Report – Patrick Canama

1 - Wigmore
Ratio Legis: Spirit of the law or Legislative Intent as the Primary Object
As expressed in the literal reading of the text
1. Verba Legis – Literal or plain meaning rule.
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech
is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature
in a statute correctly express its intention or will, and preclude the court from construing it
differently. For the legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used them
advisedly, and to have expressed the intent by use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no
departure.. (PAGCOR V. PEJI)
Cases:
IBBAEU v. Inciong
Facts:
The Secretary of Labor, issued Policy no. 9 interpreting article 94 of Labor Code as regards Right
to Holiday pay, stated among others, that PD 850 principally intended to benefit daily-paid
workers. Those who are paid by the month, i.e., he is paid uniformly from January to December
is presumed to have been paid with legal holidays, unless his salary is deducted for the month
the holiday occurs. Invoking this Policy, the Bank stopped paying its employees for the legal
holidays.
Issue:
Whether or not, PD 850 was intended only for daily wage workers.
Held:
“It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear
and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the
provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit
- it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9,
the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally
intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid
their regular holiday pay. This is a flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the
Labor Code, which states that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor
of labor." Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and
permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky
vs. Haskell, 155 A. 112.)
“While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers
whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is
so erroneous, as in the instant case, the same must be declared as null and void. It is the role of
the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation,
in the context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in
situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some
legitimate area of governmental power (The Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Swisher, 1958,
p. 36).
Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople
Facts:
The Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation of its monthly paid employees/
members, instituted a complaint with the Regional Office No. IV, Department of Labor, now
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) against private respondent Chartered Bank, for the
payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials
for worked legal holidays.
On the bases of the foregoing facts, both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the petitioners ordering the respondent bank to pay its
monthly paid employees, holiday pay for the ten (10) legal holidays effective November 1, 1974
and to pay premium or overtime pay differentials to all employees who rendered work during said
legal holidays. On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed
the petitioner’s claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the
Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9, which respectively provide:
“Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month.—Employees who are uniformly paid by the
month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the
statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month
whether worked or not.”
POLICY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 TO: All Regional Directors SU BJECT: PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS
“The rules implementing PD 850 have clarified the policy in the implementation of the ten (10)
paid legal holidays. Before PD 850, the number of working days a year in a firm was considered
important in determining entitlement to the benefit. Thus, where an employee was working for at
least 313 days, he was considered definitely already paid. If he was working for less than 313,
there was no certainty whether the ten (10) paid legal holidays were already paid to him or not.
“The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily
employees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment
for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit. “Under the rules implementing PD
850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement of monthly
paid employees. The new determining rule is this: ‘If the monthly paid employee is receiving not
less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from
January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays.
However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where
they occur, then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays.
Issue:
First Error: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor erred and acted contrary to law in promulgating
Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9.
Second Error: Whether or not the respondent Secretary of Labor abused his discretion and acted
contrary to law in applying Sec. 2, Rule IV of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9
above-stated to private respondent’s monthly-paid employees.
Held:
The decision in Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong (132
SCRA 663) resolved a similar issue. Significantly, the petitioner in that case was also a union of
bank employees. We ruled that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy
Instruction No. 9, are contrary to the provisions of the Labor Code and, therefore, invalid.
Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. V. Gimenez
Facts:
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc., is a corporation duly organized and existing
under Philippine laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies.
On several occasions, it imported from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract.
sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate, precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate,
for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation
made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special
excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other
charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as
the Exchange Tax Law.
The petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise
tax it had paid. The claim for refund was based on section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides
that "foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges
incident to the importation into the Philippines of * * * stabilizer and flavors * * * shall be refunded
