Rekkedal Insurgency and Counter Insurgency

Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency
Insurgency and
Counter-Insurgency
A Presentation of Concepts and Problems
Nils Marius Rekkedal

Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: A Presentation of Concepts and Problems
Author: Nils Marius Rekkedal
Cover: Illustration, based on a photo showing the victory parade when North
Vietnam had won the Vietnam War in 1975. The illustration is a reminder of the
fact that that a guerrilla war may change over time. (Illustration: Samuel Svärd)
© Swedish National Defence College and Nils Marius Rekkedal 2006

No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without
written permission. Swedish material law is applied to this book.
The contents of the book has been reviewed and authorized by the Department
of War Studies’ publication council. The contents has been updated in part after
the translation for the English edition.
Picture editor: Elsa Johannesson

Graphic design, technical editing, index: Elsa Johannesson
Maps: Samuel Svärd
Printed by: Elanders Gotab, Vällingby 2006
First edition, first printing, August 2006
ISBN 91-85401-45-5
For information regarding publications published by the Swedish National Defence

College, call +46 8 553 42 500, or visit our home page www.fhs.se/publikationer.
Contents
Preface 1
1. Introduction 7
1.1 Introduction to the subject 7
1.2 About this book 10
2. Concepts and problems 13

2.1 In general 13
2.2 Introduction 13
2.3 Methods of insurgency – a brief overview 16
2.3.1 Counter-insurgency and other concepts for
countering insurgency 21
2.3.2 Factors that influence developments 27
2.3.3 The concepts of irregular armed forces, LIC
and insurgency 30
2.4 What form does insurgency take today? 35
2.4.1 Introduction 35
2.4.2 Today’s theories have a previous history 35
2.4.3 Theories regarding generations of warfare 38
2.4.4 Warfare for the 21st Century? 46
3. Factors that influence today’s international environment 55

3.1 Introduction 55
3.2 What are the new challenges? 55
3.2.1 ‘The world is not ruled by Gods’ 65
3.3 Developments after the Cold War 68
3.3.1 What consequences did developments in the
1990s have? 69
3.3.2 Globalisation 70
3.4 Fresh challenges for intergovernmental and internal
conflicts 77
3.5 War is still common 85
4. What can cause wars? 91

4.1 Introduction 91
4.2 Ethnicity as a political dimension 91
i
4.3 The need for legitimacy 93
4.4 What creates the basis for insurgency? 96
4.5 Conflict and methods of warfare 101
4.5.1 What characterises today’s conflicts? 101
4.5.2 Warfare and the ‘CNN effect’ 103
4.6 New developmental features – an evaluation 106
5. Guerrilla Warfare 109

5.1 Introduction 109
5.2 The basis of guerrilla warfare 109
5.2.1 There is a long previous history of guerrilla
warfare 110
5.2.2 Guerrilla tactics are indirect 111
5.3 What are the characteristics of an insurgency? 112
5.3.1 Phases of guerrilla warfare 114
5.4 Evaluation 117
6. Asymmetric warfare and terrorism 123

6.2 Has war changed? 125
6.2.1 Weapons of mass destruction and
‘cyber-terrorism’ in connection with
asymmetric warfare 130
6.3 What do the concepts asymmetry and asymmetric
warfare stand for today? 133
6.3.1 ‘Asymmetric threats’ – what are these? 137
6.3.2 Asymmetric warfare – in more tangible terms 139
6.3.3 The importance of information and
information control 148
6.3.4 The combination of information, information
operations and intelligence 155
6.4 The different forms of insurgency – an evaluation 162
6.4.1 ‘Revolutionary war’ after the Second World War
– two important cases 162
6.4.2 ‘New world disorder’? 167
7. Terror and terrorism – a part of modern insurgency 175

7.1 A short introduction 175
ii
7.2 Terrorism and the effect of acts of terrorism 176
7.2.1 Modern terrorist organisations 181
7.2.2 Insurgency and terror – Afghanistan as an
example 209
7.2.3 Terrorism as a substitute for reconstruction
activity? 216
7.3 Experiences so far 227
7.3.1 Possible future developmental features 233
8. Urban warfare – the new challenge? 247

8.2 The background 247
8.3 Methods and framework 249
8.3.1 A little about source materials and problems 250
8.4 Urban warfare – modern examples 252
8.4.1 Two modern examples 252
8.4.2 Falluja – first round 253
8.4.3 Falluja – second round 255
8.4.4 Grozny – a Russian example 258
8.4.5 Some important trends in urban warfare 260
8.4.6 Urban warfare – some experiences 261
8.4.7 Warfare in urban areas – what experiences
are emphasised? 265
8.5 Conclusion 270
9. Counter-Insurgency 275
9.2 Insurgent warfare is common 281
9.2.1 Two wars – different results 282
9.3 ‘Modern warfare’ – differences and similarities between
the various forms 284
9.3.1 Assumptions one should have some
knowledge of 294
9.3.2 The importance of intelligence 311
9.4 Counter-insurgency – what is important? 321
9.4.1 Counter-insurgency – must it be relearned
each time? 324
9.4.2 What can we learn from the past? 326
iii
9.4.3 What will the challenges be for those
combating terror and insurgency? 328
9.5 Can we learn anything from past and contemporary
examples and thinking? 329
9.5.1 Northern Ireland – an example of a lengthy
conflict/LIC 330
9.5.2 The relevance of earlier French theories about
insurgency? 331
9.5.3 The need for alternative military thinking 337
9.5.4 What is important for counter-insurgency
operations? 340
9.5.5 ‘A mixture of the use of force and persuasion’ 344
9.5.6 Military and civilian measures should work in
the same direction 346
9.6 Summing up 348
10. Epilogue 363
Bibliography 369
Presentation of the author 389
Index 391
iv
Preface
The acts of terrorism in the United States on September 11, 2001, had an
enormous psychological impact on the country’s people. The ongoing so-called
‘war on terror’ is a result of American opinions and experiences following this
massive act of terrorism.* I have, however, considered it desirable to provide
readers with a broader introduction to insurgency and counter-insurgency than
the time perspective after September 11 provides.
The various forms of insurgency are normally characterised by an area’s
distinctive features. In this respect, it may be a natural progression to mention
the report of 2 December 2004 on the future of the UN. Interpreted freely, it
says here that poverty, infectious diseases, war and destruction of the environ-
ment reinforce each other in a ‘deadly spiral’. It also describes how poverty is
often associated with the outbreak of civil war, while diseases such as AIDS and
* Other American terms are ‘war against terrorism’, ‘war on terrorism’, and ‘war against ter-
ror’. June 2005, members of the Bush administration started using the term ‘global strug-
gle against violent extremists’. In the summer of 2005, some observers thought that the
term would eventually take over from the term ‘war on terror’ in American official rhetoric.
President Bush himself has, however, not yet abandoned the old term. See, for instance,
Richard W. Stevenson, ‘President Makes it Clear: Phrase Is “War on Terror”’, The New York
Times, 4 August 2005. In early 2006, however, a new and maybe more convenient term was
introduced: ‘The Long War’. The spending on the Iraq conflict alone is now approaching the
cost of the Korean War, about $330bn in today’s dollars. Meanwhile the cost of the overall
‘war on terror’ – relabelled ‘The Long War’ by the Pentagon – is already close to half a trillion
dollars, and will soon equal that of the 13-year-long Vietnam War. Julian Borger, ‘Cost of
wars soars to $440bn for US’, The Guardian, Saturday February 4, 2006. However, I still find
it more correct to use the term ‘war on terror’ in this book, as this is still the best-established
term.
1
malaria claim many lives each year.* This, in turn, intensifies poverty. Diseases
and poverty are often associated with the destruction of the environment and
many researchers assert that climate changes can aggravate the situation. The
destruction of environments as a result of overpopulation, and a lack of avail-
able land and other natural resources may, in turn, lead to troubles within a
country’s borders. This could possibly be seen as a ‘circular argument’ where
factors directly influence each other and where it can be difficult to stop a trend.
This presentation at least provides some explanations to the ongoing conflicts
but also deals, to a lesser extent, with causes such as ethnicity, religion and
ideology – causes that have been of importance in many ongoing conflicts. The
book consequently also contains individual historical examples and presents
some of the thoughts and theories that have been common with regard to
different forms of insurgency and terrorism. Thoughts and theories that have
been presented and documented in book form since 1960 are emphasised in
my presentation.
I will try, among other things, to demonstrate that the many insurgencies
and acts of terrorism from 1945 to the present day do not have just one cause,
but are due to a combination of several local or regional causes. Ideology, eth-
nicity and religion have acted as important catalysts for the local wars that have
taken place during this period. The leaders of a successful insurgency will often
analyse and exploit local displeasure with economic conditions, the country’s
political leaders or other ethnic groups in the area. In this way, the people may
be mobilised without necessarily understanding the entire consequences of an
insurgency.
The following is a short description of the themes that the individual chap-
ters contain:
• Chapter 1 provides an overview of what this book deals with.

• In Chapter 2, several of the basic concepts and problems of insurgency are
presented.
• In Chapter 3, a more comprehensive introduction to the concepts and
problems selected is provided. Here, I also present different forms of insur-
gency together with historical examples. Emphasis is placed on the causes
and effects of insurgency.
* The official Norwegian translation is ‘Høynivåpanelet for trusler, utfordringer og endringer’

[High-level panel on threats, challenges and changes]. The panel’s final report was presented
on 2 December 2004, <http://www.fn.no/temasider/fn_reform/hoeynivaapanelet_for_tru-
sler_utfordringer_og_endringer>. UN has not been able to restructure its organisation by
April 2006.
2
Preface
• Chapter 4 builds further on the discussion presented in Chapter 3 and deals

with, among other things, the reasons for war.
• Chapter 5 is an examination of the basic features of guerrilla warfare.
• In Chapter 6, the concept of ‘asymmetric warfare’ is presented, as are its dif-
ferent aspects. Much of the text is devoted to the importance of intelligence
in connection with modern warfare.
• In Chapter 7, important facets of modern terrorism are described. Examples
of terror organisations and acts of terror are presented.
• In Chapter 8, the following question is posed: what challenges will insur-
gency and guerrilla warfare in urban areas provide to conventional Western
forces? The need to be able to meet various forms of urban insurgency and
the corresponding challenges in, among other things, so-called mega-cities
will be discussed. Examples of this form of warfare will be briefly presented.
• Chapter 9 concentrates on important facets in combating insurgency –
‘counter-insurgency’. The text looks closer at the challenges and problems
that often arise when combating insurgency/guerrilla warfare.
• Chapter 10 is a short prologue and, at the same time, consists of some per-
sonal views on future trends within insurgency.
• The bibliography is a summary of important books and other background
material dealing with theories regarding insurgency and counter-insurgen-
cy. The ‘chapter’ also contains a summary of sources used in this book.
The book is laid out so that it is possible to read each chapter individually.
To make it easy to read this book as individual chapters, it has been difficult to
avoid some themes appearing in several places. I have nevertheless decided to
accept this and have made a number of cross-references between the chapters in
order to mark where a theme may also appear in another chapter.
In this book, I have chosen to follow the tradition that the renowned guer-
rilla and terrorism expert Walter Laqueur has established, i.e., that a clear
distinction is made between guerrilla warfare and terrorism.* Political acts of
violence per se are not enough to establish a person (or a group) as ‘terrorists’.
Another theme is that it is often difficult to distinguish clearly between acts of
violence carried out by insurgent movements and acts of violence carried out
by criminals, e.g., kidnappings. In connection with this, I deal with a topic: the
* Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Political and Military History (Boston: Little Brown, 1976).
3
increasingly more widespread use of so-called contractors – and these forces

may be employed either by a state or a company.
Much space is devoted to traditional insurgency, but I have chosen to also
include a presentation of terrorism. In order to demonstrate other developmental
features than those we know from traditional insurgencies such as, for example,
Vietnam, the book will look closer at both more recent and ongoing insurgen-
cies. The ongoing warfare in Iraq will provide a natural example in this context.
The book also attempts to contribute to an improved understanding of how
different concepts and problems are dealt with in other specialist literature on
insurgency. So points of view and assertions in this literature will be discussed.*
At the Swedish National Defence College, I see officers as the main users, and
it is primarily for this group that this book has been written. In this book,
emphasis is on a description of the development of concepts and definitions and
assessments are included. Historical and military experiences taken from the
literature will, together with my own points of view and assessments with regard
to current insurgencies, form the basis for the conclusions drawn. The bibliog-
raphy provides a summary of literature and documents used in this study. The
last bibliographic list provides a summary of various ‘classics’ that could possibly
be used as a basis for the reader’s own studies of modern insurgency.
It only remains for me to thank those I have directly or indirectly roped into
this work. Many thanks to Captain (Navy) Roald Gjelsten for his comments
during the introductory phase on the interim edition of the book in 2004, and
to researchers Jan Ångström, Olof Kronvall and Jerker Widén for their com-
ments and suggestions during my work on the manuscript in the winter of
2005. Researcher Magnus Petersson contributed with comments to Chapter 8
during the autumn of 2005. I would also like to especially thank Olof Kronvall
who read through and critically commented on the manuscript before my final
draft of the Norwegian version of this book. (All researchers are at the Military
Theory Section of the Department of War Studies). Also some people outside
the Swedish National Defence College have read and comment on the texts. I
would like to thank Lieutenant-Colonel Kato Waage, who is serving with the
U.S. Marine Corps, for his useful points of view, and Magne Haugseng for
his comments in connection with the IRA in particular.† Professor Magnus
* In connection with further military theory research at the Swedish National Defence College,
it is our ambition to be able to study existing literature and perform a more detailed discussion
and criticism than I have room and time for here. See, for instance, the series ‘War Studies
Research Reports’, published by the Department of War Studies, The Swedish National
Defence College.
† Magne Haugseng is an Associate of the International Centre for Regional Regeneration and
Development Studies at Durham University in England.
4
Preface
Ranstorp, now with SNDC, has commented on Chapter 7, and Milan Vego,
Professor of Operations in the Joint Military Operations Department, U.S.
Naval War College, has commented on Chapter 9.
Some people have asked not to be mentioned, but I would still like to thank
them here! They know who they are.
Stockholm, April 2006*
Nils Marius Rekkedal

Professor of War Studies, specialising in Military Theory
* The book is an updated and extended version of the book Opprør, opprørsbekjempning og ter-
rorisme [Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency and Terrorism], which was published as a prelimi-
nary edition by the Swedish National Defence College in November 2004, with the intention
of being used in our courses. This new version is based on our own studies and teaching in this
subject area. In addition, a number of officers and academics have contributed their sugges-
tions and comments on the original text. The book describes the various forms of insurgency
and counter-insurgency, seen in the context of military theory.
5
1. Introduction
Reflexes and decisions that would be considered appropriate for the sol-
dier in conventional warfare and for the civil servant in normal times
are not necessarily the right ones in counterinsurgency operations. A
soldier fired on in conventional war who does not fire back with every
available weapon would be guilty of a dereliction of his duty; the reverse
would be true in counterinsurgency warfare, where the rule is to apply
the minimum of fire.
– David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 1964
1.1 Introduction to the subject

Historically, it has proved to be a protracted and complicated business for gov-
ernments to combat insurgency. Even leading military powers have had prob-
lems on several occasions with counter-insurgency. The war in Afghanistan will
soon enter its fifth year. In Iraq, the Americans have lost more soldiers over the
course of three years than in the previous 30 years.1 After six years of war, large
Russian forces are still battling Chechen separatists. According to Kenneth N.
Waltz, the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck is supposed to have once
said that it is usually less clever people who learn from their own (personal)
experiences while clever people instead try to learn from others’ mistakes.2
1. As at late February 2006, the figure for American soldiers killed in Iraq passed 2,300.
2. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959/reprint 1996), p. 220.
7
What is the actual situation like today for Western forces, particularly the
Americans, taking part in ongoing attempts to suppress various ethnic and reli-
giously motivated insurgent movements or resistance movements?3
The American Defense Secretary has been seen as a champion of reforming
the American Armed Forces, but has also been very controversial because of the
direction he has chosen – armed forces where technological solutions appear to
be the answer to the majority of military problems.4 In the future it will be a
matter of how one can create military organisations that can quickly reorganise
themselves from one form of mission to another, and at the same time have the
attitudes and skills that will make it possible to tackle the new challenges that
are sure to come. In this respect, technology is obviously of importance, but at
least equally important are the attitudes and the level of training that officers
and soldiers possess. It is of particular importance in this respect that officers
understand that the majority of wars today are protracted and are asymmetrical
in nature. A competent opponent will always attempt to meet the Western
forces with asymmetrical means where he attempts to avoid the West’s strengths
while he himself attempts to exploit the Western states’ assumed weaknesses.
The continuation war in Iraq, which is characterised by acts of terrorism and
urban guerrilla warfare, has also forced the Pentagon to begin a rather unwant-
ed but necessary ‘involuntary’ review of American military priorities.
The war in Iraq is forcing top Pentagon planners to rethink several
key assumptions about the use of military power and has called into
question the vision set out nearly four years ago that the armed forces
can win wars and keep the peace with small numbers of fast-moving,
lightly armed troops. (…)With Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
pushing for a ‘lighter, more lethal and highly mobile fighting force,’ the
Pentagon scrapped as outdated the requirement that the U.S. military be
large enough to simultaneously fight two large-scale wars against massed
3. There is a certain difference between the two terms as the term ‘insurgency’ means, accord-
ing to my definition, that there is an insurgency against a system/regime of a somewhat
permanent nature. Are Afghanistan and Iraq ‘occupied by the enemy’ or have the countries
been ‘liberated from repressive regimes’? The answer obviously depends on what one’s start-
ing point is. Is the war that is still going on in Iraq primarily a resistance movement that
uses terror and guerrilla tactics or should the many fragmented groups taking part primarily
be regarded as terrorists? The old saying that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom
fighter’ is always a factor in guerrilla warfare.
4. Donald A. Rumsfeld, ‘Transforming the Military’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May/June
2002), p. 22. On the basis of what occurred at Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan in 2001, he
asserted: ‘The lesson from the Afghan campaign is not that the U.S. Army should start stock-
piling saddles. Rather, it is that preparing for the future will require new ways of thinking,
and the development of forces and abilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and
unexpected circumstances.’
8
Introduction
enemy armies. And it spent little time worrying about how to keep the
peace after the shooting stopped.
Something happened on the way to the wars of the future: The Pentagon
became bogged down in an old-fashioned, costly and drawn-out war of
occupation. Though the rapid assault on Baghdad in March 2003 went
smoothly, it is the bloody two years since that have diverged from the
Pentagon’s blueprint.5
In retrospect, it is easy to see that the Bush administration clearly misjudged
the political and cultural realities in Iraq, particularly at the start of the inva-
sion. In 2002, forces within the Pentagon had warned against believing that
the war would be over when Saddam Hussein’s regime was overpowered and
that they would only need an occupation force of 30,000 soldiers in Iraq for six
months. These warnings were not heeded by U.S. political and military lead-
ers. The Bush administration saw what it wanted to see, as a result of either the
situation being seen through ‘rose-tinted spectacles’ or ‘ideology being allowed
to dominate’. Today, there is much to suggest that, after three years of guerrilla
warfare and terrorism in Iraq, the Bush administration has also begun to learn
something. The administration is maybe on the way to a more realistic view
with regard to what to expect when starting a war in the Middle East?
As a result of this increasing realism, the administration has started reas-
sessing the significance of the so-called ‘Peace Support Operations’ (PSO),6
and particularly the need for good, reliable allies. These were ideas that were
rather low on the agenda 3–4 years ago, when they were considered ‘incor-
rect thoughts’ developed during the Clinton administration. The ideologically
driven top echelons of the Bush administration wanted the U.S. to put things
right itself. Now the idea of PSOs and the need for allied support have again
become ‘modern’ in Pentagon circles.
As regards the great number of anti-colonial and other forms of insurgent
wars since 1945, many have actually ended with either the colonial power or
the ruling regime in a Third World country having to give up. Normally we see
one of two possible solutions: the insurgents finally take control of the state in
question or the ruling regime manages to reform itself in such a manner that it
is able to defeat the insurgency and find a peaceful solution on its own terms.
The ethnically-based insurgencies have, however, often proved to be difficult
5. Mark Mazzetti, ‘Iraq War Compels Pentagon to Rethink Big-Picture Strategy’, 11 March
2005, <http://www.la times.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-milwar11mar11.story>.
6. Peace Support Operations (PSO) are characterised by being aimed at coming between two
contending parties in a conflict with the intention of creating a basis for ending the conflict
with a view to lasting peace between the parties.
9
to end. Peace settlements may be reached, but we have often seen this type of
conflict breaking out again. (This problem is also dealt with in Chapters 5 and
6.)7
1.2 About this book

What relevance do earlier wars then have for developments today? Undeniably,
the world has, of course, changed greatly since the 1960s. The traditional
source of inspiration for the many insurgent wars during the last half of the
20th Century, the different versions of Communist doctrine, have clearly lost
much of their earlier strong appeal. What then are the sources of inspiration
today? A natural question to ask, since there are still many wars going on. It is
probably difficult to give a clear answer today. However, I would like here to try
to provide a contribution to the ongoing debate surrounding the factors that
trigger and maintain wars – particularly in the Third World.
I would like to present and discuss several of the key concepts in use when
attempting, in a research or military context (e.g., in doctrines and rules), to
describe the different forms of insurgency. One of my assumptions in this work
has been that all insurgent wars are different, with their own local or regional
conditions. It is also my opinion that it should nevertheless be possible to try to
find certain basic characteristics in these forms of warfare also. There is much to
indicate that the world has been permanently changed over the course of the last
few years. But, at the same time, there is little to indicate that the fundamental
reasons for people choosing to employ armed force against political, ethnic or
religious opponents have changed. These factors, which are often formulated
in military theory under the collective concept ‘the nature of war’, appear to
have remained largely unchanged by time. This makes it possible to study (and
describe) the reasons for insurgencies starting. In the ongoing international
debate, some commentators have drawn parallels between, among other things,
the insurgent/resistance movements in Afghanistan and Iraq and earlier insur-
gencies against Western colonial powers, and some critics have asserted that
these occupations may be seen as part of the so-called ‘neo-colonial’ thinking.8
(See also the discussion and evaluations in Chapters 6 to 9.)
7. Anthony James Joes, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical

Sourcebook (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996). The book provides a short and concise
synopsis of most guerrilla wars since the Second World War.
8. William Blum, Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower, new updated edition
(London: Zed Books, 2002); Paul Hirst, War and Power in the 21st Century: The State, Military
Conflict and the International System (Maldan, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001); George
F. Nafziger and Mark W. Walton, Islam at War: A History (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).
10
Introduction
Almost all dominant (Western) models and thinking about how states are
established and evolve assume developments similar to the ones in Western
Europe. This gives us grounds for looking critically at whether these theories
can simply be applied to the new nation states in the Third World that were
established during decolonisation after the Second World War. The same theo-
ries have probably also provided a simplified presentation of the historically
lengthy and extremely violent period that lies behind today’s relatively stable
Western and Central Europe. An important observation, as I see it, is that
one should stress the importance of the so-called irregular armed forces, i.e.,
militias, paramilitaries, guerrilla forces, mercenaries, gangs of bandits and local
‘police’ that together constitute ‘the armed forces’ in many Third World coun-
tries today. These problems are discussed in later chapters (see, for instance,
Chapters 3 and 4). The irregular forces in these states are perhaps at least as
important for the general security situation as a state’s regular armed forces. It
is also important to point out that, in parts of the Third World, a state’s legiti-
macy is not something that comes naturally. The legitimacy to govern the state
is constantly challenged by various forms of irregular forces that operate within
a given state’s formal borders. There is probably much truth in what Professor
Achilles Batalas has written in connection with his studies of nation-building
and the consequences of irregular military units in the middle of the 17th
Century in Greece: Send a thief to catch a thief. 9
Another reason for constant conflicts is, as previously indicated, due to dif-
ferent ethnic groups with a long tradition of conflict between them either being
‘squeezed together’ within a country or borders going right through an ethnic
group’s traditional territory.10 In modern times, we in Europe have, for exam-
ple, seen antagonism between Protestants/Catholics in Northern Ireland and
Basques versus Spaniards. Europe’s most infamous recent ethnic conflicts took
place in the Balkans in the period 1991–1999, where both states and ethnic
groups have used violence to solve their problems. Today, this is perhaps the
primary threat to existing states in the Third World. Even the ongoing wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan are of the clear nature of ethnic conflicts.
9. <http://oldwww.schoolofvisualarts.edu/04.Studio/Undergraduate/HumanitiesSciences/
Faculty.html>. His views are also printed in the following book: Diane E. Davis and Anthony
W. Pereira (eds.), Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Chapter 6.
10. For example, the Kurdish people are split between the states of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria
and Armenia. In three of these states, Kurdish insurgent movements have been active in
recent times. The Albanian people are, on the other hand, split between the states of Serbia-
Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania and have fought three insurgent wars since 1998.
11
As also stated in the preface, I will, in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, describe funda-

mental concepts and problems in current debate. This is substantiated by some
historical examples. The current forms of insurgency will be dealt with and we
will look at guerrilla warfare, asymmetry/asymmetric thinking and an introduc-
tion to terrorism. In Chapter 7, theories regarding, and some examples of, how
modern terrorism has been practiced will be described, including how security
forces are attempting to combat this threat. In Chapter 8, there is an analysis of
urban warfare – a type of warfare that will perhaps become the most common
during the course of the 21st Century. In Chapter 9, there is a description of
attempts to counter the various forms of insurgency, and a number of impor-
tant theorists and some of their theories will also be presented.
12
2. Concepts and problems
Machines don’t fight wars. People do, and they use their minds.
– Colonel John R. Boyd (quote from one of his lectures)
2.1 In general
In this chapter, some of the key concepts and problems regarding insurgency
and guerrilla warfare are introduced. One intention has been to see which pat-
terns of behaviour fit in with the wars that are going on today. Knowledge of
the fundamental features of insurgency and insurgent warfare should be of
assistance in attempting to investigate what could be potential strategic choices
for the insurgents who will be behind future conflicts. It is also important what
conclusions we could possibly draw with regard to future political and military
efforts, particularly for Western forces (including the Nordic countries).
2.2 Introduction
Many people, including the author, sympathise with the relatively common
view that one should try to learn from the histories of others and oneself, and
especially from mistakes that have previously been made. One problem is, how-
ever, that one may succumb to the temptation of drawing direct parallels from
one historical setting to another. Since all wars have their own special causes
and are always conducted in a given cultural and geographical area, they will
also lead to a locally adapted military and political course of events. It is con-
sequently seldom the case that it is possible to directly compare two situations
13
and, if we nevertheless succumb to the temptation of doing this and introduce

solutions that worked in a historical situation in a completely different setting,
it is most likely that this will not work as hoped.
Every insurgency has its own unique causal connection. If we were to try
to illustrate this we could perhaps make a comparison with the DNA chain
found in science. If the war going on in Iraq in 2006 can be said to contain the
‘DNA components’, A, C, F and X, the war in Algeria in the 1950s perhaps
also contained A and C, but lacked F and X. Instead, the components E and
G were involved here. The differences between the two wars are so great that
it is difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to try to draw too many general
and universal conclusions.11 Another important point made by the American
military thinker William S. Lind about today’s warfare is that what ‘Fourth
Generation opponents’ actually do to a state is not ‘playing mind-games with
the state’s leaders’. The leadership of a successful rebellion/insurgency use the
power of weakness to bring the opposing state’s population to regard the war as
an abomination – it must be stopped. Lind writes:
Historians long ago recognized that official decisions, including for war
or peace, are vastly more complex events in which non-rational fac-
tors play decisive roles. In fact, modern decision theory recognizes not
only that decisions made by governments do not follow a “rational”
business model, neither do most business decisions. Non-rational, often
irrational, considerations dominate both.
(…) Paradoxically, the more the state is successful in winning on the bat-
tlefield by turning its immense, hi-tech firepower on guys in bathrobes
who are armed only with rusty World War II rifles, the more it becomes
disgusted with itself. The weaker the Fourth Generation enemy is physi-
cally, the stronger he is morally. And the moral level is decisive.12
Because of the historically very different experiences from one war to the
next, it is consequently likely that it is only more general experiences that we can
hope to learn something from – and we should also be content with this. In each
actual new situation that arises, we should carry out a fundamental analysis of
the likely unique political, cultural, religious and military conditions before any
11. If we were to try a more scientific example, we could perhaps talk of individual conflicts
having their own unique composition but we should note in this respect that the human
‘building blocks’/components are and have been by and large the same throughout history
– human genetics have not changed significantly in the last 3–4,000 years, but how we build
and maintain societies has clearly changed.
12. William S. Lind, ‘Critics of the Fourth Generation: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, <http://
www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_1_10_06.htm>.
14
Concepts and problems
evaluation and becoming involved in any particular conflict ‘from the outside’.13
We can see from this that challenges with regard to intelligence in particular will
be important if someone from ‘the First World’ considers intervening directly in
conflicts in ‘the Third World’. This type of analysis will require much experience
of intelligence and access to a whole series of different information and sources,
as well as a great ability to be able to analyse these factors in a relevant manner.
(Need for intelligence, see my discussion in Chapter 6.)
We should also note that the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the
U.S., were ‘indirectly at war’ with each other several times after the Second World
War even although there was never a direct military confrontation between the
two during the Cold War. In the period after the Second World War, all super-
powers, including the newer (regional) ones such as India and China, have been
directly or indirectly involved in local or regional wars. Also, since the end of
the Cold War in 1991, most of the world’s superpowers have been involved in
conflicts. This has typically taken the form of wars with smaller neighbouring
states or ethnic separatist movements that want to break away. Conflicts of the
latter variety are still going on in Chechnya and Kashmir. Another variant has
been where a superpower supports a separatist movement in the locality, such as
Russia’s support for the insurgents in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Moldova.
Since the Second World War, we have seen developments characterised by
so-called ‘asymmetric conditions’, i.e., warfare where direct confrontation with
a stronger opponent and his strengths is avoided. The inferior party instead
decides to strike his opponent where he is weakest. In practice, this can mean
anything from traditional guerrilla tactics to attacks that are exclusively directed
at economic or civilian targets.
Today there is much to suggest that this development will continue. Such
an interpretation can be countered by asking the question: does the term ‘asym-
metric warfare’ actually add anything radically new compared with well-estab-
lished terms such as guerrilla warfare and terrorism. When becoming involved
in operations against an ‘asymmetric’ opponent, it is important to acquaint one-
self with the parameters and assumptions upon which the opponent is build-
ing his military capacity and battle concept and direct one’s own operations
13. An observation: if we choose, for example, to look at the development of the Norwegian
Army in the light of the above, we see what could be called the ‘Kosovo/Bosnia syndrome’.
Particularly as many officers have been in Bosnia and Kosovo, the experiences of this involve-
ment are used as the basis for a new military structure. It is not chosen to establish a flexible
(‘generic’) structure, but instead the ‘Kosovo/Bosnia scenario’ forms the basis. In theory at
least, a structure based on historical experience will be less robust/flexible seen in relation to
future unknown operations in which the structure may be put to use. In fact, the ability to
deal with the unknown and the unexpected is more related to the level of training and profes-
sionalism of the soldiers at all levels in a deployment or an incident.
15
against the weaknesses found in these. In my opinion, this is actually a relatively

conventional view. The problem with asymmetry is probably most relevant in the
description of conflicts of the type going on between Israel and Palestine and in
Iraq. This is a form of war that the West has not yet developed effective concepts
for. Nevertheless, in order to be able to deal with local or, at most, regional con-
flicts, it is vital to understand what concepts such as asymmetry and asymmetric
warfare actually involve, both at a theoretical and practical level. The concepts of
asymmetry and terrorism are difficult to ignore today as they are much used in
literature (see Chapters 6 and 7).
2.3 Methods of insurgency – a brief overview

