Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G.R. No.

104269, November 11, 1993

Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security
services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were
deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a
complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential
pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the
payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the
decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce
and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff
levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case

Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued without its consent”
reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the
unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty.
A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The
State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State
itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation,
the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested
itself of its sovereign immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still
be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its
proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed
to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where
the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity
when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in
character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No.
3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim
must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
Republic vs. Feliciano (Consti1)

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner-appellee, vs. Pablo Feliciano and Intermediate Appellate Court,
respondents-appellants.

March 12, 1987

Facts:

 On January 22, 1970, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land. Consisting of 4 lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares situated
in barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
 Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a contract of sale
dated May 31, 1952 followed by a deed of absolute sale on Oct. 30, 1954.
 Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the owner of the property in question. That his title of ownership based
on informacionposesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that
defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.
 The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest
of the property reverted to the public domain.
 The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of
the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20 years
under claim of ownership.
 The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of
presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the
case was submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
 The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration and then the case was reopened to allow them
to present their evidence.
 Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate Court but it was denied.
 The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued
without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.

Issue:

 Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.

Held:

 No
 The complaint filed by respondent Pablo Feliciano against the Republic of the Philippines was dismissed.

Ratio:

 A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has consented to be sued,
either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.
 The complaint involves land not owned by the state but private land belonging to Feliciano, hence the
government is not being divested of any of its properties.
Republic vs. Villasor

GR No. L-30671

November 28, 1973

FACTS:

* The Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenging the validity of an order
issued by Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 1.

* (July 3, 1961)

A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R to the favor of P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan, and
International Construction Corporation confirming an arbitration award amounting to P1,712,396.40.

* (June 24, 1969)

Hon. Villasor issued an order declaring the aforementioned decision final and executor directing the Sheriffs of Rizal
Province, Quezon City, and Manila to execute said decision.

* (June 26, 1969)

An Alias Writ of Execution was issued

* (June 28, 1969)

By the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment
with several Banks, especially on the monies due the AFP in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in
the said Alias Writ of Execution.

* (June 30, 1969)

Philippine Veterans Bank received the said notice.

* (July 3, 1969)

AFP controller certified that funds of the AFP on deposit with the Banks, particularly PVB and PNB are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for:

* Payment of pensions of retirees

* Pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and;

* For maintenance and operations of the AFP

* In the answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan. The facts set forth were
admitted with the only qualification being that the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40

ISSUES

* Did Hon. Villasor act in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting
the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the AFP making the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of
garnishment null and void?
RULING

* Writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969 as well as the
alias writ of execution.

JUSTIFICATION

* Fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty.

oThe state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent.

* Classic formulation of Holmes

There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends

* Providence Washington Insurance Co. vs. Republic of the Philippines

o A continued adherence to the doctrine of non suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be
caused private parties, the loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are
far greater if such fundamental principles were abandoned.

* Art 15, Sec. 16, 1973 Constitution (Art 16, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution)

The state may not be sued without its consent.

* Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego

A well settled doctrine was stated by Justice Teehankee

* The universal rule that where the state gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it
may limit claimant’s action only up to the completion of the proceedings anterior to the stage of execution. That the power of
the Courts ends when judgment is rendered.

* Director of Commerce and Industry vs. Conception

The functions and public services rendered by the state cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects as appropriated by law.

Such principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee.

* Justice Malcolm

Money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these
employees in the process of garnishment.

* State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the legislator, and
to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly.

* Moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to
the latter.

* Every consideration of public policy forbids it.

Lansang vs. Court of Appeals

Amado J. Lansang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, General Assembly of the Blind, Inc., and Jose
Iglesias, respondents.

February 23, 2000

Quisumbing, J:

Facts:

 Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a verbal
contract of lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). However,
this verbal contract accommodation was unclear because there was no document or instrument
involved.
 With the change of government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner Amado J. Lansang,
sought to clean up Rizal Park and terminated the said verbal agreement with GABI and
demanded that they vacate the area.
 The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose Iglesias, allegedly to
indicate his conformity to its contents but later on claimed that he was deceived into signing the
notice.
 On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC
against the petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against
the state which could not be sued without its consent.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a
government official being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protest such official from
liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.

Issues:

 Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as Chairman of

NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent.
 Whether or not petitioner Lansang abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of private
respondents from Rizal Park.

Held:

 No, the complaint is not a suit against the state.

 No, Lansang did not abuse his authority.

Ratio:

 The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts
done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against
the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the
state itself to perform a positive act.
o Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal capacity. It is
evident from the complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly for having personal motives in
ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
 There was no evidence of abuse of authority.
Republic vs. Sandoval (Consti1)
(Two petitions consolidated.)

Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State - Beyond the Scope of Authority

Facts:

 The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola massacre, together with those injured
(Caylao group), instituted the petition, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the orders of
respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31 and Aug 8, 1988) in "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the
Philippines, et al." which dismissed the case against the Republic of the Philippines
o May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are being charged in their personal and
official capacity, holding them liable, if at all, would not result in financial responsibility of the
government
o Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for reconsideration
 In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they called "genuine
agrarian reform"
 The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and
demands such as:
o giving lands for free to farmers
o zero retention of lands by landlords
o stop amortizations of land payments

 Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) began on January 15, 1987
 On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez
 Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President
Cory Aquino during the January 21 Cabinet meeting
 Tension mounted the next day
 The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the
employees from going inside their offices
 On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo, Tadeo's group decided
to march to Malacanang to air their demands
 On their march to Malacanang, they were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang
Lungsod (KPML)
 Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infliltrated by CPP/NPA
elements, and that an insurrection was impending
 Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola
 The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at around 4:30 pm
 From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue took place; "pandemonium broke
loose"
 After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13 according to Tadeo)
 39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of marchers
 Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffered minor physical injuries
 The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the incident on February 27, 1987 as
follows
o The march did not have any permit
o The police and military were armed with handguns prohibited by law
o The security men assigned to protect the government units were in civilian attire (prohibited by
law)
o There was unnecessary firing by the police and military
o The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law
o It is not clear who started the firing
 o The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the crowd; the water
cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because:
 there was no order to use them
 they were incorrectly prepositioned
 they were out of range of the marchers
 The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals
shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers
 The Commission also recommended that all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police
District (WPD) and Integrated National Police (INP) who were armed be prosecuted for violation of par.
4(g) of the Public Assembly Act of 1985
 Prosecution of the marchers was also recommended
 It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding the rally without permit and for
inciting sedition
 Administrative sanctions were recommended for the following officers for their failure to make
effective use of their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola:
o Gen. Ramon E. Montaño
o Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim
o Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres
o Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz
o Col. Cezar Nazareno
o Maj. Filemon Gasmin

 Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated
by the government
o It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for damages from the
government
o No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims

 On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages against the Republic of the
Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident
 Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its
consent
 Petitioners said that the State has waived its immunity from suit
 Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that there was no such waiver
 Motion for Reconsideration was also denied

Issues:

1. Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e. Whether or not this is a suit against
the State with its consent)
o Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to
indemnify the heirs and victims, and by public addresses made by President Aquino, the State
has consented to be sued
2. Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State

Holding:

1. No.
o This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
2. No.
Ratio:

1. Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued without its consent
o The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically
attaches to the State
o The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall serve only as cause of action
for litigation; it does not bind the State immediately
o President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the State; they are not tantamount to a
waiver by the State
2. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:
1. When the Republic is sued by name;
2. When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
3. When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that the ultimate
liability will belong not to the officer but to the government
o Although the military officers and personnel were discharging their official functions during
the incident, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority
o There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms.
o Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order, but they fired at the crowd
instead

No reversible error by the respondent Judge found. Petitions dismissed.

E. Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands

Facts:

When riding a motorcycle, plaintiff E. Meritt, who is a contractor, had a collision with the General Hospital
Ambulance without any sound of whistle or horn. By reason of the collision, the plaintiff was severely injured
which resulted him to be slightly deaf and had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. In
addition, the accident affected his work as a contractor because, prior to the collision, the plaintiff’s mental and
physical condition was excellent. The plaintiff is seeking a certain amount for permanent injuries and the loss of
wages during he was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. By authority of the United States, an Act was
enacted in favor of the plaintiff, authorizing the latter to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and authorizing Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Government is legally liable for damages resulting therefrom and, if so, could it be
extended to any case not previously recognized

Held:

According to Art. 1903, Par. 5 of the Civil Code, in a damage case, the responsibility of the State is limited
to that which it contracts through a special agent. The evidence showed that the chauffeur, who acted
negligently, of the ambulance was not such an agent. The court held that the judgment must be reversed and
herein case rests solely with the Legislature and not with the Court.
USA v. RUIZ
GR No. L-35645; May 22, 1985

FACTS:
Sometime in May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for certain naval projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co.
Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequently, the company received two telegrams requesting it to
confirm its price. In June 1972, the copany received a letter which said that the company did not qualify to receive an
award for the projects. The company then sued the United States of America and individual petitioners demanding that the
company perform the work on the projects, or for the petitioners to pay damages and to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the petitioners from entering into contracts with third parties concerning the project.

ISSUE:
1) Do the petitioners exercise governmental or proprietary functions?
2) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
The rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver.
This is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of states. However, state immunity now
extends only to governmental acts of the state. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. In this case, the projects are integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of the USA and Philippines which is, indisputably, a function of the government.
As such, by virtue of state immunity, the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the case for the US government
has not given consent to the filing of this suit.