to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under
the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." OIC of ETA of
the CB approved the claim, however, the auditor refused to pass in audit its claim for refunds on
the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange
Tax Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the
Central Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned in section 2 of the
Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food
products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for
review.
Issue:
Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream
stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax
Law (Republic Act No. 601) so as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof.
Held:
The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the law refers
only to those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products
is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that "general terms may be
restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific
language which indicates the statute's object and purpose." The rule, however, is, in our opinion,
applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration
belong to or fall under one specific class.
In the case at bar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles
that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items
immediately following it do not belong to the same classification. (such as: fertilizer and poultry
feed, use in farming and poultry, Vitamin concentrate which is more of a medicine rather than a
food product)
It cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the above-quoted
provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the manufacture of food and food
products. This view is supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish". Since the law does
not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in the preparation of f ood and those used in
the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and
must construe the words in their general sense. The rule of construction that general and unlimited
terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does
not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining
the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.
Salvatierra v. CA
Facts:
In 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without issues. He was survived by his brothers
Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio, Macario and sister Marcela. His estate consisted of three parcels
of land (Cad. Lot No. 25 covered by Tax Declaration No. 11950, Cad. Lot No. 26 covered by Tax
Decl. No. 11951, and Cad. Lot No. 27 Covered by Tax Decl. No. 11949). On September 24, 1968,
an "Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation of Sale" was executed by and among the surviving
legal heirs and descendants of Enrique Salvatierra, which consisted of the aforementioned Lot
No. 25, 26 and 27. On June 15, 1970, Venancio sold the whole of Lot No. 27 and a 149-sq. m.
portion of Lot 26 for the consideration of P8,500.00 to herein respondent spouses Lino Longalong
and Paciencia Mariano. It was discovered in 1982 (through a relocation survey) that the 149 sq.
m. portion of Lot No. 26 was outside their fence. It turned out that Anselmo Salvatierra, the son
of Macario, was able to obtain a title, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-4221 in his name, the title
covering the whole of Lot No. 26 which has an area of 749 sq. m. Anselmo registered the whole
Lot no. 26 with 749 sq. m. land area in his name on May 20, 1980 with a showing of bad faith
knowingly that he only owns 405 sq. m. of land portion in Lot 26 as sold by his father to him which
the latter inherited from Enrique.
Lito Longalong and Paciencia Mariano filed a case with the RTC for the reconveyance of the said
portion of Lot 26 on November 22, 1985. Anselmo contends that such action already prescribed
in 4 years as provided in article 1391. The court a quo dismissed the case on the following
grounds: 1) that Longalong, et al. failed to establish ownership of the portion of the land in
question, and 2) that the prescriptive period of four (4) years from discovery of the alleged fraud
committed by defendants' predecessor Anselmo Salvatierra within which plaintiffs should have
filed their action had already elapsed. However, on appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the
RTC and ruled that the prescription periods in the case at bar is 10 years according to Art. 1144.
Petitioners assailed the CA decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Longalong is entitled to reconveyance of the 149 sq. m. in Lot 26?
2. Whether or not the prescription period runs in 4 years (according to Art. 1391 of the Civil Code)
or 10 years (according to Art. 1144 of the Civil Code)?
HELD:
SC ruled that there was no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition.
When the terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, the literal and plain meaning thereof
should be observed. The applicable provision of law in the case at bar is Article 1370 of the New
Civil Code.
Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties, should be fulfilled according to the
literal sense of their stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter what their forms maybe,
whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present. As such, the confirmation of sale
between Macario and his son Anselmo, mentioned in the extrajudicial partition involves only the
share of Macario in the estate. The law is clear on the matter that where there are two or more
heirs, the whole estate of the decedent its, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs,
and hence, the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the
coownership.
With the evidence of fraud and the issue involving a real property, the court ruled that Article 1144
of the Civil Code provides that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate
of title and should govern in the case at bar. The action has not prescribed.
Kapisanan ng mga Mangagawa v. Manila Railroad Company
FACTS:
The petitioner-appellant seeks for the reversal of a decision made by the lower court dismissing
their petition for mandamus, which relied on what was considered to be a right granted by Section
62 of the Republic Act No. 2023. They argued that the provision of this law provides that the
loans granted by credit unions to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection from the
employees‘ wage and salaries. However, the lower court determined that the mandatory
character of RA 2023 is only to compel the employer to make the deduction of the employees‘
