to another judicial determination of
whether he had breached the condition of his
parole by committing a subsequent offense. Thus:
[a] statute [like Section 64 (i)] supervenes to
avoid the necessity for any action by the
courts in the premises. The executive
clemency under it is extended upon the
conditions named in it, and he accepts it
upon those conditions. One of these is that
the governor may withdraw his grace in a
certain contingency, and another is that the
governor shall himself determine when that
contingency has arisen. It is as if the
convict, with full competency to bind himself
in the premises, had expressly contracted
and agreed, that, whenever the governor
should conclude that he had violated the
conditions of his parole, an executive order
for his arrest and remandment to prison The status of our case law on the matter under
should at once issue, and be conclusive consideration may be summed up in the following
upon him. 9
In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol,10 the
petitioner had been convicted of the crime of
inciting to sedition. While serving his sentence, he
was granted by the President a conditional pardon
"on condition that he shall not again violate any of
the penal laws of the Philippines."11 Espuelas
accepted the conditional pardon and was released
from confinement. Sometime thereafter, he was
convicted by the Justice of the Peace Court in
Tagbilaran, Bohol, of the crime of usurpation of
authority. He appealed to the Court of First
Instance. Upon motion of the provincial fiscal, the
Court of First Instance dismissed the case
provisionally, an important prosecution witness not
having been available on the day set for trial. A few
months later, upon recommendation of the Board
of Pardons and Parole, the President ordered his
recommitment to prison to serve the unexpired
period of his original sentence.
The Court in Espuelas reaffirmed the continuing
force and effect of Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. This Court,
quoting Tesoro and Sales, ruled that:
Due process is not necessarily judicial The
appellee had had his day in court and been
afforded the opportunity to defend himself
during his trial for the crime of inciting to
sedition, with which he was charged, that
brought about or resulted in his conviction,
sentence and confinement in the
penitentiary. When he was conditionally
pardoned it was a generous exercise by the
Chief Executive of his constitutional
prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the
convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the
authority or power of the Executive to
determine whether a condition or conditions
of the pardon has or have been violated. To
no other department of the Government
[has] such power been intrusted. 12
propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the
determination of the terms and conditions of
a conditional pardon are purely executive
acts which are not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 124
2. The determination of the occurrence of a
breach of a condition of a pardon, and the
proper consequences of such breach, may
be either a purely executive act, not subject
to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be
a judicial act consisting of trial for and
conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code. Where the President opts to
proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent
crime is necessary, much less conviction
therefor by final judgment of a court, in order
that a convict may be recommended for the
violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et
unique judicial process, and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had already
been accorded judicial due process in his
trial and conviction for the offense for which
he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not
afflicted with a constitutional vice.
We do not believe we should depart from the clear
and well understood rules and doctrine on this WHEREFORE,
matter. DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the
instant case is not the prosecution of the parolee
for a subsequent offense in the regular course of
administration of the criminal law. What is involved
is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict
has breached his undertaking that he would "not
again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him
of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The
consequences that we here deal with are the
consequences of an ascertained breach of the
conditions of a pardon. A convict granted
conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who
is recommitted must of course be convicted by final
judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or
crimes with which he was charged before the
criminal penalty for such subsequent
offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a
distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict
who is regarded as having violated the provisions
thereof must be charged, prosecuted and
convicted by final judgment before he can be made
to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article
159.1avvphi1
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who
has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his
pardon, the Executive Department has two
options: (i) to proceed against him under Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to
proceed against him under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty
of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a
convict who "having been granted conditional
pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of
the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President
has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
That choice is an exercise of the President's
executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial
scrutiny.
this Petition is hereby
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento
and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., is on leave.
Narvasa, J., took no part.
CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 125

COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIMED DURING

SERVICE OF PENALTY IMPOSED FOR
ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE

G.R. Nos. L-38346-47 October 23, 1964

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee,
vs.
TEOFILO DIOSO and JACINTO
ABARCA, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Vicente R. Acsay counsel de oficio for defendants-

appellants.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Mandatory review of the death sentences imposed

by the Circuit Court of Rizal upon Teofilo Dioso and
Jacinto Abarca for the crime of murder.

The crime was committed inside the New Bilibid

Prison in Muntinglupa, Rizal where both accused
were serving sentence, Abarca having been
previously convicted by final judgment of the crime
of homicide, and Dioso, of robbery.

At the time of the incident, Dioso and Abarca were

members of the "Batang Mindanao" gang, while
the victims Angelito Reyno and Fernando Gomez,
also prisoners at the New Bilibid Prisons, belonged
to a group known as the "Happy Go Lucky" gang.
These rival factions had been involved in
intermittent, and sometimes bloody, clashes, the
latest of which resulted in the death of one Balerio
a member of the "Batang Mindanao" gang

Suspecting that Reyno and Gomez had authored

the slaying of their gangmate, the two accused set
their Minds to avenge his death. They found the
occasion to execute their nefarious design when
they learned that Reyno and Gomez were sick and
confined in the prison hospital. At 6:15 in the
'morning of September 12, 1972, Abarca, feigning
illness, went to the hospital to seek admission as a
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 126
patient. He was accompanied by his co-accused
Dioso. Inside Ward 6 of the hospital they saw their
intended victims: Reyno was taking breakfast with
Gomez was lying down on a "tarima" [wooden bed]
under a mosquito net. Dioso approached Reyno
and spoke briefly to him, while Abarca headed
towards the "tarima". Then, both accused
suddenly drew out their improvised knives matalas
Abarca raised the mosquito net over the "tarima"
and stabbed Gomez, as Dioso, almost
simultaneously, attacked Reyno with his knife. And
after the latter had fallen, Dioso strode to the
"tarima" to help his co-accused finish off Gomez.
When the accused rushed out of Ward 6, they
were met at the corridor by Prison Guard Enriquito
Aguilar Both gave themselves up and handed their
weapons to him.
Dr. Ricardo E. Baryola medico-legal officer of the
NBI, who performed the autopsy, found that both
accused died of massive bleeding due to multiple
stab wounds on the chest and abdomen. 1
The accused were immediately interrogated by
prison investigator Buenaventura dela Cuesta; and
they; readily executed their respective sworn
statements, wherein they admitted responsibility
for the death of the victims. 2
In his sworn statement, Teofilo Dioso narrated how
he delivered the death blow on Reyno, thus: tê
T Pagdating ninyo sa ward 6 ano ang inyong
ginawa?
S Tumuloy ho ako kay Reyno at tinamong ko kung
saan si Intsik [Gomez] ngayon tinuro ni Reyno sa
akin. Sabi ho iyong nakakulambo. Pagkatapos,
sinabi ko naman kay Abarca ang lugar ni Intsik
ngayon, pinuntahan naman niya. Pagtapat niya
kay Intsik, sinipa ko si Reyno sabay bunot ng aking
matalas at sinaksak ko sa kanya. Noong sa pag-
aakala kong patay na, iniwan ko at tumulong ako Dioso revealed the motive for the killing as
kay Abarca sa pagsaksak kay Gomez. Noong follows: tê
tumihaya na si Gomez, sumigaw ako kay Abarca
na labas na tayo. Tumakas ka palabas at noong
nasa pasilyo kami ng hospital nasalubong namin
iyong guardiya at doon namin sinurender ang mga
matalas namin. Tapos karning makapag-
surrender, dinala kami ng guardiya sa Control
Gate tuloy dito. [Exhibit "D", p. 21]
Jacinto Abarca on the other hand narrated his
version of the killing as follows: tê
T Pagkatapos ninyong mapagkasunduan na
manaksak sa ward 6, ano ang inyong ginawa?
S Ang sabi pa niya na bukas na tayo titira
pagkatapos ng almosalan tapos naghiwalay na
kami baka pa marinig ng iba. Kaninang umaga .
pagkatapos naming kumain lumabas na ako sa
ward 2 at nakita ko siya sa pintuan ng ward 4 na
naghihintay sa akin. Ngayon, pumasok muna siya
sa ward 4 at kumuha ng sigarilyo at pagkatapos
tumuloy kami sa ward 6. Pagdating namin sa ward
6, siya ang umuna dahil sa hindi ko pa alam kung
saan naka puwesto ang mga Happy Go [gang].
Pagkatapos lumapit siya doon sa nakaupo hindi ko
alam kong kumakain o hindi at ako naman ay
umupo sa isang tarima sa tabi ni intsik iyong tinira
ko tapos bigla na lang siya bumunot ng matalas
niya bago tinira iyong nakaupo sabay sabi na "tira
na". Pagkatira niya, ako naman ay lumapit doon sa
tarima ni intsik [Gomez] bago ko biglang tinaas ang
kulambo dahil nakahiga siya tapos tumakbo.
Hinabol ko tapos paghabol ko, nadapa siya tapos
sumuot sa silong ng tarima. Doon ko siya inabutan
at sinaksak ko. Ngayon sa pagsaksak ko sa kanya,
biglang dumating itong si Dioso at tumulong sa
akin sa pagsaksak. Hindi nagtagal, sumigao si
Dioso ng 'tama na' bago kami tumakbo palabas ng
ward 6. Noong nasa pasilyo kami ng hospital,
nasalubong namin iyong guardiya at doon namin
sinurender ang mga matalas namin. Pagkatapos
naming ma surrender ang mga matalas nang
dinala kami ng guardiya sa labas. [Exhibit "C ", p.
2].
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 127

T Bakit naman ninyo ni Abarca sinaksak sina say that the accused are quasi-recidivist, having
Reyno at Gomez sa ward 6? committed the crime charged while serving
sentence for a prior offense. As such, the
S Dahil po doon sa nangyari kay Balerio. Si Balerio maximum penalty prescribed by law for the new
po ay sinaksak ng mga "Happy Go" at iyong felony [murder] is death, regardless of the
panaksak namin kanina ay iyon ang ganti naming presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating
mga BM sa mga "Happy Go". [Exhibit "D", p. 1] circumstance or the complete absence thereof. 3

Of similar tenor is the following statement of But for lack of the requisite votes, the Court is
Abarca: tê constrained to commute the death sentence
imposed on each of the accused to reclusion
T lbig mo bang sabihin, iyong mga sinaksak ninyo perpetua
sa hospital kanina ay iyon din ang pumatay sa
sinasabi mong kakusa ninyo na si Balerio? ACCORDINGLY, accused Teofilo Dioso and
Jacinto Abarca are hereby sentenced to reclusion
S Hindi ho pero katatak nila iyong pumatay kay perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
Balerio. Pareho silang miembro ng "Happy Go deceased, jointly and severally, the sum of
Lucky" gang. Ngayon ang pagka panaksak namin P30,000.00. Costs against appellants.
kanina sa hospital noong dalawa na miembro ng
"Happy Go" ay ganti naming mga BM [Batang SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Mindanao] sa pagkapatay nila kay Balerio. [Exhibit
"C", p. 1]. Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, Abad
Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, De la
When arraigned for the crime of murder, both Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
accused voluntarily entered the plea of guilty.
Thereafter the trial court required the presentation Teehankee and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., took no part.
of evidence to determine the degree of their
culpability. At the hearing, they acknowledged the Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
voluntary execution of their respective
confessions.

The trial court correctly found that the crime was

perpetrated with alevosia. As revealed by the
accused themselves, they inflicted the fatal blows
while Gomez was lying down under a mosquito
net, and Reyno was taking his breakfast. Clearly,
neither of the victims was in a position to defend
himself from the sudden and unexpected assault.

It is thus noted that in their briefs, no attempt was

made to impugn the lower court's conclusion as to
their guilt. Instead, they seek attenuation of the
death sentence imposed by the trial court by
invoking the circumstances of voluntary surrender
and plea of guilty. We find no necessity to discuss
at length the effects of such mitigating
circumstances on the penalty imposed. Suffice it to
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 128

WHEREAS, these criminal acts have resulted in

loss of human lives, damage to property and
destruction of valuable resources of the country;

WHEREAS, there are various laws and

presidential decrees which penalized illegal
possession and manufacture of firearms,
ammunition and explosives;

WHEREAS, there is a need to consolidate, codify

and integrate said laws and presidential decrees to
harmonize their provisions;

WHEREAS, there are some provisions in said laws

and presidential decrees which must be updated
and revised in order to more effectively deter
violators of the law on firearms, ammunition and
explosives.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.

MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF hereby decree:1awphi1©
FIREARMS AND AMMUNITIONS
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,
Presidential Decree No. 1866 June 29, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms
1983 or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to
be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of
Ammunition. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in
CODIFYING THE LAWS ON its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to
INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR ammunition.
EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER
PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS If homicide or murder is committed with the use of
THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES" an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be
imposed.
WHEREAS, there has been an upsurge of crimes
vitally affecting public order and safety due to the If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of,
proliferation of illegally possessed and or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
manufactured firearms, ammunition and rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of
explosives; death shall be imposed.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 129

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of,
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
upon the owner, president, manager, director or rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of
other responsible officer of any public or private death shall be imposed.
firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
owned by such firm, company, corporation or period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
entity to be used by any person or persons found
upon the owner, president, manager, director or
guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding
other responsible officer of any public or private
paragraphs. firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the explosives
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed owned by such firm, company, corporation or
upon any person who shall carry any licensed entity to be used by any person or persons found
firearm outside his residence without legal guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding
authority therefor. paragraphs.

Section 2. Presumption of Illegal Manufacture of Section 4. Presumption of Unlawful

Firearms or Ammunition. - The possession of any Manufacture. - The possession of any machinery,
machinery, tool or instrument used directly in the tool or instrument directly used in the manufacture
manufacture of firearms or ammunition, by any of explosives, by any person whose business or
person whose business or employment does not employment does not lawfully deal with the
lawfully deal with the manufacture of firearms or manufacture of explosives shall be prima facie
ammunition, shall be prima facie evidence that evidence that such article is intended to be used in
such article is intended to be used in the the unlawful/illegal manufacture of explosives.
unlawful/illegal manufacture of firearms or
ammunition. Section 5. Tampering of Firearm's Serial
Number. - The penalty of prision mayor shall be
Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of tamper, change, deface or erase the serial number
Explosives. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in of any firearm.
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully Section 6. Repacking or Altering the Composition
manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose of Lawfully Manufactured Explosives. - The
or possess handgrenade(s), rifle grenade(s) and penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
other explosives, including but not limited to any person who shall unlawfully repack, alter or
"philbox bombs", "molotov cocktail bomb", "fire- modify the composition of any lawfully
bombs", or other incendiary devices capable of manufactured explosives.
producing destructive effect on contiguous objects
or causing injury or death to any Section 7. Unauthorized Issuance of Authority to
person.1awphi1©ITC Carry Firearm and/or Ammunition Outside of
Residence. - The penalty of prision correccional
Any person who commits any of the crimes defined shall be imposed upon any person, civilian or
in the Revised Penal Code or special laws with the military, who shall issue authority to carry firearm
use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation and/or ammunition outside of residence, without
agents or incendiary devices, which results in the authority therefor.
death of any person or persons shall be punished
with the penalty of death.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 130

Section 8. Rules and Regulations. - The Chief of
the Philippine Constabulary shall promulgate the
rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of this Decree.
Section 9. Repealing Clause. - The provisions of
Republic Act No. 4, Presidential Decree No. 9,
Presidential Decree No. 1728 and all laws,
decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations
which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby
repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
ammunition. – The penalty of prision correccional
in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun,
.380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower,
part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition:
Provided, That no other crime was committed.

Section 10. Effectivity. - This Decree shall take "The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
effect after fifteen (15) days following the period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette. (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is
classified as high powered firearm which includes
Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of June, those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber
in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45
eighty-three. and also lesser calibered firearms but considered
powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22
Republic Act No. 8294 June 6, 1997 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing
capability of full automatic and by burst of two or
AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS committed by the person arrested.
AMENDED, ENTITLED "CODIFYING THE LAWS
ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, "If homicide or murder is committed with the use of
MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
OR DISPOSITION OF FIREARMS, firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR circumstance.
INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE
OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR "If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of or
EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER incident to, or in connection with the crime of
PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted
THEREOF, AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES." coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection,
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:: "The same penalty shall be imposed upon the
owner, president, manager, director or other
Section 1. Sec. 1 Presidential Decree No. 1866, responsible officer of any public or private firm,
as amended, is hereby further amended to read as company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully
follows: or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by
such firm, company, corporation or entity to be
"Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, used by any person or persons found guilty of
disposition or possession of firearms or violating the provisions of the preceding
ammunition or instruments used or intended to be paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of
used in the manufacture of firearms or them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 131

without any legal authority to be carried outside of such firm, company, corporation or entity, to be
their residence in the course of their employment. used by any person or persons found guilty of
violating the provisions of the preceding
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed paragraphs."
upon any person who shall carry any licensed
firearm outside his residence without legal Section 3. Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
authority therefor." as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
Section 2. Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
as amended, is hereby further amended to read as "Sec. 5. Tampering of firearm's serial number. –
follows: The penalty of prision correccional shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
"Sec. 3. Unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, tamper, change, deface or erase the serial number
disposition or possession of explosives. – The of any firearm."
penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal and a fine of not less than Fifty Section 4. Sec. 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
thousand pesos (P50,000) shall be imposed upon as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, follows:
assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess
hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other "Sec. 6. Repacking or altering the composition of
explosives, including but not limited to 'pillbox,' lawfully manufactured explosives. – The penalty of
'molotov cocktail bombs,' 'fire bombs,' or other prision correccional shall be imposed upon any
incendiary devices capable of producing person who shall unlawfully repack, alter or modify
destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing the composition of any lawfully manufactured
injury or death to any person. explosives."

"When a person commits any of the crimes defined
in the Revised Penal Code or special laws with the
use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation
agents or incendiary devices, which results in the
death of any person or persons, the use of such
explosives, detonation agents or incendiary
devices shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
Section 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed
Firearm. – The term unlicensed firearm shall
include:
1) firearms with expired license; or
2) unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the
commission of the crime.

"If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of, or
incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup
d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crimes of rebellion, insurrection,
sedition or attempted coup d'etat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the
owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm,
company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully
or knowingly allow any of the explosives owned by
Section 6. Rules and regulations. – The
Department of Justice and the Department of the
Interior and Local Government shall jointly issue,
within ninety (90) days after the approval of this
Act, the necessary rules and regulations pertaining
to the administrative aspect of the provisions
hereof, furnishing the Committee on Public Order
and Security and the Committee on Justice and
Human Rights of both Houses of Congress copies
of such rules and regulations within thirty (30) days
from the promulgation hereof.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 132

Section 7. Separability clause. – If, for any
reason, any Sec. or provision of this Act is declared
to be unconstitutional or invalid, the other Sec.s or
provisions thereof which are not affected thereby
shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 8. Repealing clause. – All laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed, amended, or modified
accordingly.
Section 9. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect
after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the "Section
Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of Acquisition, Disposition, Importation or Possession
general circulation.
OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER
PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER RELEVANT
PURPOSES"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales,
of an Explosive or Incendiary Device. - The penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall willfully and unlawfully
manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose,
import or possess any explosive or incendiary
device, with knowledge of its existence and its
explosive or incendiary character, where the
explosive or incendiary device is capable of
producing destructive effect on contiguous objects
or causing injury or death to any person, including
but not limited to, hand grenade(s), rifle
grenade(s), 'pillbox bomb', 'molotov cocktail
bomb', 'fire bomb', and other similar explosive and
incendiary devices.

"Provided, That mere possession of any explosive

or incendiary device shall be prima facie evidence
that the person had knowledge of the existence
and the explosive or incendiary character of the
device.
Republic Act No. 9516 December 22
Amending Section 3 and 4 of PD 1866 "Provided, however, That a temporary, incidental,
casual, harmless, or transient possession or
AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING THE control of any explosive or incendiary device,
PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. without the knowledge of its existence or its
1866, AS AMENDED, ENTITLED CODIFYING explosive or incendiary character, shall not be a
THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL violation of this Section.
POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN,
ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION OF "Provided, Further, That the temporary, incidental,
FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES casual, harmless, or transient possession or
OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE control of any explosive or incendiary device for
MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 133

the sole purpose of surrendering it to the proper manufacture, construction, assembly, delivery or
authorities shall not be a violation of this Section. detonation of an explosive or incendiary device.