If it is appropriate to see insurgency as a political phenomenon where the fight
for power is the key element, a whole series of methods that can be used to
achieve this goal must exist. Often the basis for the mobilisation of people is
a combination of the following factors: ideology, religion,14 a feeling of being
subjected to an injustice, ethnicity and a rapidly increased sense of national
identity. A combination of these factors could lead to the formation of a con-
stituency of interest strong enough to provide the recruiting ground for a major
insurgency against authorities and their forces.
Seen in isolation, ideology is hardly of any decisive importance because it is
too elite-oriented in form, and insurgents who have unilaterally invested in this
factor have historically only become a marginal group. It was therefore seldom
able to mobilise a people that was largely satisfied with the state of affairs, even
if a significant amount of terrorism is used. The people must feel that they have
good reason for becoming involved in insurgency. Ideology is probably never
the only reason; there must be a more tangible basis such as, for example, an
unfair division of economic benefits and/or a lack of a future for a large per-
centage of the population. But it may also be a matter of a struggle between
power elites who use religion/nationalism/ethnicity, etc., as a means of getting
national groups to involve themselves directly as insurgents.15
14. There are several variants of ‘religious conflicts’. The conflict may either be part of a struggle
for national identity as in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and, later, in Chechnya.
During the conflicts in the Balkans, religious differences were particularly important to the
Serbs in their wars against other ethnic groups. A third, and purer, variant of ‘religious con-
flicts’ is the ‘global religious war’ as al-Qaeda often portrays its struggle.
15. See, for example, Nils Marius Rekkedal, Asymmetric Warfare and Terrorism – An Assessment
(The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Security Policy Library 5-2002). This text, which was
written in the spring of 2002, has, after being greatly updated and expanded, been used as
the basis of the text here. There has been much research/study of the phenomenon of asym-
metric warfare since September 11, 2001, and parts of the international material have been
used here. See footnotes and the bibliography.
16
Often insurgencies of this type have led to problems for the conventional
military forces that have been used in this type of warfare. Today there is much
to suggest that this development will continue. In order to be able to deal with
local or, at most, regional conflicts, it is important to understand what concepts
such as, for example, asymmetry, asymmetric warfare, guerrilla warfare and ter-
rorism actually stand for, in theory and in connection with local practice.
Insurgent wars may obviously be ‘war by proxy’, which was often spoken of
during the Cold War, but this is not normally the case in today’s situation.16 It
is ‘normal’ in today’s situation for the wars we see to have local causes.
Civil wars of the protracted variety, including the associated guerrilla cam-
paigns and (local) use of terror against the civilian population, always constitute
a great social problem. In addition to many human lives being lost in direct
acts of war each year, wars of this type have a number of barely controllable
extended effects. Some examples are shown below and the points also indicate
a number of common features in these conflicts:
• In contrast to wars between states, civil wars, conducted as guerrilla wars,

normally last many years. Often the wars last for between 15 and 20 years,
but some, such as the one that has now ended in Guatemala, have lasted even
longer. The first attempt at a major insurgency in Guatemala was started in
1962 by Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), the Rebel Armed Forces, but was,
in practice, defeated during the period 1966–1967. In the 1970s, we saw
a new insurgency, led by groups such as the Guerrilla Army of the Poor or
Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP)17 and later also by the Guatemalan
National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). The URNG was only a formal
merger of FAR, the EGP and a group called the Organisation of the People in
Arms, ORPA. Even although some Communist countries supported these
attempted insurgencies, the insurgents were never successful in taking over
government in Guatemala and the war was formally ended in 1996. As part
of the counter-insurgency, we saw here the government forces carrying out a
comprehensive ‘counter-terror’ by, among other things, kidnapping and kill-
ing suspected sympathisers of the guerrilla movement.18 The government
16. One exception is perhaps the Hezbollah organisation which some sources see as the extended
arm of Iran in Lebanon, and which has traditionally received support from the ‘secularly’
governed country, Syria.
17. The Guerrilla Army of the Poor is abbreviated as EGP.
18. Joes, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 148–149. The foreign support was probably not very large. The
support principally went to the FMLN in El Salvador, which was a priority. Those providing
support were probably thinking along the lines of ‘Yesterday Nicaragua, today El Salvador,
tomorrow Guatemala’.
17
forces also committed major breaches of human rights, including regular

massacres of the country’s Indian population.19
• Ethnic wars such as those in Eritrea, Burma and Laos have also typically
lasted a long time. The war in the eastern part of Burma has been going on
since 1948.
• The acts of war are often combined with terrorist campaigns. Typically we
see a combination of both state terrorism and terrorism on the part of the
insurgents, directed at what they see as the ‘reluctant’ elements of the civil-
ian population. This type of warfare often leads to streams of refugees (both
internally and possibly over into neighbouring countries).
• The areas devastated by war have a tendency to become a sanctuary for
extremely violent political groups. Today, some of these groups may often be
‘imported’ from abroad, cf., what happened with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan
and most recently in connection with the ongoing guerrilla and terrorist
activity in Iraq.
• The war/conflict normally leads to poor economic growth in the area dev-
astated by war as almost no one dares to invest in actual (or potential) areas
of conflict.
• Warfare in a country can directly or indirectly generate political instability
in neighbouring countries.
War has often historically shown itself to lead to the spread of epidemic
diseases – today the lack of control over several dangerous diseases in Africa
in particular is a constant problem. The ability of the authorities to provide
public health services, etc., in war-torn areas is then limited. The insurgents
often see all activities financed and supported by the central authorities as part
of the government’s counter-insurgency. At the same time, they have neither
the capacity for nor an interest in implementing similar projects themselves.
The civilian population is again often affected – it is difficult to be neutral in
this type of internal war.
When a lengthy war has first occurred in an area, the experience of history
suggests that there is a great danger of new conflicts breaking out in the same
19. According to calculations carried out by the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH),
over 200,000 people were killed during the civil war in Guatemala. Of those breaches of
human rights and killings that the Commission investigated, 93 per cent had been carried out
by the country’s security forces or their paramilitary groups. By comparison, the insurgents
were responsible for 3 per cent. 83 per cent of the victims were Maya Indians. (See text on
the Internet: <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ ceh/report/english/conc1.html>)
18
area, even several years after a formal conclusion of peace. Much hatred and
bad blood exist between the actual ethnic and/or political groups and it often
does not take much before one sees a fresh outbreak of acts of war. It can also
be noted in this respect that the conclusion of peace often results in an increase
in criminal activity in the area when thousands of young men who only have
experience of warfare are faced with finding something to live on.
This categorisation of conflicts also helps to put the spotlight on the need
for a fresh evaluation of the actual concept of armed forces. If we are to under-
stand the ongoing changes, we should discuss these in a wider context since
many European countries are increasingly participating in warfare outside their
traditional localities. Former colonial powers such as Great Britain and France
have a certain experience of this type of warfare. For most other NATO or EU
members, participation in this type of conflict is, on the other hand, something
new and neither their training nor their equipment is adapted to the new situ-
ation.20 As previously pointed out, there are many reasons for this type of civil
war/low-intensity conflict breaking out and it is, in practice, difficult to identify
any set pattern as to how this type of war both starts and can be ended. Some
main types of conflict stand out and can provide some pointers with regard
to what may contribute to bringing these conflicts to an end. Nevertheless, a
locally acceptable and permanent solution must be created – or else it is likely
that a fresh conflict will erupt again within a relatively short time.21
Poor countries not only have the longest wars; this is where living conditions
are so poor that wars are very likely to flare up again, even if a (formal) peace
agreement has been agreed between the warring parties.22 The reasons that are
20. It is perhaps possible to split this into three traditional approaches: (1) National territorial
defence (as we have traditionally focused on in the Nordic countries), (2) A ‘laissez-faire’ atti-
tude, i.e., lets others take the responsibility and burdens and be content ourselves to take ‘the
moral high ground’ and (3) Actively take part in the defence of the country’s interests abroad
(in the current areas of conflict) in order to avoid it spilling over into one’s own country (this
could be said to be Norway’s new strategy – for the time being).
21. There is comprehensive literature on insurgency and counter-insurgency. Some of the most
important books are: Marc Jason Gilbert (ed.), Why the North Won the Vietnam War (New
York: Palgrave, 2002); Martin S. Alexander and John F. V. Keiger (eds.), France and the
Algerian War, 1954–62: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy (London: Frank Cass Publishers,
2002); Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classical Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington,
D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 1965/2002); Roger W. Barnett, Asymmetrical Warfare: Today’s Challenge to
U.S. Military Power (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2003); John Gray, Al Qaeda and What
it Means to be Modern (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 2003); Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The
True Story of Radical Islam (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 2003); Chris E. Stout, Psychology of
Terrorism: Coping with the Continuing Threat, Condensed Edition (London: Praeger, 2004).
22. See the SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003), Appendix 2, for figures regarding the various wars in Africa
and Asia.
19
most important for this trend are difficult to establish/document. It could, for
example, be because the machinery of government in a poor country is nor-
mally weak, i.e., the government does not have an effective police organisation
and military force available to quickly suppress an insurgency. Consequently,
seen from the regime’s point of view, it is often indiscriminate about offers of
help from outside. Such help is most likely to trigger the provision of aid and
resources to the other side in the conflict, often from states in the same region
with a hostile attitude to the ruling regime.
Many governments also struggle with a lack of legitimacy and can be sus-
pected of preferring to have a military apparatus that is weak but loyal to avoid
an internal military coup. In other situations, governments will have problems
mobilising the armed forces in an internal conflict due to loyalty problems.
Tribal allegiance is often stronger than loyalty to the government. It has often
been the case that African military forces have been shown to perform more
effectively in conflicts with other countries than in internal conflicts.23 A slug-
gish and barely effective national military mobilisation of the people in support
of the government also gives insurgents plenty of time to establish sources of
finance and build up a relatively effective military organisation. If the insurgent
movement has plenty of time during the critical initial phase to develop an
infrastructure and can recruit relatively freely, the war against the insurgency
will naturally be correspondingly protracted. It should be noted in this respect
that conflicts in Africa not only last longer than conflicts on other continents,
but they also end more seldom in the government side winning.
Another possible reason may be that it has proved to be easier for insur-
gent movements in Africa and Asia to recruit ‘angry young men’ with bleak
future prospects than in other parts of the world. Access to relatively simple
hand weapons, even to a modest extent, may, if the local authorities are weakly
formed, provide a disproportionately strong basis for the execution of power
by those who have access to such weapons, something that may contribute to
conflicts dragging on. Taking part in an insurgent movement also eventually
becomes a form of lifestyle and the only way that many ‘angry young men’ know
how to live. Without war they would be unemployed. Those guerrilla groups
that want the war to be concluded after negotiations often experience problems
in controlling their own forces. At least parts of these groups may regard their
interests as best served by the warfare continuing, so that they can have work
and continue to enjoy financial security.
23. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is an example of how two previously allied African
insurgency movements ended up in a protracted conventional war. The Ethiopian forces in
particular demonstrated good military proficiency here.
20
We have seen that insurgent wars have many different and complicated
roots and occur in many forms. If a well-organised insurgency has acquired a
good footing and the broad support of the people over a period of time, it is a
very demanding task to suppress the uprising, even with a strong military force
at one’s disposal. That is why military means alone are seldom sufficient in such
conflicts. Other measures must be cleverly used in addition if one is to succeed
in creating a lasting peace.
It is probably also difficult to find a modern conflict where the terrorising
of the civilian population in areas controlled by insurgent forces has not been
employed, often by both parties. In this regard, the term ‘state terrorism’ has
been used for the force that a state employs against its own civilian population
that is receptive to a guerrilla movement or that at least does not wish to support
the government forces in their fight against the guerrilla. We will probably see
the use of some form of ‘counter-terrorism’ or other state terrorism in practi-
cally every single insurgency. It is then the civilian population that will face the
majority of the government forces’ counter-insurgency.24 What will normally
be the result of such a strategy, and can state terrorism function in connection
with counter-insurgency? It is often keenly disputed in specialist literature what
an acceptable strategy for a government is. (Some of the problems will be dis-
cussed later in Chapter 9.)
2.3.1 Counter-insurgency and other concepts for countering insurgency

The term ‘counter-insurgency’, often abbreviated to COIN, more or less fell
out of use in the U.S. armed forces at the end of the 1970s. Seldom has a super-
power so quickly revised its strategic evaluations and the assumptions behind
the country’s foreign policy as the Americans did in the middle of the 1970s.
Even although, from the 1980s, COIN was no longer a common term within
the U.S. armed forces, the countries that the Americans supported political-
ly and militarily made use of the techniques/tactics that were developed and
described during the Vietnam War. So-called COIN operations were common
in Latin America and elsewhere from the 1970s to the 1990s (particularly in
El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru and the Philippines). El Salvador in
24. At the beginning of the 1980s, Guatemala’s army identified several ethnic groups of Maya
Indians as ‘collective accessories’ of the EGP and classified the group as ‘internal enemies’. In
the area populated by the Ixil Indians, between 70 and 90 per cent of all villages were burned.
The Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) described the killings and massacres of
Indians in this and other areas as ‘acts of genocide’. The EGP, which was reckoned, in 1980,
to be the strongest of Guatemala’s insurgent movements was, after several years of this form
of counter-insurgency, no longer any military threat to the government. (Based on an interview
with P. Refsdal in June 2005.) See also Joes, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 141–149.
21
particular conducted a relatively successful counter-insurgency policy targeted at

an amalgamation of revolutionary groups under the name of the FMLN. That
the government forces would succeed was by no means certain, taking into
account that, during the introductory phase of the war at the beginning of the
1980s, the government forces lacked military competence and often commit-
ted breaches of human rights. After the FMLN had conducted an unsuccessful
‘final offensive’ from 1981–1983, the insurgency continued without any clear
victor. In 1992, a peace agreement was signed and the FMLN went from being
an insurgent movement to being a political party.25
The superpower that was clearly least in a position to utilise COIN was the
Soviet Union. In Afghanistan, this country made most of the errors we find
described in international literature on this type of warfare.26 For their part, the
British have, since the 1970s, continually further developed their experiences in
Northern Ireland. Due to the restrictions that accompany counter-insurgency
in a Western European country,27 the British security forces developed sophis-
ticated COIN tactics with a minimum loss of human life on all sides. Even
although there is now officially peace in this area, there is still clear antagonism
between the different groups in Northern Ireland (will be discussed later, see
Chapter 3).
At the end of the 1970s, the U.S. closed down the many programmes and
research initiatives within the area of counter-insurgency. All the experiences
that had been harvested during the approximately 25-year-long period from
1950 to 1975 now looked like being thrown onto the ‘scrap heap of history’.
With President Jimmy Carter in the White House and defeat in Vietnam fresh
in their memories, no one had any desire to take part in fresh attempts to
combat insurgent movements in the Third World. But, as usual, it is not the
individual great power that can freely decide by itself what the actual agenda
will be in the many areas that we call the Third World. In the last 30 years
there have normally been about 20 wars going on at any time in just what we
call the Third World, and most of these have at some stage involved a form of
insurgency or civil war. Today, the superpowers are also, to a greater or lesser
25. Joes, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 141–145.

26. Lester W. Grau (translator/editor), The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics
in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), in particular
see pp. ix–xxviii.
27. The most discussed action carried out by British forces was the killing of 13 Catholics on
Sunday, 30 January 1972 in the city of Londonderry. The event, which became known as
Bloody Sunday, largely contributed towards creating a concept of the British forces as the
enemy among Northern Ireland’s Catholics. By comparison, hardly anyone other than those
directly involved would have reacted to the killing of 13 civilians during a counter-insurgency
in an African or Asian state.
22
extent, involved in several of these conflicts. (See the description in Chapter 9

of modern counter-insurgency.)
The concept of counter-insurgency has consequently acquired a fresh topi-
cality today. The unexpected extent of guerrilla warfare and terrorism directed
at the American-led coalition forces and their Iraqi allies in Iraq in particular
has contributed to fresh interest in the topic. Also closely associated with the
same problems is the relatively new American concept of Stability and Support
Operations (SASO) which is much used in the ongoing military operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The concept of (Principles of ) Military Operations Other
Than War (MOOTW) has also been common in American military literature.
Nevertheless, the two concepts that were most common in English-speaking
literature in the 1990s were probably Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and Non-
State Warfare.
Counter-insurgency can, according to American sources, be divided into
two main categories: unconventional war (UW)28 and direct action (DA). The
United States Department of Defense defines UW as a broad spectrum of mili-
tary and paramilitary operations, normally of short duration, predominantly
conducted by indigenous or local forces who are, to varying degrees, organised,
trained, equipped, supported, and directed by an external source. It includes
guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine
operations, as well as the indirect activities of intelligence work, subversion,
sabotage, and evasion and escape. (See point 9.6.)29
It has generally often been common to include concepts such as insurgency/
counter-insurgency, terrorism/counter-terrorism and peace enforcement in the LIC
concept. The concept of Peace Support Operations (PSO) can perhaps also be
included but there are clearly divided opinions on this in literature. However,
the concept of peacekeeping is not included in the current definition of the LIC
concept. This is because it is usually emphasised in connection with peacekeep-
ing that one should not actively use armed force to solve a mission. Most of
those who use the LIC concept also specify that, in addition to making use
of military force, it is also necessary for social, economic, humanitarian, legal
28. Abbreviated to ‘UW’ in Special Operations lingo. UW is one of the nine core missions of U.S.
Army Special Forces.
29. See Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (April 1998): ‘Unconventional war-
fare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration,
predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained,
equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guer-
rilla warfare and other direct offensive low-visibility; covert, or clandestine operations, as well
as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape
(E&E).’
23
and diplomatic measures to be taken. A problem with the LIC concept in

the manner in which it is normally used in literature is that it is definitely a
Western term. At the same time, this signals Western thinking and experiences
as regards this form of war/warfare. The rest of the world does not necessarily
think of warfare in the same way as we do in the West. It is not uncommon for
those in the Third World to have different attitudes with regard to what is right
and wrong when waging war.30 In other words, the definitions vary depend-
ing on the source, but the concepts are generally used to describe a lengthy
political/military conflict between an insurgent movement and a ruling regime,
normally internally in a Third World country.
If one follows the debate in the Western specialist military journals and
English language specialist literature, there has been a constant debate since the
mid-1990s about which trends or ‘ideologies’ have been dominant with regard
to the many insurgencies in the Third World in particular. A common view
has been that, within the leadership of the many insurgencies during the Cold
War, the Marxist-Leninist or Maoist ideological platforms have dominated but
that these are well on the way to having been replaced by a new preoccupation
with national or ethnic identities.31 Others have asserted that many of the
insurgency leaders have focused from an early stage on identity problems but
that, due to the situation where two superpowers dominated the picture dur-
ing the entire Cold War, the majority of insurgencies were put into a political
and economic context with associated labels. It was ‘anti-capitalist’ rhetoric in
particular that dominated during the entire Cold War. The truth is probably
instead that, at ground level in the many insurgent movements, it was rarely
the case that reality fitted directly in with the simplified picture of Capitalism
versus Communism. It is likely that growing nationalism and identification
with a local group were more important as a basis for recruitment for most of
those who reported to actively take part in wars than a great desire to introduce
an idealistic Marxist-Leninist social system or other similar dogmatic notions
of the future.
The possibility of being sponsored in connection with a planned or ongoing
insurgency was very much present during the latter part of the Cold War. If the
30. Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (London:
Arrow Books Ltd., The Random House Group Ltd., 2003). The book shows with great
clarity what can happen when a conflict gets totally out of control. General Dallaire was
‘force commander’ for the unsuccessful UN mission in Rwanda in the early 1990s. The book
describes the consequences the combination of ethnic and social opposites can have.
31. An example of a researcher who has emphasised this type of evaluation is Mary Kaldor, Nya
och gamla krig: Organiserat våld under globaliseringens era [New and Old Wars: Organised
Violence in a Global Era] (Gothenburg: Bokförlaget Daidalos AB, 1999).
24
government one wanted to fight against was supported by one of the superpow-
ers, there was always the possibility of the other superpower wanting to support
the insurgents. In insurgent movements that desired socialist-inspired social
reforms, the sponsor was usually the Soviet Union and sometimes also China
and smaller countries such as Cuba and Libya. In conflicts that have clear ethnic
overtones, we should always study who they were fighting against if we are to
understand which superpower directly or indirectly may have supported the
insurgent movement. Areas of protracted conflict such as Eritrea (1961–1993),
Angola (UNITA was established in 1961 and waged war against various oppo-
nents almost without interruption up until 2003), and the Palestinians (during
the time in the 1970s when they were strong in the Lebanon) are all examples
of conflicts where ethnicity has been of great importance. The examples men-
tioned here are natural ones to study if we wish to acquaint ourselves with the
patterns of behaviour in ethnic conflicts. It is also possible that several insur-
gent movements used (and are using?) rhetoric to attract a sponsor, such as, for
example, the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan and UNITA in Angola. Both clearly
used ‘anti-Communist’ rhetoric but were, in practice, nationalist and ethnic
respectively.32
It should be noted here that, during the Cold War, the many revolution-
ary movements were often seen as an expression of rivalry between the two
superpowers, but this is probably also too simple a method for describing the
realities. The question is who took advantage of whom? Is the insurgent move-
ment using a superpower as a ‘sponsor’ or was it the superpower that used the
insurgent movement in the game for control of the Third World? Or was it
often quite simply more a case of a series of ‘marriages of convenience’ between
a sponsor and the insurgent movement in question than anything else? This
form of warfare has, however, also continued after the end of the Cold War.
This could be seen as possible evidence that these wars have their own inter-
nal lives. Another important factor may be that the remaining superpowers
have, in order to secure their own and what are seen as Western interests, been
involved since the end of the Cold War in combating various forms of revolu-
tionary groups in the Third World. The best-known examples are probably the
attempts at countering insurgencies and drug barons in Colombia and the still
ongoing so-called ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq among other places.
An interesting observation is also that research into insurgent wars has come
a bit further since the first wave of literature on counter-insurgency in the 1960s.
These were books and articles that were often based on the actual authors’ own
25
200 km
UZBEKI TAJIKISTAN CHINA
-STAN Dushanbe
TURKMENISTAN
Chah-e Ab
Feyzabad
Mazar-e Sharif Kondoz
Khanabad
Zibak
Baghlan
Meymaneh Shahr-e Monjan
Barg-e Matal
Kamdesh
USH Mehtar Lam
U K Charikar
ND Bamian Bagram
Asadabad
Safed Koh HI Kabul Narang
Herat Meydan Shahr Jalalabad
Agha
Khyber Pass
Shindand Kashmir
Pol-e Alam
Ghazni Gardez Islamabad
A F G H A N I S T A N Khost
Moqor Sharan
Farah ak Orgun
b
da rn
h an Ta
rg Qalat Shkin
A
Kandahar
IRAN
nd
a Spin Buldak
m PAKISTAN
He
l
INDIA
Afghanistan, year 2006. (Map: Samuel Svärd)
personal experiences. When, from the spring of 1965, the Americans began
their increasingly serious military intervention in Vietnam, more research-based
literature began to appear. The research institution, the RAND Corporation,
in particular played a key part in this gradually extremely widespread research
work. The best of these reports are also of a very high standard, measured
against today’s research. This was nevertheless a conflict with a completely dif-
ferent tradition to those that European research from the 1970s was preoccu-
pied by and which was characterised by analyses of organisations such as the
IRA and RAF, etc.33
33. The abbreviation IRA stands for Irish Republican Army and RAF for Red Army Faction.
26
2.3.2 Factors that influence developments

Another important set of relatively new factors that influence developments
today are the consequences of so-called globalisation. Over the course of the
last 20 years, this has led to a significant transformation of social, economic and
political conditions at a global level. Overall, this has led to a need to develop
new analytical concepts when trying to gain an overall view of experiences from
the actual conflicts, at the same time as studying relevant theories about this
type of warfare. The American Thomas Barnett is one of those who address this
in his book The Pentagon’s New Map. In this, he divides the world into those
who embrace/are positive towards the ongoing globalisation (‘connected’), and
those who do not want to participate for various reasons (‘disconnected’). The
way he sees it, it would be a good American policy to establish a strategy to
get onboard those states that are not involved in global development.34 The
main idea behind his thinking is that nations that have intensive economic
contact/trade with each other have established a certain dependency within
the economic area, which makes it less likely that they will go to war with each
other. The more countries that participate in this collaboration (‘connected’),
the less risk there is of conflict. It obviously remains to be seen whether there
is any realism in Barnett’s thinking. It can hardly be expected that there will
be any rapid transition to this type of concept in Europe, particularly when we
see the scepticism that prevails within several leading EU countries and also in
parts of the Third World to this new concept.
Even if new definitions of concepts such as insurgency, revolutionary war,
guerrilla war and terrorism, etc., have been continually developed over a period
of time, there is nevertheless still no complete agreement as to what the indi-
vidual definitions should describe. Today there is, however, much agreement
that the concept of insurgency describes internal war within a state/nation. It
can be seen as the key overall concept in the many wars ongoing between an
opposition or insurgent group and a ruling regime, but the concept says noth-
ing of any external support from other actors. The assumption is that the parties
have employed force in order to reform, revolutionise, transform or preserve
the legitimacy of a state system. Political control is normally based on the four
following important political framework factors:
• That one is in a position to secure one’s own state’s borders and the survival
of the actual state.
34. Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004).
27
• Ensuring that the political systems of the state survive.

