Indian thinking on foreign policy

India needs a major intellectual exercise that will give its policymakers a realistic
understanding of history, an essential prerequisite for the evolution of an effective
foreign policy.

A. G. NOORANI

A COUNTRY'S foreign policy is shaped by its self-perception, its image of the world
and some major inarticulate premises it has formed over the years. For centuries, British
foreign policy was based on the principle of balance of power in Europe and supr emacy
at sea while the United States enforced its Monroe Doctrine in Latin America and
cherished its isolation. The Second World War and the Cold War that followed changed
all that.

However, the U.S. involvement in the affairs of the world was accompanied by a
remarkable surge of intellectual effort in the realm of foreign affairs which went a long
way to mould informed opinion. Every nation has its myths and legends. There is the i
nherent complexity of the subject, besides. Dean Acheson has written of "the cliches, the
moralism, the emotionalism, the bad history, faulty analysis and just plain ignorance
which suffocate most discussion of foreign affairs".

But, beginning with Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau's Scientific Man versus Power Politics
(1946) a series of theoretical studies appeared in the U.S., soon after the Second World
War ended, which helped the serious student to find his way "through that lush, tangled,
and dangerous jungle which is our times".

Morgenthau propounded and developed the criterion of the national interests as a guide to
foreign policy, not only of one's own national interests but those of other countries as
well. Kennan deplored "the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems"
which "runs like a red skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years". Louis J.
Halle sought to develop "an applicable body of theory" of world politics. Charles Burton
Marshall stressed the limits of foreign policy and Henry A. Kiss inger expounded upon
the necessity for choice when the country had "reached a turning point in its relations
with the rest of the world. The patterns of action of a secure past no longer work (vide,
Kennan's American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (1951); Ha lle's The Nature of Power,
Civilisation & Foreign Policy (1955); Marshall's Limits of Foreign Policy (1954); and
Kissinger's Necessity for Choice (1960)).

These writers produced a change in the American intellectual climate. A comparable

effort in India has not even begun. India's image of the world order was fashioned by the
Gandhian and the Nehruvian legacies. As Dr. Paul F. Power has written in his stud y
Gandhi on World Affairs, Gandhi "did not consider outstanding political, economic and
legal forces operating in the international community. Because of his intellectual make-
up and the political and social activities he stressed, he did not, per haps could not, extend
his ideas to master complex questions involving power, wealth and law that underlie both
struggle and cooperation in world affairs."

It was Nehru who influenced Indian intellectuals more. For over 40 years he spoke and
wrote ceaselessly on world affairs, in 17 of which he played an active part himself. It
would be worth the while of any scholar to study the Nehruvian image of the worl d and
his understanding of the conditions of foreign policy - first as the country's leading expert
and next as the architect of its foreign policy.

Truth to tell, Nehru was not learned in the discipline of international relations or
diplomacy. His was the world of an ardent nationalist who saw "these pacts and alliances
and treaties... made in a desperate attempt to steady a quarrelsome and collapsi ng
world". He hated sin.

Professionalism suffered under him. K.P.S. Menon, who served as Secretary in the
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) wrote in his autobiography Many Worlds (Oxford;
page 271) in sheer bliss: "A Foreign Office is essentially a custodian of precedent s. We
had no precedents to fall back upon, because India had no foreign policy of her own until
she became independent. We did not even have a section for historical research until I
created one... Our policy therefore necessarily rested on the intuit ion of one man, who
was Foreign Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Fortunately his intuition was based on
knowledge...." (emphasis added, throughout).

How could the civilian head of a Foreign Office offer frank advice to the political head
when he himself regards the organisation as no more than a research bureau? Nehru
himself had scant use for expertise in a field he regarded exclusively his own.

After interviewing former members of the Indian Foreign Service, Waner F. Ilchman of
the University of California, Berkeley, noted a "tendency for men in the field to write
what the Prime Minister wished to hear" (Journal of Commonwealth Political Stu dies,
November 1966, Leicester University Press).

It would be a mistake to ignore the pre-Nehru legacy which was ably recorded by Dr.
N.V. Rajkumar, Foreign Secretary, Indian National Congress, in a compilation prefaced
by his essay (The Background of India's Foreign Policy, All India Congress Co mmittee,
New Delhi, 1952). The Congress adopted resolutions on foreign affairs no sooner than it
was born. It was opposed to increased expenditure for "military activity going on beyond
the natural lines of the defence of the country, in pursuance of the Imperial Policy of
Great Britain in its relations with some of the Great Powers of Europe". It should be
borne by the British, not Indian, Treasury (1892). In 1897, it denounced "the present
Frontier Policy of the Government of India" as being "a ggressive".

