G.R. No.
164457 April 11, 2012 The Prosecution’s first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he
ANNA LERIMA PATULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must rigidlytest the State’s
evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidenceadheres to the basic
rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime
charged upon such evidence. Nothing less is demanded of the judge;
otherwise, the guarantee of due process of law is nullified.The accused
need notadduceanythingto rebut evidence that is discredited for failing the
test.Acquittal should then follow.
Antecedents
Petitioner was charged withestafaunder an informationfiled in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in DumagueteCitythat averred:
That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997 and for
sometime prior thereto, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a
saleswoman of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City,
having collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from several
customers of said company under the express obligation to account for
the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company,
but far from complying with her obligation and after a reasonable period
of time despite repeated demands therefore, and with intent to defraud the
said company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
fail to deliver the said collection to the said company but instead, did, then
and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply
and convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid amount
of P131,286.97.
Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.1
Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the information. At pre-
trial, no stipulation of factswas had, and petitioner did not avail herself of
plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
was the branch manager of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc.
(Footlucker’s) in Dumaguete City since October 8, 1994; that petitioner
was an employee of Footlucker’s, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she
became a sales representative; that as a sales representative she was
authorized to take orders from wholesale customers coming from
different towns (like Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia, Lumbangan and
Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect payments from
them; that she could issue and sign official receipts of Footlucker’s for
the payments, which she would then remit; that she would then submit the
receipts for the payments for tallying and reconciliation; that at first her
volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped, leading him to
confront her; that she responded that business was slow; that he
summoned the accounting clerk to verify; that the accounting clerk
discovered erasures on some collection receipts; that he decided to subject
her to an audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan; that he learned from
a customer of petitioner’s that the customer’s outstanding balance had
already been fully paid although that balance appeared unpaid in
Footlucker’s records; and that one night later on, petitioner and her
parents went to his house to deny having misappropriated any money of
Footlucker’s and to plead for him not to push through with a case against
her, promising to settle her account on a monthly basis; and that she did
not settle after that, but stopped reporting to work.2
On March 7, 2002, Go’s cross examination, re-direct examination and re-
crossexamination were completed.
The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan,
whomFootlucker’s employed as its store auditor since November 16,
1995 until her resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go had
requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told him that
they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still
reflected outstandingbalances for them; that she first conducted her audit
by going to the customers in places from Mabinay to Zamboanguitain
Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor; thatshe discovered in the course of
her audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in
the possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts written
on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office;
that upon completing her audit, she submittedto Go a written report
denominated as "List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA
PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March
16-20, 1997" marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner
had misappropriated the total amount ofP131,286.92.3
During Guivencan’s stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the ledgers
of petitioner’s various customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits
B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a first
column that contained the dates of the entries, a second that identified the
invoices by the number, a third that statedthe debit, a fourth that noted the
credit (or the amounts paid), and a fifth that summed the balances (debit
minus credit).Only 49 of theledgerswere formally offered and admitted
by the RTC because the 50thledger could no longer be found.
In the course of Guivencan’sdirect-examination,petitioner’s counsel
interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figuresentered in
Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because
the persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in
court.4With that, petitioner’s counsel did not anymore cross-examine
Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to be irrelevant because
she thereby tended to prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the
information.
TheProsecution thenformally offered its documentary exhibits, including
Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of
the receipts supposedly executed and issued by petitioner), inclusive, the
confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the accounts served
by petitioner, and Guivencan’s so-called Summary (Final Report) of
Discrepancies.5
After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a
demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the intention to do so,
and instead rested itscase.The Prosecution and Defense submitted their
respective memoranda, and submitted the case for decision.6
On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had
opted "not to present evidence for her defense" the Prosecution’s evidence
remained "unrefuted and uncontroverted,"7rendered its decision finding
petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the Court
finds ANNA LERIMA PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa under Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and
accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an INDETERMINATE
PENALTY of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum to 18 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum
with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify private
complainant the amount of P131,286.92 with interest at 12% per annum
until fully paid and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the cash bail put up by the accused shall be effective only until the
promulgation of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC denied the
motion on May 7, 2004.9
Issues
Insisting that the RTC’s judgment "grossly violated [her] Constitutional
and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her because, while the charge against her is estafa under Art. 315,
par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the evidence presented against her
and upon which her conviction was based, was falsification, an offense
not alleged or included in the Information under which she was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty," and that said judgment likewise "blatantly
ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules on admission of evidence in
that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all private
documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved
in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence," petitioner has directly appealed to the Court via petition for
review on certiorari, positing the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR THAT
MATTER , CHARGED OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE CONVICTED UPON OR BY
EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER WAS VIOLATED
WHEN SHE WAS CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF
FALSIFICATION CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST
HER IS ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER ART.
315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
IN EVIDENCE, EXHIBITS "B" TO "YY"-"YY-2", ALL PRIVATE
DOCUMENTS, THE DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF
WHICH WERE NOT PROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC. 20,
RULE 132 OF THE SAID REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE ASIDE
FROM THE FACT THAT SAID EXHIBITS TEND TO PROVE
FALSIFICATION BY THE ACCUSED, A CRIME NEITHER
CHARGED NOR ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
THE TESTIMONY OF KAREN GUIVENCAN DESPITE THE
OBJECTION THAT SAID TESTIMONY WHICH TRIED TO PROVE
THAT THE ACCUSED FALSIFIED EXHIBITS "B" TO "YY"-"YY-
2"INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HER, FOR BEING IRRELEVANT AND
IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE ACCUSED
IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
"REMAINS UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED" DESPITE
ACCUSED’S OBJECTION THAT SAID EVIDENCE IS
IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT TO THE CRIME CHARGED.
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSE’S NOT CROSS-EXAMINING
KAREN GUIVENCAN FOR THE REASON THAT HER TESTIMONY
IS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT AS IT TENDED TO PROVE
AN OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN INFORMATION RESULTED IN
THE ADMISSION OF SAID TESTIMONY AS BEING "UNREFUTED
AND UNCONTROVERTED", AND WHETHER OR NOT THE
DEFENSE’S OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
WAIVED IF THE DEFENSE CROSS-EXAMINED SAID WITNESS.
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT EXHIBIT "A", WHICH IS THE LIST OF CUSTOMERS
COVERED BY SALESWOMAN LERIMA PATULA WITH
DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS NOT HEARSAY AND SELF-
SERVING.10
The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:
1. Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to allege the
falsification of the duplicate receipts issued by petitioner to her
customersviolated petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation;
2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting evidence of the
falsification of the duplicate receiptsdespite the information not alleging
the falsification;
3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioner’s guilt
for estafaas charged despite their not being duly authenticated;and
4. Whether or not Guivencan’stestimony onthe ledgers and receipts
(Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioner’s
misappropriation or conversion wasinadmissible for being hearsay.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I Section 8.Designation of the offense.– Whenever possible, a complaint or
Failure of information to allege falsification
did not violate petitioner’s right to be informed
of thenatureand cause of the accusation
Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her Constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation when: (a) it held
that the information did not have to allege her falsification of the duplicate
receipts, and (b) when it convicted her of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Codeby relying on the evidence on
falsification.
The contentionof petitioner cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights guaranteessome rightsto every person accused of a
crime, among them the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, viz:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect when the
information was filed in the RTC, contained the following provisions on
the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in
the information, to wit:
information should state the designation given to the offense by the
statute, besides the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the
same, and if there is no such designation, reference should be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (7)
Section 9.Cause of accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language
without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the
offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable
the court to pronounce proper judgment. (8)
The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of
the accusation in the informationshould never be taken for granted by the
State. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly
charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an offense
other than that charged in the complaint or information would be violative
of the Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation.11 Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if
duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him.
The crime of estafacharged against petitioner was defined and penalized
by Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code, viz:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not
exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be
committed by any of the following means:
xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
xxx
The elements of the offense charged were as follows:
(a) That the offender received money, goods or other personal property in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
(b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such money, goods or
other personal property, or denied his part in its receipt;
(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to the prejudice
of another; and
(d) That the offended party made a demand on the offender for the
delivery or return of such money, goods or other personal property.12
According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner
misappropriated or converted the sums paid by her customers, and later
falsified the duplicates of the receipts before turning such duplicates to
her employer to show that the customers had paid less than the amounts
actually reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she committed the
falsification in order to conceal her misappropriation or conversion.
Considering that the falsificationwas not an offense separate and distinct
from the estafacharged against her, the Prosecution could legitimately
prove her acts of falsification as its means of establishing her
misappropriation or conversion as an essential ingredient of the crime
duly alleged in the information. In that manner, her right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not infringed or
denied to her.
We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein
completely pleaded the estafa defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Codewithin the context of the substantive
lawand the rules. Verily, there was no necessity for the information to
allege the acts of falsification by petitioner because falsification was not
an element of the estafacharged.
Not surprisingly,the RTC correctly dealt in its decision with petitioner’s
concern thuswise:
In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that [the]
prosecution’s evidence utterly fails to prove the crime charged. According
to the defense, the essence of Karen Guivencan’s testimony is that the
accused falsified the receipts issued to the customers served by her by
changing or altering the amounts in the duplicates of the receipts and
therefore, her testimony is immaterial and irrelevant as the charge is
misappropriation under Art. 315, paragraph (1b) of the Revised Penal
Code and there is no allegation whatsoever of any falsification or
alteration of amounts in the [i]nformation under which the accused was
arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY. Accused, thus, maintains that the
testimony of Karen Guivencan should therefore not be considered at all
as it tended to prove an offense not charged or included in the
[i]nformation and would violate [the] accused’s constitutional and
statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her. The Court is not in accord with such posture of the accused.
It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the crime
charged in the [i]nformation is merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru
[f]alsification of documents, the prosecution could not prove falsification.
Such argumentation is not correct. Since the information charges accused
only of misappropriation pursuant to Art. 315, par. (1b) of the Revised
[P]enal Code, the Court holds that there is no necessity of alleging the
falsification in the Information as it is not an element of the crime
charged.
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and
Falsification will constitute as one complex crime and when they are
considered as two separate offenses. The complex crime of Estafa
Through Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to falsify
certain documents to be able to obtain money or goods from another
person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary means of
committing estafa. However, if the falsification is committed to conceal
the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and falsification are
committed. In the instant case, when accused collected payments from the
customers, said collection which was in her possession was at her
disposal. The falsified or erroneous entries which she made on the
duplicate copies of the receipts were contrived to conceal some amount
of her collection which she did not remit to the company xxx.13
II
Testimonial and documentary evidence, being hearsay,
did not prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the
burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In
discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s duty is to prove each and every
element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of
guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included
therein.14 The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the
accused in the commission of the offense.15In doing all these, the
Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor
its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden
of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has
guaranteed.16Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden
of proof,17that he must then be acquitted and set free should the
Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor.In
other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is
inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not
discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime
charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for
it.
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in the information?
To establish the elements of estafaearlier mentioned, the Prosecution
presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various
documentsconsisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to
each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the
accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of
the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation
sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself.18The ledgers and receipts
were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties
of petitioner as Footlucker’s sales representative. On her part, Guivencan
conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received
by petitioner from the customersor remitted by petitioner to
Footlucker’s.This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,and that Guivencan
based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued
by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footlucker’s corresponding to
each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the
customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the
entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to
validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of
petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination
by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered theentire proof of
misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and
untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and
untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made
toSection 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness
can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a
substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that
establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft ofpersonal
knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose
because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to
her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency
of the extrajudicial source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard
another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the
witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and
under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such
testimony thendepends not upon theveracity of the witness but upon the
veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without
oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not
standing in court as a witness andcannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to
enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties,
to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any
ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that
she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent
author.19 Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the
ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant.20 The testimony may have been given under oath and before a
court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.21
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance
is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the
assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can
be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to
the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is
offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without
reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not
apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies
that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this
testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a
thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words.22 This kind
of utterance ishearsay in character but is not legal hearsay.23The
distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made,
to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts
asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.24
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only
rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from
consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the
opposing party to cross-examine the originaldeclarant claiming to have a
direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence.25If hearsay is allowed,
the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court.26It is
then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s
witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence
to establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguardinga party’s right to
cross-examine her adversary’s witness,the Rules of Court offers two
solutions. The firstsolution is to require that allthe witnesses in a judicial
trial or hearing be examined only in courtunder oath or affirmation.
Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution,viz:
xxx," the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally
applies to non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon
serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay
evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and
due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing
counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the
out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out-
of-court statement depends.27
Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencan’s testimony as well as
Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely
rejected as proof of petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion.

Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of III

witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and
under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or Lack of their proper authentication rendered
the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
witness shall be given orally. (1a) inadmissible as judicial evidence

The secondsolution is to require that all witnesses besubject to the cross-
examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Courtensuresthis solutionthusly:
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. – Upon the
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined
by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the
reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional
precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the
1987 Constitution,which guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face
Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as
evidence Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite their
being private documents that were not duly authenticated as required by
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes between a public
document and a private document for the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, viz:
Section 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments, and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required
by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the
documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by
virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because
it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court.In contrast, a private document is any other
writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or
sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed
by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed
by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only
in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one
within the context of Section 21,28 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b)
when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have
not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;29(c) when
thegenuineness and authenticity of the document
have been admitted;30 or (d) when the document is not being offered as
genuine.31
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were
private documents because private individuals executed or generated
them for private or business purposes or uses. Considering that none of
the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be
presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the
Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the manner
provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. – Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.
The Prosecution attempted to have Go authenticate the signature of
petitioner in various receipts, to wit:
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not tally with the
original receipts, do you have copies of these receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but it’s not now in my possession.
Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this Honorable Court,
can you assure this
(Next Page)
ATTY ABIERA (continuing):
Honorable Court that you will be able to present those receipts?
A. Yes.
Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the accused in this case,
Anna Lerima Patula?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the accused in this case?
A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the receipts also.
Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which we would
present this,or offer the same as soon as the original receipts can be
presented, but for purposes only of your testimony, I’m going to point
to you a certain signature over this receipt number FLDT96 20441, a
receipt from Cirila Askin, kindly go over the signature and tell the
Honorable Court whether you are familiar with the signature?
A. Yes, that is her signature.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word "collector".
(Next Page)
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature rather, of
the accused in this case appears?
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.
ATTY. ABIERA:
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting the
original receipts Your Honor, because it’s quite voluminous, so we will
just forego with the testimony of the witness but we will just present the
same using the testimony of another witness, for purposes of
identifying the signature of the accused. We will request that this
signature which has been identified to by the witness in this case be
marked, Your Honor, with the reservation to present the original copy and
present the same to offer as our exhibits but for the meantime, this is only
for the purposes of recording, Your Honor, which we request the same,
the receipt which has just been identified awhile ago be marked as our
Exhibit "A" You Honor.
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit "A".
ATTY. ABIERA:
And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "A-1".
(Next Page)
COURT:
Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. "A-1". What is the number of that
receipt?
ATTY. ABIERA:
Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that: received from
Cirila Askin.32
xxx
As the excerpts indicate, Go’s attempt at authentication of the signature
of petitioner on the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a
document that was marked as Exhibit A, while the purported signature of
petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled out
after the Prosecution admitted that the document was a
meremachinecopy, not the original. Thereafter, as if to soften its failed
attempt, the Prosecution expressly promised to produce at a later date the
originalsof the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other
receipts. But that promise was not even true, because almost in the same
breath the Prosecution offered to authenticate the signature of petitioner
on the receiptsthrougha different witness (though then still unnamed). As
matters turned out in the end, the effort to have Go authenticate both
themachinecopy of the receiptwith serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and
the signature of petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because the
machine copy was inexplicablyforgotten and was no longer evenincluded
in the Prosecution’s Offer of Documentary Evidence.
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96
No. 20441was subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough Guivencan.
However,the Prosecution did not establishthat the signature appearing on
Exhibit B was the same signature that Go had earliersought to identify to
be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy (Exhibit
A). This is borne out by the fact that the Prosecution abandoned Exhibit
A as the marking nomenclature for the machine copyof the receipt bearing
serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 for all intents and purposes of this case,
and used the same nomenclature to referinstead toan entirely
differentdocument entitled "List of Customers covered by ANA LERIMA
PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March 16-
20, 1997."
In her case, Guivencan’s identification of petitioner’s signature on two
receipts based alone on the fact that the signatures contained the legible
family name of Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw
infecting the documentary evidence against petitioner. Apparently,
Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioner’s signature on the
receipts either because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or
because she had not seen petitioner affix her signature on the receipts, as Mark it.33
the following excerpts from her testimony bear out: xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
ATTY. ZERNA to witness: Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603 issued to
Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the confirmation sheet, will one Divina Cadilig. Will you please identify this receipt if this is the
you go over these Miss witness? receipt of your office?
A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by the customer. The A.Yes.
other receipt is the one showing her payment prior to the last payment. Q.There is a signature over the portion for the collector. Whose signature
COURT: is this?
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts? A.Ms. Patula.
A. From the customer. Q.How do you know that this is her signature?
Q. And who issued those receipts? A.Because we can read the Patula.34
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
ATTY. ZERNA: We also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as to
We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as Exhibit the ledgers the Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies between
"B-3", receipt number 20441. the amountspetitioner hadallegedly received from the customers and the
(Next Page) amounts she had actually remitted to Footlucker’s. Guivencanexclusively
COURT: relied on the entries of the unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit
Mark it. report on petitioner’s supposed misappropriation or conversion, revealing
ATTY. ZERNA: her lack of independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the
The signature of the collector be marked as – following excerpts of her testimony show:
Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of the collector,
are your familiar with that signature? (shown to witness) ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
A. Yes. Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records showed that
Q. Whose signature is that? this Cecilia Askin has an account of P10,791.75?
A. Miss Patula. ATTY. DIEZ:
Q. How do you know? The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, office record.
A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula. COURT:
Q. Are you familiar with her signature? Let the witness answer.
A. Yes. WITNESS:
ATTY. ZERNA: A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that and
We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as Exhibit "B-3-a" showed it to the customers for confirmation.
COURT: ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Mark it. Q. What about the receipts?
ATTY. ZERNA: COURT:
The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit "B-4" and the Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you copied that
signature as Exhibit "B-4-a". amount in the ledger and you had it confirmed by the customers, what
COURT: was the result when you had it confirmed by the customers?
WITNESS: COURT:
A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a balance The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the receipt in your
of P10,971.75. earlier testimony? Is that what you referred to as the receipts, the original
ATTY. ZERNA to witness: receipts?
Q. Do you have a-what’s the basis of saying that the balance of this A. This is what I copied from the ledger.
customer is still P10,971.75 Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said showed that that
(Next Page) particular customer still has a balance of Ten Thousand something?
ATTY. ZERNA (continuing): A. The receipt is no longer here.
[i]n your office? Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered in the
COURT: ledger?
That was already answered pañero, the office has a ledger. A. Yes.36
Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you? In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecution’s evidence, it
A. No, Ma’am.35 should come as no surprise that petitioner’s counsel interposed timely
objections. Yet, the RTC mysteriously overruled the objections and
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of allowedthe Prosecutionto present the unauthenticated ledgers, as follows:
Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002) (Continuation of the Direct Examination of
ATTY. ZERNA to witness: Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)
ATTY. ZERNA:
Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the original and the CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION
duplicate, will you please enlighten the Honorable Court on that Q – Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us several ledgers.
discrepancy which you said? Where is it now?
A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully paid. Her A – It is here.
ledger shows a zero balance she has fully paid while in the original Q – Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina Cadilig, how
(Next page) much is her account in your office?
WITNESS (continuing): ATTY. DIEZ:
[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven hundred Ninety- Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to answer the
one Pesos and Seventy-five Centavos (10,791.75). question, let me interpose our objection on the ground that this ledger
COURT: has not been duly identified to by the person who made the same. This
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is indicated there? witness will be testifying on hearsay matters because the supposed
A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was already forwarded ledger was not identified to by the person who made the same.
to the Manila Office. COURT:
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing that it has Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I think they were
already a zero balance? already duly identified by this witness. As a matter of fact, it was she who
A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the original brought them to court
receipt she has still a balance. (Next Page)
xxx COURT (cont.):
ATTY. ZERNA: because these were the ledgers on file in their office.
The confirmation sheet --- ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the entries is not
this witness, Your Honor. How do we know that the entries there is
(sic) correct on the receipts submitted to their office.
COURT:
Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that. Let the
witness answer.
WITNESS:
A – It’s the office clerk in-charge.
COURT:
The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.
ATTY. ZERNA:
She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she is the
auditor of Footluckers.
COURT:
I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where those entries
were taken. So, you answer the query of counsel.
xxx
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a continuing
objection to the questions profounded(sic) on those ledgers on the
ground that, as I have said, it is hearsay.
COURT:
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted.
Q – (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who prepared the
entries on those ledgers, is she still connected with Footluckers?
A – She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,
COURT:
Alright proceed.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ZERNA:
Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of business. So,
exempt from the hearsay rule.
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.37
The mystery shrouding the RTC’s soft treatment of the Prosecution’s
flawed presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the
instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as withSection 22 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court,which contains instructions on how to prove the
genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as follows:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting
of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or
been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of
such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted
or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
(Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the
execution or signing of the documents,the Prosecution surely did not
authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably with the
aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That
was the onlyfair and just result, as the Court held in Malayan Insurance
Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation:38
On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends
that Jeanne King’s testimony was hearsay because she had no
personal knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting
respondent’s cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing
list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner
avers that even though King was personally assigned to handle and
monitor the importation of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation,
herein respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the
facts which gave rise to respondent’s cause of action. Further, petitioner
asserts, even though she personally prepared the summary of weight of
steel billets received by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge
of the weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.
At the outset, we must stress that respondent’s cause of action is founded
on breach of insurance contract covering cargo consisting of imported
steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to prove, first, its
importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued
at P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and
received by the importer, namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King,
who was assigned to handle respondent’s importations, including their
insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel billets
being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony
is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage
in the delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not have personal
knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though she
prepared the summary of the received steel billets, she based the
summary only on the receipts prepared by other persons. Her
testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It has no probative
value even if not objected to at the trial.
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly
authenticate respondent’s documentary evidence. Under Section 20,
Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed
it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any
person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its
execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to
whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed
execution thereof. In this case, respondent admits that King was none
of the aforementioned persons. She merely made the summary of the
weight of steel billets based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and
the SGS report. Thus, the summary of steel billets actually received
had no proven real basis, and King’s testimony on this point could
not be taken at face value.
xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or private.
Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations
in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Section 20of the same law,
in turn, provides that before any private document is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who
saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Here, respondent’s
documentary exhibits are private documents. They are not among
those enumerated in Section 19, thus, their due execution and
authenticity need to be proved before they can be admitted in
evidence.With the exception concerning the summary of the weight
of the steel billets imported, respondent presented no supporting
evidence concerning their authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be
utilized to prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short delivery of
the imported steel billets. In sum, we find no sufficient competent
evidence to prove petitioner’s liability.
That the Prosecution’s evidence was left uncontested because petitioner
decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-examination, and did not tender
her contrary evidencewas inconsequential. Although the trial court had
overruled the seasonable objections to Guivencan’s testimony
bypetitioner’s counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be denied
thathearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, had no probative
value.39Verily, the flaws of the Prosecution’s evidence were fundamental
and substantive, not merely technical and procedural, and were defects
that the adverse party’s waiver of her cross-examination or failure to
rebutcould not set right or cure. Nor did the trial court’s overruling of
petitioner’s objections imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and
value.
Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the
application of the hearsay rule by also terselystating that the ledgers "were
prepared in the regular course of business."40Seemingly, the RTC applied
Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near
the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated,
may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries
in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping mannerof
justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need
to show the concurrence of the several requisites before entries in the
course of business could be excepted from the hearsay rule. The requisites
are as follows:
(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer;
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or religious;
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE ANDREVERSESthe decision
convicting ANNA LERIMA PATULAof estafa as charged, and
ACQUITS her for failure of the Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil action brought against her
for
the recoveryof any amount still owing in favor of Footlucker’s Chain of
Stores, Inc.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty.41

