BASIC LEGAL ETHICS
LOURDES OLIVEROS
CANON 8
RULE 8.01
TIONGCO YARED V. ILARDE [PEREZ]
G.R. No. 114732 (1 August 2000)
Petitioner: Estrella Tiongco Yared (deceased) substituted by
one of heirs, Carmen Matilde Tiongco
Respondent: Judge Ricardo Ilarde of RTC Iloilo, Jose Tiongco
and Antonio Doronila Jr.
Facts:
1. Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
assailing the Order dated March 17, 1994 1 of RTC Iloilo
which reinstated an earlier order cancelling the notice of
lis pendens annotated on the back of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-92383 and T-5050, of the
Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244 and
3246, respectively, located in Iloilo City.
2. Estrella Yared, substituted by Carmen Tiongco because
the former is now dead, and Jose Tiongco were
opposing parties to a property in litigation. Carmen
directly filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the
Supreme Court because Judge Ilarde of the RTC
ordered the cancellation of annotation of notices of lis
pendens. The Supreme Court noticed and commented
that Carmen has failed to comply with the principle of
judicial hierarchy and that she should have filed the
petition in the CA first.
3. However, the Supreme Court also noticed the improper
and unethical language employed by Jose Tiangco, who
was also a counsel for the private respondents, in his
pleadings and motions filed both in SC and lower court.
He described the counsel of the petitioner, Atty.
Marciana Deguma, “a rambunctious wrestler-type
female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not red,
and who stampedes into the court room like a mad fury
and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty
grammar.” Jose Tiongco alleged that Atty. Deguma
does that “to please and tenderize and sweeten towards
her own self the readily available Carmelo Tiongco, an
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unmarried mestizo who lives with Carmen.” He further
described Atty. Deguma as “an unmarried maiden of
certain age” and a “love-crazed female Apache who is
ready to skin the defendant alive for not being a bastard”
and a “horned spinster and man-hungry virago and
female bull of an Amazon.” He also stated that Atty.
Deguma is using PAO (Public Attorney’s Office) as a
“marriage bureau for her own benefit.”
Issue: WON Jose Tiongco, being also one of the counsels of
the defendants, violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes. With the language that he employed, he obviously violated
Canon 8-A Rule 8.01 which states that a lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use languages which is abusive,
offensive, or otherwise improper. He also violated Rule 11.03
which says that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive, or menacing language before the courts.
The SC also cited Romero vs Valle, “although allowed some
latitude of remarks or comment in furtherance of the cause he
upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious
to both court and opposing counsel and be of such words as
may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another.” Jose
Tiongco was merely warned.
Note: In the first part of the case, even the title of the case, it
was not mentioned whether Jose Tiongco is a lawyer or not.
Then, there‘s one sentence which addressed him “Atty. Jose
Tiongco.”
The petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
CANON 9
ZETA V. MALINAO [VILLAFUERTE]
A.M. No. P-220 (20 December 1978)
FACTS:
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An administrative complaint was filed against Felicisimo
Malinao, court interpreter of the CFI of Catbalogan, Samar,
charging him of illegally appearing in court, grave misconduct in
office, the crime of Falsification, and violation of Section 12,
Rule 28 of the Civil Service Law. Accordingly, Malinao had been
appearing as an attorney in the municipal courts of Catbalogan,
Daram, Zumarraga, Talalora, and Sta. Rita, Samar, despite the
fact that he was not authorised to do so. It was also alleged that
he would instigate persons, especially in his barrio, to grab land,
rob, or coerce, inciting them and telling them not to be afraid;
that since he was a court employee, he had influence over the
judges. With respect to the crime of Falsification, he made it
appear on his daily record that he was present in his office on
several dates, when in fact, he was attending to different cases.
Lastly, the Civil Service Law that Malinao had allegedly violated
prohibits civil service employees from engaging in private
practice of any profession or business without permission from
the Department Head.
In his answer, Malinao stated that he did not violate any rule or
law, much less Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules;
that his participation for defendants’ cause was gratuitous as
they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of
poverty and the absence of one in the locality.
The Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter,
referred the complaint and answer to District Judge Segundo
Zosa for investigation, report, and recommendation. Inspite of
diligent efforts exerted by the Court to subpoena the
complainant, Julio Zeta, the same had failed because he
appeared to be a fictitious person. Nevertheless, the Court
proceeded with the investigation by calling the respective
Judges of the courts in which Malinao had appeared in. After
careful review, Judge Zosa recommended that Malinao be
given a stern warning and severe reprimand for the irregularities
presented.
ISSUE:
W/N Felicisimo Malinao should be administratively liable for his
conduct. YES.
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HELD:
● The defense of Malinao that “his participation for
defendant’s cause was gratuitous as they could not
engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and
the absence of one in the locality” cannot, even if true,
carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as
counsel in court, he did so without permission from his
superiors, and worse, he falsified his time record of
service to conceal his absence from his office on the
dates in question.
● Indeed, the number of times that Malinao acted as
counsel under the above circumstances would indicate
that he was doing it as a regular practice obviously for
considerations other than pure love of justice.
● It is quite obvious that the offence committed by Malinao
is grave, hence it warrants a more drastic sanction than
that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa.
RULING:
Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his
position as interpreter in the CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
SEC. 20 (D), RULE 138, RULES OF COURT. It is the duty of
an attorney:
d. To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him, such means only as are consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or
any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact
or law;
Rule 10.1. Shall do no falsehood
MALIGAYA V. ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA [BASA]
A.C. No 6198 (15 September 2006)
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Facts:
An action for damages was filed by Renato Maligaya against
several military officers whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel.
At one point in the hearing, Atty. Doronilla said: “And another
matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he
[complainant Maligaya] filed before against the same
defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the case
against him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with that
understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving
pension.”
The presiding judge ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his
statements into writing and file the appropriate pleading. Atty.
Doronilla however did not submit any pleadings after many
weeks. Maligaya then filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla
for "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts
resulting [in] obstruction of justice,"
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Darilla is guilty of his false
statements?
Held: Yes.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had
agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these
peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated
the lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court," of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but
restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never
seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or
false statement of fact or law."
WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO MONTHS. He
is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct
shall be dealt with more severely.
Note: Penalty is light because the SC gave him considerations.
“We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his
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liability somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting
enough candor to admit, during the investigation, the falsity of
the statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom.
Second, the absence of material damage to complainant may
also be considered as a mitigating circumstance. And finally,
since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled to some
measure of forbearance.”
YOUNG V. CAESAR BATUEGAS, ET AL. [LIMOSNERO]
A.C. No. 5379 (9 May)
Doctrine: A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon
his admission to the Bar that he will “do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court” and he shall “conduct
himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his
clients.” He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court
his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law
and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving
at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled
to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to
defend his client’s rights and is expected to display the utmost
zeal in defense of his client’s cause, his conduct must never be
at the expense of truth.
Facts:
In a criminal case for murder, Atty. Young was the counsel for
the plaintiff, Attys. Batuegas and Llantino were the counsel for
the accused, and Atty. Susa was the clerk of court of RTC. Atty.
Young, filed for disbarment against Attys. Batuegas, Llantino
and Susa for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court
and violating the lawyer's oath in a criminal case for murder.
Attys. Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed for
bail dated December 13, 2000, alleging that the "accused has
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and now under
detention. Upon personal verification with the NBI where
accused allegedly surrendered, Atty. Young learned that he
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surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the
Certificate of Detention.
Attys. Batuegas and Llantino contended that on December 13,
2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against
their client, they filed for bail with the trial court. Then they
immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to
the NBI to voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic,
they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the
certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered
on December 14, 2000. They argued that there was neither
unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their
client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the NBI.
As for Atty. Susa, he calendared the motion on December 15,
2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects,
namely, the lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant,
violation of the three-day notice rule.
In defense, Atty. Susa argues the inclusion of the motion in the
court's calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized by the
presiding judge and, thus, was done by Atty. Susa in faithful
performance of his ministerial duty.
Issue: W/N Attys. Batuegas, Llantino and Susa guilty of
deliberate falsehood and violated the lawyer’s oath.
Held: Yes.
Attys. Batuegas, Llantino and Susa fell short of the duties and
responsibilities expected from them as members of the bar.
Anticipating that their motion for bail will be denied by the court
if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that
accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority
and was under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a
deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to
injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the
pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn.
They violated their oath when they resorted to deception.
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys.
Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found
guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely.
CHERYL VASCO-TAMARAY V. ATTY. DEBORAH Z. DAQUIS
[ANDAL]
(26 January 2016)
FACTS:
- Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-Tamaray) filed a
Complaint Affidavit before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on July 30, 2007, alleging that respondent
Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis (Atty. Daquis) filed, on her
behalf, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
without her consent and forged her signature on the
Petition.
- She also alleged that Atty. Daquis signed the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage as "counsel for
petitioner," referring to Vasco-Tamaray.
- Vasco-Tamaray stated that Atty. Daquis was not her
counsel but that of her husband, Leomarte Regala
Tamaray.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty Daquis should be held administratively liable for
making it appear that she is counsel for complainant Cheryl
Vasco-Tamaray and for the alleged use of a forged signature
on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
HELD:
Yes
- SC states that Atty. Daquis violated violated Canons
1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
- By pretending to be counsel for complainant,
respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and failed to uphold her duty
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of doing no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any
falsehood in court as stated in the Lawyer's Oath.
- Respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10,
Rule 10.01 when she allowed the use of a forged
signature on a petition she prepared and notarized.
- Atty. Daquis violated Canon 17 because failed to protect
the interests of her client when she represented
complainant, who is the opposing party of her client
Leomarte Tamaray, in the same case.
- Atty. Daquis was disbarred by the Supreme Court.
ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO V. ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR.,
supra.
Rule 10.02. Shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent
QUE V. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. supra.
RE: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DATED JANUARY 11, 2010
OF ALEU A. AMANTE, PIAB-C, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN [SIOCHI]
A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC (2 March 2010)
FACTS:
The subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman has
been rendered moot and academic. In the appropriate case, the
Office of the Ombudsman has full authority to issue subpoenas,
including subpoena duces tecum, for compulsory attendance of
witnesses and the production of documents and information
relating to matters under its investigation. The grant of this
authority, however, is not unlimited, as the Ombudsman must
necessarily observe and abide by the terms of the Constitution
and our laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable
jurisprudence on the issuance, service, validity and efficacy of
subpoenas. Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of
subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operates under
the requirements of reasonableness and relevance. For the
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production of documents to be reasonable and for the
documents themselves to be relevant, the matter under inquiry
should, in the first place, be one that the Ombudsman can
legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon. 

