Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Markets Research
Industry Date
20 May 2016
Telco Cloud
Europe
Technology
Robert Sanders
Research Analyst
(+44) 20 754-58394
rob.sanders@db.com
Johannes Schaller
Research Analyst
(+49) 69 910-31731
johannes.schaller@db.com
Robert Grindle
Research Analyst
(+44) 20 754-58490
robert.grindle@db.com
Matthew Niknam
Research Analyst
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Deutsche Bank AG/London
Deutsche Bank does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. Thus, investors should
be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should
consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. DISCLOSURES AND ANALYST
CERTIFICATIONS ARE LOCATED IN APPENDIX 1. MCI (P) 057/04/2016.
Deutsche Bank
Markets Research
Robert Sanders
foot, embracing open standards and leveraging its superior R&D scale (35,000
Companies Featured
R&D heads post restructuring). The acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent has given
Nokia unrivaled breadth (access, routing, optics), and key cloud assets Nokia (NOKIA.HE),EUR4.61 Buy
(eg Cloudband, Nuage). By contrast, Ericsson’s services-led approach seems Ericsson (ERICb.ST),SEK62.45 Hold
more vulnerable from the transition to cloud, while its partnership with Cisco is ARM Holdings (ARM.L),GBP925.00 Hold
muddled. We continue to believe Nokia merits a 15% premium to Ericsson, Imagination (IMG.L),GBP165.50 Sell
versus a 7% discount today, (EV/EBITDA 2018E: Nokia 4.8x, Ericsson: 5.1x). Spirent (SPT.L),GBP81.25 Hold
ADVA (ADAG.DE),EUR8.38 Hold
We up our target on ARM (Hold) to £10.50. We downgrade Imagination to Sell Source: Deutsche Bank
With the smartphone and PC markets now mature, next-generation
networking (along with auto) remains one of the few growth drivers left in the
semiconductor industry. We believe that ARM should continue to take share
against the MIPS (owned by Imagination) and Power architectures, with
ARM’s unit share in networking set to rise from 15% today to 51% by 2020.
We upgrade our target on ARM to £10.50 (from £10), but keep our Hold rating
given concerns on mobile royalties, which are still much more significant than
networking. We downgrade our rating on Imagination Tech from Hold to Sell
with a 120p target (27% downside), given declining MIPS royalties and high
exposure in graphics IP to weak demand trends at Apple.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Deutsche Bank AG/London
Deutsche Bank does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. Thus, investors should
be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should
consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. DISCLOSURES AND ANALYST
CERTIFICATIONS ARE LOCATED IN APPENDIX 1. MCI (P) 057/04/2016.
20 May 2016
Technology
Telco Cloud
Table Of Contents
Reference architectures..................................................... 64
Glossary ............................................................................. 66
Acronyms ......................................................................................................... 67
Executive summary
We believe that this is the first comprehensive report for the investment
community that covers an important upcoming disruption, namely the “telco
network cloud”, and should be of high interest to long-term investors in both the
technology and telecom sectors. While we are at the beginning of a lengthy
transition, the impact of this trend will be far-reaching, and we expect the key
themes to materially drive investment cases over the medium-term. There are
numerous sectors in TMT that could be impacted including network equipment
vendors, telecoms, and semiconductor companies. We touch on all of these in
the following FITT report. Please do not hesitate to reach out with questions.
Telcos are continuing to see high levels of traffic growth driven by video (eg
Youtube, Netflix), but monetization is continuing to prove a challenge, and
profitability continues to decline. The advent of cloud concepts inside telecom
networks like NFV and SDN, what we call the “telco network cloud” or “telco
cloud” for short, offers an opportunity to address the challenges being posed
by OTT (over the top) vendors like Amazon, which can launch a service in a
matter of seconds (“failing fast”) versus several months for a telco to launch its
services. In addition, we believe that full adoption of NFV and SDN can drive
opex and capex savings of up to 35% and 20% respectively.
While this may sound like “future music”, large tier-1 operators are starting to Figure 1: Customer concentration
embrace virtualization, as part of a 10-year transition. John Donovan, from first
mover AT&T, recently talked about their target to virtualize 75% of its network Top 10 customers as a % of sales
functions by 2020 as a matter of “survival”. That kind of commentary does not
46% 50%
relate to worries about intra-telco competition, but is a response to the direct
threat posed by the OTTs. This becomes even more the case in a “multi-play”
world where fixed-line telcos, wireless telcos and pay TV companies are
increasingly the same company. Further, new revenue opportunities from
internet-of-things (IoT) and 5G will likely have virtualization at their foundation. Ericsson Nokia
These tier-1 operators matter because they comprise 50% of global capex, and
a similar percentage of revenue for our coverage (see Figure 1). Source: Company filings, Deutsche Bank estimates
Network functions virtualization (NFV) de-couples hardware and software Figure 2: Ericsson: business mix
business and has a meaningful impact for equipment vendors, which up until
today have sold dedicated hardware as the primary entry point. The business
model for the likes of Nokia and Ericsson has been to up-sell proprietary,
software-led upgrades into an installed base of lower-margin hardware, not
Hardware
dissimilar to the classic “razor blade” model. If the hardware becomes a Services
34%
43%
commodity (an off-the-shelf server), the stickiness or “vendor lock in” that
vendors enjoy becomes less meaningful, while new entrants can enter the fray.
Software
23%
Vendors have responded by participating in proof of concepts (PoCs) around
NFV and SDN, while demonstrating reluctance to fully participate in the
development of open standards, the basis of the new model. These challenges Source: Company filings
of interoperability have hindered progress with the new technology. In
addition, vendors have been accused of spreading fear, uncertainty and doubt
(FUD) around benefits. Leading telcos like AT&T, Telefonica, Vodafone and
Verizon are being forced to take matters into their own hands, driving adoption
of open standards, and exploring use of startups. Vodafone just this week
revealed a target of virtualizing 50% of network functions by 2020. So for
vendors, we believe that “resistance is futile”, given that some are attempting
to slow the pace of change to their traditional business model.
So while significant challenges remain for telcos to fully adopt NFV and SDN
concepts in many parts of the network, we believe that we are now entering
the “deployment phase” and that momentum should build over the next 3
years. This should increase the profile of telco cloud on the investment cases
of many companies. Given our coverage in Europe, we focus this report on the
impact on Nokia and Ericsson amongst the equipment vendors, but there are
clearly implications for a multitude of companies across hardware, software
and IT services. We highlight them in Figure 3.
Ericsson 90%
Nokia 87%
Ciena 87%
Amdocs 80%
ZTE 66%
Juniper 61%
Huawei 58%
Cisco 20%
NEC 17%
Accenture 10%
Capgemini 7%
Fujitsu 5%
Oracle 5%
IBM 3%
HP Enterprise 3%
Samsung 2%
We show below in Figure 4 above our overall view on the top-line impact on
wireless equipment vendors. We see the net negative impact from NFV and
SDN to become meaningful from 2018 onwards, and rising to a -20% negative
impact by 2025, relative to the existing run-rate of wireless equipment spend
(which is declining by 2% CAGR to 2019), and currently driven by the tapering
off of LTE rollouts. Overall, we see increased software sales from NFV/SDN,
but we don’t believe this can fully compensate for lost hardware sales at the
profit level, given price aggression of new entrants, and potential adoption of a
subscription model. We believe that services should see a positive opportunity
from transformation opportunities, but a negative impact from reduced
managed services and network rollout sales.
