By: Jim Garrett

Submitted to: Interagency OPSEC Support Staff

06 December 2017
OPSEC Lessons in History Series: 2nd Edition
Table of Contents
Introduction......................................................................................................................................3
Threat Analysis................................................................................................................................ 3
Critical Information ......................................................................................................................... 5
Egyptian-Syrian Collaboration.................................................................................................... 5
Date of Attack .............................................................................................................................. 5
Limit of the Attack.......................................................................................................................5
War Capability ............................................................................................................................. 6
Vulnerability Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 7
Risk Assessment .............................................................................................................................. 8
Employ D&D Measures .................................................................................................................. 9
Syrian Mobilization ..................................................................................................................... 9
Egyptian Mobilization ............................................................................................................... 10
Close-Hold Planning..................................................................................................................11
Soviet-Arab Relationship...........................................................................................................11
Diplomatic Deception................................................................................................................ 12
False Scheduling........................................................................................................................ 12
Unready Armies......................................................................................................................... 12
Assessing OPSEC ...................................................................................................................... 13
The War..........................................................................................................................................14
OPSEC Success, Intelligence Failure, Both? ................................................................................ 15
Problems in the Intelligence Community .................................................................................. 20
OPSEC Success ......................................................................................................................... 22
Lessons .......................................................................................................................................... 23
About the Author ........................................................................................................................... 25
Introduction
An Arab coalition comprising forces from nine nations struck Israel on October 6th, 1973.
Along their southern front, the Suez Canal, over 100,000 Egyptian soldiers from the Second and
Third Armies attacked 450 Israeli reservists.1 In the north five Syrian divisions assaulted three
Israeli brigades guarding the Golan Heights.2 The Arab armies massed over a period of weeks
along the Israeli borders, in full view of the defenders and vulnerable to multiple Israeli
collection platforms. Yet, Israel was unprepared for the attack.
The Arabs coupled OPSEC and deception to maintain essential secrecy of their capabilities
and activities preceding the attack. They developed an adversarial threat analysis that erred on
the side of caution and honestly analyzed their vulnerabilities. Their information operations
targeted their adversaries’ fallacies to establish a very specific counter-analysis. Until a few
hours before the Arabs struck Israeli decision makers were certain that the Arabs would not
attack. It might not have achieved complete surprise but Arab denial and deception (D&D)
activities maintained essential secrecy.

Threat Analysis
The Arabs were familiar with the danger posed by Israel’s intelligence capabilities long
before the Yom Kippur War. The Israelis had a rich history in espionage. Despite only becoming
a nation in 1948 some of its intelligence officers had been working in espionage since its days of
resistance. A nation rapidly growing from the reversal of the Jewish diaspora was also gaining
immigrants with intelligence and technical skills from other wars and nations.
The Military Intelligence Bureau (AMAN), was the primary threat. They were the authors of
Israel’s national intelligence estimate. They prepared the all-source assessments given to
decision makers. AMAN was the primary target of Arab D&D activities. If AMAN was
deceived then they would pass the deception to
the decision-makers. Additionally, AMAN
managed most of Israel’s technical intelligence
capabilities.
Unit 515, an Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
SIGINT task force, monitored all Egyptian Air
Force (EAF) activities west of the Suez Canal.
The Israeli military had established a chain of
31 forts along the 93 miles of the Suez Canal’s
east bank known as the Bar Lev Line. Not only
did the forts provide Israel positions to watch
Egyptian activity for up to 25 miles west of the
Suez Canal but it was also rigged with Figure 1 A Bar Lev Outpost145
communications intelligence (COMINT)
intercept equipment so they could listen to radio communications. In the north Mount Hermon
was the most important of Israel’s outposts along the Golan Heights. Radars monitored Syrian
aircraft. Antenna array intercepted Syrian radio traffic. Additionally, it was equipped with a
number of electromagnetic, electro-optical, and seismic sensors.3 The General Staff
Reconnaissance Unit (Sarayet Matkal), highly trained commandos, went deep into Egyptian
territory to tap directly into their military telephone lines, thus creating a COMINT capability
known as Israel’s “special means.” Israeli leaders were sure that their top secret COMINT
capability would provide them any warning of a pending Egyptian attack.
The Israeli Air Force (IAF) owned all of the reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) that would provide the nation with imagery intelligence (IMINT). This IMINT
would be passed to AMAN. Additionally, Israeli military attaches, naturally being AMAN
officers, would receive IMINT the United States provided from its satellites and any
reconnaissance aircraft that overflew the Middle East. Despite the collection assets the IMINT
threat was moderate. The Egyptians and Syrians had strong belts of air defense artillery (ADA)
surrounding infrastructure with which to place manned aircraft at risk. UAVs were limited by
signal strength and fuel. The Arabs discovered a blind spot in the US satellite coverage of the
region, and an advantageous position at that.4 Israel’s air reconnaissance platforms lacked
nighttime imaging capabilities, providing the Arabs some night-time concealment opportunity.5
AMAN would also receive all reporting from the IDF’s frontlines. The soldiers guarding the
Bar Lev Line in the south and the Purple Line in the north would send any observation reports to
their intelligence staffs which would move up through channels to AMAN. AMAN monopolized
the Israeli intelligence community.
AMAN was completely wedded to a vision so profound it was called
the “Concept.” In 1969 the son-in-law of Egypt’s last President, Nasser,
Ashraf Marawn, became a source for Mossad. The Egyptian was a
confidant of the new Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat.6 He provided his
Mossad handlers with an Egyptian self-assessment of their needs for
another war. This self-assessment required air superiority over Israel and
Syria to join them in the attack.7 The Israelis had latched onto this, after
all, it was Egypt’s own assessment.
Unknown to AMAN was the fact that Sadat abandoned the Concept on
October 24th, 1972 when he informed the Egyptian General Staff they
needed to plan for a war with means already available.8 The Arabs were
aware of Israel’s Concept. If any information which seemed to confirm the
Concept was collected it might lead the Israelis to asses that a war was Figure 2 Ashraf Marwan, Israel's
highest level spy in Egypt146
forthcoming. As long as Arab actions ran counter to the Concept or at least
did not confirm it than Israel was unlikely to raise its awareness.
Less wedded to the Concept was the Mossad, Israel’s equivalent to the CIA. Mossad was in
charge of espionage. Its case handlers managed a vast network of spies in the Arab nations. They
were famous for carrying out a number of daring James Bond style operations including
kidnappings and assassinations of hard targets. One of their spies infiltrated the highest levels of
the Syrian government and identified the positions of every Syrian army position in the Golan
Heights before the Six-Day War. The Arabs were well aware that Mossad’s HUMINT networks
were active in both capitals. They were likely unaware that Mossad’s primary focus was now on
the constant terrorist threat and many of those intelligence officers who once manned the Egypt
desk were now focusing on the Palestinian threat.9
There were other adversaries to worry about. News correspondents would file reports on
military announcements and other snippets of news that could reveal aspects about military
readiness. Diplomats would be searching for rumors and intentions of war while their military
attaches attempted to judge Arab readiness.
Critical Information

Egyptian-Syrian Collaboration
Knowing Israel’s Concept the Arabs knew they must prevent the Israelis from learning about
the coalition they were forming. If Israel became aware that Egypt and Syria was collaborating it
might put its forces on a higher state of alert and/or take actions to increase defenses at the
borders. If Israel learned the two nations were allied together then it would be more prone to see
any simultaneous buildup of Egyptian and Syrian militaries as preparation for an attack.