• Safeguarding/protecting those who have the authority to govern the state
(possibly on behalf of the people).
• That politics can be conducted in a way that one can lawfully decide who is
to get what in the community.
Much of the political struggle will normally be over who is to carry out the
four points above and there are few if any rules laid down in this field. The dif-
ferent insurgencies will always have their basis in local conditions, and priorities
will consequently vary from country to country. Some examples may illustrate
the differences in objectives:
• The ‘Tamil Tigers’ in Sri Lanka, the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines
and the Polisario guerrillas in the Western Sahara (still a de facto part of
Morocco even if several countries have acknowledged the area as a separate
state) are all trying to break away from the three current nation states in
order to set up separate states.
• The two insurgency movements, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) in Algeria, wish, on
their part, to assume government in the states in question, i.e., to take
charge themselves as the new governing party.
• A third form of insurgent activity is represented by what the Ulster Defence
Association has stood for in Northern Ireland. This may perhaps be regard-
ed as meeting terror with ‘counter-terror’, or using insurgency techniques
against an ‘insurgency’? It could possibly be asserted that violent Protestant
paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster
Freedom Fighters (UFF) had a similar function to the so-called death squads
in El Salvador and Guatemala. Nor were many of these groups in Latin
America under the direct control of the authorities but they regarded them-
selves as a tool in the established counter-insurgency strategy. Such groups
normally wish to maintain the traditional political system by preventing
changes to this. (They fear that changes would weaken the group’s political
influence, as the leaders have interpreted the local situation.)
• Insurgent movements of the nature of those seen in latter years in, for exam-
ple, Iraq and Chechnya all wish to remove the relatively recent occupation
of their (ethnic) areas, but it has often proved to be the case that this type
of group has lacked clear plans as to what will happen after their goal of
independence has been achieved. The result of such a lack of a perspective
28
of the future is perhaps a new round of civil war when the first objective has
been achieved – national independence.35
In other words, the various forms of insurgent movements normally have

extremely different objectives in their warfare and use of violence.36 (For more
details, see the discussion on al-Qaeda in points 7.2.1–7.2.2.) Some want to set
up a new state while others are primarily occupied with securing a better and
more just (local) socio-economic order. Over the last few years we have also
seen the development of so-called theocracies, i.e., where it is desired to estab-
lish a new state order based on religious laws. More extreme groupings want
the introduction of Western-inspired democratic arrangements and perhaps
to go in a more social democratic direction. But a strong desire to avoid any
changes at all may be the cause of an insurgency – and then it is obviously very
difficult to see the insurgents as ‘revolutionaries’. Seen in this way, it is neces-
sary to study each individual case if one is to have any hope of understanding
why and how an insurgency arises and how it may develop. This complexity as
regards the many insurgent and guerrilla movements makes it necessary to look
at insurgent movements differently today than one did in traditional counter-
insurgency literature from the 1960s. Here it was assumed that one was dealing
with a form of social and nationalist insurgency directed at a ruling regime and
where it was often a Communist cadre that formed the leadership. In short, the
35. Joseph R. Rudolph, Jr., (ed.), Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 2003), pp. 94–99. A classic example of independence not necessarily lead-
ing to lasting peace and a balance between ethnic groups is provided by India. First, the
British colony of India was split into two parts: India and Pakistan. Pakistan has since been
divided again into Pakistan and Bangladesh and, during this entire time, small guerrilla wars
or terrorism have gone on in what has today become the regional superpower, India. In fed-
eral states such as Punjab, Kashmir and where, for example, ethnic tribes such as the Naga
and Mizo have kept a protracted insurgency going in the state of Assam with the assistance
of Communist organisational principles. Finally, they were given their own tribal-based state
– Nagaland, in 1963. Once one tribal area was given its freedom, the others demanded the
same. During the period, 1972–1987, Assam was divided into 7 federal provinces. It has not,
however, ever been possible to achieve a new and lasting stability in this north-eastern part of
India.
36. It has been stated that almost 100,000 ‘soldiers’ went to various training camps in Afghanistan
during the period 1980 to 2001. The Pakistani intelligence service, ISI, for instance, ran sev-
eral training camps in Pakistan during the war in Afghanistan (1979–1989) where the major-
ity of participants were Afghans. Later, camps were also run by various warlords, the ISI and
the Taliban regime when they took over power in the country during the period from 1990
to 2001. The terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia is an example of such a group. It
was members of this group that, among other things, carried out a series of bomb attacks in
Indonesia in 2002 and 2003. The probably best-known attack in Indonesia so far was carried
out in Bali in October 2002 when 202 people were killed.
29
situation today requires a careful examination of each individual insurgency if

the driving forces behind the insurgency are to be understood.
According to Professor Ted Robert Gurr, there are three stages in the devel-
opment of a society that can lead to the people supporting insurgency or terror-
ism directed at the ruling regime. Gurr looks at the gap between aspirations and
the ability to realise these. If one sees one’s ability to, for instance, earn money
suddenly disappear while continuing to expect the same lifestyle as before, the
gap between aspirations and reality will increase. Similarly, if one gradually sees
the situation improve, expectations will increase in step with this improvement.
If then the opportunities to realise aspirations at a certain stage begin to lag
behind, the gap will again increase. The third ‘scenario’ is a society where one
actually has a stable relationship with one’s surroundings and one’s ability to
earn money. If, under these circumstances, one is promised ‘the promised land’,
one’s expectations will rise. If reality does not then change, this aspirational gap
will again increase and be able to create fertile soil for discontent, frustration
and gradually less resistance to those who create opposition to the regime. The
ruling regime will over a period of time be regarded as responsible for the lack
of personal progression.37
2.3.3 The concepts of irregular armed forces, LIC and insurgency

By way of introduction, it may be appropriate to introduce the concept of irreg-
ular armed forces. This concept is often given a broad and negative definition,
as almost all ‘militarised’ insurgent or oppressive actors fall into this category.
The terms that are often used in the English vocabulary when discussing what
irregular armed forces involve are militias, paramilitaries, guerrillas, mercenaries,
warlords, bandits, vigilantes, veterans, police and possibly also militarised youth
groups (gangs). It is exactly because this concept has been defined as widely as it
is, that I will largely avoid it in this book. Instead, I will place greater emphasis
on the terms that will be introduced below. The uniformed and conventional
state armies that defend a state’s independence against external enemies cannot,
on the other hand, be called irregular forces.
One of the first military writers to use the term Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)
was the British General Frank Kitson.38 During the same period, the term
37. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Fourth Printing,
1974), pp. 28–29. These theories are further developed in a newer book written by Ted
Robert Gurr and Barbara Haff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1994), Chapter 1, pp. 1–14.
38. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping (London: Faber
and Faber, 1971), see page XI.
30
‘protracted war’ came into use.39 The LIC concept has also been used to describe
so-called ‘LIC strategies’ and may then possibly be seen as a more informal
American ‘strategy’ whose roots go back to the beginning of the 1980s. (It is,
however, disputed whether this can be regarded as a strategy.) Ivan Molloy has
presented the concept in an alternative manner:
(…) LIC remains the foremost and most effective means by which the
United States can combat threatening revolutionary nationalism when
direct intervention is not an option. Or alternatively, it remains the
pre-eminent strategy for preparing the ground for direct and ‘just’ US
military intervention in foreign target states. As such, this most effective
strategy has continued to be used either fully or partially by the United
States, and indeed other states, since the 1980s and its original emer-
gence in the Philippines and Central America. Used to fight wars when
‘it is not fighting wars’, LIC remains one of the most enduring legacies
of the Reagan era. (…) 40
Insurgency and insurgent movements are not in any way anything new.
Insurgency has always existed, normally in the form of people taking up arms
to counteract what they feel is unfair treatment from rulers. In doing so, they
are (in the vast majority of cases) reacting to impulses or pressures from others.
But if this is to develop into an organised and well-led insurgent movement,
often with its starting point in an almost spontaneous insurgency, it is required
that those behind the insurgency are able to develop a politically educated
leadership. The insurgency may also be directed against a foreign influence or
against a direct occupation by forces from outside the region supporting the
movement and is then often called a resistance movement. Nevertheless, insur-
gencies or resistance movements will be violent activities that are carried out by
a weaker party and directed at those in power. Guerrilla warfare has historically
shown itself to be the most effective means of organising an insurgency for the
weaker party. A certain use of terror has normally been an ‘integral weapon’ in
all guerrilla warfare.
One should note here that not all insurgencies develop into guerrilla wars
or a resistance movement such as those directed against Nazi Germany in occu-
pied Europe during the Second World War. The English terms insurgency and
insurrection are often lumped together in translation as insurgency even if there
is a difference in meaning between the two terms. The terms actually assume
39. As an example of this use of the term, see the book written by R. Strausz-Hupé, W. R.
Kintner, J. E. Dougerty, A. J. Cottrell, Protracted Conflict: A Challenging Study of Communist
Strategy (New York: Harper Colophon Books, Harper & Row, publ., 1963).
40. Ivan Molloy, Rolling Back Revolution: The Emergence of Low Intensity Conflict (London: Pluto
Press, 2001), p. 1.
31
that the insurgents have introduced a Western concept/thinking in connection

with the insurgency, i.e., that they have a clear political objective and are led by
a recognised leadership.
An individual variant of this has been so-called revolutionary warfare. This
concept also has an assumption: that a revolution is desired and that this is
based on the concept that individual people or groups have rights and not just
obligations to a ruling class or group. When politics is injected into the insur-
gency, one gets at the same time a notion that a society can be changed and
that this can be done systematically. As we see, it is difficult to give insurgency
warfare only one definition. There are consequently at least a hundred such defi-
nitions in literature today. Professor Thomas A. Marks, for example, who is the
author of one of the more accepted books about so-called Maoist movements,
attaches importance to the following factors:
• He assumes that different levels of warfare exist.

• On this basis, he asserts that an organised insurgency makes use of force as a
strategic support for a political goal. At an operational level, the insurgents
will use force to develop a political infrastructure, something that will, at a
tactical level, make it possible to secure political dominance.
• In other words, insurgent wars are a political struggle in which the use of
force is central and where power is fought over by forceful means.41
The American Larry E. Cable has described the phenomenon in the follow-
ing manner: ‘Insurgency is the armed expression of organic, internal political
disaffiliation.’42 A somewhat different definition that also describes modern
insurgencies has been worded as follows by Bard E. O’Neill:
Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group
and the ruling authorities in which the on-ruling group consciously
uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and
demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the
basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.43
41. Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass Ltd., 1996), pp.
1–18. Particular attention should be paid to his explanation on p. 4.
42. Larry E. Cable, ‘Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency and
Peacekeeping Post Cold War’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 4, No. 2, (Autumn 1993),
pp. 228–262. The definition comes from p. 229.
43. Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Dulles, VA:
Brassey’s, 1990), p. 13.
32
O’Neill also goes a little further and divides the different forms of insurgent
movements into what he calls ‘types’ where he uses terms such as ‘anarchist,
egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist and preservationist’
to describe the different groups. On his part, Cable states:
While insurgency exists in two forms, offensive and defensive, with the
distinction being drawn upon the basis of the overarching political goal, a
radical restructuring of the social-political matrix in the case of the former
or the assertion of autonomy by a distinct social, cultural linguistic group
with respect to the latter, the process which produces the end result of
armed conflict is the same.44
In other words, he is saying that, if an insurgent movement is to be a lasting
success, it is necessary to create a political platform – and the members must,
in addition, have a strong desire to create change and be willing to use force to
achieve their goal. Accordingly, it would be difficult to see previous religious
leaders such as Buddha and Jesus as revolutionaries in this sense since they both
desired a peaceful change to the state of affairs by spreading their teachings.
If it is appropriate to see insurgency as a political phenomenon where the
fight for power is the central element, a whole series of methods that can be
used to achieve this goal must exist. Normally, attempts at mobilising the peo-
ple are a key element, but it cannot be excluded either that a so-called coup
d’etat, for example, may be the basis for a change to the system. Even if the
golden days of Marxist-Leninism as a spiritual source of inspiration are prob-
ably over, one should continue to have much respect for ideology as a basis for
mobilisation. Today, a mixture of ethnicity, a struggle for national identity and
religious conceptions is probably the most important mobilising factor in the
insurgent wars currently going on.
Seen in isolation, ideology is seldom of any decisive importance because it
is too elite-oriented in its form and the insurgents have historically normally
only become a marginal group. One will, however, always see extremely devout
cadres who can be willing to sacrifice everything ‘for the cause’, cf., the Chinese
cadres in Mao’s China and what we see continuing in, among other places,
Russia and East Germany’s elderly, unemployed and poor. In Norway, we saw
the lay preacher Hans Nilsen Hauge’s movement at the end of the 18th Century
function in a similar role. Notions of justice and all men having human rights
can per se have a considerable mobilising force and should accordingly not be
underestimated as a political explosive.
An example from Europe’s own recent past could be the German Red Army
Faction (RAF), better known as ‘the Baader-Meinhof Gang’, which operated in
44. Cable, ‘Reinventing the Round Wheel’, in Note 2, p. 229.
33
Germany in the early 1970s. The group was not able to mobilise the German
people, who were largely very content with the state of affairs, even although
a not insignificant amount of terrorism was employed. Historically there have
always been a number of fanatics who wish to bring about a revolution where
the conditions for this do not actually exist. What the RAF had, despite eve-
rything, was a ‘sponsor’ in the form of East Germany, which indirectly helped
them to maintain their fight without popular support.
The people need a good reason to create an insurgency – ideology is prob-
ably never the only reason. A more tangible basis is required, such as, for exam-
ple, an unfair division of economic benefits and/or a lack of a future for a large
percentage of the population. But it may also be a matter of a struggle between
power elites that use religion/nationalism/ethnicity, etc., as a means of getting
national groups to involve themselves directly as insurgents.45 Alternatively,
these means may be used to scare the population away from supporting the side
they feel has a hostile attitude towards their own cause.
Several factors have been indicated that are part of getting people involved
in insurgencies or revolutions. Some of the actual factors are indicated below:
• Demography – how could leaders such as Napoleon and Hitler raise their
armies? Was it the availability of large groups of youths without a future or
opportunities that was the decisive factor? Politics is about wanting to cre-
ate or creating visions and belief in the future. A person who can succeed in
giving young people between the ages of 14 and 30 a vision of a better life
will have secured himself an enormous resource. If we look at the situation in
many Muslim countries today, there are large numbers of youths without any
great hope of an education or well-paid jobs. This sets the scene for one of
the reasons that Islamic extremist groups today recruit well from youths with
a middle-class background who are on the way downwards in social status.
• Creating an external enemy can provide many opportunities for rallying a
people. Then one can recruit in order to defend the country or, as is often
the case today in Africa, in order to ensure that one’s own tribe/national
group can safeguard its threatened rights. In this way, a clever leadership
of an insurgency will be able to attract support from within and direct the
actual hatred against the groups they see as enemies of what they themselves
45. See, for example, Rekkedal, Asymmetric Warfare and Terrorism – An Assessment. This earlier
book is in many ways the starting point for this new study. The text, which was written in the
spring of 2002, has been rewritten and extended. There has been much research and several
studies carried out on the phenomenon of asymmetric warfare and parts of the international
material have been used here. (See footnotes and bibliographies.)
34
wish to achieve. This type of organising provides, among other things, the
opportunity to stigmatise rivals for power, whether they are hangers-on of
the declared enemy or are only trying to find political solutions to a dead-
lock situation.
• Today, we also see the extensive use of ideology and religion as a means of
mobilising local support within one’s own ethnic group or within a social
class. There is no absolute requirement here for the actual power elite itself
to be very ‘religious’ but they must be able, in a credible manner, to organise
active opposition to the ruling regime, to foreigners or to whoever is the
actual ‘enemy’.
2.4 What form does insurgency take today?
2.4.1 Introduction
Before the First World War it was common in Western military literature to
regard guerrilla warfare as a ‘pure’ military form of warfare, i.e., warfare based
on swift attacks against the enemy’s weaknesses. Guerrilla warfare was then
regarded as a tactic and no political dimension was attached to this form of
warfare. Those who made use of guerrilla warfare were, for example, tribal
warriors battling against a colonial power’s soldiers. Alternatively, they could be
an armed group continuing the war after a country’s conventional forces were
overcome by a foreign invasion force. During the Boer War (1899–1902) in
South Africa, guerrilla warfare was used because British forces had developed a
greater military capacity than the Boers. The use of guerrilla forces was actually
less common. One must move on to the 1930s and 1940s to see that guerrilla
forces had developed into real revolutionary movements where the insurgents
had clear political intentions of overthrowing the ruling regime and where clear
ideological programmes had been developed which formulated objectives for
the armed struggle.46
2.4.2 Today’s theories have a previous history

Key people in the development of the military and political capacity of revo-
lutionary warfare are, for instance, Chairman Mao Zedong, North Vietnam’s
later President Ho Chi Minh, the North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap,
46. Ian F. W. Beckett, Insurgency in Iraq: A Historical Perspective, Monograph (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005), p. 2.
35
and the Secretary-General of the Communist Party Truong Chinh. The essence
here is that a small cadre/group should over a period of time develop in such
a way as to be able to combat the ruling regime and take over government
itself. This involves making use of time and combining different subversive
techniques, political mobilisation, propaganda and military battles. Such an
insurgency, developed over a period of time, has also been shown to be able
to take over states as was first seen in China and later also in countries such as
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
Before examining the different forms of insurgency below, it may be of
interest to note some of the experiences drawn in the aftermath of the first
so-called counter-insurgency era, in the form here of a summary written by one
of the U.S.’s leading theorists and practitioners from this period (1950–1975),
Douglas S. Blaufarb:
The fundamental lesson to draw from our misadventures of the coun-
terinsurgency era is the one already emphasized by many – the lesson
of the limits of American power. It is also of importance that we should
understand in what way our power, great as it is, can be challenged by a
few thousand ragged jungle fighters armed with a dedicated leadership, a
tested theory, and great patience. Too many have fallen back on the easy
excuse that we failed in Indochina because our power was constrained
and leashed, that more bombs, more destruction, more firepower was the
answer. At the end of this account of what we tried to do and why it fell
short, it is to be hoped that some will be convinced that the failure was
one of understanding, of inability to perceive the underlying realities of
both our own system and that of the countries into which we thrust our
raw strength.47
If one is to study what is now going on within the many insurgent move-
ments and terrorist organisations in the world, it may be useful to identify and
categorise some of the trends that appear to dominate. It is, for instance, natural
to study how those states and others subjected to insurgency and terrorism
react. It is particularly interesting how the superpower, the U.S., has reacted
after the acts of terrorism against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
on September 11, 2001. These acts of terrorism had an enormous psychologi-
cal significance for the Americans and, in reality, led to the Bush administra-
tion changing its foreign policy with significant consequences, particularly in
Europe and the Middle East.
(…) In a place like Iraq, you’re dealing with the jihads that are com-
ing in to raise hell, crime on the streets that’s rampant, ex-Ba’athists
47. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, pp. 310–311.
36
that are still running around, and the potential now for this country to
fragment: Shi’ia on Shi’ia, Shi’ia on Sunni, Kurd on Turkomen. It’s a
powder keg (…)
This is a different kind of conflict. War fighting is just one element of
it. Some people on this battlefield are different; they don’t come in those
formations and with that kind of equipment (as Westerners). And they
come in many different forms. All their agendas are different.48
As the above quote by the American Colonel Gary I. Wilson indicates, there
are several theorists who assert that what is an almost new form of warfare has
arisen over the last few years, targeted at Western, and particularly American,
political and economic interests. I am at the very least sceptical about this. It is
probably more correct to see the new form as a further development of guerrilla
warfare and terrorism – phenomena that have existed in similar forms for the
last couple of hundred years. In the 1970s and 1980s, the IRA used an opera-
tional pattern that could be compared to that used by al-Qaeda on September
11, 2001. Instead of striking at the British in densely populated areas such
as Belfast or out in the rural districts in Northern Ireland, they began a ter-
rorism campaign in London and other cities of Great Britain. The campaign
was never, however, sufficiently heavy to create a demand from the British
people for the withdrawal of troops from Northern Ireland. On the contrary,
the bombing campaign created British ‘martyrs’, which actually indirectly led
to increased popular support for taking a harder line against the IRA and the
Irish Catholics.
Muslim terrorist organisations had made clear (military/political) demands
on countries such as the USA, Israel, and Spain, etc., both before and after the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The Americans often describe terrorism
as an expression of hatred towards American ideals. Seen from the standpoint of
the terrorists, the attacks were, on the contrary, a punishment against the U.S.
for what the terrorists believe the Americans have done, or are doing, in the
Islamic areas. What al-Qaeda, for instance, has focused on in its propaganda
since 2000 is that there were (previously) American troops in Saudi Arabia, that
the U.S. provided support to Muslim dictators, provided support to Israel and,
obviously, they are against Western countries participating in the ongoing wars
in Afghanistan/Iraq.
Seen in this light, what is new is not that extremist groups are willing to
attack what they regard as legitimate targets, but that, on 11 September 2001,
they were able to make a strong international impression with their attacks.
48. Gary I. Wilson, USMCR Ret., wilson@aol.com (Washington, D.C.: Renaissance,

INFOWARCON, 1–3 October 2003).
37
What can also be established is that the attitude to the use of war as a politi-
cal means and to the use of force is generally changing, particularly in Western
countries. But this may still lead to a problem in relation to the secular, but
nevertheless ‘Christian’ West and the more radical Muslim factions. The latter
have begun their mobilisation, as a reaction to what they feel is Western deca-
dence and suppression of their religious and political interests.49 These devel-
opments will probably have consequences over a period of time with regard to
what armed forces could be used for. This will, in the long-term, also influence
when one will be willing to make use of such means, what type of capacities are
acceptable and what kind of military structure and type of troop are used.
2.4.3 Theories regarding generations of warfare

Over the last 10–15 years, particularly in the United States, a new military and
academic interest in the various forms of counter-insurgency has been seen. In
connection with this, during the same period, a number of books and journal
articles were published with regard to two relatively new concepts. Concepts
such as ‘Fourth-Generation Warfare’ (4GW) and ‘The Three Block War’ have
been introduced. Perhaps these ideas are not as new as the most enthusiastic
advocates try to make them seem, but this is, without doubt, a new twist as
regards the American military debate, which gives some hope of an increasing
awareness with regard to the approach.
Both concepts have their starting point in U.S. Marine Corps circles and
both military and civilian theorists have contributed to developments. One
of the first to begin to write about 4GW was the previously great champion
of manoeuvre warfare the American military theorist William S. Lind. In an
article published in the Marine Corps’ journal, Marine Corps Gazette, in 1994,
he describes a broad outline of the problems that advocates of these theories
have later developed.50
49. Examples of such events and attitudes were seen in connection with the killing of a Dutch
film producer in 2004 and in the demonstrations that led to a decision to cancel a controver-
sial play in Birmingham, England, that same autumn. At the same time Western democracies
are potentially attractive targets as scenes for terrorist attacks since one is presumably guaran-
teed dramatic media coverage and strong political reactions to a terrorist attack (cf., the bomb
attacks against trains in Spain in 2004, which had significant political consequences). This act
was even easier to carry out in Europe than in more totalitarian states due to the open internal
European borders. (See the more detailed discussion in Chapters 5 and 6.)
50. William S. Lind, ‘Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 78,
Iss. 12, (December 1994), p. 34. A more recent key article on the same theme was in print
in the same journal a few years later: William S. Lind, ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the
Fourth Generation’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 85, Iss. 11, (November 2001), p. 65, 4.
38
Several military thinkers have attempted to understand the war on terror

that began on September 11, 2001 in the light of the term Fourth-Generation
Warfare, which was coined by William S. Lind et al. in 1989.51 At the same
time, there are many people who have wanted to differentiate between Lind’s
military theories and his controversial and cultural points of view; something
that this author feels is an essential distinction. He has answered his critics in
an article.
William S. Lind is regarded as one of the founders of modern manoeuvre
warfare theory. His book, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (1985), is still required
reading at many military academies in many places in the world, including the
Norwegian military academies and at the Swedish National Defence College in
Stockholm. In addition to his work on manoeuvre philosophy, Lind has writ-
ten on a topic he calls ‘Fourth-Generation Warfare’. As previously mentioned,
this subject was first illustrated in an article he wrote along with several others
with the title ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth-Generation’ as early
as in 1985.52 In light of what happened later, and particularly September 11,
2001, ‘the day that changed the world’, it might be interesting to read Lind’s
article again. It is particularly relevant in some areas. If we stick to the terminol-
ogy that William S. Lind uses, even states that adhere to ‘Second-Generation
Warfare’ (2GW) or ‘Third-Generation Warfare’ (3GW) can successfully use/
exploit 4GW techniques.53 According to Lind and like-minded people, the
generations can be described as follows:
First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore
musket, the tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed
51. William S. Lind, Col. Keith Nightengale, USA, Capt. John F. Schmitt, USMC and Lt. C.
Gary I. Wilson, ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation’, Marine Corps
Gazette. Oct. 1989. pp. 22–26.
52. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985). Lind
has also written a number of articles in, for instance, Marine Corps Gazette. In 1999, he
was honoured by this magazine by receiving the title of Marine Corps Gazette Distinguished
Author. Lind has visited Norway twice – in 1999 at the Norwegian Military Academy and
Naval Academy and in 2000 at the Military Operations Symposium arranged by the Military
Academy. William S. Lind has impressed many people with his knowledge of military history
and strategy and with his analysis of modern military doctrines and training. He has also been
provocative with his radical political and cultural points of view, which have put him far to the
right in American social debate, even if he does not see himself as a so-called NeoCon. In The
Atlantic Monthly magazine from 2002, it was pointed out in a commentary on the ongoing
war in Afghanistan that a website associated with al-Qaeda quotes Lind’s article as inspiration
for the terrorists’ strategy for fighting a new type of war against the West.
53. William S. Lind, ‘Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.
85, Iss. 11, November 2001, p. 69, 3; Lind, ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth
Generation’.
39
partially in response to technological factors – the line maximized fire-

