Assembly
BP Blg. 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985)
- The Public Assembly Act of 1985
-Declaration of Policy. - The constitutional right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances is essential and
vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this
end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of such
right without prejudice to the rights of others to life,
liberty and equal protection of the law
-Permit is required if person(s) organize to hold a
public assembly in a public place
-No permit if private property or freedom park (duly
established by law or ordinance)
-If assembly is done in a private property, consent of
the owner or one entitled to its legal possession is
required
-Political meetings or rallies held during any election
campaign period as provided for by law are not
covered by this Act.
-Application Requirements:
1. in writing, with: the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the
date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to
be used for the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the transport and the
public address systems to be used.
2. incorporate the duty and responsibility of the
applicant (Sec.8)
3. filed with the office of the mayor of the city or
municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended
activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days
before the scheduled public assembly
4. acknowledged in writing and posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or municipal building
-Action to be taken on the application:
1. The mayor or any official acting on his behalf shall
issue or grant the permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will
create a clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health
2. The mayor shall act on the application within 2
working days from the date the application was filed,
failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted.
3. All cases filed in court under this Section shall be
decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of
filing. In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan
Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the
Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be
appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight
(48) hours after receipt of the same
- Should the proposed public assembly involve the use,
for an appreciable length of time, of any public
highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor
or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent
grave public inconvenience, designate the route
thereof which is convenient to the participants or
reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that
there will be no serious or undue interference with the
free flow of commerce and trade.
-Law enforcement shall not interfere with the holding
of a public assembly however, they may be detailed
and stationed in a place at least 100 meters away from
the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order
to ensure public safety. They shall be in complete
uniform with their nameplates and are to observe
“maximum tolerance.” They shall not carry any kind
of firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot
sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks,
boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards
- No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed.
However, when an assembly becomes violent, the
police may disperse such public assembly.
- When the public assembly is held without a permit
where a permit is required, the said public assembly
may be peacefully dispersed
-Violation: The holding of any public assembly as
defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without
having first secured that written permit where a permit
is required from the office concerned, or the use of
such permit for such purposes in any place other than
those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That
no person can be punished or held criminally liable for
participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful
assembly
-6 months after the effectivity of this Act, every city or
municipality shall establish or designate at least one
suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective
jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be
centrally located within the poblacion where
demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time
without the need of any prior permit.
Primicias vs Fugoso
This is an action of mandamus instituted by the
petitioner Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager of
the Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeriano
Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to compel the
latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon,
November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the
government for redress to grievances on the ground
that the respondent refused to grant such permit.
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the
people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions
of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle
growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil
societies that the exercise of those rights is not
absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign "police power," which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people. This sovereign police
power is exercised by the government through its
legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating
those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it
may be delegated to political subdivisions.
[Sec. 1119 mandates that the streets and public places
in the city is free for use of the public provided that the
holding of athletic games, sports, exercises during the
celebration of national holidays, parade or procession
provided that they are issued a permit by the mayor].
The Court decided it best to adopt the second
construction of Sec. 1119 to mean that the applicant
has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the
Mayor, subject only to the latter’s reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the purpose, with a view to
prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of the streets and public places by
others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risk of disorder.
To adopt the construction that the mayor is vested with
unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant the
permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting,
parade, or procession in the streets and other public
places of the city would be tantamount to authorizing
him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public
places for holding of meetings, parades or processions,
because such a construction would make the ordinance
invalid and void or violative of the constitutional
limitations.
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for
refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable
ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances
and upon the fact that passions, especially on the part
of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that
similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in
their government, and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the
peace and a disruption of public order." As the request
of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful
public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or
any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the
reason given for the refusal of the permit cannot be
given any consideration.
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression
of free speech and assembly. Moreover, even
imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of
these functions essential effective democracy, unless
the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition
of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent
that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting
a relatively trivial harm to a society. The fact that
speech is likely to result in some violence or in
destruction of property is not enough to justify its
suppression. There must be the probability of serious
injury to the state. Among freemen, the deterrents
ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are
education and punishment for violations of the law,
not abridgment of the rights of free speech and
assembly.
Petition is granted. There being no reasonable
objection to the use of Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the
meeting applied for, the mayor is ordered to issue the
corresponding permit.