Adoption curve
20%
Uncertainty around roadmap vRAN
Net revenue + Virtualized mobile core Subscription-model
impact on
C-RAN savings led by startups
wireless 0%
infrastructure Managed
market including - Consulting and SI uplift services decline
services ($100bn)
White-label Intel hardware sales
-20%
Source: Deutsche Bank
Cisco and Juniper, in our view, are in the early innings of getting design wins
for their cloud automation and service orchestration frameworks - e.g. Juniper
Contrail, Cisco APIC (Application Policy Infrastructure Controller), as the core
SDN and NFV platform - for enabling automated and dynamic delivery of
network services such as business VPNs, Ethernet and optical connectivity,
managed security services etc.
Our industry conversations with the telco/carrier IT channel suggest that Cisco
is in the early innings of selling turnkey telco cloud solutions for web-based
services ordering and automated fulfillment for network service offerings such
as layer 3 business VPNs, Ethernet and optical connectivity, managed security
services, etc. These turnkey engagements are typically multi-year opportunities
for Cisco, involving sales of edge and core routers, metro optical, software
automation and service cataloging solutions, and software- based mobile
packet core, IP video delivery etc.
For Juniper, our view is very similar to Cisco. We believe Juniper is leading the
customer dialogue with their Contrail NFV cloud software automation solution
- so as to pull forward multi-year sales for their edge routing, switching and
network firewall platforms, and related network integration opportunities. The
publicly announced Contrail design win at AT&T Domain 2.0 for NFV is a case
in point.
The DB telecom services research team views the ‘cloudification’ of network By Robert Grindle & team
resources and the associated disaggregation of hardware and software supply
as a welcome continuation of an ongoing process of efficiency gains for the
industry, akin to switch digitalization, fiber optics, or in purely economic
terms, the ascendance of Chinese vendors. We believe that efficiencies in
signal coding and greater spectrum availability and Moore’s Law have
materially reduced the unit costs of deploying fixed and mobile data capacity.
We estimate that mobile operators like Vodafone are already seeing unit
capacity costs falling in excess of 30% annually. This is just as well given high
levels of consumer demand and the need to offset legacy voice revenues. All
telcos should benefit from increased efficiency gains, but larger operators, and
those with cross-border footprints, may prove the biggest beneficiaries. In
addition, new revenue opportunities from IoT, which have virtualization at their
foundation could also become signficiant on a long-term view.
We see the disruption to the equipment supply chain as positive for the ARM
processor architecture given that the large majority of key semiconductor
companies have licensed ARM’s v8 core for networking to enable next-
generation designs supporting SDN, NFV, C-RAN and 5G. We expect almost all
networking semiconductor companies except Intel to ramp up ARM-based
products between now and 2020, increasing ARM’s unit share from 15% in
2015 to 51% in 2020 (41% by value), at the expense of Power and MIPS
(owned by Imagination). We raise our target on ARM to £10.50 (from £10), but
keep a Hold rating, while we downgrade Imagination to Sell (120p target, 26%
downside), given loss of share in MIPS and declining GPU royalties from Apple.
45%
41%
34%
ARM
Intel
25%
19% MIPS
8% 12% Power
8% Others
Source: Deutsche Bank; Note Power is an architecture that was originally born out of IBM technology
60 4%
3%
40 38%
34%
20 55%
0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Figure 7: Telco growth rates (%), 2005-15 Figure 8: Telco EBITDA margins (%), 2005-15
Median growth rate (top 10 operators) Median EBITDA margin (top 10 operators)
Median growth rate (sample of 40 operators) Median EBITDA margin (sample of 40 operators)
20% 45%
15%
40%
10%
35%
5%
0% 30%
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Nokia then go on to calculate the level of data growth that operators can
support profitably by region – see Figure 10. This varies from 32% to 51%
compound growth. The current issue is that this is below the 55-79%
compound growth currently seen at operators. As a result, there is a “demand
gap” relative to the capacity that can profitably be supported. Telcos then will
have to use a combination of tools: data caps, increased prices and cost
reduction activities to maintain current levels of profitability. The recent trend
of declining profitability suggests this has been tough to achieve. However,
Nokia’s work suggests that those countries like North America which have the
greatest enthusiasm for next-generation technologies (5G, NFV/SDN) will be
able to support the highest consumption per device, given the increased cost
reduction this should support.
Figure 9: Cost trends (North America), per GB Figure 10: Profitable cellular consumption per device
(GB)
$14 16
North
America:
$11.44
14 51% CAGR
$12
CAGR: 2014-20E 12
$10 Developed Asia
Maximum of a 30%
10 Pacific:
annual reduction in 34% CAGR
$8
cost per GB
Small cells 8 China
35% CAGR
$6
6 Europe
32% CAGR
$4
4 Latin America
SDN/NFV 41% CAGR
$2 $1.35
2 Emerging
5G, LTE-U Asia/MEA
$0 0 38% CAGR
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Source: Deutsche Bank, Nokia Bell Labs Mobility Traffic Report Source: Deutsche Bank, Nokia Bell Labs Mobility Traffic Report
Figures 11 and 12 illustrate the important point about telcos’ lack of agility.
Telcos have been working on a timeline of 2-6 years when it comes to
launching new services (which could range widely from testing out
promotions, new video services, the launch of a MVNO or a tailored customer
offering for a one-off event). This is because to date the telco deployment cycle
has been conditioned by hardware.
This hardware has been complex and expensive, while by contrast, cloud
service providers have been quick to launch services. Over time, this has led to
telcos looking slow and cumbersome compared with the much nimbler cloud
providers, which are able to “fail quickly” and innovate. The good news is that
telcos are now embarking on a major and challenging transformation to adopt
the cloud paradigm, which could ultimately lead to innovative services, and
potentially telcos’ products and services actually being prioritized over OTT
applications, were that to pass the scrutiny of the regulators.
The rise of “hyperscale” cloud service providers reflects the significant benefits
to scale that can be realized from building large data centers with hardware
tailored to the specific need of that provider. Revenue for leaders in public
cloud like Amazon Web Services (AWS) has exploded accordingly (see
Figure 13). Amazon gives its customers access to an entire shared pool of
compute resources, first with core server and storage capacity, and then up
the stack to database and even certain application software. Many enterprises
like GE, News Corp, Time, Coca-Cola and Netflix are moving large portions of
their IT workloads to AWS. Deutsche Bank has written research on this subject
(see the FITT report written on AWS by US software analyst, Karl Keirstead,
from November 2015).
Figure 13: Amazon Web Services, revenue ($bn) and yoy growth (%)
70%
49% 49%
30% Amazon Web
Services
(AWS)
15.3 revenue
11.7
7.9 yoy growth
4.6 (%)
3.1
Figure 14: IT infrastructure outsourcing firms, TTM revenue ($bn), yoy growth
CSC
-3% -3%
-5% -6%
-7% -9% -11% -11%
Hewlett
Packard
Enterprise
55 55 54 53 52 50 48 47 IBM
aggregate
yoy growth
(%)
Q1-14 Q2-14 Q3-14 Q4-14 Q1-15 Q2-15 Q3-15 Q4-15
The telcos have since re-focused their cloud efforts away from classic IaaS
(infrastructure-as-a-service) towards more “stickier”, value-added services for
small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), for example security and mobility
services. Telcos are also now leveraging their large customer bases to provide
network access to the large third-party cloud providers like AWS and Microsoft
Azure. In addition, telcos are now looking to provide WAN optimization
functions that were previously provided by appliances as cloud services.
