CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
x-----------------------------x
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs.HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE
JR., respondents.
Election Law; Disqualification Cases; Jurisdiction; Decisions of the COMELEC on
disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; COMELEC’s decision on a
disqualification case involving a presidential candidate could be elevated to, and could well
be taken cognizance of by, the Supreme Court.—Decisions of the COMELEC on
disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of
the 1987 Constitution also reads—“Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all
its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision
or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of
a copy thereof.” Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that
judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law which power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” It is
sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and
could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial
to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice,
on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; The omission in the 1935 and 1973
Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-
presidential contests, has constrained the Supreme Court to declare as “not (being)
justiciable” controversies and disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice President; The statutory set-up under Republic Act
No. 1793 would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7 of the
1987 Constitution.—Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No.
161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA
No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads: “The Supreme Court, sitting
en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.” The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935
and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and
vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as
“not (being) justiciable” controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The constitutional lapse
prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, “An Act
Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the
Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same.” Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the
members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of
government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No.
1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Election Contests; Quo Warranto; Words and Phrases;
Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a post-election scenario;
Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although
two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
candidate from office.—Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a
postelection scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e.,to
dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule
13, and Rule 14 of the “Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal” promulgated by the
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court defined
by Sec. 4, par. 7, of the 1987 Constitution, does not include cases directly brought before
it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before
the elections are held; A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office.—The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the “President” or “Vice-President”, of
the Philippines, and not of “candidates” for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest
can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who
would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an
election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to conclude
that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are
held.
Citizenship; Words and Phrases; Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was
that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to refer
to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office.—
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office. Aristotle saw its significance if only
to determine the constituency of the “State”, which he described as being composed of
such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. The
concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which
qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was
seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant
obligations, on the other. In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society.
Same; Same; The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries, from
simply being limited to civil citizenship and then expanding to include political citizenship,
social citizenship, and an ongoing and final stage of development might well be the
internationalization of citizenship.—The concept of citizenship had undergone changes
over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil
citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights
to property, personal liberty and justice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to
include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of
political power. The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social
citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and
social security. The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in
keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of
citizenship.
Same; Same; There was no such term as “Philippine citizens” during the Spanish regime
but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.”—There was no such term as “Philippine
citizens” during the Spanish regime but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.” In church
records, the natives were called ‘indios’, denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the
archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century
but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for
those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.
Same; Same; Treaty of Paris; Upon the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, and pending
legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the
Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects, and although they did not become American
citizens, they, however, also ceased to be “aliens”under American laws and were thus
issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection
of the United States.—The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history.
Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole
colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle
of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation
of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain
virtually intact. The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain
and the United States. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of
the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by
its Congress—x x x Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United
States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be
Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also
ceased to be “aliens” under American laws and were thus issued passports describing
them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
Same; Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” appeared
for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United
States in the Philippines.—The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” appeared for the
first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic
Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on
the Philippines—“. . . . that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed end held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
2

accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight.” Under the
organic act, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines,
and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to
include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain,
and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.
Same; Jus Soli Principle; With respect to the status of children born in the Philippines from
11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines, weight was given to the view that the common law principle of jus soli,
otherwise known as the principle of territoriality, governed.—Controversy arose on to the
status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which
period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view,
articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli,
otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and
England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period.
Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; Jones Laws (Philippine Autonomy Act); Words and Phrases;
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine citizens” had for
the first time crystallized; The word “Filipino” was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil
Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, “The
Philippines for the Filipinos”; Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the
Philippines was deemed a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was (1) a
subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, (3)
since that date, not a citizen of some other country.—With the adoption of the Philippine
Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine citizens” had for the first time crystallized. The word
“Filipino” was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General inthe Philippines
when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, “The Philippines for the Filipinos.” In
1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912—
x x x Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be
a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April
1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of
some other country.
Same; Jus Sanguinis Principle; 1935 Constitution; The 1935 Constitution brought to an
end to any such link to the common law principle of jus soli by adopting, once and for all,
jus sanguinis or blood relationship as the basis of Filipino citizenship.—While there was,
at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring
citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by
adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino
citizenship.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Same; Same; 1973 and 1987 Constitutions; Seeking to correct the anomaly of women
automatically losing their Filipino citizenship and acquiring that of their foreign husbands,
resulting in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from
transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and requiring such children
to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, as well as fully cognizant
of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973
Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns.—Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing
civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their
Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory
situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino
citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers
to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this
anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals
to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution
on citizenship to reflect such concerns—x x x The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct
the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Same; Evidence; Public Documents; Birth Certificates; Marriage Certificates; Death
Certificates; Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of Fernando Poe, Jr.,
constitute prima facie proof of their contents.—Being public documents, the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and
the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule
130, of the Rules of Court provides: “Entries in official records. Entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.” The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the
entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation
of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3)
the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record
which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
Same; Parent and Child; Paternity; Filiation; Acknowledgment; Under the Civil Code of
Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 8 December 1889 to 30 August 1950
when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to
establish filiation or paternity.—Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the
Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil
Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative
parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
3

document. Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law
expressing in Section 5 thereof, that—“In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate
shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the
father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the
document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein
any information by which such father could be identified.” In order that the birth certificate
could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the
certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such
requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; The 1950 Civil
Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary,
legal or compulsory; Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the
lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to
claim acknowledgment could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.—
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children
into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly
made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an
illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor
any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during
the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to
claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed
parent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The growing trend to
liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break
away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate
relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child; There
is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would
also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State; Civil law has been
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance,
authority and obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among
members of society for the protection of private interests.—It should be apparent that the
growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an
attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-
legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the
child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the
family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the
individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State.
While, indeed, provisions on “citizenship” could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions
must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly—Civil
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family
and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which
determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among
members of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection
of private interests.”
Same; The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law is best exemplified in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.—The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law is
best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that—“Laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad”—that explains the need to
incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil
Code, such as on successional rights and family relations. In adoption, for instance, an
adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the
same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights
under civil law and not his political status.
Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias
against illegitimacy; The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy should remain
only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political
law—the proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining a child’s citizenship
should be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for
civil law purposes.—Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This
discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while
defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions
in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain,
the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines
and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount. These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the
Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code
became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and
should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the
domain of political law. The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his
citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up
with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on
proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters
alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should
govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Same; Same; Evidence; Acts or Declarations About Pedigree; Requisites.—Section 39,
Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides—“Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or
4

declaration of a person deceased, or unable totestify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred
before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word ‘pedigree’ includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.” For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the
declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue,
(c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d)
declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship
between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.
Same; Paternity; Filiation; DNA Testing; In case proof of filiation or paternity would be
unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which
examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.—In case proof of filiation or paternity
would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear
up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,this Court has acknowledged the
strong weight of DNA testing—“Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods
unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability toconduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA or a child/person has two (2)
copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother,
the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
result is to deny progress.”
Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Where jurisprudence regarded an
illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit of the
child; Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the 1935 Constitution states that among
the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.”—
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody,
would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was
to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him. The fact of the matter—
perhaps the most significant consideration—is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental
law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more
explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that
among the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.” There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions
where there clearly are none provided.
Same; Same; Same; The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.—In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has
been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking
after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84
years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines
was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ.
The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
Citizenship; For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a Filipino
and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow
the citizenship of his putative father.—Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was
not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case around the illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier
effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a non-issue. For purposes of the citizenship of
an illegitimate child whose father is a Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of
paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizenship of his putative father,
as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one of the amici curiae. Since paternity or filiation is
in fact admitted by petitioner Fornier, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 1 of
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which reads: Section 1. The following are citizens of
the Philippines: . . . (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
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Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,"1 that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it
or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the
qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people
are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero
of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born
Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial
roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion
resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in
the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself
to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be
Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner,
versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA
No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to
deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to
FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation
of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only a year after the birth of respondent.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner,
in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate
of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe
y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father
of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley,
3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate
of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management
and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives
that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6)
a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more
significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b)
a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate
of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name
of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No.
23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g)
a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and
h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating
that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946
were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three
days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion
was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,
petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule
64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed
G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the
COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No.
161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’), and
Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G.
Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,
6

of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to
resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny
due course to or cancel FPJ’s certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a
material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner
Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code –
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ---
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false" –
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the
Omnibus Election Code -
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to
the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission
shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections" -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize
"any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court per Rule 642 in an action for certiorari under Rule 653 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads –
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by
the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which
power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated
to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross
denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper
choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the
land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging
the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The
Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-
presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,4 as "not
(being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted
Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an
Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting
the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and
Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief
Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal.
Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973
Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up,
nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario.
Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although
two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
7

candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of
the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en
banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo
warranto shall not include an election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-
President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of
votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case
may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.5 In such context, the election contest
can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who
would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an
election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before
the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission
on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on
the concept of citizenship.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office.6Aristotle saw its significance if only
to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of
such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient
existence.7 The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for
which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship
was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant
obligations, on the other.8 In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century,
the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights
necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and
justice.9 Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship,
which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power.10 The 20th
century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis
on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.11 The idea of
citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in
Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly
shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.12
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects
of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."13 In church records, the natives were called 'indios',
denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship
became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to
point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were
made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal
Decrees.14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated
in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines
remained to be the subject of differing views among experts;15 however, three royal
decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de
la Regencia of 14 August 1841,16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining
the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,17 and finally, the Ley Extranjera
de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by
the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.18
8

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because
of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar
among which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.19
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December
1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens.
- under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of
any town of the Monarchy."20
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of
decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an
upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law
dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws
then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United
States.21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native
inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its
Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which
Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in
such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of
property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds;
and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and
professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to
foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance
to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the
date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to
preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they
reside.
Thus –
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress
on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects.
Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens"
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill
of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who
were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to
be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between
the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred
and ninety eight."23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was
taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular
Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.24
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899
to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines.
Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the
common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality,
operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.25 More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to
the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other
insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
9

Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws
of the United States, if residing therein."26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for
the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil
Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The
Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the
Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended
by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to
be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since
become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States,
and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws
of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April
1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of
some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode
of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with
common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being
the basis of Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law
provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations
that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as
fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers
of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to
reflect such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that –
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
10

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except
for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age
on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime
of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship -
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis28 – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e.,
jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs29 (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not
been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino,
a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11
September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he
was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español
mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed
certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage
to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-
five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years
old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that
he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married
to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on
the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would
be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September,
1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-
born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth
certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record
in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as
Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by
respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence
for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they
purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan
11

F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on
11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had
utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true
copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x xxx xxx
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is
recorded in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof
of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of
a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein
could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made,
2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and
disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes
more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.31
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954,
at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo
Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain.
Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period
of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the
Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show
that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate,
the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence
of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume,
that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence
before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Office would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to
1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of
the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to
the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to
petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December
1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took
effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment
was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was
possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment
could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document.32 Complementary to the
new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that
-
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name
of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment
of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father.
The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative
document of recognition.33 In Mendoza vs. Mella,34 the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question
here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a
certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his
having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be
placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing
that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section
5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not even they or either
of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say
that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein
voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same
12

Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in
the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only
other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In
Pareja vs. Pareja,35 this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof of
voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those
executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those
issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public document
pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made
belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children
into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly
made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an
illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor
any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during
the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to
claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed
parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so
as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a
genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument
(one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private
writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175
provide:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or
her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority
or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years
within which to institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
death of either or both of the parties.
"x x x xxx x x x.
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case
the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be
decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that
Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place
according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body
of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive
effect."
13

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of
keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of
the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern
the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or,
in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be
found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations,
the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization
of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass
of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and
obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among members of
a society for the protection of private interests."37
In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons,
govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence,
'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of
the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as
between them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property,
marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property,
legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in
general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties
of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of
the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15
of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in
different parts of the Civil Code,39 such as on successional rights and family relations.40 In
adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive
parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction
extended only to define his rights under civil law41 and not his political status.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the
rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the
distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and
the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil
Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the
primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should
remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of
political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should
thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil
law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity,
although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family
relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the
matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code
or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased,
or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by
birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree’ includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where
these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or
unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be
a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before
the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the
person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the
acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together
14

with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one
family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in
Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby
declare that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more
popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,’ or `FPJ’.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ’ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
Magdalena Street, Manila.
"x x x xxx xxx
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they
were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to
Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth,
Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our
family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of
Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more
children after Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x xxx xxx
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald
Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando
Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would
be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells
of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted
to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,42 this
Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to
conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and
the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are
analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said,
that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioner’s Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child.
According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5,
1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage
to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most
doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent
himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his
parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American
mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an
illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American
citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian
vs. de Leo44 and Serra vs. Republic.45
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is
most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If
the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the
15

pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare
decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not
establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino
father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a
Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed
the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson
did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of
a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino
by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV,
Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.
The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who
still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case. The case was about the
citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan
claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio,
his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio
was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio
was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin
therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum.
The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin
would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about
Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for
the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter
dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation
in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago
by People vs. Cayat.47 I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children
and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone
do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one
purpose but not for another purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service?
What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from
becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit
liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his
own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to
punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality
in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the
distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar
views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should
indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody,
would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was
to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum –
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction
over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of
16
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –
the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of
respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in the 10th May 2004 1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio,
national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed material Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No.
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in
G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court 2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
in the latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice- Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando
presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
are held.
No Costs.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has
been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether SO ORDERED.
or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on
whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his
place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.

