G.R. No.

179754 : November 21, 2012

JOAQUIN G. CHUNG, Jr., PAZ ROYERAS-SOLER, and MANSUETO MACEDA, Petitioners, v. JACK DANIEL
MONDRAGON, (deceased), substituted by his sisters namely: TEOTIMA M. BOURBON, EMMA M.
MILLAN, EUGENIA M. RAMA and ROSARIO M. CABALLES; CLARINDA REGIS-SCHMITZ and MARIA LINA
MALMISA, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners Joaquin G. Chung, Jr., Paz Royeras-Soler, and Mansueto Maceda are descendants of Rafael
Mondragon (Rafael) by his first wife, Eleuteria Calunia (Eleuteria), while respondent Jack Daniel
Mondragon (Jack Daniel) is Rafaels descendant by his second wife, Andrea Baldos (Andrea).

OCT No. 22447 is registered in the name of "Heirs of Andrea Baldos represented by Teofila G. Maceda"
and covers 16,177 square meters of land in Macrohon, Southern Leyte (the land). Chung, et al. claim
that from 1921 up to 2000, Rafael appeared as owner of the land in its tax declaration, and that a free
patent was issued in 1987 in the name of Andreas heirs upon application of Teofila G.Maceda (Teofila),
who is petitioners sister.

On the other hand, respondents Bourbon, et al. claim that Andrea is the exclusive owner of the land,
having inherited the same from her father and that after Andrea died, his son Fortunato Mondragon
inherited the land; and when the latter died, his son Jack Daniel (herein respondent) came into
possession and enjoyment thereof. Sometime in the year 2000, Jack Daniel sold a 1,500-square meter
portion of the land to his co-respondent Clarinda Regis-Schmitz (Regis-Schmitz).

On the claim that Jack Daniel had no right to sell a portion of the land and that the sale to Regis-Schmitz
created a cloud upon their title, Chung, Jr., et al. filed an action to quiet title. The RTC dismissed the
complaint of Chung, Jr., et al. The CA sustained the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action to quiet title should prosper?

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

CIVIL LAW: quieting of title

The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the plaintiff need to prove only two things,
namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

It is evident from the title that the land belongs to no other than the heirs of Andrea Baldos, Rafaels
second wife. The land could not have belonged to Rafael, because he is not even named in OCT No.
22447.With greater reason may it be said that the land could not belong to petitioners, who are Rafaels
children by his first wife Eleuteria. Unless Eleuteria and Andrea were related by blood such fact is not
borne out by the record they could not be heirs to each other. Add to this is the fact that petitioners are
not in possession of the land. Petitioners do not possess legal or equitable title to the land.

Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 169272, July 11, 2012

National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the Philippines, petitioner
vs Alfredo Pascual, respondent
Ponente: Brion

Facts:
December 11, 2000, Bahais filed a complaint with RTC for quieting of title, injunction and other claims
against Silverio Songcuan and/or his heirs, the secretary of DENR and the regional executive director of
DENR of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

Bahais alleged that it is the lawful and absolute owner of two parcels of land, who acquired ownership
from Marcelina Ordono. The Bahais had been in possession of the land for 30 years, until the Bureau of
Lands rejected the sales applications of the Bahais predecessors-in-interest for the lots and ordered all
those in privity to vacate the lots and to remove their improvements. DENR secretary affirmed with this
decision. Recourse to the office of the President had been unavailing, so DENR issued writs of execution
pursuant to the President's decision.

Pascual moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state cause of action. Saying that the petitioner
had no legal right to file the complaint since the final and executory Bureau of Lands’ decision ruled that
the petitioner was not entitled to possess the lots.

RTC's Ruling: denied the motion to dismiss, Bureau of Lands was not yet final since President's ruling on
the appeal was unavailable. Respondent elevated this case to the CA, questioning the propriety of the
RTC's denial of the motion to dismiss.

CA's Ruling:CA set aside the RTC, the RTC should have dismissed the complaint for prematurity.

Issue: Whether CA committed a reversible error in finding that RTC committed a grave abuse of
discretion in not dismissing the complaint.