The expedition to Tibet in 1904 was criticised as it "threatens to involve India in foreign
entanglements". Just as the Soviet Union published and denounced the secret treaties the
Tsar had concluded in 1921, the Congress declared "most treaties e ntered into with the
Imperial Government by neighbouring States as mainly designed by the latter to
perpetuate the exploitation of India by the Imperial Power."

At the time of Independence, the Expert Committee (No. IX) on Foreign Relations,
comprising representatives of India and Pakistan, drew up (Annexure V) a list of 627
treaties and agreements to which India was then party. The Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of
1904, and "the Indo-Tibetan Boundary Agreement of 1914" (defining the Mc-Mahon
Line) were among them. By an agreed order made under the Indian Independence Act,
1947, (the Indian Independence (Inter-national Arrange-ments) Order, 1947),
membership of internat ional organisations devolved solely on India but "rights and
obligations under international agreements having an exclusive territorial obligations
applicable to an area" devolved on the state to which the area came to belong (Partition
Proceedings, Expert Committees Nos. III-IX, pages 202-294).

While Nehru, the Curzon-democratic, ardently owned up accords the British had
concluded with Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and, of course, China, the intellectual baggage he
had collected before Independence suffered the impact of power and responsibility. It wa
s battered, but not destroyed. From the late 1920s and increasingly in the next decade,
Nehru emerged as the Congress' main expert on foreign affairs, challenged only by
Subhas Chandra Bose. Indian studies were few and limited. Even in 1944 Dr. Lanka Sun
daram's India in World Politics covered no more than the British Commonwealth, the
League of Nations, the International Labour Organisation, foreign trade, Indians overseas
and Indian representation at the peace conference to come.

Britain's appeasement of Nazi Germany justifiably invited Indian censures. But there was
little understanding of the forces at play. In a brilliant article in The Times Of India
(February 28, 1982) Nirad C. Choudhuri analysed at length "the ignora nce of
international politics among the new rulers of India". He added: "The most unexpected
aspect of the ignorance was its extent in the two Cambridge men in the Indian nationalist
movement, Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose, who were always talking abo ut the
international situation. They were also regarded by their political colleagues as expert
authorities on international politics. In spite of all that, not only their knowledge but also
their approaches were wholly unreal. Both of them saw it in the light of their personal
predilections, which were shaped by their temperaments and feelings. And their
predominant feeling was hatred of British rule in India. In short, their ideas on
international politics were only a projection of their nationalism, which prevented their
seeing any international situation for what it was."

In the first major test which the Congress leaders faced, all of them failed, especially
Gandhi; so did Nehru, who knew better. Only three weeks before the outbreak of the
Second World War on September 1, 1939, the Congress Working Committee (CWC)
adopte d a resolution opposing "all attempts to impose (sic.) a war on India", and asking
the Congress governments in the provinces "to assist in no way the war preparations but
rather resign from office". The leaders simply did not expect Britain to keep it s word to
Poland and go to war with Hitler if he invaded that country. In 1942, very many expected
Japan to win. The Quit India resolution was not intended to be a call for revolt as it is
made out to be. It was in truth a warning to the Viceroy to h eed - by inviting Gandhi to
talks. He did not expect to be arrested (Maulana Abul Kalam Azad; India Wins Freedom
(1988), page 88). Nehru's Prison Diary reflects his bitterness at the misjudgment to which
he was privy, despite his reservations. His comments on Gandhi were severe to the point
of rejection.

Shortly after Independence, Girja Shankar Bajpai, the first Secretary in the MEA and by
far the finest Indian intellect on foreign policy, made a valiant effort, in an atmosphere
suffused with "high morality" to educate the new elite about some enduring verities of the
world order in an essay entitled "India and the Balance of Power" (The Indian Year Book
of International Affairs, 1952; published by the Indian Study Group of International
Affairs, University of Madras; pages 1-87). He pointed out that "power exerted without
regard to moral standards and moral ends is a crime against humanity. But to ignore fact
that, over the greater part of the world, politics remains a quest after power, is to do
justice neither to the ideals nor to realities. " He pleaded that "armed power supported by
adequate industrial power, constitutes the only safeguard against a threat to a country's
independence... The warning is necessary because, in certain circles, the opinion prevails
that the present level of exp enditure on India's defence forces is excessive and this is an
even more dangerous assumption - that the only military threat to India comes from
Pakistan."