(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty
of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position
and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
17

G.R. No. 221697 March 8, 2016
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs. COMELEC AND
ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack
thereof of the candidate.—The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the CoC of
petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled “on the exclusive ground” that she
made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should
hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the
qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet
undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the
same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
Same; Disqualification of Candidates; As presently required, to disqualify a candidate there
must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought
to be disqualified “is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.”—Clearly, the amendment done in
2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently
required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a
competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified “is guilty of or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.”
Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; If a candidate cannot
be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification
“provided by law or the Constitution,” neither can the certificate of candidacy (CoC) be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her
qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be
found.—Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are
flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of
jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of
qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority
properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute,
by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal. If a candidate cannot
be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification
“provided by law or the Constitution,” neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled
or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her
qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be
found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to
prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined.
Citizenship; Burden of Proof; The burden of proof was on private respondents to show that
petitioner is not a Filipino citizen.—At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions
regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code
of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said, there is more
than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born
Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that
petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner’s parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the
burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that
her parents are Filipinos.
Same; Foundlings; Presumptions; That a person with typical Filipino features is
abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a ninety-nine percent (99%)
chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than
ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos.—Other
circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner’s parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical
Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an
oval face. There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that
a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality
where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would
be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would
indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are
Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule
128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Same; Same; As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.—As a
matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 (1987), this Court
held that: The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle
of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is
to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
18

people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people
in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to
discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this
path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization.—The Solicitor
General makes the further point that the framers “worked to create a just and humane
society,” that “they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon
them a discriminatory intent against foundlings.” He exhorts that, given the grave
implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must
search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions “for an express intention to
deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the
constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution really intended
to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization.” We find
no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary,
all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort
the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the
present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the “State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights,” Article XIII, Section 1
which mandates Congress to “give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities x x x” and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend
the “right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.” Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to
discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Same; Same; Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos.—Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee.
Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of
such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights,
duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the
Philippines even though living abroad.” Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine
adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.
Same; Same; Adoption; Republic Act (RA) No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing the
Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes”
(otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”), RA No. 8552, entitled “An
Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes” (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court’s A.M.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
No. 02-6-02-SC or the “Rule on Adoption,” all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and
include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.—Recent legislation is
more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-
Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the
“Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”), R.A. No. 8552, entitled “An Act Establishing the
Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the
“Rule on Adoption,” all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as
among Filipino children who may be adopted. It has been argued that the process to
determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate
under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is
erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 “Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship.” In the first place, “having to perform an act” means that the act must
be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is
done not by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the
determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly,
the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine
citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino
mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it. In this instance, such
issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a
Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974,
which approved petitioner’s adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her “foundling parents,” hence
effectively affirming petitioner’s status as a foundling.
Same; Same; Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.—Foundlings are
likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.
The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other
hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international
custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding as
a result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that
thepractice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
“General principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are principles “established by a
process of reasoning” or judicial logic, based on principles which are “basic to legal
19

systems generally,” such as “general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice,” and the “general principle against discrimination” which is embodied
in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention
(No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.” These
are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied
in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.
Same; Same; The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from
birth and ensure that no child is stateless.—The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC
and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no
child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be
accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act
No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least
eighteen (18) years old. The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by
the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14
of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the “nationality of the country of birth,”
to wit: Article 14 A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth. If the child’s parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined
by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known. A foundling is, until the
contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was
found. (Underlining supplied) The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born
of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness: Article 2 A foundling found in the
territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered
to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.
Same; Same; Foreign Judgments; Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which
are “basic to legal systems generally,” support the notion that the right against enforced
disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as
“generally accepted principles of international law” under the incorporation clause.—Our
approach in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), and Mijares v. Ranada, 455
SCRA 397 (2005), effectively takes into account the fact that “generally accepted principles
of international law” are based not only on international custom, but also on “general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” as the phrase is understood in Article
38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which
are “basic to legal systems generally,” support the notion that the right against enforced
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as
“generally accepted principles of international law” under the incorporation clause.
Same; Same; It is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings
as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.—
Petitioner’s evidence shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America,
and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of
those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are
parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the
Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out
that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as
citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that
it is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having
been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.
Same; Same; Passports; It has been pointed that the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows
that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as
Philippine citizens.—Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this
generally accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No.
8042 and this Court’s Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to “Filipino children.” In all of
them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has
been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued
only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA,
considers foundlings as Philippine citizens. Adopting these legal principles from the 1930
Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable
and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of
natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are
nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that
presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
Same; Same; Repatriation; Natural-born Citizens; Parreño v. Commission on Audit, 523
SCRA 390 (2007), is categorical that “if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under
Republic Act [RA] No. 9225), he will . . . recover his natural-born citizenship.”—R.A. No.
9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They
include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, 678 SCRA 267 (2012), where we described it as
an “abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship x x x.” Also
included is Parreño v. Commission on Audit, 523 SCRA 390 (2007), which cited Tabasa
v. Court of Appeals, 500 SCRA 9 (2006), where we said that “[t]he repatriation of the former
Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreño v. Commission on
Audit is categorical that “if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No.
9225), he will . . . recover his natural-born citizenship.”
20

Same; Natural-born Citizens; Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship
may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to disagree with the Congress’ determination.—The COMELEC construed
the phrase “from birth” in the definition of natural citizens as implying “that natural-born
citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth.” R.A.
No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress’ sole prerogative to determine how
citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born
citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to
disagree with the Congress’ determination. More importantly, COMELEC’s position that
natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545 (2001), where the phrase “from birth”
was clarified to mean at the time of birth: “A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen
of a particular country, is a natural­born citizen thereof.” Neither is “repatriation” an act to
“acquire or perfect” one’s citizenship. In Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987
Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for
repatriated citizens: It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the
present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-
born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in
said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons,
they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of
their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As
such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House
of Representatives.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
cannot reverse a judicial precedent.—The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent.
That is reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule
reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Carpio-Morales v. Court of
Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., 774 SCRA 431 (2015), where we decreed
reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it “should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.” This
Court also said that “while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s error, it should
be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the
people’s reliance thereupon should be respected.”
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Civil Law; Adoption; One (1) of the effects of adoption is “to sever all legal ties between
the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of
the adopter.”—It was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner
committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for “born to” in her application for
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the
BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data
required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown. This
position disregards one important fact — petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects
of adoption is “to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except
when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter.” Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner
was also entitled to an amended birth certificate “attesting to the fact that the adoptee is
the child of the adopter(s)” and which certificate “shall not bear any notation that it is an
amended issue.” That law also requires that “[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to
the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and
Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings
shall be kept strictly confidential.” The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her
adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth
certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records,
petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee. Clearly, to avoid a direct
ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for
cancellation of CoC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The
whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
Election Law; Presidential Candidates; Residence; The Constitution requires presidential
candidates to have ten (10) years residence in the Philippines before the day of the
elections.—The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years’
residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections
will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior
to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of “Period of
Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016,” she put in “10 years 11
months” which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date
of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S. When petitioner immigrated to
the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three
requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2.
an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
21

Same; Same; Same; Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is
clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.—It is obvious that
because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the respondents,
the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition
of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the
evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion
that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the
children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S.
Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the
Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S.
house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually reestablished her
residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N., enrolling her children in Philippine
schools, buying property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines
after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous
stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May
2005 it was for good.
Same; Residence; Balikbayan Program; A closer look at Republic Act (RA) No. 6768 as
amended, otherwise known as the “An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program,” shows that
there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after
one (1) year.—The COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended,
otherwise known as the “An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program,” shows that there is no
overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year.
Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and “comes or
returns to the Philippines.” The law institutes a balikbayan program “providing the
opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become
economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the country” in line with
the government’s “reintegration program.” Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary
transients. Given the law’s express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help
him reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute
terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously
granted him to allow him to reestablish his life and reintegrate himself into the community
before he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that
is exactly what petitioner did — she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and
buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for repatriation
shortly thereafter.
Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy (CoC)
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitution’s residency qualification requirement.—It was grave abuse of discretion for the
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
COMELEC to treat the 2012 CoC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner.
It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There
is precedent after all where a candidate’s mistake as to period of residence made in a CoC
was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995),
the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where the
required period was a minimum of one year. We said that “[i]t is the fact of residence, not
a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether
or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.”
The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was
telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC
done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 CoC and the 2015 CoC both correctly
stated the pertinent period of residency.
Same; Misrepresentation; Disqualification of Candidates; The candidate’s
misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) must not only refer to a material
fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.—
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide
the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover,
has on her side this Court’s pronouncement that: Concededly, a candidate’s
disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material
misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the
cancellation of, a CoC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate’s misrepresentation
in his CoC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective
office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive
the electorate as to one’s qualifications to run for public office. Poe-Llamanzares vs.
Commission on Elections, 786 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 221697, G.R. Nos. 221698-700 March
8, 2016
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the
following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA
No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and
( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC),
SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
22

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo)
on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by
Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6
September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate
of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her
adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial
court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary
Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although
necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting
the court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in
the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure
from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the
name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit
attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006,
OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter
with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received
her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila.5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998,
she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos.
L881511 and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the
University of the Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the
United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College
in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political
Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares),
a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San
Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the
couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16
April 1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were
both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained
U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support
her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that
she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two
daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the
Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father
slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3
February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the
settlement of his estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her
entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her
husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first
quarter of 2005.19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification
of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next
semester;20coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods,
furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities
as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country.22 As
early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and without delay,
secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3)
children immediately followed25 while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to
complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her
husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005.27 The corresponding
Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the
Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February
2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending Philippine private schools.
23

On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal
of some of the family's remaining household belongings.29 She travelled back to the
Philippines on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the
family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S.31 The family home was
eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in
April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine
company in July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home34 and to this day, is where the couple
and their children have been residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said
property was issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on
1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship
on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July
2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is
deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as
citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in
petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31
August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No.
XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued
Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson
of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming
her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in
Pasig City on 20 October 2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5
of R.A. No. 9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said
affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then
on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."49 On that
day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the
intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same
questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in
the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months"
to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner
obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No.
DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that
her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC
an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before
a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of
several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a
petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001
(DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.59She is convinced that the COMELEC
has jurisdiction over her petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner
committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a
natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed
that international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen to begin with.64Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born
24

Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized American
citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by
the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that
she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013
Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to
regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year
residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the
earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act.
Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship,
Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was
actually a petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in
the Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary
jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain
allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement in her
COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that
there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings
were considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of
citizens of the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to
the filing of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that
the same is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-
born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile
in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-
born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for
Senator was an honest mistake, not binding and should give way to
evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the
Filipino people to decide a purely political question, that is, should she
serve as the country's next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed
submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding
that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of
the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material
representations which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe
Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner
which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying
the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad),
Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before
the COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
25

In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the
requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered
natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born
status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is
excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the
categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude
them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support
her claim that foundlings have a nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions
and treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give
effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no
standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to
reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former
natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with
the ten (10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her
domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American citizenship which
was sometime in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of
intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed
thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as
SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not
bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that former
natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine
citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only
been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the
13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she
could have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10)
year residency requirement for President.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras'
petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He
claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that
she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy and that
she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras
contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines
should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship
was approved by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country
before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile
since she was then living here as an American citizen and as such, she was governed by
the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action.
His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated under
Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on
the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are not among the
recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they
focus on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the
COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-
born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and
are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found.94 Consequently, the
petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under
R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts
of the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of
the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as
MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She believed
that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.98
26

Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing
her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement
and schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the
construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the
Philippines even before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three
determinants for a change of domicile are complied with.100She reasoned out that there
was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the
acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for
Senator was a mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled
that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year
residency requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC
when she declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of
ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The
COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position
of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First
Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions
for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28
December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the
COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation
of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral
arguments were held in these cases.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to
ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in
SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner,
vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007
(DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D.
Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the
1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the
11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a
QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied
due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false
material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the
COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate
for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the
proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the
qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article
IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
27

appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not
appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions
which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve
their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to
this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise
be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground
for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of
Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the
President, the Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives
was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these
positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v.
COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of
candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in
Rule 25 § 1, the following:
28

Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law
or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be
supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action
which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making
power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the
right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds
for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their
grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from
those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated,
are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40
of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual
from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word,
their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its
progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed
in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not
imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate
for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law.
(C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not
imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the
respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of
provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no
necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual
should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote
buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification
is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are
established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his
favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won,
either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or,
as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning
of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No.
120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence
was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary
to the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the
law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and
its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they
are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their
qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in
cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the
COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections
for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives.
(R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the
Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated
in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25
September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which states
that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of
a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as
a candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by
final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering
from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.
29

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a
combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such
that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final
judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or
found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides
of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of
jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of
qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority
properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute,
by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from
a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of
candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations
regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not
qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident
facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can
be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23
that deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's
citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since
foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935
Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments,
when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry.
Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein
petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such
relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to present
evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown
nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
on Paternity and Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner
110
has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of
proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private
respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her
admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did
not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where
there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown,
but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters
shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born
Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province
for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734
foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures
were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for
the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against
730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and
886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190
female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against
only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably,
Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner
was found in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she
was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has
1âw phi 1
typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes
and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a
person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality
where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would
be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would
indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are
30

Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule
128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines
so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do not face a
situation where the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of
being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions
properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would
be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average,
there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to
1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio
of non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino
is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while
the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio
of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that any child
born in the Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I
am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a
natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all,
the likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than
99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not
imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those infants
would have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical
paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple
has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because
there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might
be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and
unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any
child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings
such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable
Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of
common sense are not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of
the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by
the explanation offered by the framers.115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted:
"The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The
gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown
parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them
Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born
in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of
unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that
a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there
is no need ...
31
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Sr. Rafols: Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino. objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only
because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the
Sr. Montinola: account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment. said:

Sr. Rafols: During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment
The amendment should read thus: to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
children of unknown parentage." amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the
cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to
Sr. Briones: apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage. believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that
illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings
followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making
Sr. Rafols:
unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is
not unknown.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February
2016 Oral Arguments:
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was
the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the
Sr. Rafols:
way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a
Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown
Filipinos.
and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not
recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct.
Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are
President:
imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu,
matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the
Mr. Briones.
convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because
they are already impliedly so recognized.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency
Legislature?
and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a
class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy
Sr. Roxas: is carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently
constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children or silent, it is silently vocal. 118
people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and
it is not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.116
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and
humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute
upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave
32

implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must
search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to
deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the
constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution really intended
to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.
All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions
in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section
1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend
the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to
discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These
laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is
Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties,
status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even
though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have
jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an
unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may
entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over
the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that
of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over
the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this
theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the
Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.120 (Underlining
supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to
Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise
known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and
include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the
issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are
acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized
Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act"
means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the
determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities.121 Secondly,
the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the
citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one
born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act
to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a
foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.122 The Decree of
Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora
Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar,
as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation
or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue
of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they
do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law
include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.125 International customary rules
are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence
of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are
principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles
which are "basic to legal systems generally,"127 such as "general principles of
equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle
against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention
33

Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination
in Respect of Employment and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which
underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as
part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC).
Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth
to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and
be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their
national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field,
in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a
nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of protection
as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality
must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present
naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of
which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are
generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which
a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If
the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules
applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of
the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the
nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not
binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory
to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the
UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or
ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in
the said convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of
international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally
accepted principle of international law although the convention had been ratified by only
34

sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the ratification of a
minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content with
the practice of international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin
America, and State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v.
Ranada, 134 where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966
"Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that
that nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the
Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition
of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and
yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread
practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally
accepted principles of international law" are based not only on international custom, but
also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is
understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and
the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of
Rights and which are "basic to legal systems generally,"136 support the notion that the right
against enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly
considered as "generally accepted principles of international law" under the incorporation
clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South
America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-
two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three
(33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not
signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral
Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings
are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus
sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to
presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling
is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted
principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's
Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are
among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the
DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This
shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings
as Philippine citizens.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention
on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime
in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from
the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data
provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality
of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers
from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application
if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations.
The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those
treaties and conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that the
situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this
Honorable Court ended up using the international instruments which seek to protect and
uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them second-class
citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions
of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The
COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is
not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-
born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases.
They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we described it as an
"abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also
included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of
Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to
recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that
35

"if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his
natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as
implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and
continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to
decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is
not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was
already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to
mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or
perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are
only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized,
and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who
are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did
not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode
prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And
while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be
retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay,
Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should
be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's
error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment.
Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a
falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation under
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that
she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the
names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the
effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee,
except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552,
petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the
adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation
that it is an amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers
relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare
and Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption
proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to
state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in
her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption
records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in
the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is,
moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave
abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner
committed false material representation when she stated in her COC that she has before
and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the
Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on
9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016
for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which
according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005
when she returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the
Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily
36

presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon
the old domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be
for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned
their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include
petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the
Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March
2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their
household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the
Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines;
school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005
and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles
for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax
declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation
Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-
mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement
from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27
April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where
petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and
her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from
petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the
Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to
sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC,
particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely
changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim
conceded the presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus
manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC
disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the
position that the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines
was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In
this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v.
COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the private
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC. Respondents contend that these cases
158
decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a
permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under
a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any
resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24
May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her
situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a community tax
certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count
residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that
residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts
after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the
candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he only visited during his
frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American
citizen who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On
residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial officer. The
COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient
to prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by
the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only
from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other
conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the
house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company,
notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating
excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right
after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-
established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in
Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the
Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned
on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the
Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended,
otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no
overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year.
Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or
37

returns to the Philippines." The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the
163
opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become
economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the country"164in line with
the government's "reintegration program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary
transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him
reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms
that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted
him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before
he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is
exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying
property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly
thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile
is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's
evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close
to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v.
COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have
its rulings there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of
residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the
COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six
( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator.
Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in
November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement
in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required
in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012.
She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the
U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was
advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence
before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC,
is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which
is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The
COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version
was vague.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S.
house and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had returned
a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the school records
of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and
conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but
it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake
as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-
Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of
residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the
fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency
qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented
and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005.
Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015
COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually
and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because
COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that
in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24
May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already
stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as early as
August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of
residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established
fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012
COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by
Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have
answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed
petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed
it in the media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that
surrounded the statement were already matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition
for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted
that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6)
38

months as she misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer
period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when
petitioner accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said
to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for
Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide
the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover,
has on her side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily
constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to,
and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's
misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and
qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform
or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with
an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office.168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good
number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines
and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of
coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having
been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the
COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence
in the Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this
declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for President." This
conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of
residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of
compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election as President. It
ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency have been
decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number,
weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what
we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her
COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered by the SET as an issue
against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for
Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months
counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency
requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of
residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time the
declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for
the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made aware by petitioner,
by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a
length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts
of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however
stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner]
enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College
in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007,
when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson
Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the
construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former
lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and
stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal
of some of the family's remaining household belongings. [Petitioner] returned to the
1a\^/phi1
Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the
family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the
Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where
they eventually built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case
fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date than that
mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her
candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in
39
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion
from root to fruits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No.
15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May
9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner,
v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY
GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local
and National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Second Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY
GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11
December 2015 of the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015
Resolution of the First Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the
National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.
40

G.R. No. L-30241 December 29, 1928
GREGORIO NUVAL, petitioner-appellant, vs. NORBERTO GURAY, ET
AL., respondents. NORBERTO GURAY, appelllee.
1. ELECTIONS; ELECTION LISTS, PETITION TO EXCLUDE VOTER FROM;
SUMMARY CHARACTER OF PROCEDURE.-
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act
No. 3387, is of a summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not
appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the capital
or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge of first instance.
2. ELECTIONS; "QUO WARRANTO".-
The judgment rendered in the case on the petition to cancel the respondent-appellee's
name in the election list is not conclusive and does not constitute res judicata in the
present quo warranto proceeding, as in the two cases, there is no identity either of
parties, or of the thing or matter litigated, or of issues or causes of action.
This appeal was taken by the petitioner Gregorio Nuval from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of La Union, upholding the defense of res judicata and dismissing the quo
warranto proceedings instituted by the said Gregorio Nuval against Norbeto Guray and
others, with costs against the petitioner.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assign the following alleged errors as committed
by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the judgment rendered upon Gregorio
Nuval's petition for the cancellation of Norbeto Guray's name on the election list
of Luna is conclude and constitutes res judiata in the present case.
2. The trial court erred in not holding that Norbeto Guray at the time of his
election, was ineligible for the office of the residence in said municipality.
3. The lower court erred in not finding in its judgment that the petitioner is entitled
to hold the office in question.
In regard to the first assignment of error, the evidence adduced during the trial of the
case shows:
That on May 11, 1928, and within the period fixed by section 437 of the Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, Gregorio Nuval filed, in civil case No. 1442 of the
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Court of First Instance of La Union, in his dual capacity as a voter duly qualified and
registered in the election list of the municipality of Luna and as a duly registered
candidate for the office of municipal president of said municipality, a petition against
Norberto Guray asking for the exclusion of his name from the election list of said
municipality, not being a qualified voter of said municipality sine he had not resided
therein for six months as required by section 431 of the said Administrative Code.
Proceedings were had upon the petition in accordance with sections 437 and 438 of the
same Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, and Judge E. Araneta Diaz, rendered
judgment dismissing it because, in his opinion, Norberto Guray was a bona fide resident
of the municipality of Luna from Janury 1, 1927. As that order was not appealable,
Norberto Guray's name remained in the election list of the municipality of Luna.
The general election having been held on June 5, 1928, Norbeto Guray was elected to
the office of municipal president of Luna by a plurality of votes, Gregorio Nuval obtaining
second place. On June 7, 1928, the municipal council of Luna, acting as the municipal,
Norberto Guray, elected to the office of municipal president of the said municipality of
Luna for the next triennium.
On June 18, 1928, Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo warranto as provided in
section 408 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, asking that
Norberto Guray be declared ineligible had a legal residence of one year previuos to the
election as required by section 2174 of the said Administrative Code in order to be
eligible to an elective municipal office.
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the
judgment rendered in the case of the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Guray's name
from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent the institution and
prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by
Act. No. 3387 is of a summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not
appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the capital
or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge of first instance, with
whom said two lower judges have concurrent jurisdiction.
The petition for execution was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as qualified
voter of the municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the office of the
president of said municipality, against Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the
election list of said municipality. The present proceedings of quo warranto was
intreposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate voted for the
office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate
for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is
41

not enough that there be an identity of persons, but there must be an identity of
capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of
Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165.)
In said case for the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious
matter was the conclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the
municipality of Luna, while in the present quo warranto proceeding, the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter in his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he
has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray
had not the six months' legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter
thereof, while in the present proceedings of quo warranto, the case of this action is that
Norberto Guray has not the one year's legal residence required for the eligibility to the
office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist, therefore, identity of
causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) Identity of parties; (b)
identity of things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 850).
And as in the case of the petition for exclusion and in the present quo
warranto proceeding, as there is no identity either of parties, or of things or litigious
matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata.
1aw phi 1.net
For the above considerations, the trial court erred in holding that the judgment rendered
in the case on the petition of Gregorio Nuval asking for the cancellation of Norberto
Guray's name in the election list of Luna is conclusive and constitutes res judicata in the
present case.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the evidence establishes the following
facts:
Up to June 27, 1922, Norberto Guray had resided in the municipality of Luna, his
birthplace, where he had married and had held the office of municipal treasurer. On that
date he was appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan, Province of La Union. The rules
of the provincial treasurer of La Union, to which Norberto Guray was subject as such
municipal treasurer, require that municipality treasurers live continuously in the
municipality where they perform they official duties, in order to be able to give an account
of their acts as such treasurers at any time. In order to qualify and be in a position to vote
as an elector in Balaoan in the general election of 1925, Norberto Guray asked for the
cancellation of his name in the election lists of Luna, where he had voted in the general
elections of 1922, alleging as a ground therefore the following: "On the ground of transfer
of any residence which took place on the 28th day of June, 1922. My correct and new
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
address is Poblacion, Balaoan, La Union;" and in order to be registered in the subscribed
affidavit Exhibit F-1 before the board of election inspectors of precinct No. 1 of Balaoan,
by virtue of which he was registered as an elector of the said precinct, having made use
of the right of suffrage in said municipality in the general elections of 1925. In his cedula
certificates issued by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan from the year 1923 to
1928, included, he made it appear that his residence was the residential district of
Balaoan. In the year 1926, his wife and children who, up to that time, had lived in the
municipality of Balaoan, went back to live in the town of Luna in the house of his wife's
parents, due to the high cost of living in that municipality. Norberto Guray used to go
home to Luna in the afternoons after office hours, and there he passed the nights with
his family. His children studied in the public school of Luna. In January, 1927, he
commenced the construction of a house of strong materials in Luna, which has not yet
been completed, and neither be nor his family has lived in it. On February 1, 1928,
Norberto Guray applied for and obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and on the
16th of the same month he filed his resignation by telegraph, which was accepted on the
same day, also by telegraph. Nothwithstanding that he was already provided with a
cedula by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31, 1928, declaring him
resident of said town, he obtained another cedula from the municipality of Luna on
February 20, 1928, which was dated January 15, 1928, in which it is presented that he
resided in the barrio of Victoria, municipality of Luna, Province of La Union. On February
23, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained the cancellation of his name in the
election list of the municipality of Balaoan, and on April 14, 1928, he applied for
registration as a voter in Luna, alleging that he had been residing in said municipality for
thirty years. For this purpose he made of the cedula certificate antedated.
In view of the facts just related, the question arises whether or not Norberto Guray had
the legal residence of one year immediately prior to the general elections of June 5,
1928, in order to be eligible to the office of municipal president of Luna, Province of La
Union.
There is no question but that when Norberto Guray accepted and assumed the office of
municipal treasurer of Balaoan, La Union, he transferred his residence from the
municipality of Luna to that of Balaoan.
The only question to determine refers to the date when he once more established his
residence in the municipality of Luna.
It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a state and
acquires one in another state, he cannot again vote in the state of his former residence
until he has qualified by a new period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71, par. 28).
"The term 'residence' as so used is synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention." (People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.)
42

Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of Luna and
acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be a candidate in the municipality of
Luna, he needed to reacquire residence in the latter municipality for the length of time
prescribed by the law, and for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so,
but his personal presence in said municipality.
By reason of his office as municipal treasurer of Balaoan and on account of the rules of
the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose jurisdiction was such municipality,
Norberto Guray had to reside and in fact resided in said municipality until the 6th of
February, 1928 when he filed his resignation from his office, which was accepted on the
same date. The fact that his family moved to the municipality of Luna in the year 1926 in
order to live there in view of the high cost of living in balaoan; the fact that his children
studied in the public shool of said town; the fact that on afternoons after hours he went
home to the municipality of Luna and there passed the night with his family, are not in
themselves alone sufficient to show that from said year he had transfered his residence
to said municipality, since his wife and children lived with his father-in-law, in the latter's
house that only in the month of January, 1927, did he begin the construction of a house
of strong materials, which is not yet completed, nor occupied by himself or his family, His
aftrenoon tips to Luna, according to his own explanation given to the provincial treasurer,
were made for purpose of visiting his sick father. His own act in recording in his cedula
certificates for the years 1927 and 1928 issued by himself in his favor as municipal
treasurer of Balaoan, that his place of residene was that municipality, and in taking out a
new cedula in the municipality of Luna of February 20, 1928, and having the date of its
issuance surreptitiuosly put back to January 15 1928, show that until the date of his
resignation he did not consider himself as a resident of the municipality of Luna. The fact
that his wife and children lived in Luna not in his own house but in that of his wife's father
since the year 1926, cannot be looked upon as a change of residence, since a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the former (20 Corpus Juris,
p. 71) and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
The present case is different from that of Doctor Apacible cited by the appellee in his
brief. Doctor Apacible never had abandoned his legal residence in the Province of
Batangas, nothwithstanding that he had been living with his family in the City of Manila,
taking out his cedula certificates here, but he never exercised the right of suffrage here.
Norberto Guray abandoned his legal residencce in the municipality of Luna, transferring
it to the municipality of Balaoan by reason and an account of the requirements of the
rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose jurisdiction is said municipality,
exercising his right of suffrage in the latter.
1awphi 1.net
For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold in fact and in law
Norberto Guray only abandoned his legal residence in the Municipality of Balaoan, and
began to acquire another in the municipality of Luna from Febraury 16, 1928, when he
filed his resignation from the office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which he had been
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
holding, and which resignation was accepted; and on being elected municipal president
of Luna in the general elections of June 5, 1928, he had not reacquired the legal
residence necessary to be validly elected to said office.
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the office of
municipal president of Luna is hereby held to be unlawful and quashed and, in
consequence, he has no right to take possession of said office, petitioner Gregorio Nuval
being the one legally elected to said office with a right to take possession thereof, having
secured second place in the election. With costs against the respondent. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Villamor, J., dissents.
RULING ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
February 1, 1929
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is a motion praying for the reasons given that the judgment rendered in this case on
December 29, 1928 be reconsidered, and another rendered affirming the judgment
appealed from.
In regard to the grounds of the motion with reference to the defence of res judicata, as
the movant does not adduce any new argument in support thereof, and inasmuch as this
court has already discussed question at length, we find no sufficient reason to grant the
motion on said grounds.
As to the other grounds touching this court's holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one who
has been legally elected to the office of municipal president of Luna, La Union, and
entitled to take possession thereof, having received second place, we consider them
meritorious, for the reason that 408 of the Election Law, providing the remedy in case a
person not eligible should be elected to a provincial or municipal office, does not
authorize that it be declared who has been legally elected, thus differing from section 479
of the law, which contains such an authorization, and for the reason, furthermore, that
section 477 of the said law provides that only those who have obtained a plurality of
votes, and have presented their certificates of candidacy may be certified as elected to
municipal offices. Elective offices are by nature different from the appointive offices. The
occupation of the first depends on the will of the elector, while that of the second
depends on the will of the authority providing for it. In quo warranto proceedings referring
to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidate
elect, while in quo warrantoproceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is
43
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
determined is the legality of the appointment. In the first case when the person elected is
ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has
been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of
election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented
his certificate of candidacy. In the second case, the court determines who has been
legally appointed and can and ought to declare who is entitled to occupy the office.

In view of the foregoing, we are of opinion that the judgment rendered in this case on
December 29, 1928, should be, and is hereby, amended, eliminating from the dispositive
part thereof, the holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one who has been legally elected, so
as to read as follows:

By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the

office of Municipal president of Luna, is hereby declared unlawful and quashed
and, consequently, that he has no right to take possession of said office, with
costs against said respondent.

So ordered.

44

G.R. No. L-43314 December 19, 1935
A.L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody, plaintiff -
appellant, vs. JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-
appellee.
1. INHERITANCE TAX; DOMICILE OF TAXPAYER.-
To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable
choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a
declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent place of abode,
one's home. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record' that M ever
established a new domicile in a foreign country.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instant of manila in an action to
recover from the defendant-appellee as Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of
P77,018.39 as inheritance taxes and P13,001.41 as income taxes assessed against the
estate of Arthur G. Moody, deceased.
The parties submitted to the court an agreed statement of facts as follows:
I. That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931.
II. That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will, certified
copy of which marked Exhibit AA is hereto attached and made a part hereof, by
virtue of which will, he bequeathed all his property to his only sister, Ida M.
Palmer, who then was and still is a citizen and resident of the State of New York,
United States of America.
III. That on February 24,1931, a petition for appointment of special administrator
of the estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was filed by W. Maxwell
Thebaut with the Court of First Instance of Manila, the same being designated as
case No. 39113 of said court. Copy of said petition marked Exhibit BB is hereto
attached and made a part hereof.
IV. That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition will of the deceased Arthur
Graydon Moody, and the same was, after hearing, duly probated by the court in a
decree dated May 5, 1931. Copies of the petition and of the decree marked
Exhibits CC and DD, respectively, are hereto attached and made parts hereof.
V. That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and only
heiress of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody by virtue of an order issued by
the court in said case No. 39113, copy of which marked Exhibit EE is hereto
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
attached and made a part hereof; and that during the hearing for the declaration
of heirs, Ida M. Palmer presented as evidence a letter dated February 28, 1925,
and addressed to her by Arthur Graydon Moody, copy of which marked Exhibit
FF hereto attached and made part hereof.
VI. That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted principally
of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other personal properties, as are more fully
shown in the inventory of April 17, 1931, filed by the special administrator with
the court in said case No. 39113, certified copy of which inventory marked Exhibit
GG is hereto attached and made a part hereof. This stipulation does not,
however, cover the respective values of said properties for the purpose of the
inheritance tax.
VII. That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the
estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return, certified copy
of which marked Exhibit HH is hereto attached and made a part, hereof.
VIII. That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return for the fractional period
from January 1, 1931 to June 30, 1931, certified copy of which marked Exhibit 11
is hereto attached and made a part hereof, was also prepared by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for the estate of the said deceased Arthur Graydon Moody. 1aw phil.net
IX. That on December 3, 1931, the committee on claims and appraisals filed with
the court its report, certified copy of which marked Exhibit KK is hereto attached
and made a part hereof.
X. That on September 15, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to
the attorney for the administratrix Ida M. Palmer a letter, copy of which marked
Exhibit LL is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
XI. That on October 15, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer answered the letter
of the Collector of Internal Revenue referred to in the preceding paragraph. Said
answer marked Exhibit MM is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
XII. That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the letter mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the attorney
for Ida M. Palmer another letter, copy of which marked Exhibit NN is hereto
attached and made a part hereof.
XIII. That on December 7, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer again replied in a
letter, marked Exhibit OO, hereto attached and made a part hereof.
45

XIV. That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the
sum of P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and the other sum of P40,019.75 on January
19, 1932, making assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41
covers the assessment for income tax against said estate.
XV. That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled the
protest made by Ida M. Palmer through her attorney.
XVI. The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the hearing
of the present case.
Manila, August 15, 1933.
In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, both parties introduced oral and
documentary evidence from which it appears that Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen,
came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in business in these
Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931. He had no
business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate consisting principally of
bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, bank deposits and other intangibles and personal property valued by the
commissioners of appraisal and claims at P609,767.58 and by the Collector of Internal
Revenue for the purposes of inheritance tax at P653,657.47. All of said property at the
time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands. So far as this
record shows, he left no property of any kind located anywhere else. In his will, Exhibit
AA, executed without date in Manila in accordance with the formalities of the Philippine
law, in which he bequeathed all his property to his sister, Ida M. Palmer, he stated:
I, Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United States of America, residing in the
Philippine Islands, hereby publish and declare the following as my last Will and
Testament . . ..
The substance of the plaintiff's cause of action is stated in paragraph 7 of his complaint
as follows:
That there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine
Islands under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied, assessed
or collected upon transfer, by death and succession, of intangible personal
properties of a person not domiciled in the Philippine Islands, and the levy and
collection by defendant of inheritance tax computed upon the value of said
stocks, bonds, credits and other intangible properties as aforesaid constituted
and constitutes the taking and deprivation of property without due process of law
contrary to the Bill of Rights and organic law of the Philippine Islands.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended) provides as follows:
SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. — Every transmission by virtue of
inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation of
inheritance. devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine Islands
and real rights in such property; of any franchise which must be exercised in the
Philippine Islands, of any shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any corporation
or sociedad anonima organized or constituted in the Philippine Islands in
accordance with its laws; of any shares or rights in any partnership, business or
any personal property located in the Philippine Islands shall be subject to the
following tax:
xxx xxx xxx
It is alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur G. Moody was a "non-
resident of the Philippine Islands". The answer, besides the general denial, sets up as a
special defense "Arthur G. Moody, now deceased, was and prior to the date of his death,
a resident in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, where he was engaged actively in
business." Issue was thus joined on the question: Where was the legal domicile of Arthur
G. Moody at the time of his death?
The Solicitor-General raises a preliminary objection to the consideration of any evidence
that Moody's domicile was elsewhere than in Manila at the time of his death based on
the proposition that as no such objection was made before the Collector of Internal
Revenue as one of the grounds of the protest against the payment of the tax, this
objection cannot be considered in a suit against the Collector to recover the taxes paid
under protest. He relies upon the decision in the case of W.C. Tucker vs. A.C. Alexander,
Collector (15 Fed. [21, 356). We call attention, however, to the fact that this decision was
reversed in 275 U.S., 232; 72 Law. ed., 256, and the case remanded for trial on the
merits on the ground that the requirement that the action shall be based upon the same
grounds, and only such, as were presented in the protest had been waived by the
collector. In the case before us no copy of the taxpayer's protest is included in the record
and we have no means of knowing its contents. We think, therefore, the preliminary
objection made on behalf of the appellee does not lie.
We proceed, therefore, to the consideration of the question on the merits as to whether
Arthur G. Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of his death.
Moody was never married and there is no doubt that he had his legal domicile in the
Philippine Islands from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated a
fortune from his business in the Philippine Islands He lived in the Elks' Club in Manila for
many years and was living there up to the date he left Manila the latter part of February,
1928, under the following circumstances: He was afflicted with leprosy in an advanced
stage and been informed by Dr. Wade that he would be reported to the Philippine
46

authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required by the law. Distressed
at the thought of being thus segregated and in violation of his promise to Dr. Wade that
he would voluntarily go to Culion, he surreptitiously left the Islands the latter part of
February, 1928, under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket, passport or tax
clearance certificate. The record does not show where Moody was during the remainder
of the year 1928. He lived with a friend in Paris, France, during the months of March and
April of the year 1929 where he was receiving treatment for leprosy at the Pasteur
Institute. The record does not show where Moody was in the interval between April,
1929, and November 26, 1930, on which latter date he wrote a letter, Exhibit B, to Harry
Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him mis interest in the Camera Supply Company, a
Philippine corporation, in which Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares. In this letter,
among other things, he states: "Certainly I'll never return there to live or enter business
again." In this same letter he says:
I wish to know as soon as now (as to the purchase) for I have very recently decided
either to sell or put in a line of school or office supplies ... before I go to the necessary
investments placing any side lines, I concluded to get your definite reply to this ... I have
given our New York buying agent a conditional order not to be executed until March and
this will give you plenty of time ... anything that kills a business is to have it peddled
around as being for sale and this is what I wish to avoid. He wrote letters dated
December 12, 1930, and January 3, 1931, along the same line to Wendt. As Moody died
of leprosy less than two months after these letters were written, there can be no doubt
that he would have been immediately segregated in the Culion Leper Colony had he
returned to the Philippine Islands. He was, therefore, a fugitive, not from justice, but from
confinement in the Culion Leper Colony in accordance with the law of the Philippine
Islands.
There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a new
domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he was physically present for some
months in Calcutta prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not claim that
Moody had a domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and
cabled that he wished to sell his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live
there again. Much less plausible, it seems to us, is the claim that he established a legal
domicile in Paris in February, 1929. The record contains no writing whatever of Moody
from Paris. There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed abode that he
intended to be his permanent home. There is no evidence that he acquired any property
in Paris or engaged in any settled business on his own account there. There is no
evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the establishment of a legal domicile there.
The negative evidence that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return to Manila does
not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris. His short stay of three months in
Paris is entirely consistent with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose
of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute. The evidence in the record indicates
clearly that Moody's continued absence from his legal domicile in the Philippines was
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
due to and reasonably accounted for by the same motive that caused his surreptitious
departure, namely, to evade confinement in the Cullion Leper Colony for he doubtless
knew that on his return he would be immediately confined, because his affliction became
graver to us while he was absent than it was on the day of his precipitous departure and
he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where he was well known, as he might do
in foreign parts.
Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their
usual residence". The record before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual
residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a "fugitive" and
"outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a
century, rather than in any foreign country he visited during his wanderings up to the date
of his death in Calcutta. To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a
deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the
place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed and
permanent place of abode, one's home. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the
record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.
The contention under the appellant's third assignment of error that the defendant
collector illegally assessed an income tax of P13,001.41 against the Moody estate is, in
our opinion, untenable. The grounds for this assessment, stated by the Collector of
Internal Revenue in his letter, Exhibit NN, appear to us to be sound. That the amount of
P59,986.69 was received by the estate of Moody as dividends declared out of surplus by
the Camera Supply Company is clearly established by the evidence. The appellant
contends that this assessment in taxation: First, because the corporation paid income tax
on the same amount during the years it was accumulated as surplus; second, that an
inheritance tax on the same amount was assessed against the estate, and third, the
same amount is assessed as income of the estate. As to the first, it appears from the
collector's assessment, Exhibit 11, to the collector allowed the estate a deduction of the
normal income tax on said amount because it had already been paid at the source by the
Camera Supply Company. The only income tax assessed against the estate was the
additional tax or surtax that had not been paid by the Camera Supply Company for which
the estate, having actually received the income, is clearly liable. As to the second alleged
double taxation, it is clear that the inheritance tax and the additional income tax in
question are entirely distinct. They are assessed under different statutes and we are not
convinced by the appellant's argument that the estate which received these dividends
should not be held liable for the payment of the income tax thereon because the
operation was simply the conversion of the surplus of the corporation into the property of
the individual stockholders. (Cf. U.S. vs. Phellis, 257 U.S., 171, and Taft vs. Bowers, 278
U.S., 460.) Section 4 of Act No. 2833 as amended, which is relied on by the appellant,
plainly provides that the income from exempt property shall be included as income
subject to tax.
47
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court, first, because the property in the estate of Arthur G. Moody at
the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands and,
second, because his legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the Philippine
Islands. Costs against the appellant.

48

G.R. No. L-22041 May 19, 1966
MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO, petitioner and appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.
1. Citizenship; Residence is required in reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.-
One of the qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant shall
have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization
[Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63].
2. Citizenship; Domicile; Residence; Term “residence” construed.-
The term “residence” in Commonwealth Act No. 63 has already been interpreted to mean
the actual or constructive permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile
(Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a country or
state where he lives and stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after a
temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. In other words, domicile is
characterized by animus manendi. “Residence” imports not only an intention to reside in a
f ixed place but also presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention (Yen vs.
Republic, L-18885, Jan. 31, 1964; Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). So an alien who has
been admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or
for reasons of health, though actually present in this country cannot be said to have
established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only temporary in nature
and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished.
3. Citizenship; Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.-
Since legal residence for six months is required for the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, the applicant should secure a quota for permanent residence here. A permit
for temporary residence would not be sufficient. He is not qualified to reacquire Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal Ilocos Sur. He is married
to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has one son, Prospero, who is now of legal age. He left
the Philippines for the United States of America in 1927 where after a residence of more
than 20 years he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. He returned to the
Philippines on November 10, 1960 to which he was admitted merely for a temporary stay.
He owns an agricultural land and a residential house situated in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur
worth not less than P5,000.00. He receives a monthly pension of $115.00 from the Social
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Security Administration of the United States of America. He has no record of conviction
and it is his intention to renounce his allegiance to the U.S.A.1äwphï1.ñët
After hearing, the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition on the ground that
petitioner did not have the residence required by law six months before he filed his petition
for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Hence the present appeal.
The court a quo, in denying the petition, made the following comment: "One of the
qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant 'shall have resided
in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization' [Section 3(1),
Commonwealth Act No. 63]. This 'residence' requirement in cases of naturalization, has
already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive permanent home otherwise
known as legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines,
95 Phil. 890). A place in a country or state where he lives and stays permanently, and to
which he intends to return after a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile.
In other words domicile is characterized by animus manendi. So an alien who has been
admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for
reasons of health, though actually present in this country cannot be said to have
established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only temporary in nature
and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished. In the present case,
petitioner, who is presently a citizen of the United States of America, was admitted into
this country as a temporary visitor, a status he has maintained at the time of the filing of
the present petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which continues up to
the present. Such being the case, he has not complied with the specific requirement of law
regarding six months residence before filing his present petition."
We can hardly add to the foregoing comment of the court a quo. We find it to be a correct
interpretation [Section 3 (1) of Commonwealth Act No. 63] which requires that before a
person may reacquire his Philippine citizenship he "shall have resided in the Philippines at
least six months before he applies for naturalization." The word "residence" used therein
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention (Yen vs. Republic, L-18885, January 31,1964;
Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). Indeed, that term cannot refer to the presence in this
country of a person who has been admitted only on the strength of a permit for temporary
residence. In other words, the term residence used in said Act should have the same
connotation as that used in Commonwealth Act No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,
even if in approving the law permitting the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship our
Congress has liberalized its requirement by foregoing the qualifications and special
disqualifications prescribed therein. The only way by which petitioner can reacquire his lost
Philippine citizenship is by securing a quota for permanent residence so that he may come
within the purview of the residence requirement of Commonwealth Act No. 63.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
49

G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
MATEO CAASI, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C.
MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990
ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
1. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; Miguel’s immigration to the United States in
1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines.-
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel’s immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did
not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the
United States with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application
for an immigrant’s (not a visitor’s or tourist’s) visa. Based on that application of his, he
was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there
permanently.
2. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United
States before he was elected to public office.-
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law” is not applicable to Merito
Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was
elected to public office, not “during his tenure” as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
3. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States; Waiver should be manifested by
some act or acts independent of and done prior to the filing his candidacy for elective
office in this country.-
To be “qualified to run for elective office” in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have “waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country.” Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was
“disqualified to run for any elective office.”
4. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States; Records of this case are starkly
bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as
Municipal Mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988.-
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, but the records of this case are
starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as
municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was
disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
5. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States; Absent clear evidence that he
made an irrevocable waiver of that status, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to
run for said public office hence his election thereto was null and void.-
Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The
waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent
clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered
his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in
the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run
for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private
respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to
which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is
a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of
Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13,
1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito
Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C.
Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the
local elections on January 18, 1988.
50

G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the
decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531
dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the
position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on
account of his being a green card holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him
by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the
United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may
freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his
children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that
he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of
Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the
Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent
has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as
shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As
the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and
residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) as provided for in
Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there is no legal obstacle to
his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No.
84508).
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a
foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card
holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This
respondent has not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel,
respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio
R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court which
denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed by Caasi. The Court
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
of Appeals ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further proceeding
in the quo warranto case. The Court of Appeals held:
... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning
the qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the
COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic
requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local
officials (sic) and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of
the petitioner, considering that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts
on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are appealable to the
COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the
holder is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2) whether respondent Miguel
had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the
local elections on January 18, 1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant
of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status
as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25,
1971, EC).
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials in
the present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green cards in
foreign countries, their effect on the holders' right to hold elective public office in the
Philippines is a question that excites much interest in the outcome of this case.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application
for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State)
which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila
51

before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21
therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's
answer was, "Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States
Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent
Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back
of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed:
Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside
permanently and work in the United States." (Annex A pp.
189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did
not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the
limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his
application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application
of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to
reside there permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of
immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose
of permanent residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes
give a broader meaning to the term "immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S.,
the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection given to
him during the period of his residence therein.
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain,
are in general entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their
rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted
to remain are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to
their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal
responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are entitled to the benefit of the
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution that no
state shall deprive "any person" of life liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of the law, and
the protection of this amendment extends to the right to earn a livelihood
by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the
protection of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal
constitution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito
Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was
elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),
which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.'
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a
candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to
filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was
"disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a
permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are
starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as
52
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was set aside. The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao,
disqualified to become a candidate for that office. Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs against the said respondent.

The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in SO ORDERED.
the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the
time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for
elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code).
Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the
United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one
year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of
that municipality on January 18, 1988.

In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy
of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who
possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens
who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of
evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are
incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with
one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the
laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent
residents thereof.

Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in
the United States, he never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he
wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other
words, he would have this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under
false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his
other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a
party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him the best of both
worlds so to speak.

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The
waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent
clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered
his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in
the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run
for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC
Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are hereby
53

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
Election Law; Domicile; Residence; Words and Phrases; Residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.—A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC’S Second Division reveals a
startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of “Domicile” and “Residence” in
election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile,
the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for
actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s
qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an
elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing
or physical presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the intention of returning
there permanently.—Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that “[f]or the exercise of civil
rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place
of habitual residence.” In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to
mean an individual’s “permanent home,” “a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances
in the sense that they disclose intent.” Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of “the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile and Residence, Distinguished.—Residence, in its
ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It
is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential
distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to
leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may
seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s intent be
to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have
different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single
domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.—For political purposes the concepts of
residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged
is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; When the Constitution speaks of
“residence ” in election law, it actually means only “domicile.”—The deliberations of the
1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed
beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of “residence” in election
law, it actually means only “domicile.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.—It is the
fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or
appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would
lead to his or her disqualification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The honest mistake in the certificate of candidacy
regarding the period of residency does not negate the fact of residence in a
congressional district if such fact is established by means more convincing than a mere
entry on a piece of paper.—Having been forced by private respondent to register in her
place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner’s claimed domicile, it appears that
petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence in a space which
required her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries
in Item 7 and Item 8—the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring
domicile—coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s registration as a voter
in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be
disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of
residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing
than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different places.—We have stated, many times in
the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-
permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
54

COMELEC that “she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up
to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many
places” flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made
distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Origin; A minor follows the domicile of his
parents.—A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is
retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner’s being
born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This
domicile was not established only when she reached the age of eight years old, when
her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent’s averments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for a change of domicile.—Domicile of
origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3.
Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act
of relinquishing former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of
her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).—In the absence of clear and positive proof
based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with
evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In
the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree
of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of
origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment
requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner’s former domicile with an intent to
supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; Husband and Wife; The presumption that the
wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by operation of law upon marriage
cannot be inferred from the use of the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.—In this
connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in
1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
“domicile” and “residence.” The presumption that the wife automatically gains the
husband’s domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of
the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area
where the two concepts are well delineated.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A survey of jurisprudence yields nothing
which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in
favor of the husband’s choice of residence upon marriage.—A survey of jurisprudence
relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the
female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female
spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband’s choice of
residence upon marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 of the
Civil Code refers to “domicile” and not to “residence.”—The duty to live together can only
be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the
situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the
husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may “live together.” Hence, it is illogical to
conclude that Art. 110 refers to “domicile” and not to “residence.” Otherwise, we shall be
faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for
professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What petitioner gained upon marriage was
actual residence—she did not lose her domicile of origin.—Parenthetically when
Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged—
by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband’s actual place of
residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several
places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There
is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family’s residence. But
assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what
petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of
origin.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The common law concept of
“matrimonial domicile” appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New
Family Code.—On the other hand, the common law concept of “matrimonial domicile”
appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after
the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the
term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision
(Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The
provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women’s rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses.
55

