NPC vs. Chiong

2/25/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 404
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 527

National Power Corporation vs. Chiong
*
G.R. No. 152436. June 20, 2003.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

SPOUSES IGMEDIO and LIWAYWAY CHIONG and the
HEIRS OF AGRIFINA ANGELES, represented by
FRANCISCO MERCURIO, respondents.
Administrative Law; National Power Corporation; Due

Process; Elements; The elements of due process are well
established.—The elements of due process are well established,
viz.: (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) Jurisdiction
must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or
property which is the subject of the proceedings; (3) The
defendant must
_______________
28 See Cabaero v. Cantos, 338 Phil. 105, 116-117; 271 SCRA 391 (1997).
* SECOND DIVISION.
528
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) Judgment must be

rendered upon lawful hearing.
Same; Same; Same; What is repugnant to due process is the
denial of the opportunity to be heard.—What is repugnant to due
process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As pointed
out that the petitioner was afforded this opportunity is beyond
question. Having failed to make use of this opportunity, the
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petitioner cannot justifiably claim now that its right to due

process has been violated.
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Just Compensation;
Commissioners; The duty of the court in considering the
commissioners’ report is to satisfy itself that just compensation will
be made to the defendant by its final judgment in the matter.—The
duty of the court in considering the commissioners’ report is to
satisfy itself that just compensation will be made to the defendant
by its final judgment in the matter, and in order to fulfill its duty
in this respect, the court will be obliged to exercise its discretion
in dealing with the report as the particular circumstances of the
case may require. Rule 67, Section 8, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure clearly shows that the trial court has the discretion to
act upon the commissioners’ report in any of the following ways:
(1) it may accept the same and render judgment therewith; or (2)
for cause shown, it may: [a] recommit the report to the
commissioners for further report of facts; or [b] set aside the
report and appoint new commissioners; or [c] accept the report in
part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render
such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the
defendant just compensation for the property so taken.
Same; Same; Same; Market Value; In eminent domain or
expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just
compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled
to is the market value.—In eminent domain or expropriation
proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to
which the owner of condemned property is entitled to is the
market value. Market value is “that sum of money which a person
desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and
received therefor.” The aforementioned rule, however, is modified
where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a
case the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion
actually taken. In addition to the market value of the portion
taken, he is also entitled to recover for the consequential damage,
if any, to the remaining part of the property. At the same time,
from the total compensation must be deducted the value of the
consequential benefits.
529
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 529
Same; Same; Same; Same; Just compensation is determined

by the nature of the land at the time of taking.— It is the nature
and character of the land at the time of its taking that is the
principal criterion to determine just compensation to the
landowner.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Rainier B. Butalid for petitioner.
Pejo, Aquino & Associates for private respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
1
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated October 26, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 60716,
affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, dated June 7, 2000 in Civil Case
No. 1442-I. The trial court directed petitioner National
Power Corporation (NPC) to pay the value of the land
expropriated from respondents herein for use in NPC’s
Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line 2Project. Likewise
assailed in this petition is the resolution of the appellate
court, dated February 26, 2002, denying herein petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioner is a government owned and controlled
corporation,
3
created and existing pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6395, as amended, for the purpose of undertaking the
development of hydroelectric power, the production of
electrical power from any source, particularly by
constructing, operating, and maintaining power plants,
auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains,
transmission lines, power stations, and similar works to
tap the power generated from any river, creek, lake, spring,
or waterfall in the country and supplying such power to the
inhabitants thereof.
_______________
1 CA Rollo, pp. 113-124. Penned by Tria Tirona, J., with Abesamis and
Barcelona, JJ., concurring.
2 Id., at p. 184.
3 Entitled “An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power
Corporation.”
530