Although US operators are already “talking up” 5G, the 5G standard setting
process won’t be complete until 2020 (release 16). However, it is already clear
that 5G and LTE-Advanced Pro will be driven as much by new use cases, as it
will be by faster mobile broadband for typical consumer video use cases. Many
of these new use cases will be driven by specific vertical requirements around
latency, connection density and throughput which will be inherently
contradictory. This will create the need for “network slicing”, tailored networks
for specific applications (eg automotive, public safety, healthcare) that leverage
cloud concepts like NFV and SDN which we will discuss in the next section.
True “telco network cloud” promises to radically change the telecom industry
landscape by introducing cloud computing concepts into the network
architecture itself. This involves the creation of a common virtualized
infrastructure to deploy and operate different network applications, provided
by multiple network vendors. The common infrastructure can be built with
COTS (commercial off the shelf) data center equipment, enabling capex and
opex savings, whilst the time to launch services can be radically shortened.
Figure 16: Amazon: lessons in efficiency and agility Figure 17: Value of the telco cloud
13%
30%
16%
16%
25%
Two key concepts under-pin the emergence of telco cloud:: NFV and SDN.
NFV (network functions virtualization), and SDN (software-defined networks).
NFV was created by a consortium of telcos in 2012 that were frustrated that Network virtualization enables
existing hardware had limited their ability to speed up deployment of new network resources to be
services. NFV is then an initiative to virtualize the network services that are shared dynamically by
now being carried out by proprietary, dedicated hardware. NFV disaggregates
dividing the network’s
software and hardware with network functions being run in software via
available bandwidth into
virtualization techniques and then runs them on commodity hardware (today
separate, individual channels
this is standardized Intel-based, x86 servers). This allows virtual appliances to
be launched on demand without the delays that come from installing new where each can operate
equipment. NFV then offers the promise of allowing operators to increase independently
resource utilization, reduce hardware purchasing costs, reduce opex and most
importantly launch services more rapidly. In Figure 19, we illustrate the impact
on the classical network appliance approach.
Figure 18: Classical network appliance approach Figure 19: Network functions virtualization (NFV)
approach
SDN by contrast was born in the data center, and is a networking technology SDN is a networking model
that decouples the control plane from the underlying data (aka where control of the network
user/forwarding/bearer) plane and consolidates the control functions in a is decoupled from the
centralized controller. SDN is thus an approach to networking that allows
physical hardware
administrators to manage a network through the abstraction of “higher-level”
functionality. In a classic SDN scenario, rules for packet handling are sent to
OpenFlow is a standard
the switch from a controller. Controllers and switches normally communicate
via the “southbound” interface, normally the OpenFlow application protocol between centralized
programming interface (API) protocol. Northbound interfaces interact with control point and network
applications via APIs. SDN architectures are characterized by being open, switches.
directly programmable, configurable, agile, and centrally managed (SDN
controllers).
Operating System
Packet forwarding
hardware
App App App Router App App App
Operating System
Dedicated packet
forwarding hardware
Do you need both NFV and SDN for telco cloud to work??
NFV and SDN are mutually beneficial, highly complementary to eachother, and
share the same feature of promoting innovation, openness and
competitiveness. However, the virtualization of network functions does not rely
on SDN technologies, and vice versa. For example, if we consider a router
service at a customer site: NFV can be applied by virtualizing the router
function, which replaces the router with a simpler device at the customer site.
SDN can be introduced on top of this to separate control and data. Data
packets can then forwarded by an optimized data plane, which the routing
software is moved from an expensive location in a dedicated platform to an
optimized location (a virtual machine on a server).
For more detail on NFV and SDN reference architectures, please see page 64.
1. Reduced capex
The operator is able to deploy virtual functions in commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) hardware. This infrastructure is expected to support virtual functions
from multiple vendors. Functions that are non-real time and reside on the
control plane can then run on scalable hardware wherever capacity is
available. Consolidation from an infrastructure point of view can also increase
the utilization of computing and storage resources, ie when capacity is under-
utilized, the resources manager may re-allocate the resources to other network
functions or to the processing of other workloads (eg OSS/BSS). In addition,
operating network functions on standard hardware allows for interface
connections over virtual “links” to be placed on the same hardware. This
potentially reduces both physical ports and equipment required. Total capex
savings are estimated to be up to 20%, but actual numbers remain to be seen.
2. Reduced opex
The deployment of virtual functions as software using cloud techniques
enables scalable automation. The ability to automate on-boarding, provisioning
and in-service activations can yield significant opex savings. Another area for
operational savings is reduced manual intervention. For example, VoLTE has
several node elements in the network which are required to deploy an end-to-
end solution. In a VoLTE deployment with proprietary hardware, it could
require installation of many racks of independently deployed equipment. With
NFV, the same scenario could require a single blade server. Total opex savings
are estimated to be as high as 35%, but actual numbers remain to be seen.
2. Lack of interoperability
The NFV/SDN architecture depends on adoption of open standards. This
necessitates vendors to support and develop these standards so that
interoperability is not an issue. We have already heard of cases where vendors
have been reluctant to contribute to open standards, or only pay “lip service”
to the concept. This appears most commonly leveled at Ericsson. Overall
standardization is still a work-in-progress, which could slow down change.
We summarise a full list of benefits and challenges of NFV and SDN below.
Figure 23: NFV and SDN: Full list of benefits and challenges
NFV SDN
Benefits Benefits
Reduced capex via low-cost COTS servers (x86) Centralized provisioning and network control
Multi-versioning and multi-tenancy of network functions Service provisioning speed and agility
Operational efficiency through single platform and automation Network flexibility
Faster service delivery (time-to-market) Better and more granular security
Service differentiation and customization Reduced complexity, efficiency and lower opex
Reduced opex costs (power consumption, reduced space & monitoring) Reduced capex via reduced dependency on proprietary hardware (eg
lower cost switches)
Allows for multi-vendor interoperability (reduced vendor lock-in) Automation
Challenges Challenges
Lack of standardization and technology maturity Single point of failure
Lack of relevant skills, both operator and vendors Additional bandwidth
Openness and questions over interoperability Set-up delay
Integration of physical (legacy) and virtual infrastructure, and multiple vendors Lack of standards (eg northbound APIs)
Carrier-grade scalability and robustness (hardware accelerators, high availability, Lack of service control software
service level agreement (SLA) support)
Real-time and dynamic provisioning Multi-vendor network control
Management and orchestration (MANO) of virtual appliances
Resistance to loss of vendor lock-in and silo platform issue
Risks to network performance
Hard to measure benefits (TCO uncertainty)
Integration with or replacement of OSS/BSS functionality
Potential benefits to waiting and watching – “fast follower” strategy
Source: Deutsche Bank
We also show the results of a survey of operators from IHS Infonetics. What is
interesting in our view is that agility of service provisioning is seen as the key
benefit of NFV and SDN. On the barriers, availability of talent, integration with
legacy hardware and integration with OSS/BSS as key issues. This illustrates
that while NFV/SDN offer much promise, implementing full NFV and SDN will
be a 10-year transition. Many barriers to adoption exist, and only tier-1
operators appear prepared to take on the challenge given the relative scale of
their CTO offices.
