1.

Facts:
On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177
hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of
Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had acquired
the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced
by an informacion posesoria that upon plaintiff's purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the
same, introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was
approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954
On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement
purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a
tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and
its successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the
property in question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the
private property of plaintiff and should therefore be excluded therefrom.
Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in question consisting of
1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest
be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the
settlers.

Issue:
WON the state can be sued for the recovery of the parcel of land
Held:
No. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is
claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an
action in personam.
The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted,
except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the
use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse,
the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the
complaint should have been dismissed.
 2. Republic vs Villasor
Facts:
The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan and
International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P.
Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. And for the
strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks, especially on the
'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received
the same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and
operations of AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence the notices and
garnishments are null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Held:
No. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state and its
government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
 3. DA vs NLRC
Facts:
The DA and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services, pursuant to the
agreement guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the DA. September 1990, several
guards of Sultan Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages before Regional
Arbitration Branch of CDO against the DA and Sultan Security Agency.

The executive labor arbiter rendered that DA and Sultan Agency are jointly and severally liable. Sultan
didn't appeal the decision, thus it became final and executory. July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution commanding the City Sheriff to enforce the judgment against the property of DA and Sultan's
property.

DA, filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of
injunction was filed by the petitioner with the NLRC CDO, saying that the writ issued was affected without the
labor arbiter’s jurisdiction over the petitioner. DA also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property
would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.

This petition charges NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution.
The NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. NLRC argued on the other hand
that the DA has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Agency.

Issue:
Whether NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:
Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction
must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is
done in its proprietary capacity.

In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday pay,
overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act
No. 3083, afore-cited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability
arising from contract, express or implied, . . . Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as
amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on
Audit.

We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the
Labor Code with respect to money claims against the State. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides
the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be
pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.
Wherefore, the petition is granted.