EMINENT DOMAIN
the public about the identities, qualifications and
Philippine Press Institute vs.
COMELEC
TAKING IN EMINENT DOMAIN. - To compel print
media companies to donate "Comelec space" of the
dimensions specified in Section 2 of resolution No.
2772 (not less than one-half Page), amounts to
"taking" of private personal property for public use
or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended
frequency of such compulsory "donation:" only
once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21
March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or
once a week? or has often as Comelec may direct
during the same period? the extent of the taking or
deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of
a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon
the use of private property. The monetary value of
the compulsory "donation," measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper
publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas,
may be very substantial indeed.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected
may first be appraised under the public of
expropriation of private personal property for public
use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of
private property for public use need to be examined
here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is
the legal authority to effect the taking. The element
of necessity for the taking has not been shown by
respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that
the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space
at their normal rates to Comelec for election
purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of
Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the
problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let
alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been
granted the power of imminent domain either by
the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A
reasonable relationship between that power and
the enforcement and administration of election
laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to
be assumed.
That the taking is designed to subserve "public use"
is not contested by petitioner PPI. We note only
that, under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the
free "Comelec space" sought by the respondent
Commission would be used not only for informing
programs of government of candidates for elective
office but also for "dissemination of vital election
information" (including, presumably, circulars,
regulations, notices, directives, etc. issued by
Comelec). It seems to the Court a matter of judicial
notice that government offices and agencies
(including the Supreme Court) simply purchase print
space, in the ordinary course of events, when their
rules and regulations, circulars, notices and so forth
need officially to be brought to the attention of the
general public.
The taking of private property for public use it, of
course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of "just compensation" (Article III,
Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what
is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission,
whether Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 is read as
petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority
to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free
print space for Comelec purpose, or as an exhortion,
or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free
print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A
attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to
prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from
voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the
purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772.
Section 2 of resolution No. 2772 does not, however,
provide a constitutional basis for compelling
publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual
context here present, to provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a
valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Manosca vs. Court of Appeals
PUBLIC USE: This Court is asked to resolve whether
or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent
Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by
the Republic of a 492-square- meter parcel of land
so declared by the National Historical Institute
("NHI") as a national historical landmark. x x x (the
birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni
Cristo) x x x The validity of the exercise of the power
of eminent domain for traditional purposes is
beyond question;
it is not at all to be said, however, that public use
should thereby be restricted to such traditional
uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to
clear cases of "use by the public" has long been
discarded. Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA
412 (1996)
PUBLIC USE IN EMINENT DOMAIN. The term "public
use," not having been otherwise defined by the
constitution, must be considered in its general
concept of meeting a public need or a public
exigency. Black summarizes the characterization
given by various courts to the term: thus:
"Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional
and statutory basis for taking property by eminent
domain. For condemnation purposes, 'public use' is
one which confers some benefit or advantage to the
public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is
measured in terms of right of public to use proposed
facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as
long as public has right of use, whether exercised by
one or many members of public, a 'public
advantage' or 'public benefit' accrues sufficient to
constitute a public use.
"Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting
the exercise of the right to take private property in
virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning
the whole community as distinguished from
particular individuals. But each and every member
of society need not be equally interested in such
use, or be personally and directly affected by it; if
the object is to satisfy a great public want or
exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los
Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67
L.Ed. 1186.
The term may be said to mean public usefulness,
utility, or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants
of a small or restricted locality, but must be in
common, and not for a particular individual. The use
must be a needful one for the public, which cannot
be surrendered without obvious general loss and
inconvenience. A 'public use' for which land may be
taken defies absolute definition for it changes with
varying conditions of society, new appliances in the
sciences, changing conceptions of scope and
functions of government, and other differing
circumstances brought about by an increase in
population and new modes of communication and
transportation. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245
A.2d 579,586."
Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual
interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo's)
birthplace become so vital as to be a public use
appropriate for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain" when only members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some
religious perspective to the case deserves little
consideration, for what should be significant is the
principal objective of, not the casual consequences
that might follow from, the exercise of the power.