"Provided, finally, That in addition to the instances

"Provided, however, That a temporary incidental,
provided in the two (2) immediately preceeding casual, harmless or transient possession or control
paragraphs, the court may determine the absence of any part, machinery, tool or instrument directly
of the intent to possess, otherwise referred to used in the manufacture, construction, assembly,
as 'animus possidendi", in accordance with the delivery or detonation of any explosive or
facts and circumstances of each case and the incendiary device, without the knowledge of its
application of other pertinent laws, among other existence or character as part, ingredient,
things, Articles 11 and 12 of the Revised Penal machinery, tool or instrument directly used in the
Code, as amended." manufacture, construction, assembly, delivery or
detonation of any explosive or incendiary device,
Section 2. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. shall not be a violation of this Section.
1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows: "Provided, Further, That the temporary, incidental,
casual, harmless, or transient possession or
"SEC 3-A. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, control of any part, ingredient, machinery, tool or
Acquisition, Disposition, Importation or Possession instrument directly used in the manufacture,
of a Part, Ingredient, Machinery, Tool or construction, assembly, delivery or detonation of
Instrument Used or Intended to be Used for the any explosive or incendiary device for the sole
Manufacture, Construction, Assembly, Delivery or purpose of surrendering it to the proper authorities
Detonation. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall not be a violation of this Section.
shall be imposed upon any person who shall
willfully and unlawfully manufacture, assemble, "Provided, finally, That in addition to the instances
deal in, acquire, dispose, import or possess any provided in the two (2) immediately preceeding
part, ingredient, machinery, tool or instrument of paragraphs, the court may determine the absence
any explosive or incendiary device, whether of the intent to possess, otherwise referred to as
chemical, mechanical, electronic, electrical or 'animus possidendi', in accordance with the facts
otherwise, used or intended to be used by that and circumstances of each case and the
person for its manufacture, construction, application of other pertinent laws, among other
assembly, delivery or detonation, where the things, Articles 11 and 12 of the Revised Penal
explosive or incendiary device is capable or is Code, as amended."
intended to be made capable of producing
destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing Section 3. Insert a new Section 3-B, 3-C, 3-D, 4,
injury or death to any person. 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, 4-D, 4-E, 4-E and 4-F in Presidential
Decree No. 1866 to read as follows:
"Provided, That the mere possession of any part,
ingredient, machinery, tool or instrument directly "SEC. 3-B. Penalty for the Owner, President,
used in the manufacture, construction, assembly, Manager, Director or Other Responsible Officer of
delivery or detonation of any explosive or Any Public or Private Firm, Company, Corporation
incendiary device, by any person whose business or Entity. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
activity, or employment does not lawfully deal with be imposed upon the owner, president, manager,
the possession of such article shall be prima director or other responsible officer of any public or
facie evidence that such article is intended to be private firm, company, corporation or entity, who
used by that person in the unlawful/illegal shall willfully or knowingly allow any explosive or
incendiary device or parts thereof owned or
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 134
controlled by such firm, company, corporation or
entity to be used by any person or persons found
guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding
paragraphs.
"SEC. 3-C. Relationship of Other Crimes with a
Violation of this Decree and the Penalty Therefor.
- When a violation of Section 3, 3-A or 3-B of this
Decree is a necessary means for committing any
of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code
or special laws, or is in furtherance of, incident to,
in connection with, by reason of, or on occassion
of any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal
Code or special laws, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and a fine ranging from One hundred
Thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed.
"SEC. 3-D. Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double
Jeopardy. - Subject to the provisions of the Rules
of Court on double jeopardy, if the application
thereof is more favorable to the accused, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case for violation of this Decree
shall be a bar to another prosecution of the same
accused for any offense where the violation of this
Decree was a necessary means for committing the
offense or in furtherance of which, incident to
which, in connection with which, by reason of
which, or on occasion of which, the violation of this
Decree was committed, and vice versa.
"SEC. 4. Responsibility and liability of Law
Enforcement Agencies and Other Government
Officials and Employees in Testifying as
Prosecution Witnesses. - Any member of law
enforcement agencies or any other government
official and employee who, after due notice, fails or
refuses, intentionally or negligently, to appear as a
witness for the prosecution of the defense in any
proceeding, involving violations of this Decree,
without any valid reason, shall be punished
with reclusion temporal and a fine of Five hundred
Thousand pesos (P500,000.00) in addition to the
administrative liability he/she may be meted out by
his/her immediate superior and/or appropriate
body.
"The immediate superior of the member of the law
enforcement agency or any other government
employee mentioned in the preceding paragraph
shall be penalized with prision correccional and a
fine of not less than Ten Thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) and in addition, perpetual
absolute disqualification from public office if
despite due notice to them and to the witness
concerned, the former does not exert reasonable
effort to present the latter to the court.
"The member of the law enforcement agency or
any other government employee mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs shall not be transferred or
reassigned to any other government office located
in another territorial jurisdiction during the
pendency of the case in court. However, the
concerned member of the law enforcement agency
or government employee may be transferred or
reassigned for compelling reasons: Provided, That
his/her immediate superior shall notify the court
where the case is pending of the order to transfer
or reassign, within twenty-four (24) hours from its
approval: Provided, further, That his/her
immediate superior shall be penalized with prision
correccional and a fine of not less than Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and in addition,
perpetual absolute disqualification from public
office, should he/she fail to notify the court of such
order to transfer or reassign.
"Prosecution and punishment under this Section
shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any existing law.
"SEC 4-A. Criminal Liability for Planting of
Evidence. - Any person who is found guilty of
'planting' any explosive or incendiary device or any
part, ingredient, machinery, tool or instrument of
any explosive or incendiary device, whether
chemical, mechanical, electronic, electrical or
otherwise, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 135
"Planting of evidence shall mean the willful act by
any person of maliciously and surreptitiously
inserting, placing, adding or attaching, directly or
indirectly, through any overt or covert act,
whatever quantity of any explosive or incendiary
device or any part, ingredient, machinery, tool or
instrument of any explosive or incendiary device,
whether chemical, mechanical, electronic,
electrical or otherwise in the person, house, effects
or in the immediate vicinity of an innocent
individual for the purpose of implicating
incriminating or imputing the commission of any
violation of this Decree.
"SEC. 4-B. Continuous Trial. - In cases involving
violations of this Decree, the judge shall set the
case for continuous trial on a daily basis from
Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar
so as to ensure speedy trial. Such case shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused.
"SEC. 4-C. Authority to Import, Sell or Possess
Chemicals or Accessories for Explosives. - Only
persons or entities issued a manufacturer's
license, dealer's license or purchaser's license by
the Philippine National Police (PNP)-Firearms and
Explosives Division may import any of the
chemical or accessories that can be used in the
manufacture of explosives or explosive ingredients
from foreign suppliers, or possess or sell them to
licensed dealers or end users, as the case may be.
"SEC. 4-D. Types of Chemicals/Accessories
Covered. - The chemicals and accessories
mentioned in the preceding Section shall
exclusively refer to chlorates, nitrates, nitric acid
and such other chemicals and accessories that
can be used for the manufacture of explosives and
explosive ingredients.
"SEC. 4-E. Record of Transactions. - Any person Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
or entity who intends to import, sell or possess the Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
aforecited chemicals or accessories shall file an assembled:
application with the chief of the PNP, stating
therein the purpose for which the license and/or
permit is sought and such other information as may
be required by the said official. The concerned
person or entity shall maintain a permanent record
of all transactions entered into in relation with the
aforecited chemicals or accessories, which
documents shall be open to inspection by the
appropriate authorities.
"SEC. 4-F. Cancellation of License. - Failure to
comply with the provision of Section 4-C, 4-D and
4-E shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of
the license and the confiscation of all such
chemicals or accessories, whether or not lawfully
imported, purchased or possessed by the subject
person or entity."
Sec. 4. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason,
any provision of this Act is declared to be
unconstitutional or invalid, the other Sections or
provisions thereof which are not affected thereby
shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Sec. 5. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed, amended, or modified
accordingly.
Sec. 6. Effecfivity. - This Act shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10591
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE
LAW ON FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 136

ARTICLE I because of its association with some historical

TITLE, DECLARATION OF POLICY AND figure, period or event.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
(d) Arms smuggling refers to the import, export,
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of
as the "Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition firearms, their parts and components and
Regulation Act". ammunition, from or across the territory of one
country to that of another country which has not
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. – It is the been authorized in accordance with domestic law
policy of the State to maintain peace and order and in either or both country/countries.
protect the people against violence. The State also
recognizes the right of its qualified citizens to self- (e) Authority to import refers to a document issued
defense through, when it is the reasonable means by the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
to repel the unlawful aggression under the authorizing the importation of firearms, or their
circumstances, the use of firearms. Towards this parts, ammunition and other components.
end, the State shall provide for a comprehensive
law regulating the ownership, possession, (f) Authorized dealer refers to any person, legal
carrying, manufacture, dealing in and importation entity, corporation, partnership or business entity
of firearms, ammunition, or parts thereof, in order duly licensed by the Firearms and Explosive Office
to provide legal support to law enforcement (FEO) of the PNP to engage in the business of
agencies in their campaign against crime, stop the buying and selling ammunition, firearms or parte
proliferation of illegal firearms or weapons and the thereof, at wholesale or retail basis.
illegal manufacture of firearms or weapons,
ammunition and parts thereof. (g) Authorized importer refers to any person, legal
entity, corporation, partnership or business duly
Section 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the
Act: business of importing ammunition and firearms, or
parts thereof into the territory of the Republic of the
(a) Accessories refer to parts of a firearm which Philippines for purposes of sale or distribution
may enhance or increase the operational under the provisions of this Act.
efficiency or accuracy of a firearm but will not
constitute any of the major or minor internal parts (h) Authorized manufacturer refers to any person,
thereof such as, hut not limited to, laser scope, legal entity, corporation, or partnership duly
telescopic sight and sound suppressor or silencer. licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the
business of manufacturing firearms, and
(b) Ammunition refers to a complete unfixed unit ammunition or parts thereof for purposes of sale or
consisting of a bullet, gunpowder, cartridge case distribution.1âwphi1
and primer or loaded shell for use in any firearm.
(i) Confiscated firearm refers to a firearm that is
(c) Antique firearm refers to any: (1) firearm which taken into custody by the PNP, National Bureau of
was manufactured at least seventy-five (75) years Investigation (NBI), Philippine Drug Enforcement
prior to the current date but not including replicas; Agency (PDEA), and all other law enforcement
(2) firearm which is certified by the National agencies by reason of their mandate and must be
Museum of the Philippines to be curio or relic of necessarily reported or turned over to the PEO of
museum interest; and (3) any other firearm which the PNP.
derives a substantial part of its monetary value
from the fact that it is novel, rare, bizarre or
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 137

(j) Demilitarized firearm refers to a firearm by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the business
deliberately made incapable of performing its main of repairing firearms and other weapons or
purpose of firing a projectile. constructing or assembling firearms and weapons
from finished or manufactured parts thereof on a
(k) Duty detail order refers to a document issued per order basis and not in commercial quantities or
by the juridical entity or employer wherein the of making minor parts for the purpose of repairing
details of the disposition of firearm is spelled-out, or assembling said firearms or weapons.
thus indicating the name of the employee, the
firearm information, the specific duration and (q) Imitation firearm refers to a replica of a firearm,
location of posting or assignment and the or other device that is so substantially similar in
authorized bonded firearm custodian for the coloration and overall appearance to an existing
juridical entity to whom such firearm is turned over firearm as to lead a reasonable person to believe
after the lapse of the order. that such imitation firearm is a real firearm.

(l) Firearm refers to any handheld or portable (r) Licensed citizen refers to any Filipino who
weapon, whether a small arm or light weapon, that complies with the qualifications set forth in this Act
expels or is designed to expel a bullet, shot, slug, and duly issued with a license to possess or to
missile or any projectile, which is discharged by carry firearms outside of the residence in
means of expansive force of gases from burning accordance with this Act.
gunpowder or other form of combustion or any
similar instrument or implement. For purposes of (s) Licensed, juridical entity refers to corporations,
this Act, the barrel, frame or receiver is considered
organizations, businesses including security
a firearm. agencies and local government units (LGUs)
which are licensed to own and possess firearms in
(m) Firearms Information Management System accordance with this Act.
(FIMS) refers to the compilation of all data and
information on firearms ownership and disposition (t) Light weapons are: Class-A Light weapons
for record purposes. which refer to self-loading pistols, rifles and
carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and light
(n) Forfeited firearm refers to a firearm that is machine guns not exceeding caliber 7.62MM
subject to forfeiture by reason of court order as which have fully automatic mode; and Class-B
accessory penalty or for the disposition by the FEO Light weapons which refer to weapons designed
of the PNP of firearms considered as abandoned, for use by two (2) or more persons serving as a
surrendered, confiscated or revoked in compliance crew, or rifles and machine guns exceeding caliber
with existing rules and regulations. 7.62MM such as heavy machine guns, handheld
underbarrel and mounted grenade launchers,
(o) Gun club refers to an organization duly portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns,
registered with and accredited in good standing by recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank
the FEO of the PNP which is established for the missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of
purpose of propagating responsible and safe gun anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a
ownership, proper appreciation and use of caliber of less than 100MM.
firearms by its members, for the purpose of sports
and shooting competition, self-defense and (u) Long certificate of registration refers to licenses
collection purposes. issued to government agencies or offices or
government-owned or -controlled corporations for
(p) Gunsmith refers to any person, legal entity, firearms to be used by their officials and
corporation, partnership or business duly licensed
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 138

employees who are qualified to possess firearms duly registered with and accredited in good
as provider in this Act, excluding security guards. standing by the FEO of the PNP.

(v) Loose firearm refers to an unregistered firearm,
an obliterated or altered firearm, firearm which has
been lost or stolen, illegally manufactured
firearms, registered firearms in the possession of
an individual other than the licensee and those
with revoked licenses in accordance with the rules
and regulations.
(cc) Short certificate of registration refers to a
certificate issued by the FEO of the PNP for a
government official or employee who was issued
by his/her employer department, agency or
government-owned or -controlled corporation a
firearm covered by the long certificate of
registration.

(w) Major part or components of a firearm refers to (dd) Small arms refer to firearms intended to be or
the barrel, slide, frame, receiver, cylinder or the primarily designed for individual use or that which
bolt assembly. The term also includes any part or is generally considered to mean a weapon
kit designed and intended for use in converting a intended to be fired from the hand or shoulder,
semi-automatic burst to a full automatic firearm. which are not capable of fully automatic bursts of
discharge, such as:
(x) Minor parts of a firearm refers to the parts of the
firearm other than the major parts which are (1) Handgun which is a firearm intended to be fired
necessary to effect and complete the action of from the hand, which includes:
expelling a projectile by way of combustion, except
those classified as accessories. (i) A pistol which is a hand-operated firearm having
a chamber integral with or permanently aligned
(y) Permit to carry firearm outside of with the bore which may be self-loading; and
residence refers to a written authority issued to a
licensed citizen by the Chief of the PNP which (ii) Revolver which is a hand-operated firearm with
entitles such person to carry his/her registered or a revolving cylinder containing chambers for
lawfully issued firearm outside of the residence for individual cartridges.
the duration and purpose specified in the authority.
(2) Rifle which is a shoulder firearm or designed to
(z) Permit to transport firearm refers to a written be fired from the shoulder that can discharge a
authority issued to a licensed citizen or entity by bullet through a rifled barrel by different actions of
the Chief of the PNP or by a PNP Regional Director loading, which may be classified as lever, bolt, or
which entitles such person or entity to transport a self-loading; and
particular firearm from and to a specific location
within the duration and purpose in the authority. (3) Shotgun which is a weapon designed, made
and intended to fire a number of ball shots or a
(aa) Residence refers to the place or places of single projectile through a smooth bore by the
abode of the licensed citizen as indicated in his/her action or energy from burning gunpowder.
license.
(ee) Sports shooting competition refers to a
(bb) Shooting range refers to a facility established defensive, precision or practical sport shooting
for the purpose of firearms training and skills competition duly authorized by the FEO of the
development, firearm testing, as well as for sports PNP.
and competition shooting either for the exclusive
use of its members or open to the general public, (ff) Tampered, obliterated or altered firearm refers
to any firearm whose serial number or other
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 139

identification or ballistics characteristics have been (d) The applicant has passed a gun safety seminar
intentionally tampered with, obliterated or altered which is administered by the PNP or a registered
without authority or in order to conceal its source, and authorized gun club;
identity or ownership.
(e) The applicant has filed in writing the application
(gg) Thermal weapon sight refers to a battery to possess a registered firearm which shall state
operated, uncooled thermal imaging device which the personal circumstances of the applicant;
amplifies available thermal signatures so that the
viewed scene becomes clear to the operator which (f) The applicant must present a police clearance
is used to locate and engage targets during from the city or municipality police office; and
daylight and from low light to total darkness and
operates in adverse conditions such as light rain, (g) The applicant has not been convicted or is
light snow, and dry smoke or in conjunction with currently an accused in a pending criminal case
other optical and red dot sights. before any court of law for a crime that is
punishable with a penalty of more than two (2)
ARTICLE II years.
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS For purposes of this Act, an acquittal or permanent
dismissal of a criminal case before the courts of
Section 4. Standards and Requisites for Issuance law shall qualify the accused thereof to qualify and
of and Obtaining a License to Own and Possess acquire a license.
Firearms. – In order to qualify and acquire a
license to own and possess a firearm or firearms The applicant shall pay the reasonable licensing
and ammunition, the applicant must be a Filipino fees as may be provided in the implementing rules
citizen, at least twenty-one (21) years old and has and regulations of this Act.
gainful work, occupation or business or has filed
an Income Tax Return (ITR) for the preceding year An applicant who intends to possess a firearm
as proof of income, profession, business or owned by a juridical entity shall submit his/her duty
occupation. detail order to the FEO of the PNP.

In addition, the applicant shall submit the following Section 5. Ownership of Firearms and
certification issued by appropriate authorities Ammunition by a Juridical Entity. – A juridical
attesting the following: person maintaining its own security force may be
issued a regular license to own and possess
(a) The applicant has not been convicted of any firearms and ammunition under the following
crime involving moral turpitude; conditions:

(b) The applicant has passed the psychiatric test (a) It must be Filipino-owned and duly registered
administered by a PNP-accredited psychologist or with the Securities and Exchange Commission
psychiatrist; (SEC);

(c) The applicant has passed the drug test (b) It is current, operational and a continuing
conducted by an accredited and authorized drug concern;
testing laboratory or clinic;
(c) It has completed and submitted all its reportorial
requirements to the SEC; and
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 140

(d) It has paid all its income taxes for the year, as danger due to the nature of their profession,
duly certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. occupation or business:

The application shall be made in the name of the (a) Members of the Philippine Bar;
juridical person represented by its President or any
of its officers mentioned below as duly authorized (b) Certified Public Accountants;
in a board resolution to that effect: Provided, That
the officer applying for the juridical entity, shall (c) Accredited Media Practitioners;
possess all the qualifications required of a citizen
applying for a license to possess firearms. (d) Cashiers, Bank Tellers;

Other corporate officers eligible to represent the (e) Priests, Ministers, Rabbi, Imams;
juridical person are: the vice president, treasurer,
and board secretary. (f) Physicians and Nurses;

Security agencies and LGUs shall be included in (g) Engineers; and

this category of licensed holders but shall be
subject to additional requirements as may be (h) Businessmen, who by the nature of their
required by the Chief of the PNP. business or undertaking, are exposed to high risk
of being targets of criminal elements.
Section 6. Ownership of Firearms by the National
Government. – All firearms owned by the National ARTICLE III
Government shall be registered with the FEO of REGISTRATION AND LICENSING
the PNP in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. Such registration shall be exempt from Section 8. Authority to Issue License. – The Chief
all duties and taxes that may otherwise be levied of the PNP, through the FEO of the PNP, shall
on other authorized owners of firearms. For reason issue licenses to qualified individuals and to cause
of national security, firearms of the Armed Forces the registration of firearms.
of the Philippines (AFP), Coast Guard and other
law enforcement agencies shall only be reported Section 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. –
to the FEO of the PNP. Subject to the requirements set forth in this Act and
payment of required fees to be determined by the
Section 7. Carrying of Firearms Outside of Chief of the PNP, a qualified individual may be
Residence or Place of Business. – A permit to issued the appropriate license under the following
carry firearms outside of residence shall be issued categories;
by the Chief of the PNP or his/her duly authorized
representative to any qualified person whose life is Type 1 license – allows a citizen to own and
under actual threat or his/her life is in imminent possess a maximum of two (2) registered firearms;
danger due to the nature of his/her profession,
occupation or business. Type 2 license – allows a citizen to own and
possess a maximum of five (5) registered firearms;
It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove that
his/her life is under actual threat by submitting a Type 3 license – allows a citizen to own and
threat assessment certificate from the PNP. possess a maximum of ten (10) registered
firearms;
For purposes of this Act, the following
professionals are considered to be in imminent
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 141

Type 4 license – allows a citizen to own and Section 12. License to Possess Ammunition
possess a maximum of fifteen (15) registered Necessarily Included. – The licenses granted to
firearms; and qualified citizens or juridical entities as provided in
Section 9 of this Act shall include the license to
Type 5 license – allows a citizen, who is a certified possess ammunition with a maximum of fifty (50)
gun collector, to own and possess more than rounds for each registered firearm: Provided; That
fifteen (15) registered firearms. the FEO of the PNP may allow more ammunition
to be possessed by licensed sports shooters.
For Types 1 to 5 licenses, a vault or a container
secured by lock and key or other security Section 13. Issuance of License to Manufacture or
measures for the safekeeping of firearms shall be Deal In Firearms and Ammunition. – Any person
required. desiring to manufacture or deal in firearms, parts
of firearms or ammunition thereof, or instruments
For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the citizen must comply and implements used or intended to be used in the
with the inspection and bond requirements. manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms or
ammunition, shall make an application to:
Section 10. Firearms That May Be Registered. –
Only small arms may be registered by licensed (a) The Secretary of the Department of the Interior
citizens or licensed juridical entities for ownership, and Local Government (DILG) in the case of an
possession and concealed carry. A light weapon application for a license to manufacture; and
shall be lawfully acquired or possessed exclusively
by the AFP, the PNP and other law enforcement (b) The Chief of the PNP in the case of a license to
agencies authorized by the President in the deal in firearms and firearms parts, ammunition
performance of their duties: Provided, That private and gun repair.
individuals who already have licenses to possess
Class-A light weapons upon the effectivity of this The applicant shall state the amount of
Act shall not be deprived of the privilege to capitalization for manufacture or cost of the
continue possessing the same and renewing the purchase and sale of said articles intended to be
licenses therefor, for the sole reason that these transacted by such applicant; and the types of
firearms are Class "A" light weapons, and shall be firms, ammunition or implements which the
required to comply with other applicable provisions applicant intends to manufacture or purchase and
of this Act. sell under the license applied for; and such
additional information as may be especially
Section 11. Registration of Firearms. – The requested by the Secretary of the DILG or the
licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity shall Chief of the PNP.
register his/her/its firearms so purchased with the
FEO of the PNP in accordance with the type of The Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of the PNP
license such licensed citizen or licensed juridical may approve or disapprove such application
entity possesses. A certificate of registration of the based on the prescribed guidelines. In the case of
firearm shall be issued upon payment of approval, the Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of
reasonable fees. the PNP shall indicate the amount of the bond to
be executed by the applicant before the issuance
For purposes of this Act, registration refers to the of the license and the period of time by which said
application, approval, record-keeping and license shall be effective, unless sooner revoked
monitoring of firearms with the FEO of the PNP in by their authority.
accordance with the type of license issued to any
person under Section 9 of this Act.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 142

Upon approval of the license to manufacture or manufacturer of firearms, on the other hand, is
otherwise deal in firearms by the Secretary of the entitled to import various firearms for reference,
DILG or the Chief of the PNP as the case may be, test and evaluation for manufacture of similar,
the same shall be transmitted to the FEO of the types of firearms covered by the License to
PNP which shall issue the license in accordance Manufacture.
with the approved terms and conditions, upon the
execution and delivery by the applicant of the An export permit shall, however, be necessary to
required bond conditioned upon the faithful export manufactured parts or finished products of
compliance on the part of the licensee to the laws firearms and ammunition. The Export Permit of
and regulations relative to the business licensed. firearms and ammunition shall be under the
administration of the PNP.
Section 14. Scope of License to Manufacture
Firearms and Ammunition. – The scope of the Section 15. Registration of Locally Manufactured
License to Manufacture firearms and ammunition and Imported Firearms. – Local manufacturers
shall also include the following: and importers of firearms and major parts thereof
shall register the same as follows:
(a) The authority to manufacture and assemble
firearms, ammunition, spare parts and (a) For locally manufactured firearms and major
accessories, ammunition components, and parts thereof, the initial registration shall be done
reloading of ammunitions, within sites, areas, and at the manufacturing facility: Provided, That
factories stated therein. The Secretary of the DILG firearms intended for export shall no longer be
shall approve such license; subjected to ballistic identification procedures; and

(b) The license to deal in or sell all the items (b) For imported firearms and major parts thereof,
covered by the License to Manufacture, such as the registration shall be done upon arrival at the
parts, firearms or ammunition and components; FEO of the PNP storage facility.