In order to carry out said purposes, NPC is authorized to

exercise the power of eminent domain.
On February 19, 1998, NPC filed a complaint for
eminent domain with the RTC of Iba, Zambales. It sought
the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way and certain
portions of agricultural lands owned by Igmedio 4
and
Liwayway Chiong and the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles, as
represented by Francisco Mercurio, to be used in its
Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line Project. The
complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 1442-I,
prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession and an order
of expropriation, the appointment of three (3)
commissioners to determine the just compensation, and to
adjudge NPC as having a lawful right to enter, take, and
acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of the
properties owned by herein respondents.
In their answer, the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles did not
dispute the purpose of NPC in instituting the
expropriation proceedings. However, they pointed out that
NPC had already entered and taken possession of a portion
of their realty with an area of 4,000 square meters, more or
less (Lot “A”) and wanted to occupy another 4,000 square
meters of the adjacent property (Lot “B”). Respondents
averred that the fair market value for both properties was
P1,100.00 per square meter or a total of P8,800,000.00 and
prayed that the trial court direct NPC to pay them said
amount.
On March 31, 1998, NPC filed an ex parte motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession, which the trial court
granted.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that the
controversy would be limited to determining the actual
land area taken by NPC and the just compensation to be
paid by petitioner.
On September 28, 1999, the trial court appointed as
commissioners, Atty. Henry P. Alog, Atty. Regalado
Castillo, and Ms. Roselyn B. Ragadio, Legal Researcher of
the trial court, to determine the fair market value of the
land, as well as the total area taken by NPC from
respondents.
On March 9, 2000, Atty. Castillo and Ms. Ragadio
submitted their report to the court finding that the
property classified as “unirrigated riceland shall have a fair
market value of P500.00 per
_______________
4 Also spelled as “Agripina” in other part of the records.
531
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 531

5
square meter” considering that “the property is situated at
Baytan, Babali, Lomboy, Sta. Cruz, Zambales 6
which is
more than 900 meters from the town proper.”
On May 5, 2000, Atty. Alog submitted his report
recommending that NPC pay the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles
an easement fee of P20,957.88 and the Spouses7
Chiong be
paid total easement fees of P9,187.05. The affected
properties of the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles were assessed
by Atty. Alog to have a fair market value of P22.50 per
square meter, while those of the Spouses Chiong were 8
assigned a fair market value of P15.75 per square meter.
After considering the reports of the Commissioners, the
trial court on June 7, 2000 decreed as follows:
“The Commissioner’s Report dated March 9, 2000 filed by

Commissioner Roselyn B. Ragadio and Atty. Regalado Castillo is
given due course.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff is directed to pay the defendants
Mercurio their land containing an area of 4,000 square meters at
P500.00 per square meter and an interest of six (6%) percent per
annum from April 16,
9
1998 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.”
Dissatisfied, NPC filed a special civil action for certiorari

with the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
60716. NPC averred that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or want of
jurisdiction when it: (a) directed NPC to pay just
compensation for the land taken without first issuing an
order of expropriation; (b) adopted the compensation
recommended by the two commissioners without a hearing;
and (c) directed petitioner to pay the full market value of
the property instead of a mere easement fee.
On October 26, 2001, the appellate court decided CA-
G.R. SP No. 60716 as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is

hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
_______________
5 Supra, note 1 at p. 61.

6 Id., at p. 62.
7 Id., at pp. 69-70.
8 Ibid.
9 Id., at p. 23.
532

10
SO ORDERED.”
In holding that NPC was not entitled to a writ of certiorari,

the Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion when it failed to issue
an expropriation order. The appellate court pointed out
that as early as the pre-trial, respondents did not question
NPC’s right to expropriate their properties. Hence, the
only matter to be addressed by the trial court was the
amount of just compensation to be paid. Second, NPC could
not claim that it was denied due process because the trial
court issued the order without first conducting a hearing on
the commissioners’ report. The court a quo noted that
formal-type hearings are not necessary in expropriation
proceedings, as long as the parties are afforded a fair and
reasonable opportunity to be heard before the order to pay
compensation is issued. NPC was afforded ample time or
opportunity to object to the commissioners’ report before
said order was issued. This it failed to do. It likewise failed
to move for reconsideration or to appeal the trial court’s
order. Hence, NPC was now estopped from claiming that it
had been denied due process. The appellate court likewise
found the assessed value of P500.00 per square meter to be
fair as opposed to the NPC-appointed commissioner’s
valuation of P22.50 per square meter. Finally, the CA held
that as NPC failed to appeal the trial court’s order,
certiorari could not be a substitute for a lost or lapsed right
to appeal.
NPC moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by
the appellate court in its resolution of February 26, 2002.
Hence, the instant recourse to this Court, with
petitioner submitting the following issues for our
resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

