Bombo Radyo Philippines VS The Secretary of DOLE

G.R. No. 179652 - March 6, 2012

Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J

Nature Of Case: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 from the decision of the CA

Facts:

1. Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against petitioner DOLE Regional Office for illegal
deduction, nonpayment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day
and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and non-coverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and
Philhealth
2. DOLE Regional Director found that private respondent was an employee of petitioner, and was entitled to
his money claims
3. Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, claiming that it was denied due process. The CA held that
petitioner was accorded due process as it had been given the opportunity to be heard, and that
jurisdiction is with the DOLE Secretary, as the jurisdictional limitation imposed by Article 129 of the Labor
Code on the power of the DOLE Secretary under Art. 128 (b) of the Code had been repealed by Republic
Act No. (RA) 7730
4. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CA and the complaint against the petitioner was
dismissed for it found that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private
respondent
5. PAO filed a motion for clarification of decision to clarify as to when the visitorial and enforcement power
of the DOLE be not considered as co-extensive with the power to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship
6. The SC treated the Motion for Clarification as a second motion for reconsideration, granting said motion
and reinstating the petition

Procedural:

 DOLE Regional Director: Decided in Favor of the Respondent

 CA Decision: Affirmed the decision of the DOLE Regional Director
 SC Decision: Reverse the decision of the CA

Issues:

 Whether DOLE make a determination of whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists and to
what extent?

Supreme Court Enbanc Decision

1. The answer is to the affirmative

Ratio Decidendi (Reasoning Of The Court Enbanc)

1. No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship
2. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary 􀀿nding, that the power was
primarily held by the NLRC and the law did not say that the DOLE should first seek the NLRC’s
determination
3. The DOLE must have the power to determine whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists,
and from there to decide whether or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128 (b) of the
Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.
4. The DOLE should use the same guidelines as the courts do.
5. If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, it takes cognizance
of the matter, to the exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no jurisdiction only if the employer-
employee relationship has already been terminated or non-existent.
6. Under Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to make a
determination as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial
and enforcement power, subject to judicial CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com review,
not review by the NLRC
7. DOLE had the jurisdiction, despite the amount of the money claims involved wherein the court has ruled
that Art. 128 (b) has been amended to expand the powers of the DOLE Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives by RA 7730
8. if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor
Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that there is an existing employer-
employee relationship, the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that
there is no employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is
filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with
the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217 (3) of the Labor Code
Aliling VS Feliciano

G.R. No. 185829 - April 25, 2012

Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J

Nature Of Case: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 from the decision of the CA

Facts:

1. respondent WWWEC offered to employ petitioner Aliling as Account Executive(Seafreight Sales)

2. The offer came with a six (6)-month probation period condition with this express caveat: "Performance
during probationary period shall be made as basis for confirmation to Regular or Permanent Status."
3. Aliling and WWWEC inked an Employment Contract but instead of a Seafreight Sale assignment, WWWEC
asked Aliling to handle Ground Express (GX) which was a new company product involving domestic cargo
forwarding service for Luzon. It formed the core of Aliling’s new assignment.
4. A month after the Marketing Director emailed petitioner to express dissatisfaction with his performance.
5. The HR Manager asked Petitioner to explain his absence taken without leave, from which the latter
denied and showing a copy of his timesheet. His explanation came with a query regarding the withholding
of his salary corresponding to September 11 to 25, 2004
6. Petitioner sent a letter to the Marketing director to tender his resignation. WWWEC took no action.
7. Petitioner demanded reinstatement and a written apology, claiming to management that the marketing
director had forced him to resign.
8. The HR Manager advise Petitioner of the termination of his services effective as of that date owing to his
"non-satisfactory performance" during his probationary period.
9. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal due to forced resignation, nonpayment of salaries as well
as damages with the NLRC against WWWEC. On his affidavit he stated that “at the time of my
engagement, respondents did not make known to me the standards under which I will qualify as a regular
employee”
10. WWWEC on its position paper pointed out to the letter of appointment containing the terms of
engagement. Also attached is the letter sent by the Marketing Manager on asking petitioner on why he
should not be terminated for his poor performance. Which petitioner denied to have received

Procedural:

 Labor Arbiter: Petitioner’s termination was unjustified and respondent to pay petitioner on his salaries
and other benefits for the unserved portion of his contract
 NLRC Decision: Affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
 CA Decision: Partly Granted the decision of the NLRC with modification as to the solidary liability and
money awards.