Same; Same; Same; The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the
Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law.—Without as much belaboring the
point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and
quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife-the term residence
should only be interpreted to mean “actual residence.” The inescapable conclusion
derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner
married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained
a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Same; Statutory Construction; Mandatory and directory provisions; It is a settled doctrine
that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory.—It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition
of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, “so that
non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.”
Same; Same; Same; The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is
often made on grounds of necessity.—The difference between a mandatory and a
directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held
by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino v. Cruz held that: The difference
between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of
expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding
than enforcing the letter of the law.
Same; Jurisdiction; Electoral Tribunals; The HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.—
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET’S jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections return and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate
has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member
of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question. Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, 248
SCRA 300, G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an
aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the election."2 The mischief which this provision — reproduced
verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified
with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on
March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________
Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a
"Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging
that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition,
private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence
of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her
Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner)
disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the
filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on
or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the
COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was
likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred
that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result
of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive
in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
56

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending
to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First
District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration
by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter
in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein,
petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a
move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent
as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District.
He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the
creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of
the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass
the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant
petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit
along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of
the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean
elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by
a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the
original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of
candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the
Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed
word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or
honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should
subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was
asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not
residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which
she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying
affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of
the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent
and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum,
she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that
she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of
Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before
coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in
Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban
City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this
intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of
Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and
not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly
acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or
honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for
RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of
"residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious
why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her
explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical
presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the
question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate
of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the
CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be
made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The
reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only
applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result
of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure
timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case
considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant
case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of
residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a
substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy,
specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in
the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the
amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds
of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
57

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of
her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is
to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The
arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated
in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her
Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which
reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at
the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is
further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these
three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent
conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last
week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7
months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in
the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear
that respondent has not complied with the one year residency
requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as
synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside
in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96
Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's
case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she
chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the
First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot
hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her
affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years
after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In
1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in
San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she
lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In
1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the
representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor
of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not
been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her
certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she
claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact
on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of
San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration
in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that
she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up
to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a
resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim
that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the
First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make
Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and
on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila.
Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to
have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other
different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the
Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must
concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention
to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non
revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in
Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter
there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise
be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the
effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the
accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her
58

choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to
show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to
reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her
residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the
First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident
of the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly
pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at
precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her
Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa
for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the
respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her
failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior
to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she
had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution
declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission
RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised
therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation
should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in
the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number
of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of
Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent
Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental
Petition.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional
seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal
issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the
First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9,
1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus
Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling
confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election
law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for
the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution
reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence,
a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for
election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it
were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has
a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
59

individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense
that they disclose intent." 21Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements
of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or
country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken
up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave
as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal
for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can
only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this
distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is
used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
"domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent,
one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile
is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A
man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he
may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is
generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so
since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has
clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is
used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena
vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the
respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the
mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to
abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution
speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it
the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period
of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was
domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper
time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage
says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have
to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical residence. 30
60

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, this Court concluded that
31
the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term
residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos
satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of
Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in
jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement.
The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the
subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual
stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was
"since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply
detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a
different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would
be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private
respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa,
not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First
District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source
of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry
for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________
Years and Seven Months.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in
Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down
her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7
and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile —
coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa
obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified.
This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in
the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere
entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First
District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April
24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for
some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The
Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's
domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban,
Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro
Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her
husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a
voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and
Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not
been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion
lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile
even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears
repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The
absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other
things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.
Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence
in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile
for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own
house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having
ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either
alone or with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the
former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in
the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for
61

various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures,"
as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study
in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When
an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his
lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for
professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not
absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he
registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not
willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to
run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or
residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation
why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin
has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of
such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of
every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof
of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its
proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled
jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional
commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's
assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied
in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she
graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's
College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her
degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School,
still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin,
the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos
when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as
a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959,
she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President
of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted
and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home
to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the
Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated
that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable
is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four
decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a
minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban,
reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of
the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of
the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the
benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by
appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to
her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos
power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions,
or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew:
the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile
of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after
leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years
and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her
intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained
until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was
not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private
respondent's averments.
62

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two
legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this
court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her
own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin
by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos
in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
"domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the
husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of
the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area
where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific
area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and
residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but
in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or
juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the
court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live
abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or
residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would
suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the
husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which
states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su
residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla
de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar
o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article,
which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the
article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of
fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by
the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which
means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act
of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article
obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one
place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his
family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the
law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife
bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake
of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual
residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading:
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding
Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences
(as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of
their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live
63

together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to
"residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the
domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their
(various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with
reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a
question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from
a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used.
Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence
is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist
without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that,
once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention
to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some
other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife
during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the
question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain
situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that
the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or,
for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed
to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs.Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman
may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the
existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that
the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in
such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live
separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile
of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband
on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within
the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of
course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of
contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal
right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other
purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he
experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed
to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights
at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to
warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by
process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent
party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice
was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce
such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir
James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division
of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on
the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where
a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but
could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the
growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act
(1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for
the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so
far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order
requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case
where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to
(Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil
Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was
decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful
even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the
idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21
Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to
have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring
a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her
failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and
64

effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest
which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the
marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order
for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any
other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that
her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,
petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her
husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time,
Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and
Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his
family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the
conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did
not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have
been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the
Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the
intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been
supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in
meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary
changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice
of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil
law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is
that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her
marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died,
petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation
of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the
Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
(our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for
the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained
her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house,
an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the
PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in
a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and
"residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as
temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our
discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her
domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would
be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the
death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist
within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different
from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court
up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily
in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the
First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering
that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before
the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover,
petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the
COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of
Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is
untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time
is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does
not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it
would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory
provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several
American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury
results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of
the law.
65
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative
containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be of the First District of Leyte.
entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory
provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without SO ORDERED.
affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which
relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the
aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act."
Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely
to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from
rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it
lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would
then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a
decision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section
78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction
to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even
after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of

jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being
a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has
no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us
to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the
personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground
here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for
the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred
ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established
principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law.
Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May
25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the

66

G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.
1. MARRIAGE; ITS NATURE AND SANCTITY; SECURITY AND STABILITY OF
STATE.-
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The
state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity andpermanence.
The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is in the interest
and duty of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a
condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The
incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties.
2. MARRIAGE; ANNULMENT; IMPOTENCY; LONE TESTIMONY OF HUSBAND; CASE
AT BAR.-
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the
marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage
he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have
been satisfactorily established because from the commencement of the proceedings until
the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein.
3. MARRIAGE; WOMAN'S REFUSAL FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION; NOT
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE.-
Although the wife's refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference
on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not arise or be inferred, because women of this country are by nature
coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled
to by competent authority. This the court may do without doing violence to and infringing
upon her constitutional right. A physical examination in this case is not self-incrimination.
She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against
herself. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed.
4. MARRIAGE; ANNULMENT; PRESUMPTION OF POTENCY; HUSBAND'S LONE
TESTIMONY INSUFFICIENT.-
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is
physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have
bound them together as husband and wife.
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the
plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant
Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court
of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small
to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her
genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and
that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been
married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint.
She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article
88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire
whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court
entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a
competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to
submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result
thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to
comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with warning that her failure to undergo
medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack
of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented by her
husband would be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court
entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26
April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered,
upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's impotency has not been
satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been physically examined
because she had refused to be examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the
Court should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to undergo a
physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree sought to be
reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to
collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed
that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a physical examination.
Pending resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the decree. On
13 May 1957 the motion for reconsideration was denied.
The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the
strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife
was and is impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint, was absent during the
hearing, and refused to submit to a medical examination.
67
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The
state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and
permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the
interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a
condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The
incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically
enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to
annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was
decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony
tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks.
Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, becase from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the
decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined
or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred
because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit
to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court
may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She
is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against
herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency."2 The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is
physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have
bound them together as husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

68

G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913
CONSTANZA YAÑEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. GABRIEL
FUSTER, defendant and appellant.
1. DIVORCE; JURISDICTION OF COURTS WHERE PARTIES LITIGANT ARE
SPANISH SUBJECTS, RESIDING IN THE PHILIPPINES AND MARRIED UNDER THE
ECCLESIASTICAL LAW.-
The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have jurisdiction to try actions for
divorce (separation) when the parties litigant, one or both, are citizens or residents, even
though they are Spanish subjects and were married in accordance with the ecclesiastical
forms and ceremonies. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34; Ibañez vs. Ortiz, 5
Phil. Rep., 325.)
2. APPEAL; CONSIDERATION OF FINDINGS OF FACTS WHEN THE EVIDENCE
DOES NOT ACCOMPANY THE RECORD.-
When the evidence is not made a part of the record, the Supreme Court will accept as
true the facts admitted by the pleadings and found by the lower court in its decision, even
though a motion was made for a new trial in the lower court.
3. DIVORCE; ADULTERY; PUBLIC SCANDAL.-
When adultery is made the cause or ground for a divorce, it is not necessary to show that
the adultery had been accompanied by public scandal and contempt for the wife.
4. EVIDENCE; FOREIGN LAWS.-
Foreign laws cannot be proven by the affidavit of a person not versed in the law,
especially by ex parte affidavit which was not presented or received in evidence. A
foreign law may be proved by the certificate of the officer having in charge the original,
under the seal of the state or country. It may also be proved by an official copy of the
same, published under the authority of the particular state and purporting to contain such
law. (Secs. 300 and 301, Act No. 190.)
5. HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PROPERTY.-
All of the property belonging to a husband and wife shall be considered as conjugal
property, until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. (Art.
1407, Civil Code.)
6. HUSBAND AND WIFE; SEPARATION; ALIMONY.-
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
A husband and wife entered into a contract to live separately. The husband agreed to
pay to the wife a certain amount for her support (as alimony). In an action for divorce the
wife can not recover the arrears of payment, even though the payments had been
stipulated in the contract. Such an action must be maintained by the person who actually
f urnished the support.
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yañez were joined in a
Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. In February of 1892, Gabriel
Fuster came to the Philippine Islands, settled, and acquired real and personal property.
Toward the middle of 1896, Constanza Yañez came to Manila, where her husband was
residing, and here lived with him in conjugal relations until the month of April, 1899. On
the 4th day of that month and year they made an agreement, in a public document, by
which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and
by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in
such place as the said lady pleases." (B. of E., p. 13.) In the same document, the
husband undertook to send his wife the sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support,
payable in Madrid, Spain, from the month of June of the said year 1899. The husband
complied with this obligation until August, 1899, after which time he ceased to make
further payments.
In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the Philippines, but the husband
had absented himself therefrom in the early days of February of the same year. On the
11th of March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her husband,
alleging as cause of action the adultery committed by him in or about the year 1899 with
a certain woman that she named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and
cohabited and by whom he had had two children. She prayed that she be granted a
decree of divorce; that the court order the separation of the properties of the plaintiff and
the defendant, to date from the date of the said decree; that the conjugal society be
therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal property had been determined,
that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to the amount of pension
owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant be ordered to pay her the
sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to
Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint, amounted to
P12,959.90.
The defendant denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the city of Manila, as
they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain, and he alleged that both of them were
natives and subjects of Spain. He admitted that he was married to Constanza Yañez; he
also admitted having executed the document of the 4th of April, 1899, in which he had
undertaken to make an allowance for the support of his wife in Madrid, but he denied the
other paragraphs of the complaint. As a special defense with regard to the allowance, he
alleged: "That in or about the month of May, 1900, he wrote to his wife, the plaintiff,
instructing her to return to Manila, with a view of joining her husband and being
69