A GRAVE ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
COURT A QUO IN DIRECTING THE PETITIONER TO PAY
THE COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE
EXPROPRIATED WITHOUT FIRST ORDERING ITS
EXPROPRIATION.
_______________
10 Id., at p. 123.
533
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 533

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT ADOPTING IN TOTO THE
UNSUBSTANTIATED REPORT OF THE APPOINTED
COMMISSIONERS MS. REGARDIO AND ATTY. CASTILLO,
WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE THIRD COMMISSIONER,
ATTY. ALOG AND WITHOUT CONDUCTING A HEARING.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN DIRECTING
PETITIONER TO PAY THE FULL MARKET VALUE OF THE
LAND INSTEAD OF THE EASEMENT FEE AS PRAYED FOR
IN THE COMPLAINT AND PROVIDED UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 6395 AS AMENDED, WHICH 11 IS OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE REVISED NPC CHARTER.
In sum, we find that the pertinent issues before us are the

following: (1) whether petitioner NPC was deprived of due
process; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the Order of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, dated
June 7, 2000, by dismissing NPC’s petition for certiorari.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the appellate
court gravely erred in affirming the trial court’s order
directing it to pay the respondent the compensation
recommended by the majority report of the commissioners.
Petitioner points out that there were two reports submitted
by the commissioners, with conflicting findings as to the
market values of the expropriated properties. It insists
that, given said situation, the trial court should have

conducted hearings
12
on the two reports, as required by Rule
67, Sections 7 and
_______________
11 Rollo, pp. 18-19.

12 SEC. 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon.—The
court may order the commissioners to report when any particular portion
of the real estate shall have been passed upon by them, and may render
judgment upon such partial report, and direct the commissioners to
proceed with their work as to subsequent portions of the property sought
to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such property.
The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all
their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not be effectual until the
court shall have accepted their report and rendered judgment in
accordance with their recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly
ordered
534

13
8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, before accepting
the majority report. In failing to do so, the trial court not
only blatantly violated the Rules; it likewise denied
petitioner due process, as the latter was not afforded a
chance to raise its objections to the majority report in a
hearing held for that purpose. It was, thus, grievous error
for the appellate court to have sustained the trial court.
The respondents, Heirs of Agrifina Angeles, point out
that the petitioner’s contentions are without basis, since it
was given ample time and/or opportunity by the trial court
to object to the questioned order. The respondents assert
that the petitioner, had it been so minded, could have
moved for reconsideration or filed an appeal therefrom
within the reglementary period, but it did not. Instead, it
opted for the wrong remedy by filing a special civil action
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, after the period to
appeal had lapsed. Having made an erroneous choice in its
remedies, petitioner cannot now come to this Tribunal
crying that it was denied due process.
On record we find that the majority report of
Commissioners Ragadio and Atty. Castillo was submitted
to the trial court on March 9, 2000, while the minority
report of Commissioner Atty. Alog, was submitted on May
5, 2000. It is not disputed that petitioner was furnished
copies of said reports. After petitioner NPC obtained its

copy of the majority report, it did nothing. The records
_______________
by the court, such report shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the
date the commissioners were notified of their appointment, which time
may be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such
report, the clerk of court shall serve copies thereof on all interested
parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days from which to file
objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire.
13 SEC. 8. Action upon commissioners’ report.—Upon the expiration of
the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even
before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties
have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement
therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render
judgment in accordance therewith; or for cause shown, it may recommit
the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set
aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the
report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render
such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the
exercise of his right of expropriation; and to the defendant just
compensation for the property so taken.
535
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 535