Date of Attack
The Arabs were aware the Israelis knew that a future war was coming. However, because of
the Concept the Israelis were not expecting the Arabs to initiate a war before 1975. General
Abdul Munim Riad, the Egyptian soldier who commandeered Jordanian forces in the Six Day
War predicted “The Concept was so ingrained ‘the mere fact that we start an attack at all will be
the most important element of surprise.’”10
If Israel learned of a confirmed date for the attack they could reinforce their borders, making
a shooting gallery of the Canal in the south and the plains in the north. If the Israelis had a
confirmed date they could plan the mobilization of their reserves in a timeframe to meet the
attack without significant economic waste. If the Israelis were only aware of a general intent to
attack they could not afford to mobilize until the threat appeared imminent to mitigate the
economic impacts.
OPSEC was needed to reduce the difficulty in seizing the border outposts. If the Israelis
learned of their plans long enough to reestablish 13 Bar Lev outposts they had abandoned and
prepare Mount Hermon. An attack against the heavily fortified defenses would likely increase the
Arab casualty rate significantly. Additionally, the Israelis might choose to evacuate the Bar Lev
Line so they could focus on a maneuver fight in the desert. Egypt needed the surprise if possible
to surround and cut off the forts. Not only would taking the forts be a small victory and a boost
for morale but the Arabs would then be able to utilize their antitank tactics to inflict heavy
casualties on the tanks that Israel would undoubtedly come to rescue their beleaguered outpost
garrisons.

Limit of the Attack

The Arabs had limited territorial goals. Egypt wanted to cross the Canal and draw a line in
the sand approximately 10 miles in the Sinai desert. This objective was largely due to this also
being the limit or their air defense screen. Outside of this safe zone the IAF would be capable of
bombing and strafing their ground forces. Syria, whom staked more on strategic surprise than the
Egyptians wanted to seize the entire Golan Heights in 30 hours.11 Syria believed Israel would
require 30 hours to mobilize reserves and reinforce the Golan. If the reserves arrived to find
Syria entrenched on the high ground hopefully the Israelis would be content to let Syria reclaim
their territory without much resistance.
The Arabs walked a fine line preventing Israel from knowing the limit of their attack. Past
Arab attacks on Israel intended to destroy the state and drive the Israelis into the sea. If Israel
believed this new war had the same intent they would fight with everything they had. They might
even decide to use their nuclear deterrent if they believed the destruction of their country was at
hand. While this might seem like a reason for the Arabs to broadcast their intent rather than risk
nuclear fires they had tactical reasons to keep the information concealed. If the Israelis believed
that their population centers were at risk they would be forced to establish secondary defensive
lines and withhold forces to protect civilian population centers. If they knew that limited territory
was sought they could push all of their forces forward to repel the attack without the need for
holding forces in reserve.

War Capability
The Arabs wanted to lull their adversaries into a false sense of security by portraying their
armies as incompetent and logistically incapable of going to war. They could play on Israeli
biases. The IDF assessed the Arabs as “primitive, undisciplined, and incapable of handling
sophisticated equipment or conducting coordinated operations.”12 The IDF’s past successes
instilled them with a superiority complex. They were expecting to face the same Arab armies in
the next war as they had in the previous wars.13
The Arab armies had numerical superiority in every war. Yet in 1973 their armies would be
significantly larger. The Egyptians and the Syrians each had five ready divisions. The Syrians
could also fill two more fully while the Egyptians could reconstitute losses to their five with its
700,000 reserves. Their conscription rate in 1973 of 20% kept a large trained force ready for
battle.14 Seven countries sent expeditionary forces, further increasing the Arab army by 100,000
personnel.
The Arabs needed their adversaries to underestimate their firepower. The Soviets supplied
both armies with sophisticated modern weaponry. The Arabs countered the second tenant of the
Concept with this weaponry. They gave up the idea of gaining air dominance in the sky and
settled with denying the Israelis the airspace over their troops. This would be done with the
world’s largest deployment of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) creating an air defense umbrella
over the battlefield. The Egyptians would also counter Israel’s superior armor with antitank
weapons rather than simply attempt to meet tanks head-on with their own tanks.
Downplaying the Soviet-Arab relationship was important for disguising the Arab’s war
capabilities. In June 1972 Sadat evicted the Soviets from Egypt because they refused to provide
him the weapons they needed for an offensive war. While it was known that relations were
reinstated in February 1973 it was not known to the great extent at which the Soviet Union began
to flood the Arabs with weaponry. If their adversaries were under the impression that the Soviet-
Arab relationship was unraveling it would hopefully drive down Israel’s assessments of their
capability.
“I have received from the Russians what I want and now I am satisfied," Sadat told Heikal,
"They are drowning me in new arms. Between December 1972 and June 1973, we received more
arms from them than in the whole of the two preceding years." 15

The Arabs improved their armies’ technical and tactical prowess to be capable of using the
Soviet weaponry. The Syrian army modernized itself after its 1967 failures. The military budget
increased to 20% of the nation’s GDP in 1973. Steps were taken to grant more commissions
based on competence rather than politics and social favoritism. Discipline reduced ethnic, social,
and religious tensions.16 The Egyptian army took drastic steps to increase the caliber of its
fighting men. The failed generals of the previous wars were fired along with those officers
without the education and intelligence to lead complex operations. Whereas Nasser banned
college graduates from the military Sadat’s military had 100,000 graduates of higher learning in
its 800,000 troops.17
The Syrians had a very important tactical advantage upon which their offensive hinged. Their
T-62 battle tanks were equipped with infrared night-sights. Egypt’s Centurion and Patton tanks
were not equipped for night fighting. The Syrian plan relied on their assessed 30 hours upon
which the Purple Line’s defenders would be without reinforcements. They would need every
hour. A top secret operational plan was produced for a three-division night attack on the Golan
Heights – clearing the Israeli front lines, followed by a thrust the next day to capture the rest of
the Golan.

Vulnerability Analysis
Israel’s HUMINT network was pervasive. Preventing it from collecting critical information
about the campaign plan would require limiting knowledge of the plan to only those personnel
absolutely necessary for its development. Successive planning was chosen to limit the spread of
information. Successive planning allowed the Arabs to shift the planning from the strategic to
operational and tactical levels only when those levels needed to know to complete a task.18
Israel’s COMINT capabilities made any coordination between the Egyptians and the Syrians
over electronic means extremely risky. Israel’s COMINT capability was widespread. Thus, the
coordination between the Syrians and Egyptians needed to take place in person. Unfortunately,
this too would incur new indicators for HUMINT. The Syrians decided that they would conceal
the movements of their planners by forgoing the formal modes of travel expected of generals.
Certainly, Center Ten, Egypt’s national military headquarters, was under constant watch.
The necessity to coordinate the war was limited. The Egyptian and Syrian armies would be
fighting on their own fronts. The actual operational plans themselves remained respective to each
nation. Egypt would execute its war plan Granite 2. Syria had its own plan Al-Owda for
capturing the Golan.19 The two nations only needed to synchronize their plans and make small
modifications to ensure they could be executed jointly.
Indicators of mobilization were certainly collectable by the Israelis. The mobilization of
hundreds of thousands of soldiers could not be concealed. However, coupling OPSEC and
deception could lead to a false conclusion, or as the US Army’s regulation 530-1 calls it
“counter-analysis”.
The Egyptians had a ready excuse in hand. Each fall they called up their reserves, much like
Israel, to perform their annual duty requirements. Additionally, Egypt’s military had conducted a
wargame Tahrir (Liberation) for the last six years. The exercise followed the operation’s strategy
perfectly for the last four years. Units moved to the Suez Canal, repaired and upgraded defensive
positions, executed a water crossing, and established a defensive line in the desert.
Through their honest self-analysis Egypt recognized their activity profiles provided them
with several strengths they could capitalize on. One of these was warning fatigue. The Israelis
had witnessed Egyptian forces mobilize into battle formations and move to the Canal five times
by May 1973 and yet no war. The Israelis responded to the May mobilization with one of their
own at a cost of $20 million.20 Israeli intelligence would lend less credence to yet one more such
show of force. The decision makers would be less willing to commit to another expensive
mobilization, especially as Israeli elections were October 28th.
Egypt needed this warning fatigue to extend to the mobilization of its reserves.21 Disruptions
of civilian life for military service outside of normal reserve-duty periods cause social and
economic impacts that governments must take into account as costs. Egypt had greater latitude
than Israel to call up reserves without ill effects but that did not make it immune. With annual
reserve duty mobilizations coming and the size of the Tahrir 41 wargame which would include
army headquarters units and division level exercises it would seem natural that the 1973 reserve
buildup was larger than usual to capitalize on this training event.
May’s mobilization assisted the October mobilization in another way. When the invasion
force demobilized it also hid their bridging assets near the Canal. This would reduce the Israel
IMINT assets’ available observation time, and the processing, assessing, and disseminating
analysts would have in providing warning. Egypt’s crossing sites could not be hid from the
soldiers on the Bar Lev Line. The Israelis could simply mark the coordinates on the map and
strike them on artillery. During the May mobilization Egypt had built 65 ramps to confuse the
Israelis about which would actually be used as the crossing points. Already, the ramps
outnumbered Israel’s 44 artillery pieces in the Sinai.22
Despite the May preparations Egyptian actions along the Canal were still vulnerable to
observation from the Bar Lev Line. Each of the outposts had a 65-foot watchtower. These towers
looked over the Egyptian berms and as far as 25 miles into the desert.23 All Egyptian movement
in the daylight could be observed.
Naming the operation Badr created a vulnerability. Badr referred to a battle on the 10th day of
Ramadan in 642 AD. This year that date would fall on October 6th. However, it was a
vulnerability that Sadat would accept. Naming the operation Badr would solidify it as an Arab
war rather than a Syrian and Egyptian war. Additionally, there was a low probability this
vulnerability would expose the plan. The same close-hold planning that was protecting the
operation would protect Badr’s name. The name was applied seven weeks before Y Day. There
was limited time for Israel’s HUMINT to collect the name.24
Another factor in favoring both Arab armies was they had prepared and constantly manned
positions along both fronts. All of Egypt’s five divisions maintained prepared positions along the
Canal already.25 Syria maintained three divisions between Damascus and the Heights.
The Syrians did not have near the amount of favorable conditions for their own OPSEC.
They had no readily available exercise forthcoming. Instead, their military and intelligence
services set out to make a tense situation between Israel and Syria wherein Syria could claim that
it was the victim of Israeli aggression and that mobilization was needed for their own defense.