power, rigid drill was necessary to generate a high rate of fire, etc. – and
partially in response to social conditions and ideas, e.g., the columns of
the French revolutionary armies reflected both the élan of the revolution
and the low training levels of conscripted troops. Although rendered
obsolete with the replacement of the smoothbore by the rifled musket,
vestiges of first generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently
encountered desire for linearity on the battlefield. Operational art in the
first generation did not exist as a concept although it was practiced by
individual commanders, most prominently Napoleon.
Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breech-
loaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were
based on fire and movement, and they remained essentially linear. The
defense still attempted to prevent all penetrations, and in the attack
a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small groups. Perhaps
the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy reliance on
indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the French
maxim, ‘the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies’. Massed fire-
power replaced massed manpower. Second generation tactics remained
the basis of U.S. doctrine until the 1980s, and they are still practiced
by most American units in the field. While ideas played a role in the
development of second generation tactics (particularly the idea of lateral
dispersion), technology was the principal driver of change. Technology
manifested itself both qualitatively, in such things as heavier artillery and
bombing aircraft, and quantitatively, in the ability of an industrialized
economy to fight a battle of materiel (Materialschlacht). The second gen-
eration saw the formal recognition and adoption of the operational art,
initially by the Prussian army. Again, both ideas and technology drove
the change. The ideas sprang largely from Prussian studies of Napoleon’s
campaigns. Technological factors included von Moltke’s realization that
modern tactical firepower mandated battles of encirclement and the
desire to exploit the capabilities of the railway and the telegraph.
Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in bat-
tlefield firepower. However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Aware
they could not prevail in a contest of materiel because of their weaker
industrial base in World War I, the Germans developed radically new
tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third generation tactics
were the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on infiltration to
bypass and collapse the enemy’s combat forces rather than seeking to
close with and destroy them. The defense was in depth and often invited
penetration, which set the enemy up for a counterattack. While the basic
concepts of third generation tactics were in place by the end of 1918, the
addition of a new technological element-tanks-brought about a major
shift at the operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg.
40
In the blitzkrieg, the basis of the operational art shifted from place (as
in Liddell Hart’s indirect approach) to time. This shift was explicitly
recognized only recently in the work of retired Air Force Col John Boyd
and his ‘OODA (observation–orientation–decision–action) theory’.54
The point here is that the three ‘generations’ above describe the European
way of conducting warfare. Very little is said in the theory about how people in
other parts of the world fought wars at that time. In Asia, the traditions were
very similar to how 4GW is described today. We should ask ourselves – is there
anything really new in this thinking? A difficult question to answer. But one of
the most detailed descriptions of Fourth-Generation Warfare so far is written by
the retired USMC Colonel Thomas X. Hammes. In his book, he defines the
phenomenon of 4GW in the following manner:
Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks – politi-
cal, economic, social, and military – to convince the enemy’s political
decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too
costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still
rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when
properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power,
4GW makes use of society’s networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previ-
ous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the
enemy’s military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the
mind of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will.
Fourth-generation wars are lengthy – measured in decades rather than
months or years.
Clearly, 4GW is a very different concept from the short, intense war the
(U.S.) administration planned for and celebrated by declaring the end of
major combat on May 1, 2003.55
These theorists often regard themselves as an alternative to those who have
primarily had a technological basis for their new military thinking with regard to
future warfare. Those they have seen as their clear opponents – on the basis of
the 4GW thinkers’ own standpoint – have been theorists such as, for instance,
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, who, early in the 1990s, went heavily in
for the rapidly advancing data technology in particular as the basis for what
they saw as a new form of warfare, based on what they called ‘cyberwar’. They
54. William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC),
Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), ‘The
Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 73, Iss. 10
(October 1989), pp. 22–26.
55. Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN:
Zenith Press, 2004), p. 2.
41
visualised that in the future there would be short wars where all forms of high
technology would play a leading part.56
One could possibly present/interpret Thomas X. Hammes’ thoughts in the
following manner:
• ‘Idea-based warfare’ – which means that groups that actually have/could

have conflicting interests can nevertheless unite for a common goal. The
actual tactics can be developed by the different groups individually.
• ‘4GW’ can possibly be seen as a further developed form of insurgency.
• Progress is measured, as he sees it, in decades and not years, something that
is often difficult to understand for impatient Western politicians and mili-
tary leaders.
• Network-based insurgency or counter-insurgency (i.e., that all types of net-
work can be included, not just technological ones are of importance to the
warfare).
• There is no strategic focus on the enemy’s strengths, and the focus is instead
on influencing the enemy’s political will by means of the political decision
makers.
• One communicates simultaneously (entirely deliberately!) different messages
to different target groups, via all available channels.
• Superpowers have all been defeated (several times) in this type of ‘new con-
flict’. In order to avoid themselves (i.e., the insurgents) appearing as ‘targets’
for high technology weapon systems, 4GW is today the only current form
of warfare that can succeed against a technologically superior opponent.57
In a draft from January 2005, Hammes has additionally developed his the-
ories. Here he describes what he calls ‘Characteristics of Fourth Generation
Warfare’ as:
Fourth generation war uses all available networks – political, economic,
social, and military – to convince the enemy’s political decision makers
that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the
perceived benefit. It is rooted in the fundamental precept that superior
political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and
military power. 4GW does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s
56. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ‘Cyberwar is Coming’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12, No.
2 (Spring 1993), pp. 141–165.
57. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone.
42
military forces. Instead, combining guerrilla tactics or civil disobedience

with the soft networks of social, cultural and economic ties, disinforma-
tion campaigns and innovative political activity, it directly attacks the
enemy’s political will.
Fourth generation war spans the spectrum of human activity – politi-
cal, economic, social and military. Politically, it involves transnational,
national and sub-national organizations and networks to convey its mes-
sage to the target audiences. Strategically, it focuses on breaking the will
of decision makers. It uses different pathway to deliver different mes-
sages for different target audiences. The messages serve three purposes:
break the enemy’s will; maintain the will of its own people; ensure neu-
trals remain neutral or provide tacit support to the cause. Operationally,
it delivers those messages in a variety of ways from high impact, high
profile direct military actions to indirect economic attacks such as those
designed to drive up the price of oil. Tactically, 4GW forces avoid direct
confrontation if possible while seeking maximum impact it uses mate-
rials present in the society under attack. To minimize their logistics
requirements they can attack using industrial chemicals, liquefied natu-
ral-gas tankers or fertilizer shipments. Finally, 4GW practitioners plan
for long wars – decades rather than months or years.
In sum, 4GW is political, socially (rather than technically) networked
and protracted in duration. It is the anti-thesis of the high-technology,
short war the Pentagon is preparing to fight.58
In sum, 4GW is of a protracted nature. It is the antithesis of the high-tech-
nology, short war the Pentagon is preparing to fight.
4GW can accordingly be regarded as a basis for both a counter-insurgency
strategy and an insurgency strategy – something that could probably contrib-
ute to confusion among those with a Western cultural background attempting
to acquaint themselves with this way of thinking. Mao Zedong’s thoughts on
protracted war have clearly been an important starting point,59 but he states,
sensibly, that practice must be developed and refined so that military and politi-
cal measures are adapted to local conditions. China can be seen as an example of
58. Hammes, ‘War Evolves into the Fourth Generation’, draft from 31 January 2005, electronic
copy from Hammes to Rekkedal, October 2005.
59. Mao Tsetung, Om den langvarige krigen [On Protracted War] (Oslo: Forlaget Oktober, 1976).
The original was written by Mao in the Yenan province of China in May–June 1938, and the
translation is based on a certified English translation done on the orders of Beijing in 1963.
(On Protracted War: Selected Military Writings of Mao Tsetung, Beijing, 1963.) See the chapters
‘Hvorfor en langvarig krig?’ [‘Why a Protracted War?’], pp. 36–40, ‘De tre stadiene i den
langvarige krigen’ [‘The Three Stages of Protracted War’], pp. 40–51, and ‘Krig og politikk’
[‘War and Politics’], pp. 61–63 in particular.
43
a country/superpower that has concentrated very much on this type of activity

over the last few years.60
The ‘Fourth Generation War’ as a theory emerged as mentioned earlier in
the late 1980s, but has become well known also outside military circles due to
the developments during the war in Iraq after 2003 and the many international
terrorist attacks. According to one of the critics of the theory, Dr. Antulio J.
Echevarria II, the theory ‘has several fundamental flaws that need to be exposed
before they can cause harm to U.S. operational and strategic thinking. A cri-
tique of 4GW is both fortuitous and important because it also provides us an
opportunity to attack other unfounded assumptions that could influence U.S.
strategy and military doctrine.’ According to him, the theory holds that war-
fare has evolved through four generations: first, the use of massed manpower,
second, firepower, third, manoeuvre, and fourth, an evolved form of insurgency
that employs all available networks, i.e., political, economic, social, military,
‘to convince an opponent’s decision makers that their strategic goals are either
unachievable or too costly’.61
As Echevarria sees the development, instead of examining the way terrorists
groups actually behave,
4GW-theory misleadingly pushed the storm-trooper ideals as the terror-
ist of tomorrow. Instead of looking at the probability that such terrorists
would improvise with respect to the weapons they used box cutters,
aircraft, and improvised explosive device, it posited high-tech ‘wonder’
weapons.62
According to Echevarria, the theory went through what he called ‘a second
incarnation when the notion of non-trinitarian war came into vogue’, but it
failed to examine these ideas critically. He claims the 4GW-theory ‘is found-
ed on the consequences of the so-called Westphalian system and the German
theory of blitzkrieg’. As Echevarria sees the development of 4GW-thinking, the
theory reinvented itself once again after September 11, 2001, when some of
its proponents, according to Echevarria, claimed that al-Qaeda ‘was waging a
4GW against the United States’. The theory’s proponents, rather than think-
ing critically about future warfare, became more concerned with demonstrat-
ing that they had predicted the future. According to Echevarria: ‘While their
recommendations are often rooted in common sense, they are undermined by
60. Published 16 October 2000: ‘Year 2000 China Defense White Paper Document.’ Translated
by World News Connection, <http://wnc.fedworld.gov/subscription.html>. Details will be
discussed later in this book.
61. Antulio J. Echevarria II, ‘Fourth-Generation War and other Myths’, <http://www.Strategic
StudiesInstitute.army.mil>, November 2005, pp. V–VI.
62. Echevarria, ibid.
44
being tethered to an empty theory.’ Echevarria concludes his harsh criticism

with these words in his Summary:
What we are really seeing in the war on terror, and the campaign in Iraq
and elsewhere, is that the increased ‘dispersion and democratization of
technology, information, and finance’ brought about by globalization
has given terrorist groups greater mobility and access worldwide. At this
point, globalization seems to aid the nonstate actor more than the state,
but states still play a central role in the support or defeat of terrorist
groups or insurgencies. We would do well to abandon the theory of
4GW altogether, since it sheds very little, if any, light on this phenom-
enon.63
Of course, Echevarria’s attack has been answered. The former U.S. Marine
John Sayen has written an article called ‘4GW – Myth, or the Future of
Warfare? A Reply to Antulio Echevarria’.64 He starts out with the view that
nearly all the wars that have been fought in the last 15 years or so have had
states involved on no more than one side (frequently the losing side), and that
this fact changes everything. According to Sayen, modern items like warships
or fighter jets become, if not altogether irrelevant, much less useful against the
highly dispersed and decentralised opponents that characterise 4GW conflicts,
making it much harder to justify their cost. Armies geared for conventional
combat tend to have difficulty with unconventional forces. The latter requires
a completely new mindset from the state-run forces. However, even if non-state
entities acquired and used weapons like tanks or jet fighters (at least one drug
gang actually did manage to acquire a submarine and Chechen militias even
used a few tanks) they would still be engaging in 4GW because what really
distinguishes 4GW from earlier generations is not the equipment or tactics but
the identity and motivations of the people who fight it. Echevarria’s reaction to
this thesis is to deny all of it, according to Sayen. He avoids talking about the
essentials of 4GW by insisting on ‘using Col Hammes’ flawed and erroneous
definition of 4GW as his straw man. It is, however, an easy straw man to demol-
ish so the good professor spills buckets of ink in doing so.’
After answering some of Echevarria’s attacks, Sayen concludes by claiming:
Echevarria’s silliest point by far is his assertion that the US military has
it all under control (Iraq, of course, being the perfect counterexample).
He even makes the quite breathtaking assumption that the world wars
and the Cold War were really non-state conflicts because the states that
exclusively fought them made (and, whenever they chose to, broke)
63. Echevarria, ibid, p. VI.

64. John Sayen, ‘4GW – Myth, or the Future of Warfare? A Reply to Antulio Echevarria’, <http://
www. MILINET, 2005. See <http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/sayen_4gw_reply.htm>.
45
alliances among themselves! Even today, states rarely obey international

authority except when their rulers deem it to be in their own (though
not necessarily their subjects’) best interests. Attempts by the United
Nations to wield military power have almost invariably ended in fiasco
except where the United States was legitimizing its own policies by drap-
ing them in the UN flag (as in Korea, for example). Even if an inter-
national organization acquired real power of its own it would in effect
become a ‘super-state’ (better known as an empire).
Far from eliminating the state system it would entrench it even more
deeply. States, after all, are about the centralization of power, not its dev-
olution. If a super-state were to fight recalcitrant states that it claimed
authority over, it would do it as a state vs. state conflict. Both sides would
field conventional armies whose members wore uniforms and presum-
ably expected Geneva Convention treatment if captured. Today’s non-
state actors are less than states, not above states. They don’t devolve power
up they devolve it down. A non-state does not need discreet territory, a
full-time military or formal government. They are the revolution that the
4GW model depicts. They come from below, not from above. Effective
super-states, should any emerge, would not be part of this revolution but
part of the reaction to it.65
2.4.4 Warfare for the 21st Century?

Supporters of 4GW have seen as their alternative to modern warfare what is,
in the quotation above, called ‘net war’.66 They see the actual war as a complex
and protracted form of conflict and which has its roots in, among other places,
the theories that Mao asserted in what he called ‘the way of the people’s war’.
As they see it, developments are now moving in the direction of this being
probably the ‘standard war’ of the future. This is a philosophy that is undeni-
ably in contrast to the thinking behind terms such as ‘Revolution in Military
Affairs’ (RMA) and ‘Network-Centric Warfare’ (NCW),67 which dominated in
65. John Sayen, ibid.

66. Some of the best known authors who have written about 4GW with a background from
the U.S. Marines are: Colonel G. I. Wilson, Colonel T. X. Hammes, Colonel Mike Wylie,
Major John Schmitt, Gunny John Poole and Gunny Bob Howard. Important high-ranking
military officials from the U.S. Marine Corps who have written about the phenomenon are:
General Al Gray (29th Commandant of the Marine Corps), General Anthony Zinni (former
Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command) and General Charles Krulak (31st
Commandant of the Marine Corps). There is a lot of written material by these writers on the
Internet.
67. Nils Marius Rekkedal, Central Features of the Debate on RMA and Network-Centric Warfare,
Second edition (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, Department of War Studies,
2004).
46
the 1990s and up to around 2001 in official rhetoric in the U.S.68 and also in
many European countries.
William S. Lind formulated this as follows in an article published in January
2004:
(…) Characteristics such as decentralization and initiative carry over
from the Third to the Fourth Generation, but in other respects the
Fourth Generation marks the most radical change since the Peace
of Westphalia in 1648. In Fourth Generation war, the state loses its
monopoly on war. All over the world, state militaries find themselves
fighting non-state opponents such as al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and
the FARC. Almost everywhere, the state is losing.
Fourth Generation war is also marked by a return to a world of cultures,
not merely states, in conflict. We now find ourselves facing the Christian
West’s oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam. After about three
centuries on the strategic defensive, following the failure of the second
Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam has resumed the strategic offensive,
expanding outward in every direction. In Third Generation war, invasion
by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army.
Nor is Fourth Generation warfare merely something we import, as we
did on 9/11. At its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state,
and that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Generation
war on their soil. America, with a closed political system (regardless of
which party wins, the Establishment remains in power and nothing really
changes) and a poisonous ideology of ‘multiculturalism’, is a prime candi-
date for the home-grown variety of Fourth Generation war – which is by
far the most dangerous kind.69
Lind usually otherwise emphasises that what he calls Fourth-Generation
opponents are obviously not inclined to endorse the Western-dominated Geneva
Conventions. Terrorist organisations or insurgents cannot formally endorse
these either, because conventions can only be endorsed by states. But it should
not be entirely ruled out that such groups would accept some form of ‘soldier’s
code’ as to how the actual warfare was to be conducted. He believes this is a
feature of new war that should be assessed and investigated further – if nothing
else, as a contribution towards keeping the use of violence down.
68. Besides the concepts mentioned, the concepts ‘Joint Vision 2010’ and ‘Joint Vision 2020’
and the American Department of Defense’s ‘Transformation Planning Guidance’ can also be
seen as important symbols of the traditionally technology-oriented American philosophy of
modern warfare. All concepts have conventional war as the theoretical basis for their military
theory platform.
69. William S. Lind, ‘Understanding Fourth Generation War’, <http://www.antiwar.com/lind/
index.php?articleid=1702>, 15 January 2004.
47
The American General Charles Krulak, who served as Commandant of the

U.S. Marine Corps at the end of the 1990s, has discussed and written on many
occasions on what he sees future trends to be. He has, however, developed a
slightly different system of concepts to the system that Lind and later Hammes,
for instance, make use of. Krulak is clearly of the opinion that there has been a
significant shift in thinking surrounding military use of force.
On one hand, you have to shoot and kill somebody; On the other hand,
you have to feed somebody. And, you have to build an economy, restruc-
ture the infrastructure, and build the political system. And there’s some
poor lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier general down there, stuck in
some province with all that saddled onto him, with NGOs [nongovern-
mental organizations] and political wannabes running around, with fac-
tions and a culture he doesn’t understand. These are now culture wars
that we’re involved in. We don’t understand that culture (…)
In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and cloth-
ing displaced refugees – providing humanitarian assistance. In the next
moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting
peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-
intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be
what we call the three block war.70
Based on the texts of Krulak’s speeches, which are available on the Internet,
we can summarise his thoughts as follows:
• Americans prefer conventional war as this type of warfare is normally to the

advantage of the party that is strongest technologically. For the same reason,
an educated insurgent who uses ‘Fourth-Generation Warfare’ will prefer to
use what Krulak has, on several occasions, called ‘Fourth-Generation judo’
in order to, in this way, be able to meet American and Western dependency
on technology and ‘throw us down’ by exploiting our own bureaucratic
heaviness and Western thinking against ourselves.
• Our enemies’ ‘technological advantage’ as regards the September 11 attacks
in 2001 consisted of a few simple craft knives and tin openers combined
with a fanatical will to die for a cause. It served its purpose as this put the
significant American military and civilian security systems’ bureaucracy in a
hopeless position. The Americans were not able to do anything about what
happened.
70. General Charles Krulak, USMC, <http://www.usefulreference.com/cee/ch/charles_c__kru-

lak.html>. Charles C. Krulak, ‘The Three Block War: Fighting In Urban Areas’, presented to
the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 10 October 1997, ‘Vital Speeches of the Day’,
15 December 1997, p. 139.
48
• Today, we see a development where the nature of the actual conflicts is

changing. The previously clear dividing line between the contending par-
ties, criminal elements and ordinary civilians is about to be erased. The
modern urban soldier (and this fundamentally also applies to the guerrilla
soldier out in the rural districts) may be anything from a religious fanatic to
a child who perhaps fires an automatic rifle or RPG for payment. (…)71
There are, however, several similarities between what is asserted here and the
thoughts that the military theorist Martin van Creveld, for instance, made him-
self a spokesman for in his 1991 book, The Transformation of War, particularly
if one looks at how he writes about future warfare in Chapter 7 of the book.72
Seen in this way, there were several military thinkers who, in the 1990s, began
to look around for new interpretation models. Supporters of 4GW are, seen
in this light, only one of several possible interpreters of the many local wars
taking place. And to what extent the West should become involved in these
is, of course, an important factor in the different opinions seen. (See also the
bibliography with key sources on the many LIC/guerrilla wars and how these
can be evaluated.)
If one is to attempt to briefly describe the existing trends with regard to the
thinking surrounding today’s guerrilla warfare and terrorist activity, the follow-
ing points can be mentioned:
• There is a tendency for the wars that are going on at the moment to have
more than one cause. Typically, there are two/three categories that are to be
taken into consideration: the struggle for political power, ethnicity, envi-
ronmental factors such as water shortages/desertification and demographic
pressure. There are many examples of poor people with a minimum of
political influence being pressured into giving up their areas and having to
move to less fertile places at the same time as the population figures rise.
Emotive conflicts with some form of ethnic thinking or another are perhaps
the most dominant cause of several of today’s wars. The struggles against
what many see as the occupations of Chechnya and Iraq can perhaps also be
seen as ‘ethnic conflicts’ where the population opposes being governed by
71. It is the writer of this book who has edited the English statements, based on speeches given
by General Charles Krulak during the period 2000-2002. See, for instance, <http://www.
nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Charles-C.-Krulak>. An example of this: in a specific small
area of Belfast in Northern Ireland, a few too many British soldiers were shot in the head for
this to be accidental. Contract killings in connection with terrorism therefore go back to at
least the 1970s.
72. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (London: The Free Press, 1991).
49
foreigners without an understanding of and/or respect for the local culture.

Economic conditions are also always something lurking in the background
but there is much to suggest that these are not of vital importance as regards
if/when a conflict breaks out.73 A good example of a local war like this is
the one that is still going on between black farmers and Arab nomads in
Darfur in Sudan. The antagonism has built up gradually here and been
intensified by an ideological crisis in the area. Under conditions like these, it
is normally only a matter of time before another form of insurgency breaks
out. The economic trends indicate that, in many countries, there are a few
people becoming increasingly richer while the majority have the same or
fewer resources – and this gap does not look like decreasing, particularly in
the Second and Third Worlds.
• Another factor is that the UN, which was created in the 1940s on the
assumption that states were sovereign units, is today faced with the paradox
that it has supported, on several occasions, insurgents against formal govern-
ments, on the basis of self-determination for the people. According to the
UN Statutes, states should not show aggression towards other states – on the
basis of the hypothesis that if such aggression can be avoided, this will con-
tribute to a more stable world. However, since the Cold War ended, we have
seen a series of intra-state conflicts or civil war like clashes. One reason can
be easily pointed out: if one tries to secure political autonomy for a national
group and the host country does not accept an attempt such as this to break
away, one is left with a war situation. The UN has then intervened to the
advantage of insurgents in East Timor, something that may contribute to
other national groups that feel that they are more or less suppressed being
encouraged into an insurgency. This will obviously weaken those states sub-
jected to insurgency, something that will hardly contribute to stability in the
world. It is not easy to be nice to everyone. We can obviously ask rhetorically
whether it is only the UN that has developed an acceptance of some ethnic
conflicts, but not of others over the last few years. Perhaps our Western
image of the so-called international community is important for our evalu-
ations? We can obviously also ask why the international community needed
three years before intervening in the brutal Sudan conflict – when the facts
have been well-known all this time. It should also be noted that both the
UN and the majority of existing states do not wish to allow new states to be
formed. There are grounds for questioning how forward-looking the exist-
ing fear of new states being formed based on ethnic dividing lines is. The
73. Jeremy Black, War and the New Disorder in the 21st Century (New York: Continuum, 2004).
See, in particular, his discussion of factors in Chapter 3, pp. 69–118.
50
majority of borders, even in today’s Europe, were drawn up in keeping with

ethnic/cultural dividing lines, not economic ones. (This UN policy is now,
probably as a result of recommendations from the panel that assesses the
UN’s future role and organisation, in the process of being changed. In many
ways, the UN system is now being given an internal ‘reality check’.)74
• The West has traditionally placed emphasis on technology and advanced
weapon systems. The ongoing wars in Afghanistan and the ‘continuation
war’ in Iraq, however, may serve as a ‘wake-up call’? In the real world it is
not machines that wage war, but people and their ideas that are the actual
basis of the wars that arise.
• It is also a common notion that it is so-called ‘low-tech approaches’ that
apply with regard to what theorists such as the American William S. Lind
and like-minded people have called ‘Fourth-Generation Warfare’. In this,
the use of alternative solutions such as the actual tactics the weaker party
uses has prominence. This is, however, perhaps too simple an interpretation?
Insurgents have, on several occasions, been able to successfully turn Western
conventional military strategies and tactics into a handicap for Western forc-
es. One should then, through independent analysis, develop and adapt one’s
own tactical and strategic conditions to meet the conditions in question. The
structures of the armed forces in many Western countries and also in the
former Soviet Union have only, as yet to a limited extent, been able to adapt
since the Cold War. The question one should then ask is whether the armed
forces one possesses have adapted to the missions they face today.75 In the
74. The UN Security Council possibly no longer has a composition that makes it possible to
look without prejudice at macro-political issues. The problems/scandals revealed with regard
to Iraq’s ‘Oil for Food’ programme and the tension between the institution itself and the U.S.
have created major and fundamental problems for the organisation.
75. Martin van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought (London: Cassell/Orion
Publishing Group Limited, 2002). In this book, van Creveld has, among other things, writ-
ten about how an ‘empire’, i.e., a ‘hegemonial’ superpower can combat threats to itself. These
threats typically come from the periphery, i.e., from the edge of the superpower’s sphere of
interest. They build up gradually so they are not initially seen as constituting a threat. When
they have become sufficiently serious then the ‘hegemony’ can take action. Success is achieved
when the superpower takes the ‘fight’ to a local level and attempts to isolate the events so as
not to spill over/spread to other parts of its own spheres of interest. They should then fight
under the conditions that the local insurgent forces use and so avoid asymmetry. It will take
time to defeat an insurgency. Creveld’s point is that, in connection with COIN, sufficient
military capabilities/capacities should be deployed to exploit the options (in time and space)
that exist. He sees what is briefly outlined here as being the method that has proved to be
most relevant historically – and COIN is then an effective procedure for combating opposi-
tion forces. With the U.S.’s ‘global reach’ (i.e., the ability to project forces) this is at least a
potential approach for the U.S.
51
U.S. in particular, since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, there has been extensive
discussion about how the armed forces should be organised and equipped.
The problem is that, after the conventional phase of war, they have had to
maintain protracted operations in order to combat militant insurgents, who,
together with criminal elements and foreign ‘soldiers’, have made it very
difficult to re-establish an Iraqi Government. This has obviously been par-
ticularly complicated as Iraq is very much split, ethnically and religiously.
• Another factor that is often underestimated is that warfare cannot be seen
as something that states have a monopoly on. This is also a basis for asking
whether it actually ever has been. But in European thinking with regard to
warfare, we have, for about 350 years, often seen warfare as something that
went on between states/countries and organised and recognised by these.
This notion may perhaps be seen as a fixed point for all Western political
and military thinking on war and warfare since the Peace of Westphalia in
1648. It is likely that a more correct explanation of this development is that
not even during the ‘glory days’ of the nation states in the 17th and 18th
Centuries were all wars in the European cultural sphere conducted between
states. A great number of civil wars occurred in places such as France, Austria-
Hungary and in Finland. In the Third World, in particular, there is scarcely
any state monopoly on power today of the type one would envisage as ‘nor-
mal’ in Western thinking. (This will be discussed later in this book.)
• If one looks more historically at developments, guerrilla warfare (including
use of terrorism) and conventional warfare have often been used as political
means to bring about changes within a nation state and to society as such.
Democratisation and greater social justice have been part of a successful
counter-insurgency strategy in several so-called ‘social’ insurgencies and the
measures have, after a time, taken the edge off the insurgency, cf., devel-
opments in, for example, El Salvador and Guatemala during the guerrilla
wars of the 1980s. The insurgents had obviously wanted a total victory, but
had to be satisfied with these ‘spin-off ’ results when peace had finally been
concluded. Otherwise it should be noted here that, even if resources and
political support may come from other nation states that sympathise with
the insurgents, one decides oneself to stay out of the conflict.
As some military theorists see it today, new trends are making their way into
the traditional pattern. As regards ‘Fourth-Generation Warfare’, the insurgents
like to use a mixture of terrorism, guerrilla warfare and other types of uncon-
ventional warfare as tools for changing a given society, its culture and attitudes.
The insurgents may also oppose the nation state with the necessary suprana-
tional measures and means.
52
The unusual thing is that it is often difficult to see that the insurgents have
any clear ideology and/or declared objectives for what will happen if they are
successful in taking over power. This particularly applies in ethnic or resistance
wars where the insurgents are fighting against something (e.g., an occupation
and/or what is seen as the ethnic predominance of another national group),
more than where they are fighting for a new and more righteous social order
(cf., examples such as Peru, El Salvador and, more recently, in connection with
the Maoist-led insurgency in Nepal).76
76. It is outside the framework of this book to examine the many ongoing conflicts in detail.
Anyone who would themselves like to study in greater detail what characterises the ongoing
ethnic conflicts can study, for example, Rudolph, Jr., (ed.), Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic
Conflicts.
53
3. Factors that influence today’s international
environment
3.1 Introduction
What is it that influences the insurgencies, guerrilla wars and terrorist organisa-
tions we see today? What we can be reasonably sure of is that there are a large
number of factors and that these vary from conflict to conflict. It is, however,
possible to see some factors that frequently recur.
In this chapter, some of the factors that today influence the international
environment will be introduced, including the nature of the intergovernmental
and civil war like conflicts. Finally, methods of conducting conflicts/warfare
will also be presented. Subject-wise, Chapter 3 belongs with Chapter 4 and a
short summarised analysis of the problems discussed in these two chapters has
been compiled (see point 4.6).
3.2 What are the new challenges?

