was no fulfillment with the condition such as what obtains in the
Central Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No.
112230. July 17, 1995
Central Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112230. July 17, 1995
246 SCRA 511
FACTS:
In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor
of CPU together with the following conditions:
a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively for the
establishment & use of medical college;
b) The said college shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party;
c) The said land shall be called “Ramon Lopez Campus” and any
income from that land shall be put in the fund to be known as “Ramon
Lopez Campus Fund”.
However, on May 31, 1989, PR, who are the heirs of Don Ramon filed
an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance & damages
against CPU for not complying with the conditions. The heirs also
argued that CPU had negotiated with the NHA to exchange the
donated property with another land owned by the latter.
Petitioner alleged that the right of private respondents to file the action
had prescribed.
ISSUE:
1) WON petitioner failed to comply the resolutely conditions annotated
at the back of petitioner’s certificate of title without a fixed period when
to comply with such conditions? YES
2) WON there is a need to fix the period for compliance of the
condition? NO
HELD:
1)
Under Art. 1181, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights as
well the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired shall depend
upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.
Thus, when a person donates land to another on the condition that the
latter would build upon the land a school is such a resolutory one. The
donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. If there
instant case, the donation may be revoked & all rights which the
donee may have acquired shall be deemed lost & extinguished.
More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been
allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the
condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor
forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no
more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such
procedure would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve
no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive
multiplication of suits.
Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of
the deed of donation up to the time of filing of the instant action,
petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner
has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence,
it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation
already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as
donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the
donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
2)
Under Art. 1197, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its
nature & circumstance it can be inferred that the period was intended,
the court may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the
obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the
period for compliance therewith & such period has arrived. However,
this general rule cannot be applied in this case considering the
different set of circumstances existing more than a reasonable period
of 50yrs has already been allowed to petitioner to avail of the
opportunity to comply but unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there
is no need to fix a period when such procedure would be a mere
technicality & formality & would serve no purpose than to delay or
load to unnecessary and expensive multiplication of suits.
Under Art. 1191, when one of the obligors cannot comply with what is
incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek rescission before the court
unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the
absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period of
compliance there is no more obstacle for the court to decree
recission.
Danguilanvs IAC
Facts: ApoloniaMelad filed a complaint against Felix Daguilan with CFI
Cagayan for recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot which she claimed
she had purchased from Domingo Melad in 1943 and were now being
unlawfully withheld by the Danguilan. She claimed to be the illegitimate
daughter of Domingo and presented a deed of sale purportedly signed by
the latter. She only moved out in 1946 because Danguilan approached her
and asked permission to cultivate the land and to stay therein. She had
agreed on condition that he would deliver part of the harvest from the farm
to her, which he did from that year to 1958. Deliveries later stopped thus
the complaint.
Danguilan, on the other hand, is the husband of IsidraMelad, Domingo's
niece. He presented a private instrument which Domingo Melad also
purportedly signed, giving to him the farm in 1943 another private
instrument in which Domigo also gave him the residential lot, on the
understanding that the Danguilan would take care of the grantor and would
bury him upon his death.
Lower court ruled in favor of Danguilan. Upon appeal, the IAC modified the
deicision and ruled that the conveyance of the real properties in question
were null and void, as they were donations of real property and as such
should have been effected through a public instrument.
ApoloniaMelad alleges that the deed of sale was allegedly executed when
the respondent was only three years old and the consideration was
supposedly paid by her mother, Maria Yedan from her earnings as a wage
worker in a factory. Danguilan, on the other hand, avers that this contract
was simulated and prepared after Domingo's death.
Issue:
WON ApoloniaMelad can be considered as the owner of the disputed
properties
Held: Decision of trial court reinstated.Danguilan wins.
Based on the evidence adduced, it is clear that Domingo did intend to
donate the properties to Danguilan. The fact that the donation was
executed in a private document is not material because the donation was
onerous- the properties were given to the Danguilan in exchange for his
obligation to take care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for
his burial. Hence, it could not come under the operation of Article 749
requiring donations of real properties to be effected through a public
instrument.
As to the deed of sale executed between Domingo and Apolonia, the record
shows that the ApoloniaMelad did not take possession of the disputed
properties and indeed waited until 1962 to file this action for recovery of
the lands from the Danguilan. If she did have possession, she transferred
the same to the petitioner in 1946, by her own sworn admission, and moved
out to another lot belonging to her step-brother. She thus failed to show
that she consummated the contract of sale by actual delivery of the
properties to her and her actual possession thereof in concept of
purchaser-owner.
As consistently held by jurisprudence, ownership does not pass by mere
stipulation but only by delivery. That symbolic delivery was effected through
the deed of sale, which was a public instrument, Addison vs Felix controls:
"in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of
tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over
the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could
have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the
ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his
control. When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold
passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor,
symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is
sufficient.But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the
purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing
and make use of it himself or through another in his name, because such
tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of another will,
then fiction yields to reality—the delivery has not been effected."
(eventually, the Court said that both claims were weak, but the presumption
is in favor of Danguilan who is in possession)
G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE
CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and
THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 77450 June 19, 1991
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE
CASTRO and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and
THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS
1. August 23, 1930: sps. Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now
both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of Roman
Catholic Archbishop (RCA) of Manila covering a parcel of land at
Kawit, Cavite containing an area of 964 sq. meters
2. Deed of donation donee shall not dispose or sell the property within
a period of 100 years from the execution of the deed. Otherwise, a
violation of this would make the deed void and the property would
revert to the estate of the donors.
3. On or about June 30, 1980: Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in
whose administration all properties within the province of Cavite
owned by the Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly transferred on
April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property in
favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad Ignao in for P114,000.00.
4. November 29, 1984: private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a
complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of
contract and reconvoyance of realproperty with damages against
the Ignao spouses, the bishop of Imus and RCA Manila.
5. December 17, 1984: Ignao spouses filed a motion to dismiss. On the
grounds that: (1) herein private respondents don’t have legal
capacity to sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.
6. December 19, 1984: Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus also filed a
motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, the first two (2) grounds of
which were identical to that of the motion to dismiss filed by the
Ignao spouses, and the third ground being that the cause of action
has prescribed.
7. -January 9, 1985, the RCA Manila likewise filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that he is not a real party in interest and, therefore,
the complaint does not state a cause of action against him.
8. RTC: Dismissed: no cause of action; CA: REVERSED and remanded
the case.
9. MFRs filed separately by the spouses Ignao and the RC Bishop of
Imus were denied
ISSUES
1. WON the action has already prescribed
2. WON the private respondent has a cause of action against petitioners?
(unjustified cause of action)
HELD:
1. NO.
Provision in question: ARTICLE 764: "(t)his action shall prescribe after 4
years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to
the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs.”
. DEED HAS AUTOMATIC REVERSION EXPRESSED, JUDICIAL DECLARATION NOT
NECESSARY HENCE.
a. Judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the
contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of
any of its terms and conditions.
b. Judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special
provision granting the power of cancellation.
2. YES. UNDUE RESTRICTION ON RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP, CONTRARY TO PUBLIC
POLICY.
a. DONATION: effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to
the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute
owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain
conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
b. Condition imposed must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of
time.