(c) The authority to subcontract the manufacturing Section 16. License and Scope of License to
of parts and accessories necessary for the Deal. – The License to Deal authorizes the
firearms which the manufacturer is licensed to purchase, sale and general business in handling
manufacture: Provided, That the subcontractor of firearms and ammunition, major and minor parts of
major parts or major components is also licensed firearms, accessories, spare parts, components,
to manufacture firearms and ammunition; and and reloading machines, which shall be issued by
the Chief of the PNP.
(d) The authority to import machinery, equipment,
and firearm parts and ammunition components for
Section 17. License and Scope of License for
the manufacture thereof. Firearm parts and Gunsmiths. – The license for gunsmiths shall allow
ammunition components to be imported shall, the grantee to repair registered firearms. The
however, be limited to those authorized to be license shall include customization of firearms
manufactured as reflected in the approved License
from finished or manufactured parts thereof on per
to Manufacture. The Import Permit shall be under
order basis and not in commercial quantities and
the administration of the PNP. making the minor parts thereof, i.e. pins, triggers,
trigger bows, sights and the like only for the
A licensed manufacturer of ammunition is also purpose of repairing the registered firearm. The
entitled to import various reference firearms license for gunsmiths shall be issued by the Chief
needed to test the ammunition manufactured of the PNP.
under the License to Manufacture. A licensed
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 143

Section 18. Firearms for Use in Sports and from authorized dealers, importers or local
Competitions. – A qualified individual shall apply manufacturers and may be transferred or sold only
for a permit to transport his/her registered firearm/s from a licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity to
from his/her residence to the firing range/s and another licensed citizen or licensed juridical
competition sites as may be warranted. entity: Provided, That, during election periods, the
sale and registration of firearms and ammunition
Section 19. Renewal of Licenses and and the issuance of the corresponding licenses to
Registration. – All types of licenses to possess a citizens shall be allowed on the condition that the
firearm shall be renewed every two (2) years. transport or delivery thereof shall strictly comply
Failure to renew the license on or before the date with the issuances, resolutions, rules and
of its expiration shall cause the revocation of the regulations promulgated by the Commission on
license and of the registration of the firearm/s Elections.
under said licensee.
Section 22. Deposit of Firearms by Persons
The registration of the firearm shall be renewed Arriving From Abroad. – A person arriving in the
every four (4) years. Failure to renew the Philippines who is legally in possession of any
registration of the firearm on or before the date of firearm or ammunition in his/her country of origin
expiration shall cause the revocation of the license and who has declared the existence of the firearm
of the firearm. The said firearm shall be upon embarkation and disembarkation but whose
confiscated or forfeited in favor of the government firearm is not registered in the Philippines in
after due process. accordance with this Act shall deposit the same
upon written receipt with the Collector of Customs
The failure to renew a license or registration within for delivery to the FEO of the PNP for safekeeping,
the periods stated above on two (2) occasions or for the issuance of a permit to transport if the
shall cause the holder of the firearm to be person is a competitor in a sports shooting
perpetually disqualified from applying for any competition. If the importation of the same is
firearm license. The application for the renewal of allowed and the party in question desires to obtain
the license or registration may be submitted to the a domestic firearm license, the same should be
FEO of the PNP, within six (6) months before the undertaken in accordance with the provisions of
date of the expiration of such license or this Act. If no license is desired or leave to import
registration. is not granted, the firearm or ammunition in
question shall remain in the custody of the FEO of
Section 20. Inspection and Inventory. – The Chief the PNP until otherwise disposed of in-accordance
of the PNP or his/her authorized representative with law.
shall require the submission of reports, inspect or
examine the inventory and records of a licensed Section 23. Return of Firearms to Owner upon
manufacturer, dealer or importer of firearms and Departure from the Philippines. – Upon the
ammunition during reasonable hours. departure from the Philippines of any person
whose firearm or ammunition is in the custody of
ARTICLE IV the FEO of the PNP, the same shall, upon timely
ACQUISITION, DEPOSIT OF FIREARMS, request, be delivered to the person through the
ABANDONED, DEMILITARIZED AND ANTIQUE Collector of Customs. In the case of a participant
FIREARMS in a local sports shooting competition, the firearm
must be presented to the Collector of Customs
Section 21. Acquisition or Purchase and Sale of before the same is allowed to be loaded on board
Firearms and Ammunition. – Firearms and the carrier on which the person is to board.
ammunition may only be acquired or purchased
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 144

Section 24. Safekeeping of Firearms and acquisition, possession of firearms and

Ammunition. – Any licensee may deposit a
registered firearm to the FEO of the PNP, or any
Police Regional Office for safekeeping.
Reasonable fees for storage shall be imposed.
Section 25. Abandoned Firearms and
Ammunition. – Any firearm or ammunition
deposited in the custody of the FEO of the PNP
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall be
deemed to have been abandoned by the owner or
his/her authorized representative if he/she failed to
reclaim the same within five (5) years or failed to
advise the FEO of the PNP of the disposition to be
made thereof. Thereafter, the FEO of the PNP may
dispose of the same after compliance with
established procedures.
Section 26. Death or Disability of Licensee. –
Upon the death or legal disability of the holder of a
firearm license, it shall be the duty of his/her next
of kin, nearest relative, legal representative, or
other person who shall knowingly come into
possession of such firearm or ammunition, to
deliver the same to the FEO of the PNP or Police
Regional Office, and such firearm or ammunition
shall be retained by the police custodian pending
the issuance of a license and its registration in
accordance, with this Act. The failure to deliver the
firearm or ammunition within six (6) months after
the death or legal disability of the licensee shall
render the possessor liable for illegal possession
of the firearm.
ammunition shall be penalized as follows:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium
period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a small arm;
(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed if three (3) or more
small arms or Class-A light weapons are unlawfully
acquired or possessed by any person;
(c) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-A light
weapon;
(d) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall, unlawfully
acquire or possess a Class-B light weapon;
(e) The penalty of one (1) degree higher than that
provided in paragraphs (a) to (c) in this section
shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully possess any firearm under any or
combination of the following conditions:
(1) Loaded with ammunition or inserted with a
loaded magazine;
(2) Fitted or mounted with laser or any gadget used
to guide the shooter to hit the target such as
thermal weapon sight (TWS) and the like;

Section 27. Antique Firearm. – Any person who
possesses an antique firearm shall register the
same and secure a collector’s license from the
FEO of the PNP. Proper storage of antique firearm
shall be strictly imposed. Noncompliance of this
provision shall be considered as illegal possession
of the firearm as penalized in this Act.
(3) Fitted or mounted with sniper scopes, firearm
muffler or firearm silencer;
(4) Accompanied with an extra barrel; and
(5) Converted to be capable of firing full automatic
bursts.

ARTICLE V (f) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum

PENAL PROVISIONS period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of
Section 28. Unlawful Acquisition, or Possession of a small arm;
Firearms and Ammunition. – The unlawful
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 145

(g) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum the penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall
period shall be imposed upon any person who be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime
shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for charged: Provided, further, That if the crime
a small arm or Class-A light weapon. If the violationcommitted with the use of a loose firearm is
of this paragraph is committed by the same person penalized by the law with a maximum penalty
charged with the unlawful acquisition or which is equal to that imposed under the preceding
possession of a small arm, the former violation section for illegal possession of firearms, the
shall be absorbed by the latter; penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period
shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the
(h) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code
period shall be imposed upon any person who or other special laws of which he/she is found
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of guilty.
a Class-A light weapon;
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or
(i) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium incident to, or in connection with the crime of
period shall be imposed upon any person who rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d’
shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
a Class-A light weapon. If the violation of this element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or
paragraph is committed by the same person attempted coup d’ etat.
charged with the unlawful acquisition or
possession of a Class-A light weapon, the former If the crime is committed by the person without
violation shall be absorbed by the latter; using the loose firearm, the violation of this Act
shall be considered as a distinct and separate
(j) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum offense.
period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of Section 30. Liability of Juridical Person. – The
a Class-B light weapon; and penalty of prision mayor in its minimum to prision
mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon
(k) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum the owner, president, manager, director or other
period shall be imposed upon any person who responsible officer of/any public or private firm,
shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for company, corporation or entity who shall willfully or
a Class-B light weapon. If the violation of this knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such
paragraph is committed by the same person firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by
charged with the unlawful acquisition or any person or persons found guilty of violating the
possession of a Class-B light weapon, the former provisions of the preceding section, or willfully or
violation shall be absorbed by the latter. knowingly allow any of them to use unregistered
firearm or firearms without any legal authority to be
Section 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the carried outside of their residence in the course of
Commission of a Crime. – The use of a loose their employment.
firearm, when inherent in the commission of a
crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code Section 31. Absence of Permit to Carry Outside of
or other special laws, shall be considered as an Residence. – The penalty of prision
aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the correccional and a fine of Ten thousand pesos
crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is (P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person
penalized by the law with a maximum penalty who is licensed to own a firearm but who shall
which is lower than that prescribed in the carry the registered firearm outside his/her
preceding section for illegal possession of firearm, residence without any legal authority therefor.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 146

Section 32. Unlawful Manufacture, Importation, Section 33. Arms Smuggling. – The penalty
Sale or Disposition of Firearms or Ammunition or of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
Parts Thereof, Machinery, Tool or Instrument Used person who shall engage or participate in arms
or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of smuggling as defined in this Act.
Firearms, Ammunition or Parts Thereof. – The
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion Section 34. Tampering, Obliteration or Alteration
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who of Firearms Identification. – The penalty of prision
shall unlawfully engage in the manufacture, correccional to prision mayor in its minimum
importation, sale or disposition of a firearm or period shall be imposed upon any person who
ammunition, or a major part of a firearm or shall tamper, obliterate or alter without authority
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used the barrel, slide, frame, receiver, cylinder, or bolt
or intended to be used by the same person in the assembly, including the name of the maker, model,
manufacture of a firearm, ammunition, or a major or serial number of any firearm, or who shall
part thereof. replace without authority the barrel, slide, frame,
receiver, cylinder, or bolt assembly, including its
The possession of any machinery, tool or individual or peculiar identifying characteristics
instrument used directly in the manufacture of essential in forensic examination of a firearm or
firearms, ammunition, or major parts thereof by light weapon.
any person whose business, employment or
activity does not lawfully deal with the possession The PNP shall place this information, including its
of such article, shall be prima facie evidence that individual or peculiar identifying characteristics into
such article is intended to be used in the unlawful the database of integrated firearms identification
or illegal manufacture of firearms, ammunition or system of the PNP Crime Laboratory for future use
parts thereof. and identification of a particular firearm.

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period
to prision mayor in its medium period shall be
imposed upon any laborer, worker or employee of
a licensed firearms dealer who shall unlawfully
take, sell or otherwise dispose of parts of firearms
or ammunition which the company manufactures
and sells, and other materials used by the
company in the manufacture or sale of firearms or
ammunition. The buyer or possessor of such
stolen part or material, who is aware that such part
or material was stolen, shall suffer the same
penalty as the laborer, worker or employee.
If the violation or offense is committed by a
corporation, partnership, association or other
juridical entity, the penalty provided for in this
section shall be imposed upon the directors,
officers, employees or other officials or persons
therein who knowingly and willingly participated in
the unlawful act.
Section 35. Use of an Imitation Firearm. – An
imitation firearm used in the commission of a crime
shall be considered a real firearm as defined in this
Act and the person who committed the crime shall
be punished in accordance with this
Act: Provided, That injuries caused on the
occasion of the conduct of competitions, sports,
games, or any recreation activities involving
imitation firearms shall not be punishable under
this Act.
Section 36. In Custodia Legis. – During the
pendency of any case filed in violation of this Act,
seized firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof,
machinery, tools or instruments shall remain in the
custody of the court. If the court decides that it has
no adequate means to safely keep the same, the
court shall issue an order to turn over to the PNP
Crime Laboratory such firearm, ammunition, or
parts thereof, machinery, tools or instruments in its
custody during the pendency of the case and to
produce the same to the court when so ordered.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 147

No bond shall be admitted for the release of the
firearm, ammunition or parts thereof, machinery,
tool or instrument. Any violation of this paragraph
shall be punishable by prision mayor in its
minimum period to prision mayor in its medium
period.
(d) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or major
parts thereof outside of residence or workplace
without, the proper permit to carry the same;
(e) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or major
parts thereof in prohibited places;

Section 37. Confiscation and Forfeiture. – The
imposition of penalty for any violation of this Act
shall carry with it the accessory penalty of
confiscation and forfeiture of the firearm,
ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tool or
instrument in favor of the government which shall
be disposed of in accordance with law.
Section 38. Liability for Planting Evidence. – The
penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period
shall be imposed upon any person who shall
willfully and maliciously insert; place, and/or
attach, directly or indirectly, through any overt or
covert act, any firearm, or ammunition, or parts
thereof in the person, house, effects, or in the
immediate vicinity of an innocent individual for the
purpose of implicating or incriminating the person,
or imputing the commission of any violation of the
provisions of this Act to said individual. If the
person found guilty under this paragraph is a
public officer or employee, such person shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
(f) Dismissal for cause from the service in case of
government official and employee;
(g) Commission of any of the acts penalized under
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002″;
(h) Submission of falsified documents or
misrepresentation in the application to obtain a
license or permit;
(i) Noncompliance of reportorial requirements; and
(j) By virtue of a court order.
Section 40. Failure to Notify Lost or Stolen
Firearm or Light Weapon. – A fine of Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
licensed firearm holder who fails to report to the
FEO of the PNP that the subject firearm has been
lost or stolen within a period of thirty (30) days from
the date of discovery.

Section 39. Grounds for Revocation, Cancellation Likewise, a fine of Five thousand pesos
or Suspension of License or Permit. – The Chief of (P5,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person
the PNP or his/her authorized representative may holding a valid firearm license who changes
revoke, cancel or suspend a license or permit on residence or office address other than that
the following grounds: indicated in the license card and fails within a
period of thirty (30) days from said transfer to notify
(a) Commission of a crime or offense involving the the FEO of the PNP of such change of address.
firearm, ammunition, of major parts thereof;
Section 41. Illegal Transfer/Registration of
(b) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude Firearms. – It shall be unlawful to transfer
or any offense where the penalty carries an possession of any firearm to any person who has
imprisonment of more than six (6) years; not yet obtained or secured the necessary license
or permit thereof.
(c) Loss of the firearm, ammunition, or any parts
thereof through negligence; The penalty of prision correccional shall be
imposed upon any person who shall violate the
provision of the preceding paragraph. In addition,
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 148

he/she shall be disqualified to apply for a license PNP, after public hearings and consultation with
to possess other firearms and all his/her existing concerned sectors of society shall formulate the
firearms licenses whether for purposes of necessary rules and regulations for the effective
commerce or possession, shall be revoked. If implementation of this Act to be published in at
government-issued firearms, ammunition or major least two (2) national newspapers of general
parts of firearms or light weapons are unlawfully circulation.
disposed, sold or transferred by any law
enforcement agent or public officer to private Section 45. Repealing Clause. – This Act repeals
individuals, the penalty of reclusion temporal shall Sections 1, 2, 5 and 7 of Presidential Decree No.
be imposed. 1866, as amended, and Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 8294 and all other laws, executive orders,
Any public officer or employee or any person who letters of instruction, issuances, circulars,
shall facilitate the registration of a firearm through administrative orders, rules or regulations that are
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or submission of inconsistent herewith.
falsified documents shall suffer the penalty
of prision correccional. Section 46. Separability Clause. – If any provision
of this Act or any part hereof is held invalid or
ARTICLE VI unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the
FINAL PROVISIONS provision not otherwise affected shall remain valid
and subsisting.
Section 42. Firearms Repository. – The FEO of
the PNP shall be the sole repository of all firearms Section 47. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect
records to include imported and locally after fifteen (15) days from its publication in a
manufactured firearms and ammunition. Within newspaper of nationwide circulation
one (1) year upon approval of this Act, all military
and law enforcement agencies, government
agencies, LGUs and government-owned or -
controlled corporations shall submit an inventory of
all their firearms and ammunition to the PNP.

Section 43. Final Amnesty. – Persons in

possession of unregistered firearms and holders of
expired license or unregistered firearms shall
register and renew the same through the Final
General Amnesty within six (6) months from the
promulgation of the implementing rules and
regulations of this Act. During the interim period of
six (6) months, no person applying for license shall
be charged of any delinquent payment accruing to
the firearm subject for registration. The PNP shall
conduct an intensive nationwide campaign to
ensure that the general public is properly informed
of the provisions of this Act.

Section 44. Implementing Rules and

Regulations. – Within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the effectivity of this Act, the Chief of the
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 149
[G.R. Nos. 115008-09. July 24, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. DANIEL QUIJADA Y accused being then armed with a .38 cal. revolver,
CIRCULADO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals
from the decision of 30 September 1993 of Branch
1 his head and causing serious injuries which
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol
convicting him of the two offenses separately
charged in two informations, viz., murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form under
P.D. No. 1866, and imposing upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for the first crime and an
indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen
years, four months, and one day, as minimum, to
twenty years and one day, as maximum, for the
second crime.[1]
The appeal was originally assigned to the
Third Division of the Court but was later referred to
the Court en banc in view of the problematical
issue of whether to sustain the trial court's
judgment in conformity with the doctrine laid down
in People vs. Tac-
an,[2] People vs. Tiozon,[3] People vs. Caling,[4] Pe
ople vs. Jumamoy,[5] People vs. Deunida,[6] Peopl
e vs. Tiongco,[7] People vs. Fernandez,[8] and Peo
ple vs. Somooc,[9] or to modify the judgment and
convict the appellant only of illegal possession of
firearm in its aggravated form pursuant
to People vs. Barros,[10] which this Court (Second
Division) decided on 27 June 1995.
The informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8178
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992,
in the municipality of Dauis, province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with
intent to kill and without any justifiable motive, with
treachery and abuse of superior strength, the
while the victim was unarmed, suddenly attacked
the victim without giving the latter the opportunity
to defend himself, and with evident premeditation,
the accused having harbored a grudge against the
victim a week prior to the incident of murder, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea
with the use of the said firearm, hitting the latter on
resulted to his death; to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of the deceased.
Acts committed contrary to the provision of Art. 248
of the Revised Penal Code, with aggravating
circumstance of nighttime being purposely sought
for or taken advantage of by the accused to
facilitate the commission of the crime.[11]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8179
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992,
in the municipality of Dauis, province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 150

keep, carry and have in his possession, custody positioned themselves was duly lighted and was
and control a firearm (hand gun) with ammunition, approximately four meters from the dancing hall),
without first obtaining the necessary permit or decided to just watch the activities in the dance hall
license to possess the said firearm from competent directly from the plaza.
authorities which firearm was carried by the said
accused outside of his residence and was used by After dancing, Rosita Iroy decided to leave and
him in committing the crime of Murder with went outside the gate of the dance
Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea as the victim; to the area. Subsequently, or around 11:30 of the same
damage and prejudice of the Republic of the night, while facing the direction of Diosdado Iroy,
Philippines. Rosita lroy saw appellant surreptitiously approach
her brother Diosdado Iroy from behind. Suddenly,
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of appellant fired his revolver at Diosdado Iroy, hitting
P.D. No. 1866.[12] the latter at the back portion of the head. This
caused Rosita Iroy to spontaneously shout that
Having arisen from the same incident, the appellant shot her brother; while appellant, after
cases were consolidated, and joint hearings were shooting Diosdado Iroy, ran towards the cornfield.
had. The witnesses presented by the prosecution
were SPO4 Felipe Nigparanon (Acting Chief of Diosdado Iroy was immediately rushed by
Police of Dauis, Bohol), SPO Gondalino Inte, Dr. Elmer Nigparanon and Largo Iroy to the hospital
Greg Julius Sodusta, Rosita Iroy, and Teodula but the injury sustained was fatal. In the meantime,
Matalinis. The defense presented as witnesses Rosita Iroy went home and relayed to her parents
Alfred Aranzado, Edwin Nistal, Julius Bonao, the unfortunate incident (TSN, Crim Case Nos.
Saturnino Maglupay, and the appellant himself. 8178 & 8179, June 8, 1993, pp. 9-22, inclusive of
the preceding paragraphs).
The evidence for the prosecution
is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor At around midnight, the incident was reported
General in the Brief for the Appellee as follows: to then Acting Chief of Police Felipe Nigparanon
by Mrs. Alejandra Iroy and her daughter Teodula
On 25 December 1992, a benefit dance was Matalinis. The police officer made entries in the
held at the Basketball Court of Barangay Tinago, police blotter regarding the shooting and
Dauis, Bohol. On this occasion, a fist fight correspondingly, ordered his men to pick up the
occurred between Diosdado Iroy and appellant appellant. But they were unable to locate appellant
Daniel Quijada as the latter was constantly on that occasion (TSN, Crim. Case Nos. 8178 &
annoying and pestering the former's sister. Rosita 8179, June 9, 1993, pp. 2-6).
Iroy (TSN, Crim. Cases 8178 & 8179, June
8, 1993, pp. 32-35; August 5, 1993, pp. 14-15). In the afternoon of 31 December 1992,
appellant, together with his father Teogenes
In the evening of 30 December 1992, another Quijada went to the police station at Dauis,
benefit dance/disco was held in the same Bohol. There and then, appellant was pinpointed
place. This benefit dance was attended bv Rosita by Elenito Nistal and Rosita Iroy as the person who
Iroy, Ariel Dano, Teodora Badayos, Ado Aranzado, shot Diosdado Iroy. These facts were entered in
Largo Iroy and Diosdado Iroy. the police blotter as Entry No. 1151 (TSN, Crim.
Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, ibid. p. 14, June 14,
While Rosita Iroy and others were enjoying 1993, pp. 4-6).[13]
themselves inside the dancing area, Diosdado
Iroy, Eugene Nesnea and Largo Iroy, who were The slug was embedded at the
then sitting at the plaza (the area where they midbrain.[14] Diosdado Iroy died of
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 151

Cardiorespiratory arrest, secondary to tonsillar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
herniation, secondary to massive intracranial charged and sentenced him accordingly. It
hemorrhage, secondary to gunshot wound, 1 cm. appreciated the presence of the qualifying
left occipital area, transacting cerebellum up to circumstance of treachery considering that the
midbrain.[15] appellant shot the victim at the back of the head
while the latter was watching the dance. The
The firearm used by the appellant in shooting dispositive portion of the decision dated 30
Diosdado Iroy was not licensed. Per certifications September 1993 reads as follows:
issued on 26 April 1993, the appellant was not a
duly licensed firearm holder as verified from a PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case
consolidated list of licensed firearm holders in the No. 8178, the court finds the accused Daniel
province[16] and was not authorized to carry a Quijada guilty of the crime of murder punished
firearm outside his residence.[17] under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment
The appellant interposed the defense of alibi, of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories of the
which the trial court rejected because he was law and to pay the cost.
positively identified by prosecution witness Rosita
Iroy. It summarized his testimony in this wise: In Criminal Case No. 8179, the Court finds the
accused Daniel Quijada guilty of the crime of
Daniel Quijada y Circulado, the accused in the Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and
instant cases, declared that in the afternoon of Ammunition punished under Sec. 1 of R.A. No.
December 30, 1992 he was in their house At 6:00 1866 as amended, and hereby sentences him to
o'clock in the afternoon he went to Tagbilaran City suffer an indeterminate sentence from Seventeen
together with Julius Bonao in a tricycle No. 250 to (17) years Four (4) months and One (1) day, as
solicit passengers. They transported passengers minimum, to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day,
until 10:30 o'clock in the evening. They then as maximum, with the accessories of the law and
proceeded to the Tagbilaran wharf waiting for the to pay the cost.
passenger boat Trans Asia Taiwan. Before the
arrival of Trans Asia Taiwan they had a talk with The slug or bullet which was extracted from
Saturnino Maglopay. They were able to pick up the brain at the back portion of the head of the
two passengers for Graham Avenue near La Roca victim Diosdado Iroy is hereby ordered forfeited in
Hotel. They then returned to the Tagbilaran wharf favor of the government.
for the arrival of MV Cebu City that docked at 12:10
past midnight. They had a talk with Saturnino It appearing that the accused Daniel Quijada
Maglopay who was waiting for his aunties has undergone preventive imprisonment he is
scheduled to arrive aboard MV Cebu City. They entitled to the full time he has undergone
were not able to pick up passengers which, as a preventive imprisonment to be deducted from the
consequence, they went home. They had on their term of sentence if he has executed a waiver
way home passengers for the Agora Public otherwise he will only be entitled to 4/5 of the time
Market. They arrived at the house of Julian Bonao he has undergone preventive imprisonment to be
at Bil-isan, Panglao, Bohol at 3:00 o'clock in the deducted from his term of sentence if he has not
morning of December 31, 1992 where he passed executed a waiver.[19]
the night. He went home to Mariveles, Dauis,
Bohol at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.[18] On 29 October 1993, after discovering that it
had inadvertently omitted in the decision an award
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the of civil indemnity and other damages in Criminal
version of the prosecution and found the appellant Case No. 8178, the trial court issued an order
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 152

directing the appellant to pay the parents of the Diosdado, the victim, boxed him on the night of 25
victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for December 1992 because he allegedly "bothered
the death of their son and P10,000.00 for funeral her." He further asserts that Rosita could not have
expenses.[20] The order was to form an integral seen the person who shot Diosdado considering
part of the decision. their respective positions, particularly Rosita who,
according to defense witnesses Nistal and
The decision was promulgated on 29 October Aranzado, was still inside the dancing area and ran
1993.[21] towards the crime scene only after Diosdado was
shot. And, the appellant considers it as
The appellant forthwith interposed the present suppression of evidence when the prosecution did
appeal, and in his Brief, he contends that the trial not present as witnesses Diosdado's companions
court erred who were allegedly seated with Diosdado when he
was shot.
I
As to SPO4 Nigparanon, the appellant
. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT intimates improper motives in that the said witness
AND GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY is a neighbor of the Iroys, and when he testified, a
OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA IROY case for arbitrary detention had already been filed
AND FELIPE NIGPARANON. against him by the appellant. The appellant further
claims of alleged omissions and unexplained
II entries in the police blotter.

. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES Finally, the appellant wants us to favorably

OF DEFENSE WITNESSES EDWIN NISTAL AND consider his defense of alibi which, according to
ALFRED ARANZADO, AND IN DISREGARDING him, gained strength because of the lack of
THE PICTORIAL EXHIBITS OF THE ACCUSED- evidence on the identity of the killer. Furthermore,
APPELLANT PARTICULARLY THE RELATIVE he stresses that his conduct in voluntarily going to
POSITIONS OF DIOSDADO IROY, ROSITA the police station after having been informed that
IROY, EDWIN NISTAL, AND ALFRED he, among many others, was summoned by the
ARANZADO. police is hardly the actuation of the perpetrator of
the killing of Diosdado Iroy -- specially so if Rosita
III Iroy's claim is to be believed that moments after
the shooting she shouted that Daniel Quijada shot
. . . IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT Diosdado Iroy.
PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA IROY
AND SP04 FELIPE NIGPARANON HAD In its Appellee's Brief, the People refutes every
MOTIVES IN FALSELY TESTIFYING AGAINST argument raised by the appellant and
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[22] recommends that we affirm in toto the challenged
decision.
The appellant then submits that the issue in
this case boils down to the identity of the killer of After a careful scrutiny of the records and
Diosdado Iroy. To support his stand that the killer evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties,
was not identified, he attacks the credibility of we find this appeal to be absolutely without merit.
prosecution witnesses Rosita Iroy and SP04
Felipe Nigparanon. He claims that the former had The imputation of ill-motive on the part of
a motive "to put him in a bad light" and calls our Rosita Iroy and the basis therefor hardly
attention to her direct testimony that her brother persuade. The appellant was the one who was
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 153
boxed by and lost to Diosdado Iroy in their fight on
the night of 25 December 1992. It is then logical
and consistent with human experience that it
would be the appellant who would have forthwith
entertained a grudge, if not hatred, against
Diosdado. No convincing evidence was shown
that Rosita had any reason to falsely implicate the
appellant in the death of her brother Diosdado.
The claim that Rosita could not have seen who
shot her brother Diosdado because, as testified to
by defense witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, she
was inside the dancing hall and rushed to her
brother only after the latter was shot is equally
baseless. The following testimony of Rosita shows
beyond cavil that she saw the assailant:
Q You said that you were initially dancing
inside the dancing place and you went out,
about what time did you get out?
A 11:00 o'clock.
Q And you were standing about two (2) meters
from Diosdado Iroy until 11:30 when the
incident happened?
A Yes, I was standing.
Q And where did you face, you were facing
Diosdado Iroy or the dancing area?
A I was intending to go near my brother. I was
approaching and getting near going to my
brother Diosdado Iroy and while in the
process I saw Daniel Quijada shot my
brother Diosdado Iroy.[23]
xxx xxx xxx
Q And in your estimate, how far was your
brother Diosdado Iroy while he was sitting
at the plaza to the dancing place?
A More or less four (4) meters distance.
COURT:
From the dancing hall?
A Yes, your honor.
Q And in your observation, was the place
where Diosdado Iroy was sitting lighted or
illuminated?
A Yes, sir.
Q What kind of light illuminated the place?
A I do not know what kind of light but it was
lighted.
Q Was it an electric light?
A It is electric light coming from a bulb.
Q Where is that electric bulb that illuminated
the place located?
A It was placed at the gate of the dancing
place and the light from the house.
Q You said gate of the dancing place, you
mean the dancing place was enclosed at
that time and there was a gate, an
opening?
A Yes, sir.
Q What material was used to enclose the
dancing place?
A Bamboo.
Q And how far was the bulb which was placed
near the entrance of the dancing place to
the place where Diosdado Iroy was
sitting?
A Five (5) meters.
Q You mentioned also that there was a light
coming from the house, now whose house
was that?
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 154

A The house of spouses Fe and Berto, I do not the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the
know the family name. scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath,
the carriage and mien.[27] The appellant has
Q Was the light coming from the house of miserably failed to convince us that we must depart
spouses Fe and Berto an electric light? from this rule.

A Yes sir. Neither are we persuaded by the claimed

Q And in your estimate, how far was the
source of light of the house of Fe and
Berto to the place where Diosdado Iroy
was sitting?
A About six (6) meters distance.[24]
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was the color of the electric bulb in the
gate of the dancing place?
A The white bulb.[25]
The trial court disbelieved the testimony of
Nistal and Aranzado. It explicitly declared:
The factual findings of the Court in the instant case
is anchored principally in ". . . observing the
attitude and deportment of witnesses while
listening to them
speak (People vs. Magaluna, 205, SCRA 266).
thereby indicating that on the basis of the
witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying,
the declarations of Nistal and Aranzado failed to
convince the trial court that they were telling the
truth. Settled is the rule that the factual findings of
the trial court, especially on the credibility of
witnesses, are accorded great weight and
respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different
indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the
angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden
pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of
a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready
reply;[26] or the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the
flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness,
suppression of evidence occasioned by the non-
presentation as prosecution witnesses any of the
companions of Diosdado who were seated with
him when he was shot. In the first place, the said
companions could not have seen from their back
the person who suddenly shot Diosdado. In the
second place, the testimony of the companions
would, at the most, only corroborate that of Rosita
Iroy. Besides, there is no suggestion at all that the
said companions were not available to the
appellant. It is settled that the presumption in
Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced does not apply when the testimony of the
witness is merely corroborative or where the
witness is available to the accused.[28]
The alleged improper motive on the part of
SP04 Nigparanon simply because he is a neighbor
of the Iroy; remains purely speculative, as no
evidence was offered to establish that such a
relationship affected SP04 Nigparanon's
objectivity. As a police officer, he enjoyed in his
favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duty.[29] As to the
alleged omissions and unexplained entries in the
police blotter, the same were sufficiently clarified
by SP04 Nigparanon.
The defense of alibi interposed by the
appellant deserves scant consideration. He was
positively identified by a credible witness. It is a
fundamental judicial dictum that the defense of
alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
of the accused.[30] Besides, for that defense to
prosper it is not enough to prove that the accused
was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; he must also demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of its
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 155

commission.[31] As testified to by defense witness In light of the doctrine enunciated

Julian Bonao, the Tagbilaran wharf, where the in People vs. Tac-an,[35] and reiterated
appellant said he was, is only about eight to nine in People vs. Tiozon,[36] People vs. Caling,[37] Peo
kilometers away from the crime scene and it would ple vs. Jumamoy,[38] People vs. Deunida,[39] Peopl
take only about thirty minutes to traverse the e vs. Tiongco,[40] Peoplevs. Fernandez,[41] and Pe
distance with the use of a tricycle.[32] It was, ople vs. Somooc,[42] that one who kills another with
therefore, not physically impossible for the the use of an unlicensed firearm commits two
appellant to have been at the scene of the crime at separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder
the time of its commission. under the Revised Penal Code, and (2)
aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the
Finally, the appellant asserts that if he were second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866,
the killer of Diosdado Iroy, he would not have we sustain the decision of the trial court finding the
voluntarily proceeded to the police station. This appellant guilty of two separate offenses of murder
argument is plain sophistry. The law does not find in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of aggravated
unusual the voluntary surrender of offenders; it illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No.
even considers such act as a mitigating 8179.
circumstance.[33] Moreover, non-flight is not
conclusive proof of innocence.[34] Although Tac-an and Tiozon relate more to
the issue of whether there is a violation of the
The evidence for the prosecution further constitutional proscription against double jeopardy
established with moral certainty that the appellant if an accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder
had no license to possess or carry a firearm. The and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm,
firearm then that he used in shooting Diosdado Iroy they at the same time laid down the rule that these
was unlicensed. He, therefore, committed the are separate offenses, with the first punished
crime of aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the Revised Penal Code and the second
under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. under a special law; hence, the constitutional bar
No. 1866, which reads: against double jeopardy will not apply. We
observed in Tac-an:
SEC.
1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Dispo It is elementary that the constitutional right against
sition or Possession of Firearms, Ammunition or I double jeopardy protects one against a second or
nstruments Used or Intended to be Used in the M later prosecution for the same offense, and that
anufacture of Firearms or Ammunition -- The when the subsequent information charges another
penalty of reclusiontemporal in its maximum and different offense, although arising from the
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited
upon any person who shall unlawfully double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal
any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to unlicensed firearm penalized under a special
be used in the manufacture of any firearm or statute, while the offense charged in Criminal Case
ammunition. No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the
Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident
If homicide or murder is committed with the that these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite
use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death different one from the other, such that in principle,
shall be imposed. the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is
not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a
prohibited second jeopardy.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 156

And we stressed that the use of the unlicensed not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased
firearm cannot serve to increase the penalty for elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of
homicide or murder; however, the killing of a the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy
person with the use of an unlicensed firearm, by as to one of them is not obstacle to a prosecution
express provision of P.D. No. 1866, shall increase of the other, although both offenses arise from the
the penalty for illegal possession of firearm. same fact, if each crime involves some important
act which is not an essential element of the other.
In Tiozon, we stated:
In People vs. Bacolod [89 Phil. 621], from the act
It may be loosely said that homicide or murder of firing a shot from a sub-machine gun which
qualifies the offense penalized in said Section 1 caused public panic among the people present
because it is a circumstance which increases the and physical injuries to one, informations of
penalty. It does not, however, follow that the physical injuries through reckless imprudence and
homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; for serious public disturbance were filed. Accused
otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results pleaded guilty and was convicted in the first and he
whereby a more serious crime defined and sought to dismiss the second on the ground of
penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed double jeopardy. We ruled:
by a statutory offense, which is just
a malum prohibitum. The rationale for the The protection against double jeopardy is only for
qualification, as implied from the exordium of the the same offense. A simple act may be an offense
decree, is to effectively deter violations of the laws against two different provisions of law and if one
on firearms and to stop the "upsurge of crimes provision requires proof of an additional fact which
vitally affecting public order and safety due to the the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under
proliferation of illegally possessed and one does not bar prosecution under the other.
manufactured firearms, x x x." In fine then, the
killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed Since the informations were for separate
firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for offense[s] -- the first against a person and the
(a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) second against public peace and order -- one
violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the
249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The rule on double jeopardy.
accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or,
stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy In Caling, we explicitly opined that a person
cannot be invoked because the first is punished by
charged with aggravated illegal possession of
a special law while the second, homicide or firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1
murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code. of P.D. No. 1866 can also be separately charged
with and convicted of homicide or murder under
In People vs. Doriguez, [24 SCRA 163, 171], We the Revised Penal Code and punished
held: accordingly. Thus:

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against
double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense or identical offenses. A simple act may
offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision
requires proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction
or a dismissal of the information under one does
It seems that the Court a quo did indeed err in
believing that there is such a thing as "the special
complex crime of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed
Firearm Used in Homicide as provided for and
defined under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D.
1866 as amended," and declaring Caling guilty
thereof. The legal provision invoked, "Sec. 1 of
P.D. 1866, as amended," reads as follows:
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 157

"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, he mere possession of a firearm without legal aut
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms hority consummates the crime under P.D. 1866, a
[or] Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended nd the liability forillegal possession is made heavi
to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or er by the firearm's use in a killing. The killing, whe
Ammunition. - The penalty ofreclusion temporal in ther homicide or murder, is obviously distinct from
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be the act of possession, and is separately punished
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully and defined under the Revised Penal Code.(emp
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess hasis supplied)
any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to In Jumamoy, we reiterated Caling and
be used in the manufacture of any firearm or amplified the rationale on why an accused who kills
ammunition. another with an unlicensed firearm can be
prosecuted and punished for the two separate
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of offenses of violation of the second paragraph of
an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and for homicide or
imposed." murder under the Revised Penal Code. Thus:

What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar as
material to the present case is the sole, simple act
of a person who shall, among others, "unlawfully
possess any firearm x x x (or) ammunition x x x."
Obviously, possession of any firearm is unlawful if
the necessary permit and/or license therefor is not
first obtained. To that act is attached the penalty
of reclusion temporal, maximum,
to reclusion perpetua. Now, if "with the use of
(such) an unlicensed firearm, a "homicide or
murder is committed," the crime is aggravated and
is more heavily punished, with the capital
punishment.
The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form i
s, basically, the fact of possession of a firearm wit
hout license. The crime may be denominated sim
ple illegal possession, to distinguish it from its agg
ravated form. It is Aggravatedif the unlicensed fire
arm is used in the commission of a homicide or m
urder under the Revised Penal Code. But the ho
micide or murder is not absorbed in the crime of p
ossession of an unlicensed firearm; neither is the
latterabsorbed in the former. There are two distinc
t crimes that are here spoken of. One is unlawful
possession of a firearm, which may be either sim
ple or aggravated, defined and punished respecti
vely by the first and second paragraphsof Section
1 of PD 1866. The other is homicide or murder, c
ommitted with the use of an unlicensed firearm. T
Coming to the charge of illegal possession of
firearms, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866
penalizes, inter alia, the unlawful possession of
firearms or ammunition with reclusion temporal in
its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua.However, under the second
paragraph thereof, the penalty is increased to
death if homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed
firearm. It may thus be loosely said that homicide
or murder qualifies the offensebecause both are c
ircumstances which increase the penalty. It does
not, however, follow that the homicide or murder i
s absorbed in the offense. If these were to be so,
an anomalous absurdity would result whereby a
more seriouscrime defined and penalized under t
he Revised Penal Code will be absorbed by a stat
utory offense, one which is merely malum prohibit
um. Hence, the killing of a person with the use of
an unlicensed firearm may give rise toseparate pr
osecutions for (a) the violation of Section 1 of P.D
. No. 1866 and (b) the violation of either Article 24
8 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revise
d Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one to
bar the other; stated otherwise, the rule against
double jeopardy cannot be invoked as the first is
punished by a special law while the second -
Murder or Homicide - is punished by the Revised
Penal Code. [citing People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA
368, 379 (1991); People vs. Doriguez, 24 SCRA
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 158

163 (1968)]. Considering, however, that the
imposition of the death penalty is prohibited by the
Constitution, the proper imposable penalty would
be the penalty next lower in degree,
orreclusion perpetua. (emphasis supplied)
killing of a human being, whether characterized as
homicide or murder, is patently distinct from the act
of possession of an unlicensed firearm and is
separately punished under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code.

In Deunida, in discussing the propriety of the The foregoing doctrine suffered a setback
Government's action in withdrawing an information when in our decision of 27 June 1995
for murder and pursuing only the information for in People vs. Barros,[43] we set aside that portion
"Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm," this of the appealed decision convicting the appellant
Court categorically declared: of the offense of murder and affirmed that portion
convicting him of illegal possession of firearm in its
At the outset, it must be stressed that, contrary to aggravated form. We therein made the following
the prosecution's legal position in withdrawing the statement:
information for murder, the offense defined in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 [A]ppellant may not in the premises be convicted
does not absorb the crime of homicide or murder of two separate offenses [of illegal possession of
under the Revised Penal Code and, therefore, firearm in its aggravated form and of murder], but
does not bar the simultaneous or subsequent only that of illegal possession of firearm in its
prosecution of the latter crime. The 1982 decision aggravated form, in light of the legal principles and
in Lazaro vs. People, involving the violation of propositions set forth in the separate opinion of Mr.
P.D. No. 9, which the investigating prosecutor Justice Florenz D. Regalado, to which the
invokes to justify the withdrawal, is no longer Members of the Division, the ponente included,
controlling in view of our decisions subscribe.
in People vs. Tac-
an, People vs. Tiozon, and People vs. Caling. The pertinent portions of the separate opinion
of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado referred to
In Somooc, we once more ruled: therein read as follows:

The offense charged by the Information is clear
enough from the terms of that document, although
both the Information and the decision of the trial
court used the term "Illegal Possession of Firearm
with Homicide," a phrase which has sometimes
been supposed to connote a "complex crime as
used in the Revised Penal Code. Such
nomenclature is, however, as we have ruled
in People vs. Caling, a misnomer since there is no
complex crime of illegal possession of firearm with
homicide. The gravamen of the offense penalized
in P.D. No. 1866 is the fact of possession of a
firearm without a license or authority for such
possession. This offense is aggravated and the
imposable penalty upgraded if the unlicensed
firearm is shown to have been used in the
commission of homicide or murder, offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The
This premise accordingly brings up the second
query as to whether or not the crime should
properly be the aggravated illegal possession of an
unlicensed firearm through the use of which a
homicide or murder is committed. It is submitted
that an accused so situated should be liable only
for the graver offense of aggravated illegal
possession of the firearm punished by death under
the second paragraph of Section 1, Presidential
Decree No. 1866, and it is on this point that the
writer dissents from the holding which would
impose a separate penalty for the homicide in
addition to that for the illegal possession of the
firearm used to commit the former.
If the possession of the unlicensed firearm is the
only offense imputable to the accused, the Court
has correctly held that to be the simple possession
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 159

punished with reclusion temporal in its maximum serious physical injuries with ignominy under the
period to reclusion perpetua in the first paragraph second paragraph of Article 265. The serious
of Section 1. Where, complementarily, the slander by deed is integrated into and produces a
unlicensed firearm is used to commit homicide or graver offense, and the former is no longer
murder, then either of these felonies will convert separately punished.
the erstwhile simple illegal possession into the
graver offense of aggravated illegal possession. In What is, therefore, sought to be stressed by such
other words, the homicide or murder constitutes alternative illustration, as well as the discussion on
the essential element for integrating into existence complex and composite crimes, is that when an
the capital offense of the aggravated form of illegal offense becomes a component of another, the
possession of a firearm. Legally, therefore, it resultant crime being correspondingly punished as
would be illogical and unjustifiable to use the very thus aggravated by the integration of the other, the
same offenses of homicide or murder as integral former is not to be further separately punished as
elements of and to create the said capital offense, the majority would want to do with the homicide
and then treat the former all over again as involved in the case at bar.
independent offenses to be separately punished
further, with penalties immediately following the With the foregoing answers to the second
death penalty to boot. question, the third inquiry is more of a question of
classification for purposes of the other provisions
The situation contemplated in the second query is, of the Code. The theory in Tac-an that the
from the punitive standpoint, virtually of the nature principal offense is the aggravated form of illegal
of the so-called, special complex crimes," which possession of firearm and the killing shall merely
should more appropriately be called composite be included in the particulars or, better still, as an
crimes, punished in Article 294, Article 297 and element of the principal offense, may be
Article 335. They are neither of the same legal conceded. After all, the plurality of crimes here is
basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes actually source from the very provisions of
in Article 48, since they do not consist of a single Presidential Decree No. 1866 which sought to
act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave "consolidate, codify and integrate" the various laws
felonies nor do they involve an offense being a and presidential decrees to harmonize their
necessary means to commit another. However, provision" which must be updated and revised in
just like the regular complex crimes and the order to more effectively deter violators of said
present case of aggravated illegal possession of laws.
firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each
of such composite crimes although composed of This would be akin to the legislative intendment
two or more offenses. underlying the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972, wherein the principal crime to be
On the other hand, even if two felonies would charged is still carnapping, although the penalty
otherwise have been covered by the conceptual therefore is increased when the owner, driver or
definition of a complex crime under Article 48, but occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed. The
the Code imposes a single definite penalty same situation, with escalating punitive provisions
therefor, it cannot also be punished as a complex when attended by a killing, are found in the Anti-
crime, much less as separate offense, but with only Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974
the single penalty prescribed by law. Thus, even and the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, wherein
where a single act results in two less grave felonies the principal crimes still are piracy, highway
of serious physical injuries and serious slander by robbery and cattle rustling. Also, in the matter of
deed, the offense will not be punished as destructive arson, the principal offense
a delito compuesto under Article 48 but as less when, inter alia, death results as a consequence
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 160

of the commission of any of the acts punished agencies, the only probable problem being the
under said article of the Code. determination and obtention of evidence to show
that the firearm is unlicensed.
In the present case, the academic value of
specifying whether it is a case of illegal possession Now, if a separate information for homicide or
of firearm resulting in homicide or murder, or, murder is filed without alleging therein that the
conversely, homicide or murder through the illegal same was committed by means of an unlicensed
possession and use of an unlicensed firearm, firearm, the case would not fall under Presidential
would lie in the possible application of the provision Decree No. 1866. Even if the use of a firearm is
on recidivism. Essentially, it would be in the alleged therein, but without alleging the lack of a
theoretical realm since, taken either way, the license therefor as where that fact has not yet been
penalty for aggravated illegal possession of a verified, the mere use of a firearm by itself, even if
firearm is the single indivisible penalty of death, in proved in that case, would not affect the accused
which case the provision on recidivism would not either since it is not an aggravating or qualifying
apply. If, however, the illegal possession is not circumstance.
established but either homicide or murder is
proved, then the matter of recidivism may have Conversely, if the information is only for illegal
some significance in the sense that, for purposes possession, with the prosecution intending to
thereof, the accused was convicted of a crime file thereafter the charge for homicide or murder
against persons and he becomes a recidivist upon but the same is inexplicably delayed or is not
conviction of another crime under the same title of consolidated with the information for illegal
the Code. possession, then any conviction that may result
from the former would only be for simple illegal
Lastly, on the matter of the offense or offenses to possession. If, on the other hand, the separate and
be considered and the penalty to be imposed when subsequent prosecution for homicide or murder
the unlawful killing and the illegal possession are prospers, the objective of Presidential Decree No.
charged in separate informations, from what has 1866 cannot be achieved since the penalty
been said the appropriate course of action would imposable in that second prosecution will only be
be to consolidate the cases and render a joint for the unlawful killing and further subject to such
decision thereon, imposing a single penalty for modifying circumstances as may be proved.
aggravated illegal possession of firearm if such
possession and the unlawful taking of life shall In any event, the foregoing contingencies would
have been proved, or for only the proven offense run counter to the proposition that the real offense
which may be either simple illegal possession, committed by the accused, and for which sole
homicide or murder per se. The same procedural offense he should be punished, is the aggravated
rule and substantive disposition should be adopted form of illegal possession of a firearm. Further, it is
if one information for each offense was drawn up the writer's position that the possible problems
and these informations were individually assigned projected herein may be minimized or obviated if
to different courts or branches of the same court. both offenses involved are charged in only one
information or that the trial thereof, if separately
Indeed, the practice of charging the offense of charged, be invariably consolidated for joint
illegal possession separately from the homicide or decision. Conjointly, this is the course necessarily
murder could be susceptible of abuse since it indicated since only a single composite crime is
entails undue concentration of prosecutorial actually involved and it is palpable error to deal
powers and discretion. Prefatorily, the fact that the therewith and dispose thereof by segregated parts
killing was committed with a firearm will in piecemeal fashion.
necessarily be known to the police or prosecutorial
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 161