Held:
Petition lacks merit, CA committed no reversible error.

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it arises; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to
respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. If any
of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action.
"Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading. In resolving a
motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action only the facts alleged in the complaint
must be considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based
on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for."

From these allegations, we find it clear that the petitioner no longer had any legal or equitable title to or
interest in the lots. The petitioner’s status as possessor and owner of the lots had been settled in the
final and executory December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary and the
OP affirmed on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership of the lots.

Vda. DE AVILES v. CA

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary
dispute.

FACTS:

Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is the bother of defendant Camilo. They inherited
their lands from their parents and have agreed to subdivide the same amongst themselves. The area
alloted (sic) to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214 square
meters more or less, while the area alloted to defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or
less.

Defendant’s land composed of the riceland portion of his land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond
portion is 500 square meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or a total of 14,470
square meters.

The Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish pond which they claim is within their area.
Defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with an area
of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the
earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said
portion.

Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly encroach to their property but the defendant
said that he merely reconstructed the same.

Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were denied thus this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners filed the right action

RULING:

No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously a boundary dispute and as such the action must
fail.

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is, in
truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an
action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property or any
interest therein.

Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that could
been a “cloud” to their title. In fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence of the
agreement of partition dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was allotted to
them and that the only controversy is whether these lands were properly measured.

A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and
that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. An action for forcible entry, whenever
warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the
prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may
be fully threshed out.

Alejandrino vs. CA
Facts: The late spouses Alejandrino left their six children named Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia,
Laurencia and Abundio a lot in Cebu City. Upon the death of the spouses, the property should have been
divided among their children, however, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in
accordance with the procedures.

Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased portion of the lots from her brothers,
Gregorio's, Ciriaco's and Abundio's share. It turned out, however, that a third party named Nique, the
private respondent in this case, also purchased portions of the property from Laurencia, Abundio and
Marcelino.

However, Laurencia (the alleged seller to Nique) later questioned the sale in an action for quieting of
title and damages. The trial court (Quieting of title case) ruled in favor of Nique and declared him the
owner of the lots. Laurencia appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but later withdrew the same.

Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the property that had been declared by the
trial court (Quieting of title case) as his own by virtue of purchase. The trial court segregated the
property on the basis of the Extra-Judicial Settlement between Mauricia and Laurencia.
Issue: Whether or not partition of the lot was validly made

Held: Yes.

1) Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has
not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over
such inchoate right.

Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share. The legality of Laurencia's
alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was upheld in the Quieting of title case
which had become final and executory by Laurencia's withdrawal of her appeal in the CA. When Nique
filed a motion for the segregation of the portions of the property that were adjudged in his favor, he
was in effect calling for the partition of the property. However, under the law, partition of the estate of
a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an
ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself,
and (4) by the third person designated by the testator.

2) Extrajudicial settlement between Mauricia and Laurentia became the basis for the segregation of the
property in favor of Nique

However, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the trial court and it
became the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to Nique. Mauricia does not deny
the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She only questions its
validity on account of the absence of notarization of the document and the non-publication thereof.

3) A partition is valid though not contained in a public instrument.

Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate reflected the intention of
both Laurencia and Mauricia to physically divide the property. Both of them had acquired the shares of
their brothers and therefore it was only the two of them that needed to settle the estate. The fact that
the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two of them. The
partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document to be valid between the
parties.

MANUEL T. GUIA VS. CA AND JOSE B. ABEJO GR NO. 120864 October 8, 2003

Facts: Two parcels of land covering a fishpond equally owned by PrimitivaLejano and LorenzaAraniego.
The one half undivided portion owned by Araniego was later purchased by plaintiff from his father
TeofiloAbejo, the only heir of the original owner (husband of Araniego). Prior to this sale, the whole
fishpond was leased by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo
in favor of De Guia. De Guia continues to possess the entire fishpond and derived income therein
despite the expiration of the lease contract and several demands to vacate by TeofiloAbejo and by his
successor-in-interest, Jose Abejo.Abejo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages
against De Guia. However, Abejo failed to present evidence of the judicial or extrajudicial partition of
the fishpond.