The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially
to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late
Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather
than to commemorate his founding and leadership
of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that
greater benefit may be derived by members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be
true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to
be merely incidental and secondary in nature.
Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from
the expropriation of property does not necessarily
diminish the essence and character of public use.
EPZA vs. Dulay
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION: It is
violative of due process to deny to the owner the
opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax
documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to
basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the
haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to
absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have
actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and
after all factors and considerations essential to a fair
and just determination have been judiciously
evaluated. x x x P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the
court's discretion to appoint commissioners
pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is
unconstitutional and void. EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA
305 (1987)
DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS A
POWER THAT BELONGS TO THE COURT. The
determination of "just compensation" in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make
the initial determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that
private property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings.
Much less can the courts be precluded from looking
into the "just- ness" of the decreed compensation.
The method
 of ascertaining just
compensation
 decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
render this Court initial in a matter which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the
court technically would still have the power to
determine the just compensation for the property,
following the applicable decrees, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the
property as declared either by the owner or the
assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be
useless for the court to appoint commissioners
under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the
need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking
of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it
cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not
had before the actual taking.
However, the strict application of the decrees
during the proceedings would be nothing short of a
mere formality or charade as the court has only to
choose between the valuation of the owner and that
of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to
the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its
discretion or independence in determining what is
just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could
substitute for the judge insofar as the determination
of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
We are convinced and so rule that the trial court
correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may
only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors
in determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the court's own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at
such amount. A return to the earlier well-
established doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping
with the principle that the judiciary should live up to
its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights." (See Salonga v. Cruz Paño,
134 SCRA 438, 462; citing Mercado v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93.)
The doctrine we enunciated in National Housing
Authority v. Reyes, supra, therefore, must
necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this
Court's role as the guardian of the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the due process and equal
protection clauses and as the final arbiter over
transgressions committed against constitutional
rights.
Just compensation means the value of the property
at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to
the condition of the property and its surroundings,
its improvements and capabilities, should be
considered.
In this particular case, the tax declarations
presented by the petitioner as basis for just
compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu
municipal, later city assessor long before martial
law, when land was not only much cheaper but
when assessed values of properties were stated in
figures constituting only a fraction of their true
market value. The private respondent was not even
the owner of the properties at the time. It
purchased the lots for development purposes. To
peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents
which are out of date and at prices below the
acquisition cost of present owners would be
arbitrary and confiscatory.
Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M.
Realty Corp.
CONDITIONS FOR THE VALID EXERCISE OF EMINENT
DOMAIN BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS. Petitioner
contends that a resolution approved by the
municipal council for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation case "substantially complies with the
requirements of the law" because the terms of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,
"ordinance" and "resolution" are That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated
synonymous
 for “the purpose of property shall be determined by the proper court,
based on the fair market value at the time of the
bestowing
 government unit through its chief taking of the property."
executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings Thus, the following essential requisites must concur
in court in the exercise of the power of eminent
before an LGU can exercise the
 power of eminent
domain." Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention
domain:
by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local
Regulations Implementing the Local Government
legislative council authorizing the local chief
Code, which provides:
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the
"If the LGU fails to acquire a private property
power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
for public use, purpose, or welfare through
proceedings over a particular private property.
purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised
through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing
for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit
its chief executive to initiate expropriation
of the poor and the landless.
proceedings."