Risk Assessment
The Arabs assessed their D&D plan would not allow them complete surprise, but it would
provide them essential secrecy. Once the OPSEC planning was done even Egypt’s deception
planners assumed that Israel would know about Egypt’s plan as early as 15 days before the attack
and at best their plan would be hidden until three days before the attack.26 The goal of their plan
was therefore to mitigate the time with which Israel had to prepare for coming onslaught.
 A warning period of three days would allow Israel plenty of time to mobilize its reserves.
The IDF could mobilize in its entirety in 48 hours according to its assessments and the Egyptians
agreed.27 The mobilization of the soldiers themselves was a concern, but not perhaps the direst
concern. The Bar Lev Line was in disrepair and the Mount Hermon intelligence outpost was
under construction. Both were vulnerable to enemy attack. Even if the Israelis had a three-day
notice they would need more time to prepare their fortifications. Despite the heavy losses the
Arabs might incur attempting to cross reinforced borders the attack was still feasible.
OPSEC alone would not suffice for this operation. There were too many indicators
collectible by their adversaries. Channelizing deceptions were needed. If the Arabs did not
provide their own explanations for the indicators they observed the Israelis might stumble upon
the truth. However, if the Arabs created a narrative that took into account the indicators their
activities would generate the Israelis were likely to believe it. Israel’s own assessments believed
that the Arabs would not meet the Concept’s requirements for war before 1975 so channelizing
deceptions that supported the Concept were likely to be successful. The Egyptians and Syrians
embarked on separate deception activities to mobilize under a false guise.
The D&D activities would be focused primarily at the strategic level. The Israelis were
always oriented toward the Arab nations so there was zero probability that adversarial
intelligence capabilities were not directed at them. However, the Arabs could mitigate the
amount of adversarial collection platforms aimed at them. They could only hide some indicators
from the collection platforms. Therefore, the OPSEC activities would be aimed at disrupting the
decision-making process with the ultimate goal being to compact the time for Israel to act.
There were other factors outside of the vulnerability to Israel’s intelligence apparatus that
affected their assessment of their risk as acceptable. Israeli politicians would be more concerned
with the upcoming elections on October 28th than anything else in October. The politicians would
also be averse to taking political risks. Additionally, the IDF would turn control of its borders
largely over to reserve units for their annual duty in the last week of September. The active duty
would authorize leave to large numbers of troops during this time period, especially during the
Yom Kippur holiday.
If hope against hope the Israelis did not learn of the attack until Yom Kippur their OODA
loop would be further lengthened. The nation’s broadcast media shuts down on the holiday. The
usual mode of announcing emergency mobilization was radio. On Yom Kippur the military
would be forced to hunt down the reservists individually and mobilize them.

Employ D&D Measures

The Egyptians and Syrians faced different obstacles. The Syrians could not employ OPSEC
to deny adversaries’ the capability to observe indicators in the way that Egypt could. They relied
heavily on strategic level deception and tactical OPSEC while the Egyptians were able to weave
D&D together at all levels. Multiple compromises would take place. Some the Arabs would learn
and attempt to correct. Others produced indicators that reached all the way to Israeli decision
makers.

Syrian Mobilization
Syria’s high vulnerability to Israeli intelligence reduced their capability to employ OPSEC.
Much of their activities would fall into the deception category. They set about to create a
politically and military charged situation in which they could explain their mobilization.
 Syrian airplanes attacked an Israeli flight on September 13th, resulting in a 12 to one loss in
favor of the Israelis.28 This solidified Israel’s overestimated capability in their airpower. General
Zeira, Israel’s Director of Military Intelligence, firmly informed the Israeli General Staff that it
was impossible for Syria to contemplate going to war against Israel now.29
There is reason to believe that Syrian intelligence sponsored a terrorist attack to divert the
Israeli government’s attention and further create a probable excuse for mobilization. On
September 28th, two Palestinian terrorists held five Jews and an Austrian customs official hostage
at the Schoenau Castle in Vienna, Austria. The Austrians gave into their demands to close down
the Schoenau transition point, the primary conduit for Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel. Prime
Minister Golda Meir turned her attention to this new issue, even traveling to Austria to petition
for the transition point’s reopening.
In a statement to a German newspaper following the war the terrorists stated their operation
was part of preparations for the imminent Arab attack. While there has been no official
admittance of this by the Egyptian or Syrian government it is known that the terrorists belonged
to the As Sa’iqa (thunder) terror organization which was managed by the Syrian security forces.30
The boasting of such an attack, no matter how successful, would likely result in an unnecessary
and uncomfortable tension between Austria and the Arab sponsors and therefore no admittance is
likely to be forthcoming from a political level. Therefore, we may never know whether this was
truly a part of the Syrian deception as some historians and the terrorists themselves claim.
The Syrians maintained strict OPSEC in the days before the war. All troop movements were
done at night without lights and a minimum of noise. High-ranking officers removed their rank at
the front while troops stayed hidden and dug in during the day.31

