PEOPLE VS.

LARANNAGA [2004]
There is clear and overwhelming evidence that appellants, who are private individuals, forcibly dragged Marijoy and Jacqueline
into the white car, beat them so they would not be able to resist, and held them captive against their will. In fact, Jacqueline
attempted to free herself twice from the clutches of appellants — the first was near the Ayala Center and the second was in Tan-
awan, Carcar — but both attempts failed. Marijoy was thrown to a deep ravine, resulting to her death. Jacqueline, on the other
hand, has remained missing until now.

Article 267 states that if the victim is killed or died as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People vs. Ramos, 131 citing Parulan vs. Rodas, 132 and People
vs. Mercado, 133 we held that this provision given rise to a special complex crime, thus:

"Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity of RA No. 7659, the rule was that where the kidnapped
victim was subsequently killed by his abductor, the crime committed would either be a complex crime of
kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, or two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping
and murder. Thus, where the accused kidnapped the victim for the purpose of killing him, and he was in fact
killed by his abductor, the crime committed was the complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art.
48 of the Revised Penal Code, as the kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of committing the
murder. On the other hand, where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was
subsequently slain as an afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were committed.

However, RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code by adding thereto a last paragraph
which provides —

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping
with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases
where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing
of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is:
Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex
crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659."

The prosecution was able to prove that Marijoy was pushed to a ravine and died. Both girls were raped by the gang. In committing
the crimes, appellants subjected them to dehumanizing acts. Dehumanization means deprivation of human qualities, such as
compassion. 134 From our review of the evidence presented, we found the following dehumanizing acts committed by appellants:
(1) Marijoy and Jacqueline were handcuffed and their mouths mercilessly taped; (2) they were beaten to severe weakness during
their detention; (3) Jacqueline was made to dance amidst the rough manners and lewd suggestions of the appellants; (4) she was
taunted to run and forcibly dragged to the van; and (5) until now, Jacqueline remains missing which aggravates the Chiong family's
pain. All told, considering that the victims were raped, that Marijoy was killed and that both victims were subjected to dehumanizing
acts, the imposition of the death penalty on the appellants is in order.

Thus, we hold that all the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 wherein Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping
and serious illegal detention in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is the victim.

A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised
Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, 135 (2) robbery with rape, 136 (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, 137 (4)
kidnapping with murder or homicide, 138 and (5) rape with homicide. 139 In a special complex crime, the prosecution must
necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of
separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this
provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the
cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped
"on the occasion and in connection" with her detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof."
Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape. It appearing from the overwhelming evidence
of the prosecution that there is a "direct relation, and intimate connection" 140 between the kidnapping, killing and raping of
Marijoy, rape cannot be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a component offense forming part of the herein
special complex crime. It bears reiterating that inPeople vs. Ramos, 141 and People vs. Mercado, 142 interpreting Article 267, we
ruled that "where the person killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was
merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Article 267." The same principle
applies here. The kidnapping and serious illegal detention can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate
crime but shall be punished as a special complex crime. At any rate, the technical designation of the crime is of no consequence in
the imposition of the penalty considering that kidnapping and serious illegal detention if complexed with either homicide or rape,
still, the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed.

Anent Criminal Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is the victim, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
appellants considering that the above-mentioned component offenses were not alleged in the Information as required under Sections
8 and 9, 143 Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.Consistent with appellants' right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, these attendant circumstances or component offenses must be specifically pleaded or
alleged with certainty in the information and proven during the trial. Otherwise, they cannot give rise to a special complex crime,
as in this case. Hence, the crime committed is only simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

PEOPLE VS. SALVADOR

In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the
crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries
are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person
kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim
is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is
immaterial. 184 AEcTaS

In the case at bar, the accused-appellants, who were indicted for forcibly abducting Albert, are all private individuals. Albert was
taken on April 7, 2002 and his detention lasted for six days, during which period, threats to kill him and demand for ransom were
made.

“At around 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002, seven men went to the basement of the safehouse where Albert and Pinky were detained.
They threatened Albert with bodily harm should he not accede to their demand for ransom. Albert identified them as Jubert, Morey,
Marcelo, Ricky, Lowhen, Jose and Nelson. Five of the men left but Nelson and Lowhen were left behind to guard Albert and Pinky.
191

The overt acts of the accused-appellants Jubert, Morey, Marcelo, Ricky, Robert, Roger, Lowhen and Jose were undoubtedly geared
towards unlawfully depriving Albert of his liberty and extorting ransom in exchange for his release.”

All told, we find that the RTC and the CA did not overlook essential facts or circumstances which may otherwise justify the
acquittal of Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Robert, Morey, Lowhen, Jose and Roger for having conspired in kidnapping Albert for the
purpose of extorting ransom. That no ransom was actually paid does not negate the fact of the commission of the crime, it being
sufficient that a demand for it was made.

Betty and Monico are to be held as

co-conspirators because they
knowingly provided the venue for
Albert's detention. HS

Albert categorically stated that on the night of April 7, 2002, Monico assisted him in descending the stairs leading to the basement
of the safehouse. Albert likewise named Betty as the woman who brought him and Pinky corned beef for dinner on April 10, 2002,
and food items from Jollibee for lunch on April 11, 2002.