Navarro vs Villegas (Resolution)
The right to peaceably assemble is not absolute and
may be regulated. Respondent Mayor possesses
reasonable discretion to determine or specify the
streets or public places to be used for the assembly in
order to secure convenient use thereof by others and
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the
risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order.
Respondent Mayor has expressly stated his
willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at
Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily
great disruption of the normal activities of the
community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as
an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of the
demonstration sought to be held.
That civil rights and liberties can exist and be
preserved only in an ordered society; That petitioner
has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the
part of respondent Mayor to grant their application for
permit unconditionally.
The Court denied the write prayed for and dismissed
the petition.
Ignacio vs Ela
Petitioners, in their behalf and for the benefit of other
Jehovah's Witnesses in the province of Zambales,
brought this action to compel respondent to grant them
a permit to hold a public meeting at the public plaza of
Sta. Cruz, Zambales, together with the kiosk, on such
date and time as may be applied for by them.
It therefore appears that the right to freedom of speech
and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our
Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in
order that it may not be "injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious
to the rights of the community or society", and this
power may be exercised under the "police power" of
the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
The power exercised by respondent cannot be
considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the
peculiar circumstances of this case. It appears that the
public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short
distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The
proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some
concern on the part of the authorities that to avoid
disturbance of peace and order, or the happening of
untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to
prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious
denomination as a place of meeting of its members.
This was the policy adopted by respondent for
sometime previous to the request made by petitioners.
Respondent never denied such request but merely tried
to enforce his policy by assigning them the
northwestern part of the public plaza. It cannot
therefore be said that petitioners were denied their
constitutional right to assemble for, as was said, such
right is subject to regulation to maintain public order
and public safety. This is especially so considering that
the tenets of petitioners' congregation are derogatory
to those of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which
respondent must have considered in denying their
request.
J.B.I. Reyes vs Bagatsing
Petitioner, retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of
the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the
City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally
starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of
the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away.
The march would be attended by the local and foreign
participants of such conference. There was likewise an
assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all
the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a
peaceful march and rally.
The filing of this suit for mandamus was due to the fact
that as of that date, petitioner had not been informed
of any action taken on his request on behalf of the
organization to hold a rally. It turned out that on
October 19, such permit was denied. Petitioner was
unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by
ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was
due to "police intelligence reports which strongly
militate against the advisability of issuing such permit
at this time and at the place applied for." To be more
specific, reference was made to "persistent
intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of
subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or
disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large
number of people is expected to attend. Respondent
Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with the
recommendation of the police authorities, that "a
permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at
the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where
the safety of the participants themselves and the
general public may be ensured
Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public concern without censorship or punishment.
There is to be then no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability
whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or
action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless
there be a "clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." Freedom of
assembly connotes the right of the people to meet
peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters
of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the
utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case
with freedom of expression, of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent.
By way of a summary, the applicants for a permit to
hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority
of the date, the public place where and the time when
it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be
filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but
at another public place. It is an indispensable condition
to such refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his
decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if
so minded, they can have recourse to the proper
judicial authority.
The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the
ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. Not that it
should be overlooked. There was in this case,
however, the assurance of General Narciso Cabrera,
Superintendent, Western Police District, Metropolitan
Police Force, that the police force is in a position to
cope with such emergency should it arise. That is to
comply with its duty to extend protection to the
participants of such peaceable assembly. Also from
him came the commendable admission that there were
at least five previous demonstrations at the Bayview
Hotel Area and Plaza Ferguson in front of the United
States Embassy where no untoward event occurred. It
was made clear by petitioner, through counsel, that no
act offensive to the dignity of the United States
Mission in the Philippines would take place and that,
as mentioned at the outset of this opinion, "all the
necessary steps would be taken by it `to ensure a
peaceful march and rally.'" WHEREFORE, the
mandatory injunction prayed for is granted.
Ruiz vs Gordon
Petitioner personally delivered to the respondent
Gordon, city mayor of Olongapo City, a letter-
application to hold a prayer rally at the Rizal Triangle,
Olongapo City. Petitioner files on court on November
25, 1983 for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
to issue such permit. The respondent sent his
manifestation the very same day the court required the
party to file an Answer stating that he had been
interviewed on the matter by the Editor-in-Chief of the
“Guardian,” a newspaper of general circulation in
Olongapo and Zambales mentioning the fact the he
had granted the permit of the petitioner, which
interview appeared in the November 22-28, 1983
issue of the said newspaper. The petitioner came and
moved to withdraw the petition.