Egyptian Mobilization
Egypt mobilized its reserves 22 times in 1973 before September.32 Egypt conducted its last
large-scale mobilization on September 17th. Egyptian media falsely announced that all of these
reserves would be demobilized. Twenty thousand were demobilized to further the ruse.33 A
deferral was announced stopping the remainder from leaving for home. AMAN was not
concerned. It was the third such deferral that year.34 Warning fatigue was set.
Egypt greatly expanded their telephone lines to counter Israeli COMINT. These lines
extended from Cairo to the Suez Canal. They were aware that Israelis were listening to their
radio transmissions. They used the radio nets during their routine activities and for the battle
drills expected to be part of Tahrir. Overt activity died off when staffs announced the end of a
particular night’s scheduled activities. Unknown to Israeli SIGINT the Egyptians switched to
their telephone system and continued operating throughout the night under noise and light
restrictions.35 Only Israel’s “special means” would have broken this communication security
measure.
The Egyptians built their berms on the west bank, though not quite as high as that of the
Israelis. However, the berms were high enough in some places to create blind spots where the
Israelis could not see. Syrian engineers built pads under the berms’ high points to shelter guns
and tanks from overhead IMINT.36
The Egyptians took steps to placate the adversary. Some soldiers were allowed time to relax
along the Canal. Egyptian soldiers spent long hours sunning themselves, resting and fasting
during the early days of Ramadan.37 Israeli soldiers would later remark these soldiers
disappeared moments before the artillery barrage struck.
Close-Hold Planning
The Syrians and Egyptians were aware of adversarial intelligence capabilities within their
own nations. Syrian leaders traveling to Egypt for the planning forewent their military aircraft to
prevent Israeli SIGINT from tracking their travels. Instead, wearing civilian clothing and
equipped with false identities they boarded a passenger liner in Latakia, Syria that docked in
Alexandria, Egypt on August 21st. Rather than going to Center Ten, the Egyptians held their
meetings with the attendees met at naval headquarters. However, these planners did not even
know the date of the attack. It would be left up to Sadat and President Assad of Syria to
determine.38
Prior to October 1st only President Sadat and Minister of War Ismail Ali of Egypt were aware
of the date and time of attack. On October 1st, the Syrian Defense Minister was startled by the
news that his forces which he had been mobilized along the Golan Heights were to launch an
attack in five days.39
Egypt’s army was unaware of the true purpose of Tahrir. According to the journal of General
Shazley, the Egyptian military’s chief of staff, only five days warning was given to the
commanders of Egypt’s Second and Third Armies. Division commanders were given 72-hours’
notice. Brigade commanders were told a day later and their battalion commanders informed 12-
24 hours before the attack. Following the war Israel was amazed to learn from their prisoners just
how ill-informed they were of the reason they marched out into the desert. Many learned only
minutes before the war began.40 Some said they did not know until their commanders told them
to put their boats in the water.41
The Syrian army likewise waited until the last possible moment to inform their soldiers of
their real purpose for mobilization. Company commanders received this information two hours
before beginning movement and platoon leaders were informed an hour thereafter. Even orders
were issued to initiate radio silence and remove all radios from the ranks then to prevent
spillage.42

Soviet-Arab Relationship
The Arabs turned the open source intelligence into open source disinformation. Syrian
newspapers began to highlight a falling out between their government and the Soviet Union.
According to the reports the Soviet advisors were exhausted with the incompetence of their Arab
military counterparts. Those military advisors were in actuality working hand-in-hand to
establish the world’s most comprehensive air defense system. Nor did the Syrians limit this
deception campaign to their own newspapers. The stories frequently showed up in Beirut as
well.43
Sadat criticized the Soviet Union during a September interview for Le Monde. He
complained the Soviets were not giving them the modern weaponry Egypt needed.44 The
Egyptian press ran multiple stories that Cairo was debating on breaking relations from the Soviet
Union and entering negotiations with Western nations to supply arms to the Egyptian army. If
Egypt chose to go that route then it would be many years of acquisition and training before their
army could contemplate an offensive.45

Diplomatic Deception
Sadat declared 1971 to be the “Year of the Decision.”46 Yet 1971 and 1972 passed without
incident. The Egyptian leader’s rhetoric in 1973 was more subdued than previous years.
President Sadat took a more appeasing tone with Israel beginning in June and weeks before the
war began ordered diplomats to follow suit. Sadat spoke in July 1973 that the United Nations
would be the answer for the tension between Egypt and Israel.47 On September 26th during a
speech he said, “I have not broached the subject of fighting because there has not been enough
talk.”48 Assad cooled his relations with the Palestinian fedayeen, removing a Palestinian radio
station that transmitted anti-Semitic propaganda. The lack of an aggressive rhetoric reinforced
Israeli perceptions that the mobilizations which began in September were not hostile.
In the weeks before the war Sadat dispatched his foreign minister to Eastern capitals and his
national security advisors to Western capitals to ensure them that Egypt was committed to a
peaceful solution with Israel.49 Other diplomats were rapidly flying around the Arab world on
another initiative that Sadat had announced. To the Israelis it looked like a desperate national
leader looking to make a headline of success anywhere. In fact, the diplomats were securing the
finances and expeditionary forces needed for the war.

False Scheduling
Schedules were not to indicate any disruption of normal activities in Egypt. One group of
planners finalized the details of a war in late September. Throughout Egypt multiple military
and political planners, unaware of Badr, planned for tasks that would never be carried out.
The Egyptian Army’s internal deception included allowing its transportation officers to
schedule trains for the return of the Alexandria garrison from the front. The Egyptian high
command informed their forces that Tahrir 41 would end October 7th and that routine activity
would continue on October 9th, including military courses.50 In fact training courses and leave
schedules were cancelled.51 A Defense Ministry public release announced registration openings
for soldiers to pilgrimage to Mecca at the end of October just days before hostilities began.52
President Sadat told a foreign representative “he intended to participate in the UN General
Assembly in October.53 A meeting was scheduled between the Romanian and Egyptian War
Ministers on October 8 .54 Syria news media announced that President Assad would travel to
th

eastern Syria on October 10th for a nine-day visit. Egyptian foreign affairs officials traveling
abroad were not recalled to the country prior to the war’s initiation. Many, “including the
Foreign Minister were abroad when the war started”.55 This lack of a recall reduced the
probability of Israeli or pro-Israeli national intelligence communication intercepts. Also, the
recall may have alerted Israeli intelligence that a significant event was about to occur if foreign
relations were being disrupted.
During a conference Sadat attended in September it was noted that the Egyptian leader
looked quite ill. Whether or not the illness at the time was real or fake it was used to spawn
another deception. Egyptian intelligence officials made a show of pretending to be secretly
scouring European medical facilities for a secure place where Sadat could seek treatment for the
illness. Surely, if the Egyptian commander-in-chief was sick then he would not be authorizing a
war for which he unlikely had the stamina to direct.

Unready Armies
The Arabs exploited Israel’s belief that Egypt and Syria lacked resources to launch an attack.
The Egyptian Navy allowed false information that two submarines were scheduled for
maintenance in Pakistan to convince the Israelis their Navy was ill prepared for conflict.56 In
actuality those submarines put to sea to blockade the Israeli coast. A supposedly classified report
leaked to the media indicated that only “40% of the [Egyptian] army’s weaponry and 60% of
aircraft were operable.”57 Egypt and Syria spread disinformation in the coffee houses, especially
in Beirut. They claimed the Soviets denied them critical weapon systems and aircraft parts. They
emphasized the situation as being so bad that the Arab air forces were nearly grounded because
of maintenance issues.58 The Arabs continued to pretend that they were abiding by the Concept.
The Israelis knew that the Egyptian Armed Forces Supreme Council consistently opposed
military action, arguing that even a limited ground operation without adequate offensive
capability in the air could turn into a disastrous defeat.59
The Arabs turned Israel’s open source intelligence into open source disinformation. The
Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram was a witting agent, distributing false news. Foreign outlets were
simply a conduit. The news reports featured articles on corruption in the military, low morale,
high crash rates of military aircraft, shortages in pilots, spare parts, and gasoline.60 Everything
was designed to further the Israeli opinion that the Arabs were unprepared for war either
logistically or professionally. Egypt invited the foreign military attaches in Cairo to observe a
military exercise in July. One attaché commented that “everything that could go wrong did.”
They were not aware it was a ruse so that the information would get back to Israel and further
drive down their assessment of the Egyptian army’s capability.61

Assessing OPSEC
Arab and Israeli troops were able to observe each other from their positions. While Israeli
reports were filled with information about growing Arab troop numbers and preparations along
the border the Arab reports reflected an absence
of Israeli preparations. Mount Hermon, the most
important of the border outposts called the “eyes
of Israel,” was one such place where the Israelis
could observe Syrian reinforcements pouring
into the border region daily. On the other hand,
the Syrians noted that no action was being taken
to finish the outpost’s incomplete fortifications.
If the Israelis were worried about repelling a
Syrian attack they showed no sign.62 As of
October 5th, they saw no indications that Israel
understood that war was coming.63
Figure 3 Mt Hermon Intelligence Outpost147
On October 5th, the Egyptian commanders
inside Center Ten were becoming paranoid that the lack of Israeli mobilization was a ruse. Their
risk assessment’s most positive estimates stated the Israelis should have begun reacting within
the last 24 hours. They dispatched dozens of reconnaissance teams on across the Canal to report
on Israel’s readiness. The scouts reported, “The Israelis are asleep.” Egyptian OPSEC was
working.64 The arrival of officers at RefidimAirbase in the Sinai was initially mistaken as an
indicator that Israel was starting to respond. The officers were in fact showing up for a change of
command ceremony.
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger informed the Arabs that one piece of critical
information was known by the Israelis. Golda Meir sent a message to tell Washington on October
6th that Israel was aware that an attack would occur at 1800 that night. Kissinger, likely in an
attempt to convince the Arabs they had lost surprise, told them. The Arabs were shocked and
elated. Israel was unaware the time was changed to 1400. The attack would still catch them by
surprise.65
As the Israeli decision makers failed in their portion of the OODA loop until October 6th the
IDF’s time to act was constrained. Because of Yom Kippur’s restraints on broadcast television
and radio during the holiday the mobilization cadre were forced to send couriers hunting houses.
One benefit to the Israelis was how many Jews, even those that considered themselves
nonreligious attended services on Yom Kippur, much like Easter or Christmas service in
America. Lists of names were delivered to synagogues where rabbis broke their services to read
off the names, at times including the names of their own children, to join their units.