do not disclose any objection thereto or any comment

opposing the findings and recommendations of the two
commissioners in their report.
The majority report was submitted on March 9, 2000.
The trial court issued its order adopting the majority report
on June 7, 2000. Clearly, petitioner had ample time to
make its objections or ventilate its opposition to the
majority report before the trial court. A formal hearing or
trial was not required for the petitioner to avail of its
opportunity to object and oppose the majority report.
Petitioner could have filed a motion raising all possible
grounds for objecting to the findings and recommendations
of the commissioners. It could have moved the trial court to
remand the report to the commissioners for additional
facts. Or it could have moved to expunge the majority
report, for reasons petitioner could muster. Petitioner,
however, failed to seize the opportunity to register its
opposition or objections before the trial court. It is a bit too
late in the day now to be asking for a hearing on the

pretext that it had not been afforded due process.
The elements of due process are well established, viz.:
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with

judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it;
(2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
person of the defendant or property which is the
subject of the proceedings;
(3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard; and
14
(4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
What is repugnant to 15due process is the denial of the

opportunity to be heard. As pointed out that the petitioner
was afforded this opportunity is beyond question. Having
failed to make use of this opportunity, the petitioner cannot
justifiably claim now that its right to due process has been
violated.
_______________
14 Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 934 (1918).

15 Garments and Textile Export Board v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil.
723, 765; 268 SCRA 258 (1997) citing Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 114061, 23 August 1995, 247 SCRA 599, Bermejo v.
Barrios, G.R. No. L-23614, 27 February 1970, 31 SCRA 764, and Caltex
Phil., Inc. v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-24657, 27 November 1967, 21 SCRA
1071.
536

The duty of the court in considering the commissioners’

report is to satisfy itself that just compensation will be
made to the defendant by its final judgment in the matter,
and in order to fulfill its duty in this respect, the court will
be obliged to exercise its discretion in dealing with the
report as16
the particular circumstances of the case may
require. Rule 67, Section 8, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure clearly shows that the trial court has the
discretion to act upon the commissioners’ report in any of
the following ways: (1) it may accept the same and render
judgment therewith; or (2) for cause shown, it may: [a]
recommit the report to the commissioners for further report

of facts; or [b] set aside the report and appoint new
commissioners; or [c] accept the report in part and reject it
in part; and it may make such order or render such
judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to
the defendant
17
just compensation for the property so
taken.
From March 9, 2000 to June 7, 2000, petitioner did not
object to the majority report. On record, it did not, at the
time, signify its opposition thereto, or specify that not all of
the evidence, pertinent and material thereto, had been
considered by the commissioners or presented to the court.
The option of recommitting the report of the
commissioners, which petitioner now claims, was not
ventilated before the trial court. No claim appears on
record that fraud or prejudice tainted the majority report.
When it still had the opportunity below, herein petitioner
did not challenge the majority report on the ground that
the commissioners concerned disregarded the evidence
before them, or used an improper rule of assessment, in
their submission to the trial court. As previously held,
where there was no opposition filed to the Commissioners’
Report in the lower 18
court, the findings in said Report will
not be disturbed. Absent the objections raised by the
petitioner, it became the duty of the trial court to make a
final order and judgment in which the proper award will be
made and thus end the controversy.
Moreover, after its receipt of the trial court’s order dated
June 7, 2000, which decided the issue of compensation as
delineated at the pre-trial, petitioner resorted to a special
civil action, rather than an
_______________
16 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286, 298 (1915).