Issues:

1. Whether Petitioner was illegally dismissed?

2. Whether Petitioner’s right to procedural due process was violated?
3. Whether Petitioner is entitled to back wages and separation pay?
4. Whether Petitioner is entitled to Moral and Exemplary damages?
Supreme Court Decision

1. Yes Petitioner was illegally dismissed.

2. Yes Petitioner’s right to procedural due process was violated
3. Yes Petitioner is entitled to back wages and separation pay
4. No Petitioner is not entitled to Moral and Exemplary damages

Ratio Decidendi (Reasoning Of The Court)

1. Issue #1
 WWWEC had failed to discharge its twin burden that the dismissal was based on a just cause and
the employee was afforded due process.
 An employee's failure to meet sales or work quotas falls under the concept of gross inefficiency,
which in turn is analogous to gross neglect of duty that is a just cause for dismissal under Article
282 of the Code. In order for the quota imposed to be considered a valid productivity standard
and thereby validate a dismissal, management's prerogative of fixing the quota must be
exercised in good faith for the advancement of its interest
 The duty to prove good faith, however, rests with WWWEC as part of its burden to show that the
dismissal was for a just cause. WWWEC must show that such quota was imposed in good faith,
from which it failed to do so.
 Probationary employees do not enjoy permanent status, they enjoy the constitutional protection
of security of tenure. They can only be terminated for cause or when they otherwise fail to meet
the reasonable standards made known to them by the employer at the time of their
engagement.
 Respondent WWWEC failed to prove the termination of petitioner was for a just cause nor was
there substantial evidence to demonstrate the standards were made known to the latter at the
time of his engagement
2. Issue #2
 When the Labor Code speaks of procedural due process, the reference is usually to the two (2)-
written notice rule envisaged in Section 2 (III), Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code.
 In the case at bar the first and second notice requirements have not been properly observed,
thus tainting petitioner's dismissal with illegality
 There was non-compliance with the imperatives of a hearing or conference, And the written
notice of termination itself did not indicate all the circumstances involving the charge to justify
severance of employment
3. Issue #3
 Aliling cannot be rightfully considered as a mere probationary employee but as a regular
employee when he became part of the WWWEC organization without a fix term employment.
Thus he is entitled to back wages reckoned from the time he was illegally dismissed until the
finality of the decision of the case as provided for under Article 279 of the Labor Code
 Aliling is entitled to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement on the ground of strained
relationship. Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is
considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer
desirable or viable.
4. Issue #4
 Aliling has failed to overcome such burden to prove bad faith on the part of WWWEC.
 Aliling has not presented any clear and convincing evidence to show bad faith.
 The fact that he was illegally dismissed is insufficient to prove bad faith
Naranjo VS Biomedica Healthcare Inc.

G.R. No. 193789 - September 19, 2012

Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J

Nature Of Case: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 from the decision of the CA

Facts:

1. Respondent Biomedica Health Care, Inc. (Biomedica) was engaged in the distribution of medical
equipment, while petitioners were former employees of Respondent Company
2. Petitioners were all absent on a specific date for various personal reasons
3. Later that day, petitioners reported for work after receiving text messages for them to proceed to
Biomedica but were refused entry and was told to start looking for another work place.
4. Petitioners allegedly came in for work but were not allowed to enter the premises.
5. Biomedica issued a notice of preventive suspension and notices to explain within 24 hours (Notices). In
the Notices, Respondent accused the petitioners of having conducted an illegal strike and were
accordingly directed to explain why they should not be held guilty of and dismissed for violating the
company policy against illegal strikes under the company policy.
6. Petitioners filed a Complaint with the NLRC for constructive dismissal and nonpayment of salaries,
overtime pay, 13th month pay as well as nonremittance of SSS, Pag-IBIG and Philhealth contributions as
well as loan payments.
7. Biomedica served Notices of Termination on petitioners for not submitting a letter of explanation as
requested in their preventive suspension.

Procedural:

 Labor Arbiter: Dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner
for their 13th Month pay, Service Incentive Leave and several monetary award.
 NLRC Decision: Ruled in favor of the Petitioner and declared that there was illegal dismissal
 CA Decision: Reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Petitioners were illegally dismissed and should be awarded their money claims?

Supreme Court Decision

1. Yes Petitioners were illegally dismissed and should be awarded their money claims

Ratio Decidendi (Reasoning Of The Court)

 The Labor Code promotes the right of the worker to security of tenure protecting them against illegal
dismissal. In dismissing an employee the law requires that due process be observed. Such due process
requirement is two-fold, procedural and substantive, that is, "the termination of employment must be
based on a just or authorized cause of dismissal and the dismissal must be effected after due notice and
hearing.
 In the instant case, petitioners were not afforded both procedural and substantive due process
 In the instant case, the notice specifying the grounds for termination that the petitioners were charged
with conducting an illegal strike, not a mass leave, without specifying the exact acts that the company
considers as constituting an illegal strike or violative of company policies. Such allegation falls short of the
detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the
employees. Also Respondent company failed to quote the provision of the company polilcy which was
purportedly violated.
 Respondent Biomedica did not even quote or reproduce the company policies referred to in the notice.
Without a copy of the company policy being presented in the court the contents of the pertinent policies
being quoted in the pleadings, which would lead to non-determination if there was a violation of the
company’s policies.
 Biomedica did not set the charges against petitioners for hearing or conference in accordance with Sec. 2,
Book V, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code.
 Biomedica again deviated from the dictated contents of a written notice of termination as laid down in
Sec. 2, Book V, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules that it should embody the facts and circumstances to
support the grounds justifying the termination.
 Biomedica has failed to prove that petitioners are guilty of a wrongdoing that is punishable with
termination from employment. Art. 277 (b) of the Labor Code states, "The burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer." which respondent company
failed to overcome
 Given the illegality of their dismissal, petitioners are entitled to reinstatement and back wages as
provided in Art. 279 of the Labor Code
David VS OSG Shipment Manila.