It caused quite a stir in the 1990s when Professor Samuel P. Huntington from
Harvard University in the United States presented his hypothesis that conflicts
between the major world civilisations would dominate international politics in
the years to come. Huntington’s view was that mankind has, since the end of
the Cold War, grouped itself into major world civilisations. Two civilisations,
Western and Orthodox, are led by the U.S. and Russia respectively. Three other
civilisations consist of only one state each, namely India, China and Japan,
while the last group of civilisations does not have any core states. This is the case
with the Muslim, African, Latin American and Buddhist civilisations. Where
55
the world civilisations clash, there are, according to Huntington, so-called fault
lines. Huntington asserted that conflicts would constantly arise on these fault
lines. There will be many fault lines around the Muslim civilisation in particu-
lar, Huntington predicted.
When developments after September 11, 2001, are discussed however,
Huntington’s name has constantly come up in the media. He has also been
criticised for seeing the world one-sidedly through one simple formula. His
critics point out that it masks more than it reveals to assert that the patterns
of conflict after the Cold War will follow (the not too exact) borders between
the major world civilisations. It is also easy to demonstrate that many of the
ongoing conflicts in the world would be difficult to interpret on the basis of
a ‘recipe’ like this. Despite the criticism, there are many people who maintain
that Huntington has provided a valuable contribution to understanding the
world as it emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Empire in the
years 1989–1991. He also asserted in his article that, now that the fight against
Communism has ended, the fundamental dividing lines in the world would
appear clearer. These dividing lines were, according to Huntington, far more
fundamental than the division into ‘the free world’ and ‘the Communist camp’
that characterised the world picture during the entire Cold War. The dividing
lines of the 1990s and the 21st Century have arisen through different parts of
mankind having developed distinct civilisations over the course of more than
a thousand years, and these characterise people’s thinking and their actions.
Huntington later further developed these problems in the book The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, published in 1996.77
This rather rough division can, on the other hand, be seen as masking the
conflicts that take place exclusively within Huntington’s third group of civilisa-
tions, i.e., those civilisations that he asserts have no core states, like the many
weak states in Africa. As previously demonstrated, we have seen that conflicts
have continuously gone on within his third group since the Second World
War. Even if Huntington’s division can perhaps be accepted at a macro level,
he has largely ignored one of the fundamental questions behind his hypothesis
that wars will arise. Does this tell us the reasons for the conflicts he predicts?
Can armed conflict be prevented if the reasons and symptoms are known? An
alternative approach to this very problem comes from Professor Immanuel
Wallerstein, who, in his introductory remarks on the driving forces behind the
development of society in the former colonial states, has shown an interest in
‘How legitimate authority is established and a sense of membership in the national
77. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London:
Touchstone, 1996). It is Chapter IV of his book, ‘Clashes of Civilizations’, that has generated
most debate.
56
Factors that influence today’s international environment
entity spread among the citizenry’.78 Huntington’s theories still have no answers
to this aspect. It is not clear from the text whether Wallerstein himself has any
clear alternative interpretation.
The British historian (and journalist) John Keegan used, in connection
with developments in Afghanistan, Huntington’s theories as a basis for a lead-
ing article in the British newspaper The Daily Telegraph. Previously it was also
his desire to demonstrate some long-term historical parallels and he asserted
that this knowledge is relevant when interpreting today’s developments. He
indicated, among other things, that Huntington had rejected President Bush
senior’s vision of a ‘New World Order’ and insisted instead that mankind had
never given up its use of force. What was new was that one would now see
conflicts between cultures, especially between the secular and liberal West and
the religious culture of Islam. While the debate on the war in Afghanistan was
under way, John Keegans article in the Daily Telegraph had some thought-pro-
voking words about what was developing at the time. The point he was making
in his article was that culture is of significance to how one thinks about war
and warfare:
If I [Keegan] thought Huntington’s view had a defect, it was that he did
not discuss what I think is the crucial ingredient of any Western-Islamic
conflict, their quite distinctively different ways of making war. Westerners
fight face to face, in stand up battle, and go on until one side or the other
gives in. They choose the crudest weapons available, and use them with
appalling violence, but observe what, to non-Westerners may well seem
curious rules of honour. Orientals, by contrast, shrink from pitched battle,
which they often deride as a sort of game, preferring ambush, surprise,
treachery and deceit as the best way to overcome an enemy. This is not
to stereotype Afghans, Arabs, Chechens or any other Islamic nationality
traditionally hostile to the West as devious or underhand, nor is it to
stereotype Islam in its military manifestation. The difference in styles of
warfare is borne out by the fact of military history. Western warfare had its
origins in the conflicts of the citizens of the Greek city-states who fought
to defend the strictly defined borders of their small political units. Beyond
their world the significant military powers, however, were nomads, whose
chosen method was the raid and the surprise attack (…) 79
78. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (London: Academic Press, 1974).
79. John Keegan, ‘In this war of civilisations, the West will prevail’, The Daily Telegraph, 7
October 2001. Keegan regards the Oriental tradition of warfare as continuing into our own
time: ‘(The oriental tradition) had not been eliminated. It reappeared in a variety of guises,
particularly in the tactics of evasion and retreat practised by the Viet Cong against the United
States in the Vietnam War. On September 11, 2001 it returned in an absolutely traditional
form. Arabs, appearing suddenly out of empty space like their desert raider ancestors, assault-
ed the heartlands of Western power, in a terrifying surprise raid and did appalling damage.’
57
There are perhaps grounds for surprise that Keegan uses this generalised
theory as to how different cultures have different forms of warfare. It is obvious
that we in the West also choose combat techniques based on ambush, surprise,
treachery and stratagems if we are the weaker party ourselves. We also have a
long tradition of the use of stratagems in Western military theory and practice.
Obviously the French resistance movement during the Second World War and
the IRA in Northern Ireland, for example, did not line up on a plain to fight
their enemies in an ‘honourable battle’. Don’t Muslim countries also go to
war in accordance with Western principles when they believe they are strong
enough, cf., the Saddam regime’s war of aggression against Iran in the 1980s?
The British historian Sir Michael Howard expressed some of the same
thoughts in an article in The Times in October 2001. He was of the opinion
that there was little new as regards the use of insurgency and terrorism. The
historical parallels that Michael Howard describes is in clear contrast to the
statement from George W. Bush that the world would see ‘a new kind of war’
during the American attack on Afghanistan in October 2001:
But the Europeans of the Middle Ages, to say nothing of the Romans,
would have found nothing strange about it. They were used to fight-
ing latrunculi – robbers, pirates, brigands, outlaws, ‘the common
enemies of mankind’. But the Romans distinguished between this and
war against a ‘legitimate’ enemy, legitimus hostis. This distinction was
inherited by the medieval Church, and was eventually established in our
own doctrines of ‘the just war’.80
Howard’s point was that one ought to think these historical definitions
through when starting a ‘just war’ or considering the use of war at all as a
solution to a political conflict. One of the most important criteria as regards
whether a war was a ‘just war’ or not in the Middle Ages was whether the war
had been declared by a so-called ‘lawful authority’. In the aftermath of the fall
of the Roman Empire, Europe was ruled by a lot of kings and princes who
were constantly at war with each other. Some of these had the support of either
the Catholic Church/the Vatican or, for example, from the newborn French
Empire in Western Europe that Charlemagne (A.D. 742–814) established.
80. Sir Michael Howard, ‘It’s not so much war it’s more like a hunt’, The Times, 2 October 2001.
He stated in the article: ‘(…) Over the past 500 years Western states have been so successful in
establishing a monopoly of violence within their own territories that such a guerra has become
a matter primarily for the police. But a quite useful analogy with the situation we face today is
that which confronted European states, not least Britain, in maintaining order in their impe-
rial possessions. There also we were faced with rebels who challenged the established order,
often using terrorist tactics, who saw themselves as ‘freedom fighters’ and were often prepared
to martyr themselves in their cause (…)’
58
They thereby obtained legitimacy and became the founders of what eventually
became what we now call nation states. Other kings and princes lost their sta-
tuses and ended up as ‘robber barons’, i.e., their use of forcible means against
others was seen as illegitimate. Howard’s formulation was that ‘It was only
after the extirpation of such latrunculi from European society in the 14th and
15th centuries that any kind of peaceful order was possible. There is, of course,
a world of difference between these latrunculi and robber barons on the one
hand, and the religious fanatics with whom we have to deal today.’81 Despite
the difference, he describes how those lacking legitimacy have in common that
they acquire the status of criminals and can be combated by those with legitima-
cy. In this respect, Howard can be interpreted as saying that it is the West that
represents the legitimate use of force. In September 2002, he again wrote about
a similar problem, but this time on the basis of developments since September
11, 2001:
The appalling events of September 11th 2001 may not have changed
the world as much as was thought at the time, but they made clear three
very disquieting facts about it. The first was the inability of the most
powerful state in the world to protect its citizens against massive and
lethal damage by terrorists who were not even using ‘weapons of mass
destruction’, but manipulating the indispensable facilities of everyday
life. The second was the readiness of such people to sacrifice their lives
in doing so. But perhaps the most alarming was the third: throughout a
significant part of the world these people were applauded as heroes and
martyrs, and the destruction of the Twin Towers welcomed much as
the fall of the Bastille had been two centuries earlier, as the collapse of a
corrupt and repressive regime. The question left hanging in the minds
of the American people was not so much ‘How can we stop this from
happening again?’ as ‘Why do they hate us so much?’. To which the
official response, ‘Because they are evil’, hardly provided an adequate
answer. (…) 82
It is obviously difficult to give a good answer to the rhetorical questions that
Howard asks in the quotation above. It is, however, clear that many Americans
have developed a ‘siege mentality’ since the events of September 2001, some-
thing that few Europeans have. A feeling like this is obviously something that
must be taken seriously by those watching the U.S. as a phenomenon. Another
element of this is that it is difficult to be at war with terrorism. The U.S. may
need a more concrete enemy image than al-Qaeda and an Osama bin Laden
who they never manage to catch. This need for a visible enemy is perhaps one
81. Howard, ibid.

82. Sir Michael Howard, ‘Smoke on the horizon’, The Financial Times, 6 September 2002.
59
of the factors that should be considered if one is to understand why the U.S.
focused on Iraq’s dictator Saddam Hussein. Even among European opponents
of an invasion, there was little doubt that he was an unusually brutal and domi-
nant leader who had used weapons of mass destruction against his opponents
on several occasions.
But since the rest of the world did not feel it was at war in the same way
as the Americans, it proved difficult for the U.S. to convince most states that
it was an urgent matter to remove the regime in Baghdad. Disagreement has
also continued since the war in Iraq in 2003, with Germany and France as the
leading critics of American foreign policies and the occupation of Iraq. ‘The
war on terror’ can perhaps also be seen as a result of the American approach
to problem solving: ‘If you have a problem – fix it!’ The European tradition,
particularly since the Second World War, is more organised towards dialogue
and co-operation. The use of military force/war is often presented in official
rhetoric as a last resort but European powers have on repeated occasions used
force since the Second World War. The Falkland Islands and Northern Ireland
are British examples; the wars in Algeria and Chad are French examples. In
2002, Spain made its mark on Morocco over the almost worthless island of
Perejil outside Morocco.
The type of lengthy process that we see today in the European Union’s
attempts to develop a European defence and foreign policy does not fit in well
with American foreign policy since September 11, 2001. We should remember,
in this context, that the United States has not had a war on its own soil during
the entire 20th Century and had only taken part in wars conducted on others’
territories. This could have a certain significance for the population’s attitude
to war and warfare. This is where ‘the fourth estate’ comes in – the media. In
many cases, the media can almost ‘steer’ Western politics in general by setting
the agenda, something that, among other things, influences the possibility of
the re-election of political leaders. When the election on 30 January 2005 was
of no vital significance in the attempts to restrict the insurgency in Iraq, this
led to a certain change in the American media’s attitude. During the spring and
summer of 2005, media coverage had become increasingly more sceptical about
the warfare, something that was also reflected in public opinion.83 Modern
media coverage leads to a need for constant success and quick conclusions:
83. In a survey carried out on behalf of CNN/USA Today only 34 per cent of those questioned
answered that they believed the U.S. and its allies were on the way to winning the war in
Iraq. This trend is probably correct, but we should remember that CNN and USA Today are
relatively liberal media with an ‘affiliation’ to the Democrats in American politics. Sometimes
these surveys may be used deliberately in internal political dialogue. On this occasion it was
used in this manner.
60
‘Finish the job and return the troops home.’ Media focus is often concentrated
on reporting and, to a lesser degree, on explanatory analyses – this often creates
‘short-term horizons’. The tendency is today for the American administration
not to get its argument across about staying on the job until things are settled
in Iraq and Afghanistan.84
It is possible to demonstrate certain parallels to developments during the
Vietnam War in this respect. When the Americans entered fully into the war in
the spring of 1965 there was important political consensus that it was right to
combat the advance of Communism in Vietnam. Public opinion supported the
intervention, as did the media, by and large. As indicated previously, the atmos-
phere changed after the Communist Tet Offensive in 1968. The political envi-
ronment became more and more negative about the war, media reports became
increasingly more critical and the tide of American public opinion turned. The
Nixon administration then invested in what was called the ‘Vietnamisation’
of the war, i.e., that South Vietnam itself would, with material aid from the
U.S., continue the war against the NLF and North Vietnam. When North
Vietnam engaged in the decisive conventional offensive in the spring of 1975,
the American leadership found that it had to accept an overall Communist
Vietnam. It had become impossible due to domestic politics to intervene in the
war once more with American forces.
We thereby see that, even if a war is not fought on American soil, the people
will eventually become tired of war. Important elements are the number of one’s
own losses and whether any positive results are seen from the warfare. Even if
public opinion tolerates the loss of its own soldiers to a greater extent since
September 11, 2001, we see similar developments at the end of the 1960s in
connection with the war in Iraq. Support for the war is waning in the media,
public opinion and the political environment. We can see American attempts to
build up a stable Iraqi regime and the training of security forces as an American
attempt at the ‘Iraqisation’ of the anti-guerrilla war and fight against terror-
ism in Iraq. ‘Iraqisation’ can possibly be seen as an attempt to limit American
losses and, in this way, maintain the support of public opinion at home, but
84. Even if the warfare in Iraq only indirectly involves countries such as Norway and Sweden to a
small degree, there are some more general rules that affect the political situation, particularly
if one has stable majority governments or minority governments/coalitions. In a majority
system, the government can make unpopular decisions and establish strategies that will be
in force for the election period. In minority systems, with small margins, politics is about
surviving the fiscal year and so it is a case of avoiding unpopular political decisions. Overall,
this means that national strategies are not always chosen on the basis of a nation’s best interests
but politics often has a core of internal needs that it is attempted to accommodate on an ad
hoc basis, e.g., the government’s survival, re-election, avoiding media pressure, etc.
61
LAOS
Hue
Da Nang
Ho
Mek
THAILAND
Ch
Tam Ky
i M
on g
inh Quang Ngai

Trail
Dac To
Kontum
An Khe
Pleiku
Qui Nhon
Tuy Hoa
CAMBODIA
rail
Ban Me
Thuot
h T
in
Nha Trang
M
hi
Loc Ninh
C
o Cam Ranh Bay

H
Phnom Penh SOUTH VIETNAM Phan Rang
Tay Ninh
Bien
Cu Chi Hoa
Bear Cat Phan Triet
Saigon
Tan An
Binh Phuc Vung Tau
Dong Tan
Vinh Long Ben Tre
Rach Gia Can Tho
Bac Lieu
Ca Mau
100 km
The so-called ‘Ho Chi Minh Trail’ throughout Eastern Laos and Cambodia was very important for the North
Vietnamese war against the regime in South Vietnam. This system of roads and trails made it possible to send
soldiers and supplies from North Vietnam to the war waged in South Vietnam. (Map: Samuel Svärd)
62
it is unclear whether the Bush administration actually has a clear plan for the
future conduct of war. Senator Edward Kennedy, who has constantly spoken
out against the war, has asserted that he believes that Iraq is on the way to
becoming a new Vietnam. His comments were: ‘We thought in those early
days in Vietnam that we were winning. We thought the skill and courage of our
troops was enough. We failed to comprehend the events around us. We did not
understand that our very presence was creating new enemies and defeating the
very goals we set out to achieve.’85
The Vietnam War is often used as an example of how badly things can go
when the U.S. gets involved in a low intensity war without fully understand-
ing the consequences. If we look at the American method of operation, there
are certain similar features between the war in Vietnam and the war in Iraq.
Firstly, expectations among politicians, the press and the population that both
wars would be over within a short time. When, on the contrary, it became
clear that the opposition was motivated by a strong ideological/religious belief,
combined with nationalism, the focus changed to using mostly local forces in
the warfare.
Professor Jeffrey Record, who has personal experience of the Vietnam War,
has stated that ‘The issue of creating a legitimate government in Iraq and the
domestic political sustainability of our policy in Iraq are the two major areas of
interface with our experience in Vietnam, where we failed. That doesn’t mean
we’re necessarily doomed to failure, (but) the challenge of “Vietnamisation” is
akin to “Iraqisation”.’ Record is of the opinion that, in contrast to the situation
in today’s Iraq, the Americans had large South Vietnamese armed forces and
security forces that they could build on. On the other hand, the Iraqi armed
forces were disbanded by the occupying power immediately after Saddam
Hussein’s regime fell and therefore had to be built up again from scratch.86
The reason for the difference between the two wars is, however, who the
Americans are fighting against. The Vietnamese insurgent movement was large-
ly centrally controlled and had a strong sponsor – North Vietnam. In com-
parison, Iraq is characterised by uncoordinated groups with ad hoc financing,
organisation and tactics. The insurgent movements in Iraq today are principally
directed against the American occupation and its working partners, but there
is much to suggest that when the Americans and their Western allies leave,
the insurgents will aim their weapons at the weak central government. If this
falls, there will probably be an ethnic civil war where the borders between the
85. Todd S. Purdum, ‘In Iraq, another Vietnam?’, The International Herald Tribune, Saturday–
Sunday, 29–30 January 2005, p.1 and 5.
86. Purdum, ibid.
63
three sections of the population and control of the oil fields become the most
important issues. Even today, we clearly see signs that this ‘war within a war’
is imminent. It has become almost routine for Sunni Muslim insurgents to
target the bombing and killing of Shia Muslims and Kurds. In this context, we
should, as I see it, remember the American saying: ‘Nobody’s washing a rental
car’, i.e., that if you personally own a problem, you solve it – otherwise others
have to do it.
Despite the period since the Second World War, the U.S. has no real tra-
ditions as an occupying power and they would increasingly like to see the
Iraqis taking over the problems in Iraq. Nor can we be certain today that the
Americans will totally pull out of Iraq. It is likely that they are interested in
having base rights in this strategically important area so that they can conduct
operations to support their own national interests (within a long-term strategy).
This is at least the way that the Americans are likely to see the situation. The
Americans are, however, not interested in taking responsibility for the lengthy
and expensive administration of Iraq over beyond what is necessary, and they
have a negative attitude to nation-building. The problem so far has been that
the new regime in Baghdad is obviously weak and has problems appearing as
a viable regime. One possibility, as indicated above, is that the Americans will
maintain bases in Iraq but be barely visible in the day-to-day ‘security picture’.
This is obviously under the clear condition that the Iraqi security structure sur-
vives and grows stronger. Iraq is important as a base for the continuation war
on terror, seen through the eyes of the Americans.
As we saw during the Lebanese civil war, it cannot be ruled out that Iraq’s
neighbours would become involved in any civil war in the country. Iran and
Turkey in particular are regarded as having a great interest in the country.
Iran would probably support the Iraqi Shia Muslims in their fight against
the Sunni Muslims. Turkey, on the other hand, fears an independent Kurdish
state in northern Iraq could lead to fresh unrest among Turkish Kurds.87 It
is, therefore, possible that the country would try to use military means to
prevent the formation of such a state, perhaps under the pretence of protect-
ing the Turkmen minority in Iraq.88 Today, however, the Turks are politically
87. The Kurdish insurgent movement, the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), began a guerrilla
war against the Turkish central authorities in 1984 with the goal of establishing an independ-
ent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey, northern Iraq, northeast Syria and northwest Iran.
After the leader of the group, Abdullah Öcalan, was arrested in 1999, the PKK declared a
unilateral ceasefire. Since the autumn of 2004, the group has continued its guerrilla warfare
against the Turkish authorities, but now to a limited extent.
88. The number of Turkmens in Iraq is a politically sensitive issue in today’s situation. Kurdish
and Turkmen political groups therefore work with figures that vary from between 1.5 million
and 3 million.
64
willing to compromise a lot in order to establish long-term good political and

economic relations with Europe (EU) and the U.S. It is the Turkish military
that is the biggest opponent to the American presence in Iraq. They fear that
this will contribute to long-lasting and polarised developments that will have
significant consequences for both the stability of Turkey and particularly the
Turkish Army’s traditionally strong role in Turkish politics. The decision not
to support the U.S. by allowing American forces to make use of a secondary
northern front in 2003 can be seen in this light.
We should, obviously, be careful when drawing too large parallels with a war
and a political situation that ended 30 years ago. What the Americans clearly
underestimate is that the majority of guerrilla wars are protracted – often lasting
more than 15 years. For most Americans, this is incredibly long – given their
traditionally strong preferences for short and ‘successful’ wars. It is probably
only a matter of time before the Bush administration is forced to give a date
for the troops to be pulled out of Iraq. President Bush has also hinted him-
self in a speech that the time is drawing near for beginning the withdrawal of
American forces,89 but has refused to give a date for withdrawal, most recently
in his speech of June 2005. However, there is much that now suggests that
the Americans are preparing for a significant reduction in troops in Iraq from
2006.90
3.2.1 ‘The world is not ruled by Gods’

The world is not an orderly and just place where the powers of good prevail and
provide everyone with good living conditions and fair treatment. If one looks at
the concept of fairness from a grass roots level in many developing countries, it
is often demonstrated that laws are something that only affect most people to a
small extent. Justice is something one must secure for oneself locally. They have
developed local methods for this, such as clans and village councils – which pro-
vide a local interpretation of what is fair. In addition, they have the opportunity
to ‘buy’ themselves ‘local justice’ from the police and local judicial system or
89. Elisabeth Bumiller, David E. Sanger and Richard W. Stevenson, ‘U.S. pullout possible, Bush
says’, The International Herald Tribune, Saturday–Sunday, 29–30 January 2005, p. 5. In the
meantime, Bush refused in his speech in June 2005, to provide a date for withdrawal. The
Republican congressman Walter Jones asked Bush to come up with a date. Seen in this light,
everything points to internal pressure on the Bush administration’s warfare increasing. See
Leader, ‘Is US Strategy in Iraq Working?’, The Christian Science Monitor, 21 June 2005.
90. Michael Hirsh and John Barry, ‘Drastic troop cuts are in the Pentagon’s secret plans’,
Newsweek, 8 August 2005.
65
to put things straight with the help of family and friends. The use of violence
thereby becomes a natural and essential ingredient of everyday life. Seen in
relation to a perspective like this with regard to everyday realities, the Western
law-based outlook is something distant and unreal. In Europe, it is often the
formal that is stressed: the world is interpreted from a European perspective
where states are effective and functioning units that have control over their ter-
ritories and their populations. Here it is assumed that ‘everyone’ is interested
in society working well and having everyone’s best interests at heart. This is
only natural since the ‘ideology’ requires that everyone’s best interests be best
served by laws and regulations functioning for everyone. Similarly, there is the
view that the international system should be governed through international
laws and agreements, with the UN playing a central role. An arrangement such
as this will ensure through joint efforts that a functional international order is
maintained.
The dilemma arises when the West itself comes to use force against those
who are threatening its interests. This dilemma will not disappear any time
soon. The common man’s scepticism of using extensive military force has been
strongly intensified since the Second World War, something that can be easily
observed in general political rhetoric. The situation within areas such as human
rights and the division of economic benefits is far from how a Western ideal
would like conditions to be. This applies in the majority of states in the world
today. Some people assert that many of today’s UN member states are states
more in form than in reality, as they only exercise very limited control within
their borders. It is therefore difficult to speak of a law-governed society in the
Western meaning of this term. Weak states like this naturally enough do not
have resources either to act internationally with any weight. Another problem
is that many governments often represent their own and their own elite group’s
interests ahead of the people’s welfare. Regimes like this often impoverish their
own people. A variant of this type of regime often even acts as a client of inter-
national criminal syndicates. The many insurgencies and terrorist plots against
ruling regimes in the Third World are often a natural reaction to state structures
that do not function satisfactorily.91
91. Nils Marius Rekkedal, ‘Nye trender innen krigføringen: men kriger er i dag som i tidligere
tider vanskelige å forutse’ [New Trends in Warfare: But Wars are Today, as in Previous Times,
Difficult to Predict], in Arne Baudin, Thomas Hagman, Jan Ångström (eds.), En ny Medeltid?
En introduktion till militärteori i lågintensiva konflikter [A New Middle Age? An Introduction
to Military Theory in Low-Intensity Conflicts] (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence
College, 2002), pp. 31–32.
66
In the more developed areas of the world, such as many of the former
Eastern European Communist states, the greatest challenge is managing the
reorganisation of society from Communist into a modern European state. But
Eastern Europe has, despite everything, an older, although somewhat narrow,
democratic tradition to look back to. One should perhaps also see China as a
country like this, even if the country still formally regards itself as a Communist
state? China has probably never had anything similar to Western democracy,
but there are limits to how long the Communist party can retain power in a
market economy. China, with a population of more than a billion people, needs
effective government if internal conflicts are to be avoided. When democratic
thinking eventually becomes part of thinking in China, this could be a source
for new political development but also a cause of instability and perhaps also
internal conflicts. Today, the growth of many of the Chinese cities is still incred-
ibly much greater than in the hinterland, something that could easily lead to
the growth areas beginning to resent financing the economically weak, more
backward regions.
This delayed modernisation in previously Communist states is, despite eve-
rything, significantly better developed than the misgovernment we often see in
the Third World. There, the problem is often the power elite’s lack of willing-
ness to see what the duties of a state should be. Many states in large parts of
the Second and Third Worlds also have ineffective and corrupt regimes. This
difficult assumption makes it likely that the number of internal insurgencies
and thereby protracted conflicts will remain high for many years to come. One
of the most important matters on the UN’s agenda is then also to address the
problems surrounding the so-called ‘failed states’.
Problems of this type also characterise several of the Islamic states in the oil-
rich Middle East. Despite these being regarded as Western-friendly, this form
of government rarely bears the characteristics of Western ideals. Here, popu-
lar insurgencies could break out in a few years. The question then is whether
these will be democratic or Islamic insurgencies. Even if these two forces come
together in the actual insurgency, there would, by necessity, be a power strug-
gle once the regime had fallen. During, for example, the revolution in Iran in
1979, democrats and Islamists stood side by side, but it was the conservative
Islamists who later won the battle for government. The expansion of the radical
Islamic parties in particular is a sign that there is extensive popular disquiet in
the Middle East. This could turn into an insurgency against the more ‘archaic’
Muslim regimes in the area. Sir Michael Howard has commented on the new
developments in the following manner:
As for the elite states of Western Europe, apart from Britain and France,
the negative experience of the Balkans have made their electorates deeply
67
cautious about assuming broader global responsibilities. Who is left to

maintain order in the world, apart from the US and its closest allies?92
3.3 Developments after the Cold War

The end of the Cold War has actually led to a significant re-evaluation of the
Western great powers’ strategies. At the moment it is those problems which
have their roots in Third World countries that have principally dominated stra-
tegic debate in the West. The conflicts in Somalia and Haiti, the internal debate
in the United States in the middle of the 1990s over American participation in
Bosnia, Kosovo and the UN’s so-called ‘peacekeeping’ operations in the 1990s,
have been part of the American debate with regard to what the U.S. strategic
role should be. In retrospect, it can be difficult to see any clear or consistent
American policy in this decade. The U.S. seemed to be searching for a new
strategy. The 1990s, nevertheless, represented a clear change of scenery. Russia
(and, to an extent, China) was no longer seen as a complete opposite. Several
conflicts were also ended during the course of the 1990s through formal diplo-
matic solutions. Some examples are the peace settlements in Nicaragua and El
Salvador, while the Gulf War in 1991 and, most recently, the war in Iraq have
probably scared most dictators – but by no means all – from considering more
traditional wars of conquest against neighbouring states by means of conven-
tional military forces. What now constitutes a great element of uncertainty as
regards future international developments are the reactions that the terrorist act
of September 11 in the U.S. provoked, particularly internally in the U.S. The
ongoing so-called ‘war on terror’ and the disagreement between the superpow-
ers ahead of the war in 2003 against the regime in Iraq could possibly form a
basis for fresh antagonism and potential new alliances internally in the West.
Another interesting factor is that the world has, in the last few years, seen
a ‘mini revolution’ in forms of government, as many countries have swapped
their military dictatorships or Communist form of government for more or less
92. Howard, ‘Smoke on the horizon’. In this article he wrote, among other things: ‘This chaotic
situation has led political thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic – Philip Bobbitt in America,
Robert Cooper over here – to demand a total paradigm shift in our approach to international
order. Globalisation, they argue, has meant the end of the territorial national state and the
advent of “market states” or “post-modern states” whose power transcends territorial bounda-
ries. With that power goes – or should – responsibility for the maintenance of order among
impotent and backward “pre-modern” states; not only moral but prudential responsibility
for rescuing their populations from starvation, enforcing human rights, and ensuring that
they do not spawn bellicose dictators or provide safe harbour for terrorists and pirates. If
this means the assertion of hegemonial or imperial rule, so be it. There are worse things than
empires. After half a century the White Man’s Burden must be taken up again.’
68
democratically elected regimes. Things have also gone better economically over
the last 10 years for many countries in the Third World than for a long time,
something that is a result of economic reforms and renewed growth. There has
been most success in Asian and Latin American countries while the situation
is still very difficult in parts of Africa, parts of Central Asia and in the Middle
East.
What can be seen as a great challenge for the superpowers and for the inter-
national community in general is to be constantly able to identify changes to
the assumptions they have based their policies on and to implement the neces-
sary countermeasures in time so as to deal with changes to general conditions.93
The situation is relatively stable in large parts of the world, something that
over a short period of time can lead to conflicts breaking out and then perhaps
principally as internal clashes in countries in the Third World.
3.3.1 What consequences did developments in the 1990s have?