Bajpai was not out to seek a confrontation with China. On the contrary, he strongly
advised Nehru to take up the boundary issue with it in a straightforward manner and
resolve it. Nehru preferred K.M. Panikkar's advice to declare India's position unilate
rally. Having done that, he refused to negotiate when China raised the issue in January
1959. To Nehru, throughout, "our major possible enemy is Pakistan".

Nehru was alive to the need for armed strength and the principle of balance of power.
Two decades before Independence, in a much neglected speech at the Kerala Provincial
Conference on May 27, 1928, he asked: "But what external dangers will face us when the
British leave India? We have an Indian army brave and efficient, well-tried in many
continents. It is good enough to fight for the freedom of the Allies in the battlefields of
Europe and it will be good enough to fight if necessary for the freedom of India. When
freedom comes, we shall develop our army and strengthen it and make it more efficient
than it is today. We have seen during the Great War how vast armies can grow up in time
of need. The strength of the country depends not only on the defenc e force but even
more so on the international situation and the balance of power."

He was certain, well before two blocs appeared on the scene in 1947, that "the other
countries could not tolerate that the rich prize of India should fall again to another
power." Ergo, India needed to be friends with all the major powers; after 1 947; that is,
with both blocs. Hence, India's policy of non-alignment.

Whatever went wrong in the assessment of one who was aware of these truths? It is
simply that he refused to learn and relied on outmoded concepts. He who had scoffed at
the Kellog-Briond global no-war pact of 1928 spoke of its elaboration in the five pri
nciples of Panch Sheel in 1954 as if they were a panacea or substitute for a boundary
accord with China. In the 1930s, Britain imposed alliance treaties on Egypt, Iraq and
Transjordan before granting them independence. In the 1950s, Nehru could not bring
himself to accept that not all alliances diminished independence and a small ally retained
freedom of choice if its vital interests were involved. Synghman Rhee defied the U.S.;
Denmark could refuse to allow American troops on its soil; and Pakistan cou ld defy the
U.S. for a whole decade (1961-71) and develop closest ties with the U.S.' Asian
adversary, China. Nehru's intolerance led to the neglect of South-East Asia.

He had absolutely no concept of local wars, obsessed as he was with a world war.
Initially enamoured of an "Asian Personality", he lost all interest in the concept. Nor had
he any concept of dealing with the smaller neighbours on a footing of equality. B ut by
far his greatest flaw was an intractable approach to conflict resolution. He counselled
talks. But he would not deign to negotiate. The quest for regional ascendancy was
coupled with the quest for great power status. Inconsistencies a bounded. It was bad
enough to opt for confrontation with China. Worse still, thereafter to neglect the U.S. It
was Sino-American understanding in mid-1962, blissfully overlooked by Nehru, which
enabled Mao Zedong to withdraw his troops from the Taiwan se ctor and send them to
action across the Himalayas in October 1962. In panic, Nehru sought aerial cover from
President John F. Kennedy.

Has the nation learnt the lesson from its past? One doubts that. For it continues to be
treated to nostrums and dogmas in aid of the same aspirations of old, aspirations to
absolute security so eloquently expressed in the Draft Nuclear Security Doctrine.

What India really needs is an intellectual exercise of the kind Louis J. Halle attempted in
his work. He "felt the lack of an applicable body of theory and concluded that "no
practical and effective foreign policy can be developed merely by the ingenious
improvisation of clever negotiators, brilliant tacticians, or master chess-players. Such a
foreign policy has to be founded on a philosophy that represents a realistic understanding
of history. An adequate philosophy is no less important to our statesma nship today than
it was to the statesmanship of our founding fathers. If we are to have an effective foreign
policy we need to base it on a conceptual scheme that reveals and explains the world in
terms that bear the test of practical application. " Such an exercise cannot begin unless it
is realised that the familiar dogmas are of no relevance or worth.