3. There is payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the
The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
is lodged in the legislative branch of government,
4. A valid and definite offer has been
which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs,
previously made to the owner of the property
other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
therefore exercise the power to expropriate private
accepted.
property only when authorized by Congress and
subject to the latter's control and restraints
imposed "through the law conferring the power or Republic vs. Lim
in other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA DOCTRINE: REPUBLIC VS. LIM RECOVERY OF
7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of EXPROPRIATED LAND: In summation, while the
eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for
prevailing doctrine is that "the non- payment of just
its exercise. It provides as follows:
compensation does not entitle the private
"Section 19. Eminent Domain. — A local
landowner to recover possession of the
government unit may, through its chief executive
expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the
government failed to pay just compensation within
power of eminent domain for public use, or
five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned
the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
shall have the right to recover possession of their
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
property. This is in consonance with the principle
pertinent laws.
that "the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment." To be sure, the five-year
Provided, however, That the power of eminent
period limitation will encourage the government to
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping
definite offer has been previously made to the with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
owner, and such offer was not accepted: government, whenever it takes property from
Provided, further, That the local government unit
private persons against their will, to facilitate the
may immediately take possession of the property
payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v.
upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and
Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation as
upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
not only the correct determination of the amount to
least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value
be paid to the property owner but also the payment
of the property based on the current tax declaration
of the property within a reasonable time. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just."
TAXATION
Sison vs. Ancheta
Limitation on due process. It is undoubted that it
may be invoked where a taxing statute is so
arbitrary that it finds no support in the
Constitution. An obvious example is where it can
be shown to amount to the confiscation of
property from abuse of power. Petitioner alleges
arbitrariness but his mere allegation does not
suffice and there must be a factual foundation of
such unconstitutional taint.
Limitation on equal protection clause. It suffices
that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. On
the matter that the rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable – this requirement is met
when the tax operates with the same force and
effect in every place where the subject may be
found.” Also, the rule of uniformity does not call
for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because
this is hardly unattainable.” When the problem of
classification became the issue, the Court said:
“Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all
taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
class shall be taxed the same rate. The taxing
power has the authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation..” As
provided by this Court, where “the differentiation”
complained of conforms to the practical dictates of
justice and equity it is not discriminatory within the
meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform.
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public
Works
Public money may only be appropriated for public
purpose. As regards the legal feasibility of
appropriating public funds for a public purpose, the
principle according to Ruling Case Law, is this: “It is
a general rule that the legislature is without power
to appropriate public revenue for anything but a
public purpose. It is the essential character of the
direct object of the expenditure which must
determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not
the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor
the degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be
ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental
to the public or to the state, which results from the
promotion of private interest and the prosperity of
private enterprises or business, does not justify
their aid by the use public money.
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in
the following language: In accordance with the rule
that the taxing power must be exercised for public
purposes only, discussed surprasec. 14, money
raised by taxation can be expended only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of private
individuals.
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus
Juris Secundum states: Generally, under the
express or implied provisions of the constitution,
public funds may be used only for public purpose.
The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is
correlative with its right to tax, and, under
constitutional provisions against taxation except
for public purposes and prohibiting the collection
of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof
to another purpose, no appropriation of state
funds can be made for other than a public purpose.
The test of constitutionality of a statute requiring
the use of public funds is whether the statute is
designed to promote the public interest, as
opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of
individuals, although each advantage to individuals
might incidentally serve the public.
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with
the foregoing views which apart from being
patently sound, are a necessary corollary to our
democratic system of government, which, as such,
exists primarily for the promotion of the general
welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the
established jurisprudence in the US< after whose
constitutional system ours has been patterned,
said views and jurisprudence are, likewise, part and
parcel of our own constitutional law.
The validity of the appropriation is determined
under the circumstances prevailing at the time of
appropriation and not on subsequent events.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers
of Congress at the time of its passage or approval,
not upon events occurring, or acts performed,
subsequently thereto, unless the latter consists of
an amendment of the organic law, removing, with
retrospective operation, the constitutional
limitation infringed by said statute. Referring to the
P85,000,00 appropriation for the projected feeder
roads in question, the legality thereof depended
upon whether said roads were public or private
property when the bill, which, latter on,
became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress,
or, when said bill was approved by the President and
the disbursement of said sum became effective, or
on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act).
Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder
roads were to be constructed belonged then to
respondent Zulueta, the result is that said
appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence,
was null and void. 4 The donation to the
Government, over five (5) months after the approval
and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the
petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of
legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question,
did not cure its aforementioned basic defect.