If we look back at the 1990s, this decade can perhaps appear as if it was a pause
in the otherwise always ongoing drama that in literature is often called ‘world
politics’. In retrospect, it is likely that the entire decade will seem like a ‘period
of exception’. A decisive factor for this state of affairs was obviously the collapse
of the Soviet Union and with it also the discrediting of Communism as a lead-
ing ‘world philosophy’.
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was repelled in the spring of 1991
by apparently unanimous world opinion, where the new Russia and the U.S.
had, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, agreed on the
necessary UN resolutions that supported the U.S.-led coalition liberating the
country. Also, America’s then president, George H. W. Bush, using almost the
same visionary rhetoric as one of his predecessors Woodrow Wilson had used
after the First World War, then spoke of the world facing a ‘New World Order’.
This new future was to be based on democracy and a modern form of global
capitalism, often called globalisation.
93. See, for instance, Robert D. Kagan’s ‘trendy’ book, Paradise and Power: America and Europe
in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 2003). One of his points here is:
‘It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the
world, or even that they occupy the same world. Europeans see the world as less threatening
than Americans do and see themselves moving beyond power into a self-contained world of
laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. The United States, however,
remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where interna-
tional laws and rules are unreliable and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still
depend on the possession and use of military might. Americans and Europeans agree on little
and understand one another less and less.’
69
For a short time, it looked as though the entire world would accept that, in
order to achieve political and economic progress, one would have to become
closer to the Western economies – no clear alternative actually existed. Even
China and India, which had traditionally gone their own ways and had often
previously spoken of being older civilisations than those in the West, now began
to quickly rearrange their economies. It appeared to many who wrote of devel-
opments in the 1990s that what would propel the world in the future would
no longer be power politics or ideology, but technology. Government control
should concentrate on setting the future course of new trends.
It was perhaps possible to interpret developments as a new age but, in that
case, it was a rather short one. It would obviously be wrong to assert that, in the
coming years, the importance of economics will be reduced or that the impor-
tance of technological developments will clearly decrease. A more likely new
development is that the two aforementioned factors must again share the stage
with more traditional political factors such as foreign policy and power politics.
It is likely that we will see a reinforced role for politics, and probably also for
religion and ideology, together with the increasing importance of cultural fac-
tors, something that will, in turn, influence how government control is regarded
as a basis for modern states. Today, in particular, there is an argument for stating
that the importance of politics has again become clearer. As previously demon-
strated, the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, has been of real significance
to the international situation. For American politics – and thereby indirectly for
the rest of the world – this date symbolises that new elements have arrived on
the international scene, but also that they have been forced to realise that many
traditional factors slowly but surely had retaken their places on the stage. So far
it is perhaps the new elements that have attracted greatest attention, symbolised
by an enemy that is difficult to define. Terrorist groups that are often collectively
called ‘al-Qaeda’ due to a lack of exact knowledge about them, where and how
they work, together with concepts such as asymmetry and unconventional war-
fare, have entered the public domain. It is probably important in this respect to
understand that those behind this new terrorism hardly wish to establish a free
country, take over power in an existing state or have a similar goal that would
normally previously have motivated nationalist or revolutionary guerrilla groups.
Most of these new groups appear to have an essential hatred of, for example, the
U.S. or the West in general as their ‘ideological’ basic element.
3.3.2 Globalisation
So-called globalisation is probably also of great significance. The concept has
not until now been particularly central in military theory or debate of a more
military nature, but as I see it, it is difficult to avoid dealing with this concept
70
since it indirectly has clear consequences in terms of how we should assess cur-
rent conflicts. Globalisation was undeniably an important catchword during
the entire 1990s, and apparently all old political and economic models were
now on the way to becoming outdated. Technology would now unite the entire
world, symbolised by the Internet. Technological changes would create a new
world, regardless of whether one was against the trend or not.
The editor of Newsweek International Fareed Zakaria has aptly worded the
thinking that prevailed in the following manner:
During the 1990s one constantly heard that the world had been trans-
formed. Globalization was sweeping old models aside as technology was
bringing us together. (Did I mention that the Internet changes every-
thing?) All this was happening whether one wanted it to or not. The sense
of frustration in the face of immovable forces was best expressed by James
Carville, Bill Clinton’s erstwhile campaign manager, who saw many of his
and Clinton’s cherished policy proposals get tossed aside after the 1992
electoral victory for fear that they would offend Wall Street.94
After the collapse of Communism, as previously indicated, the market
economy became the world’s dominant new ‘ideology’. In several places the
rapid deregulation of state monopolies and the sale of large state enterprises led
to clear social strain and governments began to fear that they could no longer
control developments. But experiences from the 1990s, nevertheless, appear
to suggest a new direction being found, and few states seem to be considering
going back to the old order.95 And, as we see in Scandinavia, it has proved to be
94. Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Return of History: What September 11 Hath Wrought’, in James F.
Hodge, Jr., and Gideon Rose, How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War (Oxford:
Public Affairs Ltd., 2001), pp. 308–309.
95. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The Calvinist Manifesto’, The New York Times, 13 March 2005. In a
thought-provoking article on religion and culture, Professor Fukuyama has discussed prob-
lems with developments, particularly in the U.S. He wrote: ‘What held traditional China
and Japan back, we now understand, was not culture, but stifling institutions, bad politics
and misguided policies. Once these were fixed, both societies took off. Culture is only one
of many factors that determine the success of a society. This is something to bear in mind
when one hears assertions that the religion of Islam explains terrorism, the lack of democracy
or other phenomena in the Middle East. At the same time, no one can deny the importance
of religion and culture in determining why institutions work better in some countries than
in others. The Catholic parts of Europe were slower to modernize economically than the
Protestant ones, and they took longer to reconcile themselves to democracy. Thus, much
of what Samuel Huntington called the “third wave” of democratisation took place between
the 1970’s and 90’s in places like Spain, Portugal and many countries of Latin America.
Even today, among the highly secular societies that make up the European Union, there
is a clear gradient in attitudes toward political corruption from the Protestant north to the
Mediterranean south. It was the entry of the squeaky-clean Scandinavians into the union
that ultimately forced the resignation of its entire executive leadership in 1999 over a minor
corruption scandal involving a former French prime minister.’
71
possible to maintain a welfare state, even if the state is not the owner of increas-
ingly bigger companies or an over-regulated industry. Capitalism can perhaps
be described as a large house with many rooms, but where one must always be
prepared for not always getting where you wanted to go? This was particularly
seen in the years between 1997 and 1999 in East Asia where liberalisation had
come extremely far. The problems probably arose not because the reforms failed
– over the last few years Asia has generally had an enormous increase in the liv-
ing standard of ordinary people – but because none were fully able to deal with
the great changes that accompanied this.
Urbanisation and social disquiet have led to demands for political changes.
If a new round of insurgencies in the region during the decade we are now into is
to be avoided, political reforms will be required. If the political costs of globali-
sation are ignored, developments can become as they did in Indonesia after the
major economic problems we saw there at the end of the 1990s. Here, President
Suharto’s Indonesia got into a real mess and was ‘put under administration’ by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United States as they wanted
to force the regime into reforms. The Suharto regime fell, but instead of the
desired political and economic reforms, the Indonesian state almost collapsed
and had a reduction in GNP of almost 50 per cent, i.e., regular progress over
the previous 20 years vanished and millions of people disappeared below the
poverty line. Sure enough, insurgencies then began, often based on the underly-
ing ethnic differences on the many islands that Indonesia consists of.
The battle for world trade is another factor. In practice, discussion on
extended and liberalised world trade has really come to a halt and this is not
due to demonstrators against globalisation turning up outside all conference
venues. The demonstrators are themselves part of globalisation. What is really
being fought over is whether the West should open up its protected internal
market for agricultural goods and, if so, when. So far, the West has not been
willing to remove agricultural subsidies, out of regard to domestic policies in
particular.
According to the Internet site Globalization.com, globalisation is:
Every day you hear it on the news, you read it in the papers, you over-
hear people talking about it… and in every single instance the word glo-
balization seems to have a different meaning. So, what is globalization?
At a top political and economic level, globalization is the process of
denationalization of markets, politics and legal systems, i.e., the rise of
the so-called global economy. The consequences of this political and
economic restructuring on local economies, human welfare and envi-
ronment are the subject of an open debate among international organi-
zations, governmental institutions and the academic world. This portal
does not take part in this debate or offer any information on this matter.
At a business level, we talk of globalization when companies decide to
72
take part in the emerging global economy and establish themselves in

foreign markets. First they will adapt their products or services to the
final user’s linguistic and cultural requirements. Then, they might take
advantage of the Internet revolution and establish a virtual presence on
the international marketplace with a multilingual corporate web site or
even as an e-business. (…) 96
Again, we see that political considerations strongly influence developments
– not everything is based on a liberal market interpretation of the world. In this
respect, there are several points that have often been debated and which have
been characterised by certain interpretations and perhaps misunderstandings
– accidentally or consciously, depending on which position the debaters have
on the topic. Some of the presumed most important assertions, as I see them,
are outlined below.
1. Assertion 1: ‘Globalisation cannot be stopped.’ In Europe, in the period

from about 1840 up to the outbreak of the First World War, we saw relative-
ly intensive trade development, internally in Europe and with the colonies
the great powers had in Africa and Asia. The so-called free trade that then
existed had certain similarities to what is today called globalisation. These
developments spread from Great Britain to France and then on to large
parts of Europe. The so-called gold standard that was introduced ensured
relatively stable exchange rates and prices. Goods, capital and people could
move relatively freely over borders. This liberal period came to a sudden
end in 1914 and it was impossible to do anything about international trade
development until the United States took control in Western Europe after
1945.
If nothing else, this should be a warning that the current liberal economic
order has not always been there and it would be naïve to assume that it
will always continue. If we look at developments historically, it is easy to
understand that if no one wants to fight for open world trade, we could
end back up with protectionism. This has happened previously in history
and if many states no longer desire open world trade, globalisation will
presumably disappear at the same time. This problem will arise if there are
too many forms of global instability and strong rivalry between the super-
powers. Conflicts within states or between states, including further develop-
ments in the direction of international terrorism, could contribute to the
climate for co-operation breaking down. The result could then be everyone
96. <http://www.globalization.com>. For another view, see <http://www.ifg.org> (IFG stands for
The International Forum on Globalization).
73
principally safeguarding their own interests. The biggest loser would then
be the Third World.
2. Assertion 2: ‘Globalisation makes states powerless.’ This has been a com-
mon assertion over the last few years. There is little to suggest that this is a
real trend even if it is easy to see that many states, particularly in the Third
World, have not been able to manage their economies in a responsible and
forward-looking manner.
The states that do not have control over their machinery of power, legisla-
tion and judiciary and that are characterised by extensive corruption will
obviously be punished by the market. Hardly anyone will invest somewhere
where it is impossible to know whether one’s investment will be seized by
corrupt ministers next year. In reality, even small countries may have sig-
nificant control of their own developments. There are states that introduce
laws, demand taxes and duties, maintain law and have their own military
power at their disposal. The Swedish Parliament has far more power than
a company like Volvo or Ericsson. Even in a developing country, the gov-
ernment has the same rights and obligations – but then those ruling must
accept that they themselves have this responsibility and need to want to
develop their own countries – not just their own private economies.
It is, however, difficult to see a region such as the Middle East being able
to develop an economic system in the short-term that is based on the close
political and economic cooperation that will provide the much-needed eco-
nomic progress that the area needs. One of the main reasons for this is that
the ruling elites here believe that, if major reforms are introduced, many of
the existing regimes, which rely on traditional forcible means, would not
survive. For regimes like this, globalisation is obviously looked upon as a
clear threat and not a new opportunity.
3. Assertion 3: ‘Globalisation is damaging to poor countries.’ Critical litera-
ture in the form of articles on the Internet and books has, over the last 5
years, continually complained about the West exploiting employees in Asia
by giving them low salaries and poor working conditions. Many of these
assertions have a core of truth but several are clearly exaggerated and tell us
little about the advantages that the actual employees enjoy by having steady
employment and a certain security in their day-to-day lives. In the Third
World, we cannot simply compare local salaries to those we have in Western
Europe – the standard of living is totally different and it will take years to
redress this. The problem is, rather, that, if an Indian employee were to be
paid the same salary as in the Nordic countries, no one would employ him.
Then very few foreigners would invest in factories in India either.
74
It is also common for foreign companies to pay better than the local ones
and provide better terms of employment – something that could eventually
benefit other workers in the same area. Countries in Asia have also gradu-
ally increased their living standards and countries such as Singapore, South
Korea and Taiwan are good examples of this. Seen in this light, there are
grounds for doubting that globalisation requires poor people to be exploited
– instead it provides otherwise unemployed people with an opportunity to
fend for themselves through the development of industry and this is now
going on in large parts of the Third World.
4. Assertion 4: ‘Globalisation leads to the gap between the rich and the poor
becoming bigger.’ This is a common assertion. The integration of the world’s
economies has, as opponents of globalisation see it, increased the distinction
between rich and poor.
If we look at developments over the last 20–25 years, two of the world’s most
populated countries, India and China, have both chosen to liberalise and
open up their economies to the outside world. Previously, this was impos-
sible for ideological reasons. In the period from 1998–2001, China increased
its earnings per person by around 400 per cent. India has also doubled its
Gross National Product in the same period. Today, we see a considerable
middle class in both countries. These are important figures as approximately
40 per cent of the world’s population live in these two future world powers.
There have been similar trends in many countries in Asia, which have gone
from planned economies to market economies. Martin Wolf, a journalist
with The Financial Times, states in his book, Why Globalization Works, that
never before have so many people, or such a large percentage of the world’s
population experienced such a great economic improvement in such a short
time. The earnings gap between social groups has also narrowed in many
countries since the 1970s, combined with an increasing number of coun-
tries having become able to lose their status as poor nations. The exceptions
we see to these positive trends are, first and foremost, in Africa. However,
the number of people living in the most extreme poverty has been reduced
for the first time in 200 years.97
For example, both China and India each have a middle class of around 300
million people, the same number of people as there are in the U.S. and a
little smaller than in Europe. When this middle class begins to look for the
same goods as the West, we will, at the same time, see an outline of the
opportunities that manifest themselves within world trade.
97. Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), see statis-
tics in Chapter 8.
75
5. Assertion 5: ‘Globalisation is a threat to jobs (in Europe).’ Today, there are

many who view negatively that traditional jobs within industry are disap-
pearing and moving to Asia or Eastern Europe – i.e., to countries with lower
wages and salaries. Globalisation is often blamed for this.
Many of these relocations away from Europe have little to do with the inte-
gration of the world economy. The reason is often a result of technological
developments combined with the owner wanting to avoid the high European
taxes and duties. In addition, there is much to show that it has become
unprofitable to keep labour-intensive manufacture in Europe and the
United States – they have chosen to invest in new technologies and automa-
tion, something that makes the need for unskilled labour steadily decrease
in Europe. This does not automatically mean that there is a corresponding
reduction in the number of jobs in Europe but that they are moved over to
other sectors of the economy. A change of this nature can be difficult, par-
ticularly in Europe where the labour market has proved relatively difficult
to change. But in time to come it will be a well-educated population that
will be the best means of competition – not manufacture based on labour-
intensive industry. This is probably the greatest challenge the West faces.
Regardless of the attitudes and political conditions that apply in a given

area, there is one thing in common: we can see globalisation as a political
response to the dominance that capitalism as an economic system has obtained
during the course of the 1990s, and many of the reactions that have emerged
to globalisation are often anti-American (possibly also anti-Western, in general)
as the U.S. is today the world’s leading superpower and is seen as the defender
of globalisation. Globalisation is, in other words, a great challenge and it has
security consequences.98 Niklas Ekdal wrote of developments in a very short
and apt manner in the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, based on an inter-
view with Professor Sanjaya Lall:
98. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map. Barnett expressed himself as follows in the March 2003
edition of Esquire magazine: ‘It explains why we’re going to war, and why we’ll keep going
to war.’ He also states in the same article: ‘Globalization’s “ozone hole” may have been out of
sight and out of mind prior to September 11, 2001, but it has been hard to miss ever since.
And measuring the reach of globalization is not an academic exercise to an eighteen-year-old
marine sinking tent poles on its far side. So where do we schedule the U.S. military’s next
round of away games? The pattern that has emerged since the end of the cold war suggests
a simple answer: in the Gap.’ As I interpret developments, his thoughts are today central in
connection with the new change in the U.S. (military) strategy: Americans want to influence
regimes to embrace globalisation – without necessarily changing the fundamental conditions
that apply to individual countries (e.g., religion, culture, social conditions, democratisation,
etc.).
76
(…) Forget the globalisation debate. Forget everyone who says that glo-
balisation is good because it provides increased prosperity or that glo-
balisation is bad because it leads to exploitation.
– The shortcomings in a discussion like this are that it makes an ideology
out of technology, says development economist, Sanjaya Lall. The core
of the process is technical developments that eliminate distances, open
up markets, create specialisation and move production and exports in
a high-tech direction. The only sure way to prosperity is through the
continuous application of new technologies and no politics in the world
can change that. The positive side of this natural law is that all countries
have, in principle, the chance to take off as China and others have shown
over the last 20 years. The negative side is that a wedge is driven between
winners and losers; new technologies require new skills and, if there is
a shortfall regarding schools or stability, they fall increasingly further
behind. Today’s pattern will then be consolidated. Upward for East Asia,
India and Mexico. Continued good times for North America, Europe
and Japan. Black as night for the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia.
In Professor Lall’s beautiful but brutal new world, globalisation is a nat-
ural force. Being for it or against it is like being for or against the tide:
a waste of energy that one should deploy instead in learning to go with
the flow.99
If the perception of reality referred to in the quotation is to be believed, the
trend towards continually new conflicts will probably continue. The negative
economic, social and political developments in the Middle East, Africa and
Central Asia are particular reasons for this. A potential consequence of develop-
ments is that the negative trend could provoke a collapse within all weak nation
states. This, in turn, could increase the need for international intervention if the
necessary political power and will to constantly put primarily Western forces
into so-called peace enforcement operations remain. As yet, it is, however, dif-
ficult to point out current wars that have broken out as a direct result of the
ongoing globalisation.
3.4 Fresh challenges for intergovernmental and internal conflicts

When one comes to look at the challenges that ongoing conflicts mean for
Western countries in military terms, one can attempt to present the world’s
international system in a simplified form in the following manner:
99. Niklas Ekdal, ‘Ingen kan stoppa tidvattnet’ [No one can stop the tide], Dagens Nyheter, 6
March 2005.
77
1. The ‘First Division’ consists of relatively stable and highly developed states
in North America, Western Europe and parts of Asia.
2. The ‘Second Division’ includes countries that are still threatened by inter-
nal crises. They fluctuate between being controllable and relatively success-
ful and then to again being faced with a fresh crisis. Some of these coun-
tries often have internal chronically ‘ungovernable’ areas, i.e., conflicts that
simply cannot be resolved. An example of this could be protracted conflicts
of an ethnic or religious nature in one or more provinces, which were previ-
ously highlighted in connection with India and Pakistan.
3. The ‘Third Division’ consists of countries and territories that cannot be
controlled and governed in a normal manner. Conflicts here are of a semi-
permanent nature, something that means that the development of a lasting
peace is less likely.100 Examples of two such areas are the conflict in the
Middle East between the Palestinians and the Israelis and the series of so-
called ‘failed states’ in Africa such as, for example, Somalia and Liberia.
It will normally be conflicts in the latter category that will have the greatest
consequences for what is often called ‘global instability’. Unfortunately, there
is much to suggest that we will see a significant amount of conflicts, growing
chaos and disintegration in several states in the Third World for a long time to
come. It is difficult to perceive some of the countries that we are talking about
here as nation states in the Western European sense of the term. There is no
order whatsoever here and the central power is entirely or partly out of action
in large parts of the country. Today, many of the African states south of the
Sahara and several of the former Soviet republics south of Russia are in serious
difficulties, and may easily end up experiencing the same tendencies towards
disintegration as well-known areas of unrest such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone,
Somalia and Liberia. In Europe, Bosnia has been in a similar situation, even
if it is going through a relatively quiet period at the moment. In many states,
particularly in the Third World, they are experiencing the central power not
having full control of the country’s entire territory. Control is something that is
extremely changeable, and a capital city may, for example, ‘live a life of its own’
while local power centres under the control of local insurgent movements, clans
100. Steven Metz, ‘A Strategic Context for Third Tier Conflict’, Military Review, (December
1994/January–February 1995). See also an interesting series of articles printed a few years
ago in a special edition of the Military Review journal, 1994/1995, titled Controlling Chaos?,
articles in Military Review from December 1994/January/February 1995.
78
or other forms of ‘counter forces’ rule over other parts of the country. A form of
‘anarchist regionalism’ arises.101
In practice, we see that the governments in ‘collapsing states’ rule over the
capital and a few regions and larger towns while the day-to-day control and
execution of power is carried out by local so-called warlords, or by autonomous
regions where the leadership is based on tribal or clan affiliation, ethnic condi-
tions, religious affiliation or race. In areas like these it is also common that they
form security or police forces of their own. Security often depends on a strong
local leader ‘selling’ security in a so-called patron-client relationship, often with
clear similarities to the structure of the Mafia movement in Sicily. Many of
these local warlords also then have a personal interest in the conflicts continu-
ing. If one has access to local valuable resources, e.g., diamonds or poppies for
heroin production, one is also often in a position to maintain ‘private’ armies
and control the local population by means of one’s private machinery of power.
This very control of diamond production has proved to be an important fac-
tor as regards the protracted war in Angola where the insurgent movement,
UNITA, which was led by Jonas Savimbi until his death in January 2002, con-
trolled the diamond-rich Lunda Norte province. In Colombia, the production
of cocaine has been the key economic resource for the two guerrilla forces there,
FARC and ELN, and for various private drug barons.102
101. I reproduce below some of the most common assertions one sees in literature – the points
are not reproduced in any order of importance:
• The gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ is growing. (This is one of the most common
assertions – but is not strictly correct. In many Second and Third World countries things
are now clearly going better economically than before.)
• Economic and environmental factors, population growth/migration, and unequal dis-
tributions of power exacerbate the situation. (Also a common assertion, but should be
qualified from area to area.)
• Places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, etc., are becoming training
bases for a new breed of terrorists well schooled in 4GW (Comment: asserted often by
William S. Lind in his articles.)
• Most men – especially men from non-Western cultures and less-developed areas – take
great pleasure in waging war (Claimed, for instance, often by Martin van Creveld and
Ralph Peters in their texts.)
• Anti-war sentiment only prevalent in Western/Westernised cultures (asserted, for instance,
by Bozeman.)
• Women appear to be just as capable as men of waging 4GW, for example, female suicide
bombers. (Few write this directly, but perhaps many think this is the case?)
102. Two books that, each in its own way, provide a good overview of the many local conflicts
in Africa and Asia in the 1990s are: John W. Turner, Continent Ablaze: The Insurgency Wars
in Africa 1960 to the Present (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1998); Ian F. W. Beckett,
Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, in the series ‘Warfare and History’ (London:
Routledge, 2001).
79
Two examples may help to illustrate these problems: in Northern Ireland,