In the
present case, the matter that gave rise to the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum was a criminal complaint filed by the
complainants Lozano for the alleged violation by retired
Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and retired
Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria -Martinez of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act). 

A simple jurisprudential research would easily reveal
that this Court has had the occasion to rule on the liability of
Justices of the Supreme Court for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 the very same provision that the complainants
Lozano invoke in this case. 


ISSUES:

1. W/N constitutional provisions were misused.

2. W/N complainants violated Rule 10.02 of the CPR. 


HELD/RATIO:
1. YES. The complainants appear to us to have brazenly
misquoted and misused applicable constitutional provisions to
justify their case against the retired Justices. We refer
particularly to their use (or strictly, misuse) of Article X, Section
2(3) of the 1973 Constitution which they claim to be the
governing rule that the retired Justices should have followed in
acting on Pael. 

This constitutional provision states: 
Cases
heard by a division shall be decided with the concurrence of at
least five Members, but if such required number is not obtained
the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine
or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered
en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by
the Court sitting en banc.
For failure of the retired Justices to
act according to these terms, the complainants claim that the
former subverted the Constitution by reversing, by a vote of a
majority of only three members, the decision of the First Division
unanimously approved by its full membership of five members.


Had the complainants bothered to carefully consider the facts
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BASIC LEGAL ETHICS
and developments in Pael and accordingly related these to the
applicable constitutional provision, they would have discovered
that Pael was decided in 2003 when the 1987 Constitution, not
the 1973 Constitution, was the prevailing Charter. They then
would have easily learned of the manner cases are heard and
decided by Division before the Supreme Court under the 1987
Constitution. 

Section 4(3), Article VIII of this Constitution
provides: 
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be
decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without
the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. 
 
This
was the provision that governed in 2003 and still governs to this
day. Thus, the complainants’ argument and basis for their
criminal complaint that in ruling on a motion for reconsideration,
all five members of the Division should concur is totally wrong.


2. YES. In their criminal complaint, the complainants gave a
slanted view of the powers of this Court to suit their purposes;
for these same purposes, they wrongly cited and misapplied the
provisions of the Constitution, not just any ordinary statute. As
lawyers, the complainants must be familiar and well acquainted
with the fundamental law of the land, and are charged with the
duty to apply the constitutional provisions in light of their
prevailing jurisprudential interpretation. As law practitioners
active in the legal and political circles, the complainants can
hardly be characterized as unknowing in their misuse and
misapplication of constitutional provisions. They should, at the
very least, know that the 1973 Constitution and its provisions
have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution, and that they
cannot assail invoking the 1973 Constitution the judicial acts of
members of the Supreme Court carried out in 2003 when the
1987 Constitution was in effect. Their misuse of the Constitution
is made more reprehensible when the overriding thrust of their
criminal complaint is considered; they used the 1973 provisions
to falsely attribute malice and injustice to the Supreme Court
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and its Members. 
In our view, the complainants errors do not
belong to the genre of plain and simple errors that lawyers
commit in the practice of their profession. Their plain disregard,
misuse and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions
constitute serious misconduct that reflects on their fitness for
continued membership in the Philippine Bar. 

To emphasize
the importance of requiring lawyers to act candidly and in good
faith, an identical provision is found in Canon 22 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics. Moreover, lawyers are sworn to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court before they
are even admitted to the Bar. All these the complainants appear
to have seriously violated. 


WHEREFORE, premises
considered, we DISMISS the criminal complaint entitled Oliver
O. Lozano, et al. v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al.,
OMB-C-C-09-0527-J for utter lack of merit, and DECLARE as
MOOT and ACADEMIC the question of compliance with the
subpoena duces tecum dated January 11, 2010 that the
Ombudsman issued against this Court. 

We hereby ORDER
the complainants Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline
Lozano- Endriano to EXPLAIN IN WRITING to this Court, within
a non-extendible period of 15 days from receipt of this
Resolution, why they should not be penalized as members of
the Bar and as officers of this Court, for their open disregard of
the plain terms of the Constitution and the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, and their misuse and misrepresentation of
constitutional provisions in their criminal complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman, entitled Oliver O. Lozano, et al. v.
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al., OMB-C-C-09-0527-J. 


Note: See also Resolutions dated 15 June 2010 and March
2012
Rule 10.03. Shall not misuse rules of procedure
FRANCISCO V. ATTY. ROMEO M. FLORES [MATIENZO]
A.C. No. 10755
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