The War
On October 6th at 1400 hours Egypt and
Syria launched simultaneous attacks on Israel.
Sixty planes launched the first attack on the
Golan Heights.66 Egypt on the other hand
attacked with 250 fighters. Egypt did not forget
OPSEC in the opening of their war. Their
airplanes targeted radar, communications, and
command and control centers to blind the
Israelis and reduce their capability to pass
intelligence and orders. The dust barely settled
from the air raid before 2,000 Egyptian artillery
pieces began a 53-minute bombardment to cover
the 8,000 troops that crossed in the first wave.67
Figure 4 Egyptian soldiers celebrating the successful crossing of the Suez
The Arabs achieved tactical surprise. Canal 148
General Peled’s IAF took to the air immediately
to prevent the Egyptian crossing. They ran smack into the Arab air defense umbrella. Throughout
the first several days of the war the Israelis were unable to provide their ground forces air
support and lost 100 planes.68 The Egyptians enacted their battle plan Dovecote, sending their
tanks charging toward the Canal, and straight into the sights of the Saggers. Within a day General
Mandler’s brigade lost more than two-thirds of its 290 tanks.69
The Third Army Commander later reported he was pleasantly surprised that he lost 10% of
his force rather than the 30% predicted. The war planners assessed they could sustain up to
30,000 casualties in the crossing alone. Instead, barely 200 were killed.70
The Syrians’ human wave attacks overwhelmed the Israeli defenders in the Golan’s southern
areas. They even closed in on the Northern Command post at Nafakh. The Israeli Barak Brigade
was down to 15 tanks fighting against 450 before reinforcements arrived. The fighting was so
fierce tanks were firing on each other at point blank range. Syrian commandos seized the Mount
Hermon outpost, capturing sensitive electronics, military codes, and intelligence professionals
The Israelis did not discover the critical information of the limits of Egypt’s attack. Because
Israel was not aware of the limited territorial objectives they were under the impression that like
in previous wars the Arabs intended to destroy the state of Israel. Even Minister of Defense
Moshe Dayan lamented that the Third Temple was about to be destroyed. This is a reference to
Israel. The first Jewish temple was destroyed by the Babylonians in 586 BC and the second in 70
AD by the Roman legions.
 Relying on the plans Marwan provided them they believed that Egypt would attempt to
move from the Suez to the Gidi and Mitla passes immediately. After Dovecote failed the Israelis
established defensive lines at the passes. A number of sources even claim that Israel placed its
nuclear arsenal in an advanced state of readiness.71 The situation was indeed grim.
The tide started to turn on October 7th. That night,
despite having open roads before them the Syrians halted
their advance. This may have been to prevent from
opening a seam between the forces in the south which
were deep in the Golan and the forces in the north which
were still struggling against a strong Israeli defense. Or it
may have been because its supply lines were over-
extended. It allowed the Israeli reserves time to arrive and
stave off their attack on the Northern Command post at
Nafakh. The Israelis largely stabilized the northern front
by October 8th and started their push to Damascus. They
would end up shelling the outskirts of the city by October Figure 5 Israeli Troops Counterattack Across the
13th. Paratroopers retook the Mount Hermon outpost on Suez149
October 22 .nd

The failure in the north prompted the Syrians to beg Egypt for assistance. Egypt reluctantly
complied on October 14th. It sent two divisions outside of the SAM umbrella against Israeli
defensive positions. Free of the SAM threat the IAF dismantled the attacking Egyptian force.
Afterward, the Israelis secured a bridgehead on October 16th and crossed into Egypt. Soon the
Egyptian Third Army was in danger of annihilation. By October 25th the Arabs and Israelis
agreed to a UN resolution cease-fire. Dayan remarked on his disbelief of the fighting ability that
Arabs showed in the war. “As for the fighting standard of the Arab soldiers, I can sum it up in
one sentence: they did not run away.”77
The war had a high cost. The Israelis suffered more than 11,000 casualties, 2,800 killed. The
Arabs suffered over 28,000, 8,500 killed.73 The Syrians lost 1,400 tanks in the fighting. Israel
was clearly the victor in numbers alone.74 However, due to Israel’s smaller population the loss of
life was percentage was more significant. Syria received no returned land. The peace agreement
returned full control of the Suez Canal to Egypt. A year later the Israelis would agree to withdraw
further into the Sinai. Israel would finally give all of the Sinai back after the 1978 Camp David
Accords.

OPSEC Success, Intelligence Failure, Both?