the Protestant terrorists now want compensation from the British Government
for giving up crime. British police have been working on the theory that it was
IRA groups that robbed the Northern Bank in Northern Ireland in December
2004, perhaps as part of their ‘exit strategy’?103
We could perhaps also interpret this as part of the otherwise common devel-
opment from war to peace, where people, who have spent large parts of their
adult lives with weapons in their hands, continue doing what they do best.
Enemies and targets are then replaced, but the network and the excitement
are the same. The attitude may be something like, ‘Well, I’ve been fighting for
the cause for 15 years, I deserve a reward’. In this respect, it is my opinion that
countries that go from a protracted war to a peaceful situation often experience
a significant increase in crime. The crime statistics in several countries in Africa,
including South Africa, also show extremely high figures.
An attitude often seen among former insurgents who indulge in crime is
that they now ‘deserve a reward’ after fighting for the cause for years.104 The
subsequent crime can also be seen as a result of great weaknesses in the inter-
national community’s approach to peace enforcement and the resolution of
conflicts. This not only applies to ongoing political processes like those in con-
nection with the so-called Truth Commission in South Africa but is also, to a
significant extent, connected to how much investment there is in developing
the judicial system, i.e., establishing a credible state system based on ‘the rule
of law’, and where one has sufficient educated politicians and lawyers, etc.
Stability and security have been tasks left to the military – investment in a
similar development of the civil security structure including the judiciary has
been under-budgeted and been hardly focused on.
In ‘Second-’ and ‘Third Division’ countries, it is not uncommon to see clear
contrasts between relatively successful and productive regions, often surround-
ed by areas with clearly devastating poverty. Important factors that influence
developments are a rapid population growth, a lack of education, an often insuf-
ficient or non-existent infrastructure, a lack of capital and human resources to
make use of what there is, chronic instability, corruption and poorly managed
measures by central authorities. This relatively anarchistic chaos can quickly
lead to negative economic consequences. Collectively, these factors destroy the
103. In July 2005, the IRA issued an official statement that the organisation had given up vio-
lence. ‘IRA statement in full’, The Daily Telegraph, 28 July 2005.
104. My own research interviews, June 2005.
80
foundations for stable and lasting economic growth. What they end up with is
a form of subsistence economy based on agriculture. Some areas will be able to
export raw products or develop labour intensive industries, but most have to get
along on their own, often combined with assistance in the form of ‘foreign aid’
from the rich countries in the ‘First Division’. Future prospects are relatively
poor and much suggests that regions that have fallen into a negative spiral such
as this will end up experiencing protracted stagnation and decline.
In a situation where people are going through hard times, it is common for
various forms of social movements to come into existence. Their aim is, among
other things, to give people something to live and hope for and keywords are:
meaning to life, order in day-to-day life, something to believe in. Countercultures
like these often become militant. A form of counterculture of this type is what is
in the West today normally called religious fundamentalism. These movements
may fundamentally be based on any form of religion, whether Christian, Hindu
or Islamic. Here, we can also point to the individual ‘para-religious’ political
movements such as the Maoists in Peru. The leaders believed that it was from
their movement that the next world revolution would come and the group’s
leader saw himself as the ‘fourth sword’ of Communism.105 In other words,
the Peruvian Maoists have a ‘quasi-messianic’ view of the future. Anthony J.
Joes has characterised this rather special view of the world as ‘Lima-centric’.106
However, they may also be based on local, regional or supranational symbols
of identity such as ethnicity or affiliation with a certain tribe, often associated
with religion.107 These countercultures have been strong political driving forces
in the former Yugoslavia and are active in parts of Africa and South-East Asia.
As previously mentioned, the combination of a privileged upper class, poverty,
105. After ‘the three great swords’ which in the Marxist-Leninist world of thought are Marx,
Lenin and Mao.
107. This is often called primalism in modern specialist literature.
81
guerrilla warfare and drug barons has been the core of similar internal confron-
tations in many places in Latin America.108
Political power struggles, economic stagnation, ecological problems and
tendencies towards social disintegration will probably lead to a deterioration
in the security situation in large parts of the Third World in the time to come.
There is, however, also a real threat in parts of the more established part of the
world, e.g., in parts of Latin America. These are problems that cannot simply be
resolved by means of advice or outside assistance. This can be seen as a histori-
cal process where normally a form of government (or system of government)
has become strong and enduring because the regime has been able to militarily
suppress all internal challengers and protect its own people most of the time.109
This is now becoming increasingly more difficult to achieve, particularly in
108. When the Geneva Conventions were extended in 1949, civil war and other forms of inter-
national conflict were incorporated (Article 3). In Article 13, it was recognised that, in the
new forms of conflict that could be seen evolving, those waging war would not always wear
uniform. In the period since 1945, uniform has not then been the distinctive mark of the
soldier, but bearing weapons has been. In the Convention, it was accordingly required that
the soldier/warrior bears the weapon visibly. Other supplementary protocols from 1977 place
two demands on an insurgency, that it has a) a responsible command that exercises con-
trol over part of the state’s territory, and b) follows the provisions in the protocol. Previous
demands regarding bearing weapons openly and bearing easily recognised characteristics have
been removed. In connection with the use of ‘security personnel’ in Afghanistan and Iraq,
it is interesting to note that Additional Protocol 1, Article 47, defines what a ‘mercenary’ is
and stipulates that they cannot demand the status of belligerent or prisoner of war. In 1997,
the door was opened for the International Red Cross Committee to be able to intervene in
these many national freedom wars and in internal civil disobedience campaigns. (The U.S.
and Israel, among others, did not sign this addendum – they do not agree with it.) But even
if the Red Cross is given access to an insurgent group, it is often very difficult to find/make
contact with any responsible leader. (In the Convention, the term ‘dissident armed forces
under responsible command’ is used.) A typical feature of warfare in the 1990s was, in fact,
that many of the conflicts were kept going by irregular forces or paramilitary forces (which
could often be more regarded as criminal gangs) that combined a soldier’s existence with vari-
ous forms of looting as well as pressure on the local civilian community. In many states, the
official authorities have lost their grip on developments, and local warlords have taken over
local government – and their forces act according to their own agenda. This means, in reality,
that many of the so-called rituals of self-restraint (e.g., discipline, fixed routines and so-called
soldier’s honour) that would normally apply within the regular forces have ceased to function
to all intents and purposes. It is instead the ‘law of the jungle’ and self-help that applies. An
opinion: if there is anything new in any of the ‘new’ forms of insurgency, it is that, instead
of the guerrilla trying to secure the support of the people as in earlier revolutionary wars,
widespread looting and the terrorising of the local population are deployed instead.
109. In this respect, one should note that it will normally be the dominant section of the popu-
lation that governs – it will then also be this leading group’s interests that will normally
become almost synonymous with the state’s interests.
82
parts of the Third World, as a result of challenges from, for example, drug car-
tels or from the guerrilla forces of ethnic minorities that not infrequently man-
age to resist the government military forces. It is also important that, at a local
level, the government is usually not able to maintain basic law and order, i.e.,
safety in the day-to-day life of the majority of its people. In large parts of the
Third World, security has gradually become something that the individual or
local organisations (or companies) must take responsibility for themselves. This
obviously leads to a dangerous ‘grey area’ where the laws of war, for instance, are
disregarded. When armed guards and local patron-client relationships become
more important than the state’s police and military forces for local security, the
government’s influence rapidly diminishes. The consequences are clearly nega-
tive: when defence and day-to-day security become a local or almost individual
problem and no longer a national responsibility, people are most often forced
to invest in local military forces, local political organisations or private compa-
nies to secure the most elementary protection of lives and property. The state’s
machinery of power will, in such a situation, decay relatively quickly and the
actual existence of the state will be threatened over a period of time.
In his book about the development of modern ‘mercenary units’, Peter W.
Singer writes:
In many of the ongoing wars around the globe, the traditional ration-
ales behind the initiation, maintenance, and continuation of war are
under siege. The profit motive has become a central motivator, equal or
greater to that of political, ideological, or religious inspirations. Or, as
one military analyst puts it, ‘With enough money anyone can equip a
powerful military force. With a willingness to use crime, nearly anyone
can generate enough money’.110
In his book, Singer also deals with what he calls ‘the power of privatization
and the privatization of power’. From the 1990s onwards, there has been a great
deal of ‘outsourcing’ of the services and power functions that the state previ-
ously saw as its area of responsibility. This is a phenomenon that has spread
over large parts of the world, but this development became particularly com-
mon in the U.S. and Europe. The inspiration for the trend can probably be
found in Great Britain, symbolised by the election of Margaret Thatcher as
the new Prime Minister in 1979. The rather poorly functioning state-owned
British heavy industry was largely sold or shut down.111 In particular, we later
saw the massive (and uncontrolled) sale of state property in Russia after the
110. Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 64.
111. Ibid., pp. 66–67.
83
collapse of the Soviet Union – a pattern that several other former states in the
Soviet Union have attempted. In short, we saw, during the course of the 1990s,
a degree of privatisation of state-controlled property, industries and services
unlike anything seen before. These developments perhaps went, in many ways,
hand in hand with globalisation (see point 3.3.2). Both trends embraced the
concept that competition would create greater effectiveness and thereby also a
more competitive advantage for the individual nation in the long-term. We are
now seeing the effects in Western countries in particular where previous state
monopolies such as postal services, telecommunications services and even the
running of prisons have been privatised. There has been remarkable unity on
the correctness of this, right across the political spectrum. It is then perhaps not
so remarkable that the wave of privatisation also ended up affecting the state’s
traditional main function: the security of the state itself and responsibility for
the security of the state’s own inhabitants.
But as I see it, there are grounds for asking how wise it is for a democratic
state based on the rule of law to privatise the actual basis of law and order – the
police and judiciary – and parts of the military system. It is difficult to explain
away that when a state allows someone (normally privately owned firms) per-
mission to organise private police and military forces, the state, at the same
time, loses full control of its core functions. There are also few observers who
are aware of developments who do not see the characteristic features of strong
state government now on the decline. The privatisation of, among other things,
the police services will lead to it being those who can afford it being able to
buy protection – the rest (and this is obviously the majority) will eventually
end up with clearly weakened security options. Things such as an increase in
crime cannot be dealt with by reduced police services, social security and legal
protection without the majority losing out. The latest trend is also that private
military services are in the process of becoming a new and rapidly growing
‘security industry’.112 It is difficult to predict the consequences of this trend,
but it hardly benefits the traditional role that the nation state has had: provid-
ing security to all its inhabitants.
Today, it is possible to talk of several forms of threat. Besides the more tradi-
tional political and military danger of an invasion from neighbouring countries,
there have gradually arisen many organised criminal organisations that make use
of their own armed forces, e.g., in Colombia in Latin America. Besides, it is today
common for revolutionary insurgent movements to use criminal activity as part
of their funding, cf., diamond smuggling in Angola. The latter can be seen as a
kind of ‘grey area’ between the two forms of threats that are mentioned above.
112. Singer, ibid., pp. 68–69.
84
At a time when many Third World countries today have major problems,
both in dealing with organised crime and local insurgent movements, one of
the reasons is that these threatened governments’ military and political leaders
are neither prepared intellectually, nor in terms of doctrines, to tackle the chal-
lenges. Nor are the local police equipped or trained to be able to meet the chal-
lenges. But perhaps the most important thing is that the local authorities are
‘unfunded’, i.e., that ‘everyone’ can be bought (or threatened) by the insurgents
or by the criminal groups. An example of this type of problem can be found in
South Africa’s Natal province:
The Warlords control the local county system with a mixture of ter-
ror and protection. In their own county they can tax and recruit, take
protection money, use hired assassins and finance private militias by
squeezing their subjects for money.
This anarchy forces many people to swear allegiance to political parties in
order to seek revenge, protection or both elements (…) Political parties
have been rights organisations for millions of people because a great vacu-
um exists that the police has either been unwilling or unable to fill.113
3.5 War is still common

At least 80 (major) wars have been fought in the world since 1945, with an esti-
mated loss of the lives of between 20 and 30 million people. Most of these wars
have been conducted as civil wars. Many tens of millions have, as a result of
these wars, become refugees, and there are probably as many millions of people
on the run in the world today as there were during the mass movements in the
aftermath of the Second World War.114 The conflicts that were estimated as the
bloodiest of the 1980s were the war between Iran and Iraq and the Soviet inter-
vention in Afghanistan. The first lasted 8 years and cost an estimated 450,000
people their lives – losses that are far greater than in all the other wars in the
Middle East since 1945 put together. The other war lasted 9 years, and losses
here were probably somewhere between 400,000 and 600,000. In comparison,
the wars (and accompanying poverty and starvation catastrophes) in Sudan,
113. Bill Berkeley, ‘The Warlords of Natal’, Atlantic Monthly, March 1994, pp. 88–94. (The text
has been translated from Norwegian.)
114. Statistics drawn up by the U.S. Committee for Refugees state that, in 1997, about 14.5
million refugees were living abroad, while in the same year there were about 19 million
internal refugees, i.e., people who had fled from their own homes to save their lives in con-
nection with internal clashes. (The figures were estimated at roughly the same at the turn
of 2000/2001. As refugees are often used as a resource in the ongoing political struggle, it is
difficult, in practice, to establish certain figures.)
85
Ethiopia, Somalia and Mozambique led to direct losses of about 500,000 lives,
while about 17 million people became refugees for longer or shorter periods
and about 7 million of these were forced into neighbouring countries. Probably
most human lives were lost in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly
Zaire). It has been suggested that 3.5 million people were direct or indirect
victims of the wars here, but this figure is very uncertain. None of the observ-
ers are, however, in any doubt that many people lost their lives in the civil
wars and foreign interventions that have gone on in the country over the last
few years.115 And the war is still going on. Martin Bell’s report published in
the British newspaper The Guardian written after his visit to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, tells the story of a war out of control:
The Great War of Africa has been fought for eight years in the east of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Peace and power-sharing deals
have come and gone. Elections are promised for July, the first free elec-
tions in the country’s history. A UN peacekeeping force, Monuc, is in
place, with 17,000 blue helmets trying to dominate a country the size
of western Europe.
But the fighting continues, between the Congolese army and shift-
ing alliances of rebel militias under the umbrella of the MRC, the
Revolutionary Movement of the Congo. The death toll since 1998 has
passed 4 million, the highest of any conflict since the second world war.
The most volatile province is North Kivu, up against the borders with
Uganda and Rwanda. (…) This conflict in the heart of Africa shows
modern warfare at its most brutal and primitive. It is the only war I have
ever known where the worse things get, the more they are ignored.116
In the 1990s, a peace agreement was finally reached in Mozambique and
this was also a clear victory for the insurgents in Ethiopia and Eritrea. However,
in the same period, the disintegration of states like Liberia and Somalia began
and we saw the enormous ethnically based massacres of the Tutsis in Rwanda.
The massacre in Rwanda in 1994 went on for 100 days and can be seen as
relatively unique in an historical context. Firstly, the murder rate of civilians
was very high, equivalent to perhaps 10,000 people a day. Secondly, ordinary
people were heavily involved in the butchery (‘they said we should kill Tutsis
on the radio….’). In comparison, the Nazi genocide of Jews and other minori-
ties was of an ‘industrial nature’. Not even Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge
regime between 1975–1979, Indonesia in connection with the eradication of
115. It has been stated in the media that more than 10,000 people were killed each month during
some periods, even if there are no reliable statistics from the area.
116. Martin Bell, ‘The war the world forgot’, The Guardian, April 24, 2006. He was appointed
UK Unicef ambassador for humanitarian emergencies in 2001.
86
the Communist Party in 1965–1967 or the Serb nationalists’ conduct during

the Balkan wars could demonstrate such great popular involvement in extermi-
nating another national group as we saw in Rwanda.117
This does not simply mean that Africans are more inclined to use violence
in political conflicts than people in other parts of the world, but Africa south of
the Sahara has had particularly negative developments over the last 20–25 years,
and this also applies to the number of open conflicts. The majority of the most
bloody and protracted conflicts of the nature of civil wars begin today in Africa
or Asia. Countries like Sudan, Algeria, Burundi, the Congo and Sierra Leone in
Africa and Afghanistan and Chechnya (which has lost between 10–20 per cent
of its population since 1994) in Asia have all suffered during prolonged hostili-
ties like this.118 The fact that states such as Liberia and Somalia disintegrated in
1991 is a warning of something that could become more common: the govern-
ment quite simply comes to an end due to the difficulties that the insurgent
movements may create, without the insurgents being either able, or desiring, to
take over political control and thereby ensuring the future existence of the state.
In the relatively new conflict in the Ivory Coast, this state is now also being
threatened – a conflict that primarily has an ethnic and social basis. The Kashmir
Conflict keeps the rivalry between India and Pakistan on the go (or the other
way round), while the regime in Myanmar (Burma) is attempting to heavy-
handedly suppress all internal opposition. In this country, it is important to
differentiate between political opposition within the dominant national group
and ethnic separatist movements, first and foremost the war the Karen people
have waged since 1948. Additionally, we had the ‘opium army’ of the Shan peo-
ple, where economic interests were central along with ethnicity.
Other protracted but less bloody conflicts are going on/have been going
on in Northern Ireland, in the Basque Country in Spain and in Corsica. These
European conflicts have all been triggered by small separatist movements
demanding political freedom for minority populations. Otherwise, low inten-
sity internal terrorism, which was often inspired by variants of Communist
philosophies and which was a common phenomenon in parts of Europe in the
1970s, is now back with a vengeance. Here it is instead various forms of clear
117. Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our
Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1998). The estimates of
fatalities vary between 800,000 and one million.
118. Warfare in a country like Uganda is perhaps not particularly bloody, but deserves to be
mentioned as an insurgent movement. The LRA belongs very much among the outsiders of
insurgent movements. Here there is a strange mixture of ethnicity, religion and ideology.
David Blair, ‘I killed so many I lost count, says boy, 11’, david.blair@telegraph.co.uk, 3
August 2005.
87
racist or Nazi-inspired ideologies that have enjoyed a certain success. These

violent movements have primarily targeted young people and have had violent
campaigns aimed at the community on their programmes, perhaps particularly
targeting immigrants from the Third World.119 Up to now, this has not led to
major insurgencies characterised by guerrilla warfare, but the combination of
terrorist activity, ethnic persecution and links to criminal environments is an
increasing threat to the social order in several European countries.
It is also a relatively new phenomenon that Islamic extremists have begun to
recruit from immigrant circles in Western Europe. This phenomenon is known
in Great Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands among other places.
In the 1990s, people from environments such as this were drawn to training
camps in Afghanistan, and it was from the extreme environment in Hamburg
in Germany that they recruited several suicide candidates for the terrorist acts
in the U.S. on 9/11 in 2001.120
The American professor Samuel P. Huntington has, in his book, Political
Order in Changing Societies, presented official statistics from the American
Department of Defense.121 In 1958, 28 protracted guerrilla wars, four military
insurgencies (coups) and two conventional wars were recorded. By 1965, the
figures had increased to 42 protracted guerrilla wars, with the addition of 10
military coups and five conventional conflicts, and in 1969 there were a total of
50 protracted guerrilla wars. After a tendency to fall in the 1980s, the number
of major conflicts in the 1990s has been between 20 and 30 each year, depend-
ing on where one wants to draw the line with regard to what can be called war
(see my assessment below). At the same time, it should be mentioned that it is
difficult to assess the quality of many American statistics from this period, as
they often used rather peculiar selection criteria. In one actual case, one can see
119. Announcements like the one published on 30 June 2005 are the last thing the British police
needed in connection with the hunt for terrorists. ‘In northern England a teenager was
killed. A teenager died after being assaulted by a gang of men in Northern England late on
Friday in what has been called a “racist murder”, according to British police. The 18-year-
old man, who was African, was attacked in a park in Huyton, near Liverpool late on Friday
by three or four men. This was just minutes after he had been called racist names while he
waited for a bus with his girlfriend and a relative. “It was a totally unprovoked and racially
motivated attack”, said a police spokesman.’ Source: Swedish Radio.
120. Based on conversations with Andrew Garfield from IPI, King’s College, London, 10 March
2005. Conversations in Stockholm in connection with a seminar at the Swedish National
Defence College.
121. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968/1976). See Chapter 1 in particular with the table and comments on conflicts
and wars, pp. 3–5 and the discussion of factors in Chapter 5, ‘Revolution and Political
Order’, pp. 264–343.
88
errors in the statistics used with regard to the IRA conflict that had cost more
than 1,000 lives at that time, figures that were extremely underestimated in the
statistics presented.122
If we use a somewhat extended definition of what may be called armed con-
flict, the result will be as documented by Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg
and Peter Wallensteen at Uppsala University in their Uppsala Conflict Data
Project. The figures for major regional armed conflicts were as follows, accord-
ing to these figures:
1990 1992 1994 1997 1999 2001 2002 2003
32 30 29 19 27 24 21 123 19 124
123 124
As the above table shows, in 2002, for example, there were 21 recorded
major armed conflicts in a total of 19 places in the world, i.e., a few less than
the previous year. In the thirteen-year period between 1990 and 2002, 58 dif-
ferent major armed conflicts were recorded, spread between 46 different places.
All, with the exception of three in the specified period, could be seen as internal
conflicts, i.e., conflicts that primarily involved who should govern a territory or
a state.125 Of these conflicts/wars, in 2000 those between Pakistan and India
and between Eritrea and Ethiopia were direct confrontations between inde-
pendent states. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia was unusual as it was
conducted using conventional forces at all times and it was ended in June 2000
122. See Edward Mickolus in Marius H. Livingston (ed.), International Terrorism in the
Contemporary World (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 44–73.
123. From SIPRI Yearbook 2003, see Appendix 2A. Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1990–
2002.
124. From SIPRI Yearbook 2004, ‘Chapter 3. Major Armed Conflicts’ by Renata Dwan and
Micaela Gustavsson. Chapter summary from the SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments,
Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). ‘Appendix
3A, by Mikael Eriksson and Peter Wallensteen, presents data on the patterns of major armed
conflicts in the period 1990–2003.’
125. The four conflicts that were directly conducted between states in the period, 1990–2003,
were between Iraq and Kuwait, India and Pakistan and Eritrea and Ethiopia. In 2003, we
had the war between Iraq and the U.S./UK. According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2004, ‘Only
two of the 19 conflicts (in 2003) were fought between states: the conflict between Iraq and
the multinational coalition led by the United States and the United Kingdom and the long-
standing conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Four of the 19 conflicts were
in Africa and eight in Asia.’ See the SIPRI Yearbook 2004, which can be found on SIPRI’s
website, <http://www.sipri.org/>.
89
after a well planned and led military offensive where Ethiopia subsequently
declared the war won.126
The war (or may be wars?) in the Congo (former Zaire) has also been com-
plicated and protracted and what was unusual here, as mentioned previously,
was that three states were providing direct or indirect military assistance to the
regime that succeeded the ‘strong man’ in Kinshasa who was killed, President
Kabila: Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Some of the insurgent movements
have been supported by Rwanda and Uganda all the way through. This long
conflict, with so many ‘sponsors’ in one of the African countries richest in natu-
ral resources, has also proved difficult to end. Still in 2006 there are fighting
in some of Congo’s Eastern provinces, even though most of the foreign troops
have departed the country.
126. The problem is, however, that there is still not any ‘final consensus’ between the parties over
who has the right to the contested desert areas that triggered off the war – the cause of the
war is therefore still unresolved politically. However, the regime in Ethiopia has, by means
of the clear military victory, established that the country is the ‘regional superpower’ in the
Horn of Africa.
90
4. What can cause wars?
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is closely connected to the previous one, but here the key theme is
the question of why insurgents opt to use war as a method. I will, by means of
introduction, describe the significance of factors such as ethnicity and the legiti-
macy of conflicts and, in the last part, look at methods of conflict and warfare.
By way of conclusion, there will also be some assessments where factors described
previously in Chapter 3 are also involved in influencing the points of view.
4.2 Ethnicity as a political dimension

Ethnic identity is seen by some observers as a fundamental, collective identity
that dominates other social factors. Ethnicity has a set of bonds that are con-
structed from factors in the socialisation process, such as language, family/clan,
religion, race, gender roles, norms or other locally important issues. Usually,
relationships such as common national or geographic origins, similar cultural
bases, the same language, a feeling of solidarity, a common religion, the same
race or possibly also certain physical characteristics are also involved in con-
structing an ethnic identity. Shared information such as awareness of one’s own
group’s history, a factor that is very important in, for instance, the Balkans and
in Russia, is also vital. Ethnic identity has a clear social significance because
it is often fundamental to group solidarity. Today this is an important reason
for many states either wanting to – or having felt forced to – formulate their
own policies for dealing with internal ethnic minorities.127 Ethnic identity can
127. Norway has, for instance, gradually formulated its own Sami policies, but has not as yet
considered its own (specialised) policies for other minorities that live in Norway.
91
become topical under certain circumstances. If a minority has perceived an

everyday injustice and the problem is put on the political agenda, this may
create a local or regional situation that can have political consequences. That is
why concepts such as ethnic identity and cultural identity normally have such
a fundamental importance for minorities. The concepts are often disputed,
especially because the term ethnic minority is a concept that is often interpreted
differently and people within the same ethnic group are often not even in agree-
ment about what this means.
A large segment of the population that belongs to a majority group is seldom
preoccupied with its own ethnic national identity. They attach importance to
factors other than ethnicity.128 This is probably an important reason as to why
so many people deny having an ethnic identity at all – we take our own identity
as a starting point and only see those who are different to us as ‘ethnic’. Stressing
an individual ethnic identity cannot normally be seen as independent of social
change. Conversely, changes in ethnic identity may also be a result of ongoing
social changes. Seen in this way, ethnic identity may become topical in step
with political and social needs, but the concept of an individual national group
cannot easily emerge or disappear. An important fact here is that ethnicity
allows itself to be used in many areas as a factor for political mobilisation – a
resource in a political battle on the same level as religion and ideology. (This
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6 which deals with asymmetric
warfare.)
Ideological factors are also taken into consideration here. With the new
materialistic mentality, perhaps with Marxist-Leninism most pronounced, many
people began, after about 1890, to believe in a ‘new universal type of person’
where ethnicity played no part. Many adherents to this new way of thinking
believed that the ‘new person’ would have class and universal cultural traits as
his main point of reference, and affiliation to traditional linguistic and cultural
groups would have less significance. As many people saw it, something more
valuable than the traditional ‘ethnic person’ and associated intense nationalism
was on the way.129
If we look at developments historically, probably many of the notions peo-
ple had of developments in the post-war period, both in the West and the new
independent states, were characterised by the suppression of ethnic thinking.
So-called ethno-regionalism and ethno-politics were seen as unfavourable and
128. The significance of ethnic/national affiliation is often not understood until one moves
abroad and then becomes part of a minority oneself.
129. This was probably also the common view in Norway and elsewhere in Scandinavia after
1945.
92
What can cause wars?
perhaps dangerous philosophies. When ethno-politics then became, from the

end of the 1960s, a force in many places in the world, manifested by ethnic
minorities beginning to demand political power and local control, this led to a
series of new conflicts. How this will be tackled by the political authorities and
the power elite could be decisive for how the future will be in a number of coun-
tries. Ethnicity is, according to the famous Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik
Barth, a fundamental social phenomenon that can hardly be ‘uninvented’.130
4.3 The need for legitimacy

An important factor with regard to developments that finally end up in armed
insurgency is to how great an extent a state can be seen as having legitimacy. If
one is to understand this form of conflict, it is necessary to look closer at what
creates legitimacy and what destroys it and which problems are likely to be
involved in building legitimacy again after this is lost in the eyes of the people.
Legitimacy as regards a regime’s management and the execution of power by
other government institutions exists when those to be governed recognise the
regime or government institution’s right to govern. Legitimacy is, above all,
something permanent when those exercising authority are continually able to
respond to any demands due to their links with and the efficiency of the system
of production and generally look after the welfare of the people as a matter of
course, not as a result of coercion. It is particularly important for new nations
that the power exercised can find an ‘ideological’ basis that justifies the author-
ity the state represents. This has previously existed under headings such as, for
example, the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, ‘mandate of heaven’, the demo-
cratic principles of human worth or in other similar ideological frameworks.
Here, local conditions, including religious traditions and natural conditions
for production (e.g., what is cultivated and how the actual types of food are
cultivated, etc.), could have a decisive influence on what would appear locally
to be an ideologically acceptable basis for legitimacy.131
130. This was how it was put by the Norwegian professor Øyvind Østerud in an article in
Aftenposten as early as the autumn of 1993: ‘It was believed for a long time that modernism
would wipe out ethnic affiliation and reduce ethnic conflicts. In a complicated and market-
oriented society, with much social movement and broad conflict levels, universal cultural
traits would dominate. So it is possible to be mistaken (…) It does not help much moralising
about this, or wishing to switch to a universal mankind (…) The first commandment is to
understand why ethnic affiliation is still so important.’
131. John C. Donnell, Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join (Santa Monica, CA:
Memorandum RM-5487-1-ISA/ARPA, RAND, 1967).
93
In most developing countries, dramatic changes are going on within the

entire production system. The traditional agricultural structure and patterns of
trade are under great pressure from internal forces in the form of, for example,
rapid population growth, from incipient local industrialisation, from imports
and, in some cases, even from new exports such as oil (See Globalisation, point
3.3.2). These forced changes will over time also necessitate new economic and
social relationships that will threaten the traditional authorities and lead to the
struggle for social power becoming acute. New wealth, new knowledge, new
values and the growth of new classes have a tendency to break down the values
that have been central in the old ideology that has normally been based on
religion and tradition.
New ideologies (often imported) are an alternative here to the existing sys-
tem of norms and religious notions. The old institutions and processes will
almost never be able to capture and satisfy the new needs that arise through new
groupings as the result of general social developments demanding a place in the
sun. Under certain circumstances, a future crisis may be met by a conscious
process of reform, but it has been most common that revolution (or whatever
the changes are called locally) has produced a new legitimacy by creating a new
system for the separation of powers – an important problem as regards so-called
democratisation.132
When we come to explain these ‘unconventional wars’, we have off and on
suggested so-called ‘conspiracy theories’ as an explanation as to why a revo-
lutionary war breaks out. It is also important to note that even where there is
help from abroad, e.g., North Vietnam’s help to insurgents in South Vietnam
during the Vietnam War, this is never the only reason for a revolution develop-
ing. If a revolutionary phase is to occur, the main reasons will be found in the
new requirements that follow from a process of rapid social change. Through
sponsorship from abroad, a guerrilla force can be created that could certainly
cause considerable damage but, without the support of the population, they
will not simply be able to execute a takeover of power. One should next seek
deeper reasons for developments in the fact that the actual ruling elite will not
have been in a position to implement the reforms necessary in the community
in question and nor will they have modified or created new institutions and
relationships in time for them to stem negative developments. The introduc-
tion of modern technology, industrial structures and, especially, new values is
generally able to dramatically change the traditional social and economic order
132. Nils Marius Rekkedal, ‘The Destruction of Oppression’: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in
South Vietnam, 1954 to 1965 (Bergen: Bergen University, 1980), Chapter 1, pp. 7–46.
94
that has until now ensured the legitimacy of the authorities/institutions in

power. In particular, great changes that are quickly imposed from outside are
often ‘dynamite’ as regards tearing up traditional agricultural societies.
These changes create a situation where a traditional or colonial politi-
cal structure or method of solving problems and exercising leadership is no
longer able to change quickly enough in step with changes in the community
otherwise. The authority of the old institutions will subsequently quickly
diminish. The lack of legitimacy that this results in can be briefly described as
a triple crisis created by demographic pressure, ecological instability and the
weakening of the social bonds between town and country – or perhaps, more
exactly, between those who live in the capital city and belong to the power elite
and the rest of the population.
It is often the following factors that make guerrilla warfare the preferred
choice of those who want radical changes:
• The machinery of power is employed by the ruling elite and it is seldom the
case that ‘outsiders’ will gain control over this. This does not prevent a mili-
tary coup taking place, but this is actually reserved for ‘insiders’ in the system
and should be seen as a method for a rival elite group to seize power.
• As one would not normally be able to employ great military resources dur-
ing the first part of the insurgency, they are required to make use of time,
i.e., opt for protracted warfare (normally at a modest intensity) directed at
the regime/machinery of power. This assumes that they have a certain sup-
port/sympathy among the people from the very beginning. Otherwise it is
difficult to survive the initial phase as an organisation.
• Propaganda, terrorism, protection, contributions to society and political
mobilisation are examples of alternative means that are used. These can
often be equally as important as pure force of arms for guerrilla movements.
The problems for those leading the insurgency are that, if the time from the
first shot being fired to the insurgent forces being strong enough to begin
‘the final offence’ is too great, the authorities will get a chance to develop
countermeasures and themselves look for a ‘sponsor’. Lengthy and detailed
preparations and a short-lived war are consequently very desirable elements
as regards newer insurgencies. What is new is that, in contrast to Maoist
strategy, they do not always want to gamble on a ‘protracted war’. We often
see, however, that, regardless of what the leadership of an insurgency wants
or plans for, developments in the war can take a completely different direc-
tion than what the leaders had planned for. It is easy to see then that, in
practice, most insurgencies become lengthy conflicts.
95
An important consequence of the three factors mentioned for those who

intend to stop an actual insurgency or revolutionary movement is that it
will often be difficult to use conventional military forces effectively against
insurgents. The most important reason for this is that the latter seldom appear
as easily identifiable units. Without extremely well organised intelligence and
police work, it is also difficult to create the necessary intelligence picture that is
required if the state’s conventional forces are to be able to be used in an effective
manner at an early phase of revolutionary developments. Typically, convention-
al forces and police are deployed in a random and often very provocative man-
ner. This may be exploited by the insurgents in the next round as ‘proof ’ that
the regime does not care about its own people, etc.133 A frequently recurring
scenario is where the government of a threatened country sends what is available
of its military forces to areas with guerrilla activity. Without the security forces
being properly trained and intelligence systems functioning, these forces often
develop an enemy image directed at the civilian population. What has happened
in almost every single counter-insurgency campaign in places like Asia and Latin
America over the last 30–40 years is that the government soldiers have attacked
the civilian population and sometimes also carried out massacres.134
4.4 What creates the basis for insurgency?