Figure 24: NFV deployment drivers Figure 25: SDN deployment drivers
Figure 26: NFV barriers to adoption Figure 27: SDN barriers to adoption
In Figure 29, we show the areas of the network that are currently seeing the
early use cases. So far, virtualized customer premise equipment (vCPE) is the
number 1 use case given that vCPE enables today’s complex boxes at
customer sites, whether at business or home, to be replaced with much
simpler boxes while many network functions (eg firewalls, routing) can be
pulled back into the carrier’s network. This leads to cheaper boxes, reduced
support costs, and reduced “truck rolls” - the benefits are compelling. The next
biggest use cases are i) service chaining (connecting L4-L7 network services in
a virtual chain), ii) vNPaaS (virtual network platform as a service), which should
enable scalability and reliability of applications, iii) virtual provider edge (could
be telco OTT services), and iv) virtualized EPC (evolved packet core), which is
the ability to run the mobile core on commercial off-the-shelf servers, rather
than proprietary hardware.
In Figure 30, we show the results of a survey commissioned by Nokia
presented at the Cloud Standard Coordination Workshop in January 2016,
which appears to have more of a sample bias towards mobile operators. Here
virtualizing the EPC comes first as the sample’s priority for virtualization.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Figure 30: What are your company’s top three priorities for network virtualization?
Key points
The initial focus of “true” virtualization for mobile operators is in the
evolved packet core, which comprises only 4% of mobile capex spend
Cloud RAN (C-RAN), harnessing cloud concepts, looks set to impactful
in the near-term, rising to 33% of mobile infrastructure spend by 2020
Operators and vendors disagree on the feasibility of virtualizing the
access network (RAN), but this could be a real threat by 2022
Over the last 6 years, LTE networks have gradually become pervasive, having
been launched by than half of the worlds 800+ mobile operators. LTE was a
break-through technology at launch in 2010, which created a simplified
infrastructure, and cell sites with fewer pieces of equipment to manage. It also
distributes functions found in 3G core networks to equipment in the cell site.
RNC
Node B 3G
MME
UE
Radio access (RAN) Backhaul Evolved packet core (EPC) GiLAN Internet
Source: 3GPP, Deutsche Bank
Notes: UE = user equipment, BSC = base station controller, SGSN = serving GPRS support node, MME = mobility management entity (control plane – session management) , SGW = serving gateway, PGW = packet
data network gateway, HSS = home subscriber server (user identification), PCRF = policy and charging rules function - manages the service policy, OSS = operation support systems (fulfillment, assurance – service
quality); BSS = business support systems (billing, CRM, customer care); Gi-LAN = gateway internet LAN interface
The radio access network (RAN): the RAN connects individual devices to other
parts of the network through radio connections, and accounts for around 65%
of network equipment cost. An LTE cell site consists of antennas, amplifiers to
adjust power levels, and a main piece of equipment, the evolved eNodeB
(eNodeB), aka a base station. The eNodeB allocates radio frequency to devices
and passes calls off to other cell sites and to the mobile operator’s core IP
network. The eNodeB also manages Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO)
antenna functions and Orthogonal Frequency Division (OFDM) signaling. The
RAN is a key element of capex intensity and operator’s opex (power).
The mobile backhaul: the backhaul is the series of connections from the base
station to the mobile core. This accounts for 15% of network equipment cost.
The means of transport can be fiber cables, microwave or copper wires, with
fiber rising in importance. With LTE, backhaul has moved from TDM to all-IP
(IP/Ethernet). Edge routers now comprise 40-45% of this market.
The evolved packet core (EPC): The evolved packet core (EPC) integrates the
traffic of multiple RANs and is the central point of data plane intelligence. This
accounts for 4% of network equipment cost. The EPC consists of four network
elements: the Serving Gateway (S-GW), the packet data network (PDN)
Gateway (P-GW), the policy and charging rules function (PCRF) and the home
subscriber server (HSS). The S-GW deals with the data plane, transporting data
between the UE (user equipment) and the external networks. The P-GW is the
point of interconnect between the EPC and the external network. The MME
(mobility management entity) deals with the control plane. It handles the
signaling related to mobility and security for access. Finally, the HSS is a
database that contains subscriber-related information. The HSS also provides
support functions in mobility management, call and session setup, user
authentication and access authorization.
Gi-LAN/Internet: The Gi-LAN is the gateway internet LAN interface, and this is
where the network operator provides content optimization solutions as well as
support functions (filtering, DNS, firewalls). The Gi-LAN’s main function is to
handle network flow for network services. Examples of functions include
firewall, network address translation (NAT), load balancing, content delivery
network (CDN), and deep packet inspection (DPI). The Gi-LAN is characterized
by static service chaining, which lowers flexibility and increases costs.
IHS Infonetics expects the C-RAN market to reach $16bn by 2020, equivalent
to 33% of the overall wireless infrastructure market (ex services). Nokia is #1
(25% share) in C-RAN given its strong position in Japan. Ericsson is #2 (22%
share), as per Infonetics. We believe Nokia is well placed to grow share here.
Somewhere in the middle between centralized RAN and vRAN lies Nokia’s
recent AirScale C-RAN launch. This product virtualizes layers down to but not
including the time-critical elements of layer 2 and layer 1, which remain local.
We believe this product is market-leading compared with Ericsson, and should
be foundational to 5G. In addition, this product appears to deal with some of
the challenges with the CPRI interface, supporting Ethernet over copper and
fiber. This product should also support local hosting of content (eg video).
20 33% 0.40
24%
13% 18%
8% 10% 0.20
15
6.2 0.00
10 4.8
3.7 -0.20
5 3.0
2.2 2.6 9.5 -0.40
5.5 7.2
2.9 3.5 4.3
0 -0.60
2015 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Slower
E/W bound
Interfaces
Middleboxes NFVI
Northbound Interface (RPC, JSON, REST, etc. …)
Virtual
Mobile
Mobile Core
Network
MME GW-C HSS PCRF Operator A
GW-D
GW-D SDN-Core
vGW-D vGW-D
Controllers ANDSF ePDG-C AAA
GW-D
Pool Virtual
vGW-D
GW-D Other Network Mobile
E/W bound
Interfaces
Router
SDN-Backhaul Routing TE VPN Virtual
Mobile
vSwitch Controllers Network
Other Network
Pool Monitoring
Apps
Operator C
Interfaces
UE
Source: Van-Giang Nguyen, Truong-Xuan Do, YoungHan Kim, School of Electronic Engineering, Soongsil University, Seoul, South Korea (openaccess: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11277-015-2997-7)
While operators and vendors are agreed on the need for change, it is
interesting that there is no consensus at vendors or at operators on the likely
pace of virtualization. We show below some example views from Telenor,
Ericsson and Nokia.
Distributed Cloud
OSS/BSS
Home appliances
Value
Edge router
EMS
Real time
OSS/BSS
Core Home
router networking
Radio Fixed
Access Access
High Low
Risk
(Technology maturity, performance requirements)
Source: Ericsson, “Communications as a cloud service”, July 2014” red highlights by Deutsche Bank
Figure 39: Nokia (ALU)’s view on virtualization benefits: automation gains vs cost gains
High
MEDIA SERVERS
AND CDN
CPE
NETWORK
MEDIA GATEWAYS APPLIANCES
Automation gain
NETWORK
APPS
PACKET GATEWAYS ANALYTICS
CONTROL PLANE CHARGING PLATFORM
Radio access FUNCTIONS AAPLICATIONS
networks NFV/SDN
EMS/NMS CONTROL
Edge Automation and Cost (TCO)
OSS/BSS
Routers optimization • Capex
Core • Elastic scale • Opex
Routers and • Resource Pooling
Ethernet • Rapid deployment
switches • Location optimization
Low
Less More
Cost gain
Source: Alcatel-Lucent (2013): “Network functions virtualization – challenges and solutions”; red highlights by Deutsche Bank
The ongoing theme is that mobile operators are optimistic about the cost and
agility benefits to their networks, while vendors are treading carefully as they
consider the effects of cannibalization on their own businesses. This theme of
operator/vendor mis-alignment is a key theme that is becoming more
prevalent. Perhaps the best illustration of this challenge has been the lead role
that AT&T has been taking at driving virtualization forwards. Verizon too
recently published a NFV/SDN reference architecture, which appears to be
another attempt by operators to drive the conversation and for vendors to
follow, not the other way around.