#2775, 8 January 2009

Should India Join NATO to Combat Terrorism?
Sanjay Kumar
Research Assistant, USI-CS3
e-mail: kumarsinha@yahoo.com

Giving India's current diplomacy against Pakistan a new boost, Prime Minister Dr.
Manmohan Singh speaking at a conference of chief ministers in New Delhi on 6 January
2008 commented, "Given the sophistication and military precision of Mumbai attacks,
some official agencies in Pakistan must have supported them." Earlier, in an interview
published on 3 January, the famous Mumbai-born novelist of the Satanic Verses, Salman
Rushdie termed 26/11 as an act of war by Pakistan.

Armed aggression, according to a UN definition, constitute among other things, sending

by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry
out acts of armed force against another State……..(Definition of Aggression, adopted on
14 December 1974 by the UN General Assembly). Going by this definition, Pakistan has
been carrying out continued acts of aggression against the Indian state for over two
decades now. The latest terrorist strike on Mumbai has been rightly adjudged an act of
war with most security analysts including senior government functionaries agreeing that
an attack of this magnitude could not have taken place without the active connivance of
state agencies.

While Prime Minister Manmohan Singh hinted at the involvement of 'elements within
Pakistan' for Mumbai attack, he fell short of naming the government agencies which
could have abetted the crime at least in parts. The Mumbai terrorist attack clearly points
to a nefarious LeT-ISI-Pakistan Army nexus. Speaking to a private TV channel on 5
January, India's Foreign Secretary, Shri Shiv Shankar Menon, opined that it was hard to
believe that an attack of this magnitude could have taken place without any one in the
Pakistani government knowing it.

The 26/11 has often been compared to the infamous 9/11 terrorist attack on the US. This
comparison is however limited only to the extent of its magnitude and impact, not
extending to the manner in which political leadership in both countries responded to the
respective terrorist attacks. The US viewed 9/11 as an "armed attack' and invoked the
collective self-defence clause under Article 5 of the NATO charter where an armed attack
on one or more of [its members] shall be considered an attack on all," and that the
members may exercise the right of self-defence which includes the use of armed force, to
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. As a result of the sustained
US-NATO combined military campaign against terrorists in Afghanistan, Pakistan and
elsewhere, the US has not suffered any serious terrorist attack since 9/11.

By contrast, India's response to 26/11 so far has been a subdued one. Having initially
thundered that India retained all options against Pakistan including the military one, the
government of India finally recoiled to the oft-repeated diplomatic approach in dealing
with Pakistan. Diplomatic pressure wrought upon Pakistan so far by India in conjunction
with the US and other countries has had little impact with the result that Islamabad
continues to remain in a state of constant denial over its involvement in the Mumbai
terrorist strike.

Pakistan's continued refusal to act on the evidence provided by India implicating Pakistan
based organizations responsible for Mumbai massacre, is edging India closer towards
some kind of punitive military strikes, at least as a token gesture, to appease public
sentiments ahead of general elections which are scheduled to be held by May this year.
With diplomacy not yielding desired results, India will be forced soon to adopt tougher
measures against Pakistan. Another terrorist strike of this magnitude and India goes to
war with Pakistan.

While it is true that the government of India has taken some very effective long-term
measures on the internal front to combat future terror, the fact however remains that no
amount of defence is plausible against suicide attacks. If India is really serious about
stopping export-variant terrorism then it will have to combat terror at the place of its
origin. India's diplomacy needs to be backed by meaningful use of force.

Failure to take unilateral military action against Pakistan stems partly from India's
inability to control surgical strikes spiraling into a full-blown war with Pakistan and
partly from the fact that India is not insulated by any collective security alliance like
NATO. India's policy of non-alignment and its ideology does not permit joining any
alliance with a military bias. However, in the changed security scenario, India needs to
seriously reexamine its policy of non-alignment, particularly at a time when the world is
dominated by a single power.

There is a sizable number of opinion makers in India who suggest that India should join
NATO to combat terrorism on a long-term basis. Joining NATO on full-term basis could
become problematic for India as it would hurl the country headlong into the Global War
on Terror, precipitating greater involvement of Indian troops in Afghanistan and
elsewhere. However, there are common grounds for NATO-India convergence such as
containing China and combating terrorism. Therefore, India needs to open a strategic
dialogue with NATO and work towards areas of common security concern on a case-by-
case basis.