If we follow Barros, the conviction of the 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on
appellant for murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 rebellion. A distinction between that situation and
must have to be set aside. He should only suffer the case where an unlicensed firearm is used in
the penalty for the aggravated illegal possession of homicide or murder would have no basis at
firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179. all. In De Gracia, this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, made the following
The Court en banc finds in this appeal an authoritative pronouncements:
opportunity to reexamine the existing conflicting
doctrines applicable to prosecutions for murder or III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted
homicide and for aggravated illegal possession of by both parties that from November 30, 1989 up to
firearm ininstances where an unlicensed firearm is and until December 9, 1989, there was a
used in the killing of a person. After a lengthy rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not
deliberation thereon, the Court en banc arrived at appellant's possession of the firearms, explosives
the conclusion that the rule laid down in Tac- and ammunition seized and recovered from him
an, reiterated was for the purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.
in Tiozon, Caling, Jumamoy, Deunida, Tiongco, F
ernandez, and Somooc is the better rule, for it The trial court found accused guilty of illegal
applies the laws concerned according to their letter possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion
and spirit, thereby steering this Court away from a pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the
dangerous course which could have irretrievably Revised Penal Code which states that "any person
led it to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of merely participating or executing the command of
separation of powers through Judicial others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty
legislation. That rule upholds and enhances the of prision mayor in its minimum period." The court
lawmaker's intent or purpose in aggravating the below held that appellant De Gracia, who had
crime of illegal possession of firearm when an been servicing the personal needs of Col.
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of Matillano (whose active armed opposition against
murder or homicide. Contrary to the view of our the Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel,
esteemed brother, Mr. Justice Florenz D. was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding the
Regalado, in his Concurring and Dissenting explosives and "molotov bombs for and in behalf
Opinion in the case under consideration, Tac- of the latter. We accept this finding of the lower
an did not enunciate an unfortunate doctrine or a court.
"speciously camouflaged theory" which
"constitutes an affront on doctrinal concepts of The above provision of the law was, however,
penal law and assails even the ordinary notions of erroneously and improperly used by the court
common sense." below as a basis in determining the degree of
liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed
If Tac-an did in fact enunciate such an on
"unfortunate doctrine," which this Court has him. It must be made clear thatappellant is charge
reiterated in a convincing number of cases and for d with the qualified offense of illegal possession o
a convincing number of years, so must the same f firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presid
verdict be made in our decision ential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct fr
[44]
in People vs. De Gracia, which was om the crime of rebellion punished under Article 1
promulgated on 6 July 1994. In the latter case, we 34 and 135of the Revised Penal Code. There are
held that unlawful possession of an unlicensed two separate statutes penalizing different offense
firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to s with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal Cod
separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 e treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, h
of P.D. No. 1866 and also for a violation of Articles omicide, arson, or other offenses, such asillegal p
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 162
ossession of firearms, that might conceivably be c
ommitted in the course of a rebellion. Presidential
Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a spe
cific offense, the crime of illegal possession of fire
arms committed in thecourse or as part of a rebell
ion.
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the cons
titutionality of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No
. 1866, the Court has explained that said provisio
n of the law will not be invalidated by the mere fac
t that the same act is penalizedunder two different
statutes with different penalties, even if considere
d highly advantageous to the prosecution and on
erous to the accused. It follows that, subject to th
e presence of requisite elements in each case, un
lawfulpossession of an unlicensed firearm in furth
erance of rebellion may give rise to separate pros
ecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles
134 and 135 of the Revised PenalCode on rebelli
on. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoke
d because the first is an offense punished by a sp
ecial law while the second is a felony punished by
the Revised Penal Code with variant elements.
We cannot justify what we did
in De Gracia with a claim that the virtue of fidelity
to a controlling doctrine, i.e., of Tac-an, had
compelled us to do so. Indeed, if Tac-
an enunciated an "unfortunate doctrine" which is
"an affront on doctrinal concepts of penal law and
assails even the ordinary notions of common
sense," then De Gracia should have blazed the
trail of a new enlightenment and forthwith set aside
the "unfortunate doctrine" without any delay to
camouflage a judicial faux pas or a doctrinal
quirk. De Gracia provided an excellent vehicle for
an honorable departure from Tac-an because no
attack on the latter was necessary as the former
merely involved other crimes to which the doctrine
in Tac-an might only be applied by
analogy. De Gracia did not even intimate the need
to reexamine Tac-an; on the contrary, it adapted
the latter to another category of illegal possession
of firearm qualified by rebellion precisely because
the same legal principle and legislative purpose
were involved, and not because De Gracia wanted
to perpetuate an "unfortunate doctrine" or to
embellish "the expanding framework of our
criminal law from barnacled ideas which have not
grown apace with conceptual changes over time,"
as the concurring and dissenting opinion charges.
The majority now reiterates the doctrine
in Tac-an and the subsequent cases not because
it has become hostage to the "inertia of time
[which] has always been the obstacle to the virtues
of change," as the concurring and dissenting
opinion finds it to be, but rather because it honestly
believes that Tac-an laid down the correct
doctrine. If P.D. No. 1866 as applied in Tac-an is
an "affront on doctrinal concepts of penal laws and
assails even the ordinary notions of common
sense," the blame must not be laid at the
doorsteps of this Court, but on the lawmaker's. All
that the Court did in Tac-an was to apply the law,
for there was nothing in that case that warranted
an interpretation or the application of the niceties
of legal hermeneutics. It did not forget that its duty
is merely to apply the law in such a way that shall
not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation
and that in the course of such application or
construction it should not make or supervise
legislation, or under the guise of interpretation
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite
the law, or give the law a construction which is
repugnant to its terms.[45]
Murder and homicide are defined and
penalized by the Revised Penal Code[46] as crimes
against persons. They are mala in se because
malice or dolo is a necessary ingredient
therefor.[47] On the other hand, the offense of
illegal possession of firearm is defined and
punished by a special penal law,[48] P.D. No.
1866. It is a malum prohibitum[49] which the
lawmaker, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in
the exercise of his martial law powers, so
condemned not only because of its nature but also
because of the larger policy consideration of
containing or reducing, if not eliminating, the
upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and
safety due to the proliferation of illegally
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 163

possessed and manufactured firearms, but then proceed further by plucking out therefrom
ammunition, and the crime of murder in order to be able to impose
explosives. If intent to commit the crime were the death sentence. For indeed, on this score, it is
required, enforcement of the decree and its policy beyond cavil that in the aggravated form of illegal
or purpose would be difficult to achieve. Hence, possession, the consequential murder (or
there is conceded wisdom in punishing illegal homicide) is an integrated element or integral
possession of firearm without taking into account component since without the accompanying death,
the criminal intent of the possessor. All that is the crime would merely be simple illegal
needed possession of a firearm under the first paragraph
isintent to perpetrate the act prohibited by law, co of Section 1.
upled, of course, by animus possidendi. However,
it must be clearly understood that The second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
this animus possidendi is without regard to any 1866 does not warrant and support a conclusion
other criminal or felonious intent which an accused that it intended to treat "illegal possession
may have harbored in possessing the firearm.[50] and resultant killing" (emphasis supplied) "as a
single and integrated offense" of illegal possession
A long discourse then on the concepts with homicide or murder. It does not use the
of malum in se and malum prohibilum and their clause as a result or on the occasion of to evince
distinctions is an exercise in futility. an intention to create a single integrated crime. By
its unequivocal and explicit language, which we
We disagree for lack of basis the following quote to be clearly understood:
statements of Mr. Justice Regalado in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, to wit: If homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicense
The second paragraph of the aforestated Section d firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
1 expressly and unequivocally provides for such (emphasis supplied)
illegal possession and resultant killing as a single
integrated offense which is punished as such. The the crime of either homicide or murder is
majority not only created two offenses by dividing committed NOT AS A RESULT OR ON THE
a single offense into two but, worse, it resorted to OCCASION of the violation of Section 1, but WITH
the unprecedented and invalid act of treating the THE USE of an unlicensed firearm, whose
original offense as a single integrated crime and possession is penalized therein. There is a world
then creating another offense by using a of difference, which is too obvious, between (a) the
component crime which is also an element of the commission of homicide or
former. murder as a result or on the occasion of the violati
on of Section 1, and (b) the commission of
It would already have been a clear case of judicial homicide or murder with the use of an unlicensed
legislation if the illegal possession with murder firearm. In the first, homicide or murder is not the
punished with a single penalty have been divided original purpose or primary objective of the
into two separate offenses of illegal possession offender, but a secondary event or circumstance
and murder with distinct penalties.It is either resulting from or perpetrated on the
consequently a compounded infringement of occasion of the commission of that originally or
legislative powers for this Court to now, as it has primarily intended. In the second, the killing, which
done, treat that single offense as specifically requires a mens rea, is the primary purpose, and
described by the law and to carry that out effectively the offender uses an
impose reclusion perpetua therefor (since the unlicensed firearm.
death penalty for that offense is still proscribed),
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 164

As to the question then of Mr. Justice (b) Section 8 of P.D. No. 533 reads in part as
Regalado of whether this Court should also apply follows:
the rule enunciated here to P.D. No. 532 (Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), SEC. 8. Penal provisions. -- Any person convicted
P.D. No. 533 (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), of cattle rustling as herein defined shall,
and P.D. No. 534 (Defining Illegal Fishing and irrespective of the value of the large cattle
Prescribing Stiffer Penalties Therefor), the answerinvolved, be punished by prision mayor in its
is resoundingly in the negative. In those cases, the
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
lawmaker clearly intended a single integrated medium period if the offense is committed without
offense or a special complex offense because the violence against or intimidation of persons or force
death therein occurs
upon things. If the offense is committed with
as a result or on the occasion of the commission violence against or intimidation of persons or force
of the offenses therein penalized or was not the upon things, the penalty of reclusion temporal in
primary purpose of the offender, unlike in the its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. imposed. If a person is seriously injured
1866. Thus, (a) Section 3 of P.D. No. 532 provides:or killed as a result or on the occasion of the com
mission of cattle rustling, the penalty of reclusion
SEC. 3. Penalties. -- Any person who commits perpetua to deathshall be imposed. (emphasis
piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein supplied)
defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court
be punished by: and (c) Section 3 of P.D. No. 534 reads as follows:

a. Piracy. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are
committed as a result or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. If
rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result
or on the occasion of piracy, or when the
offenders abandoned the victims without means of
saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel,
the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
SECTION. 3. Penalties.-- Violations of this Decree
and the rules and regulations mentioned in
paragraph (f) of Section 1 hereof shall be punished
as follows:
a. by imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, if
explosives are
used: Provided, that if the explosion results (1) in
physical injury to person, the penalty shall be
imprisonment from 12 to 20 years, or
(2) in the loss of human life, then thepenalty shall
be imprisonment from 20 years to life, or death;

b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage.-- The penalty b. by imprisonment from 8 to 10 years, if obnoxious

of reclusion temporal in its minimum period shall or poisonous substances are
be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are used: Provided, that if the use of such substances
committed during or on the occasion of the results (1) in physical injury to any person, the
commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty penalty shall be imprisonment from 10 to 12 years,
of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum or
periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping for ransom (2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall
or extortion, or murder or homicide, or be imprisonment from 20 years to life, or death; x
rape is committed as a result or on the occasion t x x (emphasis supplied)
hereof, the penalty of death shall be
imposed. (emphasis supplied) The unequivocal intent of the second
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is to
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 165
respect and preserve homicide or murder as a
distinct offense penalized under the Revised Penal
Code and to increase the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm where such a or condition of the instrument used in destroying
firearm is used in killing a person. Its clear
language yields no intention of the lawmaker to
repeal or modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, in such a way that if an
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of
homicide or murder, either of these crimes, as the
case may be, would only serve to aggravate the
offense of illegal possession of firearm and would
not anymore be separately punished. Indeed, the
words of the subject provision are palpably clear to
exclude any suggestion that either of the crimes of
homicide and murder, as crimes mala in se under
the Revised Penal Code, is obliterated as such and
reduced as a mere aggravating circumstance in
illegal possession of firearm whenever the
unlicensed firearm is used in killing a person. The
only purpose of the provision is to increase the
penalty prescribed in the first paragraph of Section
1 -- reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua -- to death, seemingly
because of the accused's manifest arrogant
defiance and contempt of the law in using an
unlicensed weapon to kill another, but never, at the
same time, to absolve the accused from any
criminal liability for the death of the victim.
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1
meant to punish homicide or murder with death if
either crime is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider such use
merely as a qualifying circumstance and not as an
offense. That could not have been the intention of
the lawmaker because the term "penalty" in the
subject provision is obviously meant to be the
penalty for illegal possession of firearm and not the
penalty for homicide or murder. We explicitly
stated in Tac-an:
There is no law which renders the use of an
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an
information charging homicide or murder, the fact
that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm
cannot be used to increase the penalty for the
second offense of homicide or murder to death ....
The essential point is that the unlicensed character
human life or committing some other crime, is not
included in the inventory of aggravating
circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code.
A law may, of course, be enacted
making the use of an unlicensed firearm as a
qualifying circumstance. This would not be without
precedent. By analogy, we can cite Section 17 of
B.P. Blg. 179, which amended the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425). The said
section provides that when an offender commits a
crime under a state of addiction, such a state shall
be considered as a qualifying aggravating
circumstance in the definition of the crime and the
application of the penalty under the Revised Penal
Code.
In short, there is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 that
manifests, even vaguely, a legislative intent to
decriminalize homicide or murder if either crime is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
or to convert the offense of illegal possession of
firearm as a qualifying circumstance if the firearm
so illegally possessed is used in the commission of
homicide or murder. To charge the lawmaker with
that intent is to impute an absurdity that would
defeat the clear intent to preserve the law on
homicide and murder and impose a higher penalty
for illegal possession of firearm if such firearm is
used in the commission of homicide or murder.
Evidently, the majority did not, as charged in
the concurring and dissenting opinion, create two
offenses by dividing a single offense into
two. Neither did it resort to the "unprecedented and
invalid act of treating the original offense as a
single integrated crime and then creating another
offense by using a component crime which is also
an element of the former." The majority has always
maintained that
thekilling of a person with the use of an illegally p
ossessed firearm gives rise to two separate
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 166

offenses of (a) homicide or murder under the evidence" test enunciated in People vs.
Revised Penal Code, and (b) illegal possession of Diaz.[53] He then concludes:
firearm in its aggravated form.
In the cases now before us, it is difficult to assume
What then would be a clear case of judicial that the evidence for the murder in the first charge
legislation is an interpretation of the second of aggravated illegal possession of firearm with
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 that would murder would be different from the evidence to be
make it define and punish a single integrated adduced in the subsequent charge for murder
offense and give to the words WITH THE USE OF alone. In the second charge, the illegal possession
a similar meaning as the words AS A RESULT OR is not in issue, except peripherally and
ON THE OCCASION OF, a meaning which is inconsequentially since it is not an element or
neither born out by the letter of the law nor modifying circumstance in the second charge,
supported by its intent. Worth noting is the rule in hence the evidence therefor is immaterial. But, in
statutory construction that if a statute is clear, both prosecutions, the evidence on murder is
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its essential, in the first charge because without it the
literal meaning and applied without attempted crime is only simple illegal possession, and, in the
interpretation,[51] leaving the court no room for any second charge, because murder is the very
extended ratiocination or rationalization of the subject of the prosecution. Assuming that all the
law.[52] other requirements under Section 7, Rule 117 are
present, can it be doubted that double jeopardy is
Peregrinations into the field of penology such necessarily present and can be validly raised to
as on the concept of a single integrated crime or bar the second prosecution for murder?
composite crimes, or into the philosophical domain
of integration of the essential elements of one In fact, we can extrapolate the constitutional and
crime to that of another would then be reglementary objection to the cases of the other
unnecessary in light of the clear language and composite crimes for which a single penalty is
indubitable purpose and intent of the second imposed, such as the complex, compound and so-
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The called special complex crimes.Verily, I cannot
realm of penology, the determination of what conceive of how a person convicted of estafa
should be criminalized, the definition of crimes, through falsification under Article 48 can be validly
and the prescription of penalties are the exclusive prosecuted anew for the same offense or either
prerogatives of the legislature. As its wisdom may estafa or falsification; or how the accused
dictate, the legislature may even create from a convicted of robbery with homicide under Article
single act or transaction various offenses for 294 can be legally charged again with either of the
different purposes subject only to the limitations same component crimes of robbery or homicide;
set forth by the Constitution. This Court cannot or how the convict who was found guilty of rape
dictate upon the legislature to respect the orthodox with homicide under Article 335 can be duly haled
view concerning a single integrated crime or before the court again to face charges of either the
composite crimes. same rape or homicide. Why, then, do we now
sanction a second prosecution for murder in the
The only apparent obstacle to the imposition of cases at bar since the very same offense was an
cumulative penalties for various acts is the rule on indispensable component for the other composite
double jeopardy. This brings us to the proposition offense of illegal possession of firearm with
in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Regalado murder? Why would the objection
that the majority view offends the constitutional bar of non bis in idim as a bar to a second jeopardy lie
against double jeopardy under the "same- in the preceding examples and not apply to the
cases now before us?
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 167
We are unable to agree to the proposition. For
one, the issue of double jeopardy is not raised in
this case. For another, the so-called "same-
evidence" test is not a conclusive, much less
exclusive, test in double jeopardy cases of the first
category under the Double Jeopardy Clause which
is covered by Section 21, Article III of the
Constitution and which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.
Note that the first category speaks of
the same offense. The second refers to
the same act. This was explicitly distinguished
in Yap vs. Lutero,[54] from where People vs.
[55]
Relova quotes the following:
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds
of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause
20, Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains
that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense." (italics in the
original) The second sentence of said clause
provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits
double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense whereas, the second contemplates double
jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under
the first sentence, one may be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided
that he is charged with different offenses, or the
offense charged in one case is not included in, or
does not include, the crime charged in the other
case. The second sentence applies, even if the
offenses charged are not the same, owing to the
fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance
and the other a violation of a statute. If the two
charges are based on one and the same act,
conviction or acquittal under either the law or the
ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the
other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is
not indispensable to sustain the plea of double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So
long as jeopardy has been attached under one of
the informations charging said offense, the
defense may be availed of in the other case
involving the same offense, even if there has been
neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
Elsewise stated, where the offenses charged are
penalized either by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important
inquiry relates to
the identity of offenses charged. The
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available only where an identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses
charged.[56] The question of identity or lack of
identity of offenses is addressed by examining the
essential elements of each of the two offenses
charged, as such elements are set out in the
respective legislative definitions of the offenses
involved.[57]
It may be noted that to determine the same
offense under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States of America which reads:
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . .
..
the rule applicable is the following: "where the
same act or transaction constitutes a violation of
two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one, is whether each provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other
does not."[58]
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Constitution of the United States of America was
brought to the Philippines through the Philippine
Bill of 1 July 1902, whose Section 5 provided, inter
alia:
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 168

[N]o person for the same offense shall be twice put WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is
in jeopardy of punishment . . . . DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of 30
September 1993 of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial
This provision was carried over in identical words Court of Bohol finding accused-appellant DANIEL
in Section 3 of the Jones Law of 29 August QUIJADA y CIRCULADO guilty beyond
1916.[59] Then under the 1935 Constitution, the reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in
Jones Law provision was recast with the addition Criminal Case No. 8178 and of illegal possession
of a provision referring to the same act. Thus, of firearm in its aggravated form in Criminal Case
paragraph 20, Section 1, Article III thereof No. 8179 is AFFIRMED. The penalty imposed in
provided as follows: the first case, as amended by the Order of 29
October 1993, is sustained; however, the penalty
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of imposed in the second case is changed
punishment for the same offense. If an act is to Reclusion Perpetua from the indeterminate
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or penalty ranging from Seventeen (17) years, Four
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to (4) months, and One (1) day, as minimum, to
another prosecution for the same act. Twenty (20) years and One (1) day, as maximum.

This was adopted verbatim in Section 22, Article Costs de oficio.

IV of the 1973 Constitution and in Section 21,
Article III of the present Constitution. SO ORDERED.

This additional-element test

in Lutero and Relova and
in Blockburger, Gore, and Missouri would safely
bring the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866 out of the proscribed double jeopardy
principle. For, undeniably, the elements of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form are
different from the elements of homicide or murder,
let alone the fact that these crimes are defined and
penalized under different laws and the former
is malum prohibitum, while both the latter are mala [G.R. No. 123918. December 9, 1999]
in se. Hence, the fear that the majority's
construction of the subject provision would violate PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
the constitutional bar against double jeopardy is appellee, vs. AUGUSTO LORETO
unfounded. RINGOR, JR., accused-appellant.

The penalty which the trial court imposed in DECISION

Criminal Case No. 8179 for illegal possession of
firearm in its aggravated form must, however, be
modified. The penalty prescribed by P.D. No. 1866
is death.Since Section 19(1), Article III of the
Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty next lower in degree, reclusion
perpetual must be imposed.
PURISIMA, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision[1] ated
November 13, 1995 of Branch 6 of the Regional
Trial Court in Baguio City, finding accused-
appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. guilty of the
crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 169

13102-R, also guilty of illegal possession of In Criminal Case No. 13102-R

firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in Criminal Case No.
13100-R for and disposing thus: That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1994, in the
City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered as follows: jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then armed with a Caliber
1. In Criminal Case No. 13102, the Court Finds 38 handgun paltick with Serial Number 853169
(sic) the accused Augusto Loreto Ringor Guilty and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the shoot MARCELINO BUSLAY FLORIDA, JR.
Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 6, RA thereby inflicting upon the latter hypovolemic
7659, qualified by Treachery and as further shock secondary to massive hemorrhage; multiple
qualified by the use of an unlicensed firearm and gunshot wounds of the liver, stomach, small
hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme intestine and mesentric blood vessels, which
penalty of Death; to indemnify the heirs of injuries directly caused his death.
deceased Marcelino Florida, Jr., the sum of
P50,000.00 for his death and the sum of That the qualifying circumstance of TREACHERY
P100,000.00 as Moral damages for his death, both attended the commission of the crime when the
indemnification being without subsidiary accused suddenly attacked victim and shot him
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the several times at the back, with the use of a
costs. handgun, thus employing means, methods of
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
2. In Criminal Case No. 13100-R, the Court Finds and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
(sic) accused Augusto Loreto Ringor Guilty himself arising from the defense which the
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of offended party might make.
Violation of Section 1 PD 1866 (Illegal Possession
of firearm and ammunitions) as charged in the CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Information and hereby sentences him, applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to an and in Criminal Case No. 13100-R
imprisonment ranging from 17 years 4 months and
I day as Minimum to 20 years as Maximum and to That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1994, in the
pay the costs. City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-
The subject gun, caliber .38 (Paltik) bearing Serial named accused, did then and there willfully,
Number 853169 (Exh. A) being the subject of the unlawfully and feloniously possess and carry
offense is hereby declared confiscated and outside of his residence, a firearm, Caliber .38
forfeited in favor of the State. revolver (Paltik) bearing Serial Number 853169,
without any legal authority or permit from any
The accused Augusto Loreto Ringor is entitled to government official or authority concerned, in
be credited in the service of his sentence four fifth violation of the above cited provision of law.
(4/5) of his preventive imprisonment in accordance
with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

SO ORDERED.[2] With the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel,

entering a plea of Not Guilty upon arraignment, a
Filed on June 28, 1994, the Informations joint trial of the two cases ensued.
against accused-appellant, alleges:
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 170

The inculpatory facts and circumstances sued wherein she positively identified appellant as the
upon are succinctly summarized in the Appellees assailant.
Brief as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
On June 23, 1994, at around 6:00 P.M.(sic), Fely
Batanes, a waitress at Peoples Restaurant located xxx xxx xxx
at Kalantiao St., Baguio City, saw appellant Ringor
and his two companions enter the NBI Forensic Chemist Ms. Carina Javier found
restaurant. (Tsn, December 8, 1994, p. 4).After both hands of appellant positive for nitrates as
seating themselves, the group ordered a bottle of stated in her Chemist Report No. C-94-22. She
gin (ibid., p. 6). Minutes later, appellant conducted a microscopic chemical examination on
approached one of the tables where Florida, the the subject firearm and found that the gun was
restaurants cook was drinking beer. Without any fired within one week prior to June 27, 1994.
warning, appellant pulled Floridas hair and poked
a knife on the latters throat. Florida stood up and Elmer Nelson Piedad, Ballistician of the Firearm
pleaded with appellant not to harm him (ibid., p. Investigation Division, NBI, Manila, tested and
7). Appellant relented and released his grip on concluded that the slugs recovered from the victim
Florida. Thereafter, he left the restaurant together were fired from appellants firearm. Upon
with his companions. However, a few minutes verification from the Firearms Explosive division,
latter he was back (ibid, p.8). Camp Crame, Quezon City, it was found that
appellant is not a licensed firearm holder nor, was
Appellant brandished a gun and menacingly the subject firearm duly registered with the said
entered the restaurant. Not encountering any office (Exh. A).[5]
resistance, he thus proceeded to the kitchen
where Florida worked (ibid). Stealthily The autopsy conducted by Dr. John Tinoyan
approaching Florida from behind, appellant fired on the cadaver of the deceased yielded a
six successive shots at Florida who fell down (Ibid., Necropsy Report, which states:
p. 9). His evil deed accomplished, appellant left the
kitchen and fled (ibid). POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Appellant was chased by a man who while running,
shouted at onlookers that the person he was
running after was armed and had just killed
somebody. Alerted, SPO2 Fernandez, who was
then in the vicinity, went into action and nabbed
appellant. He frisked appellant and recovered from
him a Paltik revolver, caliber. 38, with Serial
Number 853169 (Exh. A). He checked the
revolvers cylinder and found six empty cartridges
(Exhs. T to T-6). He noted that it smelled of
gunpowder. He and PO1 Ortega turned over
appellant and the confiscated firearm to the
Investigation Division of the Baguio Police and
then executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest (Exhibit
O). On the same night, Fely Batanes gave her
sworn statement (Exhibit E) to the Baguio Police
Body of a male, 1.66 m. height, medium built, with
complete rigor mortis, lividity well developed on the
dependent parts, cloudy cornea and dilated pupils
with very pale papebral conjunctive.
Gunshot wounds: GSW no.1 measuring 10 x 10
mm. serrated edges, positive powder burns
located at the left mid clavicular line, posterior, 2
inches below the shoulder. It was directed
downward towards the mid-body, penetrating the
skin. (sic) soft tissue, middle 3rd of the 3rd rib, the
upper and lower lobes of the left lung to the
diaphragm, through and through the stomach,
lacerating the superior mesentric vessels,
perforating the small intestine then lodged at the
superior surface of the urinary bladder (slug was
recovered marked no. 1)
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 171

GSW no.2 measures 8 mm. diameter, positive
powder burns, located on the right shoulder near
the s. joint posteriorly, penetrating the skin, soft
tissue, then lodged at the surface of the fractured
surgical neck of the humorous (sic) (slug
recovered). Marked no. 2.
3.02 Soon after receiving their orders, appellants
companion, Ramon Fernandez, stood up and
approached Florida to inquire about his
(Fernandez) brother, Cesar. Florida angrily
responded to the query and said, Putang ina ninyo!
anong pakialam ko diyan!