With considerable capex savings on offer (combined with opex savings and
faster agility), it is no wonder that telco operators are embracing NFV/SDN,
most notably the largest tier-1 operators like AT&T, which is targeting to
virtualize 75% of its network functions by 2020, while Vodafone is looking to
virtualize 50% on the same timeline (announced: May 17th 2016). However, we
should recognise that the technology is still in a “trial phase”, and tangible
savings on trials have been hard to measure. Operators have been struggling
with many issues including poor interoperability, lack of skills, but the most
common complaint we have heard is that vendors are offering “lip service” to
NFV/SDN, but in fact trying to slow down the transition to protect their core
businesses. So the saying goes, “turkeys don’t vote for Christmas”.
Vendors fear the loss of vendor lock-in and the most common area where we
hear complaints around virtualized solutions from the equipment vendors is
around resistance to open standards. Many large vendors are just too resistant
to the idea of “letting go” of a proprietary attitude, and thus are slow to
support open standards like OpenStack, a key pillar of telco cloud. So the
claims of “openness” are often seen as a “proprietary trap”. However, in
addition, sales forces at the big vendors know a negative disruption when they
see one and may not be exactly keen to sell the benefits of a virtualized
solution over a traditional solution especially given the significant and
profitable maintenance contract that is attached to the hardware sale.
The notable point on the operator side is the level of determination being
shown by operators to make this transformation a reality, and clearly AT&T is
leading the way here, while Verizon, Telefonica, DT, NTT, Verizon and
Vodafone are not far behind.
We show in Figure 40 the new “lie of the land” in telco cloud. What can be
seen is that existing network equipment providers are now competing with an
increased number of stakeholders.
TELCO Dell, IT
Brocade
Ericsson, Nokia, IT WEB 2.0
Cisco, Huawei, hardware
Ciena, Juniper, AWS
Samsung, ZTE vendors
Network IT
equipment consulting
providers firms
Telco
Cloud
HP Enterprise,
Accenture
Amdocs,
Metaswitch
Networks, Affirmed Networks,
Oracle, Domain Altiostar, Cumulus,
NEC Startups Big Switch
experts
Networks, Pica8,
Pluribus, ASOCS,
6Wind
In terms of IT services vendors, telco operators have been courting the likes of
HP and Accenture to get involved in cloud transformation projects. The
attraction is their cloud expertise and relative neutrality compared with
equipment vendors. However, so far this strategy has back-fired with
Telefonica removing HP as a lead partner its Unica project. To date, their
telecom domain expertise is insufficient.
350
250
Network rollout (NRO)
200
100
Consulting, systems
50
integration & customer
support
0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2018E
We show in Figure 42 the headcount of Nokia and Ericsson, and how Ericsson
is lop-sided in its headcount towards services. In Figure 43, we show how
Nokia and Ericsson are the most exposed to this trend – much more than
Huawei, Cisco, Juniper and Ciena.
Figure 42: Headcount by geography and function – Nokia larger in R&D, Ericsson larger in services
Nokia Alcatel-Lucent New Nokia Ericsson
Europe 22,171 17,000 39,171 45,602
Asia Pacific 25,148 16,000 41,148 39,759
North America 3,665 12,500 16,165 14,548
ROW 4,734 4,500 9,234 16,372
Total headcount 55,718 50,000 105,718 116,281
Of which R&D 20,000 20,000 40,000* 25,700
Of which services 40,000* 66,000
Of which other (manufacturing, SG&A) 25,718 24,581
Productivity metrics
Revenue per employee (€), 2016E 215,033 283,241 245,438 220,984
R&D spend per R&D employee (€), 2016E 107,154 118,725 112,940 130,247
Source: Company statements, Deutsche Bank estimates *both are likely to reduce to 35-36k given ALU synergy 33ealization
42%
32%
17% 18%
4% 3%
One of the key motives of Ericsson partnering with Cisco was to access the
enterprise channel. Ericsson is thinking long-term here, and this very much tied
to the emergence of internet of things (IoT) and 5G. We believe network
equipment providers need to build a broader understanding of the different
requirements of verticals outside of the traditional telco domain. This is
because telco operators are themselves looking at big opportunities to grow
revenue outside of traditional avenues, but with key focus on certain use
cases: examples include advanced manufacturing (industrial 4.0),
transportation (autonomous driving), utilities (smart grid), government (public
safety). Ericsson calls this the “networked society”. While this has been
somewhat over-hyped in recent years, in our view, this will become
increasingly important from 2020 onwards.
We note that Telefonica expects the boundary between core and access
networks to blur in 5G networks. In some deployment scenarios, radio
interface functionalities will be centralized in data centers. In others, local
breakout will happen very close to the radio elements, so most of the core
Wireless
infrastructure,
18% Broadband
infrastructure
Non-telecom
equipment Routers
(labour, fiber,
copper, real Optical
estate etc)
Voice Video
Customer
premises
equipment (CPE)
54%
120 44% 49%
% of WW network equipment spend
USDbn
At the same time, the architectural shift to C-RAN deployments will likely have
the bigger impact on RAN infrastructure sales given that vRAN is not ready.
However, the ongoing deployment cycle of LTE will be more meaningful for
revenue trends between now and 2018. After that, we see C-RAN (along with
5G) beginning to become as meaningful for the market outlook, with C-RAN
comprising 33% of new RAN deployments by 2020. This is especially true
given that 5G will likely re-use a considerable amount of LTE equipment, while
opening up new mmWave spectrum for ultra-dense deployments, limiting the
hardware opportunity. Overall then, disruptions out to 2020 look set to start
small, but get larger over time.
However, beyond 2020, the largest growth outside of the domains mentioned
above comes from deploying SDN in telco data centers and backhaul
environments, and from virtualizing the radio access network (RAN). This could
then become much more important for network equipment vendors.
Figure 48: NFV/SDN spending mix (%) by functional area, service providers
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
However, we should note that many of these functions are more demanding in
terms of real-time requirements (low latency) and the importance of the data
plane, so this is not a certainty to happen, despite the efforts of Intel and
others to drive this transition. And even by 2030, there will be traditional RAN
sales given that many tier-3 telcos will lag on the transition to a virtualized
RAN environment, given significant incumbency of legacy networks.
NFV software can mitigate declining hardware sales, but not entirely
As can be seen in Figure 49, the NFV market opportunity is likely to be larger
at service providers than SDN for the next decade. This reflects early adoption
of NFV in contained domains at telcos as outlined above. However, as telcos
begin to adopt leading-edge practices in their own data centers, SDN should
catch up by 2030.