The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of
every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the State’s evidence of guilt
in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic rules of
admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged
upon such evidence. The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the
guarantee of due of process of law in favor of the accused, who had no
obligation to prove her innocence. Heracquittal should follow.

IV

No reliable evidence on damage

Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt unreliable, the Court

declares that the disposition by the RTC ordering petitioner to indemnify
Footlucker’s in the amount of P131,286.92 with interest of 12% per
annum until fully paid was not yet shown to be factually founded. Yet,
she cannot now be absolved of civil liability on that basis. Heracquittal
has to bedeclared as without prejudice to the filing of a civil action against
her for the recovery of any amount that she may still owe to
Footlucker’s.1âwphi1
 G.R. No. 157766 July 12, 2007
ERNESTO L. SALAS vs. STA. MESA MARKET CORPORATION
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the April 30, 2001
decision of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 508882 and its
April 3, 2003 resolution denying reconsideration.
In a letter-agreement3 dated October 15, 1984, Primitivo E. Domingo
handed the management of his estate, including the respondent
corporation Sta. Mesa Market Corporation (SMMC), to petitioner Ernesto
L. Salas.4 As estate manager, petitioner was primarily tasked to ensure
SMMC's continued viability and profitability by redeveloping the Sta.
Mesa market and restructuring the corporation's finances.5 Domingo, on
the other hand, bound himself to transfer (on or before June 30,
1985)6 30% of SMMC's subscribed and paid-up capital stock to petitioner
as part of his compensation. But, if petitioner failed to achieve a monthly
market revenue of at least P350,000, he would be obliged to return the
shares of stock of SMMC to Domingo.7
On December 28, 1984, Domingo, as chairman of SMMC, and petitioner,
in his personal capacity and as chairman of Inter-Alia Management
Corporation (Inter-Alia), formalized their agreement under a property and
financial management contract (management contract).8
Shortly after the execution of the contract, SMMC, under petitioner's
management, leased the Sta. Mesa market to Malaca Realty Corporation
(Malaca).9 But it became apparent soon thereafter that Malaca was
financially incapable of improving and expanding the existing facilities
of the Sta. Mesa market.10 In fact, it was unable to pay the monthly
rent.11 Thus, SMMC terminated its lease contract with Malaca.12 As a
result, its board of directors became dissatisfied with petitioner's
management of the corporation. Thereafter, it ended its management
contract with petitioner (and Inter-Alia).13
On June 8, 1987, petitioner filed an action for specific performance and
damages14 against SMMC and Domingo15in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City.16 He alleged that SMMC's monthly market
revenue had surpassed P350,000 yet Domingo refused to comply with his
obligation to deliver 30% of the subscribed and paid-up capital stock of
SMMC to him.17
In his answer,18 Domingo argued that petitioner was not entitled to the
shares of SMMC. On the contrary, the corporation suffered additional
losses and incurred new liabilities (which respondents consistently
itemized in their pleadings) amounting to P1,935,995.06 over the twenty-
one (21) months petitioner was managing it.19
On August 21, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner.20 The trial court considered copies of SMMC's audited
financial statements which showed an improvement in the corporation's
monthly average gross income (from P251,790 in 1984 to P409,794 in
1985). It found that petitioner not only increased SMMC's monthly gross
income but also exceeded the target monthly gross income
of P350,000.21 Hence, it ordered respondent heirs to deliver the shares of
SMMC (equivalent to 30% of its total subscribed and paid-up capital
stocks) to petitioner.22
Respondent heirs appealed the judgment of the RTC to the CA. On April
30, 2001, the appellate court rendered its decision. It found that the trial
court erred in admitting petitioner's documentary evidence. According to
the CA, petitioner failed to prove the authenticity of the audited financial
statements. He did not present a representative of SMMC's external
auditor, Bejarin Jimenez & Co., to testify on the genuineness and due
execution of the audited financial statements of SMMC. Instead,
petitioner presented a memorandum prepared by a member of his
management team attesting to the increase in the corporation's monthly
market revenue. For this reason, the appellate court ruled that the audited
financial statements were not only self-serving but also hearsay.23 Thus,
the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed petitioner's complaint.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied.24 Thus,
this petition.
Petitioner avers that Amado Domingo, a vice-president of SMMC and an
heir of the deceased Primitivo E. Domingo, testified that the audited
financial statements presented in court were copies of those submitted by
SMMC to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) for purposes of tax payments and
compliance with reportorial requirements, respectively.25 Therefore,
Amado Domingo, in effect, admitted the genuineness and due execution
of the documents which made authentication unnecessary.
Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the audited financial
statements were inadmissible in evidence due to lack of proper
authentication.26
We agree with the CA.
The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited
financial statements of SMMC. Financial statements (which include the
balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow) show the
fiscal condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The
financial statements prepared by external auditors who are certified public
accountants (like those presented by petitioner) are audited financial
statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as general
rule, private documents.27 However, once financial statements are filed
with a government office pursuant to a provision of law,28 they become
public documents.29
Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its
admissibility as evidence. Public documents are admissible in evidence
even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. 30 On
the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless
they are properly authenticated.31 Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
a. By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
b. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.
Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as
evidence were mere copies of the audited financial statements submitted
to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies presented
were certified true copies32 of audited financial statements obtained or
secured from the BIR or the SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132
would have been public documents. Thus, the statements presented were
private documents. Consequently, authentication was a precondition to
their admissibility in evidence.
During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a
document presented as evidence is genuine and has been duly
executed33 or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor
executed by mistake or under duress.34 In this case, petitioner merely
presented a memorandum attesting to the increase in the corporation's
monthly market revenue, prepared by a member of his management team.
While there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence
to establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof available
must be presented.35 The best proof available, in this instance, would have
been the testimony of a representative of SMMC's external auditor who
prepared the audited financial statements. Inasmuch as there was none,
the audited financial statements were never authenticated.
Nevertheless, petitioner insists on the application of an exception to this
rule: authentication is not necessary where the adverse party has admitted
the genuineness and due execution of a document.36 The fact, however,
was that nowhere in his testimony did Amado Domingo categorically
admit the authenticity of the copies of the audited financial statements.
He only testified that SMMC regularly submitted its audited financial
statements to the BIR and SEC.37 There was never any admission that the
documents presented by petitioner were true or faithful copies of those
submitted to the BIR and the SEC.381avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April 30, 2001
decision and April 3, 2003 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 50888 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
 G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES GIMENEZ
Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules
is to assist and facilitate a trial court's function to be able to receive all the
evidence of the parties, and evaluate their admissibility and probative
value in the context of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings in
order to arrive at a conclusion as to the facts that transpired. Having been
able to establish the facts, the trial court will then be able to apply the law
and determine whether a complainant is deserving of the reliefs prayed
for in the pleading.
Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules
without a clear demonstration of the injury to a substantive right of the
defendant weighed against 19 years of litigation actively participated in
by both parties should not be encouraged.
There is likewise serious reversible error, even grave abuse of discretion,
when the Sandiganbayan dismisses a case on demurrer to evidence
without a full statement of its evaluation of the evidence presented and
offered and the interpretation of the relevant law. After all, dismissal on
the basis of demurrer to evidence is similar to a judgment. It is a final
order ruling on the merits of a case.
This is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions dated May 25, 20062 and September 13, 2006.3 The
Sandiganbayan deemed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
to have waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence4 and granted the
Motion to Dismiss of respondents Spouses Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa
Gimenez (Gimenez Spouses) based on demurrer to evidence.5
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), instituted a Complaint6 for Reconveyance,
Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez
Spouses before the Sandiganbayan.7 "The Complaint seeks to recover . .
. ill-gotten wealth . . . acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies,
agents[,] or nominees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda Marcos[.]"8
During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to
the positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions
of the Gimenez Spouses.9 The Republic presented the testimonies of Atty.
Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and
of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development
Department of PCGG.10 Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and
businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.11
On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall
Danilo R.V. Daniel’s testimony.12 The Republic then manifested that it
was "no longer presenting further evidence."13 Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 "to file
its formal offer of evidence."14
On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30)
days or until April 28, 2006, within which to file [its] formal offer of
evidence."15 This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a
Resolution of the same date.16
On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until
May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence.17 This
Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8,
2006.18 Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by
the Republic.
In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan
noted that the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence
notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the
date it terminated its presentation of evidence.19 Thus, it declared that the
Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.20
The first assailed Resolution provides:
It appearing that the plaintiff has long terminated the presentation of its
evidence on February 27, 2006, and it appearing further that it failed or
otherwise neglected to file its written formal offer of evidence for an
unreasonable period of time consisting of 75 days (i.e., 30 days original
period plus two extension periods totaling 45 days), the filing of said
written formal offer of evidence is hereby deemed WAIVED.
WHEREFORE, the reception of the defendants’ evidence shall proceed
on June 22 and 23, 2006, both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning as
previously scheduled.21
Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence
dated May 30, 2006.22 He argued that the Republic showed no right to
relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action.23 Fe Roa
Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of
failure to prosecute.24 Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined
Ignacio Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence.25
Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on
June 15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the
first assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of
Evidence.26 The pertinent portions of the Republic’s offer of documentary
exhibits attached to the Motion are summarized as follows:
Exhibits A to G and series consist of the Income Tax Returns, Certificate
of Income Tax Withheld On Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld
At Source, Schedule of Interest Income, Royalties and Withholding Tax,
Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net Worth of Ignacio B. Gimenez from
1980-1986 proving his legitimate income during said period. Exhibits H
-J and series refer to the Deeds of Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title
proving that spouses Gimenezes acquired several real properties.
Exhibits K and series (K-1-K-4) pertain to Checking Statements
Summary issued by the Bankers Trust Company (BTC) proving that Fe
Roa Gimenez maintained a current account under Account Number 34-
714-415 with BTC. Exhibits L and series (L1-L-114) are several BTC
checks, proving that from June 1982 to April 1984, Fe Roa Gimenez
issued several checks against her BTC Current Account No. 34-714-415
payable to some individuals and entities such as Erlinda Oledan, Vilma
Bautista, The Waldorf Towers, Cartier, Gliceria Tantoco, Bulgari,
Hammer Galleries and Renato Balestra, involving substantial amount of
money in US Dollars. Exhibits M and series (M1-M-25) are several The
Chase Manhattan Bank (TCMB) checks drawn against the account of Fe
Roa Gimenez under Account Number 021000021, proving that she issued
several checks drawn against her TCMB account, payable to individuals
and entities such as Gliceria Tantoco, Vilma Bautista and The Waldorf
Towers, involving substantial sums in US Dollars. Exhibit N is the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), New York Branch Office Charge Ticket
No. FT 56880 dated December 9, 1982 in the amount of US$30,000.00
for Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she received said enormous amount
from the PNB, New York Branch Office, with clearance from the Central
Bank, which amount was charged against PNB Manila. Exhibit N-1 is
the PNB New York Branch Advice to Payee No. FT 56535 dated
November 12, 1982 in the amount of US$10,990.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez
proving her receipt of such amount as remitted from California Overseas
Bank, Los Angeles. Exhibits O and series (O1-O-8) refer to several
Advices made by Bankers Trust AG Zurich-Geneve Bank in Switzerland
to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she maintained a current
account with said bank under Account Number 107094.50 and that from
July 30, 1984 to August 30, 1984, she placed a substantial amount on time
deposit in several banks, namely, Hypobank, Luzemburg, Luxemburg,
Societe Generale, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.
Exhibit P is the Certification dated March 19, 2002 issued by Director
Florino O. Ibanez of the Office of the President proving that Fe Roa
Gimenez, from January 1, 1966 to April 1, 1986, worked with the Office
of the President under different positions, the last of which as Presidential
Staff Director with a salary of P87,072.00 per annum.
Exhibit Q and series (Q-1-Q-18) is the Affirmation of Ralph Shapiro
filed with the United States Court of Appeals in the case entitled, "The
Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al." which
discussed certain acts of Fe Roa Gimenez and Vilma Bautista, among
others, in relation to the funds of the Marcoses.
Exhibits R and S and series (R-1, R-9; S-1-S-10) refer to the Certificate
of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed
Education, Inc., the Amended Articles of Incorporation of GEI
Guaranteed Education, Inc., the Treasurer’s Affidavit executed by
Ignacio Gimenez and the Director’s Certificate executed by Roberto B.
Olanday, Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto Coyuto, Jr. proving Ignacio
Gimenez and Roberto Olanday’s interests in GEl Guaranteed Education,
Inc.
Exhibits T and series (T-1-T-8) are the Advices made by the Bankers
Trust AG Zurich-Geneve Bank in Switzerland to Ignacio Gimenez
proving that he maintained a current account with said bank under
Account Number 101045.50 and that from March to June, 1984, he placed
a substantial amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Credit
Lyonnais, Brussels, Societe Generale, Paris, Credit Commercial De
France, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.
Exhibits U and V and series (U-1-U-5; V1-V-18) consist of the
Affidavit dated April 25, 1986 and the Declaration dated June 23, 1987
including the attachments, of Oscar Carino, Vice-President and Manager
of the PNB New York Branch, narrating in detail how the funds of the
PNB New York Branch were disbursed outside regular banking business
upon the instructions of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda Marcos using Fe Roa Gimenez and others as conduit.
Exhibits W and series (W-1-W-4) are the Debit memos from the PNB
to Fe Roa Gimenez while Exhibits X and X-1 are the Acknowledgments
of said respondent, proving that she received substantial amounts of
money which were coursed through the PNB to be used by the Marcos
spouses for state visits and foreign trips.
Exhibit Y and series (Y-1-Y-2) is the Letter dated August 25, 1986 of
Juan C. Gatmaitan, Assistant Chief Legal Counsel of PNB to Charles G.
LaBella, Assistant United States Attorney regarding the ongoing
investigation of irregular transactions at the PNB, New York Branch
proving that PNB cooperated with the United States government in
connection with the investigation on the irregular transactions of Oscar
Carino at PNB New York Branch.
Exhibit Z is the service record of Fe Roa Gimenez issued by Florino O.
Ibanez of the Office of the President which proves that she worked with
the Office of the President from 1966-1986 holding different positions,
the last of which was Presidential Staff Director.1âwphi1
Exhibits AA and series (AA-1 –AA-2) are the several Traders Royal
Bank checks drawn against Account No. 74-702836-9 under the account
name of Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that she issued said checks payable
to individuals and entities involving substantial amount of money.
Exhibits BB and CC and series (BB-1–BB-17; CC-1-CC-3) are the
several Transfer of Funds Advice from Traders Royal Bank Statements
of Account of Fe Roa Gimenez, proving that she maintained a current
account under Account No. 74-7028369 at Traders Royal Bank.
Exhibits HH and series (HH-1-HH-3) are the Certification dated
October 3, 2002 of Lamberto R. Barbin, Officer-in-Charge, Malacanang
Records Office, that the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of spouses
Marcoses for the years 1965 up to 1986 are not among the records on file
in said Office except 1965, 1967 and 1969; the Statement of Assets and
Liabilities as of December 31, 1969 and December 31, 1967 of former
President Ferdinand Marcos; and the Sworn Statement of Financial
Condition, Assets, Income and Liabilities as of December 31, 1965 of
former President Ferdinand Marcos. These documentary exhibits prove
the assets and liabilities of former President Marcos for the years
1965,1967 and 1969.
Exhibit II and series is [sic] the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of
December 31,1969 submitted by Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that her
assets on that period amounted only to P39,500.00.
Exhibit KK is the Table of Contents of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the
Sandiganbayan entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Ignacio B.
Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, et. al.", including its Annexes which prove
the assets and liabilities of spouses Gimenezes.
Exhibits KK-1 up to KK-12 are several transfer certificates of title and
tax declarations in the names of spouses Gimenezes, proving their
acquisition of several real properties.
Exhibits KK-15, KK-18, KK-20 up to KK-27, KK-30, KK-32 up to
KK-38 and KK-40 are the General Information Sheet, Certificate of
Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation, and Amended Articles of
Incorporation of various corporations. These prove the corporations in
which Ignacio B. Gimenez has substantial interests.
Exhibits KK-41 up to KK-44 are the Writs and Letters of Sequestration
issued by the PCGG which prove that the shares of stocks of Ignacio
Gimenez in Ignacio B. Gimenez, Securities, Inc. and the real properties
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 137638, 132807, 126693
and 126694 located in San Fabian, Pangasinan, were sequestered by the
PCGG.
Exhibit KK-45 is the Memorandum dated August 1, 1988 of Atty. Ralph
S. Lee and Alexander M. Berces, Team Supervisor and Investiogator,
[sic] respectively, of IRD, PCGG, proving that the PCGG conducted an
investigation on New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction
Corporation, and OTO Construction and Development Corporation in
relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday.
Exhibits KK-48, KK-49 and KK-50 are certain Lis Pendens from the
PCGG addressed to the concerned Register of Deeds informing that the
real properties mentioned therein had been sequestered and are the subject
of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan.
Exhibits KK-51, KK-51-A, KK-52 and KK-52-A are the Letter and
Writ of Sequestration issued by the PCGG on Allied Banking Corporation
and Guaranteed Education Inc. pursuant to its mandate to go after ill-
gotten wealth.
Exhibits NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 refer to the Memorandum To All
Commercial Banks dated March 14, 1986 issued by then Central Bank
Governor Jose B. Fernandez and the Letter dated March 13, 1986 of Mary
Concepcion Bautista, PCGG Commissioner addressed to then Central
Bank Governor Fernandez requesting that names be added to the earlier
request of PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga to instruct all commercial
banks not to allow any withdrawal or transfer of funds from the market
placements under the names of said persons, to include spouses
Gimenezes, without authority from PCGG.
Exhibits KK and series, NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 which prove the
various real properties, business interests and bank accounts owned by
spouses Gimenezes were part of the testimony of Atty. Tereso Javier.
Exhibit RR and series (RR-1-RR-23) are the Affidavit dated July 24,
1987 of Dominador Pangilinan, Acting President and President of
Trader’s Royal Bank, and the attached Recapitulation, Status of Banker’s
Acceptances, Status of Funds and Savings Account Ledger wherein he
mentioned that Malacanang maintained trust accounts at Trader’s Royal
Bank, the balance of which is approximately 150-175 million Pesos, and
that he was informed by Mr. Rivera that the funds were given to him
(Rivera) by Fe Roa Gimenez for deposit to said accounts.
Exhibits SS and series (SS-1-SS-29) are the Affidavit dated July 23,
1987 of Apolinario K. Medina, Executive Vice President of Traders
Royal Bank and attachments, which include Recapitulation, Status of
Funds, and Messages from Traders Royal Bank Manila to various foreign
banks. In his Affidavit, Medina divulged certain numbered confidential
trust accounts maintained by Malacanang with the Trader’s Royal Bank.
He further stated that the deposits were so substantial that he suspected
that they had been made by President Marcos or his family.
Exhibit TT and series (TT-1-TT-3) is [sic] the Memorandum dated July
19, 2005 of Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Director of the Research and
Development Department of PCGG regarding the investigation
conducted on the ill-gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, the subject
matter of Civil Case No. [0]007. He revealed that during the investigation
on the ill-gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, it was found out that from
1977 to 1982, several withdrawals, in the total amount of P75,090,306.42
were made from Trust Account No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B.
Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez.
Exhibits RR, SS, TT and their series prove that spouses Gimenez
maintained bank accounts of substantial amounts and gained control of
various corporations.1âwphi1 These are also being offered as part of the
testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel.27 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)
In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and
granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss.28 According to the
Sandiganbayan:
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the
higher ends of substantial justice militate against dismissal of cases purely
on technical grounds, the circumstances of this case show that the ends of
justice will not be served if this Court allows the wanton disregard of the
Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. Rules of procedure are designed
for the proper and prompt disposition of cases. . . .
The reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to timely file the
formal offer of evidence fail to persuade this Court. The missing exhibits
mentioned by the plaintiff’s counsel appear to be the same missing
documents since 2004, or almost two (2) years ago. The plaintiff had more
than ample time to locate them for its purpose. . . . Since they remain
missing after lapse of the period indicated by the Court, there is no reason
why the search for these documents should delay the filing of the formal
offer of evidence.
[Petitioner’s] counsel . . . admits that faced with other pressing matters,
he lost track of the time. We cannot just turn a blind eye on the negligence
of the parties and in their failure to observe the orders of this Court. The
carelessness of [petitioner’s] counsel in keeping track of the deadlines is
an unacceptable reason for the Court to set aside its Order and relax the
observance of the period set for filing the formal offer of
evidence.29 (Citation omitted)
The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its
case for an unreasonable length of time and to comply with the court’s
rules.30 The court also noted that the documentary evidence presented by
the Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies.31 However, the
persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were not
presented.32 Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.33 The
dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution reads:
ACCORDINGLY, there being no valid and cogent justification shown
by the plaintiff for the Court to Grant its Motion for Reconsideration and
admit its Formal Offer of Evidence, the plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence
is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence filed by
the defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez and adopted by defendant Fe Roa
Gimenez is GRANTED. The case is then DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.34 (Emphasis in the original)
The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November
3, 2006 before this court.35
The Gimenez Spouses were required to comment on the Petition.36 This
court noted the separate Comments37 filed by the Gimenez
Spouses.38 The Republic responded to the Comments through a
Consolidated Reply39 dated June 22, 2007.
In the Resolution40 dated August 29, 2007, this court required the parties
to submit their memoranda.41
On February 18, 2008, this court resolved to require the parties to "move
in the premises[.]"42
On March 2, 2012, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Re-open
Proceedings, to File and Admit Attached Supplement to the Petition for
Certiorari.43 In this Supplement, the Republic argued that the second
assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006 was void for failing to state
the facts and the law on which it was based.44This Motion was granted,
and the Gimenez Spouses were required to file their Comment on the
Supplement to the Petition.45 Thereafter, the Republic filed its Reply.46
Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Rejoinder47 dated December 19, 2012 which was
expunged by this court in a Resolution48dated January 23, 2013. Ignacio
Gimenez’s Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Rejoinder49 was
denied.50
The Republic raised the following issues:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in dismissing the case in
the light of the allegations in the Complaint which were substantiated by
overwhelming evidence presented vis-a-vis the material admissions of
spouses Gimenezes as their answer failed to specifically deny that they
were dummies of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and that they
acquired illegal wealth grossly disproportionate to their lawful income in
a manner prohibited under the Constitution and Anti-Graft Statutes.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner’s
Motion to Admit Formal Offer of Evidence on the basis of mere
technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right to due process.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in making a sweeping
pronouncement that petitioner’s evidence do not bear any probative
value.51
The issues for consideration of this court are:
First, whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy
to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions; and
Second, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner
Republic of the Philippines waived the filing of its Formal Offer of
Evidence and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa
Gimenez’s Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
We grant the Petition.
I
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez pictures petitioner as being confused as to
the proper mode of review of the Sandiganbayan Resolutions. According
to him, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion.52 Hence, petitioner should have filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 and not a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.53 Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any error, and
petitioner has to show that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.54
Observance of the proper procedure before courts, especially before the
Sandiganbayan, cannot be stressed enough. Due process is enshrined in
the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights.55 "Due process [in
criminal cases] guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until
the contrary is proved[.]"56 "Mere suspicion of guilt should not sway
judgment."57
To determine whether a petition for review is the proper remedy to assail
the Sandiganbayan Resolutions, we review the nature of actions for
reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages.
Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages
for ill-gotten wealth are also called civil forfeiture proceedings.
Republic Act No. 137958 provides for the procedure by which forfeiture
proceedings may be instituted against public officers or employees who
"[have] acquired during his [or her] incumbency an amount of property
which is manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as such public
officer or employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed
prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired."59
This court has already settled the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over civil
forfeiture cases:
. . . violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the
forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty.60
In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,61 this court re-affirmed the doctrine
that forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 are civil in
nature.62 Civil forfeiture proceedings were also differentiated from
plunder cases:
. . . a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate
and different from a plunder case. . . . In a prosecution for plunder, what
is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On the other hand,
all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under
RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate
income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties.
As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of
the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a
determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent public
officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.63(Citation omitted)
To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings
under Republic Act No. 1379 is the same with other civil cases —
preponderance of evidence.64
When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the
dismissal is equivalent to an acquittal.65
As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an
acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.66
Hence, the Republic may only assail an acquittal through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court:
Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting
an accused’s demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.67 (Citation omitted)
In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner
correctly filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides the mode of appeal from
judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring
to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
II
Petitioner argues that substantial justice requires doing away with the
procedural technicalities.68 Loss of vital documentary proof warranted
extensions to file the Formal Offer of Evidence.69 Honest efforts to locate
several missing documents resulted in petitioner’s inability to file the
pleading within the period granted by the Sandiganbayan.70
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner cannot fault the
Sandiganbayan for its incompetence during trial.71 Even if the evidence
were formally offered within the prescribed period, PCGG’s evidence still
had no probative value.72 It is solely petitioner’s fault "that the persons
who certified to the photocopies of the originals were not presented to
testify[.]"73 It is also misleading to argue that the pieces of documentary
evidence presented are public documents.74 "The documents are not
public in the sense that these are official issuances of the Philippine
government."75 "The bulk consists mainly of notarized, private
documents that have simply been certified true and faithful."76
According to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez, petitioner tries to excuse its
non-filing of the Formal Offer of Evidence within the prescribed period
by raising its efforts to locate the 66 missing documents.77 However, the
issue of the missing documents was laid to rest during the hearing on
November 16, 2004.78 The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until March
2005 to produce the documents; otherwise, these would be
excluded.79 The testimonies of the witnesses related to the missing
documents would also be expunged from the case records.80
Moreover, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that "[t]he Sandiganbayan
did not err when it ruled that the great bulk of the documentary evidence
offered by the PCGG have no probative value."81 Aside from the 66
missing documents it failed to present, almost all of petitioner’s pieces of
documentary evidence were mere photocopies.82The few that were
certified true copies were not testified on by the persons who certified
these documents.83
Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of
evidence. Testimonial evidence is offered "at the time [a] witness is called
to testify."84 Documentary and object evidence, on the other hand, are
offered "after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence."85 Offer
of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally unless
permission is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence.86
More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be
formally offered to be considered by the court. Evidence not offered is
excluded in the determination of the case.87 "Failure to make a formal
offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to
submit it."88
Rule 132, Section 34 provides:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional
guarantee of due process. Parties must be given the opportunity to review
the evidence submitted against them and take the necessary actions to
secure their case.89 Hence, any document or object that was marked for
identification is not evidence unless it was "formally offered and the
opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity to object to it or cross-
examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it."90
This court explained further the reason for the rule:
The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered." A formal offer is necessary because
judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its
function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for
which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this
allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will
not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the
trial court.91 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
To consider a party’s evidence which was not formally offered during
trial would deprive the other party of due process. Evidence not formally
offered has no probative value and must be excluded by the court.92
Petitioner’s failure to file its written Formal Offer of Evidence of the
numerous documentary evidence presented within the prescribed period
is a non-issue. In its first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan declared that petitioner waived the filing of its Formal
Offer of Evidence when it failed to file the pleading on May 13, 2006, the
deadline based on the extended period granted by the court. Petitioner was
granted several extensions of time by the Sandiganbayan totalling 75 days
from the date petitioner terminated its presentation of evidence. Notably,
this 75-day period included the original 30-day period. Subsequently,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Formal Offer of Evidence, and the Formal Offer of Evidence.
In resolving petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit
Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, the Sandiganbayan found the
carelessness of petitioner’s counsel unacceptable. According to the
Sandiganbayan, it could not countenance the non-observance of the
court’s orders.
This court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover
the assets and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their
close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or
nominees.93 Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding
technical rules of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten
wealth:
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court
has seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to
delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such
cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice
to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or
perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost
two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and
reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases
on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition,
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought
out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally
determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying
technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.94 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)
To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit,
belatedly. Petitioner hurdled 19 years of trial before the Sandiganbayan
to present its evidence as shown in its extensive Formal Offer of
Evidence. As petitioner argues:
Undeniable from the records of the case is that petitioner was vigorous in
prosecuting the case. The most tedious and crucial stage of the litigation
and presentation of evidence has been accomplished. Petitioner
completed its presentation of evidence proving the ill-gotten nature and
character of the funds and assets sought to be recovered in the present
case. It presented vital testimonial and documentary evidence consisting
of voluminous record proving the gross disparity of the subject funds to
spouses Gimenezes’ combined declared income which must be
reconveyed to the Republic for being acquired in blatant violation of the
Constitution and the Anti-Graft statutes.95
This court is not unmindful of the difficulty in gathering voluminous
documentary evidence in cases of forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired
throughout the years. It is never easy to prosecute corruption and take
back what rightfully belongs to the government and the people of the
Republic.
This is not the first time that this court relaxed the rule on formal offer of
evidence.
Tan v. Lim96 arose from two civil Complaints: one for injunction and
another for legal redemption, which were heard jointly before the trial
court.97 The defendant did not file a Formal Offer of Evidence in the
injunction case98 and merely adopted the evidence offered in the legal
redemption case.99 The trial court held that the defendant’s failure to file
his Formal Offer of Evidence in the injunction case rendered the
plaintiff’s evidence therein as uncontroverted.100 The Court of Appeals
reversed the Decision and was affirmed by this court.101 This court ruled
that while the trial court’s reasoning in its Decision was technically sound,
a liberal interpretation was more appropriate and in line with substantial
justice:
It may be true that Section 34, Rule 132 of the rules directs the court to
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered and that under
Section 35, documentary evidence is offered after presentation of
testimonial evidence. However, a liberal interpretation of these Rules
would have convinced the trial court that a separate formal offer of
evidence in Civil Case No. 6518 was superfluous because not only was
an offer of evidence made in Civil Case No. 6521 that was being jointly
heard by the trial court, counsel for Jose Renato Lim had already declared
he was adopting these evidences for Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court
itself stated that it would freely utilize in one case evidence adduced in
the other only to later abandon this posture. Jose Renato Lim testified in
Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court should have at least considered his
testimony since at the time it was made, the rules provided that testimonial
evidence is deemed offered at the time the witness is called to
testify. Rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid, technical
case as they are devised chiefly to secure and not defeat substantial
justice.
The logic of the Court of Appeals is highly persuasive. Indeed,
apparently, the trial court was being overly technical about the
nonsubmission of Jose Renato Lim’s formal offer of evidence. This
posture not only goes against Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure decreeing a liberal construction of the rules to promote a just,
speedy and inexpensive litigation but ignores the consistent rulings of the
Court against utilizing the rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice.
Despite the intervening years, the language of the Court in Manila
Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, still remains relevant:
"x x x. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is
to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which
courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means
best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just
judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the
other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory
and lays itself open to grave criticism."102 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
Furthermore, "subsequent and substantial compliance . . . may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure."103
Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the
number of delays petitioner incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of
Evidence and the state’s policy on recovering ill-gotten wealth, this court
is of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be relaxed and
petitioner be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence. The
Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions should be reversed.
III
According to petitioner, the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the
demurrer to evidence filed by respondents and dismissed the case despite
a "prima facie foundation [based on the pleadings and documents on
record] that spouses Gimenezes amassed enormous wealth grossly
disproportionate to their lawful income or declared lawful assets."104
Similarly, the Complaint alleged specific acts committed by respondent
Ignacio Gimenez:
[T]aking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and connection,
by himself and/or in unlawful concert and active collaboration with
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos for the
purpose of mutually enriching themselves and preventing the disclosure
and recovery of assets illegally obtained: (a) acted as the dummy,
nominee or agent of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos in several corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation,
Acoje Mining Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National
Resources, Philippine Oversees, Inc. and Pioneer Natural Resources; (b)
unlawfully obtained, through corporations organized by them such as the
New City Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multi-million peso contracts with the
government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports Complex and
Dining Hall as well as projects of the National Manpower Corporation,
Human Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika Livelihood, to the gross and
manifest disadvantage of the Government and the Filipino people; and (c)
in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes, organized several
establishments engaged in food, mining and other businesses such as the
Transnational Construction Corporation, Total Systems Technology, Inc.,
Pyro Control Technology Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T
Development Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development
Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining Corporation, Coal Basis Mining
Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation, GEI Guaranteed Education,
Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc.105
Despite the specific allegations in the Complaint, petitioner contends that
respondents merely gave general denials to the allegations in the
Complaint.106 "[N]o specific denial [was] made on the material
allegations [in] the [C]omplaint."107
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the Sandiganbayan was correct
in granting the Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez claims that petitioner cannot be excused
from filing its Formal Offer of Evidence considering the numerous
extensions given by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner had all the resources
and time to gather, collate, and secure the necessary evidence to build its
case.108 Petitioner’s presentation of evidence took 19 years to complete,
and yet it failed to submit the necessary documents and pleading.109
Similarly, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez argues that petitioner was
negligent in failing to comply with the Sandiganbayan’s orders
considering the inordinate amount of time given to petitioner to present
evidence, which resulted in only five witnesses in 19 years.110
To determine the propriety of granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
based on Demurrer to Evidence, we review the nature of demurrer.
Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.— After the plaintiff has completed
the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal
on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
In Oropesa v. Oropesa111 where this court affirmed the dismissal of the
case on demurrer to evidence due to petitioner’s non-submission of the
Formal Offer of Evidence,112 demurrer to evidence was defined as:
. . . "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue." We have also
held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of
the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as
he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not
entitled to the relief sought."113 (Citations omitted)
This court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to
evidence:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law,
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence
together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be
drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a
demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is
likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the
plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably
inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the
material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an
allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the
plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.114
Furthermore, this court already clarified what the trial court determines
when acting on a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence:
What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to
evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts
and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that
which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such
as capacity to sue. . . .115 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Petitioner, in its Supplement to the Petition, argued that the testimonial
evidence it had presented and offered during trial warranted consideration
and analysis.116 The Sandiganbayan erroneously excluded these
testimonies in determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not,
hence:
. . . even assuming that the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s formal offer
of evidence, petitioner still had testimonial evidence in its favor which
should [have] been considered. It behoved then upon the Sandiganbayan
to discuss or include in its discussion, at the very least, an analysis of
petitioner’s testimonial evidence.117
With our ruling reversing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions on
petitioner’s Formal Offer of Evidence, what should be determined now
by the Sandiganbayan is whether petitioner’s evidence is sufficient to
entitle it to the relief it seeks after the Sandiganbayan rested its case.
Petitioner is required to establish preponderance of evidence.
In the second assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted
respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on the lack of Formal Offer of
Evidence of petitioner. At the same time, it observed that the pieces of
documentary evidence presented by petitioner were mostly certified true
copies of the original. In passing upon the probative value of petitioner’s
evidence, the Sandiganbayan held:
On another note, the evidence presented by the plaintiff consisted mainly
of certified true copies of the original. These certified copies of
documentary evidence presented by the plaintiff were not testified on by
the person who certified them to be photocopies of the original. Hence,
these evidence do not appear to have significant substantial probative
value.118
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for making "a general and sweeping
statement that the evidence presented by petitioner lacked probative value
for the reason that they are mainly certified true copies which had not
been testified on by the person who certified [them]."119 Thus, its right to
due process was violated when the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s
documentary evidence in the same Resolution which dismissed the
case.120
Petitioner argues that: a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the identity
and authenticity of the documentary evidence presented by
petitioner;121 and b) the documents it presented were public documents,
and there was no need for the identification and authentication of the
original documentary exhibits.122 Petitioner relies on the Sandiganbayan
Order123 dated August 6, 2002. The Order reads:
Considering the manifestation of Atty. Reno Gonzales, counsel for
plaintiff/PCGG, that the defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, through counsel, is
willing to stipulate that the documents to be presented and identified by
the witness are in her custody as Records Officer of the PCGG, the parties
agreed to dispense with the testimony of Ma. Lourdes Magno.
WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, the continuation of the presentation of
plaintiff’s evidence is set on October 9 and 10, 2002, both at 8:30 o’clock
[sic] in the morning.
SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to
the PCGG’s functions prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section
3(b),125 and form part of the official records of the
PCGG:126 "Certifications as to the various positions held in Government
by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her salaries and compensation during her stint as a
public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns and Statement of Assets and
Liabilities showing the declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the
Articles of Incorporation of various corporations showing spouses
Gimenezes’ interests on various corporations; and several transactions
involving huge amounts of money which prove that they acted as conduit
in the disbursement of government funds."127
On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s
documents are not "official issuances of the Philippine
government."128 They are mostly notarized private
documents.129 Petitioner’s evidence has no probative value; hence, a
dismissal on demurrer to evidence is only proper.130 Respondent Fe Roa
Gimenez claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in holding that the
majority of petitioner’s documentary evidence has no probative value,
considering that most of these documents are only photocopies.131
The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves
better treatment.
For instance, the nature and classification of the documents should have
been ruled upon. Save for certain cases, the original document must be
presented during trial when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of
the document.132 This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.— When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer
or is recorded in a public office.
In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence
may be presented133 as provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of the same
Rule:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control.
— If the document is in the custody or under the control of adverse party,
he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)
SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record.— When the original of a document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano,134 citing Estrada v. Hon. Desierto,135 this
court clarified the applicability of the Best Evidence Rule:
As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only
when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope
of the rule is more extensively explained thus —
But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule
applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence
is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any
other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for
accounting for the original.
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it
is offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the
fact of execution of the documents is allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs.
McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil[.] 565). x x x
In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court had occasion to rule that —
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only [a] copy of
the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the
best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:
"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s
discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be
served by requiring production.
"x x x x x x x x x
"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been
abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute
arised [sic]. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves
universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy
may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an
opportunity to inspect it."
This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and
weighed in evidence the photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs,
MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners to establish the existence of
respondent’s loans. The terms or contents of these documents were never
the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was respondent’s position
that the PNs in the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534) never
existed, while the PNs in the second set (again, excluding PN No. 34534)
were merely executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the
MCs representing the proceeds of the loans, the respondent either denied
receipt of certain MCs or admitted receipt of the other MCs but for
another purpose. Respondent further admitted the letters she wrote
personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner
Citibank acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these
letters were just meant to keep up the ruse of the simulated loans. Thus,
respondent questioned the documents as to their existence or execution,
or when the former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents
were executed, matters which are, undoubtedly, external to the
documents, and which had nothing to do with the contents thereof.
Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply
to the evidence presented by petitioners regarding the existence of
respondent’s loans, it should be borne in mind that the rule admits of the
following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of
Court[.]136 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts,
documents are classified as either public or private. Rule 132, Section 19
of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.— For the purpose of their presentation
in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required
by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
The same Rule provides for the effect of public documents as evidence
and the manner of proof for public documents:
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.— Documents consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which
gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
SEC. 24. Proof of official record.— The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.— Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or
a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under
the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk
of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
....
SEC. 27. Public record of a private document.— An authorized public
record of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by
a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
....
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents.— Every instrument duly
acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved. (Emphasis supplied)
Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents,
this court pronounced:
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the
documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by
virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because
it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any
other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without
the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which
some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official
or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed
by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed
by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in
court.137 (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section
19 of the Rules of Court is material with regard to the fact the evidence
proves. In Philippine Trust Company v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et
al.,138 this court ruled that:
. . . not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated:
....
"Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer"
include those specified as public documents under Section 19(a), Rule
132 of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement, affirmation or oath,
or jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under
Section 23, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave
rise to their execution (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories . . . is
proof that Philtrust had been served with Written Interrogatories), and of
the date of the latter (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is proof
that the same was executed on October 12, 1992, the date stated
thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Additionally, under Section 30 of the same Rule, the acknowledgement
in notarized documents is prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to
Interrogatories is prima facie proof that petitioner executed the same).
The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties
attending the execution of the different kinds of public instruments.
Official duties are disputably presumed to have been regularly
performed. As regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories
which are required to be sworn to by the person making them, the only
portion thereof executed by the person authorized to take oaths is the
jurat. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed
therefore applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public
merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him
or her, on the date mentioned thereon. Thus, even though affidavits are
notarized documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving,
must be received with caution.139 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation,140 this court discussed the
difference between mere copies of audited financial statements submitted
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and certified true copies of audited financial
statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which are public
documents under Rule 132, Section 19(c) of the Revised Rules of
Evidence:
The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited
financial statements of SMMC. Financial statements (which include the
balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow) show the
fiscal condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The
financial statements prepared by external auditors who are certified public
accountants (like those presented by petitioner) are audited financial
statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as [a]
general rule, private documents. However, once financial statements are
filed with a government office pursuant to a provision of law, they become
public documents.
Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its
admissibility as evidence. Public documents are admissible in evidence
even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On the
other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they
are properly authenticated. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides:
....
Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as
evidence were mere copies of the audited financial statements submitted
to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies presented were
certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured
from the BIR or the SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have
been public documents. Thus, the statements presented were private
documents. Consequently, authentication was a precondition to their
admissibility in evidence.
During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a
document presented as evidence is genuine and has been duly executed
or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by
mistake or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely presented a
memorandum attesting to the increase in the corporation’s monthly
market revenue, prepared by a member of his management team. While
there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to
establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof available
must be presented. The best proof available, in this instance, would have
been the testimony of a representative of SMMC’s external auditor who
prepared the audited financial statements. Inasmuch as there was none,
the audited financial statements were never authenticated.141 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc,142 this court held that mere
collection of documents by the PCGG does not make such documents
public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course
of its investigations does not make them per se public records referred to
in the quoted rule.
Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno,
who testified that these public and private documents had been gathered
by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the
Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. However, given the purposes for which these documents were
submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their
contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to
them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify only
to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived
from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she
obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the
documents themselves.
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits
or Memoranda submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while
affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are
acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified
as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally
prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own
language in writing the affiant’s statements, parts of which may thus be
either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants.
For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.143(Citations omitted)
Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by
petitioner was cursory. Its main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss
on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no evidence to consider due
to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off
the totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case.
Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this
court finds it clear from the second assailed Resolution that the
Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence presented by
petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in
ignoring petitioner’s testimonial evidence without any basis or
justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of
petitioner’s witnesses.
Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that
tended to establish a presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten
wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s incumbency as public
officer and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion
to her and her husband’s salaries and to their other lawful income or
properties.
Petitioner presented five (5) witnesses, two (2) of which were Atty.
Tereso Javier and Director Danilo R.V. Daniel, both from the PCGG:
Petitioner presented as witnesses Atty. Tereso Javier, then Head of the
Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and Danilo R.V. Daniel, then
Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG, who
testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned and/ or under the
control of spouses Gimenezes.144
Several exhibits excluded by the Sandiganbayan were offered as part of
petitioner’s testimonial evidence:
1) Exhibit "KK"145 was offered "for the purpose of proving the assets or
properties of the spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, and
as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."146
2) Exhibits "KK-1" to "KK-12"147 inclusive of sub-markings, were
offered "for the purpose of proving the real properties acquired by the
spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, and as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier."148
3) Exhibits "KK-15," "KK-18," "KK-20," "KK-27," "KK-30," "KK-32"
to "KK-38" and "KK-40"149 were offered "for the purpose of proving the
corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez has interest, and as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier."150
4) Exhibit "KK-45"151 was offered "for the purpose of proving that the
PCGG conducted an investigation of New City Builders, Inc.,
Transnational Construction Corporation, and OTO Construction and
Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto
O. Olanday, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."152
5) Exhibits "KK-48" to "KK-50"153 were offered "for the purpose of
proving that the PCGG formally filed notices of lis pendens with the
Registers of Deeds of Taytay, Rizal, Lucena City, Quezon and San
Fabian, Pangasinan over the properties mentioned in said notices in
connection with Civil Case No. [0]007 pending with the Sandiganbayan,
and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."154
6) Exhibits "KK-51" to "KK-52"155 and their sub-markings were offered
"for the purpose of proving that the PCGG sequestered the shares of stock
in Allied Banking Corporation and Guaranteed Education, Inc. as stated
in the said writ/letter of sequestration, and as part of the testimony of
Tereso Javier."156
7) Exhibits "NN" to "QQ"157 and their sub-markings were offered "for the
purpose of proving that the PCGG formally requested the Central Bank
to freeze the bank accounts of the spouses Igancio [sic] B. Gimenez and
Fe Roa Gimenez and that the Central Bank, acting on said request, issued
a memorandum to all commercial banks relative thereto. They are also
being offered as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."158
8) Exhibits "RR" to "RR-23"159 were offered "for the purpose of proving
that Dominador Pangilinan, former Acting President and President of
Traders Royal Bank, executed an affidavit on July 24, 1987 wherein he
mentioned Malacanang trust accounts maintained with the Traders Royal
Bank the balance of which was very high, approximately 150-175 million
pesos, as indicated in the monthly statements attached to his affidavit.
They are also being offered as part of the testimony of Danilo R.V.
Daniel."160
9) Exhibits "SS" to "SS-29"161 were offered "for the purpose of proving
that Apolinario K. Medina, Executive Vice President of Traders Royal
Bank, executed an Affidavit on July 23, 1987 wherein he mentioned about
certain numbered (confidential) trust accounts maintained with the
Traders Royal Bank, the deposits to which ‘were so substantial in amount
that (he) suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or his
family. They are also being offered as part of the testimony of Danilo
R.V. Daniel."162
10) Exhibits "TT" to "TT-3"163 were offered "for the purpose of proving
that Director Danilo R.V. Daniel of the Research and Development
Department of the PCGG conducted an investigation on the ill-gotten
wealth of the spouses Ignacio and Fe Roa Gimenez and found that from
1977 to 1982, the total sum of P75,090,306.42 was withdrawn from the
account No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez
Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez. They are also being offered as part of the
testimony of Director Danilo R.V. Daniel."164
The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving
a demurrer to evidence which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
evidence.
The difference between the admissibility of evidence and the
determination of its probative weight is canonical.165
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to [be] considered at all. On the other hand,
the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it
proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as
such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the rules
on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should be presented as
witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to
question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence,
failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. As
earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value.166 (Citations omitted)
The Sandiganbayan should have considered Atienza v. Board of
Medicine, et al.167 where this court held that it is better to admit and
consider evidence for determination of its probative value than to outright
reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds.168
Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the
rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of
doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or
technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them
beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant
or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to
be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely
discarding them or ignoring them.169(Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to
recover ill-gotten wealth. In case of doubt, courts should proceed with
caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence.
An order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the
merits.170 This is because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the
expeditious termination of an action,"171 it specifically "pertains to the
merits of the case."172
In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza,173 this court defined a judgment
rendered on the merits:
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed
facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections"; or when the
judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal
or merely technical point."174 (Citations omitted)
To reiterate, "[d]emurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits
of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his [or
her] part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence
shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the relief sought."175 The order of
dismissal must be clearly supported by facts and law since an order
granting demurrer is a judgment on the merits:
As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is
a judgment on the merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision
clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is
based.176(Citation omitted)
To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally
offer documentary evidence essentially deprives one party of due process.
IV
Respondents did not fail to specifically deny material averments in the
Complaint.
Under Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the "defendant must
specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not
admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the
matters upon which he relies to support his denial."177 There are three
modes of specific denial provided for under the Rules:
1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the
truth of which the defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable,
setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to
support his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the
complaint as is true and material and denying only the remainder; (3) by
stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint,
which has the effect of a denial.178
In paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the PCGG, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, averred that:
14. Defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, by herself and/or in unlawful concert
with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking
undue advantage of her position, influence and connection and with grave
abuse of power and authority, in order to prevent disclosure and recovery
of assets illegally obtained:
(a) actively participated in the unlawful transfer of millions of dollars of
government funds into several accounts in her name in foreign countries;
(b) disbursed such funds from her various personal accounts for
Defendants’ own use[,] benefit and enrichment;
(c) acted as conduit of the Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos in purchasing the New York properties, particularly, the
Crown Building, Herald Center, 40 Wall Street, 200 Wall Street,
Lindenmere Estate and expensive works of arts;179
In their Answer, respondents claimed that;
9. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the
allegations contained in paragraphs 14(a), 14(b) and 14(c), the truth being
that defendant Fe Roa never took advantage of her position or alleged
connection and influence to allegedly prevent disclosure and recovery of
alleged illegally obtained assets, in the manner alleged in said
paragraphs.180
Similarly, the PCGG made material allegations in paragraph 16 of the
Complaint:
16. Defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez, taking undue advantage of his
relationship, influence, and connection, by himself and/or in unlawful
concert and active collaboration with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves
and preventing the disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained,
among others:
(a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of Defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, in several corporations such as, the Allied
Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining,
Multi National Resources, Philippine Overseas, Inc. and Pioneer Natural
Resources;
(b) unlawfully obtained, through corporations organized by them such as
the the [sic] New City Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multimillion peso contracts
with the government for the construction of government buildings, such
as the University of Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as
projects of the National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements,
GSIS, and Maharlika Livelihood, to the gross and manifest disadvantage
to Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
(c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes, organized several
establishments engaged in food, mining and other businesses such as the
Transnational Construction Corporation, Total Systems Technology, Inc.,
Pyro Control Technology Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T
Development Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development
Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining Corporation, Coal Basis Mining
Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation, GEI Guaranteed Education,
Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc.181
To which respondents specifically denied through the following
paragraph:
11. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the
allegations contained in paragraphs 16, 16(a), 16(b) and 16(c) that
defendant Gimenez allegedly took advantage of his alleged relationship,
influence and connection, and that by himself or in alleged unlawful
concert with defendants Marcos and Imelda, for the alleged purpose of
enriching themselves and preventing the discovery of alleged illegally
obtained assets: (1) allegedly acted as dummy, nominee or agent of
defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) allegedly obtained multi-million peso
projects unlawfully; and (3) allegedly organized several establishments,
the truth being: (1) that defendant Gimenez never acted as dummy,
nominee or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) that defendant
Gimen[e]z never once obtained any contract unlawfully; and (3) that
defendant Gimenez is a legitimate businessman and organized business
establishments legally and as he saw fit, all in accordance with his own
plans and for his own purposes.182
In Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong,183 this court held that using "specifically"
in a general denial does not automatically convert that general denial to a
specific one.184 The denial in the answer must be so definite as to what is
admitted and what is denied:
A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the
defendant. A general denial does not become specific by the use of the
word "specifically." When matters of whether the defendant alleges
having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly
and necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge, an alleged "ignorance
or lack of information" will not be considered as a specific denial. Section
11, Rule 8 of the Rules also provides that material averments in the
complaint other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages shall
be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Thus, the answer
should be so definite and certain in its allegations that the pleader’s
adversary should not be left in doubt as to what is admitted, what is
denied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form
a belief.185 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
However, the allegations in the pleadings "must be contextualized and
interpreted in relation to the rest of the statements in the pleading."186 The
denials in respondents’ Answer comply with the modes provided for
under the Rules. We have held that the purpose of requiring specific
denials from the defendant is to make the defendant disclose the "matters
alleged in the complaint which he [or she] succinctly intends to disprove
at the trial, together with the matter which he [or she] relied upon to
support the denial."187 The denials proffered by respondents sufficiently
disclosed the matters they wished to disprove and those they would rely
upon in making their denials.
To summarize, the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion to
Dismiss on demurrer to evidence. It erred in making a sweeping
declaration on the probative value of the documentary evidence offered
by petitioner and in excluding other evidence offered during trial without
full evaluation based on reasons grounded in law and/or jurisprudence.
V SO ORDERED.
The third part of Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that
"[i]f the motion [to dismiss] is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal
is reversed [the movant] shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence." As this court held:
[I]f a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal
is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence. The movant who presents a demurrer to the plaintiff’s
evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court
disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the
appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal
order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The
appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on
the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.188 (Citations omitted)
This procedure, however, does not apply.
In this case, we principally nullify the assailed Resolutions that denied the
admission of the Formal Offer of Evidence. It only follows that the Order
granting demurrer should be denied. This is not the situation
contemplated in Rule 33, Section 1.189 Respondents were not able to even
comment on the Formal Offer of Evidence. Due process now requires that
we remand the case to the Sandiganbayan. Respondents may, at their
option and through proper motion, submit their Comment. The
Sandiganbayan should then rule on the admissibility of the documentary
and object evidence covered by the Formal Offer submitted by petitioner.
Respondents then may avail themselves of any remedy thereafter allowed
by the Rules.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions
dated May 25, 2006 and September 13, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division in Civil Case No. 0007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is remanded to the. Sandiganbayan for further proceedings with due
and deliberate dispatch in accordance with this Decision.
 G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013
YASUO IWASAWA v. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the September 4, 2012
Decision2 and October 16, 2012 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 43, of Manila in Civil Case No. 11-126203. The RTC
denied the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of petitioner
Yasuo Iwasawa with private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan due to
insufficient evidence.
The antecedents follow:
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002
in one of his visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced
herself as "single" and "has never married before." Since then, the two
became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the
Philippines and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in
Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan.4
In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting
that something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his
wife about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she
received news that her previous husband passed away.5
Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and
discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo
Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994.6 This
prompted petitioner to file a petition7 for the declaration of his marriage
to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is
a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the
following pieces of documentary evidence issued by the National
Statistics Office (NSO):
(1) Certificate of Marriage8 between petitioner and private respondent
marked as Exhibit "A" to prove the fact of marriage between the parties
on November 28, 2002;
(2) Certificate of Marriage9 between private respondent and Raymond
Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibit "B" to prove the fact of marriage
between the parties on June 20, 1994;
(3) Certificate of Death10 of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as
Exhibits "C" and "C-1" to prove the fact of the latter’s death on July 14,
2009; and
(4) Certification11 from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of
marriage recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent marked
as Exhibit "D" to prove that private respondent in fact contracted two
marriages, the first one was to a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June
20, 1994, and second, to petitioner on November 28, 2002.
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) admitted the authenticity and due execution of the above
documentary exhibits during pre-trial.12
On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled
that there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondent’s prior
existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while petitioner
offered the certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it
was only petitioner who testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled that
petitioner’s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge
of private respondent’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which
makes him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate between private
respondent and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further ruled
that petitioner’s testimony about the NSO certification is likewise
unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by
the RTC in an Order dated October 16, 2012.
Hence this petition raising the sole legal issue of whether the testimony
of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due
execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary
before they could be accorded evidentiary weight.
Petitioner argues that the documentary evidence he presented are public
documents which are considered self-authenticating and thus it was
unnecessary to call the NSO Records Custodian as witness. He cites
Article 410 of the Civil Code which provides that books making up the
civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Moreover, the trial prosecutor himself also admitted the authenticity of
said documents.
The OSG, in its Comment,13 submits that the findings of the RTC are not
in accord with law and established jurisprudence. It contends that both
Republic Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Law on Registry of Civil
Status, and the Civil Code elaborated on the character of documents
arising from records and entries made by the civil registrar and
categorically declared them as public documents. Being public
documents, said documents are admissible in evidence even without
further proof of their due execution and genuineness and consequently,
there was no need for the court to require petitioner to present the records
custodian or officer from the NSO to testify on them. The OSG further
contends that public documents have probative value since they are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein as provided in the above-quoted
provision of the Civil Code. Thus, the OSG submits that the public
documents presented by petitioner, considered together, completely
establish the facts in issue.
In her letter14 dated March 19, 2013 to this Court, private respondent
indicated that she is not against her husband’s petition to have their
marriage declared null and void. She likewise admitted therein that she
contracted marriage with Arambulo on June 20, 1994 and contracted a
second marriage with petitioner on November 28, 2002. She further
admitted that it was due to poverty and joblessness that she married
petitioner without telling the latter that she was previously married.
Private respondent also confirmed that it was when she found out that
Arambulo passed away on July 14, 2009 that she had the guts to confess
to petitioner about her previous marriage. Thereafter, she and petitioner
have separated.
We grant the petition.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by
petitioner are all public documents.1âwphi1 As provided in the Civil
Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without
further proof of their due execution and genuineness.15 Thus, the RTC
erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the
petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued
them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of
authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not
only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary
weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted
since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented
evidence to the contrary.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage,16 which is void from the
beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken
together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The
exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent
married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private
respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with
Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on
July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondent’s
marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that
the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence
null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when
the second marriage was contracted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The