Many OPSEC compromises occurred in Operation Badr. Israeli intelligence collected a
number of indicators. Yet Israel reacted too late. Was it an intelligence failure or an OPSEC
success? Does one cancel out the other or does one in fact confirm the other?
Former Israeli Lieutenant General Chaim Bar Lev would argue that Israel was subject to
warning failure. The Arabs achieved “surprise in place, time, and method.”75 Any OPSEC
professional would be extremely proud if their operation achieved surprise in all three areas,
especially with the number of indicators they could not prevent from collection. Kissinger would
later state, “There was no lack of intelligence; it was the interpretation of the reports that was
faulty.”76 When OPSEC cannot hide indicators then it seeks to enforce a counter-analysis, or an
errant assessment. This is certainly the case which happened here.
 On August 30th AMAN learned that the Soviets delivered surface-to-surface missiles to both
Syria and Egypt. The Egyptians received Scuds and Syria received Frogs.77 Yet the Israelis
assessed it would be years before the Arabs were well trained enough they could consider using
the weapon systems.
General Hoffi informed the General Staff of his concerns about the Syrian mobilization on
September 24th. General Zeira’s opinion that Syria lacked the capability for war was solidified by
the IAF’s victory on September 13th. He firmly informed the Israeli General Staff that it was
impossible for Syria to contemplate going to war against Israel now.78
On the night of September 25th, King Hussein of Jordan flew to Tel Aviv and met with Prime
Minister Golda Meir. He informed her that Syria was preparing to go war. He further told her he
strongly believed they were coordinating with the Egyptians for a two-front attack. However, his
warning was not specific in date, nor was he certain about the Egyptian involvement. Dayan
asked the chief of staff to review possibilities of an unannounced Syrian attack on the Golan.79
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan visited Northern Command on September 26th, as part of a
customary visit prior to the Jewish New Year. Unlike many other Israeli leaders who were taking
their news strictly fromAMAN Dayan observed the Golan Heights personally. He listened to the
commanding general of Northern Command, General Hofi and other local commanders whose
views were not reaching Tel Aviv. He ordered an official alert on all fronts and sent two
companies of the Seventh Armored Brigade to redeploy on the Golan.80
A SIGINT officer, Shabtai Brill, was not convinced by his superiors’ surety in the Concept.
The Syrians moved squadrons of Sukhoi-7s to forward air bases on September 28th. This was
unusual because the Syrians usually kept the Sukhoi-7s deeper in the country because of the
threat posed by the IAF. He was also convinced that Egypt’s mobilization was not related to an
exercise. A convoy of 300 loaded ammunition trucks left Cairo for the Canal. It was certainly
more ammunition than any exercise warranted.81
The CIA shared intelligence with Israel on September 30th. They informed the Israelis on
September 24th that that Egypt’s actions differed greatly from the profile they had built on
monitoring past activities and indicators associated with a wargame.82 Bridging equipment and
boats were observed moving to the Canal on September 27th. The Egyptian and Syrian air
defenses were both placed on alert thereafter.83 They also confirmed that the Soviet Union
provided 17 MI-8 helicopters and nine KA-25 helicopters in September.84
On September 30th, the IDF senior leaders once again met to review the indicators in their
possession. The IDF’s Deputy Chief of Staff Yisrael Tal urged the Chief of Staff to prepare to
face the threat that the enemy’s capabilities posed rather than Israel’s assessment of their intent.
AMAN supported Dayan’s assessment that at best the Syrians might prepare an extremely
limited raid to penetrate the Golan and occupy an IDF outpost.85 They forewent adding Egypt’s
activities into the situation. Just two days prior Egypt had raised the alert level of its air force,
navy, and some ground units.86
On October 1st, Israel received warning from sources deemed “totally reliable” that a
“massive and unprecedented” flow of Soviet arms into Syria. Reports received on October 2nd
included Syrian movement of bridging equipment, fighter aircraft and SAM batteries.87 The
SAM batteries redeployed from defensive positions around Damascus moved into operational
pods that would allow them to cover the entire Golan Heights.88 Despite this General Shalev
informed Golda Meir they still assessed the probability of an attack as low. If Syria was worried
about an Israeli attack the way Zeira and Shalev claimed then it made no sense to be strip
Damascus’ air defenses.89
 In the first week of October Israeli military officers along the Bar-Lev Line reported that
hostile action was probably imminent. The Egyptian engineering on the west bank was
extensive. “Aerial photography confirmed that additional ramparts were being thrown up, new
bunkers were being built and others strengthened, roads were being resurfaced and, in two areas,
extended.”90 Observers noted that sometimes Egyptian soldiers wore chemical protective
overalls. Israel had little in the way of night-vision equipment but their few devices enabled them
to see the Egyptians were unloading equipment on the west bank under the cover of darkness.91
Mossad agents reported that Egypt was conducting blackout and air raid drills. Commando
units were also being moved to new locations. However, unlike the Egyptian regulars and
reserves which were moving freely under the guise of the Tahrir exercise these commandos were
mobilizing quietly.92
General Avraham Mandler placed his division on the first alert stage on October 1st as a
precaution.93 The commanding general of Israel’s Southern Command, General Samuel Gonen,
toured the Suez Canal fortifications on October 2nd and raised the alert level of the Sinai forces.
Holiday leave of mission essential personnel was cancelled. (Steven 1980, 363) He was not
sufficiently convinced to issue a general cancellation of all personnel leave.
A secret order was compromised on October 2nd. The Second and Third Egyptian Armies
were to be put on alert through discreet channels. Instead it was transmitted openly. It was picked
up by the Middle East News Agency and became open source. However, the government
newspaper Al Ahram almost immediately sent out a message to cover it. Through their self-
assessments they recognized their propensity for overblown threats which reduced the
seriousness with which the Israelis took them. They put out another bombastic threat towards
Israel, threatening the nation if it did not cease its provocations of Syria. Israeli intelligence
laughed at the threat and forgot the rest despite the fact that bridging equipment was observed
moving towards Third Army crossing sites.94 95
On October 2nd, Israeli intelligence received reports both the Syrians and Egyptians moved
their bridging equipment forward.96 Fusion of these reports could have indicated that a joint
Egyptian-Syrian offensive was underway, confirming that one Concept requirement was met.
There would certainly be no reason for Egypt to move its forces all the way to the Canal for their
exercise and the Syrians had no use for bridges in a defensive operation.
By October 3rd General Hofi was declaring the situation dire. He no longer needed
intelligence assessments to tell him how bad the situation was.97 Three divisions were stationed
along the Golan before the April training cycle. Now five reinforced divisions were on his
doorstep. The absence of the usual second line of Syrian defenses showed that the Syrians were
not preparing to defend but to attack.98 Tel Aviv dismissed the concerns of their northern
command’s commanding general. An attack simply did not fit the Concept. The combination of
the September 13th air battle and the September 28th terrorist attack had done its job. Despite the
general’s concern Prime Minister Meir and her cabinet assessed that Syrian mobilization along
the Golan Heights was defensive posturing in case the Israelis retaliated for the Schoenau
incident.99
The Israelis decided that an air reconnaissance mission over the Canal was required
despite the danger the SAMs posed. General Mandler was so concerned he ordered his staff
to wake him as soon as results were ready.100 Over the night of Thursday, October 4th,
analysts noted change detection within a 20-mile swath of the Canal. Every piece of Egyptian
equipment was counted. Their detections indicated 80-85% of Egypt’s capable military strength
undergoing movement during Tahrir 41.101 In 10 days, Egyptian artillery had increased from 800
to 1,100 guns. Tanks in position behind the Canal’s ramparts and a critical mass of bridging
equipment was observed. The analysts completed a bleak assessment at 0655 on October 5th. It
concluded Egypt was deployed to attack. Despite this assessment the “professionals” in Tel Aviv
maintained the probability of attack as being low.
Not only did Israel have its overhead IMINT assessment on October 5th but an Israeli agent
provided photographs and field maps of the location of trenches, airports, missile bases, and the
deployment of various units in the Canal Zone area. He reportedly had obtained intelligence
about unusually dense troop movements about a month before the invasion, but it was claimed
later that this information reached Israel only after the war. (Rip 1992, 130) Additional pieces of
evidence continued to become available throughout October 5th. At about 1700, a SIGINT station
intercepted a non-Arab message stating that there would shortly be war on both fronts.102
On October 4th Kissinger asked the US Intelligence Community about the probability of a
Middle East war. The DIA claimed the Arab buildup was nonthreatening while the INR assessed
war was unlikely. In Israel the general staff meeting did not even mention the Arab buildup.103
What should have been a weighted indicator for the Israelis was the arrival of the 47th Armored
Brigade along the Golan. The 47th was an always-ready military unit based in Homs, Syria. The
city was and continues to be a base of militant Islamic extremism. The 47th Brigade was a
defender of the secular regime against the militant radical Islamists. Captured Syrian soldiers
from a cross-border raid had informed their Israeli captors that if the 47th was ever deployed it
meant war, because for no other reason would they redeploy from maintaining government
control of Homs.104
Soviet commercial airliners were detected evacuating the families of Soviet advisers from
Cairo and Damascus that night. The Soviet fleet stationed near Alexandria and Port Said began
moving out.105 The Israelis and the Americans incorrectly assumed that relations between the
Arabs and the Soviets broke down. This might be considered an OPSEC success except that for
on the following day Soviet transports were observed landing in Damascus, filled with military
hardware. Yet the Israelis and Americans did not change their conclusion.
The Mossad duty officer called one of Zeira’s deputies in the early hours of the morning to
report an extraordinary piece of information. An agent in Cairo provided him with the date and
time of the attack. Rather than being thankful Zeira’s deputy threatened that if the Mossad officer
ever woke him again at such an hour with a ridiculous story he would ruin the man’s career.106
A second compromise occurred October 5th. The head of Egypt’s civil aviation ordered
cessation of all flights into Cairo and ordered all planes be sent to safety in Tripoli.107 War
Minister Ismail ordered the flight restriction rescinded for fear it might tip off the Israelis.
On October 5th, at the meeting that would later be deemed the “war cabinet” Zeira
maintained the party line that Syrians were deploying their forces defensively when the Minister
of Defense and Chief Inspector of the Armored Forces clamored for mobilization due to reports
that Syrian mobilization along the Golan Heights had reached unprecedented levels.108
Chief of Staff Elazar placed the IDF on “C” Alert, the highest state of readiness for the nation
since the War of Attrition. This was important as it stopped the holiday leave for the IDF soldiers
that were preparing to be released in the morning for Yom Kippur. Many of these soldiers were
released already and in the days before e-mail and cell phones they could not be easily
recalled.109 The Seventh Armored Brigade was called upon to send more of its units to the Golan
Heights. Two battalions, one tank and one artillery, were dispatched to the Golan, decreasing
Syria’s numerical advantage from 18 to one in tanks to eight to one against the Israelis.110 Golda
Meir ordered reserve mobilization centers to remain open on Yom Kippur in the event they were
needed.111 Logistics centers were told to begin preparations to arm and equip the reserves.112
Shortly after the cabinet dispersed AMAN produced its final risk assessment before the war.
Thirty-nine paragraphs of alarming indicators were recounted in the report, but the AMAN
Egyptian desk officer appended his own final paragraph. The paragraph read:

“Though the actual taking up of emergency positions on the Canal appears to contain
indicators testifying to an offensive initiative, according to our best evaluation no change has
occurred in the Egyptian assessment of the balance of power between their forces and the IDF.
Therefore, the probability that the Egyptians intend to resume hostilities is low.”113

AMAN dismissed 39 paragraphs of indicators because they were unaware Concept’s

capability requirements were met. They were unwilling to look at the facts and take into account
the possibility that Egypt changed its plan. Intelligence activities require professionals are able to
reason, open-minded, detached, imaginative, skeptic, intellectually honest, accurate, patient,
diligent, and persevering.114 Instead, AMAN showed anchor bias, an unwillingness to deter from
one piece of information it held to be gospel truth.
General Mandler was set to be replaced that Friday. He greeted his successor with the
reconnaissance report detailing an Egyptian artillery buildup on the Canal. The two agreed to
postpone the handover as war appeared imminent.115
On the Suez front Major Weissal, the commander of the Parkun fort radioed higher to inform
them that the rooftop of a villa across the Canal was occupied by a number of high-ranking
Egyptian officers. Unknown to him one of those men on the villa was General Shazley. By the
time an intelligence team arrived the Egyptian officers were gone.116
Zvi Zamir received word that Marwan wanted to meet him in London. He flew from Israel
and met the agent at 2300. Marwan informed him that an attack would occur on the morrow.
There is some discrepancy whether Marwan told him that the attack would occur at sunset or
exactly at 1800. The attack was previously set to occur at 1800 but changed to 1400 on October
4th. Zamir phoned Tel Aviv and told his chief of bureau a cryptic but somber message.117
General Zeira was awakened at his home around 0300 on October 6th. An Egyptian Jew in
the Egyptian military radioed headquarters and informed them that orders were received to
conduct an attack at 1800 that day. Additionally, a flammable retardant was being sprayed on
uniforms. This chemical would ruin the uniforms and was certainly not for use in an exercise.118
The general finally believed.
The soldiers guarding the border awoke to sobering views on October 6th. The Syrians had
moved their artillery forward during the night. This was a serious concern. Artillery would
usually remain as far back from Syrian lines as possible where it could provide defensive fires to
the forward Syrian positions but reduce its own vulnerability to tank and counterbattery fire.
Now the artillery was moved forward so the batteries could range the entire Golan and into
Galilee.119 Movement was heard on the west bank of the Canal throughout the night. The
morning sun revealed mounds of life preservers stacked near the boat ramps.120 Later that
morning, Israeli intelligence intercepted telephone calls from junior Syrian officers. They told
relatives in Lebanon not to come to Syria that weekend.121
Despite all information received by the morning of October 6th, Dayan was only willing to
authorize 100,000 personnel to be mobilized. Elazar would go on to issue a wider spread
mobilization on his own initiative.122 Despite the massive amount of collected indicators and
collected pieces of critical information some doubt still lingered about whether or not they would
be attacked.
With the date being known the exact time became a matter of if not critical at least sensitive
information. The Israeli response plan was centered on the 1800 attack. SIGINT officers doubted
command had the right time. Egyptian radio nets went silent at 1000. While it is normal to clear
radio nets before an attack so that a commander can access all of his or her forces it is not normal
to do so eight hours early.123
General Mandler’s division was warned of an imminent artillery attack at 1200. He planned
on sending his tanks to the Canal at 1700. He worried if they arrived too early it could be seen as
a provocation or the tanks would be targeted by artillery. That would be far too late for the
soldiers guarding the Bar Lev Line. At 1345 General Gonen called General Mandler to inform
him to move the timetable forward and deploy his tanks to the Canal. Mandler replied with irony,
“Yes, I suppose had. We are being bombed at the moment.”124 Despite all the precautions
General Mandler took he was also a victim of Egyptian OPSEC. It was not until 1500 hours that
he realized that today was no small raid, but a full-scale Egyptian assault.125

Problems in the Intelligence Community

Israel intelligence failed to estimate the military situation despite clear indicators and the
flow of information from reliable sources about the imminent Arab offensive. The main cause of
this failure was the self-deception and complacency of the Israeli military establishment and the
belief by the Israeli hawks of the technological disparity between them and their adversaries.126
Imminent attack should have been evident from informants as well as the absence of the usual
second line of Syrian defenses.127
Elazar informed the Agranat Commission that the intelligence cycle process too slow for him
to issue the strategic warning Israel needed to mobilize its troops. He complained that had
several pieces of collected information reached him when it was collected on October 5th, rather
than a day later he would have been able of providing that warning. Elazar stated that only after
the war did he learn that Israeli agents around the world sent 200 cables warning of imminent
war. Had he been informed he believes they might have changed his assessment of war
probability earlier.128
Colonel Ben-Porat noted several issues in his intelligence unit. They lacked Arabic speakers
and according to him soldiers enough who were intelligent enough to be in intelligence. In a
remark that has been uttered more than once about our own military, Ben-Porat lamented the unit
focused on fighting the last war, and not on the new challenges that would present themselves in
future wars. He also claimed that he was understaffed. He requested General Zeira allow him to
mobilize up to 150 intelligence reservists. Zeira had rebuked him, telling him that intelligence
was supposed to “calm the nerves of the country, not destabilize society and the market. He
further added he would not let the colonel draft “even one-quarter part of a reserve soldier.”129
AMAN’s intelligence failure is made all the more lamentable by a major compromise of
Egypt’s war plans. As early as February 1973 the Mossad Chief Zvi Zamir informed Prime
Minister Meir of plans received from Marwan that outlined the four-stage plan Egypt would use
in the Yom Kippur War.130 These war plans showed that Egypt no longer held to their assessment
that had turned into Israel’s Concept.
Marwan’s information included the deployment of large number of Sagger and other antitank
missiles as well as using air defense weaponry to negate the IAF’s air superiority.131 Israeli
intelligence collaborated with the US military on the Sagger issue. The armored corps even
developed countermeasures to the Sagger. Unfortunately, it was not taken seriously and the
information was not disseminated to the tankers.132 In regards to the Sagger it was an intelligence
failure.
On September 30th AMAN disseminated a special intelligence summary that told its readers
to discount any indicators they observed between October 1st and October 7th along the Canal.
The summary noted the exceptional indicators for war that would occur during Tahrir 41 and
ended the summary saying “which, at first sight, can be seen as alert signals, are in actuality
solely connected to the exercise.”133 War exercises by a hostile nation on one’s border is usually
a time for increased vigilance, not less. Military exercises provide the perfect cover for
mobilization. Colonel Ben-Porat, head of AMAN’s SIGINT collections, wrote on that subject
after observing Soviet tanks suddenly shift from war games to invading Czechoslovakia. He
noted that only in the last stage of the exercise when the exercising units switch from maneuver
exercises to attack does an adversary know. He also cautioned that militaries should always be on
alert when their adversary undertakes any exceptionally large or abnormal exercise.134
AMAN failed to distribute a series of very important photographs that might have ended the
war in the first few hours. General Peled of the IAF only discovered them two weeks after the
war began. These photos, taken on Yom Kippur, showed Egyptian brigades lined up bumper to
bumper, waiting to move into the Canal Zone. Peled claimed had the photographs reached him
he could have enacted more destruction on the Egyptians that day than in the entire Six-Day
War.135 AMAN certainly failed to disseminate its intelligence. As a matter of OPSEC it could be
argued that the overwhelming strategic surprise inflicted on the agency disrupted its intelligence
cycle.
Reports contradicting the Concept were suppressed. A young intelligence order of battle
officer, Lieutenant Benjamin Simon-Tov was not fooled by Egypt’s deceptions. He was not
wedded to the Concept the way AMAN was. Like a good military intelligence professional, he
checked off the tried and true indicators and warning checklists. Too many indicators of war
were checked green or unconfirmed. One indicator was especially concerning. The Egyptians
were stockpiling ammunition and emergency supplies.136
With these checklists as his proof he wrote and submitted two papers to his superior,
Lieutenant Colonel David Gedaliah, that assessed that an Egyptian attack was imminent, the
second being as late as October 3rd.137 Unfortunately, both reports were suppressed by the
lieutenant colonel. Six months after the war Gedaliah would be dismissed and Simon-Tov
promoted when the reports came out in the war’s aftermath, although too late for Israel.137
Young Simon-Tov was not alone in his censure by superiors. K ing Hussein’s September
th
25 warning alarmed Lieutenant Colonel Zusia Knizer, head of AMAN’s Jordan desk. He sent
the information to Lieutenant Colonel Avi Yaari of the Syrian desk who in turn informed
Northern Command. Their proactivity was met with reprimand. General Aryeh Shalev, the head
of AMAN’s analysis section, entered official rebukes in both officers’ files for causing
unnecessary distress to the northern command.139
Zeira greatly overstepped his bounds. A CIA report predicting that “war was imminent” was
provided to the Israeli ambassador to the United States. In turn, the ambassador made sure it
reached Golda Meir. Zeira saw it as unnecessarily unsettling for his prime minister. He bypassed
Mossad, the appropriate liaison agency with the CIA, and contacted the CIA to ensure they were
aware of his interpretation of the indicators.140
Israeli intelligence ultimately failed to understand the indicators they observed because they
were solely focused on two wrong conclusions. First, AMAN would not deviate from the
wording of the Concept. They looked for very specific weapons, such as five squadrons of
Mirage-23 fighter-bombers. This did not allow for the fact that different equipment such as the
SAMs would cancel out Israeli air superiority. Neither did the Israelis account for the fact that
the Arabs intent differed than the previous Israel-Arab conflicts. Indicators were only through the
glass of a general war, not the limited war for small territorial gains and a political rather than a
military solution.

