Professional Documents
Culture Documents
As to the penalty, Sec 4 provides that transport of at least 750 g of marijuana is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Having no attendant circumstance, Art 63 of RPC applies, in which case the lesser penalty of RP is the imposable penalty.
NO. One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus,
Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
"Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
" . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing , or is attempting to commit an
offense."
It may be pointed out, however, that although the information stated the weight to be approximately one kilo, the forensic
chemist who examined the marijuana leaves testified that the marijuana weighed only 600 grams. Such amount is not a
considerable quantity as to conclusively confer upon the accused an intent to transport the marijuana leaves.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The appellant is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and fine
of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos.
there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-
the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We
cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants during on-the-spot
apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers,
etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves supposedly seized from him was never
authenticated and therefore should not have been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes on the fact that the marijuana
package brought by patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination did not contain a tag
bearing the name of the accused. We rule, however, that since Patrolman Quevedo testified that he gave the marijuana
package together with a letter-request for examination, and the forensic chemist Marilene Salangad likewise testified that
she received the marijuana together with the letter-request and said letter-request bore the name of the accused, then the
requirements of proper authentication of evidence were sufficiently complied with. The marijuana package examined by
the forensic checklist was satisfactorily identified as the one seized from accused.
As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the appellate court.
These prosecution witnesses have no motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense against the accused.
The knowledge on what these witnesses testified to were (sic) acquired by them in the official performance of their duties
and then, (sic) being no showing that they are prejudiced against the accused, their testimonies deserve full credit.
Moreover, if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to the effect that Pat. Punzalan got all the money from his
wallet when he was accosted at the Victory Liner Terminal and was told just to keep quiet otherwise he will be "salvaged"
why will Pat. Punzalan still bring the accused to the municipal Building for interrogation and/or verification? Would not
Pat. Punzalan be exposing his identity to the accused? This is unnatural. And this is also true on the testimony to the
accused that Pat. Silverio Quevedo got his fifty-peso bill arid never returned the same to him. If the policemen really got
any money from the accused and that the marijuana leaves do not belong to the accused, why will the two policemen still
produce in Court as evidence that expensive-looking traveling red bag (Exhibit G) taken from the accused and which
contained the marijuana in question if the instant case is a mere fabrication?
As already stated, all the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by the prosecution in this case were all based on
personal knowledge acquired by the prosecution witnesses in the regular performance of their official duties and there is
nothing in their testimonies to show that they are bias (sic) or that they have any prejudice against the herein accused.
Between the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses and that of the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of the
accused, the former should prevail. (Rollo, p. 13)
Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony. He could have availed himself through
compulsory court processes of several witnesses to buttress his defense. Since not one other witness was presented nor
was any justification for the non-appearance given, the inadequacy of his lone and uncorroborated testimony remains. It
cannot prevail vis-a-vis the positive testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses.
HELD
NO. We agree with the Solicitor General's assertion that the prosecution failed to establish that appellant sold, distributed
and delivered Marijuana. The records show that the two prosecution witnesses did not actually see appellant transact any
business dealing with marijuana.
Pat. Bongalos also could not say whether appellant was selling, distributing or delivering marijuana to Abrera when he was placed
under arrest.
The person, who is in the best position to testify whether appellant sold marijuana or not, was Abrera, as he was the person whom
appellant allegedly dealth with. We are placed at a quandary as to why Abrera was not prosecuted together with appellant nor was
he made to testify for the prosecution when he was named as one of the its witnesses. As testified to by the prosecution witnesses,
Abrera was not similarly charged with appellant because Abrera, when investigated, pointed to appellant as the person who gave
him the marijuana. The reliance made by the police investigator on Abrera’s word is simply puzzling.
The sworn statement executed by Abrera, (Exh. D) pointing to appellant as the person who gave him a tinfoil of
marijuana is inadmissible in evidence and has no probative value. The failure of the prosecution to present Abrera in
court although he was named as one of the prosecution witnesses deprived the accused the opportunity to cross-examine
his accuser. ". . . [C]ross-examination is an indispensable instrument of criminal justice to give substance and meaning to
the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him and to show that the presumption of
innocence has remained steadfast and firm".
Appellant should likewise be acquitted of the offense of possession of marijuana. Admittedly, Pat. Gonzales searched
appellant without a warrant. It is contended however that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. The
arrest of appellant itself was also made without a warrant of arrest. In such a case, the arrest can be justified only if there
was a crime committed in the presence of the arresting officers.
The cardinal rule is that no person may be subjected by the police to a search of his house, body or personal belonging
except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest ( People v. De la Cruz , 184 SCRA 416 [1990]).
"If a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those justifying an arrest without warrant in
accordance with law, merely on suspicion that he is engaged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he
has indeed committed a crime, it is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof as
being 'the fruit of the poisonous tree'"
Wherefore, Rodriguez is hereby ACQUITTED.
HELD
NO. While we might concede difficulty in readily accepting the statement of the prosecution that the search was
conducted with consent freely given by appellant and members of his household, it should be pointed out, in any case,
that the search and seizure was done admittedly on the occasion of a lawful arrest. A significant exception from the
necessity for a search warrant is when the search and seizure is effected as an incident to a lawful arrest and so, in People
vs. Musa.
The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses.
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second, they allege that the accusations of the
petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights are total lies.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned, the respondents cite Article VII, Section 17 and 18 of the
Constitution.
ISSUES
HELD
NO. Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the truth. Everything before us consists of allegations.
According to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested in the saturation drives covered by the petition. No
estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley
Drive near the Manila International Airport area. Not one of the several thousand persons treated in the illegal and
inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial court to present the kind of
evidence admissible in courts of justice. Moreover, there must have been tens of thousands of nearby residents who were
inconvenienced in addition to the several thousand allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently been
charged and none of those affected has apparently complained.The aerial target zonings in this petition were intended
to flush out subversives and criminal elements particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and
police officials by elements supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were Conducted. It is clear from
the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that there was no rebellion or criminal activity similar
to that of the attempted coup d' etats. There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "areal
zoning' could not be achieved even as the rights of squatter and low income families are fully protected.A blanket
prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontationswhere search
warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals are easily procured.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a taxpayers' suit. Where not one victim complains
and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the
executive departments and for trial courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City.