GSW no. 3 measures 8 mm. Diameter, positive 3.03 A quarrel thereafter ensued between
powder burns, located on the right shoulder Fernandez and Florida prompting the appellant to
posteriorly near the joint penetrating the skin, soft intervene and pacify Fernandez. When Fernandez
tissues, and the head of the Humorous, (sic) then drew out a gun from his waist, appellant
dislodged form the same entry point. immediately seized the same directing his friend to
leave the restaurant before he started hurting other
GSW no. 4 measures 8 x 10 mm, oval shaped, with people with his gun. No sooner had Fernandez
abrasion superiorly located at the anterior left stepped out, however, Florida, armed with a bolo,
parasternal line at the level of the 6th ICS. It was came charging in from the kitchen and headed
directed downward towards the posterior of the towards the appellant.(Ibid, pp. 6 - 7)
body, penetrating the skin, soft tissue, the left lobe
of the liver with partial avulsion, then perforating 3.04 Surprised, appellant shot Florida with the gun
the stomach through and though the duodenum he was holding just as the latter was about to hit
lumbar muscle then lodged underneath the skin, him with the bolo. Thereafter, appellant put the gun
(1) paravertebral, level of L3 (slug recovered on the table and walked out of the
marked no. 4). restaurant. Once already outside the restaurant,
appellants other companion, Virgilio, followed him
CAUSE OF DEATH: and handed to him the gun he (appellant) left at the
table. He then proceeded to surrender the gun and
HYPOVOLEMIC SHOCK SECONDARY TO report the incident at the nearest police
MASSIVE HEMORRHAGE; MULTIPLE station. (Ibid, pp. 8 - 9)
GUNSHOT WOUND(S) OF THE LIVER,
STOMACH, SMALL INTESTINE AND 3.05 Before appellant could reach the police
MESENTRIC BLOOD VESSELS. Multiple station, however, appellant was already arrested
Gunshot Wound(s) of the body.[6] by off-duty policeman who brought him back to the
Peoples Restaurant. Appellant was thereafter
Accused-appellant admitted shooting the incarcerated at the Baguio City Police
victim but theorized that he acted in self- Station. (Ibid, pp. 10 - 12)[7]
defense. As embodied in the Appellants Brief, the
defense version runs thus: On November 13, 1995, the trial court handed
down the decision under automatic
3.01 On June 23, 1994, at a little after five oclock review. Accused-appellant contends that:
in the afternoon, appellant, together with two (2)
other companions, entered the Peoples I
Restaurant in Baguio City to order drinks. They sat
at a table next to another then occupied by THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
Marcelino B. Florida, Jr. (Florida) and a woman THE APPELLANT FOR SIMPLE ILLEGAL
companion (TSN, Testimony of Augusto Loreto G. POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND
Ringor, Jr., May 4, 1995, pp. 3-6). SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER AN
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE OF 17
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 172

YEARS AND 1 DAY AS MINIMUM TO 20 occupying,[12] is a self-serving and unconvincing

YEARS AS MAXIMUM. statement which did not in anyway constitute the
requisite quantum of proof for unlawful
II aggression. Prosecution witness Fely Batanes, a
waitress in the restaurant where the shooting
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING incident occurred, was firm in her declaration that
THE ACCUSED OF MURDER. the victim was in the kitchen unarmed[13] hen the
accused-appellant shot him. The victim had no
III weapon or bolo. He was neither threatening to
attack nor in any manner manifesting any
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN aggressive act which could have imperiled
SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO DEATH accused-appellants safety and well-being.
ON THE GROUNDS THAT: (i) THE CHARGE
OF MURDER WAS NOT PROVED BY THE No improper motive having been shown on the
PROSECUTION; AND (ii) ASSUMING part of Fely Batanes to testify falsely against
ARGUENDO THAT MURDER WAS accused-appellant or to implicate him in the
COMMITTED BY APPELLANT, THE commission of the crime, the logical conclusion is
APPROPRIATE PENALTY FOR THE that there was no such improper motive and her
OFFENSE IS RECLUSION PERPETUA testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.[14]
THERE BEING NO AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE TO RAISE THE PENALTY What is more, the testimony of Fely Batanes is
[8] buttressed by the fact that immediately after the
TO DEATH.
incident, the body of the victim was found lying in
Well-settled is the rule that in interposing self- the kitchen and not outside; thus weakening
defense, the offender admits authorship of the further the theory of accused-appellant that he
killing. The onus probandi is thus shifted to him to shot the victim while they were at the dining
prove the elements of self-defense and that the area.[15]
killing was justified;[9] otherwise, having admitted
the killing, conviction is Then too, the nature, location and number of
inescapable. Concomitantly, he must rely on the gunshot wounds inflicted on the deceased belie
strength of his own evidence and not on the accused-appellants theory of self-defense.[16] The
weakness of the prosecutions evidence.[10] deceased sustained three gun shot wounds on the
back and one in front. Dr. John Tinoyan, who
For self-defense to prosper, it must be conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the
established that: (1) there was unlawful victim, testified that the gunshot wound on the
aggression by the victim; (2) that the means frontal portion of the victims body showed a
employed to prevent or repel such aggression was downward trajectory of the bullet on his chest,
reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient penetrating the liver, perforating the stomach down
provocation on the part of the person defending to the small intestine, and then lodged underneath
himself.[11] the skin.[17] Verily, such finding negates the claim
of accused-appellant that he shot the victim while
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to he was at an almost prone lying position and the
prove the element of unlawful aggression. The victim was standing in front of him about to strike
allegation that the victim allegedly went out of the with a bolo. If this were true, the trajectory of the
kitchen armed with a bolo, and was about to hack bullet should have been upward or better still, it
him (accused-appellant) who was then at an should have been at the level at which the gun was
almost prone lying position on the table he was
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 173

fired while he (accused-appellant) was in a prone perpetua to death for the crime of murder. When,
lying position. as in this case, neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance is attendant, the lesser penalty
Rather telling are the three gunshot wounds on of reclusion perpetua has to be applied,[22] in
the back of the victim, which wounds showed accordance with Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal
traces of gunpowder which, according to Dr. Code.
Tinoyan, indicated that the weapon used was at a
distance of less than one meter.[18]Evidently, With respect to the conviction of accused-
accused-appellant stealthily approached the victim appellant for illegal possession of firearms under
from behind and fired at him six successive shots, P. D. No. 1866, it was held in the case of People
four of which hit him, to ensure his death.[19] If he vs. Molina[23] nd reiterated in the recent case of
shot the victim merely to defend himself, there People vs. Ronaldo Valdez,[24] that in cases where
would have been no cause for accused-appellant murder or homicide is committed with the use of an
to pump several bullets into the body of the victim. unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate
conviction for the crime of illegal possession of
In light of the foregoing, the imputation of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in view of the
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim amendments introduced by Republic Act No.
cannot be believed. Absent the element of 8294. Thereunder, the use of unlicensed firearm in
unlawful aggression by the deceased, there can be murder or homicide is simply considered as an
no self-defense, complete or incomplete. If there aggravating circumstance in the murder or
was no unlawful aggression, there was nothing to homicide and no longer as a separate
prevent or repel and the second and third offense. Furthermore, the penalty for illegal
requisites of self-defense would have no basis.[20] possession of firearms shall be imposed provided
that no other crime is committed.[25] In other words,
The Court a quo properly appreciated the where murder or homicide was committed, the
aggravating circumstance of treachery which penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no
qualified the crime to murder. It was clearly longer imposable since it becomes merely a
established that the accused-appellant fired six special aggravating circumstance.[26]
successive shots on the victim, suddenly, without
warning, and from behind, giving the victim no It bears stressing, however, that the dismissal
chance to flee or to prepare for his defense or to of the present case for illegal possession of firearm
put up the least resistance to such sudden should not be misinterpreted to mean that there
assault. There is treachery when the means, can no longer be any prosecution for the offense
manner or method of attack employed by the of illegal possession of firearms.In general, all
offender offered no risk to himself from any pending cases involving illegal possession of
defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might firearms should continue to be prosecuted and
have taken.[21] tried if no other crimes expressly provided in R. A.
No. 8294 are involved (murder or homicide, under
All things studiedly considered and viewed in Section 1, and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or
proper perspective, the mind of the Court can rest attempted coup d etat, under Section 3).[27]
easy on a finding that accused-appellant Augusto
Loreto Ringor, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal
doubt of the crime of murder, and did not act in Code, where the new law is favorable to the
self-defense. accused, it has to be applied retroactively. Thus,
insofar as it spares accused-appellant a separate
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as conviction for illegal possession of firearms,
amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 174

Republic Act No. 8294 has to be given retroactive a qualifying circumstance.[28] (Emphasis
application in Criminal Case No. 13100-R. supplied)

On the matter of the aggravating circumstance
of use of unlicensed firearm in the commission of
murder or homicide, the trial court erred in
appreciating the same to qualify to death the
penalty for the murder committed by accused-
appellant. It should be noted that at the time
accused-appellant perpetrated the offense, the
unlicensed character of a firearm used in taking the
life of another was not yet an aggravating
circumstance in homicide or murder; to wit:
Thus, before R.A. No. 8294 (which took effect
on July 6, 1997) made the use of unlicensed
firearm as an aggravating circumstance in murder
or homicide, the penalty for the murder committed
by accused-appellant on June 23, 1994 was not
death, as erroneously imposed by the trial
court. There was yet no such aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm to raise
the penalty for murder from reclusion perpetua to
death, at the time of commission of the crime.

Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 The amendatory law making the use of an
meant to punish homicide or murder with death if unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
either crime is committed with the use of an circumstance in murder or homicide, cannot be
unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider such use applied here because the said provision of R.A.
merely as a qualifying circumstance and not as an No. 8294 is not favorable to accused-appellant,
offense. That could not have been the intention of lest it becomes an ex post facto law.[29]
the lawmaker because the term penalty in the
subject provision is obviously meant to be the WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case
penalty for illegal possession of firearm and not the
No. 13102-R is AFFIRMED with the modification
penalty for for homicide or murder. We explicitly that accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr.
stated in Tac-an: is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. It is understood that the civil
There is no law which renders the use liabilities imposed below are UPHELD.
of an unlicensed firearm as an
aggravating circumstance Criminal Case No. 13100-R instituted
in homicide or murder. Under an pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866 is
information charging homicide or DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
muder, the fact that the death weapon
was an unlicensed firearm cannot be SO ORDERED.
used to increase the penalty for the
second offense of homicide or murder Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
to death (or reclusion perpetua under the Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
1987 Constitution). The essential point is Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr.,
that the unlicensed character or condition JJ., concur.
of the instrument used in destroying
human life or committing some other Davide, Jr., C.J.,
crime, is not included in the inventory of (Chairman), and Panganiban, J., in the result.
aggravating circumstances set out in
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.

A law may, of course, be enacted

making the use of an unlicensed firearm as
CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 175

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880

AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY

THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY
TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE
GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The

Public Assembly Act of 1985."

Section 2. Declaration of policy - The

constitutional right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances is essential and vital to the strength
and stability of the State. To this end, the State
shall ensure the free exercise of such right without
prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and
equal protection of the law.

Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of

this Act:

(a) "Public assembly" means any rally,

demonstration, march, parade, procession
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 176

or any other form of mass or concerted shall be required if the public assembly shall be
action held in a public place for the purpose done or made in a freedom park duly established
of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing by law or ordinance or in private property, in which
an opinion to the general public on any case only the consent of the owner or the one
particular issue; or protesting or influencing entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the
any state of affairs whether political, campus of a government-owned and operated
economic or social; or petitioning the educational institution which shall be subject to the
government for redress of grievances. rules and regulations of said educational
institution. Political meetings or rallies held during
The processions, rallies, parades, any election campaign period as provided for by
demonstrations, public meetings and law are not covered by this Act.
assemblages for religious purposes shall be
governed by local ordinances: Provided, Section 5. Application requirements - All
however, That the declaration of policy as applications for a permit shall comply with the
provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be following guidelines:
faithfully observed.
(a) The applications shall be in writing and
The definition herein contained shall not shall include the names of the leaders or
include picketing and other concerted organizers; the purpose of such public
action in strike areas by workers and assembly; the date, time and duration
employees resulting from a labor dispute as thereof, and place or streets to be used for
defined by the Labor Code, its the intended activity; and the probable
implementing rules and regulations, and by number of persons participating, the
the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227. transport and the public address systems to
be used.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway,
boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or (b) The application shall incorporate the
other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, duty and responsibility of applicant under
and/or any open space of public ownership Section 8 hereof.
where the people are allowed access.
(c) The application shall be filed with the
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest office of the mayor of the city or municipality
degree of restraint that the military, police in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is
and other peace keeping authorities shall to be held, at least five (5) working days
observe during a public assembly or in the before the scheduled public assembly.
dispersal of the same.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which
(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the must be duly acknowledged in writing, the
change of the place and time of the public office of the city or municipal mayor shall
assembly, rerouting of the parade or street cause the same to immediately be posted
march, the volume of loud-speakers or at a conspicuous place in the city or
sound system and similar changes. municipal building.

Section 4. Permit when required and when not Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
required - A written permit shall be required for any
person or persons to organize and hold a public (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any
assembly in a public place. However, no permit official acting in his behalf to issue or grant
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 177

a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his
behalf shall act on the application within two
(2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the
permit shall be deemed granted. Should for
any reason the mayor or any official acting
in his behalf refuse to accept the application
for a permit, said application shall be posted
by the applicant on the premises of the
office of the mayor and shall be deemed to
have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is
imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil warranting the denial or modification of
the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section
shall be decided within twenty-four (24)
hours from date of filing. Cases filed
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to
the executive judge for disposition or, in his
absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by
formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the
proposed public assembly involve the use, for an
appreciable length of time, of any public highway,
boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent
grave public inconvenience, designate the route
thereof which is convenient to the participants or
reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so
that there will be no serious or undue interference
with the free flow of commerce and trade.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be
writing and served on the application within the duty and responsibility of the leaders and
twenty-four hours. organizers of a public assembly to take all
reasonable measures and steps to the end that the
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his intended public assembly shall be conducted
behalf denies the application or modifies the peacefully in accordance with the terms of the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant permit. These shall include but not be limited to the
may contest the decision in an appropriate following:
court of law.
(a) To inform the participants of their
(f) In case suit is brought before the responsibility under the permit;
Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial
Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the (b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators
Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate in order to prevent non-demonstrators from
Appellate Court, its decisions may be disrupting the lawful activities of the public
appealed to the appropriate court within assembly;
forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the
same. No appeal bond and record on (c) To confer with local government officials
appeal shall be required. A decision concerned and law enforcers to the end that
granting such permit or modifying it in terms the public assembly may be held
satisfactory to the applicant shall, be peacefully;
immediately executory.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 178
(d) To see to it that the public assembly
undertaken shall not go beyond the time
stated in the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that
demonstrators do not molest any person or
do any act unduly interfering with the rights
of other persons not participating in the Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with
public assembly.
Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement violent, the police may disperse such public
authorities - Law enforcement agencies shall not assembly as follows:
interfere with the holding of a public assembly.
However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law
enforcement contingent under the command of a
responsible police officer may be detailed and
stationed in a place at least one hundred (100)
meter away from the area of activity ready to
maintain peace and order at all times.
Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It
shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies,
when their assistance is requested by the leaders
or organizers, to perform their duties always
mindful that their responsibility to provide proper
protection to those exercising their right peaceably
to assemble and the freedom of expression is
primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement
agencies shall observe the following guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement
contingent who deal with the demonstrators
shall be in complete uniform with their
nameplates and units to which they belong
displayed prominently on the front and
dorsal parts of their uniform and must
observe the policy of "maximum tolerance"
as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement
contingent shall not carry any kind of
firearms but may be equipped with baton or
riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor,
gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with
shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water
cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall
not be used unless the public assembly is
attended by actual violence or serious
threats of violence, or deliberate destruction
of property.
permit - No public assembly with a permit shall be
dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes
(a) At the first sign of impending violence,
the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall call the attention of the
leaders of the public assembly and ask the
latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where
rocks or other harmful objects from the
participants are thrown at the police or at
the non-participants, or at any property
causing damage to such property, the
ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall audibly warn the
participants that if the disturbance persists,
the public assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing
as stated in the preceding subparagraph
should not stop or abate, the ranking officer
of the law enforcement contingent shall
audibly issue a warning to the participants
of the public assembly, and after allowing a
reasonable period of time to lapse, shall
immediately order it to forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or
participant shall also be made during the
public assembly unless he violates during
the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or
any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall
be governed by Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended:
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 179

(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or
branch of the peace during the public
assembly shall not constitute a group for
dispersal.
Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without
permit - When the public assembly is held without
a permit where a permit is required, the said public
assembly may be peacefully dispersed.
area of activity of the public assembly or on
the occasion thereof;
1. the carrying of a deadly or
offensive weapon or device such as
firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon
and the like;

Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall 3 the malicious burning of any object
constitute violations of this Act: in the streets or thoroughfares;

(a) The holding of any public assembly as 4. the carrying of firearms by

defined in this Act by any leader or
organizer without having first secured that
written permit where a permit is required
from the office concerned, or the use of
such permit for such purposes in any place
other than those set out in said permit:
Provided, however, That no person can be
punished or held criminally liable for
participating in or attending an otherwise
peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or in the immediately preceding Section shall be
modification of a permit in violation of the punished as follows:
provisions of this Act by the mayor or any
other official acting in his behalf.
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to
accept or acknowledge receipt of the
application for a permit by the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or
otherwise denying the exercise of the right
to peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a
member of any law enforcement agency or
any person to disperse the public assembly;
members of the law enforcement
unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally
disturbing the holding of a public
assembly by the use of a motor
vehicle, its horns and loud sound
systems.
Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty
and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be
punished by imprisonment of one month
and one day to six months;
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d),
(e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall
be punished by imprisonment of six months
and one day to six years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g)
shall be punished by imprisonment of six
months and one day to six years without
prejudice to prosecution under Presidential
Decree No. 1866;

(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof; (d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of
subparagraph (g) shall be punished by
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
within one hundred (100) meters from the
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 180

Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS
municipality in the country shall within six months THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES"
after the effectivity of this Act establish or
designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or WHEREAS, there has been an upsurge of crimes
mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far vitally affecting public order and safety due to the
as practicable, shall be centrally located within the proliferation of illegally possessed and
poblacion where demonstrations and meetings manufactured firearms, ammunition and
may be held at any time without the need of any explosives;
prior permit.
WHEREAS, these criminal acts have resulted in
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan loss of human lives, damage to property and
Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the destruction of valuable resources of the country;
freedom parks within the period of six months from
the effectivity of this Act. WHEREAS, there are various laws and
presidential decrees which penalized illegal
Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any possession and manufacture of firearms,
provision of this Act be declared invalid or ammunition and explosives;
unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of
the other provisions shall not be affected thereby. WHEREAS, there is a need to consolidate, codify
and integrate said laws and presidential decrees to
Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, harmonize their provisions;
letters of instructions, resolutions, orders,
ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent WHEREAS, there are some provisions in said laws
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, and presidential decrees which must be updated
amended, or modified accordingly. and revised in order to more effectively deter
violators of the law on firearms, ammunition and
Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect explosives.
upon its approval.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.
Approved, October 22, 1985. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do
Republic of the Philippines hereby decree:1awphi1©
MALACAÑANG
Manila Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms
Presidential Decree No. 1866 June 29, or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to
1983 be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of
Amended by RA 9516 "Section 3 and 4" Ammunition. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
CODIFYING THE LAWS ON imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to
AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE ammunition.
OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR
EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 181

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of or causing injury or death to any
an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be person.1awphi1©ITC
imposed.
Any person who commits any of the crimes defined
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, in the Revised Penal Code or special laws with the
or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation
rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of agents or incendiary devices, which results in the
death shall be imposed. death of any person or persons shall be punished
with the penalty of death.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of,
upon the owner, president, manager, director or or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
other responsible officer of any public or private rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of
firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall death shall be imposed.
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms
owned by such firm, company, corporation or The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
entity to be used by any person or persons found period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding upon the owner, president, manager, director or
paragraphs. other responsible officer of any public or private
firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed willfully or knowingly allow any of the explosives
upon any person who shall carry any licensed owned by such firm, company, corporation or
firearm outside his residence without legal entity to be used by any person or persons found
authority therefor. guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding
paragraphs.
Section 2. Presumption of Illegal Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. - The possession of any Section 4. Presumption of Unlawful
machinery, tool or instrument used directly in the Manufacture. - The possession of any machinery,
manufacture of firearms or ammunition, by any tool or instrument directly used in the manufacture
person whose business or employment does not of explosives, by any person whose business or
lawfully deal with the manufacture of firearms or employment does not lawfully deal with the
ammunition, shall be prima facie evidence that manufacture of explosives shall be prima facie
such article is intended to be used in the evidence that such article is intended to be used in
unlawful/illegal manufacture of firearms or the unlawful/illegal manufacture of explosives.
ammunition.
Section 5. Tampering of Firearm's Serial
Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, Number. - The penalty of prision mayor shall be
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
Explosives. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in tamper, change, deface or erase the serial number
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be of any firearm.
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose Section 6. Repacking or Altering the Composition
or possess handgrenade(s), rifle grenade(s) and of Lawfully Manufactured Explosives. - The
other explosives, including but not limited to penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
"philbox bombs", "molotov cocktail bomb", "fire- any person who shall unlawfully repack, alter or
bombs", or other incendiary devices capable of modify the composition of any lawfully
producing destructive effect on contiguous objects manufactured explosives.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 182

Section 7. Unauthorized Issuance of Authority to OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR

Carry Firearm and/or Ammunition Outside of EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER
Residence. - The penalty of prision correccional PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS
shall be imposed upon any person, civilian or THEREOF, AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES."
military, who shall issue authority to carry firearm
and/or ammunition outside of residence, without Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
authority therefor. Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 8. Rules and Regulations. - The Chief of
the Philippine Constabulary shall promulgate the Section 1. Sec. 1 Presidential Decree No. 1866,
rules and regulations for the effective as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
implementation of this Decree. follows:

Section 9. Repealing Clause. - The provisions of "Sec. 1. Unlawful manufacture, sale,

Republic Act No. 4, Presidential Decree No. 9, acquisition, disposition or possession of
Presidential Decree No. 1728 and all laws, firearms or ammunition or instruments used
decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations or intended to be used in the manufacture
which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby of firearms or ammunition. – The penalty of
repealed, amended or modified accordingly. prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand
Section 10. Effectivity. - This Decree shall take pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any
effect after fifteen (15) days following the person who shall unlawfully manufacture,
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette. deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any
low powered firearm, such as rimfire
Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of June, handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of
in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and similar firepower, part of firearm,
eighty-three. ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in
Republic of the Philippines the manufacture of any firearm or
Congress of the Philippines ammunition: Provided, That no other crime
Metro Manila was committed.