September 4, 2012 Decision and October 16, 2012 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 11-126203 are hereby
SET ASIDE. The marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and private
respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan is declared NULL and VOID.

The Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City and the National Statistics Office
are hereby ORDERED to make proper entries into the records of the
abovementioned parties in accordance with this Decision.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 138084 April 10, 2002
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., vs. PHILIPPINE NAILS
AND WIRES CORPORATION
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision dated September
30, 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45547, affirming
the decision dated December 10, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 163, and the resolution dated March 25,
1999, of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.1
Respondent Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation insured against all
risks its shipment of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at
P67,156,300 with petitioner Malayan Insurance Company Inc. The
shipment delivered was short by 377.168 metric tons. For this shortage,
respondent claimed insurance for P2,698,637.04, representing the value
of undelivered steel billets, plus customs duties, taxes and other charges
paid by respondent. Petitioner refused to pay.
On July 28, 1993, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for sum
of money with the RTC of Pasig representing said lost and/or undelivered
cargo. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it
failed to state a cause of action, and that it was filed in the wrong venue.
The motion was denied. It thus filed a petition for prohibition with the
Court of Appeals. This was also denied. Upon motion for reconsideration,
the petition was reinstated. However, it was eventually dismissed by the
Court of Appeals, and its dismissal became final and executory.
On September 8, 1993, respondent filed a motion to admit an amended
complaint which the trial court granted. It sent petitioner summons and a
copy of the complaint on October 13, 1993 and also gave petitioner until
October 31, 1993 to file its answer.
On November 4, 1993, respondent moved to declare petitioner in default.
The trial court granted and allowed the presentation of evidence ex
parte before the branch clerk of court. Respondent presented its lone
witness, Jeanne King.
On November 11, 1993, petitioner filed its answer with compulsory
counterclaim. Upon motion by the respondent, the trial court expunged
from the records the answer for late filing.
On December 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a judgment by default
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the latter to pay the
following:
1. P2,532,926.53 representing the insured value of the lost and/or not
delivered 377.168 metric tons of steel billets plus legal rate of interest
from date of filing of this complaint until fully paid;
2. Fifteen (15) percent of the amount awarded to plaintiff as attorney's
fees; and
3. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
Respondent moved to execute judgment pending appeal. The trial court
granted the motion. Meanwhile, petitioner filed its notice of appeal which
was given due course.
Pursuant to the grant of the motion for execution, the trial court issued the
corresponding writ. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for
a temporary restraining order to enjoin the implementation of the writ.
The Court of Appeals granted the prayer for the temporary restraining
order. The writ of execution was likewise stayed by the trial court which
favorably considered petitioner's urgent motion to stay execution pending
appeal and to approve the supersedeas bond.
Pursuant to the notice of appeal, the entire records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, where petitioner argued that the trial
court erred in rendering judgment by default notwithstanding that issues
were joined by petitioner's filing of an answer; in awarding damages to
respondent based on unauthenticated documentary evidence and hearsay;
and in admitting documentary evidence which is irregular in nature and
not in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court and disposed the case
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error
committed by the lower court, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.3
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
nor err when it expunged the answer from the records because petitioner
answered way beyond the prescribed period. It further held that
respondent's witness, Jeanne King, was a competent witness because she
personally prepared the documentary evidence and had personal
knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. In addition, the appellate
court said that conclusions and findings of fact of the trial courts were
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for
strong and cogent reasons, which were not present in this case. Lastly, the
absence of a written report by the branch clerk of court on the ex parte
proceedings did not necessarily deny petitioner due process. Nothing in
the Rules of Court stated that the absence of the commissioner's written
report nullified a judgment by default. The appellate court observed that
if there was a defect, such was only procedural that can be waived.
Besides, petitioner was declared in default because of its own failure to
answer within the prescribed period. It cannot claim denial of due process
because it was given the opportunity to be heard.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition
alleging that the Court of Appeals erred and acted contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence in:
I. …GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE PURELY HEARSAY
TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT'S SOLE WITNESS.
II. …AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH
WAS BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ADMITTED
WITHOUT BEING PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED.4
For resolution now are the following issues: Was Jeanne King's testimony
hearsay, thus without any probative value? Should respondent
authenticate the documentary evidence it submitted at the trial?
On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that
Jeanne King's testimony was hearsay because she had no personal
knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting respondent's
cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list, bill of
lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that
even though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the
importation of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, herein
respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the facts
which gave rise to respondent's cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts,
even though she personally prepared the summary of weight of steel
billets received by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of
the weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.
At the outset, we must stress that respondent's cause of action is founded
on breach of insurance contract covering cargo consisting of imported
steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to prove, first, its
importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at
P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and
received by the importer, namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King,
who was assigned to handle respondent's importations, including their
insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel billets
being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony
is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.5
However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of
the imported steel billets. She did not have personal knowledge of the
actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared the summary of
the received steel billets, she based the summary only on the receipts
prepared by other persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was
hearsay. It has no probative value even if not objected to at the trial.6
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly
authenticate respondent's documentary evidence. Under Section 20, Rule
132, Rules of Court,7 before a private document is admitted in evidence,
it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person
before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was
present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the
instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. In this case,
respondent admits that King was none of the aforementioned persons. She
merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets based on the
unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of
steel billets actually received had no proven real basis, and King's
testimony on this point could not be taken at face value.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in giving imprimatur

to the trial court's ruling with regard to the admission of documentary
evidence submitted by respondent. On this score, we find petitioner's
contention meritorious. Under the rules on evidence, documents are either
public or private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any
of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.8 Section 209 of the same law, in turn, provides that before any
private document is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document
executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. Here, respondent's documentary exhibits are
private documents. They are not among those enumerated in Section 19,
thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be proved before they
can be admitted in evidence. With the exception concerning the summary
of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent presented no
supporting evidence concerning their authenticity.10 Consequently, they
cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short
delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum, we find no sufficient
competent evidence to prove petitioner's liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals dated September 30, 1998 and its resolution on March 25, 1999
in CA-G.R. CV No. 45547 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, Civil Case No. 63445 is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 184843 July 30, 2010
VIRGILIO DYCOCO vs. ADELAIDA ORINA
On petition for review on certiorari is the November 29, 2007 Decision
of the Court of Appeals1 affirming the dismissal of the action for
annulment of real estate mortgage and transfer certificate of title with
damages.
Virgilio Dycoco (Dycoco) is alleged to have executed on October 9, 1995
a "Real Estate Mortgage with Special Power to Sell Mortgaged Property
without Judicial Proceedings" (REM) in favor of respondent Adelaida
Orina (Adelaida), covering a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila
and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 105730 in
Dycoco’s name. The REM was notarized on even date by Notary Public
Arwin Juco Sinaguinan.
By Adelaida’s claim, Dycoco was indebted to her in the amount
of P250,000.00, payable in six months, to bear monthly interest rate of
five percent (5%), to secure which Dycoco executed the REM.
For Dycoco’s alleged failure to pay his obligation, Adelaida
extrajudicially foreclosed the REM and as no redemption was made
within the reglementary period, Dycoco’s TCT was cancelled and, in its
stead, TCT No. 243525 was issued in her name.
Dycoco’s attorneys-in-fact-brothers-in-law Cristino, Jose and Adolfo, all
surnamed Grafilo, who occupy the property covered by the REM as
caretakers/tenants, did not turn-over its possession to Adelaida, hence,
she, joined by her husband represented by her attorney-in-fact Evelyn
Sagalongos (Evelyn), filed a complaint for ejectment against them before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
Upon receiving notice of the complaint, Dycoco, represented by his
attorneys-in-fact, filed a complaint for annulment of the REM and transfer
certificate of title with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 01100522,
against Adelaida and her husband German Orina represented by Evelyn
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
Dycoco’s attorneys-in-fact claimed that Dycoco’s signature on the REM
was forged, to prove which they presented various documents that
Dycoco was working in the United States of America as a licensed
physician on the alleged date of execution of the REM. They also
presented Dycoco’s U.S. Passport, personal checks, Special Power of
Attorney and Affidavit; and a Certification from the Clerk of Court of
RTC Manila that the office does not possess a copy of the REM, Notary
Public Sinaguinan having not submitted her notarial report for October
1995.
Herein respondents Adelaida et al., maintaining the due execution of the
REM, presented Evelyn who testified on a photocopy of the REM.
By Decision of May 23, 2005, Branch 15 of the Manila RTC dismissed
Dycoco’s complaint, holding that:
Plaintiff, [Dycoco], through the testimony of their (sic) lone witness as
well as their (sic) documentary exhibits tried to show that it was not . . .
Dycoco who mortgaged the said property. Cristino Grafilo even testified
that their brother Miguel, admitted to having stole (sic) the title and have
(sic) it mortgaged. Plaintiffs (sic), however, failed to establish that the
mortgagor, (sic) defendant Adelaida Orina, knew it was not Virgilio
Dycoco who mortgaged the same.2(underscoring supplied)
By the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
dismissal of Dycoco’s complaint, it holding that albeit Dycoco’s
questioned signature appearing on the REM and the documentary
evidence presented by his attorneys-in-fact bear "striking differences,"
since Dycoco was not presented on the witness stand to establish the
genuineness, due execution and contents of the documentary evidence, no
probative value can be ascribed thereto.
In not crediting evidentiary weight on Dycoco’s U.S. passport showing
that he was not in the Philippines when the REM was executed, the
appellate court held:
. . . [T]he existence, genuineness, due execution and contents of Exhibit
"I" have not been properly established. Again, the identification made by
plaintiff-appellant Cristino Grafilo (sic) will not suffice since he is not
privy to its issuance and execution. The plaintiff-appellants (sic) should
have presented a person competent to testify to establish the genuineness
and contents of Exhibit "I" like an officer from the Bureau of
Immigration. But the plaintiff-appellants (sic) failed to do so. Thus, this
court finds the stance of plaintiff-appellants (sic) that Virgilio Dycoco
was out of the country at the time of the execution of the questioned deed
unsupported.3
The motion for reconsideration of Dycoco’s attorneys-in-fact having been
denied by Resolution of October 3, 2008, the present petition for review
was filed.
A perusal of the REM which is, as stated earlier, a merely photocopy,
shows the incompleteness of the acknowledgment portion. It reads:
Republic of the Philippines )
City of Manila ) S.S.
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila, this 9th day
of October 1995, personally came and appeared ____________________
(sic) with Res. Cert. No. : 12262297 C issued on 27 July 95 at Manila and
Tax Account No.: 110-783-724 known to me and to me known to be the
same person who executed the foregoing instrument which he
acknowledged before me as his free and voluntary act and deed.4
As the above-quoted acknowledgment shows, the name of the person who
personally appeared before the notary public is not stated.
Documents acknowledged before a notary public, except last wills and
testaments, are public documents.5 Since the subject REM was not
properly notarized, its public character does not hold.
Since the REM is not a public document, it is subject to the requirement
of proof for private documents under Section 20, Rule 132, which
provides:
Section 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be. (underscoring supplied)
It was thus incumbent upon Adelaida to prove that Dycoco’s signature is
genuine. As stated earlier, a mere photocopy of the REM was presented.
It is axiomatic that when the genuineness of signatures on a document is
sought to be proved or disproved through comparison of standard
signatures with the questioned signature, the original thereof must be
presented.6 Why respondents did not present the original, they did not
explain. Why they did not present Adelaida, who must have been present
at the execution of the REM as her purported signature appears thereon,
or the notary public, or any of the witnesses, neither did they explain. Sec.
5 of Rule 130 which reads:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of the
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Upon the other hand, Dycoco’s attorneys-in-fact presented his U.S.
passport documenting when he entered and exited from the Philippines,
as well as various documents showing his genuine signature. The
appellate court, although upholding the admissibility of Dycoco’s
documentary evidence, did not ascribe weight to it, however, upon the
justification that "[e]ven if . . . Cristino Grafilo was empowered to appear
for and on behalf of plaintiff-appellant Virgilio Dycoco in this case by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney, the powers couched in said
document do not vest upon the former the power to testify on matters [of]
which he has no personal knowledge."7
Contrary to the appellate court’s stance, there was no necessity to present
Dycoco on the witness stand or to present the one who made the entries
on his U.S. passport. In respondents’ Comment/Opposition to Dycoco’s
formal offer of evidence, the passport was objected to as being
"immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent."8 Such comment is a virtual
admission of the authenticity of the entries in the passport.
But more important, one of the documents offered by Dycoco is a Special
Power of Attorney executed on June 2, 2000 in Illinois, U.S.A. showing
his signature, notarized and certified in accordance with Public Act No.
2103,9 which effectively dispenses with the requirement of presenting
him on the witness stand.
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated
in a foreign country shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment
and authentication are made in accordance with the following
requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador,
minister, secretary of legation, chargé d’affaires, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the United States, acting within the country or place to
which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized
by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him, and that he
is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is
his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he
is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
In case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer
mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate
of the notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall
be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of
legation, chargé d’affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of
the United States, acting within the country or place to which he is
accredited. The officer making the authentication shall certify under his
official seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at the time
duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly exercising the
functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as
such he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of
instruments or documents in the place where the acknowledgment was
taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are genuine. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Evelyn insisted that Dycoco was present during the signing of the REM
on October 9, 1995:
ATTY. MERCADO:
Q: Madam Witness, when this document was prepared, were you present?
WITNESS:
A: Yes sir.
Q: Are you a witness in the execution of this document?
A: Yes sir.
Q: On page 2 of this document, the (sic) appears a signature above the
type-written name Adelaida Orina, will you please inform the Honorable
Court whose signature is this?
Q: Why do you know that it is the signature of Adelaida Orina?
A: Because she is included there.

Q: What do you mean by "kasama po siya"?

A: There were four of us at the office of the Notary Public.

Q: When you said four of you, whao (sic) are they?

A: Adelaida, Virgilio, two other witness (sic) and me.

Q: You are not four, you are five?

A: Yes sir.10 (underscoring supplied)

Evelyn’s testimony not only contradicts the entries in Dycoco’s U.S.

Passport, however, it appearing therein that Dycoco visited the
Philippines on April 2, 1990 and arrived in the United States on April 9
of the same year. Contrary to her claim, the REM does not reflect here as
one of the witnesses to its execution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court

of Appeals dated November 29, 2007 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.1avvphi1

Let a NEW judgment be entered declaring null and void the document
entitled "Real Estate Mortgage with Special Power to Sell Mortgaged
Property without Judicial Proceedings" purportedly signed by Virgilio
Dycoco in favor of Adelaida Orina.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Register of Deeds of Manila

for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 179502 September 18, 2009
PROGRESSIVE TRADE & SERVICE ENTERPRISES vs. MARIA
MILAGROSA ANTONIO
Virgilio Cebrero (Cebrero), registered owner of a 2,281 square meter
parcel of land situated in Sampaloc, Manila and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1583051 (the land) died on December 19,
1989.
On January 19, 1991, Cebrero’s wife Secundina Magno Cebrero
(Secundina) and children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate of the Deceased Virgilio D. Cebrero With Waiver of
Rights2 allotting the land to Secundina.
On September 27, 1994, Secundina sold the land to Progressive Trade and
Services (petitioner), through its president and chairman Manuel C. Chua
(Chua), via Deed of Absolute Sale.3 TCT No.158305 was thus cancelled
and in its stead TCT No. 2253404 was issued in the name of Secundina
on December 11, 1995 and, on even date, TCT No. 225340 was cancelled
and TCT No. 2253415 was issued in the name of petitioner.
On September 22, 1997, herein respondent Maria Milagrosa Antonio
(Milagrosa) filed a Complaint6 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-85178, for Annulment of Title and
Documents with Damages against petitioner and Secundina, claiming that
on April 30, 1985, Cebrero, with Secundina’s consent, sold to her the land
for P9,124,000;7 that she was not able to register the sale because she had
to go to the United States to attend to personal family matters; and that
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and the Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of petitioner are null and void.
Answer,8
In its petitioner claimed that it bought the land in good faith and
for value from Secundina and that Milagrosa’s claim appears to be
"questionable, dubious, spurious, or inexistent;"9 that any claim of
Milagrosa would only be as between her and Secundina; and that
Milagrosa’s rights, if any, had been forfeited by laches, estoppel, and
prescription.
In her Answer,10 Secundina denied that she and her husband sold the land
to Milagrosa, claiming that the sale to petitioner was lawful and for
valuable consideration; and that, in any event, laches and prescription had
set in to bar Milagrosa’s claim.
Branch 35 of the Manila RTC found petitioner to be a purchaser in good
faith. With respect to Secundina, it concluded that since she and her
husband twice sold the land to two different vendees without their
knowledge and consent, "[she] must compensate [the plaintiff Milagrosa]
who was damaged by her fraud."11 Thus the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
(1) Dismissing the complaint as far as defendant Progressive Trade &
Services Enterprises, represented by its President and Chairman Manuel
C. Chua, is concerned;
(2) Confirming the validity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 225341
issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila in the name of Progressive
Trade & Services Enterprises, a single proprietorship represented by its
President & Chairman Manuel C. Chua, for Lot 68-A-l-A of the
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-314533, located in Sampaloc, Manila;
(3) Ordering the defendant Segundina, a.k.a. Secundina, Cebrero to pay
the plaintiff:
(a) The sum of P9,124,000.00, plus interest thereon at the legal rate
computed from September 22, 1997;
(b) The sum of P50,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and
(c) The costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Both Milagrosa and Secundina appealed.13 By Decision14 of October 10,
2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. However,
on Milagrosa’s Motion for Reconsideration,15 the Court of Appeals,
finding the title, TCT No. 225340, issued to Secundina spurious, rendered
an Amended Decision16 on March 26, 2007 in favor of Milagrosa,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Plaintiff-Appellant’s Motion
for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Concomitantly, judgment is rendered:
1. Cancelling TCT No. 225340 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Manila in favor of the Defendant-Appellant, Segundina M. Cebrero, for
being spurious;
2. Cancelling TCT No. 225341 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Manila in favor of the Defendant-Appellee, Progressive Trade and
Services Enterprises, for the reason that it is a purchaser in bad faith;
3. Upholding the validity of TCT No. 158305 in the name of the late
Virgilio D. Cebrero; and
4. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue a new title over the
subject property in the name of Plaintiff-Appellant, Maria Milagrosa
Antonio, in lieu of TCT No. 158305.
SO ORDERED.17 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Hence, the present petition,18 petitioner alleging that the Court of Appeals
erred
x x x in ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 225341 which was duly
issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila in favor of the petitioner.19
xxxx
x x x in not ruling that the petitioner purchased the subject property in
good faith and for value.20
xxxx
x x x in not upholding the principle of indefeasibility of title under the
Torrens system of registration.21
x x x in ruling that the attendant circumstances did not constitute a case
of double sale.22
xxxx
x x x in not finding that under the circumstances, respondent had forfeited
whatever pretended rights she has, if any, on the grounds of laches,
estoppel and prescription.23
xxxx
x x x in not finding that the respondent has no cause of action against the
petitioner.24 (Emphasis in the original)
In the meantime, as Milagrosa died on June 15, 2006, the Court of
Appeals, in the exercise of its residual jurisdiction, substituted Romualdo
Uy for Milagrosa as plaintiff-appellant25 on December 12, 2007.
The petition is meritorious.
The former lawyer of the Cebrero spouses, Judge Celso D. Laviña (Judge
Laviña), who is familiar with the signatures of the spouses, testified that
Cebrero’s purported signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale to Milagrosa
(marked Exhibit "B" in the deed but designated Exhibit "A" during trial
in Milagrosa’s formal offer of evidence)26 is not his.27
A naked eye comparison of Cebrero’s signature in the Deed of Absolute
Sale to Milagrosa which is, by the way, a mere photocopy28 with the
sample signatures identified by Judge Laviña as those of Cebrero and
which were executed at around the time the questioned Deed of Absolute
Sale to Milagrosa was executed shows marked differences,29 indicating
that they were not affixed by one and the same hand.1avvphi1
A comparison too with the naked eye of Secundina’s signatures in public
documents which she identified to be hers, as well her signatures which
she executed in open court and the signature attributed to her in the Deed
of Absolute Sale to Milagrosa30 in which her name is typed as
"SEGUNDINA" and her signature above it reads also "Segundina,"
shows that they were not written by one and the same hand.