90
80 80%
70
60 60%
50
40 40%
30
20 20%
10
0 0%
2015E 2017E 2019E 2021E 2023E 2025E 2027E 2029E
The software mix within NFV is likely to be high at ~80%, so the profit
opportunity should be significant. However, this move is also likely to be
accompanied by a move to a recurring, subscription-based software revenue
model (eg similar to SaaS companies), as we believe new startups entering this
NFV/SDN domain are pursuing a SaaS-type pricing strategy, and these
companies are unencumbered by legacy business. This will likely mean a net
revenue and profit loss from virtualization over time in our view, especially if
you consider the impact of lost revenue in managed services, which should
decline with easier-to-manage networks.
Figure 50: DB’s view on the pace of adoption of NFV in mobile networks
Adoption curve
20%
Uncertainty around roadmap vRAN
Net revenue + Virtualized mobile core Subscription-model
impact on
C-RAN savings led by startups
wireless 0%
infrastructure Managed
market including - Consulting and SI uplift services decline
services ($100bn)
White-label Intel hardware sales
-20%
Source: Deutsche Bank
Figure 51: Wireless capex outlook ($bn) Figure 52: Wireless infrastructure & services mkts ($bn)
North America Europe APAC LatAm MEA Profit pool Hardware Software Services
180
160 120
100 101 99
140 96 94 93
100
120
80 40 38 40
100 41 42 43
80 60
13 15
60 17 19
40 20 22
40
20 20 47 48 41 36 31 28
0
0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016E 2017E
2014 2015 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E
Figure 53: NFV ecosystem – telcos’ level of familiarity Figure 54: NFV vendors – under evaluation
Figure 55: SDN ecosystem – telcos’ level of familiarity Figure 56: SDN vendors – under evaluation
Source: IHS Infonetics, June 2015 Source: IHS Infonetics, June 2015
move from testing individual ‘boxes’ such as routers and switches for
performance towards testing end-to-end software defined networks
and ‘commodity’ off the shelf server hardware is likely going to reduce
demand for purpose-built test tools, in our view. We believe Spirent
needs to continue to migrate its business model further towards
software solutions for NFV/SDN networks and end-to-end service
quality testing while further deemphasizing testing individual kit for
networks in order to remain relevant longer-term, a strategy already
partially pursued by management.
Ultimately, we believe that Spirent’s future business model may trend
towards a pure licensing business to the larger OEMs given the
disruptions outlined above, and given the increased preponderance for
live testing.
ADVA (Hold, €10 target): ADVA has a toe-hold in the NFV market with
its Overture acquisition in January 2016. Overture was a well-regarded,
early-stage orchestration vendor (Ensemble), which came combined
with an Ethernet-over-copper business that brought ADVA some key
US customers including Verizon. ADVA’s strategy appears similar to
that of Ciena and its acquisition of Blue Planet. Both companies seem
to be positioning themselves as the “last box standing” with their
Ethernet demarcation device, while other routing and firewall
functions are virtualized. ADVA’s play today in this market has been
the ADVA FSP 150-GE110Pro, which combines carrier Ethernet and IP
services in one element. How this market plays out remains to be seen,
but the key debate remains as to what gets virtualized on premises
and what gets hosted in the network, similar to the broader debate
around virtualized CPE.
Overall, we believe that ADVA has picked up Overture’s additional
capabilities at a cheap price (US$35m), so we believe that ADVA can
re-position much of this business to support the core business even if
the market does no develop as planned. Our investment concerns on
ADVA relate more to near-term margin trends, driven by a rising
proportion of Web2.0 customers in the mix. However, we concede
that the company is a credible acquisition target.
Moore’s law and efficiencies in signal coding and greater spectrum availability By Robert Grindle & team
have materially continue to reduce the unit costs of deploying mobile data
capacity. We estimate that operators like Vodafone are seeing unit capacity
costs falling in excess of 30% annually (see below) - just as well given high
levels of consumer demand and the need to offset legacy voice revenues.
Figure 58: Vodafone Group incremental traffic added Figure 59: Vodafone Group unit capex trends
700 40.0
596 34.3
600 35.0 -30%
-28%
Incremental traffic in 12m (PB)
CAGR
500 +77% 30.0 28.3 CAGR
24.8
Source: Vodafone
Source: Vodafone
Separately, Deutsche Telekom is upgrading its entire European fixed local loop
to IP, in order to avail of the lower costs and improved agility of
centralized/cloud-based service deployment. Telefonica is also very active in
the telco network cloud standards setting process and like DT, has an all-IP
network strategy, is trialing automized virtual network functions, and has
completed an SDN-IP trial in Peru. In the US, AT&T appears a first mover and
has highlighted Project Agile efficiency initiatives which include “SDN
transformation to drive continued cost momentum”.
Market size: $31bn Processor market size: $112bn Market size: $37bn
Other
2% Other
1%
Mobile
phone & PCs &
tablet 27% servers
ARM 34% x86
98% 99%
Intelligent
systems &
ARM victorious, embedded Intel victorious,
Intel on fringes systems ARM on fringes
39%
Other
8%
Market size: $44bn
MIPS ARM
37% The new battleground
20%
of "ARM vs Intel"
Power
x86
19%
16%
Networking is ~30%* of this
Source: Deutsche Bank; IDC’s measure of the wired communications TAM is $9.6bn in 2014 is lower than ARM’s estimated TAM of $13bn in 2015. We believe this relates to ARM including storage
The good news for ARM and Intel is that the move to NFV/SDN and 5G is
driving a faster transition where the partition between the end device, the
network and the cloud is blurring. This is necessitating more intelligence and
analytics to be placed around the network, what ARM calls the “intelligent
flexible cloud”. Much of the functionality in control plane intensive applications
(eg OSS/BSS, layer 4-7 services) are moving into software, based on x86 COTS
(commercial off the shelf) hardware, while the move to 5G and NFV/SDN is
necessitating more intelligence to be placed around the network.
We also show the markets where ASSP/ASIC dominate, given that this
represents the opportunity for ARM to take share at the expense of Power and
MIPS. Key ASIC players include Broadcom/Avago, Cisco, but the boundary
between ASSP and ASIC is becoming increasingly blurred for vendors like
Broadcom and Cavium. Key ASSP players include: Broadcom, Cavium,
Marvell, and Texas Instruments. Multi-core network processor vendors include
NXP, Cavium, Intel, Applied Micro, Broadcom and Mellanox.
Service
x86 Appliances
Dedicated
appliances (L4-L7) † ASSP
ARM
phased out
CPU
Reqs MIPS ASSP
Wireline Power
GWs** Core backbone
routing ASIC
ASSP Edge Customer edge
x86 routing
access
MIPS
Aggregation and data
Business CPE center switching NPUs
MIPS
L2 switch silicon
Home CPE ARM
Low
40% 37%
29% 41%
30% 35%
22%
29%
20% 15%
23%
10% 17%
11%
0%
2015 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
80%
80%
60% 51%
44%
37% 40%
40%
29%
22% 35%
20% 15%
10%
0%
2015 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Source: ARM; Grey shading implies this is a key target market for ARM in networking
Of the other areas of networking, the innovation cycle is slower, while in some
cases using ARM is less appropriate (eg in fixed access, core routing,
backhaul), but nevertheless ARM should continue to take share at a steady
rate, given the disruption that is being driven by NFV/SDN. The most notable
vendor in this segment is Broadcom, which has already publicly said that the
“MIPS ecosystem is slowly dying and collapsing” (see the Broadcom analyst
day transcript, December 2014). This is not an encouraging statement for MIPS
(owned by Imagination Technologies) given that Broadcom is its largest royalty
payor for MIPS. Broadcom has already migrated to ARM for its StrataGX
(shipping since Q1-16, quad-core ARM v8) and StrataConnect SoCs, while
Broadcom’s multi-core XLP III processor line (currently on MIPS) looks very
likely to follow to support multiple applications including switch control
processing. However, we caveat that a large portion of Broadcom’s revenue
today is in layer 2/3 switch silicon (Trident/Tomahawk) which does not support
an operating system. Here, ARM’s opportunity is likely to be limited to adding
intelligence adjacent to the switch silicon – ARM claims to be making good
progress here.