Issue: Whether a co-owner can file ejectment case against a co-owner?Whether Abejo was entitled to
rent?

Held: Under Article 484, “there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and
over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion
which is truly abstract. Article 487 also provides that ‘anyone of the co-owners may bring an action for
ejectment”. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Any co-owner may file
an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes
exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. However, the only purpose of the
action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant
from the property because as a co-owner he has a right of possession.
If one co-owner alone occupies the property without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is
no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an
agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the
house.
The Lejano Heirs and TeofiloAbejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIA’s
lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying rent.

GAPACAN V. OMIPET, 387 SCRA 383

Issues of property rights can be determined in an action to quiet title.

FACTS:

Paicat Gapacan is the primitive possessor of an unregistered land in Mt. Province, divided into 3 parcels
of riceland and another planted to camote and declared by him for taxation purposes. He had two
children Maria and Antonio. Antonio left for a long while to try his luck in the mines Benguet. Maria
remained, took care of their father and eventually took over the cultivation of the land.

Antonio Gapacan returned to and executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property showing that the
property had been transferred to him by his sister Maria Gapacan-Omipet (Omipet) making him in effect
the legal owner of the property in question. Since then, Antonio Gapacan’s family (Gapacans) had been
occupying and cultivating the property.

Sometime in 1992, Omipet hired laborers to clear and cultivate portions of the disputed property.
Gapacans prohibited them Gapacans and ordered the defendants to vacate the land and restore
possession to plaintiffs.
Omipet then filed an action to quiet title in RTC and that she be declared the lawful owner. RTC
adjudged that Gapacans have right of possession over the land. On appeal CA, declared that the land is
common property of both Omipet and Gapacans and ordered its partition.
Both parties appealed. Gapacans alleged that CA cannot declare that the land is common property since
it deviates from the cause of action in the trial court. Omipet’s appeal is mostly factual.

ISSUE: Whether or not property rights can be decided in an action to quiet title?

HELD:

Yes, property rights can be decided in an action to quiet title.

Art. 476 of the Civil Code provides that an action to quiet title may be brought when there exists a cloud
on the title to a real property or any interest therein. In the case of Bautista v. Exconde, we held that the
property owner whose property rights were being disturbed may ask a competent court for a proper
determination of the respective rights of the party-claimants, not only to place things in their proper
place, that is, to require the one who has no right to refrain from acts injurious to the peaceful
enjoyment of the property not only of the rightful owner but also for the benefit of both with the view
of dissipating any cloud of doubt over the property. It goes without saying therefore that the appellate
court in resolving the present controversy is well within its authority to adjudicate on the respective
rights of the parties, that is, to pass upon the ownership of the property; hence to declare the same as
common property.

As to Omipet’s appeal, SC merely affirmed the findings of the trial court that she did not present
sufficient evidence to overcome Gapacan’s better right to possession. SC ultimately ruled that CA was
correct in its determination that the land in dispute is common property and should be partitioned.

Adille vs CA
G.R. No. L-44546 January 29, 1988

FACTS:

The property in dispute was originally owned by Felisa Alzul who got married twice. Her child in the first
marriage was petitioner Rustico Adile and her children in the second marriage were respondents
Emetria Asejo et al.

During her lifetime, Felisa Alzul sodl the property in pacto de retro with a three-year repurchase period.

Felisa died before she could repurchase the property.

During the redemption period, Rustico Adille repurchased the property by himself alone at his own
expense, and after that, he executed a deed of extra-judicial partition representing himself to be the
only heir and child of his mother Felisa. Consequently, he was able to secure title in his name alone.

His half-siblings, herein respondents, filed a case for partition and accounting claiming that Rustico was
only a trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed the property, and thus, he cannot claim exclusive
ownership of the entire property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner may acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common.
Whether or nor Rustico had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor

HELD: No. The right to repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone.
Although Rustico Adille redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses did not make
him the owner of all of it.

Yes. The petitioner, in taking over the property, did so on behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had
constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under Art 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in
which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the respondents being the beneficiaries,
pursuant to Art 1456.