Towards Regional Stability: Establish an Indo-Pak

Nuclear Commission
D Suba Chandran
Deputy Director, IPCS
email: subachandran@gmail.com

Between India and Pakistan, there is little understanding of each other’s nuclear
capabilities and doctrines. There is likely to be an increased international pressure on
both countries, as a part of the renewed efforts towards global nuclear disarmament. Both
regional instability and the likely international pressure calls for an intensive dialogue
and innovative approaches.

At the regional level, Pakistan does not consider India’s nuclear doctrine (especially the
No-First-Use and Minimum Credible Deterrence) as credible. Rather, Islamabad in
Pakistan believes that during crisis period, India will not adhere to its NFU. Besides, the
NFU will result in India preparing for a second strike capability, thereby increasing its
nuclear arsenals considerably. According to Pakistan, this makes India’s credible
deterrence anything but minimal, besides the fact, leading to an arms race. More
importantly, Pakistan today believes, that after the Indo-US nuclear deal, India will be
able to amass sufficient fissile materials, enabling it to lead the nuclear arms race in
South Asia, at a considerable pace, leaving Pakistan behind.

On the other hand, India believes, that its doctrine including the NFU and minimum
credible deterrence, is a source of stability. A section within India even believes that the
NFU actually provides the space for Pakistan, to engage in overt and covert activities, as
India will not be the first use nuclear weapons. Regarding the nuclear deal with the US, a
section believes, that this agreement has come up with certain military costs (besides the
economic costs), in terms of opening its nuclear facilities to international inspection.
India has made substantial commitments to the international organizations including the
IAEA and NSG. Pakistan, however, has got a similar understanding with Beijing, without
any such commitments.

At the international level, after the relative success of the NPT Review Conference 2010,
one is likely to see an increased international pressure on India and Pakistan; especially
relating to certain international nuclear treaties – primarily the CTBT and FMCT. The
fact that it will not be easy for Obama to get the CTBT ratified will provide space for
India and Pakistan to debate the CTBT or prolong the decision. Unfortunately, the FMCT
does not provide that space to both countries. Despite the bold statements, it is unlikely
that the two countries would be able to withstand the international pressure. Pakistan is
dilly dallying with calling for a FMT (Fissile Material Treaty) instead of an FMCT. This
suits India, for New Delhi can argue that it will be willing to sign the FMCT, if
Islamabad is ready to do the same. Pakistan is afraid that if it signs the FMCT now, it will
not be able to match up with India’s already produced fissile materials.

While the Lahore Memorandum provides space for a nuclear dialogue, and there already
exists an earlier agreement on sharing each other’s nuclear installations, there is not much
trust between the two countries. The reason is the lack of any meaningful and intensive
nuclear dialogue, sustained over a period – either at Track-I or Track-II levels. As a part
of confidence building, numerous nuclear risk reduction measures have been proposed
already. Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) on the models of
US-Russia has been widely discussed in the strategic circles. Undoubtedly, the NRRCs
are a welcome suggestion, but are limited and negative in approach. It hopes to establish
two nuclear centers, which will be technical in nature, providing details/alerts regarding
nuclear dangers, accidental use and related issues.

What is needed now, at the Indo-Pak level is a positive, larger institution that provides
space for continuous and intensive interaction on nuclear issues, which remain
uninterrupted with other political/militant developments in Indo-Pak level. None of the
major nuclear treaties at the international level are a result of casual one-off meeting, held
over a period of two days. International nuclear agreements are the result of an intensive
interaction, over a period of years. If India and Pakistan are to have any productive
debate leading to a stable understanding, then the nuclear dialogue needs something
larger than a mere NRRC, at the technical level.
This is where an Indo-Pak Nuclear Commission on the models of Indus Water
Commission may be an idea worth pursuing. Indus Water Commission, created in 1960
after a prolonged negotiation, which resulted in the famous Indus Waters Treaty (IWT),
provides two Indus Water Commissioners in India and Pakistan. The Indus Water
Commission has met periodically ever since 1960, irrespective of wars and proxy wars,
and regime changes. If the IWT is hailed as a major example, of a treaty that have
survived four wars and numerous proxy wars, it is because that the Indus Water
Commission never broke down, and its Commissioners never failed to meet each other.
Two positive ideas from the Indus Water Commission are worth borrowing: an exclusive
commission and periodic meeting, irrespective of the prevailing political climate.