Intel has made networking a key focus in recent years and the fruits are paying
off (+60% growth in the last quarter), and we think their growth is more limited
by the applicability of the general purpose x86 CPU, rather than the whims of
the market. Intel has acquired aggressively in the market to develop domain
know how (Lantiq, Mindspeed, LSI Axxia ASSP) to expand its SAM. This new
capability is key as today Intel lacks the ability to support data plane intensive
applications that have stringent telco-grade, real-time requirements. For
example, DSPs can outweigh the benefits of using CPUs in infrastructure for
voice or video. However, this is changing and proof points are emerging (eg
cloud RAN), even if a common complaint is that Intel cores are “heavy”.
Intel’s aggressive move to acquire Altera (for $17bn, at a rich price of 26x ex-
cash 2016E EPS) should theoretically put Intel in a position to challenge ARM’s
customer base for these use cases as well. This is where we believe there
should be a “battle royale” in future years between Intel on one side and the
remaining major ARM vendors electing to play in this market (likely Broadcom,
Hisilicon, Cavium, Qualcomm, Xilinx), and potentially OEMs on the hardware
side such as Cisco, Ericsson, Nokia, although that group are less wedded to
silicon development on a 10-year view. Intel’s progress in silicon photonics
could be an important way to cement their strength in networking and the data
center.
Altera (the #2 FPGA vendor after Xilinx) should put Intel in a position to
integrate a CPU and an FPGA onto a single piece of silicon by 2019 in our
view. That could be a compelling offering to address its inadequacies to
support data plane intensive applications, effectively hardware
programmability and reconfigurability at high speed, a play that could make
ASIC/ASSPs shrink over time. For example, one avenue could be network
processors, which today are used in many of the most intense data plane use
cases as a high-performance and low-power solution for packet handling in
routers, gateways, switches and other network devices. To date, throughput
was the key criteria, but Cisco’s migration of EZchip to an ASIC suggests that
even this is changing. Another key target application is the base station as it is
feature rich and requires re-configurability. We fully expect Intel to be directly
head-on for such business with the Caviums of this world by 2019.
For Intel in turn, servers are getting more network-centric, driven by NFV/SDN.
So Intel is both defending its position in servers from ARM’s ambitions (which
we think will disappoint), and targeting growth in networking. What is
tantalizing about silicon integration of CPU plus FPGA is that silicon integration
(for example at 7nm, versus an ASSP/ASIC at 28nm) could solve the latency
challenges of a two-chip package. As things stand, Intel will push a
2.5D/interposer solution at first, but we believe that partitioning the due puts a
lot of constraints on the system. A key ambition for the next three years before
they tape out a single chip solution should be to ramp up the development
community to buy into the FPGA/CPU concept. Traditionally FPGA
development teams have been separated off given their specific programming
skills, so the challenge for Intel is to make these teams drive towards a
common goal.
So in summary, from 2019 onwards then, we expect ARM and Intel to more
directly compete, but for now both look set to succeed. We expect Intel to
grow its share to 25% by 2020, while ARM should grow to 41% (both in value
terms). See Figure 72.
45%
41%
34%
ARM
Intel
25%
19% MIPS
8% 12% Power
8% Others
20
18
15.9 16.2
15.1 15.3 15.6 Other networking
16 14.8
14
Enterprise access
12 points
10 Routing
8
Layer 2/3 switching
6
4 Carrier
infrastructure
2
Base stations
0
2015 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
We also note that there is some debate about the relative size of the TAM with
IDC suggesting the wired processor TAM was $10bn in 2014, while Gartner
suggests it is $11-12bn. ARM appears to be at $13bn for 2015, but this
estimate appears to include a contribution from the storage market within its
definition of “networking”.
37 38
27
22
15
11
Feedback to date we hear from server OEMs on first ARM-based chip launches
such as Cavium’s ThunderX has been mixed, with performance decent, but
power consumption not yet being meaningfully better than what Intel has to
offer. Server OEMs seem to remain in a ‘wait and see’ mode for now with
more ARM-based silicon scheduled to come to market in 2017. Longer-term,
ARM’s best hope is probably via the cloud service providers (Tencent, Alibaba,
Amazon, Google et al). Facebook remains very influential given their role in the
Open Compute Project. Cavium and Applied Micro meanwhile remain the most
invested companies to date in ARM servers and yet their combined annual
R&D is only $0.3bn to support all of their server and networking efforts. This is
likely 20x smaller than Intel. Cavium meanwhile is only targeting 50-100k
shipped units by H2-17, less than 1% of the server market.
We note that Mobility (smartphone and tablets) accounts for 60% of royalties
even in 2020 (versus 70% today), so ARM’s position in smartphones will
remain the #1 driver of the share price. We currently forecast Mobility-derived
royalties to grow at 7% CAGR in USD from 2016-20E while non-Mobile-derived
royalties are set to grow by 20% CAGR in USD.
1,400
1,200 Others
1,000
Embedded
800
Servers
600
Networking
400
200 Smartphones,
tablets and
0 notebooks
2015 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
We have been critical of Imagination’s strategy over the last years, arguing
that under-investment vs ARM and spreading R&D too thinly across too many
different areas will not lead to market share gains. This thesis has played out
so far with ARM keeping design wins at Samsung LSI, MediaTek and other
previous Imagination customers in mobile graphics. The company is now left
with high exposure to its key mobile graphics customer Apple (DBe ~50% of
royalties) and the acquired MIPS business (DBe ~25%). Given the challenges
we outlined in this report for the MIPS business and ongoing weak Apple
momentum, we downgrade the shares from Hold to Sell.
Too late for a MIPS turnaround and Apple momentum remaining weak
While we welcome management change at Imagination and view the new
CEO/CFO team in charge as an improvement, we note that semiconductor IP is
a long lead time business and it could be too late for new management to still
turn around the company’s fortunes. Imagination has invested only half of
ARM’s annual R&D budget over the last years while aiming to compete with
them across mobile graphics, apps processors, networking, set-top boxes,
microcontrollers and many other areas. This level of under-investment
combined with ARM’s efforts to move into the networking space has led key
licensees such as Broadcom and Cavium to de-emphasize the MIPS
architecture. MIPS overall accounts for 25% of Imagination’s royalties and we
believe Networking is a large component of this, while Broadcom is the largest
royalty payor, a company that describes MIPS as “dying”. These royalties are
at risk, in our view, as key licensees have already made a decision to migrate
to ARM, partially for now and likely full over time. Taking into account limited
growth potential with key royalty contributor Apple and recent negative data
points from the iPhone supply chain, we believe Imagination will continue to
suffer from disappointing royalty trends over the next years. Restructuring and
cost cuts likely mean Imagination can avoid heavy losses for some time but we
see the outlook for the business as challenged.
Reference architectures
In this appendix, we provide more information for those who would like to
understand more about key telco cloud concepts, NFV and SDN. Many of the
definitions come from the organizations themselves.