RULING: As shown both in the manifestation and the
answer, this action for mandamus could have been
obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying
on November 23 whether or not a permit had been
issued. A party desirous of exercising the right to
peaceable assembly should be the one most interested
in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a
permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the
day and time was designated for the decision on the
request, such party or his representative should be at
the office of the public official concerned. If he fails to
do so, a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse
or favorable, should be sent to the address of
petitioner. In that way, there need not be waste of time
and effort not only of the litigants but likewise of a
court from which redress is sought in case of a denial
or modification of a request for a permit. Case is
dismissed.
Malabanan vs Ramento
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student
Council of respondent University. They sought and
were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold
a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. on August
27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other
students, they held a general assembly at the
Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball
court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not
in the basketball court as therein stated but at the
second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested
In vehement and vigorous language their opposition to
the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science
with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the
same day, they marched toward the Life Science
Building and continued their rally. It was outside the
area covered by their permit. They continued their
demonstration, giving utterance to language severely
critical of the University authorities and using
megaphones in the process. There was, as a result,
disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-
academic employees, within hearing distance, stopped
their work because of the noise created.
Respondent Ramento, director of the NCR, found
petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated par.
146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more
specifically their holding of an illegal assembly.
ISSUE: Whether on the facts resulting in the
disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was
an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and
its cognate right of speech
RULING: Yes. What is the verdict on the complaint
of petitioners that there was a disregard of their
constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech. It must be in their favor, but subject to
qualification, in view of their continuing their
demonstration in a place other than that specified in
the permit for a longer period and their making use of
megaphones therein, resulting in the disruption of
classes and the stoppage of work by the non-academic
personnel in the vicinity of such assembly. On the
facts, however an admonition, even a censure –
certainly not a suspension – could be the appropriate
penalty.
Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly
and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy
like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their
views and communicate their thoughts to those
disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this
case. They do not "shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate." But conduct by the student, in class or out of it,
which for any reason — whether it stems from time,
place, or type of behavior — materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion
of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are
guaranteed students of educational institutions.
Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting
their welfare or involving public interest is not to be
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent
punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and
present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a
right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and
scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed
or utterances made. The peaceable character of an
assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of
disorder under the name of dissent, whatever
grievances that may be aired being susceptible to
correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly
is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought
from its school authorities, who are devoid of the
power to deny such request arbitrarily or
unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to
avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the
non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be
violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not
be disproportionate to the offense.
Arreza vs GAUF
Petitioners are the leaders or participants in a
rally/demonstration held on September 28, 1982, in
front of the Life Science Building of the respondent
University but which for them, could be more
accurately described as "a continuation of the General
Assembly of the student body held the day before —
one authorized by the School Administration." Its
purpose was to register the opposition of the students
to the abolition of the school's Institute of Animal
Science, as those taking courses therein would not be
able to graduate. Such exercise of their right to
peaceable assembly was visited by respondent
University with a refusal to let them enroll after what
or petitioners was a sham investigation of their alleged
violation of school rules and regulations.
RULING: Petitioners, as all other students, may freely
exercise such rights. "They enjoy like the rest of the
citizens the freedom to express their views and
communicate their thoughts to those disposed to
listen" in rallies and demonstrations.
There is no need, therefore, to inquire into the
allegations of respondent University as to the no
peaceable character of the rally or demonstration. As
made clear from the above excerpt, infractions of
University rules or regulations by petitioner-students
justify the filing of appropriate charges. What cannot
be justified is the infliction of the highly
disproportionate penalty of denial of enrollment and
the consequent failure of senior students to graduate,
if in the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech
and peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be
attributed to them
German vs Barangan
At about 5:00 in the afternoon of October 2, 1984,
petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen,
students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel
Street, Manila, for the ostensible purpose of hearing
Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the
Malacañang grounds locate in the same street.
Wearing the now familiar inscribed yellow T-shirts,
they started to march down said street with raised
clenched fists and shouts of anti-government
invectives. Along the way, however, they were barred
by respondent Major Isabelo Lariosa, upon orders of
his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago
Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground
that St. Jude Chapel was located within the
Malacañang security area. When petitioners'
protestations and pleas to allow them to get inside the
church proved unavailing, they decided to leave.