maintained by him in his own house; that the communication was ignored by the plaintiff,
who against the will of the defendant, continued to live separately from him that from the
year 1901, the defendant did not know her address; that since 1900, the plaintiff has
lived in comfort and has known where her husband resided; that the plaintiff, during all of
the time referred to, in addition to dispossing of valuable property belonging to her
husband, possessed and still possesses property of her own, acquired by her, in greater
amount than that owned by her husband; and that in any case the action has prescribed
by operation of law."(B. of E., pp. 7 and 8.) As to the divorce, he admits that he had by
the plaintiff two children that have died. He expressly denied the contents of paragraph 5
of the complaint, relating to the charge of adultery and also those of paragraphs 6, 7, and
8, concerning the possession of real and personal property of the conjugal partnership,
the statement of their amount, and their qualification as being all conjugal property. As a
special defense, he alleged that prior to the year 1899 he conferred powers of attorney
upon the plaintiff to administer and collect property and credits pertaining to him to the
value of about 200,000 pesos; that the plaintiff accepted and exercised the said power of
attorney, attached the property and collected the credits without ever having rendered
any account of them. As a special preferred defense, he alleged that neither the trial
court nor any other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the complaint, because, as to the allowance for support, since neither the plaintiff nor
the defendant are residents of Manila, or of any other place in the Philippine Islands, the
agreement upon the subject was neither celebrated, nor was it to be fulfilled, in the
Philippine Islands; and as to the divorce, because the action therefore ought to be tried
by the ecclesiastical courts. In conclusion, he prayed that the court find: That the court
was without jurisdiction over the two causes of action; that even if it had jurisdiction, it
could not order the payment of the sum claimed as arrears of alimony; that, after all, the
action with regard to this cause of action has prescribed; and as to the prayer for a
decree of divorce, the defendant should be acquitted, while on the other hand the plaintiff
should be required to render to the defendant an accounting, supported by proofs, of her
operations as his attorney and administratrix of his property in Spain.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have
jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and
defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former P5,010.17, directed that the communal
property be divided between the parties, with costs against the defendant, and in event
that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be effected by commissioners
according to law.
Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the appeal, the partition of
the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded with. These latter, after
various vicissitudes, rendered their report and account of the partition to the court, who
then rendered final judgment, from which, also, both parties appealed.
I. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
The first error assigned is the utter lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and of all other
courts of the Islands to try the case, either with regard to the fulfillment of the contract to
furnish alimony, or to decree a divorce or suspension of life in common between the
spouses: lack of jurisdiction over the persons and over the subject matter of the litigation;
and over the persons of the contending parties, because neither of the spouses was a
resident of the Philippines on the date of the complaint.
The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. The defendant had not proved
that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than that which he manifestly had in the
Philippines during the seventeen years preceding the date of the complaint. On the
contrary, it plainly appears, without proof to the contrary, that during this not
inconsiderable period, extending from the year 1892 until a month prior to the arrival of
his wife in the Philippines in March, 1909, he had constantly resided in the said Islands,
had kept open house, and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a little real property
which is now the object of the division of the conjugal society. It is also plainly shown,
without proof to the contrary, that his wife resided in this city of Manila from the middle of
1896 until April, 1899, at which time she was permitted by him to change her residence.
It is affirmed by the defendant in point five of his answer to the complaint, that in May,
1900, he sent a letter instructing the plaintiff to return to Manila to live withher husband
and to be supported by him in his house, but that the plaintiff, against the will of the
defendant, continued to live part from him. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also affirmed in the said
answer, that during all of the time referred to in the complaint, and especially since 1900,
the plaintiff knew where her husband resided. (B. of E., p. 7.) It is also very evident that
the contract, by virtue of which he authorized his wife to move to Spain and reside there
in such place as was agreeable to her, was executed in these Islands, "in the city of
Manila on the 4th of April, 1889," as is to be seen in the heading of the document. (B. of
E., p. 12.) Finally, at page 11 of his brief, he says that the record shows him to be a
Spanish subject, inscribed in the consulate of his nation, and cities article 26 of the Civil
Code, the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill.
Granting these facts, there can be no doubt that the defendant, although a Spanish
subject, was a resident of these Islands. Article 26 of the Civil Code that he cites itself
provides that "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country, where they may
be considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents therein, shall be
required, in order to preserve the Spanish nationality, to state that such is their wish
before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who must record them in the registry of
Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be married, and any children
they may have." From this provision, which is the exclusive and irrefutable law governing
the defendant, we are to conclude that the domicile of the defendant and the plaintiff is
fully proven, irrespective of the Treaty of Paris. Without this supposition of having
acquired his domicile and residence in these Islands, he could not have required his wife
to return to live with him therein because this requirement could only be based on articles
58 of the Civil Code of Spain, according to which the wife is obliged to follow her
70

husband wherever he wishes to establish his residence, or on article 48 of chapter 5 of
the Marriage Law in force in the Philippines, which imposes upon the wife the duty of
obeying her husband, living in his company, or of following him to wherever he transfers
his domicile or residence. And just because he was absent for a month before his wife
returned to the Philippines, he cannot be understood to have surrendered his habitual
domicile of more than seventeen years, without having established any other afterwards,
and without making any declaration in legal form, before he absented himself, of it being
his intention to change his domicile, while at the same time he retains here his house,
real property and all manner of means of subsistence. Section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure leaves to the election of the plaintiff the bringing of a personal action like the
one at bar either in the place where the defendant may reside or be found, or in that
where the plaintiff resides.
The litigating spouses have gained not only domicile (domicilio) but also residence
(vecindad) in Manila. In this litigation the defendant claims that, born as he says in
Mallorca, in the Balearic Islands, he is not subject, in his marriage, to the rules governing
conjugal property, that are in force in the territories of Spain that are governed by the
common law of Castillo (as the Philippines in their day), because they are opposed to the
Foral Law in force in the said Islands and which is respected by the Civil Code. Even if
this defense could be sustained herein, paragraph 2 of article 15 of the said Civil Code
would be applicable. It provides: "For the purposes of this article, residence (vecindad)
will be acquired: By residence of ten years in common law provinces or territories, unless
before the termination of that time he manifests his will to the contrary; or by a residence
of two years, if the interested person declares this to be his will . . . In any case, the wife
will follow the condition of her husband. . . ." On no occasion had the defendant
manifested his will to the contrary, not even as he was leaving, after a residence of
seventeen years, a month before the return of his wife to these Islands. On the contrary,
when he inscribed himself in the Spanish consulate, he declared his intention of
continuing to reside in the Islands as a Spaniard and not as a Mallorquin, subject as such
to the common law of Spain.
In an endeavor to demonstrate the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands over
the subject matter of the complaint that is to try an action for divorce between two
Catholic Spaniards, he alleges in his appeal: That both litigants are Spanish subjects and
that they contracted a Catholic marriage; that in accordance with article 9 of the Civil
Code of Spain (the same as that of these Islands) the laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards
although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, "all questions of a civil
nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the
domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their
properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property,
the classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the
AUTHORITY to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
the person and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by
the national law of the husband and wife, and, in our case, by the Spanish law by virtue
of article 9 as above set out." (Brief, p. 12.) The appellant and defendant continues his
argument, saying: That by the express provision of article 80 of the Civil Code of Spain,
"jurisdiction in actions for divorce and nullification of canonical marriages lies with
ecclesiastical courts," while that of civil tribunals is limited to civil marriages; that this
being so, the action for divorce brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within
the jurisdiction of the civil courts, according to his own law of persons, because these
courts ought to apply the Spanish law in accordance with the said article 9 of the Civil
Cod of Spain, and this Spanish law grants the jurisdiction over the present cause to the
ecclesiastical courts, in the place of which no tribunal of these Islands con subrogate
itself. Says this appellant: "If a law of a foreign country were of rigorous application in a
given case, a North American tribunal would have no jurisdiction upon an ecclesiastical
court and therefore the North American tribunal in applying it would have to exercise a
faculty which that law reserved to the ecclesiastical court." (Brief, pp. 13, 14, and 15.)
Unless we take the question itself for granted, the foregoing reasoning cannot be upheld.
The question is precisely whether the courts of the Philippines are competent or have
jurisdiction to decree the divorce now on appeal, and it is taken for granted that the
power to decree it is one of the rights included in the personal statute, but appellant does
not prove by any law or legal doctrine whatever that the personal statute of a foreigner
carries with it, to whether he transfers his domicile, the authority established by the law of
his nation to decree his divorce, which was what he had to demonstrate.
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised within
the personal status of the husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of the
statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of
private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private
law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. "The jurisdiction of courts
and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature and
consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . . All persons that have
to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since they can gain nothing by
a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the tribunales of the state which have
coercive means (property situated in the territory) to enforce any decision they may
render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures
which, although he won his case, would not contribute to secure his rights because of the
court's lack of means to enforce them." (Torres Campos, "Elementos de Derecho
International Privado," p. 108.) "Justice," says the same professor, "is a principle superior
to that of nations, and it should therefore be administered without taking into any account
whatsoever the state to which the litigants belong. . . . In order to foster their relations
and develop their commerce, all civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone
to their own people, but to those foreigners who contract within the country or outside of
it juridical ties which in some manner effect their sovereignty. (Ibid, p. 107.) Might its
71

courts, in some cases, in suits between foreigners residing in its territory, apply the
personal law of the parties, but abdicate their jurisdiction, refrain from administering
justice because the personal law of the foreigner gave the jurisdiction of the given case
to some court that is not the territorial one of the nation? This has never yet been
claimed in any of the theories regarding the conflict of laws arising out of questions of
nationality and domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing extraterritorial law in favor
of private persons. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding
within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the Spanish subject
wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan, in China,
in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain. Foreign
Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce
according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by
invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction
in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the territory of
their nation.
1awphi1.net
It is a question that has already been settled in two decisions of the Supreme Court
(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and Ibañez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep., 325).
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not
lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects,
they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein.
The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and jurisdiction to
try actions for divorce. That of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction by reason of the
subject matter of the litigation.
The second assignment of error is directed against the finding of the court that the
defendant had committed adultery with a certain woman in this city from the year 1899
until 1909; the third was against the finding that the adultery was accompanied by public
scandal and injured the dignity of his wife; and the fourth for having decreed the divorce,
suspension of the married life, and the separation of the properties of the parties.
The evidence relating to the foregoing not being sent up on appeal, we are unable to
review it, so we accept the findings of the trial court.
There is a point of law regarding the claim that the adultery, even though it were proven
would not be a cause for divorce, because no public scandal resulted therefrom nor was
there contempt displayed for the wife. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) The facts must be
accepted by this tribunal as they were found by the trial court, since the evidence cannot
be reviewed; moreover, the appellee affirms the contrary and maintains that it is a proven
fact, public and notorious, an assertion that the trial court must have found to be proven.
(Appellee's brief, p. 5.) In law, it is not necessary that adultery, to be a cause for divorce,
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
should be accompanied by public scandal and contempt for the wife. There is no law that
requires this. Law 2, title 9, of the Fourth Partida does not require it.
The fifth and sixth assignments of error are directed against the finding of the trial court
that there exists conjugal property, a finding that the appellant maintains is without
foundation, and that which holds that the property in the hands of the receiver (that
sought to be divided) is conjugal property, a conclusion which the appellant claims to be
contrary to the law which should be applied to the case and according to which, as
alleged in the tenth assignment of error, the whole of the property should be adjudicated
to the defendant as being exclusively his.
Facts: The appellant affirms that he is a native of Mallorca in the Balearic Islands and
that is also the condition of his wife, the plaintiff. Law: That although the rule of the Civil
Code is that which legally governs conjugal property, yet at the same time it admits, as
an exception, the laws, usages, and customs of the Foral Law, according to which, as
applied in the Balearic Islands, the law of the family is that of the division of property and
that of conjugal property is not known; so that the property pertains exclusively to the
spouse who, by whatever title, has acquired it. In support of the facts, appellant cites
pages 27 to 37 and 39 to 41 in the bill of exceptions; and of the law, the doctrinal
authority of Manresa, Gutierrez, and Alcubilla.
The citation from pages 39 to 41 of the bill of exceptions, the only pertinent one, is but an
affidavit filed by the defendant in which, under oath, he himself testifies as to the Foral
Law in the Balearic Islands. The adverse party says with regard to this: "This affidavit
was never presented in proof, was never received by the trial judge, and cannot seriously
be considered as an effort to establish the law of a foreign jurisdiction. Sections 300, 301
and 302 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now in force in these islands, indicate the
method by which the law of a foreign country may be proved. We maintain that the
affidavit of a person not versed in the law, which was never submitted as proof, never
received by the trial court, and which has never been subjected to any cross-
examination, is not a means of proving a foreign law on which the defendant relies."
(Brief, pp. 6 and 7.)
Furthermore, on the supposition that the defendant could invoke the Foral Law as the
law of his personal status in the matter of the regimen of his marriage, and that to allege
this he be considered as authorized by article 15 of the Civil Code, we have said before,
in dealing with his law of domicile, that paragraph 2 of this article 15 of the Civil Code
would be entirely adverse to his claim, and if it be advanced that there is a similar Foral
Law in the Philippines by virtue of paragraph 1 of the said article 15, it might be said,
though there is not at present any need to say it, that it is not in force. The two findings
attacked are in perfect accord with the law. All the property of the marriage, says article
1407 of the Civil Code, shall be considered as conjugal property until it is proven that it
72

belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. No proof has been submitted to this
effect.
As seventh assignment of error it is alleged that the court below erred in holding in the
judgment that the plaintiff had brought to the marriage a dowry of 30,000 Spanish dollars.
But the defendant himself adds that the court made no order or decree regarding the
alleged dowry. On the other hand, the plaintiff, in her fourth assignment of errors,
claimed that the court erred in not confirming the report of the commissioners which gave
to the said plaintiff the sum of 30,000 Spanish dollars. It is unnecessary to say anything
further.
The eighth error consists in that the court below ordered the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff P56,010.17 Philippine currency, whereas the plaintiff had made no demand in
her complaint with respect to this sum; that no arrears of payment are owing for alimony,
even though payments had been stipulated in the contract, unless they are claimed by
the person who had furnished the actual support, and that alimony is due only when it is
necessary; so that, as the plaintiff has had no need of it for ten years, nor has she stated
who has furnished it, there is no reason for awaring her the amount of the arrears for all
that time; that as she has allowed ten years to elapse before claiming it, her action
prescribed in 1904, that is to say, after five years.
The plaintiff acknowledges that there is no petition or prayer in her complaint as to this
cause of action, but she considers that in equity such an omission can be supplied.
Paragraph 3 of section 89 (90) of the Code of Civil Procedure determines one of the
requisites of the complaint: "A demand for the relief which the plaintiff claims." The
section goes on to say: "If the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount
demanded must be stated. If special relief, such as an order for the special restitution of
property, etc., the ground of demanding such relief must be stated and the special relief
prayed for. But there may be added to the statement of the specific relief demanded a
general prayer for such further or other relief as shall be deemed equitable."
In the complaint of the case at bar the provisions of paragraph 2 of the said section 89
[90] are complied with by setting forth in its paragraphs 4 and 5 the relation of the cause
of action, that is, the contract of the 4th of April, 1899, by which the defendant obligated
himself to send to the plaintiff in Spain a certain amount of money monthly, for her
support, and the failure to comply with this obligation after the month of August, 1899.
Paragraph 6, as a consequence of the promise established in 4 and 5, says as follows:
"That the defendant Gabriel Fuster y Fuster actually owes the plaintiff the sum of 36,100
Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 dollars, which, reduced at the present rate of exchange,
amounts to the sum of P12,959.90, Philippine currency." (B. of E., p. 2.) In the case of
default on the part of the defendant "the court shall proceed to hear the plaintiff and his
witnesses and assess the damages or determine the other relief to which the
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
plaintiff may be entitled, including the costs of the action, and render final judgment for
the plaintiff to recover such sum or to receive such other relief as the pleadings and the
facts warrant." The pleadings, not the prayer of the complaint.
This court has recently decided that the pleadings, not the prayer, exactly, are the
essential part of a complaint.
It is not a question of alimony for the present, nor for the future, which constitutes the first
cause of action, but of certain sums stipulated in a contract. This contract is a law for the
contracting parties, a law which rises superior to those general laws which regulate the
nature of the subject matter of the contract (in the present case an entirely voluntary one)
and which govern judicial action.
An action arising out of a contract of this nature does not prescribe like all personal ones,
but, by the provisions of article 1964 of the Civil Code, after fifteen years. But even
though the provisions of article 1966 were applicable, by which an action to compel the
fulfillment of an agreement to pay alimony prescribes in five years, yet by section 50 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, "when payment has been made upon any demand founded
upon contract . . . an action may be brought . . . after such payment. . . ." And the parties
admit that on the 18th of August, 1908, the plaintiff secured the payment of
6,365.68 pesetas by virtue of the contract of April 4, 1899. So that from August, 1908,
until March, 1909, the date of the complaint, the said period of five years had not
elapsed.
The ninth assignment of error consists in that the court below erred in empowering the
receiver to proceed to the separation of the property and in appointing commissioners to
make the partition and distribution between the spouses, since the principal question in
this action hinges upon the classification of the property; that it was erroneously
classified as conjugal property, whereas all of it pertained to the husband alone and
should be adjudicated to him for the reason that, as it reiterated in the tenth assignment
of error, the conjugal partnership was not subject to the provisions of the law governing
conjugal property, because such provision are totally foreign to the Foral Law of the
Balearic Islands.
The action of the trial court, by the terms of section 184 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
was in accordance with law. The only question before this court is the partition of real
property. All that referred to in the second decision appealed from, dated September 9,
1911, is urban real estate. Its classification as conjugal property is in accordance with
law, as is shown in the foregoing reasoning, and that no consideration of the Foral Law
enters into the question has also been demonstrated.
II. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL.
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As the trial court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff only
P5,010.17, the petitioner here prays that the judgment be reversed and that in its place
this court order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff her claim of P12,959.90, plus the
additional sum which the alimony amounts to at the rate of P107.70 per month, dating
from the 1st of August, 1909, until the date of payment, with legal interest upon the said
P12,959.90 from the date of the filing of the complaint until the date of payment, and,
furthermore, legal interest upon each of the monthly payments due after the filing of the
complaint, and which will continue to become due until the close of this litigation.
The trial court made the following findings: First, that the total amount of the alimony
owing to the plaintiff amounted to 34,200 pesetas; second, that of this sum the plaintiff
had collected in Madrid 6,365.68; third, that the remainder, that is, 27,834.32, was
equivalent to $5,566.86 Mexican currency; fourth, that the Mexican peso was worth 90
centavos Philippine currency; fifth, that therefore the sum of $5,566.86 Mexican currency
was equivalent to P5,010 Philippine currency; and finally, as there was no evidence as to
the kind of pesetas agreed upon, it was to be presumed that it was that current at the
time and place where the agreement was made, which was Mexican pesetas.
In her appeal, the plaintiff contends that these findings are erroneous in that, firstly, the
parties had admitted that thepesetas referred to in the contract of the 4th of April, 1899,
were Spanish, and in view of this admission the court was not empowered to define them
as being different from the kind admitted by the parties; secondly, if he were so
empowered, his interpretation should be governed by the terms of the law.
With regard to the first error, the plaintiff says that the statement is made in her complaint
that the defendant had obligated himself to pay her a "monthly pension for her support of
300 Spanish pesetas, that is, 60 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency,
amounts to P107.70;" that the defendant had admitted this in hi answer to the complaint,
and that by his finding in a sense other than that accepted and not refuted in the answer
of the defendant, the court violated the provisions of section 94 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The court has not incurred this error, because it does not appear that the defendant in
his answer accepted the fact in the manner alleged in the complaint. The defendant said
that he admitted having made the agreement referred to in paragraph 4 of the complaint,
and that he stood upon its contents. The contents of the document to which he refers is
of the following tenor: "Mr. Fuster binds and obligates himself to pay to his said wife the
sum of 300 pesetas, monthly, payable de su cuenta in the city and capital of Madrid, for
her support. . . ." He did not therefore admit the matter of the Spanish pesetas; that does
not appear in the contents of the document — the only thing he admitted in his answer.
As to the second error, the court did not commit it in applying the rule contained in article
1287 of the Civil Code. "The usages or customs of the country shall be taken into
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
consideration in interpreting ambiguity in contracts. . . ." If in the contract the word
" pesetas," not being specific, was ambiguous, then it was in harmony with this precept
to interpret it as being the peseta then in use or current when and where the agreement
was made, Mexican being then the usual and current money in the Philippines.
Furthermore, the phrase de su cuenta clearly means that it was not "Spanish pesetas"
that the contracting parties had in mind, because if the agreement had been a specific
one to pay 300 Spanish pesetas in Madrid, everyone would of course understand that
the expense of following the fluctuations of change and of the differences in value
between the money current in the country, and the Spanish pesetas, would have to be
defrayed by the obligated party; whereas, if nothing more than pesetas was mentioned, it
was necessary to decide which party should pay for the difference in value so that the
300 pesetas stipulated here should be 300 Spanish pesetas paid in Madrid. Against the
reasons of the court below for his decision this court can offer no legal grounds. The rule
of interpretation cited is the one applicable and it supports the reasoning of the decision
appealed from.
The appellant also alleges as error that the court did not adjudicate to her the 30,000
Spanish dollars which the commissioners proposed in their report. First she
characterizes this sum of 30,000 dollars as the dowry of the wife delivered to the
husband, then, later, as paraphernal property brought to the marriage.
According to the last instructions of the court to the commissioners, this amount of
30,000 dollars could not enter into the partition, and with reason. If, as was claimed, it
was inherited by the plaintiff from her uncle, it really constitutes paraphernal property
under article 1381. "Paraphernal property is that which the wife brings to the marriage
without being included in the dowry and that she may acquire after the creation of the
same without being added thereto." But it is a provision of article 1384 that "The wife
shall have the management of the paraphernal property unless she has delivered the
same to her husband, before a notary, in order that he may administer said property. In
such case the husband is obliged to create a mortgage for the value of the personal
property he may receive, or to secure said property, in the manner established for the
dowry property." Not even was there offered in evidence the public deed of delivery, nor
the equally public mortgage deed that is required by law. So that, therefore, the
necessary proof of the obligation to return paraphernal property as here demanded does
not exist.
lawphil.net
The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th of September,
1911, should be and is hereby confirmed.
The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement
of costs in this instance.
74

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA
DANDAN, * respondents.
1. Actions; Settlement of Estates; Succession; If there is a controversy before the court
as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.-
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
2. Actions; Settlement of Estates; Succession; Husband and Wife; Conflict of Laws;
Divorce; If there is a question as to whether a wife was still a Filipino citizen at the time of
her divorce from her husband—the decedent—the trial court should conduct a hearing to
establish her citizenship.-
We note that in her comment to petitioner’s motion private respondent raised, among
others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried.
She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. To this, petitioner replied that Arturo
was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they
obtained. Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial
court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial
evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely
applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
3. Actions; Settlement of Estates; Succession; Husband and Wife; Conflict of Laws;
Divorce; Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law; Once proved that a wife was no
longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from her husband, then she could very
well lose her right to inherit from the latter.-
Then in private respondent’s motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court’s
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the
ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She
prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. Petitioner opposed the motion but
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. The trial court did not grant
private respondent’s prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the
finding that both petitioner and Arturo were “Filipino citizens and were married in the
Philippines.” It main- tained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on
their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner’s citizenship at the time of their divorce. The
doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved
that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
4. Actions; Settlement of Estates; Succession; Forum Shopping; There is no forum
shopping where one petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent
petitions filed before other courts concern the issuance of new owner’s duplicate copies
of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of the decedent.-
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared
in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, the
same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same
transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical
causes of action, subject matter and issue. The present petition deals with declaration of
heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the
issuance of new owner’s duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the
estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum
shopping.
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way
their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19
July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement
of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce.
Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but
their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third
time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed
a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the
75

petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was
resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal
was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and
Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and
the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October
1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to
appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of
the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be
considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required
documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it
expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.
Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to
lack of judicial approval. 3On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that
the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children
with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November
1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.
Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the
two intestate heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present
proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children,
except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their
respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial reconsideration was
granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of
the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private
respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned
records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was
clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the
errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides
that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal;
hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision
and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the
trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner
insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution
either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and, second, the
issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper hier of the
decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish
facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan
children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo
Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who
is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than
petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the
motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an
order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on
declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among
others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried.
She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that
Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce
they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no
longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted
the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing
is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and
testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or
76
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her shopping, the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve
21

favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño. the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be
identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present petition deals with
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties
ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She of forum shopping.
prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but
failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and
finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan
Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children,
their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis,
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED.
doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the
present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not
merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's SO ORDERED.
citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the
Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing
for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the
issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked
whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since
1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the
same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the
uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring
hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did
not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be
limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private
respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo
were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was
subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning
under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that
can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be
declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum
77

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, respondents.
1. Civil Law; Conflict of Laws; Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; Foreign laws must be
alleged and proved.-
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved. While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not
admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the
renvoi doctrine, where the case was “referred back” to the law of the decedent’s
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
2. Civil Law; Conflict of Laws; Marriages; Divorce; The Court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law; Only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces.-
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying that
of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent
Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property
she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo") may
have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and
wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States
Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
"Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur.4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and
Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States
District Court, Southern District of New York.6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was
granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar
of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not
legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank.9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the
couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by
the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s
daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital
union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate
agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4)
Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted
her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by
both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The
agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with
the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula
was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On
November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San
Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
78

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia
13
had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula,
who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their
twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed
Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized
by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all
his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential
house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including
ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or
existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul
F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real
properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located
at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines
Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio
Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my
children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my
real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the
province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or
personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other
persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among
themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will
and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in
the order of age, if of age;
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served
(sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions
heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the
Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia
R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and
bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines
Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein
Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator
Lorenzo was still alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the
will to probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of
administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave
due course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol
Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to
the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the
79

marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise
void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate
even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status
of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and
so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981
as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their
conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to
one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz
and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also
entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased,
Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her
favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to
make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all
goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her
possession or to the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to
pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends
thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of
her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required
by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be
granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
decision.28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but
modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children
"legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by
him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as
the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-
third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.31
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the
deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments
raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the
trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at
the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and
(4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign
law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
80

"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit
the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore
the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently
proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement
that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article
1ªwph!1
16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the
union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can
therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called
for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in
favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw
the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2)
of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article
144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already
probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is
fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
40
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven
that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from
petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well
lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects
of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to
the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by
her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes,
since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity."44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed
in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In
fact, the will was duly probated.
81
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of
successional rights to the decedent's national law.45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.
R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo
N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San
Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall
proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the
framework of the Rules of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

82