Consequently, a judicial nullification of said
donation need not precede the declaration of
unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of
Manila
CASE DOCTRINE: Double taxation is not prohibited
under the Constitution unless it is unduly oppressive
and violates equal protection clause.
The argument against double taxation may not be
invoked where one tax is imposed by the state and
the other is imposed by the city (1 Cooley on
Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely recognized
that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the
requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted
with respect to the same occupation, calling or
activity by both the state and the political
subdivisions thereof. (51 Am. Jur., 341.)
Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
The tax exemption under Section 28(3), Art. VI,
applies only to real property tax and not to excise
taxes.
Section 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the
Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries,
churches and convents, appurtenant all lands,
buildings, and used exclusively for religious
purposes. The exemption is only from the payment
parsonages or thereto, and improvements of taxes
assessed on such properties enumerated, as
property taxes, as contradistinguished from excise
taxes.
In the present case, what the Collector assessed was
a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the
properties themselves. It did not rest upon general
ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of
the properties, upon the exercise of the
privilege of receiving the properties (Phipps vs. Com.
of Int. Rec. 91 F 2d 627). Manifestly, gift tax is not
within the exempting provisions of the section just
mentioned. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an
excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by
way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on
property used exclusively for religious purposes,
does not constitute an impairment of the
Constitution. As well observed by the learned
respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from
taxation," as employed in the Constitution (supra)
should not be interpreted to mean exemption from
all kinds of taxes. And there being no clear, positive
or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of
petitioner, the exemption herein must be denied.
Abra Valley College vs. Aquino
Exemption extends to uses which are incidental to
the main purposes. As early as 1916 in YMCA of
Manila vs. Collector of lnternal Revenue, 33 Phil. 217
[1916], this Court ruled that while it may be true
that the YMCA keeps a lodging and a boarding house
and maintains a restaurant for its members, still
these do not constitute business in the ordinary
acceptance of the word, but an institution used
exclusively for religious, charitable and educational
purposes, and as such, it is entitled to be exempted
from taxation.
In the case of Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial
Board of Ilocos Norte, 51 Phil. 352 [1972], this Court
included in the
exemption a vegetable garden in an adjacent lot and
another lot formerly used as a cemetery. It was
clarified that the term "used exclusively" considers
incidental use also. Thus, the exemption from
payment of land tax in favor of the convent includes,
not only the land actually occupied by the building
but also the adjacent garden devoted to the
incidental use of the parish priest. The lot which is
not used for commercial purposes but serves solely
as a sort of lodging place, also qualifies for
exemption because this constitutes incidental use in
religious functions.
The phrase "exclusively used for educational
purposes" was further clarified by this Court in the
cases of Herrera vs. Quezon City Board of
assessment Appeals, 3 SCRA 186 [1961] and
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Bishop of the
Missionary District, 14 SCRA 991 [1965], thus —
Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used
exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is
'not limited to property actually indispensable'
therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2,p. 1430), but
extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary forthe accomplishment of
said purposes, such as in the case of hospitals, "a
school for training nurses, a nurses' home, property
use to provide housing facilities for interns, resident
doctors, superintendents, and other members of
the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for
student nurses, interns, and residents' (84 CJS
6621), such as "Athletic fields" including "a firm used
for the inmates of the institution. (Cooley Taxation,
Vol. 2, p. 1430).
On The test of exemption from taxation is the use of
the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution (Apostolic Prefect v. City Treasurer of
Baguio, 71 Phil, 547 [1941]).
It must be stressed however, that while this Court
allows a more liberal and non- restrictive
interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for
educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI,
Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been
made that exemption extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise
stated, the use of the school building or lot for
commercial purposes is neither contemplated by
law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the
second floor of the main building in the case at bar
for residential purposes of the Director and his
family, may find justification under the concept of
incidental use, which is complimentary to the main
or primary purpose— educational, the lease of the
first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose
of education.
DUE PROCESS
Ichong vs Hernandez
BALANCING OF INTERESTS IN DUE PROCESS. The
conflict between police power and the guarantees
of due process and equal protection of the laws is
more apparent than real. Properly related, the
power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist.