However, because of the alleged warning given them
by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt
by petitioners to enter the church in the future would
likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present
recourse.
[Case is more on freedom of religion than freedom
of assembly. J. Teehankee’s dissenting opinion
discussed more of the Freedom of Assembly than the
Majority Opinion]
J. Teehankee’s dissenting opinion
RULING: The right to freely exercise one's religion is
guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. Freedom
of worship, alongside with freedom of expression and
speech and peaceable assembly "along with the other
intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme
of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly
stressed that on the judiciary — even more so than on
the other departments — rests the grave and delicate
responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to
such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no
sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what
has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes 'as
the sovereign prerogative of judgment.' Nonetheless,
the presumption must be to incline the weight of the
scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as
they do precedence and primacy."
Instances of Disorderly Conduct does not
characterize assembly tumultuous. The burden to
show the existence of grave and imminent danger that
would justify prior restraint and bar a group of persons
from entering the church of their choice for prayer and
worship lies on the military or police officials who
would so physical restrain them. Indeed, there is no
precedent in this time and age when churchgoers
whose right of free exercise of their religion is
recognized have been physically prevented from
entering their church on grounds of national security.
On the other hand, it does not lie within the
competence nor authority of such officials to demand
of church goers that they show and establish their
sincerity and good faith . . . in invoking the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious
worship and of "locomotion" as a pre-condition, as
seems to be the thrust of the majority decision. Nor is
there any burden on the churchgoer to awake "a
satisfactory showing of a claim deeply rooted in
religious conviction" before he may worship at the
church of his choice — as appears to be the basis of
Justice Gutierrez' concurring opinion for dismissal of
the petition. The exercise of such basic and sacred
rights would be too tenuous if they were made to
depend on the snap judgment and disposition of such
officials as to one's good faith and his attire. In fact,
Article 132 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes
public officers and employees who "prevent or disturb
the ceremonies or manifestations of nay religion"
while Article 32 of the Civil Code grants an
independent cause of action for moral an exemplary
damages and " for other relief" against such officials
or private individuals "who directly or indirectly
obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or
impair (the) freedom of religion (and) freedom of
speech" of any person.
Acosta vs CA
Petitioners are teachers in various public schools in
Metro Manila who did not report for work several days
and participated in mass actions at the Liwasang
Bonifacio for redress of grievances. Their activities
disrupted public service and caused stoppage of
classes. For failure to return to work despite an order
from the Secretary of the DECS, petitioners were
charged, among others, with conduct prejudicial to the
service. Petitioners, for their defense, alleged that they
did not go on strike but merely exercised their right to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances. The Secretary found petitioners
guilty as charged and ordered their immediate
dismissal from the service. Petitioners appealed to the
Merit Systems Protection Board and then to the CSC
which affirmed the decision of the DECS Secretary,
but modified the penalty to a 6-month suspension
without pay. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the CSC, hence, this petition.
RULING: Petitioners' contentions are without merit.
The character and legality of the mass actions which
they participated in have been passed upon by this
Court as early as 1990 in Manila Public School
Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio, Jr.
wherein we ruled that "these 'mass actions' were to all
intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a
concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence
from, work which it was the teachers' sworn duty to
perform, undertaken for essentially economic
reasons."
It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was
punished, but the manner in which they exercised such
right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service and classes in various
public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are
efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the
mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could
petition the government for redress of grievances."
It bears stressing that suspension of public services,
however temporary, will inevitably derail services to
the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to
strike is denied government employees. It may be
conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and
noble intentions in staging the "mass actions," but that
will not justify their absences to the prejudice of
innocent school children. Their righteous indignation
does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.
Bayan vs Ermita
Petitioners are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and their rights as organizations and
individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently
dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
[The ponente in the case saw it fit to copy-paste all
the provisions of BP880, as well as the
jurisprudence in the previous cases in this digest.
Please refer to them ]
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that
simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v.
Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a "content-
neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of
holding public assemblies.

A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus

readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference
to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based
because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled
to protection. Neither are the words "opinion,"
"protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of
public assembly content based, since they can refer to
any subject. The words "petitioning the government
for redress of grievances" come from the wording of
the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of
all rallyists and is independent of the content of the
expressions in the rally.

On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned

as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly
restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public
places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies.
Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for
the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The
delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally
"permits" is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger"
standard.