“In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation
against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an
unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of
ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within
the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as
specifically stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be
considered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said
prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation”

DISPOSITION: Judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE andanother judgment is hereby

rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 095-84 of the RTC Cavite
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v CA
G.R. No. 77425/77450 June 19, 1991
DOCTRINE
There is no need for prescription to be applied in cases where
there is stipulation for automatic reversion. Nonetheless, the stipulation is
against public policy and thus, is void.
FACTS
The administrators of the estate of deceased spouses Eusebio and
Martina De Castro filed a complaint to nullify the deed of donation, rescission of
contract, and reconveyance of the property against spouses Florencio and
Soledad Ignao, Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, and Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila.
The administrators alleged that in 1930 the De Castros executed the
deed of donation over their Cavite property to the Archbishop, said deed
allegedly providing that the latter cannot dispose or sell the property within
100 years from execution. The administration of the said properties was
transferred to the Bishop of Imus in 1962. And in 1980, the Bishop of Imus sold
the property to the spouses Ignao. The Ignaos were then able to transfer the
TCT under their names.
The lower court ruled that the action had already prescribed and
dismissed the complaint. This was reversed by the CA.
The Ignaos and the Bishops contend that the cause of action had
already prescribed, relying on Art. 764 which provides that "(t)he donation shall
be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with any of
the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his action
shall prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the condition, may
be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's
heirs.
ISSUE
WON the action has already prescribed
HELD / RATIO
ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED. Art. 764 is not applicable in this
case. The deed of donation involved expressly provided for automatic reversion
of the property donated in case of violation of the, as was correctly recognized
by the CA.
A judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the
contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its
terms and conditions. This cancellation can be applied in the case at bar. Art.
732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by
the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined
by the law on donations.
In contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is
necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a
contract already deemed rescinded, but in order to determine whether or not
the rescission was proper.
Thus, the cause of action has not yet prescribed since an action to
enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. Article 764 was
intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or
contravention of conditions specified in the deed of donation if and when the
parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of such donation upon the
occurrence of the contingency contemplated therein. That is not the situation in
the case at bar.
NONETHELESS, while the action may not be dismissed by reason of
prescription, the same should be dismissed on the ground that the estates of the
De Castros have NO CAUSE OF ACTION against the Ignaos and other
petitioners.
The cause of action of the De Castros is based on the alleged breach of
the resolutory condition that the property donated should not be sold within
the prohibited period. Said condition, however, constitutes an undue restriction
on the rights arising from ownership and is, therefore, contrary to public policy
and should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition.
The Ignaos won. The CA decision is reversed.