The balancing is the essence, or the indispensable
means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations
of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercises it, for that would be
tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty,
for that would mean license and anarchy. So the
State can deprive persons of life, liberty or property,
provided there is due process of law; and persons
may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must
exist between purposes and means. And if
distinction or classification has been made, there
must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer THE CONCEPT OF DUE PROCESS WAS NOT GIVEN
EXACT DEFINITION FOR RESILIENCY.
Corp. vs. Torres
 It is part of the art of constitution-making that the
provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
THE RIGHT TO HEARING AS AN ELEMENT OF DUE
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that
PROCESS DOES NOT CALL FOR A TRIAL TYPE
might arise on their correct interpretation. That is
HEARING. We do not see it the way PHILPHOS does
the ideal. In the case of the due process clause,
here. The essence of due process is simply an
however, this rule was deliberately not followed and
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact,
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934,
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel,
of. Where, as in the instant case, petitioner
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights,
PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the
who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained
Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case
by the body.
submitted for decision on the basis of the position
papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague
compliance with the requirement of due process, as
so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This
petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to
was felt necessary because due process is not, like
present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if
some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron
it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and
rule" laying down an implacable and immutable
examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did
command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility
not; instead, it opted to submit its position paper
must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very
with the Mediator- Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had
elasticity of the due process clause was meant to
all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its
make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
constricting its protection as the changing times and
circumstances may require.
What is the essence of administrative due process?
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to
to be heard or, as applied to administrative
adopt their own specific description of due process
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or
lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
that will deprive them of the elbow room they may
action or ruling complained of. Where, as in the
need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever
instant case, petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its
indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the
position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to
import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to
consider the case submitted for decision on the
be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion
basis of the position papers filed by the parties,
and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases
there was sufficient compliance with the
as they arise." Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the
requirement of due process, as petitioner was
U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no
afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side.
farther than to define due process -
Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired,
andinsodoingsumsitallup—as nothing more and
insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the
nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting
witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead,
idea of fair play."
it opted to submit its position paper with the
Mediator- Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the
What are the minimum requirements of due
opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal
process?
to the Secretary of Labor.
The minimum requirements of due process are
notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may
Ynot vs. IAC
not be dispensed with because they are intended as
a safeguard against official arbitrariness.
Are Notice and Hearing imperative meaning
indispensable? Yes. Absolute? No. What are the
exceptions?
1. The conclusive presumption, for example,
bars the admission of contrary evidence as
long as such presumption is based on human
experience or there is a rational connection
between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom.
2. In the summary abatement of a nuisance per
se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may
be killed on sight because of the immediate
danger it poses to the safety and lives of the
people. Pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are
inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed.
3. The passport of a person sought for a
criminal offense may be cancelled without
hearing, to compel his return to the country
he has fled. 

4. Filthy restaurants may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health
and bawdy houses to protect the public
morals. 
 contrary evidence as long as such presumption is
Reason for non-requirement of notice and Hearing?
Because of the nature of the property involved or
the urgency of the need to protect the general
welfare from a clear and present danger.
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It
is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the
other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision
is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously,
one side is only one-half of the question; the other
half must also be considered if an impartial verdict
is to be reached based on an informed appreciation
of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that
the two sides complement each other, as unto the
bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after
examination of the problem not from one or the
other perspective only but in its totality. vice of bias
or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in
repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are
notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may
not be dispensed with because they are intended as
a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a
gratifying commentary on our judicial system that
the jurisprudence of this country is rich with
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to
the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair
play. We have consistently declared that every
person, faced by the awesome power of the State,
is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel
Webster described almost two hundred years ago in
the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."
It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be
secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of
mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the
due process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are
imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a
number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive
presumption, for example, bars the admission of
based on human experience or there is a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom.
There are instances when the need for expeditious
action will justify omission of these requisites, as in
the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a
mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight
because of the immediate danger it poses to the
safety and lives of the people. Pornographic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs
are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a
criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing,
to compel his return to the country he has fled.
Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in
the interest of the public health and bawdy houses
to protect the public morals. In such instances,
previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of the nature of the
property involved or the urgency of the need to
protect the general welfare from a clear and present
danger.
What are the essential requirements of
administrative due process?
1. Right to hearing- it includes right to present
one’s case and submit evidence to support
thereof; 

2. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must
act on its own Independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy; 
 clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
3. The tribunal must consider the evidence
Presented; 
 Evidence presented must be
 acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c)
4. substantial, which means relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion;
5. The Decision must have something to
support itself; 

6. The Decision must be based on evidence
presented during hearing or at least
contained in the record and disclosed by the
parties; and 
 the oft- quoted statement that procedural due
7. The decision must be rendered in a manner
that the parties can know the various issues
involved and the reason for the decision
rendered. 

Alonte vs. Savellano
INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL DUE
PROCESS. It does seem to the Court that there has
been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the
proceedings. Perhaps the problem could have well
been avoided had not the basic procedures been, to
the Court's perception taken lightly. And in this
shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, the
trial court certainly is not alone to blame. Section
14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the
Constitution provides the fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable."
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in
criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that
the court or tribunal trying the case is properly
the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully
that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon
lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential
postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are
mandatory and indispensable. The principles find
universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in
process cannot possibly be met without a "law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."
Aniag vs COMELEC
THE RIGHT
 to preliminary
INVESTIGATION,
 although does NOT EMANATE
FROM THE CONSTITUTION IS AN ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OF CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS. Moreover,
the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against
petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of
the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was
not among those charged by the PNP with violation
of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected
by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation
for such offense. The non- disclosure by the City
Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a
respondent in the preliminary investigation is
violative of due process which requires that the  Overbreadth Doctrine 

procedure established by law should be obeyed.
What is the Void-for-Vagueness Rule?
COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the
When a statute forbids or requires the doing of an
chance to be heard because he was invited to
act in terms so vague that man of common
enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the
intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning
circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and
and differ as to its application, that law is deemed
that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of
void. Such kind of statute violates the first essential
explanation regarding the incident. This does not requisite of due process of law because it denies the
satisfy the requirement of due process the essence
accused the right to be informed of the charged
of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard
against him (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No,
and to submit any evidence one may have in support
148560, November 19, 2001)
of his defense. Due process guarantees the
What is the Overbreadth Doctrine?
observance of both substantive and procedural
A facial challenge of the statute when a
rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the
governmental purpose may not be achieved by
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
In Go v. Court of Appeals, we held that — While the
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather
(Ibid)
than constitutional in its fundamental, since it has in
fact been established by statute, it is a component
Does the two facial challenge applies to penal
part of due process in criminal justice. The right to
statute? Why?
have a preliminary investigation conducted before
No. The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines
being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and have special application only to free-speech cases,
hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other and are not appropriate for testing the validity of
penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a
penal statutes.It added that, at any rate, the
substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an opportunity
challenged provision, under which the therein
to avoid a process painful to anyone save, perhaps,
petitioner was charged, is not vague.
to hardened criminals is a valuable right. To deny
petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
would be to deprive him of the full measure of his
statute and to one which is overbroad because of
right to due process.
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.
The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or
Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during
proscribe speech and no readily apparent
the preliminary investigation of Arellano to
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
corroborate the latter's explanation. Petitioner then
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution,
was made to believe that he was not a party
the transcendent value to all society of
respondent in the case, so that his written
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
explanation on the incident was only intended to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes
exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence, it
with no requirement that the person making the
cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not
fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation
be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
against him as he was not apprised that he was
specificity." The possible harm to society in
himself a respondent when he appeared before the
permitting some unprotected speech to go
City Prosecutor.
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and
What are the two facial challenge on the
perceived grievances left to fester because of
constitutionality of a statute?
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
 Void-for-Vagueness Rule 

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorism effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.