We stress though that conspiracy transcends companionship. 206 Mere presence at the locus criminis cannot by itself be a valid
basis for conviction, and mere knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to
a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime.
In the case at bar, Monico's assistance extended to Albert when the latter descended the basement stairs and Betty's visit to the
safehouse to bring food could not automatically be interpreted as the acts of principals and conspirators in the crime of kidnapping
for ransom.

In People v. De Vera[,] we distinguished a conspirator from an accomplice in this manner —

Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal
design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided
upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached
the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a
crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether
the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment.
Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform
acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense

Absent his knowledge, consent or concurrence in the criminal design, the owner of a place, which was used to detain kidnapped
victims, cannot necessarily be considered as either a conspirator or an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However,
in the case of Betty and Monico, their claim of ignorance relative to Albert's detention in the basement of the safehouse is belied
by their presence therein. Albert positively and repeatedly testified on the matter.

In a conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the place where the victim is to be detained is logically a primary
consideration. In the case of Betty and Monico, their house in Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision has a basement. It can be
reasonably inferred that the house fitted the purpose of the kidnappers. Albert's detention was accomplished not solely by reason
of the restraint exerted upon him by the presence of guards in the safehouse, but by the circumstance of being put in a place
where escape became highly improbable. In other words, Betty and Monico were indispensable in the kidnapping of Albert
because they knowingly and purposely provided the venue to detain Albert. The spouses' ownership of the safehouse, Monico's
presence therein during Albert's arrival on the evening of April 7, 2002 and Betty's visits to bring food reasonably indicate that
they were among those who at the outset planned, and thereafter concurred with and participated in the execution of the criminal
design.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February
25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03279 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as the
amount of civil indemnity awarded to Albert Yam y Lee, to be solidarily paid by the accused-appellants, is increased from
PhP50,000.00 to PhP75,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 210

PEOPLE VS. REYES

All of the foregoing elements were duly establish by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the prosecution
in the case at bar. First, appellants and their cohorts are private individuals. Second, appellants and their cohorts kidnapped
the Yao family by taking control of their van and detaining them in a secluded place. Third, the Yao family was taken against
their will. And fourth, threats to kill were made and the kidnap victims include females.
Republic Act No. 7659 provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if any of the two qualifying circumstances
is present in the commission of the kidnapping: (1) the motive of the kidnappers is to extort ransom for the release of the
kidnap victims, although none of the circumstances mentioned under paragraph four of the elements of kidnapping were
present. Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that would
release him from captivity. 107 Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of no moment.
108 It is sufficient that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of exacting ransom; 109 and (2) the kidnap victims
were killed or died as a consequence of the kidnapping or was raped, or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. Both of
these qualifying circumstances are alleged in the information and proven during trial.
As testified to by Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San, appellants and their cohorts demanded the amount of P5 million
for the release of Chua Ong Pong Sim and Raymond. In fact, Yao San went to the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview,
Quezon City, to hand over the ransom money to appellants and their cohorts, but the latter did not show up. It was also apparent
that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were killed or died during their captivity. Yao San declared that appellants and their
cohorts called up and told him that they would kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond who were still under their custody,
because they heard the radio report that the incident was already known to the police. True to their threats, the corpses of Chua
 Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were later found dumped in La Mesa Dam. Their respective death certificates show that they
died of asphyxia by strangulation. SCaTAc\\
Withal, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the appellants in view of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 on 24
June 2006 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines. In accordance with Sections 2 and 3 thereof, the penalty
that should be meted out to the appellants is reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals, therefore,
acted accordingly in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole on each of the appellants.

Finally, we observed that the RTC and the Court of Appeals denominated the crime committed by appellants in the
present case as the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with double homicide since two of the kidnap victims
were killed or died during the kidnapping. The word "double" should be deleted therein. Regardless of the number of killings
or deaths that occurred as a consequence of the kidnapping, the appropriate denomination of the crime should be the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution, dated 18 October 2006, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the total amount of civil
indemnity is P150,000.00; (2) the total amount of exemplary damages is P700,000.00; (3) the total amount of moral damages
is P700,000.00; and (4) the appropriate denomination of the crime committed by appellants is the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide.

PEOPLE VS. EJANDRA

The fact that the cell phone used by the kidnappers to demand ransom was owned by Sherry Mae
Saliot, the daughter of appellants Ejandra and Calunod, does not constitute evidence that the said
appellants could not have used the said cell phone to demand ransom from Eddie Tan. Sherry Mae
Saliot could have just given the cell phone to her parents for their use, while she paid for the charges
thereon.

For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention, the prosecution is
burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely, (1) the offender
is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of h is
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense
any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than
three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person
kidnapped and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial.
Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
duration of his detention is immaterial.78

To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove the following beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent
on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his
liberty; and, (c) motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other person for the release
of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may
be proven by his words and overt acts before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the
victim.79 Neither actual demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be
committed.80 Ransom as employed in the law is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning,
a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases from captivity.81 It may include benefits not
necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victim’s release.82