OPSEC Success
Despite the inexcusable biases afflicting the Israeli intelligence community the Arabs’ D&D
activities can still be considered successful. Although it is highly unlikely that the OPSEC
measures would have been successful had the Israeli intelligence community been less biased,
that was not their field to plow. They analyzed the deteriorated condition of the Israelis, namely
being the Concept, accurately. While employing measures to disrupt the OODA loop at multiple
points they succeeded in confounding the decision point and reaction. Therefore, they achieved
their desired result. Thus, the OPSEC should be considered successful.
The Syrians had excellent security, in the form of the Israeli decision makers. The Israelis
were the victim of counter-analysis despite the massive army directly before them.141 While in
complete view of the Israeli defenders, their OPSEC was so effective the element of strategic
surprise was protected completely despite all loss of tactical surprise.
Israel, at a loss as to why their intelligence networks failed to collect Arab intentions
conducted a thorough survey of their 8,000 prisoners of war. Only one was aware of their
mobilization’s true purpose as early as October 3rd and 95% were unaware until the morning of
October 6th.142 Coming from a nation where taxi drivers shared the morning Cabinet’s news in
the afternoon OPSEC had greatly changed Egypt’s open culture.
A Pentagon spokesman admitted that the United States was taken aback by the support the
Soviets showed the Arabs. As the National Security Council’s flawed memo indicated the United
States was convinced that Arab-Soviet relations were breaking down. "We never imagined that
the Soviet Union would do what it has done, after the tough verbal campaigns waged against it in
the Arab world, and after the cooling of relations with Cairo following the exodus of the
Soviets." Arab soldiers on the front gloated over the success of this deception. "Some of you may
have believed all this talk -- yet our friendship is flourishing -- after all, I was being trained to
use Soviet-produced anti-tank RPG." 143 Sadat happy told Radio Cairo in a 1975 interview that
his 1972-1973 public disagreements with the Soviets was "a strategic cover -- a splendid
strategic distraction for our going to war." 144
Syria and Egypt were right not to trust the Jordanian king. Despite his warning to Israel about
their intent he was not able to provide an exact date, nor even confirm that Egypt and Syria had a
confirmed alliance. While the king’s warning should have been taken seriously by Israel the Arab
planner’s OPSEC kept him from providing the Israelis any critical information.
Proper threat analysis allowed them to identify the Israeli misconceptions and the avenues by
which they would later feed their deception. Their vulnerability analysis led them to develop
countermeasures that would counter many of the Israeli intelligence capabilities. It also helped
them identify that without deception essential secrecy would not be maintained. Their risk
assessment was conservative. Their application of OPSEC measures, combined with their
deception activities led to a successful attack against an unprepared adversary.
Lessons
It is important for OPSEC professionals to remember that OPSEC is a subset of information
operations. Effective coordination with public affairs and military deception planners can ensure
essential secrecy by redirecting the focus or causing a counter-analysis of the adversary.
Coordinating with these other professionals is extremely important when action control and
measures alone will not suffice. While OPSEC alone can result in a counter-analysis the
channelizing deceptions greatly increase the probability of success. Without channeling an
adversary toward a conclusion there is the threat they may stumble upon the right answer or may
arrive at a wrong conclusion where they overestimate your capabilities or intent.
OPSEC can be focused at strategic, operational, or tactical levels. No matter how sure the
soldiers on the Suez Canal or the Golan Heights were of the danger they faced their capabilities
to respond were limited. Until the decision makers could see through the adversary’s OPSEC and
decided to act no reinforcements would be forthcoming.
OPSEC can be aimed at any or all points of the OODA loop. If an adversary does not detect
your activity than complete surprise can be achieved. If they observe your indicators but do not
focus their collection capabilities on your activities thereafter they are unlikely to build or match
enough indicators to profile to conclude your future activities. If the adversaries orient their
collection capabilities toward you but your OPSEC prevents them from seeing the accurate
picture they are likely to make an incorrect assessment. If your OPSEC prevents them from
discovering your capabilities, activities, limitations, or intent until you are about to act then they
may delay their decision until it is too late to for them to counter. Essential secrecy and complete
surprise are not necessarily the same thing.
Know thy adversary. The Arab plans were successful because of their awareness of Israel’s
Concept. They knew how to formulate their D&D activities to play against Israel’s
misconceptions. They also had a healthy respect for Israel’s intelligence services. Their over-
exaggerated threat to Israel in the wake of an OPSEC compromise on October 2nd shows that
they understood their
Know thyself. The Arabs did an honest self-assessment. This allowed them to recognize
strengths they already had such as warning fatigue. They recognized weaknesses that could be
turned into strengths such as their propensity for making bombastic threats.
OPSEC can be offensive. Often OPSEC is focused on controlling sensitive information by
attempting to deny an adversary access. However, OPSEC measures include using force against
adversarial information collection systems. The Egyptians began their attack by targeting radar
and other sensors that would track their movements. Their attack also shows the importance of
maintaining OPSEC once surprise has been achieved. This attack hindered Israel’s ability to
develop an accurate picture of the situation.
Lastly, hope but verify. The Arab OPSEC fed into Israel’s estimate. It can be easy for
intelligence professionals and decision-makers to be lulled into complacency when the
adversary’s OPSEC plays into what you hope to see. If the intelligence points toward a positive
friendly outcome it is time to begin worrying that OPSEC and/or other forms of information
operations are being directed against you.
About the Author
Jim Garrett is an intelligence analyst in the 110th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade. He has served
as an OPSEC officer at battalion and brigade, the assistant OPSEC program manager for the
Missouri National Guard, and a member of the Army National Guard’s G3 Protection
Assessment Team. If you have any questions or feedback about the article you may contact him
at jimmy.garrett3@gmail.com. Additional OPSEC Lessons in History articles are available
through the IOSS. His papers on intelligence and other military matters are available at
https://americanmilitary.academia.edu/JimGarrett
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