Topic: Permissibility of the death penalty

According to Vann Der Haag (1983), a punishment should condemn any undesirable actions
involving the violation of other’s life, liberty or property, and scaled with respect to the
seriousness of the crime. A penalty should also accord with ‘man’s dignity,' which is undermined
when it involves the inessential infliction of pain and the lack of respect for the criminal
(Pugsley, 1981). Therefore, an appropriate punishment should be one that successfully
denounces illegal actions, is proportionate to the gravity of the crime and does not infringe on
human dignity.

Thesis: Pojman's argument that the death penalty is permissible on the basis that death penalty is
the only appropriate response to murder is largely unconvincing. The supporting reasons are:

(1) Death penalty as a uniform response to all forms of murder as suggested by Pojman fails to
account for individual circumstances and motivations behind each murder, thus leading to the
meted punishment being insensitive to the severity of the crime (Brooks, 2012).
(2) Punishments such as life imprisonment without parole are more appropriate responses to
murder as these punishments better reaffirm the idea of showing respect to the convicted
criminal as a human being and recognition of his human dignity while remains appropriately
harsh. (Pugsley, 1981)
(3) Death penalty as the sole mean to condemn acts of murder will concurrently send a wrong
signal to the public that killing is the only acceptable way and permissible under certain
situations and hence would not fulfill the condemning purpose of the punishment, deeming the
punishment inappropriate. (Simonovic, 2012)

Reason (1)
Brooks (2012) refutes the argument that the death penalty should be handed out to all murderers.
He argues that most murders occurred in the heat of passion, in the presence of mitigating and
aggravating factors. He furthered this argument by emphasizing the contrast between murders
that are premeditated or committed for personal profits or motives and murders executed in an
instant of overwrought emotions. While conceding that both cases did involve the killing of an
individual, he asserts that the latter does not deserve the death penalty as much as the former
case, being not entirely responsible for the crime committed, or may be committed
unintentionally. Since both forms of murder are arguably different in scales and complexity,
Brooks objects to a death penalty for both cases, which breaches the concept of proportionality
upheld in punishments.
Reason (2):
Pugsley (1981) rejects the claim that the death penalty is the only appropriate punishment for
murder as provided by Pojman. He argues that the death penalty, as a punishment, has eradicated
the ability for an individual to continue living, and hence violated their fundamental right to
living, which is representative of the innate and extremely pivotal ‘human dignity.' He
emphasizes on the worth of each life, regardless of the deed that the individual committed, is
absolute and perpetual. Through detailed analysis of the various retributivist argument provided
by Kantians, he concluded that states should always prioritise individuals’ rights, including the
right to life, over benefits towards the community. He thus strongly condemns the idea of the
death penalty as a punishment, deeming it to negate an individual’s human dignity and moral
worth to the utmost extent, as well as infringing on the primary membership of the individual in
the community, even when the most humane execution is imposed. Pugsley went further than
merely suggesting that death penalty is impermissible to recommend the use of punishments
such as life imprisonment. He strongly believes that only through such punishments will the
convicted murderer preserve his membership to the society while showing due respect to the
criminal as a responsible moral agent. He accentuates that life imprisonment, while being
proportionate to the severity of the crime committed, will not inflict inessential physical
suffering as death penalty did.

Reason (3):
Simonovic (2012) opposes the idea of using the death penalty to convey the message to the
public that killing is wrong. INstead of achieving the intended outcome, he argues that state
killing will backfire by lending legal authority to the dangerous idea of killing being a
permissible approach to counter violence. He does this by explaining how death penalty sends a
message that killing is dependent on individuals’ distribution of power and whether is it of
greater interests for the society to kill. He then points out the significant difference between the
act of condemnation and a ‘barbaric reaction to a barbaric act which sustains the cycle of
violence’, and deems the death penalty to be the latter, an act that continues the perpetuation of
violence in the society. He strongly stresses that state-killing is always ‘cold, calculated and
premeditated,' and should be abolished in favor of punishments that are ‘life-affirming instead of
life-ending,' which could more successfully decry the act of murder.
Reference List:
Brooks T. (2012). Punishment. United Kingdom, UK: Routledge
Conrad, J. P., & Van D. H. (1983). The Death Penalty: A Debate. New York, NY: Plenum
Publishing Corporation
Feser E. (2011). Punishment, Proportionality and the Death Penalty: A Reply to Chris Tollefsen.
Public Discourse. Retrieved from http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/10/4126/
Ivan Simonovic (2016). In United Nations Human Rights (2016). Death Penalty and the Victims.
New York, NY: United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner.
Leisor B. (1986). The Death Penalty is Permissible. In Pojman P. L. (2006). Philosophy: The
Quest for Truth (pp. 593-598). New York, NY: Oxford University Press
Pugsley, R. A. (1981). A Retributivist Argument Against Capital Punishment. New York, NY:
Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law

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