17 City of Manila v. Battle, 27 Phil. 34, 38 (1914).
18 See Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. L-71412, 15
August 1986, 143 SCRA 466, 477-478.
537
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 537

appeal before the Court of Appeals. As aptly pointed out,

petitioner could not utilize certiorari as a substitute for its
lost right of appeal. We also agree that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in ruling on the very issue of just

compensation for the land taken, as delineated by the party
themselves at the pre-trial.
Nevertheless, we shall now take up the matter of
valuation and just compensation if only to avoid any
further delay in its resolution.
The fair market value of the 4,000 square meters
occupied by the petitioner was fixed by the trial court in its
order of June 7, 2000 at P500.00 per square meter. The
appellate court affirmed the said valuation.
In contesting the valuation, petitioner argues now that
the Court of Appeals gravely erred in upholding the RTC
order requiring it to pay the full market value of the
expropriated properties, notwithstanding the fact that the
petitioner was only acquiring an easement of 19right-of-way.
The petitioner points out under Section 3-A of RA No.
6395, where only an easement of right-of-
_______________
19 SEC. 3-A. In acquiring private property or private property rights

through expropriation proceedings where the land or portion thereof will
be traversed by the transmission lines, only a right-of-way easement
thereon shall be acquired when the principal purpose for which such land
is actually devoted will not be impaired, and where the land itself or a
portion thereof will be needed for the projects or works, such land or
portion thereof as necessary shall be acquired.
In determining the just compensation of the property or property
sought to be acquired through expropriation proceedings, the same shall—
(a) With respect to the acquired land or portion thereof, not exceed the
market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone
having legal interest in the property, or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
(b) With respect to the acquired right-of-way easement over the land
or portion thereof, not exceed ten percent (10%) of the market
value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having
legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined
by the assessor, whichever is lower.
In addition to the just compensation for easement of right-of-way, the

owner of the land or owner of the improvement, as the case may be, shall
be compensated for the improvements actually damaged by the con
538

way shall be acquired, with the principal purpose for which

the land is actually devoted is unimpaired, the
compensation should not exceed ten percent (10%) of the
market value of the property. Thus, in sustaining the order
of the lower court directing the petitioner to pay the
respondents the full recommended value of their
properties, the Court of Appeals completely violated and
disregarded RA No. 6395, as amended.
Petitioner averred in its complaint in Civil Case No.
1442-I, that it sought to acquire “an easement of right-of-
way” over portions of the properties20owned by respondents,
for a total of 10,950 square meters. However, a perusal of
its complaint shows that petitioner also stated that it
would erect structures for its transmission lines on portions
of the expropriated property. In other words, the
expropriation was not to be limited for the purpose of
“easement of right-of-way.” In fact, in their Answer, the
Heirs of Agrifina Angeles, alleged that petitioner had
actually occupied an area of 4,000 square meters wherein it
constructed structures for its transmission lines 21
and was
seeking to occupy another 4,000 square meters. Petitioner
failed to controvert this material allegation. Justifiably, the
market value of these 4,000 square meters allegedly
occupied by the petitioner has became the very crux of the
present case.
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the
general rule is that the just compensation to which the
owner22of condemned property is entitled to is the market
value. Market value
_______________
struction and maintenance of the transmission lines, in an amount not

exceeding the market value thereof as declared by the owner or
administrator, or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such
market value as determined by the assessor whichever is lower; Provided,
That in cases any buildings, houses, and similar structures are actually
affected by the right-of-way for the transmission lines, their transfer, if
feasible, shall be effected at the expense of the Corporation; Provided,
further, That such market value prevailing at the time the Corporation
gives notice to the landowner or administrator or anyone having legal
interest in the property, to the effect that his land or portion thereof is
needed for its projects or works shall be used as basis to determine the
just compensation therefor.
20 CA Rollo, p. 26.
21 Id., at p. 36.
22 Metropolitan Water District v. Director of Lands, 57 Phil. 293, 294-
295 (1932); Municipality of Tarlac v. Besa, 55 Phil. 423, 425 (1930);
Manila Railroad Co. v. Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326, 328-329 (1919); Manila
539
VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 539