The trial court’s ruling that Secundina failed to prove her allegation that
the Deed of Absolute Sale to Milagrosa was a forgery because she failed
to present expert witnesses31 does not lie. It is settled that handwriting
experts, while useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing
handwritings or signatures.32 For Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provides:

The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes

it to be the handwriting of the person because he has seen the person write,
or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted
or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of
such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Underscoring
supplied)

Complementing the said provision is Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Rules

of Court which allows the reception of the opinion of a witness, like Judge
Laviña, for which proper basis is given, as evidence regarding a
handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity.

As the Court finds that the Deed of Absolute Sale in Milagrosa’s favor is
not genuine, it transmitted no rights to her. Consequently, the subject land
– part of Cebrero’s estate which was allotted to Secundina was validly
sold by her to petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated March 26, 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Civil Case No. 97-85178 lodged at the Regional Trial Court of Manila
Branch 35 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 73010 April 27, 1990
REVA RAZ vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
The subject of this petition is a Conditional Assignment of Rights and
Interests over a Foreclosure Judgment entered into between petitioner
Reva Raz and the original private respondent herein, Encarnacion
Villanueva, on August 7, 1972. 1
The said judgment was rendered in favor of Villanueva on February 5,
1969, and ordered the defendants therein to pay her the amount of
P35,000.00, with 12% per annum interest from August 7, 1965, and other
amounts, in default of which the property subject of the proceeding would
be sold at public auction to satisfy the amounts owing her. 2This property
was a parcel of land located at Quezon City which had been mortgaged
by the defendants to secure the payment of a loan she had extended to
them. The judgment was pending appeal before the respondent court at
the time of the execution of the Conditional Assignment.
By virtue of the Conditional Assignment, Villanueva transferred all her
rights and interests in the said judgment to Raz in consideration of the
sum of P75,000.00 to be paid by the petitioner as follows:
a) The ASSIGNEE shall pay the ASSIGNOR, her heirs and/or assigns the
sum of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND (P22,000.00), upon the signing of
this agreement.
b) The ASSIGNEE shall pay the ASSIGNOR, her heirs and/or assigns the
sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00), within one year from
August 7, 1972, and not later, August 7, 1973;
c) The balance of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND (P33,000.00) plus
costs mentioned in the said judgment shall be paid within the next
following year and not later, August 7, 1974. It is further understood that
the full consideration mentioned in paragraph 3, and the costs mentioned
in par. c, hereof shall be fully liquidated in two (2) years time from the
signing of this agreement and not later, August 7, 1974.
It was also stipulated in Par. 3 (d) of the agreement —
d) That the ASSIGNOR shall, as soon as the decision in the
aforementioned case shall become final and executory, proceed with the
execution of the judgment and the auction sale if allowed by law of the
property subject matter of the aforementioned case, and the ASSIGNOR
and/or her heirs shall as soon as the full consideration hereof is fully
satisfied, and if by operation of law shall become the legitimate owner of
the said property, execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the ASSIGNEE or
her heirs, and/or assigns in order to make this CONDITIONAL
ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS AND INTERESTS permanent. All
expenses for such execution and auction sale and other expenses
necessary thereto shall be for the account of the ASSIGNEE.
The petitioner paid the first installment of P22,000.00 on August 7, 1972,
and the second installment of P20,000.00 on August 7, 1973. However,
she refused to pay the third installment of P33,000.00, which was
supposed to be due on August 7, 1974, on the ground that Villanueva had
not complied with her obligation under their agreement.
On April 13, 1978, the petitioner filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against the private respondent, claiming that
the latter had reneged on her duty to deliver the property to the assignee
in accordance with their agreement. In her answer, Villanueva alleged that
it was the petitioner who had defaulted in her payments and thus given
just cause for the rescission of the agreement. This was authorized in its
Par. 3(h) reading as follows:
h) If for any reason, any of the above terms and conditions cannot fully
be complied, the same may be considered rescinded by either party, in
which event the ASSIGNOR shall return whatever money she or her heirs
may have received from the ASSIGNEE, and the said ASSIGNEE, shall
relinquish any and all rights which if any she or her heirs may have, and
this contract shall forthwith be considered null and void and without force
and effect whatsoever.
To support her claim, Villanueva presented two letters 3 she said she had
sent Raz, the first to remind her of the third installment that had not yet
been paid and the second to tender her the refund of her earlier payments
in view of the rescission of their contract. These letters follow:
April 22, 1975
thereto as provided in our contract of August 7, 1972, I am making to you
this formal tender of payment of the P42,000.00 you paid me before.
Please give this matter your preferential attention because if I will not
hear from you within a period of two (2) days from receipt hereof I will
be constrained to consign aforesaid amount in court at your own costs.

Reva Raz Yours truly,

16-A A. Matiyaga St.
Quezon City (Sgd.) ENCARNACION VILLANUEVA

Dear Mr. Raz:
I am writing you this letter to remind you of your obligation under the
Deed of Assignment we have entered into. You have not complied with
your promise to pay me the P33,000.00 the costs and expenses
corresponding thereto.
For her part, Raz contended that it was the private respondent who had
incurred in delay and bad faith.1âwphi1 The petitioner pointed out that
the motion to dismiss the appeal was filed by the appellants on August
16, 1972, and was granted by the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated
December 15, 1972. Yet it was only on August 16, 1973, that the private
respondent filed a motion for execution of the foreclosure judgment.

Hoping that you give this matter your preferential attention. Final demand This motion was granted by the trial court on October 6, 1973. The
is hereby made that you pay the aforesaid amount otherwise I will be property was sold at public auction on January 23, 1975, and the
constrained to rescind the contract and avail of my rights provided for in certificate of sale was issued in favor of Villanueva on February 25, 1975.
the contract. Truly yours, This was registered on March 26, 1975, and the period of redemption
expired one year later. However, it was only on February 9, 1978, that the
(Sgd.) ENCARNACION G. VILLANUEVA court, on Villanueva's motion, ordered the confirmation of the sale and a
new certificate of title was issued in her name.
xxx xxx xxx
According to the petitioner, the two letters allegedly sent to her by the
May 13, 1975 private respondents should not have been admitted in evidence not only
because there was no proof that she had received them. No less
importantly, their genuineness had not been established in accordance
Mr. Reva C. Raz
with Rule 132, Section 21, reading as follows:
16-A Matiyaga St.
Quezon City
Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how
proved. — Before any private writing may be received in evidence, its due
Dear Mr. Raz:
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
I am writing you this letter again to inform you that inasmuch that you
a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;
failed to pay me the P33,000.00 the costs and expenses corresponding
b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or
c) By a subscribing witness.
The petitioner likewise submitted that the rescission of the agreement was
improper because it was Villanueva who had violated the contract by
refusing to deliver the property to her. Moreover, every rescission, even
if extrajudicial, requires proper notice to the other party, and there was no
proof that such notice had been served on her.
The Court has deliberated on the issues and the arguments of the parties
and finds that the respondent court 4committed no reversible error in
sustaining the trial court 5 and dismissing the appeal.
The petitioner was actually arguing against herself in invoking Rule 132,
Section 21, for one of the modes prescribed therein for proving the
execution and authenticity of any private writing is "by evidence of the
genuineness of the handwriting of the maker." This mode must be read
with Section 23 of the same Rule, which says that —
. . . Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
We have made such comparison and find that the signature of
Encarnacion G. Villanueva on the Conditional Assignment (which is not
disputed) is similar to the signatures affixed to the two letters sent to the
petitioner. There is no doubt that the agreement and the two letters were
signed by private respondent Encarnacion G. Villanueva. Consequently,
their authenticity and execution having been established, we hold that the
letters were admissible as evidence of the private respondent.
The Court is also convinced that the two letters were correctly sent to and
personally delivered at the petitioner's address as stated in the Conditional
Assignment, were actually received there and later presumably conveyed
to her. Indeed, the signature of the person who received the first letter
closely resembles that of one of petitioner's counsel as an examination of
her pleadings will reveal. 6 At any rate, even if they were not really
transmitted to the petitioner and the letters were correctly rejected as
inadmissible, Raz would still be bound by her own admission in the
complaint, where she made the following allegations in Par. 8:
a) A week or so before August 7, 1974, defendant demanded from plaintiff
the payment of the balance of P33,000.00 of the consideration;
xxx xxx xxx
e) In view of plaintiffs insistence that the P33,000.00 would be paid only
after defendant had obtained ownership of the subject property and would
thus be ready to execute the corresponding deed of sale, defendant instead
offered to return the amount of P42,000.00 already paid to her by plaintiff
and have the contract rescinded, clearly revealing her interest not to
recognize the aforesaid contract. (Emphasis supplied.)
The last quoted-paragraph is especially telling because it belies the
petitioner's insistence that she had not been notified of the rescission. By
her own words, she has admitted understanding the letter of May 13,
1975, as informing her that because of her failure to pay the balance of
the stipulated payment, the contract was being rescinded by the private
respondent. As she herself alleged, Villanueva "offered to return the
amount of P42,000.00 already paid to her by the plaintiff and have the
contract rescinded." This is a judicial admission that the petitioner cannot
now disavow. 7
While it is true that a certain degree of delay did accompany the
registration of the property in Villanueva's name, this was not entirely
imputable to her. Good faith is presumed except in the face of the
strongest evidence to the contrary, which is not present here. The Court
also notes from her conduct that the petitioner is not entirely blameless
either. Considering the investment she had made in the land, having
already paid thereon the sum of P33,000.00, we feel she should have been
more vigilant in the protection of her interests.
The petitioner's counsel repeatedly says it was informed of each
development in the sale and registration of the property "later on." 8 By
this vague statement, which suggests that it was not following up the
matter closely, it would absolve its client of all negligence. We do not
agree.

It seems to us that in view of her substantial stake in the property, it

behooved the petitioner to see to it that the private respondent discharged
her part of the bargain without delay, especially so since no specific date
was imposed upon the private respondent to transfer the land to the
petitioner. If Raz felt that Villanueva was dilly-dallying, she should have
taken steps to make her move faster (short of refusing to pay the last
installment). As the trial judge observed, "plaintiff could very well have
paid the whole amount and then substituted herself as plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 10109." But she did not and just stood by, waiting to hear of
developments "later on."

The sum of it all is that the petitioner, in insisting on the registration first
in her name of the subject property before paying the balance, was
invoking a right not stipulated in the Conditional Assignment. What was
clearly provided therein was that the balance of P33,000.00 would be paid
by her within two years from the date of the agreement and not later than
August 7, 1974. For her refusal to make this payment, the contract was,
pursuant to its terms, properly rescinded.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of

the respondent court is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 156330 November 19, 2014
NEDLLOYD LIJNEN B.V. ROTTERDAM vs. GLOW LAKS
ENTERPRISES, LTD.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed pursuant to Ruic 45 of
the Revised Rules of Comi, primarily assailing the 11 December 2002
Resolution rendered by the Special Former Sixteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48277,2 the decretal portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the April 29. 1994 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52 thereof' in Civil Case
No. 88-45595, SET ASIDE. Nedlloyd Lijncn B.V. Rotterdam and The
East Asiatic Co., Ltd arc ordered to pay Glow l ,aks Enterprises, I ,td. the
following:
1. The invoice value of the goodslost worth $53,640.00, or its equivalent
in Philippine currency;
2. Attorney’s fees of P50,000.00; and
3. Costs.3
The Facts
Petitioner Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. Rotterdam (Nedlloyd) is a foreign
corporation engaged in the business of carrying goods by sea, whose
vessels regularly call at the port of Manila. It is doing business in the
Philippines thru its local ship agent, co-petitioner East Asiatic Co., Ltd.
(East Asiatic).
Respondent Glow Laks Enterprises,Ltd., is likewise a foreign corporation
organized and existing under the laws of Hong Kong. It is not licensed to
do, and it is not doing business in, the Philippines.
On or about 14 September 1987, respondent loaded on board M/S
Scandutch at the Port of Manila a total 343 cartoons of garments,
complete and in good order for pre-carriage tothe Port of Hong Kong. The
goods covered by Bills of Lading Nos. MHONX-2 and MHONX-
34 arrived in good condition in Hong Kong and were transferred to M/S
Amethyst for final carriage to Colon, Free Zone, Panama. Both vessels,
M/S Scandutch and M/S Amethyst, are owned by Nedlloyd represented
in the Phlippines by its agent, East Asiatic. The goods which were valued
at US$53,640.00 was agreed to be released to the consignee, Pierre
Kasem, International, S.A., upon presentation of the original copies of the
covering bills of lading.5 Upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Colon
on 23 October 1987, petitioners purportedly notified the consignee of the
arrival of the shipments, and its custody was turned over tothe National
Ports Authority in accordance with the laws, customs regulations and
practice of trade in Panama. By an unfortunate turn ofevents, however,
unauthorized persons managed to forge the covering bills of lading and
on the basis of the falsified documents, the ports authority released the
goods.
On 16 July 1988, respondent filed a formal claim with Nedlloyd for the
recovery of the amount of US$53,640.00 representing the invoice value
of the shipment but to no avail.6 Claiming that petitioners are liable for
the misdelivery of the goods, respondent initiated Civil Case No. 88-
45595 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52,
seeking for the recovery of the amount of US$53,640.00, including the
legal interest from the date of the first demand.7
In disclaiming liability for the misdelivery of the shipments, petitioners
asserted in their Answer8 that they were never remiss in their obligation
as a common carrier and the goods were discharged in good order and
condition into the custody of the National Ports Authority of Panama in
accordance with the Panamanian law. They averred that they cannot be
faulted for the release of the goods to unauthorized persons, their
extraordinary responsibility as a common carrier having ceased at the
time the possession of the goods were turned over to the possession of the
port authorities.
After the Pre-Trial Conference, trial on the merits ensued. Both parties
offered testimonial and documentary evidence to support their respective
causes. On 29 April 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision9 ordering the
dismissal of the complaint but granted petitioners’ counterclaims. In
effect, respondent was directed to pay petitioners the amount
of P120,000.00 as indemnification for the litigation expenses incurred by
the latter. In releasing the common carrier from liability for the
misdelivery of the goods, the RTC ruled that Panama law was duly proven
during the trial and pursuant to the said statute, carriers of goods destined
to any Panama port of entry have to discharge their loads into the custody
of Panama Ports Authority to make effective government collection of
port dues, customs duties and taxes. The subsequent withdrawal effected
by unauthorized persons on the strength of falsified bills of lading does
not constitute misdelivery arising from the fault of the common carrier.
The decretal part of the RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment
is renderedfor [petitioners] and against [Respondent], ordering the
dismissal of the complaint and ordering the latter to pay [petitioners] the
amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P120,000.00) on their counterclaims. Cost against [Respondent].10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the findings of the RTC and
held that foreign laws were not proven in the manner provided by Section
24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, and therefore, it cannot be
given full faith and credit.11 For failure to prove the foreign law and
custom, it is presumed that foreign laws are the sameas our local or
domestic or internal law under the doctrine of processual presumption.
Under the New Civil Code, the discharge of the goods intothe custody of
the ports authority therefore does not relieve the commoncarrier from
liability because the extraordinary responsibility of the common carriers
lasts until actual or constructive delivery of the cargoes tothe consignee
or to the person who has the right to receive them. Absent any proof that
the notify party or the consignee was informed of the arrival of the goods,
the appellate court held that the extraordinary responsibility of common
carriers remains. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals directed petitioners
to pay respondent the value of the misdelivered goods in the amount of
US$53,640.00.
The Issues
Dissatisfied with the foregoing disquisition, petitioners impugned the
adverse Court of Appeals Decision before the Court on the following
grounds:
I.
THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO NEED TO PROVE PANAMANIAN
LAWS BECAUSE THEYHAD BEEN JUDICIALLY ADMITTED. AN
ADMISSION BY A PARTY IN THE COURSE OF THE
PROCEEDINGS DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF.
II.
BY PRESENTING AS EVIDENCE THE [GACETA] OFFICIAL OF
REPUBLICA DE PANAMA NO. 17.596 WHERE THE APPLICABLE
PANAMANIAN LAWS WERE OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED, AND
THE TESTIMONY OF EXPERT WITNESSES, PETITIONERS WERE
ABLE TO PROVE THE LAWS OF PANAMA.
III.
IF WE HAVE TO CONCEDE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS’
FINDING THAT THERE WAS FAILURE OF PROOF, THE LEGAL
QUESTION PRESENTED TO THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD
BE RESOLVED FAVORABLY BECAUSE THE CARRIER
DISCHARGED ITS DUTY WHETHER UNDER THE PANAMANIAN
LAW OR UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.13 To prove a
foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply
with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court14 which read: SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of
public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreigncountry, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state,in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory: (1) itmust be attested by the officer having legal
custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) it must be accompanied
by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice-consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and
with the seal of his office.15 Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.16 The certificate
may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular
officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.17 The attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be, and mustbe under the official seal of the
attesting officer.18
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the Panamanian laws,
particularly Law 42 and its Implementing Order No. 7, were not duly
proven in accordance with Rules of Evidence and as such, it cannot
govern the rights and obligations of the parties in the case at bar. While a
photocopy of the Gaceta Official of the Republica de Panama No. 17.596,
the Spanish text of Law 42 which is theforeign statute relied upon by the
court a quoto relieve the common carrier from liability, was presented as
evidence during the trial of the case below, the same however was not
accompanied by the required attestation and certification.
It is explicitly required by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court that a copy of the statute must be accompanied by a certificate of
the officer who has legal custody of the records and a certificate made by
the secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consular or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The latter requirement is not merely a technicality but is intended
to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of the
document in a foreign country.19 Certainly, the deposition of Mr. Enrique
Cajigas, a maritime law practitioner in the Republic of Panama, before
the Philippine Consulate in Panama, is not the certificate contemplated by
law. At best, the deposition can be considered as an opinion of an expert
witness who possess the required special knowledge on the Panamanian
laws but could not be recognized as proof of a foreign law, the deponent
not being the custodian of the statute who can guarantee the genuineness
of the document from a foreign country. To admit the deposition as proof
of a foreign law is, likewise, a disavowal of the rationaleof Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, which isto ensure authenticity of
a foreign law and its existence so as to justify its import and legal
consequence on the event or transaction in issue. The above rule,
however, admits exceptions, and the Court in certain cases recognized
that Section 25, Rule132 of the Revised Rules of Court does not exclude
the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of
foreign law. In Willamete Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal20 for instance,
we allowed the foreign law tobe established on the basis of the testimony
in open court during the trial in the Philippines of an attorney-atlaw in
San Francisco, California, who quoted the particular foreign law sought
to be established.21 The ruling is peculiar to the facts. Petitioners cannot
invoke the Willamete ruling to secure affirmative relief since their so
called expert witness never appeared during the trial below and his
deposition, that was supposed to establish the existence of the foreign law,
was obtained ex-parte.
It is worth reiterating at this point that under the rules of private
international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a
fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of the foreign country
or state will be presumed to be the same as our local or domestic law. This
is known as processual presumption.22 While the foreign law was
properly pleaded in the case at bar, it was,however, proven not in the
manner provided by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The decision of the RTC, which proceeds from a disregard of specific
rules cannot be recognized.
Having settled the issue on the applicable Rule, we now resolve the issue
of whether or not petitioners are liable for the misdelivery of goods under
Philippine laws.
Under the New Civil Code, common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligencein the vigilance over goods, according to the
circumstances of each case.23Common carriers are responsible for loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods unless the same is due to flood,
storm, earthquake or other natural disaster or calamity.24 Extraordinary
diligence is that extreme care and caution which persons of unusual
prudence and circumspection use for securing or preserving their own
property or rights.25This expecting standardimposed on common carriers
in contract of carrier of goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of the
shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods have
been lodged for the shipment.26Hence, in case of loss of goods in transit,
the common carrier is presumed under the law to have been in fault or
negligent.27
While petitioners concede that, as a common carrier, they are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the care and custody of the goods in
their possession, they insist that they cannot be held liable for the loss of
the shipments, their extraordinary responsibility having ceased at the time
the goods were discharged into the custody of the customs
arrastreoperator, who in turn took complete responsibility over the care,
storage and delivery of the cargoes.28
In contrast, respondent, submits that the fact that the shipments were not
delivered to the consignee as statedin the bill of lading or to the party
designated or named by the consignee, constitutes misdelivery thereof,
and under the law it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or
negligent if the goods they transported, as in this case, fell into the hands
of persons who have no right to receive them.
We sustain the position of the respondent.
Article 1736 and Article 1738 are the provisions in the New Civil Code
which define the period when the common carrier is required to exercise
diligence lasts, viz:
Article 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts
from the time the goodsare unconditionally placed in the possession of,
and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered,
actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person
who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of
article 1738.
Article 1738. The extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues
to be operative even during the time the goods are stored in a warehouse
of the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee has been
advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity
thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them.
Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the
extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time
the goods are delivered to the carrier.29 This responsibility remains in full
force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in
transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of stop page in
transitu, and terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for the
acceptance, of the goods by the consignee or such other person entitled to
receive them.30
It was further provided in the samestatute that the carrier may be relieved
from the responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon actual or
constructive delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee or to the
person who has the right to receive them.31 In sales, actual delivery has
been defined as the ceding of the corporeal possession by the seller, and
the actual apprehension of the corporeal possession by the buyer or by
some person authorized by him to receive the goods as his representative
for the purpose of custody or disposal.32 By the same token, there is actual
delivery in contracts for the transport of goods when possession has been
turned over to the consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a
reasonable time is given him to remove the goods.33
In this case, there is no dispute that the custody of the goods was never
turned over to the consignee or his agents but was lost into the hands of
unauthorized persons who secured possession thereof on the strength of
falsified documents. The loss or the misdelivery of the goods in the instant
case gave rise to the presumption that the common carrier is at fault or
negligent.
A common carrier is presumed to have been negligent if it fails to prove
that it exercised extraordinary vigilance over the goods it
transported.34 When the goods shipped are either lost or arrived in
damaged condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its failure
to observe that diligence, and there need not be an express finding of
negligence to hold it liable.35 To overcome the presumption of
negligence, the common carrier must establish by adequateproof that it
exercised extraordinary diligence over the goods.36 It must do more than
merely show that some other party could be responsible for the damage.37
In the present case, petitioners failed to prove that they did exercise the
degree of diligence required by law over the goods they transported.
Indeed, aside from their persistent disavowal of liability by conveniently
posing an excuse that their extraordinary responsibility isterminated upon
release of the goods to the Panamanian Ports Authority, petitioners failed
to adduce sufficient evidence they exercised extraordinary care to prevent
unauthorized withdrawal of the shipments. Nothing in the New Civil
Code, however, suggests, even remotely, that the common carriers’
responsibility over the goods ceased upon delivery thereof to the custom
authorities. To the mind of this Court, the contract of carriage remains in
full force and effect even after the delivery of the goods to the port
authorities; the only delivery that releases it from their obligation to
observe extraordinary care is the delivery to the consignee or his agents.
Even more telling of petitioners’ continuing liability for the goods
transported to the fact that the original bills of lading up to this time,
remains in the possession of the notify party or consignee. Explicit on this
point is the provision of Article 353 of the Code of Commerce which
provides:
Article 353. The legal evidence of the contract between the shipper and
the carrier shall be the bills of lading, by the contents of which the disputes
which may arise regarding their execution and performance shall be
decided, no exceptions being admissible other than those of falsity and
material error in the drafting.
After the contract has been complied with, the bill of lading which the
carrier has issued shall be returned to him, and by virtue of the exchange
of this title with the thing transported, the respective obligations and
actions shall be considered cancelled, unless in the same act the claim
which the parties may wish to reserve be reduced to writing, with the
exception of that provided for in Article 366.
In case the consignee, upon receiving the goods, cannot return the bill of
lading subscribed by the carrier, because of its loss or of any other cause,
he must give the latter a receiptfor the goods delivered, this receipt
producing the same effects as the return of the bill of lading.
While surrender of the original bill of lading is not a condition precedent
for the common carrier to bedischarged from its contractual obligation,
there must be, at the very least, an acknowledgement of the delivery by
signing the delivery receipt, if surrender of the original of the bill of lading
is not possible.38 There was neither surrender of the original copies of the
bills of lading nor was there acknowledgment of the delivery in the
present case. This leads to the conclusion that the contract of carriage still
subsists and petitioners could be held liable for the breach thereof.
Petitioners could have offered evidence before the trial court to show that
they exercised the highest degree of care and caution even after the goods
was turned over to the custom authorities, by promptly notifying the
consignee of its arrival at the P01i of Cristobal in order to afford them
ample opportunity to remove the cargoes from the port of discharge. We
have scoured the records and found that neither the consignee nor the
notify paiiy was informed by the petitioners of the arrival of the goods, a
crucial fact indicative of petitioners' failure to observe extraordinary
diligence in handling the goods entrusted to their custody for transport.
They could have presented proof to show that they exercised
extraordinary care but they chose in vain, full reliance to their cause on
applicability of Panamanian law to local jurisdiction. It is for this reason
that we find petitioners liable for the misdelivery of the goods. It is
evident from the review of the records and by the evidence adduced by
the respondent that petitioners failed to rebut the prima facie presumption
of negligence. We find no compelling reason to depa1i from the ruling of
the Court of Appeals that under the contract of carriage, petitioners are
liable for the value of the misdelivcred goods.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

The assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 162886 August 11, 2008
HEIRS OF SPOUSES ARCILLA vs. TEODORO
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the September 12, 2003 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution2 dated March 24, 2004 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 72032.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On December 19, 1995, Ma. Lourdes A. Teodoro (respondent) initially
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes an
application for land registration of two parcels of land located at Barangay
San Pedro, Virac, Catanduanes. The lots, with an aggregate area of 284
square meters, are denominated as Lot Nos. 525-A and 525-B, Csd.-05-
010483-D of the Virac Cadastre. Respondent alleged that, with the
exception of the commercial building constructed thereon, she purchased
the subject lots from her father, Pacifico Arcilla (Pacifico), as shown by
a Deed of Sale3dated December 9, 1966, and that, prior thereto, Pacifico
acquired the said lots by virtue of the partition of the estate of his father,
Jose Arcilla evidenced by a document entitled Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate.4 Respondent also presented as evidence an Affidavit of Quit-
Claim5 in favor of Pacifico, executed by herein petitioners as Heirs of
Vicente Arcilla (Vicente), brother of Pacifico.
On February 7, 1996, the case was transferred to the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Virac, Catanduanes in view of the expanded jurisdiction
of said court as provided under Republic Act No. 7691.6
In their Opposition dated August 19, 1996, petitioners contended that they
are the owners pro-indiviso of the subject lots including the building and
other improvements constructed thereon by virtue of inheritance from
their deceased parents, spouses Vicente and Josefa Arcilla; contrary to the
claim of respondent, the lots in question were owned by their father,
Vicente, having purchased the same from a certain Manuel Sarmiento
sometime in 1917; Vicente's ownership is evidenced by several tax
declarations attached to the record; petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the subject lots since 1906. Petitioners
moved to dismiss the application of respondent and sought their
declaration as the true and absolute owners pro-indiviso of the subject lots
and the registration and issuance of the corresponding certificate of title
in their names.
Subsequently, trial of the case ensued.
On March 20, 1998, herein respondent filed a Motion for
Admission7 contending that through oversight and inadvertence she failed
to include in her application, the verification and certificate against forum
shopping required by Supreme Court (SC) Revised Circular No. 28-91 in
relation to SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Application8 on the ground that
respondent should have filed the certificate against forum shopping
simultaneously with the petition for land registration which is a
mandatory requirement of SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and that
any violation of the said Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the
application upon motion and after hearing.
Opposing the motion to dismiss, respondents asserted that the petitioners'
Motion to Dismiss Application was filed out of time; respondent's failure
to comply with SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 was not willful,
deliberate or intentional; and the Motion to Dismiss was deemed waived
for failure of petitioners to file the same during the earlier stages of the
proceedings.
On July 19, 1999, the MTC issued an Order9 denying petitioners' Motion
to Dismiss Application.
On June 25, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision10 the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, and considering all the above premises, the Court
finds and so holds that Applicant MA. LOURDES A. TEODORO, having
sufficient title over this land applied for hereby renders judgment, which
should be, as it is hereby CONFIRMED and REGISTERED in her name.
IT IS SO ORDERED.11
Herein petitioners then filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court of
Virac, Catanduanes. In its Decision12 dated February 22, 2002, the RTC,
Branch 43, of Virac, Catanduanes dismissed the appeal for lack of merit
and affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC. Petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its Order13 of July
22, 2002.
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, petitioners filed a Petition for
Review14 with the CA. On September 12, 2003, the CA promulgated its
presently assailed Decision dismissing the Petition. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in its
Resolution15 dated March 24, 2004.
Hence, the herein petition based on the following grounds:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with the
prevailing rules and jurisprudence when it held that the belated filing,
after more than two (2) years and three (3) months from the initial
application for land registration, of a sworn certification against forum
shopping in Respondent's application for land registration, constituted
substantial compliance with SC Admin. Circular No. 04-94.
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with
prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it held that the certification of
non-forum shopping subsequently submitted by respondent does not
require a certification from an officer of the foreign service of the
Philippines as provided under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with
prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it upheld the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that the
lots in question were not really owned by Petitioners' father Vicente S.
Arcilla, contrary to the evidence presented by both parties.
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with
prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it sustained the decision of the
RTC which affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC and in not reversing
the same and rendering judgment in favor of Petitioners.16
In their Memorandum, petitioners further raise the following issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire into conclusions of facts
made by the Honorable Court of Appeals in the instant Petition.17
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The CA ruled correctly when it held that the belated filing of a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping was substantial compliance with
SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
Under the attendant circumstances in the present case, the Court cannot
uphold petitioners’ contention that respondent's delay of more than two
years and three months in filing the required certificate of non-forum
shopping may not be considered substantial compliance with the
requirements of SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; that respondent's reasons of oversight and
inadvertence do not constitute a justifiable circumstance that could excuse
her non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of the above-
mentioned Circular and Rule; that subsequent compliance with the
requirement does not serve as an excuse for a party's failure to comply in
the first instance.
Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five
(5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party
or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping,
the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
This Rule was preceded by Circular No. 28-91, which originally required
the certification of non-forum shopping for petitions filed with this Court
and the CA; and SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which extended
the certification requirement for civil complaints and other initiatory
pleadings filed in all courts and other agencies.
In Gabionza v. Court of Appeals,18 this Court has held that Circular No.
28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective
or the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as possible.19The same guideline still applies in
interpreting what is now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.20
The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or
simply disregarded, for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.21 However, it is equally settled that
litigation is not merely a game of technicalities.22 Rules of procedure
should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice.23 Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed.24 Even the Rules of Court reflect this
principle.25
Moreover, the emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every
party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities.26
It must be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of
non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirement must not
be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the
undesirable practice of forum shopping.27 In Uy v. Land Bank of the
Philippines,28 the Court ruled, thus:
The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification,
therefore, is not unprecedented. In those cases where the Court excused
non-compliance with the requirements, there were special circumstances
or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly
unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the substantive
aspects of the case should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or
"compelling reason" for the reinstatement of the petition. x x x29
Citing De Guia v. De Guia30 the Court, in Estribillo v. Department of
Agrarian Reform,31 held that even if there was complete non-compliance
with the rule on certification against forum-shopping, the Court may still
proceed to decide the case on the merits pursuant to its inherent power to
suspend its own rules on grounds of substantial justice and apparent merit
of the case.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the lower courts did not commit
any error in proceeding to decide the case on the merits, as herein
respondent was able to submit a certification of non-forum shopping.
More importantly, the apparent merit of the substantive aspect of the
petition for land registration filed by respondent with the MTC coupled
with the showing that she had no intention to violate the Rules with
impunity, as she was the one who invited the attention of the court to the
inadvertence committed by her counsel, should be deemed as special
circumstances or compelling reasons to decide the case on the merits.
In addition, considering that a dismissal contemplated under Rule 7,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court is, as a rule, a dismissal without prejudice,
and since there is no showing that respondent is guilty of forum shopping,
to dismiss respondent's petition for registration would entail a tedious
process of re-filing the petition, requiring the parties to re-submit the
pleadings which they have already filed with the trial court, and
conducting anew hearings which have already been done, not to mention
the expenses that will be incurred by the parties in re-filing of pleadings
and in the re-conduct of hearings. These would not be in keeping with the
judicial policy of just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.32
The certification of non-forum shopping executed in a foreign
country is not covered by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
There is no merit to petitioners’ contentions that the verification and
certification subsequently submitted by respondent did not state the
country or city where the notary public exercised her notarial functions;
and that the MTC simply concluded, without any basis, that said notary
public was from Maryland, USA; that even granting that the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping were notarized in the USA, the
same may not be deemed admissible for any purpose in the Philippines
for failure to comply with the requirement of Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court that the notarized document must be accompanied by a
certificate issued by an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
who is stationed in the country in which a record of the subject document
is kept, proving or authenticating that the person who notarized the
document is indeed authorized to do so and has custody of the same.
The Court agrees with the disquisition of the CA, to wit:
From the foregoing provision [referring to Section 24, Rule 132, Rules of
Court], it can be gathered that it does not include documents
acknowledged before [a] notary public abroad. For foreign public
documents to be admissible for any purpose here in our courts, the same
must be certified by any officer of the Philippine legation stationed in the
country where the documents could be found or had been executed.
However, after judicious studies of the rule, Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the 1997
Rules of Court basically pertains to written official acts, or records of the
official of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. This
is so, as Sec. 24, Rule 132 explicitly refers only to paragraph (a) of Sec.
19. If the rule comprehends to cover notarial documents, the rule could
have included the same. Thus, petitioners-oppositors' contention that the
certificate of forum shopping that was submitted was defective, as it did
not bear the certification provided under Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, is devoid of any merit. What is important is the fact that the
respondent-applicant certified before a commissioned officer clothed
with powers to administer oath that [s]he has not and will not commit
forum shopping.33
The ruling of the Court in Lopez v. Court of Appeals,34 cited by
petitioners, is inapplicable to the present case because the Rules of
Evidence which were in effect at that time were the old Rules prior to
their amendment in 1989. The rule applied in Lopez, which was decided
prior to the effectivity of the amended Rules of Evidence,35 was Section
25, Rule 132, to wit:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record – An official record or an
entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989, Section 25, Rule 132
became Section 24, Rule 132; and the amendment consisted in the
deletion of the introductory phrase "An official record or an entry
therein," which was substituted by the phrase "The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19."
Thus, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court now reads as follows:
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 19(a) of the same Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required
by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer
in the foreign service under Section 24 refers only to the documents
enumerated in Section 19(a), to wit: written official acts or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers of the Philippines or of a foreign country. The Court agrees
with the CA that had the Court intended to include notarial documents as
one of the public documents contemplated by the provisions of Section
24, it should not have specified only the documents referred to under
paragraph (a) of Section 19.
In Lopez, the requirements of then Section 25, Rule 132 were made
applicable to all public or official records without any distinction because
the old rule did not distinguish. However, in the present rule, it is clear
under Section 24, Rule 132 that its provisions shall be made applicable
only to the documents referred to under paragraph (a), Section 19, Rule
132.
The CA did not err in sustaining the findings of fact and conclusion
of law of the MTC and the RTC.
Settled is the rule that the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are generally binding and conclusive upon this
Court.36 There are recognized exceptions to this rule, among which are:
(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there
is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
(7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to the findings
of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case;
and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties.37However, petitioners failed to show that any of the exceptions is
present in the instant case to warrant a review of the findings of fact of
the lower courts.
Petitioners insist that the documents which were presented in evidence by
respondent to prove her ownership of the subject lot are rife with defects
and inconsistencies. Petitioners contend that the subject lot should not
have been included in the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Jose
Arcilla, because he was no longer the owner of the said property at the
time of said settlement; the Deed of Sale should be declared null and void
because the seller, Pacifico Arcilla, was not the owner of the subject lands
at the time the said Deed was executed; the Affidavit of Quitclaim is not
valid and has no force and effect considering that the document indicates
that the signatures of petitioners were affixed in different places, none of
which is in Virac, Catanduanes where they supposedly acknowledged
said document.
The only evidence of petitioners to prove their claim that the disputed
property was sold by Jose Arcilla to Manuel Sarmiento in 1908 is a single
Tax Declaration in the name of the latter, with a notation that the property
was acquired by purchase.
The Court agrees with the CA in its finding that petitioners failed to
present any substantial evidence, such as a deed of sale, to prove their
claim that their predecessor, Vicente Arcilla, bought the disputed property
from Sarmiento. Petitioners were only able to present tax declarations in
Vicente's name to prove their allegation that Vicente became the owner
of the subject property. The tax declarations presented in evidence by
petitioners are not supported by any other substantial proofs.
The Court has ruled time and again that tax declarations do not prove
ownership but are at best an indicium of claims of ownership.38 Payment
of taxes is not proof of ownership, any more than indicating possession in
the concept of an owner.39 Neither a tax receipt nor a declaration of
ownership for taxation purposes is evidence of ownership or of the right
to possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.40
In addition, the Court agrees with the CA when it held that if Vicente, in
fact, owned the disputed properties, his widow, Josefa, would not have
agreed to include said lots among those partitioned in the Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of Jose.
On the other hand, respondent's claim of ownership is not only backed up
by tax declarations but also by other pieces of evidence such as the subject
Extrajudicial Settlement, Affidavit of Quitclaim, and Deed of Sale.
Petitioners question the validity of the above-mentioned documents.
However, as the CA, RTC and MTC found, these documents are all
notarized. It is settled that a notarized document is executed to lend truth
to the statements contained therein and to the authenticity of the
signatures.41 Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity
which can be overturned only by clear and convincing evidence.42
Petitioners' bare denials of the contents of the subject documents will not
suffice to overcome the presumption of their regularity considering that
they are all notarized. To overthrow such presumption of regularity, the
countervailing evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant, which petitioners failed to present.43
An examination of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate clearly
shows that the disputed lot forms part of the properties adjudicated in
favor of Pacifico Arcilla, respondent’s predecessor-in-interest.
Moreover, petitioners themselves admit that the Extrajudicial Settlement
being referred to in the Affidavit of Quitclaim executed by petitioner and
her co-heirs is the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Jose Arcilla
and not of Vicente Arcilla. An examination of the Affidavit of Quitclaim
shows that the reference made therein with respect to the date of execution
of the said Extrajudicial Settlement as well as the notary public who
acknowledged the same and the Document Number, Page Number, Book
Number and Series Number all coincide with those appearing in the
document evidencing the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Jose
Arcilla. Hence, what has been waived by petitioners is their right, if any,
to the properties mentioned in the said Affidavit of Quitclaim, which
includes the presently disputed lot.
Petitioners posit that they are not bound by the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement because they did not participate in nor did they sign the
document evidencing such settlement and that their mother who signed
on their behalf was not, in fact, authorized to do so. However, the Court
agrees with the ruling of the RTC that the Extrajudicial Settlement is a
public document, the same having been notarized; that such document is
entitled to full faith and credit in the absence of competent evidence
showing that its execution was tainted with defects and irregularities
which would warrant a declaration of nullity; that in the absence of
evidence showing that the person who signed in behalf of herein
petitioners was, in fact, not authorized to do so, the presumption that she
had the authority, as stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement, remains
undisturbed.
Moreover, petitioners' execution of the subject Affidavit of Quitclaim is
proof that they have ratified the contents of the disputed Extrajudicial
Settlement.
Petitioners' claim that the Affidavit of Quitclaim is null and void on the
ground that the signatories thereto are not residents of Virac, Catanduanes
and that they affixed their signature in places other than Virac,
Catanduanes where they supposedly acknowledged the said document, is
not persuasive. The Court finds no error in the finding of the MTC, as
affirmed by the CA, that the execution of the subject Affidavit of
Quitclaim or the signatures of the affiants appearing therein were never
contested nor raised as an issue and that petitioner Sarah Arcilla herself
acknowledged her own signature in the said Affidavit.
In any event, the law does not require that parties to a document notarized
by a notary public should be residents of the place where the said
document is acknowledged or that they affix their signature in the
presence of the notary public. What is necessary is that the persons who
signed a notarized document are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before the notary public in order to attest to the
contents and truth of what are stated therein.44
In the instant case, it is established that, with the exception of petitioner
Rene Arcilla, all of herein petitioners, including their now deceased
mother Josefa and sister Nora, executed and personally acknowledged
before the notary public the subject Affidavit of Quitclaim. Hence, aside
from Rene, the said Affidavit of Quitclaim is valid and binding on all the
petitioners.
With respect to Rene, petitioner Oscar Arcilla, acting as his attorney-in-
fact, signed the document on the former’s behalf. However, settled is the
rule that:
A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared before him. The acts
of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein
are facts of which they have personal knowledge. They should swear to
the document personally and not through any representative. Otherwise,
their representative’s name should appear in the said documents as the
one who executed the same. That is the only time the representative can
affix his signature and personally appear before the notary public for
notarization of the said document. Simply put, the party or parties who
executed the instrument must be the ones to personally appear before the
notary public to acknowledge the document.45
Thus, the herein subject Affidavit of Quitclaim may not be binding on
Rene. Nonetheless, with or without Rene’s participation in the quitclaim,
respondent’s ownership of the subject lots has been established by
preponderance of evidence, as unanimously found by the MTC, the RTC
and the CA.
Finally, petitioners' physical occupation of the commercial building
which they erected on the disputed property does not necessarily prove
their ownership of the subject lots.
This Court has held that:
ownership and possession are two entirely different legal concepts. Just
as possession is not a definite proof of ownership, neither is non-
possession inconsistent with ownership. The first paragraph of Article
1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the
thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary
does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Possession, along with
ownership, is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized
deed of conveyance. Thus, in light of the circumstances of the present
case, it is of no legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual
possession or occupation of the disputed lot after the execution of the
deed of sale in her favor because she was already able to perfect and
complete her ownership of and title over the subject
property.46 (Emphasis supplied)

The Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate in favor of Pacifico, respondent’s

predecessor-in-interest, the Affidavit of Quitclaim and the Deed of Sale
in favor of respondent establish respondent’s ownership over the disputed
property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated September 12, 2003 and its Resolution of March 24, 2004
in CA-G.R. SP No. 72032 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC
Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor
of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen
ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.
The Case
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court seeking to nullify Resolution2 dated September 6, 2011 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-44-
2010. The assailed resolution (a) reversed the Order3 dated November 30,
2010 of COMELEC Second Division dismissing petitioner’s appeal; and
(b) affirmed the consolidated Decision4 dated October 22, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, declaring
petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon (petitioner) disqualified and
ineligible to her position as Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union.
The Undisputed Facts
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of
Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became
a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant
to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was
approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of
Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn
issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased
to be an Australian citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the
2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during
the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She
obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P.
Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered
voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto
questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions
similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective
post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute
a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since
September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed
that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she
executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No.
9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment
of her Australian citizenship.
Ruling of the RTC
In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010, the trial court held
that the petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225
rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the
petitioner herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she
filed in Australia was not under oath. The law clearly mandates that the
document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be
sworn before any public officer authorized to administer oath.
Consequently, the RTC’s decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in
FAVOR of [private respondents] and AGAINST (petitioner):
1) DECLARING [petitioner] TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON,
disqualified and ineligible to hold the office of Vice-Mayor of Caba, La
Union;
2) NULLIFYING her proclamation as the winning candidate for Vice-
Mayor of said municipality; and
3) DECLARING the position of Vice-Mayor in said municipality vacant.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the COMELEC
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed
by the Second Division in its Order10 dated November 30, 2010 for failure
to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On motion for
reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en banc in
its Resolution11 dated September 6, 2011. In the same issuance, the
substantive merits of the appeal were given due course. The COMELEC
en banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC; it also
granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the private
respondents.
The decretal portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Commission RESOLVED as
it hereby RESOLVES as follows:
1. To DISMISS the instant appeal for lack of merit;
2. To AFFIRM the DECISION dated 22 October 2010 of the court a
quo; and
3. To GRANT the Motion for Execution filed on November 12, 2010.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the
COMELEC en banc.
The Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen
on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only
a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as
the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual
citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.
She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a
mandatory requirement. In support thereof, she cites portions of the
Journal of the House of Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003
containing the sponsorship speech for House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the
precursor of R.A. No. 9225.
She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her
eligibility since they failed to do so when she filed certificates of
candidacy for the 2007 and 2010 elections.
Lastly, she disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a) take
cognizance of the substantive merits of her appeal instead of remanding
the same to the COMELEC Second Division for the continuation of the
appeal proceedings; and (b) allow the execution pending appeal of the
RTC’s judgment.
The Issues
Posed for resolution are the following issues: I) Whether the COMELEC
en banc may resolve the merits of an appeal after ruling on its
reinstatement; II) Whether the COMELEC en banc may order the
execution of a judgment rendered by a trial court in an election case; III)
Whether the private respondents are barred from questioning the
qualifications of the petitioner; and IV) For purposes of determining the
petitioner’s eligibility to run for public office, whether the "sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a
mere pro-forma requirement.
The Court’s Ruling
I. An appeal may be simultaneously reinstated and definitively
resolved by the COMELEC en banc in a resolution disposing of a
motion for reconsideration.
The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is
arrogated unto the COMELEC en banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, viz:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions,
and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition
of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit:
Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a
Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on
interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division
which issued the order.
Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the
COMELEC en banc’s prerogative in resolving a motion for
reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from directly
adjudicating the substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its
reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the division that initially
dismissed it.
We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC en banc when it proceeded to decide the
substantive merits of the petitioner’s appeal after ruling for its
reinstatement.
Further, records show that, in her motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc, the petitioner not only proffered arguments on the
issue on docket fees but also on the issue of her eligibility. She even filed
a supplemental motion for reconsideration attaching therewith supporting
documents13 to her contention that she is no longer an Australian citizen.
The petitioner, after obtaining an unfavorable decision, cannot be
permitted to disavow the en banc’s exercise of discretion on the
substantial merits of her appeal when she herself invoked the same in the
first place.
The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded similar appeals to the
Division that initially dismissed them cannot serve as a precedent to the
disposition of the petitioner’s appeal. A decision or resolution of any
adjudicating body can be disposed in several ways. To sustain petitioner’s
argument would be virtually putting a straightjacket on the COMELEC
en banc’s adjudicatory powers.
More significantly, the remand of the appeal to the COMELEC Second
Division would be unnecessarily circuitous and repugnant to the rule on
preferential disposition of quo warranto cases espoused in Rule 36,
Section 15 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.14
II. The COMELEC en banc has the power to order discretionary
execution of judgment.
We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s submission that the COMELEC en
banc has no power to order the issuance of a writ of execution and that
such function belongs only to the court of origin.
There is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to order
discretionary execution of judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory
application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1,
Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.15
Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal
may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost
jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron,16 we stressed the import of the provision
vis-à-vis election cases when we held that judgments in election cases
which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial
courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of
its original or appellate jurisdiction.
III. Private respondents are not estopped from questioning
petitioner’s eligibility to hold public office.
The fact that the petitioner’s qualifications were not questioned when she
filed certificates of candidacy for 2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate
as an estoppel to the petition for quo warranto before the RTC.
Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there
are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a
registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of
candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.
– A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before the election; and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. – Any voter contesting the election
of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. (Emphasis ours)
Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain
candidate fails to file the petition within the twenty-five (25)-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for whatever
reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has
another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a
petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of
the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code.17
The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and
their failure to utilize Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot
serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo warranto
petition under Section 253.
IV. Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for
failure to renounce her Australian citizenship in accordance with
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I, _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this
Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino
citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant
therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That
they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that
oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers
in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
(Emphasis ours)
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly
re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she
held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective
public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in
Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath
contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of
foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oath.
To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner
pleads the Court to interpret the "sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship" in Section 5(2) to be a mere pro forma requirement in
conformity with the intent of the Legislature. She anchors her submission
on the statement made by Representative Javier during the floor
deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Court’s duty to interpret the law
according to its true intent is exercised only when the law is ambiguous
or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to
apply the law. As such, when the law is clear and free from any doubt,
there is no occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room
for application.19 Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance.
Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being
understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at
the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must admit of
two or more possible meanings.20
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v.
COMELEC,21 we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino
American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position
in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of
all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We
also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid,
the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before
an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in
clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign
citizenship.
The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal,22 when we held that
Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish
to run for elective posts in the Philippines, thus:
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who
either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with
or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but
who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath
of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those
seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship)
requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said
Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have
presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of
the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of
House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003
(precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman
Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to
Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different
from the renunciation of foreign citizenship;
xxxx
The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or
retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take
their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to
explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective
posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections,
Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine
citizenship.23 (Citation omitted and italics and underlining ours)
Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC,24 we declared petitioner therein to
be disqualified from running for the position of vice-mayor for his failure
to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship.
We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the
above rulings to the phrase "sworn renunciation". The language of the
provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and
sensible meaning and must thus be read literally.25 The foreign citizenship
must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an
officer authorized to administer oath.
It is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has
intended to convey.26 Even a resort to the Journal of the House of
Representatives invoked by the petitioner leads to the same inference, viz:
INTERPELLATION OF REP. JAVIER
Rep. Javier initially inquired whether under the Bill, dual citizenship is
only limited to natural-born Filipinos and not to naturalized Filipinos.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative.
Rep. Javier subsequently adverted to Section 5 of the Bill which provides
that natural-born Filipinos who have dual citizenship shall continue to
enjoy full civil and political rights. This being the case, he sought
clarification as to whether they can indeed run for public office provided
that they renounce their foreign citizenship.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that these citizens will only
have to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship
before any authorized public officer.
Rep. Javier sought further clarification on this matter, citing that while the
Bill provides them with full civil and political rights as Filipino citizens,
the measure also discriminates against them since they are required to
make a sworn renunciation of their other foreign citizenship if and when
they run for public office. He thereafter proposed to delete this particular
provision.
In his rejoinder, Rep. Libanan explained that this serves to erase all
doubts regarding any issues that might be raised pertaining to the
citizenship of any candidate. He subsequently cited the case of
Afroyim vs. Rusk, wherein the United States considered a naturalized
American still as an American citizen even when he cast his vote in
Israel during one of its elections.
Rep. Javier however pointed out that the matter of voting is different
because in voting, one is not required to renounce his foreign citizenship.
He pointed out that under the Bill, Filipinos who run for public office
must renounce their foreign citizenship. He pointed out further that this is
a contradiction in the Bill.
Thereafter, Rep. Javier inquired whether Filipino citizens who had
acquired foreign citizenship and are now entitled to reacquire their
Filipino citizenship will be considered as natural-born citizens. As such,
he likewise inquired whether they will also be considered qualified to run
for the highest elective positions in the country.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that the only requirement
is that they make a sworn renunciation of their foreign citizenship and that
they comply with the residency and registration requirements as provided
for in the Constitution.
Whereupon, Rep. Javier noted that under the Constitution, natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens at the time of birth without having to
perform an act to complete or perfect his/her citizenship.
Rep. Libanan agreed therewith, citing that this is the reason why the Bill
seeks the repeal of CA No. 63. The repeal, he said, would help Filipino
citizens who acquired foreign citizenship to retain their citizenship. With
regard then to Section 5 of the Bill, he explained that the Committee had
decided to include this provision because Section 18, Article XI of the
Constitution provides for the accountability of public officers.
In his rejoinder, Rep. Javier maintained that in this case, the sworn
renunciation of a foreign citizenship will only become a pro forma
requirement.
On further queries of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan affirmed that natural-born
Filipino citizens who became foreign citizens and who have reacquired
their Filipino citizenship under the Bill will be considered as natural-born
citizens, and therefore qualified to run for the presidency, the vice-
presidency or for a seat in Congress. He also agreed with the observation
of Rep. Javier that a natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the
country at the time of birth. He also explained that the Bill will, in effect,
return to a Filipino citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship, the status
of being a natural-born citizen effective at the time he lost his Filipino
citizenship.
As a rejoinder, Rep. Javier opined that doing so would be discriminating
against naturalized Filipino citizens and Filipino citizens by election who
are all disqualified to run for certain public offices. He then suggested that
the Bill be amended by not considering as natural-born citizens those
Filipinos who had renounced their Filipino citizenship and acquired
foreign citizenship. He said that they should be considered as repatriated
citizens.
In reply, Rep. Libanan assured Rep. Javier that the Committee will take
note of the latter’s comments on the matter. He however stressed that after
a lengthy deliberation on the subject, the Committees on Justice, and
Foreign Affairs had decided to revert back to the status of being natural-
born citizens those natural-born Filipino citizens who had acquired
foreign citizenship but now wished to reacquire their Filipino citizenship.
Rep. Javier then explained that a Filipina who loses her Filipino
citizenship by virtue of her marriage to a foreigner can regain her
repatriated Filipino citizenship, upon the death of her husband, by simply
taking her oath before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
Rep. Javier said that he does not oppose the Bill but only wants to be fair
to other Filipino citizens who are not considered natural-born. He
reiterated that natural-born Filipino citizens who had renounced their
citizenship by pledging allegiance to another sovereignty should not be
allowed to revert back to their status of being natural-born citizens once
they decide to regain their Filipino citizenship. He underscored that this
will in a way allow such Filipinos to enjoy dual citizenship.
On whether the Sponsors will agree to an amendment incorporating the
position of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan stated that this will defeat the
purpose of the Bill.
Rep. Javier disagreed therewith, adding that natural-born Filipino citizens
who acquired foreign citizenships and later decided to regain their
Filipino citizenship, will be considered as repatriated citizens.
Rep. Libanan cited the case of Bengzon vs. HRET wherein the Supreme
Court had ruled that only naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered
as natural-born citizens.
In reaction, Rep. Javier clarified that only citizens by election or those
whose mothers are Filipino citizens under the 1935 Constitution and who
elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of maturity, are not
deemed as natural-born citizens.
In response, Rep. Libanan maintained that in the Bengzon case,
repatriation results in the recovery of one’s original nationality and only
naturalized citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.
On whether the Sponsors would agree to not giving back the status of
being natural-born citizens to natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired
foreign citizenship, Rep. Libanan remarked that the Body in plenary
session will decide on the matter.27
The petitioner obviously espouses an isolated reading of Representative
Javier’s statement; she conveniently disregards the preceding and
succeeding discussions in the records.
The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record show that
Representative Javier’s statement ought to be understood within the
context of the issue then being discussed, that is – whether former natural-
born citizens who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship under the proposed
law will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens and thus be
qualified to run for government positions reserved only to natural-born
Filipinos, i.e. President, Vice-President and Members of the Congress.
It was Representative Javier’s position that they should be considered as
repatriated Filipinos and not as natural-born citizens since they will have
to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Natural-born citizens are those who need not perform an act to perfect
their citizenship. Representative Libanan, however, maintained that they
will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens. To reconcile
the renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the principle that natural-
born citizens are those who need not perform any act to perfect their
citizenship, Representative Javier suggested that the sworn renunciation
of foreign citizenship be considered as a mere pro forma requirement.
Petitioner’s argument, therefore, loses its point. The "sworn renunciation
of foreign citizenship" must be deemed a formal requirement only with
respect to the re-acquisition of one’s status as a natural-born Filipino so
as to override the effect of the principle that natural-born citizens need not
perform any act to perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned or
even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court to believe, those
who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for public
office has the option of executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation.
It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to
complement Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution on public officers’
primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which provides:
Sec. 18. – Public officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant
of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a
revered person or thing, that one’s statement is true or that one will be
bound to a promise. The person making the oath implicitly invites
punishment if the statement is untrue or the promise is broken. The legal
effect of an oath is to subject the person to penalties for perjury if the
testimony is false.28
Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an
oath ensures truthfulness to the prospective public officer’s abandonment
of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines.
To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is
only for ceremonial purposes; it would also accommodate a mere
qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the
Constitution and the legislature clearly demand otherwise.
Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under
which she is already deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to
judicial notice. We disagree.
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proven.29 To prove a foreign law, the party invoking
it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul,
or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis ours)
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that
the existence of a foreign law may also be established through: (1) a
testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in
the country where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a
section of the law and states that the same was in force at the time material
to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several naturalization cases, it
was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on
reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting
the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for
favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is
"satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a
number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization
Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be a
competent proof of that law.30
The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948
through any of the above methods. As uniformly observed by the RTC
and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of the existence of the
law during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian government
showing that petitioner already renounced her Australian citizenship was
unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in disregarding
the same.
We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit
as competent evidence the said letter in view of the photocopy of a
Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular Section of the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia attached to the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School
Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS) Member v. Datumanong31 that the
framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to concern itself with the
actual status of the other citizenship.
This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of
the legislature must do so conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans
the interference of any foreign law. If we were to read the Australian
Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No. 9225,
we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed
wise to require. To do so would be a brazen encroachment upon the
sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.32
The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve
as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court
has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship
of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of
foreign citizenship,33 such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the
enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the
additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship.34
The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her
candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the
election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter
of popularity.35
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who
re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an
authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.36 The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their
Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are
still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of
the right to run for public office.
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office
specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right
to run for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in
accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on
September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to
seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her
Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective
office in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the
Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010
is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.