149 – People v Yatco (1955)

GR NO. L-9181
XI. Admissions and Confessions (D. 2. Co-Conspirator statements)

FACTS
 Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another person whose identity is still unknown were
charged of having conspired to murder Jose Ramos in the CFI of QC. Several hearings were
conducted and the prosecution had been presenting evidence.
 In one of the hearings, the witness of the prosecution(Atty.Arturo Xavier of the NBI) was being
asked about an extra judicial confession allegedly made by Juan Consunji ,one of the accused,
before him.
 The counsel of Alfonso Panganiban made a general objection to any evidence on such
confession alleging that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against Alfonso
Panganiban.
 CFI of Quezon City
o Ordered the exclusion of the said confession
o not because of the alleged ground interposed by defendant’s counsel but on a different
ground
o stated that the prosecution cannot be permitted to introduce the confessions of the
defendants to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy
by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.
 Prosecution asked for a reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence this petition directly to the
Court via certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the court was correct in applying the rule on the co conspirator statements

HELD: NO. The rule does not apply in this case. The Sec 12 of Rule 123 provides:

“Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration.”

Manifestly, the rule refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the
unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession
made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.

It is still possible that the prosecution is still trying to adduce other proof of conspiracy between
Consunji and Panganiban before formally offering the confessions as evidence. In fact, the alleged
confessions had not been even identified and formally offered. Assuming that the rule applies in this case,
it was premature for the respondent court to completely exclude them on the ground that there was no
prior proof of conspiracy. In fact, the alleged confessions had not been even identified and formally
offered.

The lower court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against
the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally for the purpose of proving conspiracy, in
order to give a chance to the prosecution to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to
prove the charges.