Virtualized Infrastructure
Glossary
Key terms
Carrier grade: a system that is very reliable – exceeding “five nines” availability
Control (or signaling) plane: The part of the network that carries signaling
traffic
Cord cutting: the process of cutting cable connections in favour of OTT
Core router: A router that forwards packets to computer hosts in a network
Data (or forwarding) plane: The part of the network that carries user traffic
Diameter signaling: a protocol used for controlling signaling in IMS and LTE
eNodeB: performs radio resource functions such as allocating radio resources
Edge router: A router that routes data packets between a network you control
to a network you don’t
Femtocell: a low-power cellular base station for home or small businesses
Firewall: a network security device that grants or rejects network access
Gateway: a network node equipped for interfacing with another network that
uses different protocols
Hadoop: a free, Java-based programming framework
Layer 1: the physical layer in the 7-layer OSI model
Layer 2: the data link layer in the 7-layer OSI model
Layer 3: the network layer in the 7-layer OSI model
Layer 4: the transport layer in the 7-layer OSI model
Layer 5: the session layer in the 7-layer OSI model
Layer 6: the presentation layer in the 7-layer OSI model
Layer 7: the application layer in the 7-layer OSI model
Layers 4-7: the network services within the 7-layer OSI model, the “upper
layer”
Network slicing: An end-to-end logically isolated network, which includes core,
transport and access functions
OpenStack: an open source, cloud management system
Open source: software whose source code is available for modification or
enhancement by anyone
Picocell: a small cellular base station covering a small area, eg in-building
Power architecture: a RISC architecture that originated from IBM
Router: a device that forwards data packets along network
Server: a computer program or device that provides functionality for other
programs or devices
Small cells: low-powered radio access nodes with a range up to 1-2kms
Switch: a device that channels data from multiple ports to an output port
Virtualization: the act of creating a virtual machine that behaves like a real
computer with an operating system
Acronyms
A-I
I-S
S-W
Appendix
Important Disclosures
Additional information available upon request
Disclosure checklist
Company Ticker Recent price* Disclosure
ARM Holdings ARM.L 925.00 (GBp) 19 May 16 2,6,9
Ericsson ERICb.ST 62.45 (SEK) 19 May 16 2,14,15
Nokia NOKIA.HE 4.61 (EUR) 19 May 16 2,6,7,9,14
*Prices are current as of the end of the previous trading session unless otherwise indicated and are sourced from local exchanges via Reuters, Bloomberg and other vendors . Other
information is sourced from Deutsche Bank, subject companies, and other sources. For disclosures pertaining to recommendations or estimates made on securities other than the
primary subject of this research, please see the most recently published company report or visit our global disclosure look-up page on our website at
http://gm.db.com/ger/disclosure/DisclosureDirectory.eqsr.
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6. Deutsche Bank and/or its affiliate(s) owns one percent or more of any class of common equity securities of this
company calculated under computational methods required by US law.
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banking or financial advisory services within the past year.
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For disclosures pertaining to recommendations or estimates made on securities other than the primary subject of this
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Analyst Certification
The views expressed in this report accurately reflect the personal views of the undersigned lead analyst about the
subject issuers and the securities of those issuers. In addition, the undersigned lead analyst has not and will not receive
any compensation for providing a specific recommendation or view in this report. Robert Sanders/Johannes Schaller
800.00
Current Recommendations
Buy
600.00
Hold
Sell
400.00 Not Rated
Suspended Rating
*New Recommendation Structure
200.00 as of September 9,2002
0.00
May 13 Aug 13 Nov 13 Feb 14 May 14 Aug 14 Nov 14 Feb 15 May 15 Aug 15 Nov 15 Feb 16
Date
1. 25/07/2013: Sell, Target Price Change GBP470.00 7. 22/10/2014: Hold, Target Price Change GBP900.00
2. 30/08/2013: Upgrade to Buy, Target Price Change GBP1,080.00 8. 12/02/2015: Hold, Target Price Change GBP1,080.00
3. 23/10/2013: Buy, Target Price Change GBP1,130.00 9. 22/04/2015: Hold, Target Price Change GBP1,130.00
4. 09/01/2014: Downgrade to Hold, Target Price Change GBP1,070.00 10. 22/07/2015: Hold, Target Price Change GBP1,070.00
5. 05/02/2014: Hold, Target Price Change GBP975.00 11. 12/10/2015: Hold, Target Price Change GBP980.00
6. 23/07/2014: Hold, Target Price Change GBP950.00 12. 27/10/2015: Hold, Target Price Change GBP1,000.00
Strong Buy
120.00 Buy
Market Perform
10
11
Underperform
100.00
8 9
Not Rated
2 3 45 6 7 12 13 Suspended Rating
Security Price
1
80.00
14 Current Recommendations
Buy
60.00
Hold
Sell
40.00 Not Rated
Suspended Rating
*New Recommendation Structure
20.00 as of September 9,2002
0.00
May 13 Aug 13 Nov 13 Feb 14 May 14 Aug 14 Nov 14 Feb 15 May 15 Aug 15 Nov 15 Feb 16
Date
1. 22/07/2013: Buy, Target Price Change SEK85.00 8. 21/07/2014: Buy, Target Price Change SEK98.00
2. 27/08/2013: Buy, Target Price Change SEK88.00 9. 24/10/2014: Buy, Target Price Change SEK95.00
3. 25/10/2013: Buy, Target Price Change SEK86.00 10. 23/01/2015: Buy, Target Price Change SEK100.00
4. 09/01/2014: Buy, Target Price Change SEK89.00 11. 28/01/2015: Buy, Target Price Change SEK110.00
5. 31/01/2014: Buy, Target Price Change SEK91.00 12. 16/11/2015: Buy, Target Price Change SEK100.00
6. 24/04/2014: Buy, Target Price Change SEK87.00 13. 15/01/2016: Downgrade to Hold, Target Price Change SEK85.00
7. 15/07/2014: Buy, Target Price Change SEK85.00 14. 22/04/2016: Hold, Target Price Change SEK69.00
5.00 16
Current Recommendations
2
4.00 Buy
1 Hold
3.00
Sell
Not Rated
Suspended Rating
2.00
*New Recommendation Structure
1.00 as of September 9,2002
0.00
May 13 Aug 13 Nov 13 Feb 14 May 14 Aug 14 Nov 14 Feb 15 May 15 Aug 15 Nov 15 Feb 16
Date
1. 02/07/2013: Sell, Target Price Change EUR2.20 9. 30/01/2015: Hold, Target Price Change EUR6.50
2. 03/09/2013: Upgrade to Hold, Target Price Change EUR4.50 10. 01/05/2015: Hold, Target Price Change EUR6.00
3. 30/10/2013: Hold, Target Price Change EUR4.75 11. 03/08/2015: Hold, Target Price Change EUR6.20
4. 09/01/2014: Hold, Target Price Change EUR5.25 12. 21/09/2015: Upgrade to Buy, Target Price Change EUR7.50
5. 30/04/2014: Hold, Target Price Change EUR5.20 13. 30/10/2015: Buy, Target Price Change EUR8.00
6. 25/07/2014: Hold, Target Price Change EUR5.60 14. 01/02/2016: Buy, Target Price Change EUR7.40
7. 21/10/2014: Hold, Target Price Change EUR5.80 15. 15/02/2016: Buy, Target Price Change EUR6.80
8. 24/10/2014: Hold, Target Price Change EUR6.00 16. 12/05/2016: Buy, Target Price Change EUR6.20
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