debt from the latter‘s salary and turn it over to the employees‘ credit union but it does not convert
the credit union‘s credit into a top priority credit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 2023 makes credit union‘s credit into top priority credit in making deductions
to employees‘ salaries?
HELD:
When the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except apply
it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation must be obeyed.
Republic Act 2023 speaks for itself. There exists no ambiguity. As thus worded, it is clear that
in the assailed provisions of this law that it only compels employers to deduct from the salaries of
their employees‘ their credits to their credit unions, but it does not make these credits top priority
credits. As thus worded, it must then be applied.
As expressed in the literal reading of the text
Verba Legis – Literal or plain meaning rule.
When not favored
Cases:
Abellana v. Marave
Facts:
The dispute had its origins in a prosecution of petitioner Francisco Abellana of the crime of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting a motorized
pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers, namely, private respondents Marcelo Lamason,
Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita Nemeño. The criminal case was filed with the city
court of Ozamis City, which found the accused Francisco Abellana guilty as charged, damages in
favor of the offended parties likewise being awarded. The case was then appealed. An
independent civil action was filed by private respondents only at the stage of appeal, however,
there was no reservation to that effect when the criminal case was instituted in the city court of
Ozamis. Petitioners take comfort from the language of Section 1 of Rule 111 for the unwarranted
conclusion that absent such a reservation, an independent civil action is barred.
Issue:
Whether the literal construction of Section 1 of Rule 111 is favored in the case at bar.
Held:
In the first place, such an inference does not per se arise from the wording of the cited rule. It
could be looked upon plausibly as a nonsequitur. Moreover, it is vitiated by the grievous fault of
ignoring what is so explicitly provided in Section 7 of Rule 123: "An appealed case shall be tried
in all respects anew in the Court of First Instance as if it had been originally instituted in that court."
Unlike petitioners, respondent Judge was duly mindful of such a norm. This Court has made clear
that its observance in appealed criminal cases is mandatory.
In the latest case in point, People v. Jamisola,17 this Court, through Justice Dizon, reiterated such
a doctrine in these words: "The rule in this jurisdiction is that upon appeal by the defendant from
a judgment of conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the
appealed case 'shall be tried in all respects anew in the court of first instance as if it had been
originally instituted in that court.'
The restrictive interpretation they would place on the applicable rule does not only result in its
emasculation but also gives rise to a serious constitutional question. Article 33 of the Civil Code
is quite clear: "In cases of * * * physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." That is a substantive right, not to be frittered away by a construction that could render
it nugatory, if through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for
damages in a civil suit. As referred to earlier, the grant of power to this Court, both in the present
Constitution and under the 1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution, increase or
modification of substantive right. It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a
statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. Unfortunately,
petitioners, unlike respondent Judge, appeared to lack awareness of the undesirable
consequence of their submission. Thus is discernible another insuperable obstacle to the success
of this suit.
Paras v. Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay
was 2led by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled
the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. 1 At
least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement
provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's
opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on
December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner 2led before the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a
temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the
restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why
they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was
without COMELEC approval.
the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996; hence,
the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of
public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Of2ce of the Solicitor General's
manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law
department 2led the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply, he contends, that Citing
Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which
states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the
scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the 2rst Monday of May 1996, and every three
years thereafter.
Issue:
Whether the recall elections was in violation of section 74b of the LGC.
Held:
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing
in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a
statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or
nugatory.
Dura Lex Sed Lex
Spirit of the law or Legislative Intent as the Primary Object
When the law is clear, there is no other recourse but to apply it regardless of its perceived
harshness. Dura lex sed lex. Nonetheless, the law should never be applied or interpreted to
oppress one in order to favor another. As a court of law and of justice, this Court has the duty to
adjudicate conflicting claims based not only on the cold provision of the law but also according to
the higher principles of right and justice. (Obiasca v. Basallote)
Cases:
Pascual v. Pascual
Facts:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of
the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by Adela Soldevilla de
Pascual assurviving spouse, children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the
deceased, children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, acknowledged
natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased and te intestate of
Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented by his heirs.
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed
for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. all the above-mentioned
heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein
petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:

No. Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources
of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize
this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but
petitioners are his illegitimate children. Clearly the term “illegitimate” refers to both natural and
spurious.

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear
and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute
must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri
v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must
be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous.
(Nepomuceno, et al. v. RFC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded,
the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far
as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the
court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A. 145 SCRA 654
[1986]). llcd

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally
placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not
acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative. It may be said that
the law may be harsh but that is the law. DURA LEX SED LEX

Aguila v. CFI

Facts:

Juliana Matienzo had two husbands in succession, namely, Escolastico Alabastro and, after his
death, Daniel Aguila. The petitioner is claiming the disputed property as the only surviving child
of the second marriage. The private respondents are resisting this claim as the children of Maria
Alabastro, the sole offspring of the first marriage.

In an earlier action between them the private respondents had sued for partition and damages
against the herein petitioner and his wife, alleging that some properties held by them pertained to
the first marriage as Juliana and her second husband had not acquired anything during their
marriage. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs after the defendants were precluded
from presenting their own evidence owing to what they later called "the gross ineptitude of their
counsel," who had failed to appear at two scheduled hearings. Respondents invoke res judicata,
while petitioner contend in his brief that, as a mere technical defense, res judicata should not
prevail over his right to substantial justice, and specifically to due process. The petitioner claims
he was denied this constitutional protection when the defendants were deprived of the opportunity
to submit their evidence in the said case and later to appeal the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether the court must nullify all of the antecedent proceedings and recognize his (petitioner)
earlier claims to the disputed property on the justification that his counsel was grossly inept.
Held:

Such a reason is hardly plausible as the petitioner's new counsel should know. Otherwise, all a
defeated party would have to do to salvage his case is claim neglect or mistake on the part of his
counsel as a ground for reversing the adverse judgment. There would be no end to litigation if
this were allowed as every shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client
through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the
same client through another counsel, and so on ad infinitum. This would render court proceedings
indefinite, tentative and subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing
counsel.

Perhaps it is for this reason that the petitioner does not strongly attack the decision, preferring to
train his sights on his own former counsel. As he says in his petition, he "does not seek the nullity
of the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 1552 which has already become final due to legal
technicality. 10 What he does ask for is a reconveyance of the subject properties which he says
were unjustly taken from him as a result of his lawyer's mistakes. Such blunders, he contends,
are correctible in an action for reconveyance which the Court should allow in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction.
The law on reconveyance is clear, and jurisprudence thereon is well-settled. This remedy is
available in cases where, as a result of mistake or fraud, property is registered in the name of a
person not its owner. Clerical error in designating the real owner is a valid ground for
reconveyance after the decree shall have become final following the lapse of one year therefrom.
Reconveyance may also be sought where it is established that a person not entitled to the
property succeeded in registering it in his name to the prejudice of the real owner. However, it
cannot be employed to negate the effects of a valid decision of a court of justice determining the
conflicting claims of ownership of the parties in an appropriate proceeding, as in Civil Case No.
1552. The decision in that case was a valid resolution of the question of ownership over the
disputed properties and cannot be reversed now through the remedy of reconveyance.
For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its
replacement. Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it cannot
supplant although it may, as often happens, supplement the law. We said in an earlier case, and
we repeat it now, that all abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules,
which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they may
wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law as long as it
remains in force. The applicable maxim, which goes back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists
— and is now still reverently observed — is "aequetas nunquam contravenit legis."
Verba Legis
Inapplicability in Criminal Cases
Cases
PP v. Santayana
On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as “Special Agent” by then
Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an undated
certification to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol
described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as
special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of
his official duty and for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in
Plaza Miranda in possession of the firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them.
An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the
accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged.
Hence, the case was appealed to Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of firearms
Held:
The appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People
v.Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the
authority to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his official
duties and for his personal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according to Col.
Maristela, as the firearm is government property. No permit was issued, according to Capt. Adolfo
Bringas as he was already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People vs. Mapa revoked
the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, years after the
accused was charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant’s
appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in
question. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the
recommendation of the Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for
his provisional release; with costs de oficio.
People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa
Facts:
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4.
On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a
homemade revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted
that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a
secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In
his defense, the accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must
acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to
municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.
Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal
possession of firearms.
Held:
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower court’s decision. It stated that the law is
explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore
the accused is not exempted.
As determined through Construction
1. General Rule: Statute must be capable of construction, otherwise inoperative
Cases
Santiago v. COMELEC
Facts:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to lift term limits
of elective officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said
people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is: “Do you approve
of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 )
and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after
it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it will be formally filed
with the COMELEC. COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners
Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory
petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission
indicates matter of people’s initiative was left to some future law.
c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative.
Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision.
e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on amendments to the Constitution but, as
worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the Constitution has
recognized or granted the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed
afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the
Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of
the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to
the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and
local laws. The argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to
be subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in
scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative
involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress
can pass. Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or
resolution which only legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1]
Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the President;
[3] Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to local governments; and [5] Delegation to
administrative bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. In every case of
permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only
if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.
The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative. It does not have that power under Republic Act No. 6735. Whether the
COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain
an order:
(a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to
assist Delfin’s movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or
causing the publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full
compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate
legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Without the
required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires
jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading.
Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper,
which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12
December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda to file
their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources. Therefore,
Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutional amendment.