Tenth Congress "The penalty of prision mayor in its

minimum period and a fine of Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high
powered firearm which includes those with
Republic Act No. 8294 June 6, 1997 bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber
and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41,
AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS but considered powerful such as caliber
AMENDED, ENTITLED "CODIFYING THE LAWS .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum
ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, and other firearms with firing capability of
MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION full automatic and by burst of two or three:
OR DISPOSITION OF FIREARMS, Provided, however, That no other crime
AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR was committed by the person arrested.
INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 183
"If homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as
an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance
of or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition,
or attempted coup d'etat, such violation
shall be absorbed as an element of the
crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition,
or attempted coup d'etat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon
the owner, president, manager, director or
other responsible officer of any public or
private firm, company, corporation or entity,
who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of
the firearms owned by such firm, company,
corporation or entity to be used by any
person or persons found guilty of violating
the provisions of the preceding paragraphs
or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to
use unlicensed firearms or firearms without
any legal authority to be carried outside of
their residence in the course of their
employment.
"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall carry
any licensed firearm outside his residence
without legal authority therefor."
Section 2. Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows: Section 3. Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
"Sec. 3. Unlawful manufacture, sale, follows:
acquisition, disposition or possession of
explosives. – The penalty of prision mayor
in its maximum period to reclusion temporal
and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000) shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully manufacture,
assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or
possess hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s),
and other explosives, including but not
limited to 'pillbox,' 'molotov cocktail bombs,'
'fire bombs,' or other incendiary devices
capable of producing destructive effect on
contiguous objects or causing injury or
death to any person.
"When a person commits any of the crimes
defined in the Revised Penal Code or
special laws with the use of the
aforementioned explosives, detonation
agents or incendiary devices, which results
in the death of any person or persons, the
use of such explosives, detonation agents
or incendiary devices shall be considered
as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance
of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or
attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall
be absorbed as an element of the crimes of
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted
coup d'etat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon
the owner, president, manager, director or
other responsible officer of any public or
private firm, company, corporation or entity,
who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of
the explosives owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity, to be used
by any person or persons found guilty of
violating the provisions of the preceding
paragraphs."
"Sec. 5. Tampering of firearm's serial
number. – The penalty of prision
correccional shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully tamper,
change, deface or erase the serial number
of any firearm."
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 184

Section 4. Sec. 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of
as amended, is hereby further amended to read as general circulation.
follows:
Approved: June 6, 1997.
"Sec. 6. Repacking or altering the
composition of lawfully manufactured Republic of the Philippines
explosives. – The penalty of prision Congress of the Philippines
correccional shall be imposed upon any Metro Manila
person who shall unlawfully repack, alter or
modify the composition of any lawfully Fourteenth Congress
manufactured explosives." Second Regular Session

Section 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed

Firearm. – The term unlicensed firearm shall
include:
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the
1) firearms with expired license; or twenty-third day of July, two thousand seven.

2) unauthorized use of licensed firearm in Republic Act No. 9516 December 22

the commission of the crime. Amending Section 3 and 4 of PD 1866

Section 6. Rules and regulations. – The AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING THE

Department of Justice and the Department of the PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
Interior and Local Government shall jointly issue, 1866, AS AMENDED, ENTITLED CODIFYING
within ninety (90) days after the approval of this THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL
Act, the necessary rules and regulations pertaining POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN,
to the administrative aspect of the provisions ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION OF
hereof, furnishing the Committee on Public Order FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES
and Security and the Committee on Justice and OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE
Human Rights of both Houses of Congress copies MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION
of such rules and regulations within thirty (30) days OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER
from the promulgation hereof. PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER RELEVANT
Section 7. Separability clause. – If, for any PURPOSES"
reason, any Sec. or provision of this Act is declared
to be unconstitutional or invalid, the other Sec.s or Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
provisions thereof which are not affected thereby Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
shall continue to be in full force and effect. assembled::

Section 8. Repealing clause. – All laws, decrees, Section 1. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are read as follows:
hereby repealed, amended, or modified
accordingly. "Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales,
Acquisition, Disposition, Importation or
Section 9. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect Possession of an Explosive or Incendiary
after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Device. - The penalty of reclusion
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 185
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall willfully and unlawfully
manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire,
dispose, import or possess any explosive or Section 2. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
incendiary device, with knowledge of its 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
existence and its explosive or incendiary read as follows:
character, where the explosive or
incendiary device is capable of producing
destructive effect on contiguous objects or
causing injury or death to any person,
including but not limited to, hand
grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), 'pillbox bomb',
'molotov cocktail bomb', 'fire bomb', and
other similar explosive and incendiary
devices.
"Provided, That mere possession of any
explosive or incendiary device shall
be prima facie evidence that the person had
knowledge of the existence and the
explosive or incendiary character of the
device.
"Provided, however, That a temporary,
incidental, casual, harmless, or transient
possession or control of any explosive or
incendiary device, without the knowledge of
its existence or its explosive or incendiary
character, shall not be a violation of this
Section.
"Provided, Further, That the temporary,
incidental, casual, harmless, or transient
possession or control of any explosive or
incendiary device for the sole purpose of
surrendering it to the proper authorities
shall not be a violation of this Section.
"Provided, finally, That in addition to the
instances provided in the two (2)
immediately preceeding paragraphs, the
court may determine the absence of the
intent to possess, otherwise referred to
as 'animus possidendi", in accordance with
the facts and circumstances of each case
and the application of other pertinent laws,
among other things, Articles 11 and 12 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended."
"SEC 3-A. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales,
Acquisition, Disposition, Importation or
Possession of a Part, Ingredient,
Machinery, Tool or Instrument Used or
Intended to be Used for the Manufacture,
Construction, Assembly, Delivery or
Detonation. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall willfully and unlawfully
manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire,
dispose, import or possess any part,
ingredient, machinery, tool or instrument of
any explosive or incendiary device, whether
chemical, mechanical, electronic, electrical
or otherwise, used or intended to be used
by that person for its manufacture,
construction, assembly, delivery or
detonation, where the explosive or
incendiary device is capable or is intended
to be made capable of producing
destructive effect on contiguous objects or
causing injury or death to any person.
"Provided, That the mere possession of any
part, ingredient, machinery, tool or
instrument directly used in the manufacture,
construction, assembly, delivery or
detonation of any explosive or incendiary
device, by any person whose business
activity, or employment does not lawfully
deal with the possession of such article
shall be prima facie evidence that such
article is intended to be used by that person
in the unlawful/illegal manufacture,
construction, assembly, delivery or
detonation of an explosive or incendiary
device.
"Provided, however, That a temporary
incidental, casual, harmless or transient
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 186
possession or control of any part,
machinery, tool or instrument directly used
in the manufacture, construction, assembly,
delivery or detonation of any explosive or
incendiary device, without the knowledge of
its existence or character as part,
ingredient, machinery, tool or instrument
directly used in the manufacture,
construction, assembly, delivery or
detonation of any explosive or incendiary
device, shall not be a violation of this
Section.
"Provided, Further, That the temporary,
incidental, casual, harmless, or transient
possession or control of any part,
ingredient, machinery, tool or instrument
directly used in the manufacture,
construction, assembly, delivery or
detonation of any explosive or incendiary
device for the sole purpose of surrendering
it to the proper authorities shall not be a
violation of this Section.
"Provided, finally, That in addition to the
instances provided in the two (2)
immediately preceeding paragraphs, the
court may determine the absence of the
intent to possess, otherwise referred to as
'animus possidendi', in accordance with the
facts and circumstances of each case and
the application of other pertinent laws,
among other things, Articles 11 and 12 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended."
Section 3. Insert a new Section 3-B, 3-C, 3-D, 4,
4-A, 4-B, 4-C, 4-D, 4-E, 4-E and 4-F in Presidential
Decree No. 1866 to read as follows:
"SEC. 3-B. Penalty for the Owner,
President, Manager, Director or Other
Responsible Officer of Any Public or Private
Firm, Company, Corporation or Entity. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the owner, president,
manager, director or other responsible
officer of any public or private firm,
company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any explosive or
incendiary device or parts thereof owned or
controlled by such firm, company,
corporation or entity to be used by any
person or persons found guilty of violating
the provisions of the preceding paragraphs.
"SEC. 3-C. Relationship of Other Crimes
with a Violation of this Decree and the
Penalty Therefor. - When a violation of
Section 3, 3-A or 3-B of this Decree is a
necessary means for committing any of the
crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code
or special laws, or is in furtherance of,
incident to, in connection with, by reason of,
or on occassion of any of the crimes defined
in the Revised Penal Code or special laws,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine
ranging from One hundred Thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed.
"SEC. 3-D. Former Conviction or Acquittal;
Double Jeopardy. - Subject to the
provisions of the Rules of Court on double
jeopardy, if the application thereof is more
favorable to the accused, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case for violation of this Decree shall be
a bar to another prosecution of the same
accused for any offense where the violation
of this Decree was a necessary means for
committing the offense or in furtherance of
which, incident to which, in connection with
which, by reason of which, or on occasion
of which, the violation of this Decree was
committed, and vice versa.
"SEC. 4. Responsibility and liability of Law
Enforcement Agencies and Other
Government Officials and Employees in
Testifying as Prosecution Witnesses. - Any
member of law enforcement agencies or
any other government official and employee
who, after due notice, fails or refuses,
intentionally or negligently, to appear as a
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 187
witness for the prosecution of the defense
in any proceeding, involving violations of
this Decree, without any valid reason, shall
be punished with reclusion temporal and a
fine of Five hundred Thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) in addition to the
administrative liability he/she may be meted
out by his/her immediate superior and/or
appropriate body.
"The immediate superior of the member of
the law enforcement agency or any other
government employee mentioned in the
preceding paragraph shall be penalized
with prision correccional and a fine of not
less than Ten Thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) but not more than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and in
addition, perpetual absolute disqualification
from public office if despite due notice to
them and to the witness concerned, the
former does not exert reasonable effort to
present the latter to the court.
"The member of the law enforcement
agency or any other government employee
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs
shall not be transferred or reassigned to any
other government office located in another
territorial jurisdiction during the pendency of
the case in court. However, the concerned
member of the law enforcement agency or
government employee may be transferred
or reassigned for compelling
reasons: Provided, That his/her immediate
superior shall notify the court where the
case is pending of the order to transfer or
reassign, within twenty-four (24) hours from
its approval: Provided, further, That his/her
immediate superior shall be penalized
with prision correccional and a fine of not
less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)
but not more than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) and in addition, perpetual
absolute disqualification from public office,
should he/she fail to notify the court of such
order to transfer or reassign.
"Prosecution and punishment under this
Section shall be without prejudice to any
liability for violation of any existing law.
"SEC 4-A. Criminal Liability for Planting of
Evidence. - Any person who is found guilty
of 'planting' any explosive or incendiary
device or any part, ingredient, machinery,
tool or instrument of any explosive or
incendiary device, whether chemical,
mechanical, electronic, electrical or
otherwise, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
"Planting of evidence shall mean the willful
act by any person of maliciously and
surreptitiously inserting, placing, adding or
attaching, directly or indirectly, through any
overt or covert act, whatever quantity of any
explosive or incendiary device or any part,
ingredient, machinery, tool or instrument of
any explosive or incendiary device, whether
chemical, mechanical, electronic, electrical
or otherwise in the person, house, effects or
in the immediate vicinity of an innocent
individual for the purpose of implicating
incriminating or imputing the commission of
any violation of this Decree.
"SEC. 4-B. Continuous Trial. - In cases
involving violations of this Decree, the judge
shall set the case for continuous trial on a
daily basis from Monday to Friday or other
short-term trial calendar so as to ensure
speedy trial. Such case shall be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment of
the accused.
"SEC. 4-C. Authority to Import, Sell or
Possess Chemicals or Accessories for
Explosives. - Only persons or entities
issued a manufacturer's license, dealer's
license or purchaser's license by the
Philippine National Police (PNP)-Firearms
and Explosives Division may import any of
the chemical or accessories that can be
used in the manufacture of explosives or
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 188

explosive ingredients from foreign hereby repealed, amended, or modified

suppliers, or possess or sell them to accordingly.
licensed dealers or end users, as the case
may be. Sec. 6. Effecfivity. - This Act shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
"SEC. 4-D. Types of Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of
Chemicals/Accessories Covered. - The general circulation.
chemicals and accessories mentioned in
the preceding Section shall exclusively refer Republic of the Philippines
to chlorates, nitrates, nitric acid and such CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
other chemicals and accessories that can Metro Manila
be used for the manufacture of explosives
and explosive ingredients. Fifteenth Congress
Third Regular Session
"SEC. 4-E. Record of Transactions. - Any
person or entity who intends to import, sell Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the
or possess the aforecited chemicals or twenty-third day of July, two thousand twelve.
accessories shall file an application with the
chief of the PNP, stating therein the REPUBLIC ACT No. 10591
purpose for which the license and/or permit
is sought and such other information as AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE
may be required by the said official. The LAW ON FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION AND
concerned person or entity shall maintain a PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
permanent record of all transactions THEREOF
entered into in relation with the aforecited
chemicals or accessories, which Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
documents shall be open to inspection by Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
the appropriate authorities. assembled:

"SEC. 4-F. Cancellation of License. - ARTICLE I

Failure to comply with the provision of
Section 4-C, 4-D and 4-E shall be sufficient
cause for the cancellation of the license and
the confiscation of all such chemicals or
accessories, whether or not lawfully
imported, purchased or possessed by the
subject person or entity."
Sec. 4. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason,
any provision of this Act is declared to be
unconstitutional or invalid, the other Sections or
provisions thereof which are not affected thereby
shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Sec. 5. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
TITLE, DECLARATION OF POLICY AND
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known
as the "Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition
Regulation Act".
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. – It is the
policy of the State to maintain peace and order and
protect the people against violence. The State also
recognizes the right of its qualified citizens to self-
defense through, when it is the reasonable means
to repel the unlawful aggression under the
circumstances, the use of firearms. Towards this
end, the State shall provide for a comprehensive
law regulating the ownership, possession,
carrying, manufacture, dealing in and importation
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 189
of firearms, ammunition, or parts thereof, in order
to provide legal support to law enforcement
agencies in their campaign against crime, stop the
proliferation of illegal firearms or weapons and the
illegal manufacture of firearms or weapons,
ammunition and parts thereof.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this
Act:
(a) Accessories refer to parts of a firearm
which may enhance or increase the
operational efficiency or accuracy of a
firearm but will not constitute any of the
major or minor internal parts thereof such
as, hut not limited to, laser scope,
telescopic sight and sound suppressor or
silencer.
(b) Ammunition refers to a complete unfixed
unit consisting of a bullet, gunpowder,
cartridge case and primer or loaded shell for
use in any firearm.
(c) Antique firearm refers to any: (1) firearm
which was manufactured at least seventy-
five (75) years prior to the current date but
not including replicas; (2) firearm which is
certified by the National Museum of the
Philippines to be curio or relic of museum
interest; and (3) any other firearm which
derives a substantial part of its monetary
value from the fact that it is novel, rare,
bizarre or because of its association with
some historical figure, period or event.
(d) Arms smuggling refers to the import,
export, acquisition, sale, delivery,
movement or transfer of firearms, their parts
and components and ammunition, from or
across the territory of one country to that of
another country which has not been
authorized in accordance with domestic law
in either or both country/countries.
(e) Authority to import refers to a document
issued by the Chief of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) authorizing the
importation of firearms, or their parts,
ammunition and other components.
(f) Authorized dealer refers to any person,
legal entity, corporation, partnership or
business entity duly licensed by the
Firearms and Explosive Office (FEO) of the
PNP to engage in the business of buying
and selling ammunition, firearms or parte
thereof, at wholesale or retail basis.
(g) Authorized importer refers to any
person, legal entity, corporation,
partnership or business duly licensed by the
FEO of the PNP to engage in the business
of importing ammunition and firearms, or
parts thereof into the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines for purposes of
sale or distribution under the provisions of
this Act.
(h) Authorized manufacturer refers to any
person, legal entity, corporation, or
partnership duly licensed by the FEO of the
PNP to engage in the business of
manufacturing firearms, and ammunition or
parts thereof for purposes of sale or
distribution.1âwphi1
(i) Confiscated firearm refers to a firearm
that is taken into custody by the PNP,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), and all other law enforcement
agencies by reason of their mandate and
must be necessarily reported or turned over
to the PEO of the PNP.
(j) Demilitarized firearm refers to a firearm
deliberately made incapable of performing
its main purpose of firing a projectile.
(k) Duty detail order refers to a document
issued by the juridical entity or employer
wherein the details of the disposition of
firearm is spelled-out, thus indicating the
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 190
name of the employee, the firearm
information, the specific duration and
location of posting or assignment and the
authorized bonded firearm custodian for the
juridical entity to whom such firearm is
turned over after the lapse of the order.
(l) Firearm refers to any handheld or
portable weapon, whether a small arm or
light weapon, that expels or is designed to
expel a bullet, shot, slug, missile or any
projectile, which is discharged by means of
expansive force of gases from burning
gunpowder or other form of combustion or
any similar instrument or implement. For
purposes of this Act, the barrel, frame or
receiver is considered a firearm.
(m) Firearms Information Management
System (FIMS) refers to the compilation of
all data and information on firearms
ownership and disposition for record
purposes.
(n) Forfeited firearm refers to a firearm that
is subject to forfeiture by reason of court
order as accessory penalty or for the
disposition by the FEO of the PNP of
firearms considered as abandoned,
surrendered, confiscated or revoked in
compliance with existing rules and
regulations.
(o) Gun club refers to an organization duly
registered with and accredited in good
standing by the FEO of the PNP which is
established for the purpose of propagating
responsible and safe gun ownership, proper
appreciation and use of firearms by its
members, for the purpose of sports and
shooting competition, self-defense and
collection purposes.
(p) Gunsmith refers to any person, legal
entity, corporation, partnership or business
duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP to
engage in the business of repairing firearms
and other weapons or constructing or
assembling firearms and weapons from
finished or manufactured parts thereof on a
per order basis and not in commercial
quantities or of making minor parts for the
purpose of repairing or assembling said
firearms or weapons.
(q) Imitation firearm refers to a replica of a
firearm, or other device that is so
substantially similar in coloration and
overall appearance to an existing firearm as
to lead a reasonable person to believe that
such imitation firearm is a real firearm.
(r) Licensed citizen refers to any Filipino
who complies with the qualifications set
forth in this Act and duly issued with a
license to possess or to carry firearms
outside of the residence in accordance with
this Act.
(s) Licensed, juridical entity refers to
corporations, organizations, businesses
including security agencies and local
government units (LGUs) which are
licensed to own and possess firearms in
accordance with this Act.
(t) Light weapons are: Class-A Light
weapons which refer to self-loading pistols,
rifles and carbines, submachine guns,
assault rifles and light machine guns not
exceeding caliber 7.62MM which have fully
automatic mode; and Class-B Light
weapons which refer to weapons designed
for use by two (2) or more persons serving
as a crew, or rifles and machine guns
exceeding caliber 7.62MM such as heavy
machine guns, handheld underbarrel and
mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-
aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns,
recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-
tank missile and rocket systems, portable
launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems,
and mortars of a caliber of less than
100MM.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 191
(u) Long certificate of registration refers to
licenses issued to government agencies or
offices or government-owned or -controlled
corporations for firearms to be used by their
officials and employees who are qualified to
possess firearms as provider in this Act,
excluding security guards.
(v) Loose firearm refers to an unregistered
firearm, an obliterated or altered firearm,
firearm which has been lost or stolen,
illegally manufactured firearms, registered
firearms in the possession of an individual
other than the licensee and those with
revoked licenses in accordance with the
rules and regulations.
(w) Major part or components of a
firearm refers to the barrel, slide, frame,
receiver, cylinder or the bolt assembly. The
term also includes any part or kit designed
and intended for use in converting a semi-
automatic burst to a full automatic firearm.
(x) Minor parts of a firearm refers to the
parts of the firearm other than the major
parts which are necessary to effect and
complete the action of expelling a projectile
by way of combustion, except those
classified as accessories.
(y) Permit to carry firearm outside of
residence refers to a written authority
issued to a licensed citizen by the Chief of
the PNP which entitles such person to carry
his/her registered or lawfully issued firearm
outside of the residence for the duration and
purpose specified in the authority.
(z) Permit to transport firearm refers to a
written authority issued to a licensed citizen
or entity by the Chief of the PNP or by a
PNP Regional Director which entitles such
person or entity to transport a particular
firearm from and to a specific location within
the duration and purpose in the authority.
(aa) Residence refers to the place or places
of abode of the licensed citizen as indicated
in his/her license.
(bb) Shooting range refers to a facility
established for the purpose of firearms
training and skills development, firearm
testing, as well as for sports and
competition shooting either for the exclusive
use of its members or open to the general
public, duly registered with and accredited
in good standing by the FEO of the PNP.
(cc) Short certificate of registration refers to
a certificate issued by the FEO of the PNP
for a government official or employee who
was issued by his/her employer
department, agency or government-owned
or -controlled corporation a firearm covered
by the long certificate of registration.
(dd) Small arms refer to firearms intended
to be or primarily designed for individual use
or that which is generally considered to
mean a weapon intended to be fired from
the hand or shoulder, which are not capable
of fully automatic bursts of discharge, such
as:
(1) Handgun which is a firearm
intended to be fired from the hand,
which includes:
(i) A pistol which is a hand-
operated firearm having a
chamber integral with or
permanently aligned with the
bore which may be self-
loading; and
(ii) Revolver which is a hand-
operated firearm with a
revolving cylinder containing
chambers for individual
cartridges.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 192

(2) Rifle which is a shoulder firearm
or designed to be fired from the
shoulder that can discharge a bullet
through a rifled barrel by different
actions of loading, which may be
classified as lever, bolt, or self-
loading; and
license to own and possess a firearm or firearms
and ammunition, the applicant must be a Filipino
citizen, at least twenty-one (21) years old and has
gainful work, occupation or business or has filed
an Income Tax Return (ITR) for the preceding year
as proof of income, profession, business or
occupation.

(3) Shotgun which is a weapon In addition, the applicant shall submit the following
designed, made and intended to fire certification issued by appropriate authorities
a number of ball shots or a single attesting the following:
projectile through a smooth bore by
the action or energy from burning (a) The applicant has not been convicted of
gunpowder. any crime involving moral turpitude;

(ee) Sports shooting competition refers to a (b) The applicant has passed the
defensive, precision or practical sport psychiatric test administered by a PNP-
shooting competition duly authorized by the accredited psychologist or psychiatrist;
FEO of the PNP.
(c) The applicant has passed the drug test
(ff) Tampered, obliterated or altered conducted by an accredited and authorized
firearm refers to any firearm whose serial drug testing laboratory or clinic;
number or other identification or ballistics
characteristics have been intentionally (d) The applicant has passed a gun safety
tampered with, obliterated or altered without seminar which is administered by the PNP
authority or in order to conceal its source, or a registered and authorized gun club;
identity or ownership.
(e) The applicant has filed in writing the
(gg) Thermal weapon sight refers to a application to possess a registered firearm
battery operated, uncooled thermal imaging which shall state the personal
device which amplifies available thermal circumstances of the applicant;
signatures so that the viewed scene
becomes clear to the operator which is used (f) The applicant must present a police
to locate and engage targets during daylight clearance from the city or municipality
and from low light to total darkness and police office; and
operates in adverse conditions such as light
rain, light snow, and dry smoke or in (g) The applicant has not been convicted or
conjunction with other optical and red dot is currently an accused in a pending
sights. criminal case before any court of law for a
crime that is punishable with a penalty of
ARTICLE II more than two (2) years.
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS For purposes of this Act, an acquittal or permanent
dismissal of a criminal case before the courts of
Section 4. Standards and Requisites for Issuance law shall qualify the accused thereof to qualify and
of and Obtaining a License to Own and Possess acquire a license.
Firearms. – In order to qualify and acquire a
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 193

The applicant shall pay the reasonable licensing Section 6. Ownership of Firearms by the National
fees as may be provided in the implementing rules Government. – All firearms owned by the National
and regulations of this Act. Government shall be registered with the FEO of
the PNP in the name of the Republic of the
An applicant who intends to possess a firearm Philippines. Such registration shall be exempt from
owned by a juridical entity shall submit his/her duty all duties and taxes that may otherwise be levied
detail order to the FEO of the PNP. on other authorized owners of firearms. For reason
of national security, firearms of the Armed Forces
Section 5. Ownership of Firearms and of the Philippines (AFP), Coast Guard and other
Ammunition by a Juridical Entity. – A juridical law enforcement agencies shall only be reported
person maintaining its own security force may be to the FEO of the PNP.
issued a regular license to own and possess
firearms and ammunition under the following Section 7. Carrying of Firearms Outside of
conditions: Residence or Place of Business. – A permit to
carry firearms outside of residence shall be issued
(a) It must be Filipino-owned and duly by the Chief of the PNP or his/her duly authorized
registered with the Securities and representative to any qualified person whose life is
Exchange Commission (SEC); under actual threat or his/her life is in imminent
danger due to the nature of his/her profession,
(b) It is current, operational and a continuing occupation or business.
concern;
It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove that
(c) It has completed and submitted all its his/her life is under actual threat by submitting a
reportorial requirements to the SEC; and threat assessment certificate from the PNP.