The Indo-Pak Nuclear Commission, unlike the proposed NRRC should not be only
technical. It could be an ideal forum for the discussion of nuclear doctrines and
understanding each other’s anxieties and fears. While the NRRCs will contain two
centers in India and Pakistan, the Nuclear Commission could facilitate regular meetings,
alternatively in India and Pakistan. In fact, the NRRC could be the technical arm of the
Nuclear Commission. Such an Indo-Pak Nuclear Commission has the potential to become
a great stabilizer of nuclear relations between the two countries.

Non-Proliferation: What Can India Do?

PR Chari
Research Professor, IPCS
email: prchari@vsnl.net

India is rightly considered a leader in the spheres of nuclear disarmament, non-

proliferation, and similar efforts to establish a safer world. Official spokespersons have
untiringly informed the world about India’s contributions here, e.g. Espousing the cause
of general and complete disarmament, cessation of nuclear testing, and shunning the
export of nuclear materials, equipment and technology. This salubrious record informed
the United States in 2005 to negotiate the Indo-US nuclear deal and hammer it through
the skeptical Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2008, thereby making India an exception to the
international norm of not cooperating with non-signatories to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Further, India had challenged its basic premise by exploding
nuclear devices in 1974 and 1998, setting itself forth as a nuclear weapon state. In truth,
India’s policies underwent a subtle change after China exploded its first nuclear device in
October 1964. Thereafter, India’s declarations continued to exhort the need for nuclear
disarmament. But, secret efforts proceeded within its relevant establishments to derive
nuclear weapons that culminated in the nuclear test series in May 1998. In other words,
India distinguished between hortatory words and pragmatic actions, which drive external
commentators to distraction.

National security interests have guided its refusal to enter the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, although the official reasons offered for its abstention are the inequality
embedded in that Treaty, dichotomy between obligations and rights, inadequate
commitment of the nuclear haves to eliminate their nuclear stockpiles and so on.
President Obama has provided a new thrust now to the non-proliferation debate by
pledging to strive for a ‘global zero,’ reduce the salience of nuclear weapons for national
security, provide a new content to nuclear safety and security norms, declare a less
qualified no-first-use doctrine and so on. Consequently, a readjustment in India’s non-
proliferation policy is indicated, since pursuit of its time-honoured ploy of rhetoric and
inaction is no longer defensible.

So, how could India balance its legitimate national security interests with pursuing a
more credible non-proliferation policy? A conference to debate this precise question was
held in Washington last month, bringing together specialists in nuclear politics and
foreign affairs from the United States and India. It was appreciated that India cannot join
the NPT without it being amended—a practical impossibility and that India would not
join that Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state on political considerations. Consequently,
a major conclusion of that conference was that India should participate more fully in the
nonproliferation system by entering the international export control groups and other
arrangements that have been designed to restrain and control the spread of sensitive
technologies. In practice, this requires India and the United States to:
• Agree in principle to bring India into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR); the Wassenaar Arrangement (relates to the
conventional arms trade); and the Australia Group (deals with chemical and biological
agents);
• Harmonize India’s export control lists with that of the Wassenaar Arrangement and the
Australia Group. This has been achieved in respect of the NSG and MTCR guidelines;
• Begin consultations with members of these export control regimes to explore how India
might join them; and
• Address the impediments (political and legal) to India joining the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI).

The advantages to the United States and India from the success of these initiatives hardly
need belaboring. India has been recognized, incidentally by the Indo-US nuclear deal to
be a “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology.” India’s entry into these
regimes to formally join the global efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and, more broadly, weapons of mass destruction, would consolidate its ‘responsible state’
compliment. Moreover, India has traditionally been a votary of nuclear non-proliferation,
despite not entering the NPT, joining the regimes to constrain nuclear proliferation would
be a significant gesture. India’s entry into these regimes would also serve the American
objective of revitalizing non-proliferation by drawing India within its discipline that
possesses ‘advanced nuclear technology’, and technologies relevant to the manufacture of
other weapons of mass destruction. This is especially important since India is widely
believed to be on a growth trajectory that would make it among the world’s most
advanced technological nations. Further, India’s inclusion within the PSI would draw its
navy—the most powerful among the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean and among the
largest in the world, into the global counter-proliferation strategy being pursued by the
United States.
Naturally, much diplomatic hard work lies ahead for the United States and India to
achieve these objectives and bring India into these international export control regimes
that would strengthen the overall non-proliferation system. The reward would be more
robust export control regimes and a more substantive contribution by India to their
success.

