Grego vs COMELEC

Facts: In 1981, Basco was removed as Deputy Shriff for serious misconduct in an administrative
complaint filed by a certain Tordesillas (Tordesillas ruling).
In 1988, BAsco ran and won as councillor in Manila. He was also re-elected in 1992. However, his
win in the 1992 election was questioned by another candidate (and two more petitions) alleging Basco’s
ineligibility on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. All of these were however dismissed.
In 1995, Basco ran again and won a third and final term by emerging sixth in a battle for six
councilots. This time petitioner Grego filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualifictation, for the
suspension of Basco’s proclamation and for the declaration of Maranan (the 7th placer) instead.
During the pendency of the case filed by Grego, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as the
duly elected councillor.
Comelec 1st Division: dismissed petition of Grego.
COmelec en banc: denied MR.

Issue: (main) WON Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective position since he had been
removed from office as a result of an admin case as per Sec 40 (b) LGC.
Subissue1: WON the provision applies retroactively to those removed prior to its
effectivity on January 1, 1992.
Subissue2: WON respondents election three times wiped away and condoned the admin
penalty against him
Subsubissue: WON the Tordessilas decision barred BAsco from running for any
elective position.
Subissue3: WON his proclamation during the pendency of the disqualification case is void
ab initio.
Subissue4: WON Maranan the 7th placer may be declared winner instead pursuant to Sec6
RA 6646.

Held:

No. there is no legal impediment for Basco to continue in office as councillor of the 2nd district of Manila.

1. No. General rule is that the law operates only prospectively and not retroactively. That the
provision in the code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal from office and
that it is couched in the past tense does not necessarily mean that it should be applied retroactively..
there is no such intent expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of
the code.
2. Issue being raised by petitioner is beside the point because it proceeds from the assumption that
Basco was in the first palce disqualified when he ran. This assumption is untenable because he was
not subject to any disqualification at all under the LGC.
Subsub: the decretal portion of the Tordesillas decision “prejudiced the reinstatement of
Basco to any position in the local/national govt…”. under the former Civil Service Decree,
the term reinstatement referred only to appointive positions not elective position.
3. No. the provisions and jurisprudence cited by petitioner are not applicable in this case.
 Sec20(i), RA 7166
- This refers only to avoid proclamation in relation to contested returns and not to contested
disqualifications of a candidate.
Sec6, RA 6646
- Suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive as per the use of the word
“may” in this provision. The discretion of the COMELEC to suspend is based on the question
of won the evidence of guilt is so strong to warrant such suspension. In this case the COMELEC
has not found any ground.
- The implementing rule of this RA found in the Comelec Rules of Procedure should be
harmonized with this mother law.
Jurisprudence cited
- All inapplicable to the factual circumstances at bar. The issues in these cases were contested
election returns, violation of BOC’s ministerial duty, and on advanced copies of the election
returns. Whereas the issue in this case is the alleged disqualification of BAsco.
4. NO. exception to the general rule that a second placer may not be declared winner does not apply.
The two elements in the Labo case are missing: 1) one who obtained the highest number of vote is
disqualified 2) notoriety of the disqualification

Moreno vs Comelec

Facts: Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay during the 2002
elections on the ground of that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of arbitrary detention
by the RTC in 1998.

Moreno’s defense:
1. the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation. Citing Baclayon
case, that by virtue of the probation all accessory penalties were suspended.
2. Under Sec16 Probation Law, final discharge of the probation shall restore to him all civil rights lost
or suspended.
3. That the trial court on Decmber 18, 2000 termitaed his probation and restored to him all his civil
rights, including the right to be voted for in the 2002 elections.

Comelec 1st Division: disqualified Moreno.

Comelec en banc: affirmed.
OSG on behalf of the COMELEC: citing Dela Torre case, conviction for an offense involving moral
turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted probation.

Issue: (main issue according to the SC) is the application of the phrase “within 2 years after serving
sentence” found in Sec40(a) LGC.
Subissue1: WON arbitrary detention involves moral turpitude.
Subissue2: WON Dela Torre case is applicable.
Subissue3 (crucial issue): WON Moreno’s sentence was in fact served.
Subissue4: WON the Probation Law should be considered an exception to the LGC.
Held: The phrase “service of sentence” is understood in its general and common sense as to mean the
confinement of a convicted person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. Therefore those
who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation should not be equated with service
of sentence.

1. No need to rule on such. The question was never raised in the petition for dq.
2. Inapplicable. The court’s ruling on the effect of probation is a mere obiter. Dela Torre in that case
was not even entitled to probation because he appealed his case.
3. In the case of Baclayon, the SC ruled that an order placing the defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. Similarly, in the case
at hand, then accessory penalty of suspension from public office attendant to the penalty imposed
upon Moreno was suspended unpon the grant of probation.
During the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a
public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the
duration of the probation. Clearly then, the period within which a person is under probation cannot
be equated with service of the sentence adjudged.
Moreover, the trail court has already issued an order finally discharging Moreno from
probation. Sec16 of the Probation law provides that the final discharge of the probationer shall
operate to restore him to all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction…”.
4. Yes. A later statute (the LGC), general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior statute, will
ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute (PL).