is “that sum of money which a person desirous but not

compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled
to sell, would
23
agree on as a price to be given and received
therefor.” The aforementioned rule, however, is modified
where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In
such a case the owner is not restricted to compensation for
the portion actually taken. In addition to the market value
of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover for the
consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the
property. At the same time, from the total compensation 24
must be deducted the value of the consequential benefits.
In fixing the valuation at P500.00 per square meter, the
Court of Appeals noted that the trial court had considered
the reports of the commissioners and the proofs submitted
by the parties. This included the fair market value of 25
P1,100.00 per square meter proferred by the respondents.
This valuation by owners of the property may not be
binding upon the petitioner or the court, although it should
at least 26set a ceiling price for the compensation to be
awarded. The trial court found that the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated are agricultural land, with
minimal improvements. It is the nature and character of
the land at the time of its taking that is the principal
criterion 27to determine just compensation to the
landowner. Hence, the trial court accepted not the owner’s
valuation of P1,100 per square meter but only P500 as
recommended in the majority report of the commissioners.
As to the price of P22.50 per square meter recommended
by the minority report of Commissioner Atty. Alog, the
Court of Appeals found it unconscionably inadequate. It
was rightly rejected by the trial court.
In finding that the trial court did not abuse its authority
in evaluating the evidence and the reports placed before it
nor did it
_______________
Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, supra, at p. 314; City of Manila v. Corrales,

32 Phil. 85, 92 (1915); City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208, 214 (1913);
Manila Railway Co. v. Fabie, 17 Phil. 206, 208 (1910).
23 City of Manila v. Estrada, supra, at p. 215.
24 Republic v. Lara, 96 Phil. 170, 177-178 (1954).

25 CA Rollo, p. 36.
26 Republic v. Narciso, G.R. No. L-6594, 18 May 1956 (Unreported). See
99 Phil. 1031 (1956) for synopsis of the decision.
27 National Power Corporation v. Henson, G.R. No. 129998, 29
December 1998, 300 SCRA 751, 756.
540

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of

Appeals found the majority report’s valuation of P500 per
square meter to be fair. Said factual finding of the Court of
Appeals, absent any showing that the valuation is
exorbitant or otherwise unjustified, is binding on the
parties as well as this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
October 26, 2001 as well as its resolution of February 26,
2002, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 60716 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman) and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., On official leave.
Petition denied, decision affirmed.
Note.—Upon compliance with the requirements for

expropriation, issuance of writ of possession becomes
ministerial. (City of Manila vs. Serrano, 369 SCRA 231
[2001])
——o0o——
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NPC vs. Chiong

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NPC vs. Chiong

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2/25/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 404

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 527

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

Administrative Law; National Power Corporation; Due

528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

National Power Corporation vs. Chiong

be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) Judgment must be

petitioner cannot justifiably claim now that its right to due

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 529

National Power Corporation vs. Chiong

Same; Same; Same; Same; Just compensation is determined

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In order to carry out said purposes, NPC is authorized to

4 Also spelled as “Agripina” in other part of the records.

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 531

“The Commissioner’s Report dated March 9, 2000 filed by

Dissatisfied, NPC filed a special civil action for certiorari

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is

5 Supra, note 1 at p. 61.

532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In holding that NPC was not entitled to a writ of certiorari,

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 533

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS

In sum, we find that the pertinent issues before us are the

that, given said situation, the trial court should have

11 Rollo, pp. 18-19.

534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

copies of said reports. After petitioner NPC obtained its

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 535

do not disclose any objection thereto or any comment

late in the day now to be asking for a hearing on the

(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with

What is repugnant to 15due process is the denial of the

14 Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 934 (1918).

536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The duty of the court in considering the commissioners’

recommit the report to the commissioners for further report

16 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286, 298 (1915).

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 537

appeal before the Court of Appeals. As aptly pointed out,

not abuse its discretion in ruling on the very issue of just

19 SEC. 3-A. In acquiring private property or private property rights

In addition to the just compensation for easement of right-of-way, the

538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

way shall be acquired, with the principal purpose for which

struction and maintenance of the transmission lines, in an amount not

Manila Railroad Co. v. Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326, 328-329 (1919); Manila

VOL. 404, JUNE 20, 2003 539

is “that sum of money which a person desirous but not

Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, supra, at p. 314; City of Manila v. Corrales,

24 Republic v. Lara, 96 Phil. 170, 177-178 (1954).

540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of

Bellosillo (Chairman) and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Petition denied, decision affirmed.

Note.—Upon compliance with the requirements for

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