Should India give up its NFU Doctrine?

Ali Ahmed
Research Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
email: aliahd66@hotmail.com

Suba Chandran has on this website made out a case for jettisoning the No First Use. In
order for readers to make up their own minds, this article lays out a case for retaining the
pillar of the doctrine as hither-to-fore.

No First Use, simply stated, is that India would not be the first to introduce nuclear
weapons into a conflict. Its nuclear resort would be ‘retaliation only’. The logic
underlying this is has several dimensions – political, military and diplomatic.

India is a reluctant nuclear weapon state. This is in keeping with India’s strategic culture.
On its political necessity internally, NFU serves the purpose of placating that part of the
political spectrum that finds nuclear weapons’ possession and use, horrendous.
Externally, India needs the weapons to deter other states from threatening India or
restricting its strategic autonomy. These weapons are thus seen as political weapons, not
meant for war-fighting. This is made explicit by the NFU postulate.

Militarily, India does not need to rely on nuclear weapons, either in the India-Pakistan or
in the India-China conflict scenario. On both fronts, it is a status quo power and does not
have an aggressive intent. It has adequate capability for conventional self-defence. On the
Pakistan front, its conventional posture has acquired an offensive edge with ‘Cold Start’.
While it has adequate conventional advantage over Pakistan to be able to operationalize
the doctrine, it is making up for shortfalls in firepower etc. On the China front, it is
moving towards ‘active deterrence’ from a ‘dissuasive deterrence’ posture, through the
raising of formations and by creating infrastructure. There is little scope for nuclear use,
since their introduction would neutralize India’s conventional advantage on the Pakistan
front and be of little use in face of the asymmetry with China.

The moral and political high ground is proving to be of increasing importance in conflict.
Both the US and Israel, who have fought conventional wars and faced an asymmetric
counter recently, have had to exert to defend their case. Even though militarily effective,
diplomatic shortfalls have made any gains ambiguous. Consequently, it can be reckoned
that first use of nuclear weapons would place any state in considerable disadvantage on
this score. The state would require proving the need for breaching the long standing
nuclear taboo. This could have unaffordable diplomatic and political costs. Instead,
responding to a nuclear strike through nuclear means would be easily defensible.
One circumstance in which first use makes sense is in preempting enemy first-strike
levels of nuclear first use. This would amount to an attempt by the enemy to degrade
India’s nuclear retaliatory capability to such an extent that retaliation is ruled out or made
negligible. There are two ways to cope with this: one is going first through first strike
doctrines as launch on warning, launch through attack etc; and second, deterring through
punishment based on a second strike capability.

The former is more destabilizing since it requires higher alertness levels that can be
mistaken by the enemy as first strike preparedness; thereby increasing his propensity, if
any, for first strike. It lends itself more readily to vertical proliferation since a
competition in numbers develops to make the first strike effective. It is argued that
waiting to receive the grievous blow may prove fatal. The problems are two: first is the
well known one of misperception and accident; the second is that a first strike in
preemption need not prove effective. The enemy would retaliate with strikes designed to
hurt with the fewer weapons he has left. Therefore, first strike makes little sense,
especially when the opponents have already acquired second strike capability levels of
nuclear ordnance.

India favours the latter. It is in the process of acquiring a second strike capability based
on a triad of delivery means and sufficient numbers as to preclude successful first strike.
An arms race need not necessarily result if measures that lend credibility, such as suitable
basing, hardening, mobility, command and control arrangements and deception, are taken
alongside. Further, misperception is precluded. Nevertheless, second strike, to quote
General Sundarji, needs also to be ‘sensibly’ defined.

The argument so far has been that nuclear first use makes little sense for India. This does
not necessarily mean that India needs to subscribe to NFU. It need not launch nuclear
weapons first. It need not make a declaration to that effect. The critique that India’s
unilateral NFU would be received with skepticism by its adversaries is understandable.
However, their strategic assessment on India’s intent would lead them to the arguments
made here that first use has no gains for India. Therefore, even if India was to withdraw
from NFU, its doctrine would continue as ‘retaliation only’.

Nevertheless, making this explicit helps preclude the ‘use them-lose them’ dilemma
brought on as suggested by Thomas Schelling by the logic: ‘He thinks we think he thinks
we think…he thinks we think he will attack; so he thinks we shall; so he will; so we
must.’ The NFU helps mitigate edgy nuclear thresholds.