(d) It has paid all its income taxes for the For purposes of this Act, the following
year, as duly certified by the Bureau of professionals are considered to be in imminent
Internal Revenue. danger due to the nature of their profession,
occupation or business:
The application shall be made in the name of the
juridical person represented by its President or any (a) Members of the Philippine Bar;
of its officers mentioned below as duly authorized
in a board resolution to that effect: Provided, That (b) Certified Public Accountants;
the officer applying for the juridical entity, shall
possess all the qualifications required of a citizen (c) Accredited Media Practitioners;
applying for a license to possess firearms.
(d) Cashiers, Bank Tellers;
Other corporate officers eligible to represent the
juridical person are: the vice president, treasurer, (e) Priests, Ministers, Rabbi, Imams;
and board secretary.
(f) Physicians and Nurses;
Security agencies and LGUs shall be included in
this category of licensed holders but shall be (g) Engineers; and
subject to additional requirements as may be
required by the Chief of the PNP. (h) Businessmen, who by the nature of their
business or undertaking, are exposed to
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 194

high risk of being targets of criminal Section 10. Firearms That May Be Registered. –
elements. Only small arms may be registered by licensed
citizens or licensed juridical entities for ownership,
ARTICLE III possession and concealed carry. A light weapon
REGISTRATION AND LICENSING shall be lawfully acquired or possessed exclusively
by the AFP, the PNP and other law enforcement
Section 8. Authority to Issue License. – The Chief agencies authorized by the President in the
of the PNP, through the FEO of the PNP, shall performance of their duties: Provided, That private
issue licenses to qualified individuals and to cause individuals who already have licenses to possess
the registration of firearms. Class-A light weapons upon the effectivity of this
Act shall not be deprived of the privilege to
Section 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. – continue possessing the same and renewing the
Subject to the requirements set forth in this Act and licenses therefor, for the sole reason that these
payment of required fees to be determined by the firearms are Class "A" light weapons, and shall be
Chief of the PNP, a qualified individual may be required to comply with other applicable provisions
issued the appropriate license under the following of this Act.
categories;
Section 11. Registration of Firearms. – The
Type 1 license – allows a citizen to own and licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity shall
possess a maximum of two (2) registered register his/her/its firearms so purchased with the
firearms; FEO of the PNP in accordance with the type of
license such licensed citizen or licensed juridical
Type 2 license – allows a citizen to own and entity possesses. A certificate of registration of the
possess a maximum of five (5) registered firearm shall be issued upon payment of
firearms; reasonable fees.

Type 3 license – allows a citizen to own and For purposes of this Act, registration refers to the
possess a maximum of ten (10) registered application, approval, record-keeping and
firearms; monitoring of firearms with the FEO of the PNP in
accordance with the type of license issued to any
Type 4 license – allows a citizen to own and person under Section 9 of this Act.
possess a maximum of fifteen (15)
registered firearms; and Section 12. License to Possess Ammunition
Necessarily Included. – The licenses granted to
Type 5 license – allows a citizen, who is a qualified citizens or juridical entities as provided in
certified gun collector, to own and possess Section 9 of this Act shall include the license to
more than fifteen (15) registered firearms. possess ammunition with a maximum of fifty (50)
rounds for each registered firearm: Provided; That
For Types 1 to 5 licenses, a vault or a container the FEO of the PNP may allow more ammunition
secured by lock and key or other security to be possessed by licensed sports shooters.
measures for the safekeeping of firearms shall be
required. Section 13. Issuance of License to Manufacture or
Deal In Firearms and Ammunition. – Any person
For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the citizen must comply desiring to manufacture or deal in firearms, parts
with the inspection and bond requirements. of firearms or ammunition thereof, or instruments
and implements used or intended to be used in the
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 195

manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms or License to Manufacture firearms and ammunition

ammunition, shall make an application to: shall also include the following:

(a) The Secretary of the Department of the (a) The authority to manufacture and
Interior and Local Government (DILG) in the assemble firearms, ammunition, spare
case of an application for a license to parts and accessories, ammunition
manufacture; and components, and reloading of ammunitions,
within sites, areas, and factories stated
(b) The Chief of the PNP in the case of a therein. The Secretary of the DILG shall
license to deal in firearms and firearms approve such license;
parts, ammunition and gun repair.
(b) The license to deal in or sell all the items
The applicant shall state the amount of covered by the License to Manufacture,
capitalization for manufacture or cost of the such as parts, firearms or ammunition and
purchase and sale of said articles intended to be components;
transacted by such applicant; and the types of
firms, ammunition or implements which the (c) The authority to subcontract the
applicant intends to manufacture or purchase and manufacturing of parts and accessories
sell under the license applied for; and such necessary for the firearms which the
additional information as may be especially manufacturer is licensed to
requested by the Secretary of the DILG or the manufacture: Provided, That the
Chief of the PNP. subcontractor of major parts or major
components is also licensed to manufacture
The Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of the PNP firearms and ammunition; and
may approve or disapprove such application
based on the prescribed guidelines. In the case of (d) The authority to import machinery,
approval, the Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of equipment, and firearm parts and
the PNP shall indicate the amount of the bond to ammunition components for the
be executed by the applicant before the issuance manufacture thereof. Firearm parts and
of the license and the period of time by which said ammunition components to be imported
license shall be effective, unless sooner revoked shall, however, be limited to those
by their authority. authorized to be manufactured as reflected
in the approved License to Manufacture.
Upon approval of the license to manufacture or The Import Permit shall be under the
otherwise deal in firearms by the Secretary of the administration of the PNP.
DILG or the Chief of the PNP as the case may be,
the same shall be transmitted to the FEO of the
A licensed manufacturer of ammunition is also
PNP which shall issue the license in accordance
entitled to import various reference firearms
with the approved terms and conditions, upon the
needed to test the ammunition manufactured
execution and delivery by the applicant of the
under the License to Manufacture. A licensed
required bond conditioned upon the faithful manufacturer of firearms, on the other hand, is
compliance on the part of the licensee to the laws
entitled to import various firearms for reference,
and regulations relative to the business licensed.
test and evaluation for manufacture of similar,
types of firearms covered by the License to
Section 14. Scope of License to Manufacture Manufacture.
Firearms and Ammunition. – The scope of the
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 196

An export permit shall, however, be necessary to from his/her residence to the firing range/s and
export manufactured parts or finished products of competition sites as may be warranted.
firearms and ammunition. The Export Permit of
firearms and ammunition shall be under the Section 19. Renewal of Licenses and
administration of the PNP. Registration. – All types of licenses to possess a
firearm shall be renewed every two (2) years.
Section 15. Registration of Locally Manufactured Failure to renew the license on or before the date
and Imported Firearms. – Local manufacturers of its expiration shall cause the revocation of the
and importers of firearms and major parts thereof license and of the registration of the firearm/s
shall register the same as follows: under said licensee.

(a) For locally manufactured firearms and The registration of the firearm shall be renewed
major parts thereof, the initial registration every four (4) years. Failure to renew the
shall be done at the manufacturing registration of the firearm on or before the date of
facility: Provided, That firearms intended for expiration shall cause the revocation of the license
export shall no longer be subjected to of the firearm. The said firearm shall be
ballistic identification procedures; and confiscated or forfeited in favor of the government
after due process.
(b) For imported firearms and major parts
thereof, the registration shall be done upon The failure to renew a license or registration within
arrival at the FEO of the PNP storage the periods stated above on two (2) occasions
facility. shall cause the holder of the firearm to be
perpetually disqualified from applying for any
Section 16. License and Scope of License to firearm license. The application for the renewal of
Deal. – The License to Deal authorizes the the license or registration may be submitted to the
purchase, sale and general business in handling FEO of the PNP, within six (6) months before the
firearms and ammunition, major and minor parts of date of the expiration of such license or
firearms, accessories, spare parts, components, registration.
and reloading machines, which shall be issued by
the Chief of the PNP. Section 20. Inspection and Inventory. – The Chief
of the PNP or his/her authorized representative
Section 17. License and Scope of License for shall require the submission of reports, inspect or
Gunsmiths. – The license for gunsmiths shall allow examine the inventory and records of a licensed
the grantee to repair registered firearms. The manufacturer, dealer or importer of firearms and
license shall include customization of firearms ammunition during reasonable hours.
from finished or manufactured parts thereof on per
order basis and not in commercial quantities and ARTICLE IV
making the minor parts thereof, i.e. pins, triggers, ACQUISITION, DEPOSIT OF FIREARMS,
trigger bows, sights and the like only for the ABANDONED, DEMILITARIZED AND ANTIQUE
purpose of repairing the registered firearm. The FIREARMS
license for gunsmiths shall be issued by the Chief
of the PNP. Section 21. Acquisition or Purchase and Sale of
Firearms and Ammunition. – Firearms and
Section 18. Firearms for Use in Sports and ammunition may only be acquired or purchased
Competitions. – A qualified individual shall apply from authorized dealers, importers or local
for a permit to transport his/her registered firearm/s manufacturers and may be transferred or sold only
from a licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity to
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 197

another licensed citizen or licensed juridical Police Regional Office for safekeeping.
entity: Provided, That, during election periods, the Reasonable fees for storage shall be imposed.
sale and registration of firearms and ammunition
and the issuance of the corresponding licenses to Section 25. Abandoned Firearms and
citizens shall be allowed on the condition that the Ammunition. – Any firearm or ammunition
transport or delivery thereof shall strictly comply deposited in the custody of the FEO of the PNP
with the issuances, resolutions, rules and pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall be
regulations promulgated by the Commission on deemed to have been abandoned by the owner or
Elections. his/her authorized representative if he/she failed to
reclaim the same within five (5) years or failed to
Section 22. Deposit of Firearms by Persons advise the FEO of the PNP of the disposition to be
Arriving From Abroad. – A person arriving in the made thereof. Thereafter, the FEO of the PNP may
Philippines who is legally in possession of any dispose of the same after compliance with
firearm or ammunition in his/her country of origin established procedures.
and who has declared the existence of the firearm
upon embarkation and disembarkation but whose Section 26. Death or Disability of Licensee. –
firearm is not registered in the Philippines in Upon the death or legal disability of the holder of a
accordance with this Act shall deposit the same firearm license, it shall be the duty of his/her next
upon written receipt with the Collector of Customs of kin, nearest relative, legal representative, or
for delivery to the FEO of the PNP for safekeeping, other person who shall knowingly come into
or for the issuance of a permit to transport if the possession of such firearm or ammunition, to
person is a competitor in a sports shooting deliver the same to the FEO of the PNP or Police
competition. If the importation of the same is Regional Office, and such firearm or ammunition
allowed and the party in question desires to obtain shall be retained by the police custodian pending
a domestic firearm license, the same should be the issuance of a license and its registration in
undertaken in accordance with the provisions of accordance, with this Act. The failure to deliver the
this Act. If no license is desired or leave to import firearm or ammunition within six (6) months after
is not granted, the firearm or ammunition in the death or legal disability of the licensee shall
question shall remain in the custody of the FEO of render the possessor liable for illegal possession
the PNP until otherwise disposed of in-accordance of the firearm.
with law.
Section 27. Antique Firearm. – Any person who
Section 23. Return of Firearms to Owner upon possesses an antique firearm shall register the
Departure from the Philippines. – Upon the same and secure a collector’s license from the
departure from the Philippines of any person FEO of the PNP. Proper storage of antique firearm
whose firearm or ammunition is in the custody of shall be strictly imposed. Noncompliance of this
the FEO of the PNP, the same shall, upon timely provision shall be considered as illegal possession
request, be delivered to the person through the of the firearm as penalized in this Act.
Collector of Customs. In the case of a participant
in a local sports shooting competition, the firearm ARTICLE V
must be presented to the Collector of Customs PENAL PROVISIONS
before the same is allowed to be loaded on board
the carrier on which the person is to board. Section 28. Unlawful Acquisition, or Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition. – The unlawful
Section 24. Safekeeping of Firearms and acquisition, possession of firearms and
Ammunition. – Any licensee may deposit a ammunition shall be penalized as follows:
registered firearm to the FEO of the PNP, or any
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 198
(a) The penalty of prision mayor in its
medium period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or
possess a small arm;
(b) The penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed if three (3) or more small arms or
Class-A light weapons are unlawfully
acquired or possessed by any person;
(c) The penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period shall be imposed upon
any person who shall unlawfully acquire or
possess a Class-A light weapon;
(d) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon any person who shall,
unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-B
light weapon;
(e) The penalty of one (1) degree higher
than that provided in paragraphs (a) to (c)
in this section shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully possess any
firearm under any or combination of the
following conditions:
(1) Loaded with ammunition or
inserted with a loaded magazine;
(2) Fitted or mounted with laser or
any gadget used to guide the shooter
to hit the target such as thermal
weapon sight (TWS) and the like;
(3) Fitted or mounted with sniper
scopes, firearm muffler or firearm
silencer;
(4) Accompanied with an extra
barrel; and
(5) Converted to be capable of firing
full automatic bursts.
(f) The penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or
possess a major part of a small arm;
(g) The penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or
possess ammunition for a small arm or
Class-A light weapon. If the violation of this
paragraph is committed by the same person
charged with the unlawful acquisition or
possession of a small arm, the former
violation shall be absorbed by the latter;
(h) The penalty of prision mayor in its
medium period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or
possess a major part of a Class-A light
weapon;
(i) The penalty of prision mayor in its
medium period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully acquire or
possess ammunition for a Class-A light
weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is
committed by the same person charged
with the unlawful acquisition or possession
of a Class-A light weapon, the former
violation shall be absorbed by the latter;
(j) The penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period shall be imposed upon
any person who shall unlawfully acquire or
possess a major part of a Class-B light
weapon; and
(k) The penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period shall be imposed upon
any person who shall unlawfully acquire or
possess ammunition for a Class-B light
weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is
committed by the same person charged
with the unlawful acquisition or possession
of a Class-B light weapon, the former
violation shall be absorbed by the latter.
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 199

Section 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the carried outside of their residence in the course of
Commission of a Crime. – The use of a loose their employment.
firearm, when inherent in the commission of a
crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code Section 31. Absence of Permit to Carry Outside of
or other special laws, shall be considered as an Residence. – The penalty of prision
aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the correccional and a fine of Ten thousand pesos
crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is (P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person
penalized by the law with a maximum penalty who is licensed to own a firearm but who shall
which is lower than that prescribed in the carry the registered firearm outside his/her
preceding section for illegal possession of firearm, residence without any legal authority therefor.
the penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall
be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime Section 32. Unlawful Manufacture, Importation,
charged: Provided, further, That if the crime Sale or Disposition of Firearms or Ammunition or
committed with the use of a loose firearm is Parts Thereof, Machinery, Tool or Instrument Used
penalized by the law with a maximum penalty or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
which is equal to that imposed under the preceding Firearms, Ammunition or Parts Thereof. – The
section for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who
shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the shall unlawfully engage in the manufacture,
crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code importation, sale or disposition of a firearm or
or other special laws of which he/she is found ammunition, or a major part of a firearm or
guilty. ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used
or intended to be used by the same person in the
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or manufacture of a firearm, ammunition, or a major
incident to, or in connection with the crime of part thereof.
rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d’
etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an The possession of any machinery, tool or
element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or instrument used directly in the manufacture of
attempted coup d’ etat. firearms, ammunition, or major parts thereof by
any person whose business, employment or
If the crime is committed by the person without activity does not lawfully deal with the possession
using the loose firearm, the violation of this Act of such article, shall be prima facie evidence that
shall be considered as a distinct and separate such article is intended to be used in the unlawful
offense. or illegal manufacture of firearms, ammunition or
parts thereof.
Section 30. Liability of Juridical Person. – The
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum to prision The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period
mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon to prision mayor in its medium period shall be
the owner, president, manager, director or other imposed upon any laborer, worker or employee of
responsible officer of/any public or private firm, a licensed firearms dealer who shall unlawfully
company, corporation or entity who shall willfully or take, sell or otherwise dispose of parts of firearms
knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such or ammunition which the company manufactures
firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by and sells, and other materials used by the
any person or persons found guilty of violating the company in the manufacture or sale of firearms or
provisions of the preceding section, or willfully or ammunition. The buyer or possessor of such
knowingly allow any of them to use unregistered stolen part or material, who is aware that such part
firearm or firearms without any legal authority to be
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 200

or material was stolen, shall suffer the same Section 36. In Custodia Legis. – During the
penalty as the laborer, worker or employee. pendency of any case filed in violation of this Act,
seized firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof,
If the violation or offense is committed by a machinery, tools or instruments shall remain in the
corporation, partnership, association or other custody of the court. If the court decides that it has
juridical entity, the penalty provided for in this no adequate means to safely keep the same, the
section shall be imposed upon the directors, court shall issue an order to turn over to the PNP
officers, employees or other officials or persons Crime Laboratory such firearm, ammunition, or
therein who knowingly and willingly participated in parts thereof, machinery, tools or instruments in its
the unlawful act. custody during the pendency of the case and to
produce the same to the court when so ordered.
Section 33. Arms Smuggling. – The penalty No bond shall be admitted for the release of the
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any firearm, ammunition or parts thereof, machinery,
person who shall engage or participate in arms tool or instrument. Any violation of this paragraph
smuggling as defined in this Act. shall be punishable by prision mayor in its
minimum period to prision mayor in its medium
Section 34. Tampering, Obliteration or Alteration period.
of Firearms Identification. – The penalty of prision
correccional to prision mayor in its minimum Section 37. Confiscation and Forfeiture. – The
period shall be imposed upon any person who imposition of penalty for any violation of this Act
shall tamper, obliterate or alter without authority shall carry with it the accessory penalty of
the barrel, slide, frame, receiver, cylinder, or bolt confiscation and forfeiture of the firearm,
assembly, including the name of the maker, model, ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tool or
or serial number of any firearm, or who shall instrument in favor of the government which shall
replace without authority the barrel, slide, frame, be disposed of in accordance with law.
receiver, cylinder, or bolt assembly, including its
individual or peculiar identifying characteristics Section 38. Liability for Planting Evidence. – The
essential in forensic examination of a firearm or penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period
light weapon. shall be imposed upon any person who shall
willfully and maliciously insert; place, and/or
The PNP shall place this information, including its attach, directly or indirectly, through any overt or
individual or peculiar identifying characteristics into covert act, any firearm, or ammunition, or parts
the database of integrated firearms identification thereof in the person, house, effects, or in the
system of the PNP Crime Laboratory for future use immediate vicinity of an innocent individual for the
and identification of a particular firearm. purpose of implicating or incriminating the person,
or imputing the commission of any violation of the
Section 35. Use of an Imitation Firearm. – An provisions of this Act to said individual. If the
imitation firearm used in the commission of a crime person found guilty under this paragraph is a
shall be considered a real firearm as defined in this public officer or employee, such person shall suffer
Act and the person who committed the crime shall the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
be punished in accordance with this
Act: Provided, That injuries caused on the Section 39. Grounds for Revocation, Cancellation
occasion of the conduct of competitions, sports, or Suspension of License or Permit. – The Chief of
games, or any recreation activities involving the PNP or his/her authorized representative may
imitation firearms shall not be punishable under revoke, cancel or suspend a license or permit on
this Act. the following grounds:
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 201

(a) Commission of a crime or offense holding a valid firearm license who changes
involving the firearm, ammunition, of major residence or office address other than that
parts thereof; indicated in the license card and fails within a
period of thirty (30) days from said transfer to notify
(b) Conviction of a crime involving moral the FEO of the PNP of such change of address.
turpitude or any offense where the penalty
carries an imprisonment of more than six (6) Section 41. Illegal Transfer/Registration of
years; Firearms. – It shall be unlawful to transfer
possession of any firearm to any person who has
(c) Loss of the firearm, ammunition, or any not yet obtained or secured the necessary license
parts thereof through negligence; or permit thereof.

(d) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or The penalty of prision correccional shall be
major parts thereof outside of residence or imposed upon any person who shall violate the
workplace without, the proper permit to provision of the preceding paragraph. In addition,
carry the same; he/she shall be disqualified to apply for a license
to possess other firearms and all his/her existing
(e) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or firearms licenses whether for purposes of
major parts thereof in prohibited places; commerce or possession, shall be revoked. If
government-issued firearms, ammunition or major
(f) Dismissal for cause from the service in parts of firearms or light weapons are unlawfully
case of government official and employee; disposed, sold or transferred by any law
enforcement agent or public officer to private
(g) Commission of any of the acts penalized individuals, the penalty of reclusion temporal shall
under Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise be imposed.
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002″; Any public officer or employee or any person who
shall facilitate the registration of a firearm through
(h) Submission of falsified documents or fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or submission of
misrepresentation in the application to falsified documents shall suffer the penalty
obtain a license or permit; of prision correccional.

(i) Noncompliance of reportorial ARTICLE VI

requirements; and FINAL PROVISIONS

(j) By virtue of a court order.
Section 40. Failure to Notify Lost or Stolen
Firearm or Light Weapon. – A fine of Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
licensed firearm holder who fails to report to the
FEO of the PNP that the subject firearm has been
lost or stolen within a period of thirty (30) days from
the date of discovery.
Section 42. Firearms Repository. – The FEO of
the PNP shall be the sole repository of all firearms
records to include imported and locally
manufactured firearms and ammunition. Within
one (1) year upon approval of this Act, all military
and law enforcement agencies, government
agencies, LGUs and government-owned or -
controlled corporations shall submit an inventory of
all their firearms and ammunition to the PNP.

Likewise, a fine of Five thousand pesos Section 43. Final Amnesty. – Persons in
(P5,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person possession of unregistered firearms and holders of
 CRIM LAW II FEBRUARY 10, 2018 ACJUCO 202

expired license or unregistered firearms shall

register and renew the same through the Final
General Amnesty within six (6) months from the
promulgation of the implementing rules and
regulations of this Act. During the interim period of
six (6) months, no person applying for license shall
be charged of any delinquent payment accruing to
the firearm subject for registration. The PNP shall
conduct an intensive nationwide campaign to
ensure that the general public is properly informed
of the provisions of this Act.

Section 44. Implementing Rules and

Regulations. – Within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the effectivity of this Act, the Chief of the
PNP, after public hearings and consultation with
concerned sectors of society shall formulate the
necessary rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of this Act to be published in at
least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.

Section 45. Repealing Clause. – This Act repeals

Sections 1, 2, 5 and 7 of Presidential Decree No.
1866, as amended, and Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 8294 and all other laws, executive orders,
letters of instruction, issuances, circulars,
administrative orders, rules or regulations that are
inconsistent herewith.

Section 46. Separability Clause. – If any provision

of this Act or any part hereof is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the
provision not otherwise affected shall remain valid
and subsisting.

Section 47. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect

after fifteen (15) days from its publication in a
newspaper of nationwide circulation.