G.R. No. 197205 - September 26, 2012

Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J

Nature Of Case: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 from the decision of the CA

Facts:

1. petitioner Jessie David (David) entered into a six-month Contract of Employment 4 with respondent OSG
Ship management Manila, Inc. (OSG Manila), for and in behalf of its principal Michaelmar Shipping
Services, Inc., as a Third Officer of the crude tanker M/T Raphael
2. The engagement was the third contract of employment between Petitioner and Respondent, since
Respondent hired petitioner since December 2004
3. Petitioner underwent a pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit for further sea
duty.
4. Barely six month from his employment, petitioner complained of an intolerable pain on his left foot so
that he consulted a doctor which diagnosed that he was suffering from "lipoma [on the] left upper leg"
and a possible "calcaneus spur of [the] left foot.". He was advised to go for further treatment upon
repatriation to the Philippines
5. Petitioner was referred by the respondent to a hospital which showed a pathology follows: "Left anterior
thigh mass excision: Malignant fibrous histiocytoma, myxoid type. Margins of resection negative for
tumor."
6. Respondent certified petitioner's entitlement "to sickness allowance from the company or principal
equivalent to basic salary of member"
7. Petitioner had undergone medical and surgical evaluation treatment.
8. as a result of another inquiry regarding David's illness and its relation to his work and despite the non-
conclusive findings of the company designated physician, Respondent issued a Certification stating that
David has been given a "permanent disability Grade One (1)"
9. Petitioner underwent Chemotherapy but respondent refused to shoulder David's expenses and
medication.
10. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for total and permanent disability bene􀀿ts, medical and
transportation expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees

Procedural:

 Labor Arbiter: Declared Petitioner to be permanently and totally disabled, entitled to be paid his total
disability compensation, plus damages and attorney's fees for their 13th Month pay, Service Incentive
Leave and several monetary award. But his disability was not work related bur the certification issued by
respondent should bind the latter.
 NLRC Decision: Affirmed the decision of the LA
 CA Decision: Nullified the resolution of the NLRC and ruled against Petitioner’s entitlement.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Petitioners is entitled to his disability compensation and other money claims?

Supreme Court Decision

 1. Yes Petitioners is entitled to disability compensation from respondent company and all of his money
claims.

Ratio Decidendi (Reasoning Of The Court)

 In the contract of employment between petitioner and respondent which incorporates the provisions of
the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Section 20
(B) of the POEA-SEC which provides for entitlement of sea-fearers for sickness allowance in case of work-
related injury or sickness
 David suffered from malignant fibrous histiocytoma (MFH) in his left thigh. MFH is not one of the diseases
enumerated under Sec. 32 of the POEA-SEC. However, Sec. 20 (B) (4) of the POEA-SEC clearly established
a disputable presumption in favor of the compensability of an illness suffered by a seafarer during the
term of his contract. This disputable presumption works in favor of the employee
 David not only relies on this disputable presumption of the compensability of his illness but further alleges
that the following conditions provided in Sec. 32-A of the POEA-SEC:
o The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
o The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
o The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary
to contract it;
o There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer
 As part of Petitioner's duties as a Third Officer of the crude tanker M/T Raphael. he was frequently
exposed to the crude oil which has chemical components that would include, among others, sulphur,
vanadium and arsenic compounds; Hydrogen sulphide and carbon monoxide may also be encountered;
while benzene is a naturally occurring chemical from the same. These are regarded as hazardous
chemicals can possibly contribute to the formation of cancerous masses
 It is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered
by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the
employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the
establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had.
 This reasonable connection has not been convincingly refuted by respondent.
 It is significant to note that Respondent issued a Certification, after the issuance of the
letters/certifications regarding the possible etiology of David's illness, where it was tacitly suggested by
the MMC doctors that David's illness could be work related provided there is a documented exposure to
carcinogenic chemicals
 the certi􀀿cation impliedly 􀀿lls in the information required by tge doctors last letter to the company-
designated physician regarding the nature of the work performed by David and his exposure to chemical
carcinogens that could have led to his illness
 The certification issued by OSG Manila encompasses not only the gravity of David's illness but also its
nature and relation to the employment undertaken by David in their crude tankers
 The quantum of evidence required in labor cases to determine the liability of an employer for the illness
suffered by an employee under the POEA-SEC is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but mere substantial
evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." from which in the case at bar the same has been supported