Of the approximately 19 wars and about 10–12 further minor conflicts going
on in the autumn of 2005, there were only a few that were in accordance with
the ‘classic’ pattern of conventional warfare between nation states. The conflicts
in question include, for instance, mutiny within a state’s military forces, guer-
rilla campaigns against unpopular regimes or occupying forces, insurgencies by
ethnic minorities against majority rule, criminal gangs that run riot in states
about to collapse. A typical feature of all these conflicts is that the local civil-
ian population is always threatened and squeezed from several directions. The
133. Rekkedal (1980), ibid.

134. One of the best-known recent attacks was in Srebrenica in Bosnia in July 1995, where
around 8,000 Muslims were massacred. Rwanda was more a planned genocide than counter-
insurgency. Srebrenica was also somewhat the same, but here the Serbs responsible for the
attacks were regarded as ‘insurgents’. Other known examples are the My Lai massacre in
Vietnam, the killings of an estimated 10,000 civilian Kosovo Albanians while NATO’s air
war was going on in 1999, the killing and massacre of the Indian population in Guatemala
at the beginning of the 1980s (see footnote 31 in Chapter 2), the massacre of perhaps 900
civilians in the village of El Mozote in El Salvador on 11 December 1981. Known incidents
from the former Soviet Union are the riot in Baku and the ethnic cleansing and bloodbath
in Nagorno-Karabakh during the period from 1988 to 1990.
96
warfare in the 1990s in countries such as Algeria, Sri Lanka and Colombia was
characterised by irregular militia attacking the civilian populations at least as
often as the militia attacked military targets. In Sri Lanka, as in other ethnic
wars, the civilian populations belonging to ‘the other side’ have been targets for
both insurgents and government forces.135
Today, most developing countries are faced with internal pressure of a social,
economic and political nature. A short list of some of these problems is given
below:
• Socially, pressure is typically created by new social groups being formed

or increasing their importance, e.g., industrial workers in the towns and a
growing middle class. In the rural districts the number of landless people
is increasing in several places due to a population explosion and they are
forced to move into the towns. It is also common for there to be great con-
flict between older and younger people due to traditional norms or religious
notions being on the decline.136
• Something discussed in literature today is what are the underlying mecha-
nisms when fundamentalist groups emerge. Is it not ‘angry young men’ who
react to this decline [of traditional norms or religious notions] and start
their own counter-reaction? Regardless of this, these developments may
also manifest themselves in great class distinctions and a growing battle
135. Sri Lanka, Algeria and Colombia are particularly mentioned above but in Angola and
Mozambique too, the local insurgent movements were so strong that they could keep each
other in check – none could win a final victory by way of military means. It was therefore
not possible to end the war at the negotiation table until they had, in fact, almost destroyed
the communities the wars were conducted in. Conflicts like this must of necessity be pro-
tracted. A similar war is going on between Arabs in the north and blacks in the south of
Sudan, where neither party has in the short-term been able to win against the other mili-
tarily. Similar ‘unending’ wars are going on in the three states of Liberia, Rwanda (but today
the Hutu militia here are no more than an intrusion) and Burundi. These are all states that
have been in the process of collapsing under the pressure. It is typical of the wars mentioned
that they are of little interest to the superpowers as there are no great security interests or
territorial interests at stake for them and therefore no one is inclined to actively become
involved or intervene to force the parties to surrender.
136. Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman and Daniele Anastasion, The Security Demographic:
Population and Civil Conflict After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Population Action
International, 2003), see Chapter Seven ‘Interactions of Demographic Stress Factors’. It
says in the summary: ‘The findings of this report suggest that the risk of civil conflict (…)
that are generated by demographic factors may be much more significant than generally
recognized, and worthy of more serious consideration by national security policymakers
and researchers.’
97
over values. Religious-based fundamentalism is often an important political

weapon that can act as both an ideological platform and a means of legiti-
mising the use of force and social control in many developing countries.
Fundamentalism based on religious notions is therefore a central factor
today as an ideological basis for mobilisation.137
• Developments also manifest themselves economically and this normally
takes an extremely different form from country to country. Typically, it will
not only be a form of balanced economic development that will be required
and there will soon be demands for a fairer distribution of the new wealth
created. However, the problem is often that not enough new values are cre-
ated, so there is actually nothing to distribute. In a situation such as this, the
problem is often whether the relative poverty should be shared by all groups
or classes or if it is only the poorest that are to be hit. A common argument
from insurgent groups is that ‘our natural resources are being plundered’,
either by a corrupt regime and/or foreign companies.
• Another concept that is used to describe this type of dilemma in connec-
tion with a process of development is social solidarity, something that does
not, however, occur everywhere. The notoriously unfair distribution that
exists between the elite and the rest of the population in countries with a
small or absent middle class is in itself a factor here. In South America, it
has been asserted by several critics of the situation that the small percentage
that the upper class constitutes of the population consumes most of what
is created in the community, obviously something that depends on which
state is being studied. This should also be seen as a factor today as it is an
illustration as to why Communist philosophies can still have a significant
mobilising force if a charismatic leader steps forward. The point is also that
those who have significant privileges do not voluntarily relinquish these.
137. Fundamentalism as a power factor becomes important when a natural distinction between
the state and religion does not exist. Establishing a distinction between the government
and religion is perhaps one of the most important objectives of the U.S. involvement in the
Muslim world? They want to avoid what some people have called ‘state fundamentalism’.
Under President George W. Bush and under the influence of the Christian right, the bounda-
ries between the State and the Church in the U.S. have not always been as clear. Even if the
religious profile is prominent in this administration, traditional and general Christian values
have been a constant part of American politics. The growth of the fundamentalist forces in
the U.S. can also be seen as a struggle for power, domination and influence and probably
derives its power from the general frustration among ordinary citizens over a lack of say and
influence in their own life circumstances. This problem ought to be familiar in Europe also.
98
Social sympathy is often scarcely developed within the actual upper classes,
something that does not contribute to great levels of reform.138
• Politically, the changes are, as previously mentioned, characterised by the
traditional authorities fighting a losing battle. In connection with this, the
search for alternatives to foreign dominance or to so-called oligarchies/
‘strong men’ has been central to insurgent movements. The development
of a growing political consciousness among a previously passive and dis-
organised peasant population is typical of developments that end in an
insurgency. These insurgencies are very often led by new ‘modern’ ideologi-
cally educated ‘counter-elites’ that come ‘from outside’, i.e., from the major
towns. Here, however, a well-known problem is that ‘revolutions eat their
children’ – revolutions often end in a protracted period of conflict. It is
central here that legacies have an inertia that cannot easily be replaced by
imported ideas. The new ideas may, at best, have a positive effect as a model
if one is able to merge the new ideas together with ‘heritage’ in a construc-
tive manner.139 This situation means that revolutions are seldom successful
in creating anything fundamentally new. The result is normally more of
an evolution when the cultural inertia ‘fights back’. At best, the struggle
becomes a contribution to new positive developments but we often see that
‘continuation wars’ arise in the wake of a revolution.
• Ethnic conflicts often have their own (local) internal dynamics that have
their roots in the following circumstances: myths about the adversary and
his desire to hurt somebody, ethnic fear based on the feeling that one’s own
group is directly threatened by the adversary, the ability of leaders to mobi-
lise military forces that are willing to fight. When ethnic fear has become
common among a group’s members, it is easy to defend and justify the use
of force ‘in self defence’. For instance, during the wars in the Balkans in the
1990s, it was exactly these myths that existed within the different groups
about previous injustices, dominance and suppression by other states and
ethnic groups – something that was exploited by ethnic leaders to mobilise
138. Cf., the major resistance from landowners against land reforms in El Salvador and Guatemala
in the 1970s and 1980s. It was well known that they used the army’s or the so-called death
squads’ ‘services’ against the local population. These groups had an extreme anti-Communist
attitude and naturally found an ally in President Reagan’s administration and his avowed
anti-Communist policy in the area.
139. We saw an example of this in the Maoists in Peru whose hammer and sickle often took
on the traditional role of the Sun God in their propaganda material aimed at the local
Indians.
99
support for their own cause.140 Bosnia can serve as a good example of how
the various parties have a different perception of reality. The Serbs saw the
war as an ethnic conflict between the Serb people and what they saw as
‘Turks’ and the Muslims had no idea of what was going on – until it was
finally too late. Again, it proved that it suffices that only one of the parties
has a defined enemy image to start a war. This is a factor on which there
is often agreement. Objections and dialogue cease – they are unwanted.
This aspect often makes it difficult to find solutions to this type of conflict.
Thinking is in black and white because the conflict and its basis, including
the myths about the adversary, are part of the actual legitimacy of the conflict
and become thereby the actual basis of power for central actors.
• Here, we should not forget either that several of the ethnic insurgent move-
ments will be able, entirely legitimately, to assert that their national group
has been discriminated against. The Tamil Tigers often point to the anti-
Tamil riots in Sri Lanka in 1983.141 Rwanda’s Patriotic Front (RPF) man-
aged, through its military offensive in 1994, to prevent the almost complete
extermination of its national group, the Tutsis. In Kosovo, the insurgent
group, the UCK, emerged after several years of discrimination against the
Albanian section of the population.
The political, economic and social relationships that are under pressure
will, over time, lead to a confrontation between the sections of the population
that are interested in maintaining the status quo and those who desire changes.
This development has usually worked out best when the traditional elite has
voluntarily relinquished some of its monopoly on power and its privileges and
140. In the former Yugoslavia, living standards declined during the course of the 1980s. As the
country had a state-owned economy, this was a government problem. And as the state had
to make decisions based on ethnically defined federal regions, the debate about economic
reforms quickly took on an ethnic dimension too. For example, Milošović’s Serbs wanted to
centralise power further while the Slovenians and Croats in particular argued for decentrali-
sation and market reforms. The result was political paralysis in the 1980s with a growing
tendency to blame other ethnic groups for the increasing problems. When reforms finally
took place under the new Prime Minister Ante Marković, in 1989, it proved to be the case
that developments had gone so far that war could not be avoided – given the political lead-
ers they had and the attitudes that now dominated in the different regions. Note too that
political leaders often appeal to historical ‘experiences’ to justify a political point of view
– in Western countries also. In connection with this, experiences from the First and Second
World Wars are often used when they fit in.
141. The riots followed the public funeral of 13 government soldiers who were killed by the
LTTE in an ambush on 23 July 1983. The estimated number of Tamils killed during the
riots varies from a few hundred to several thousand.
100
introduced new institutions that have paved the way for the sharing of power
and responsibility. The readjustment from colonial rule and the traditional gov-
ernment by an elite has then taken on an orderly form more often than not,
even if this has not always taken place in peaceful forms.
It is actually the case that, despite the great number of conflicts since the
Second World War, there is nothing automatic about the organised use of force
taking the form of guerrilla warfare. Periodic and limited use of force is not
uncommon, but if sensible and well-adapted measures are implemented in time
in order to reduce problems for most people, it has often proved successful in
resolving or easing the problems before more extensive warfare has developed.
Consequently, insurgent wars have seldom been successful in countries where
the ruling elite has had a certain ‘sense of reality’ towards the great masses or
where the country in question has institutions and mechanisms that make it
possible for the people to have a hope of influencing the existing system. The
best example of this is perhaps the willingness of the British to accept changes,
something that resulted in a relatively orderly dissolution of the British Empire.
This is in sharp contrast to the dissolution of French colonial power, which was
full of conflicts.142
4.5 Conflict and methods of warfare
4.5.1 What characterises today’s conflicts?

As indicated by the many concepts that are used to describe this method of con-
ducting warfare, there are also differing opinions with regard to what character-
ises low intensity wars/guerrilla wars as a form of warfare. There is, however, no
doubt that this form of warfare has been important since 1945 when we look at
the world as a whole. The fact that wars are still going on in the Third World is
an obvious ‘old truth’ but it may be natural to point out here two newer features
of wars in the beginning of the 21st Century:
142. Key sources that describe ‘classic’ Communist military- and political theory are: Mao
Zedong, Om den langvarige krigen; Mao Zedong, Sitater fra Mao Tsetung [Quotes from Mao
Tse-Tung] (Peking: Publishing house for foreign languages, 1967); Bernard B. Fall (ed.),
Ho Chi Minh On Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920–1966 (Washington, D.C.: Frederic
A. Praeger Inc., 1967); Vo Nguyen Giap, Selected Writings (Hanoi: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1977); Vo Nguyen Giap, Banner of People’s War: The Party’s Military Line
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1970); Vo Nguyen Giap, How We Won The War (Philadelphia, PA:
RECON Publications, 1976). The last book is in many ways an outstanding political source.
Here, the general confirms the main features in connection with North Vietnam’s (and the
NLF’s) political and military invasion of South Vietnam, something that the Communist
side consistently publicly denied was correct during the entire 1960s.
101
• A small number of the many terrorist groups and terrorist organisations

that exist in the Third World in particular have expanded their ambitions
and have the capacity to operate anywhere in the world. The most obvious
demonstration of this was on September 11, 2001, in the U.S. The ‘globali-
sation’ of the conflict is this organisation’s way of carrying out ‘effects-based
operations’ in order to steer the conflict towards their actual underlying
intentions and goals. These terrorist acts have had significant consequences
for both domestic and foreign policy for the Americans in particular.143
• Already today, several Third World countries have acquired forms of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and many countries in this part of
the world would like to have these weapons and will probably acquire them
in the longer term.144 A few countries have acquired (or are on the way
to acquiring) modern, long-range delivery systems for at least some form
of WMDs. Previously these were weapons only available to the dominant
superpowers. The status varies, however, between the new potential users
of WMDs. Iran is regarded as much more dangerous than, for example,
Pakistan – if the sale of expertise in any case is disregarded. We are assuming
then that certain countries may be more inclined to sponsor an insurgent
movement with WMDs than other established states.
143. As long as a country has its forces involved on the other side of the globe (as the U.S. has),
there is always the chance of the insurgents/terrorists also travelling to the other side of the
globe if they wish to attack the ‘heart’ of the enemy. What was surprising about the attacks
of September 11, 2001, was not that al-Qaeda had the will to carry these out. It was more
surprising that they had the ability. However, ‘global’ insurgent/terrorist movements are not
something that started on September 11. For example, Paris was hit by no fewer than 11
terrorist bombs in the period, 1985–1986. The fact that the U.S. had not previously been
hit to such a great scale is probably principally a matter of the terrorists’ logistics and ability
to procure local recruitment. Another element is that the consequences for an insurgent
movement controlling areas of a country (or a sponsor state such as North Vietnam or Cuba)
could have been catastrophic for the attacker if they had organised such an action against the
U.S. The U.S. would then, with the support of international law, have launched a powerful
military counteroffensive. A group such as al-Qaeda has no responsibility for anything other
than its own members and is therefore freer than a government or an insurgent movement
that has a state or an area with a civilian population that they are responsible for.
144. Milton Leitenberg, The Problem of Biological Weapons (Stockholm: Swedish National
Defence College – ACTA B 27, 2004). The book discusses biological weapon systems and
looks at the potential consequences of such weapons being used.
102
Seen overall, this will quickly be able to lead to new features in future con-
flicts and the situation could be dramatically changed if developments now
move in the direction of weapons of mass destruction becoming a ‘natural’ part
of modern warfare.
It is obviously very difficult to see what consequences this could have for
future conflicts, but everything indicates that the states that acquire such
weapons could consider using them as a political means of exerting pressure,
something that could, at least, have regional consequences. Here one can also
mention the so-called ‘Bush doctrine’ and how they have discussed ‘pre-emp-
tive’ strikes. Can this perhaps be seen as an example of global consequences that
are already a reality? Is this probably where we also find an important basis for
the Iraq war? The logic appears to be that the consequence of ‘non-action’ could
be too great if it were decided to refrain from doing anything, often with refer-
ence to historical developments at the start of the Second World War.
4.5.2 Warfare and the ‘CNN effect’

Does this then mean that there have been more conflicts since the Cold War
came to an end? The answer is probably no. In fact, the number of conflicts
in 2003 was the lowest since 1997 when there were 19 major conflicts on the
go. The new media situation is one of the things that make it easier today than
before to attract international attention, even to minor ‘shoot-outs’ between
government police/soldiers and local groups and/or terrorists. Many of the local
‘insurgencies’ are also often more of the nature of local showdowns between
gangs than organised warfare. Any skirmishes between small ‘liberation groups’
and the local police and security forces are easier to classify as insurgencies or
guerrilla wars than before due to the new media situation. When we go through
those conflicts that have been of significance to large population groups in the
1990s and compare these to the 1980s, it is difficult to see any great change
in the number of conflicts. There is probably a slight decrease rather than an
increase, something that does not entirely correspond with the usual interpreta-
tion we see in the media. As the answer is probably yes to the media impression
that the number of conflicts is increasing, this is because several of the inter-
nal wars today often involve states on the verge of collapse due to significant
internal pressure. These conflicts create, to some extent, significant streams of
refugees both internally and into neighbouring countries. Many commentators
have then also asserted that ‘the whole world’ is now being affected more greatly
103
than ever before by these conflicts. This is clearly an exaggeration and one finds
little support in the data that exists to show that wars are on the increase.145
In addition, there is the ‘CNN effect’ or perhaps just as appropriate today is
the Arabic-speaking satellite TV station that has created the ‘Al-Jazeera effect’,
which people have gradually become very aware of in the West too.146 This
Arabic-speaking station’s present influence, especially in the Muslim world,
really cannot be overestimated. It has been shown in Iraq that the Al-Jazeera
TV station has been seen as a problem with a view to being able to win the
battle for ‘hearts and minds’. There have also been suspicions that elements of
the staff have sympathised with the terrorists. But it is important to note here
that, in the Middle East, there are also other satellite channels today, which,
in total, cover the entire spectrum of information. Even if many of these are
subject to various degrees of censorship, there are also some that are not. The
most important parts of this TV market are music channels à la MTV which
operate uncensored. They mainly target young people and several people have
asserted that there are clear indications that the young generation does not
automatically accept the strict religious restrictions and the cultural subjugation
this leads to. Over a period of time, this could contribute to greater openness
with regard to Islam’s culture and attitudes as a natural part of the international
community. It is also interesting that the majority of these channels are broad-
cast from Egypt, the leader of the Arab world.147
145. An interesting wording as regards what exaggerated nationalism may be is given in Stuart J.
Kaufman’s book Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Studies in Security Affairs, Cornell Univ. Press, 2001). The heading is ‘The Seven Rules of
Nationalism’:
1. ‘If an area was ours for 500 years and yours for 50 years, it should belong to us – you
are merely occupiers.
2. If an area was yours for 500 years and ours for 50 years, it should belong to us – borders
must not be changed.
3. If an area belonged to us 500 years ago but never since then, it should belong to us – it
is the Cradle of our Nation.
4. If a majority of our people live there, it must belong to us – they must be protected
against your oppression.
5. If a minority of our people live there, it must belong to us – they must be protected
against your oppression.
6. All of the above rules apply to us but not to you.
7. Our dream of greatness is Historical Necessity, yours is Fascism’.
(The author of this ‘law’ is unknown – it is printed on p. V of the book.)
146. See, for instance, Isabel Hilton, ‘Al-Jazeera: And Now, the Other News’, The New York
Times, 6 March 2005. The new trends in the mass media are described in more detail in
Hugh Miles’ book, Al-Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel That Is Challenging
the West (New York: Grove Press, 2005).
104
Through the mood it conveys, the media is, in a short time, able to change
a positive attitude towards military action in a given area into the opposite. This
happens by stressing the negative aspects of the military action and reporting
on civilian losses in the battle zone in a manner that discredits the Western
forces’ operations. A classic example of this method of rapidly influencing pub-
lic opinion is the reactions to dead American soldiers being dragged through
the streets of Mogadishu in Somalia in October 1993. A short time later, the
political leadership in Washington felt pressured into pulling out of the conflict
and abandoning its previous political objectives. The conflict was not seen by
the Washington administration as important enough for American interests to
want to continue the military action.148
Another example of these effects is from 2004 when staged/fake photo-
graphs of the mistreatment of prisoners, allegedly carried out by British soldiers
in Iraq, were published. This had a great effect on public opinion in the UK on
the day the pictures were published. The editor, who published the fake pictures,
had to resign later, but by then the damage was done. Nor should we forget
how the so-called ‘Fox effect’ has influenced American media since September
11, 2001. We can find some of the same obedience and loyalty during the first
part of the Vietnam War and during large parts of the wars in Central America
in the period from around 1980 to the 1990s. Cable TV stations such as FOX,
CNN and the others (CBS, ABC, NBC and PBS to name but a few) fill certain
functions but often cover events from their own angles. The national American
stations still have significantly greater coverage than the cable stations, FOX,
CNN and MSNBC. CBS is known as a relatively liberal station and the others
are looking for somewhat of a ‘BBC approach’, particularly NBC. Similarly, if
FOX can be said to be on the right, CNN is on the left – not that we should
over-interpret what terms such as right and left stand for in American politics!
This influence is more a result of the rotation of ‘the direction of conflicts’ in
the presentation of news material in order to create their own ‘edge’. Otherwise,
we can perhaps say that American news (outside the cable channels) is often
21. Hilton, ibid. Note also: an interesting observation is that the reasons for insurgency in
the regions where insurgency is common have gradually changed: South-East Asia in the
1960s/70s, Latin America in the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the Caucasus in the
1990s and southern Africa in the 1970s-1990s, etc. It is difficult to have any definite opin-
ion as to what the real causes are behind such ‘trends’, but this could be a future area of
research.
148. For a contemporary portrayal of these events, see Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down
(London: Bantam Press, 1999). Richard A. Clark, former security adviser and ‘counter-
insurgency czar’ in the White House, has, in his book, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s
War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), a slightly different account of the timescale
between the event and them pulling out. According to him, it took 6 months (p. 88).
105
absorbing and penetrating, but it is targeted at American internal interests.

International news coverage gets very little broadcasting time.
The use of civilians as ‘human shields’ for one’s own forces has also been
used, often combined with the insurgent force using densely populated areas so
that their adversary’s most dangerous weapon systems cannot be used without
the Western forces in particular risking a negative so-called ‘CNN effect’. So
far these have been factors that have, first and foremost, affected the efforts of
Western forces as they always try to limit ‘undesirable destruction’, and public
opinion at home is preoccupied with their own forces taking the ‘moral high
ground’. We have seen such campaigns employed by various insurgent move-
ments in Iraq as part of their day-to-day activity during the ‘continuation war’.
Used properly, such ‘unconventional measures’ can be extremely effective, seen
through the eyes of a guerrilla or terrorist leader. One of the methods used has
been the beheading of captured Western victims where the killing is recorded
on video. This can be seen as part of their desire to demonstrate the use of
‘unconventional methods’, where the insurgents are clearly trying here to have
a special effect on the Western public.
The impact can perhaps most easily be measured among so-called ‘First
World’ nations, i.e., democracies with enlightened public opinion, where the
CNN effect is probably most effective and mobility greatest, at the same time
as the general level of knowledge, education and resources is highest. As a more
recent example of the impact of the media, this time from the UK, we saw in
January 2005 riots in Manchester on the day of the Iraqi election. The demon-
strations were aimed at the Iraqis who had taken part in the election and had
cast their votes in Manchester.
4.6 New developmental features – an evaluation

Most conflicts/wars that are ongoing today are, as previously mentioned, anoth-
er form of civil war, and of a protracted nature. But the air offensive targeted
at the regime in Belgrade in the spring of 1999 is an example of a conventional
war that was conducted with clearly stated limited objectives on the part of
NATO. At the same time, however, large paramilitary forces and ‘private’ forces
were in action in Kosovo. This was a conflict where, at the same time as high
technology contributions, low intensity warfare was ongoing between the sides.
The Serbs mounted a general offensive against the UCK and the Albanian
population. It seems to have been an objective of the Serb forces to empty
Kosovo of Albanians.149
It is difficult to determine what will be the more lasting tendencies in inter-
national developments, but we have seen a trend away from international wars
in the traditional meaning. During the period from 1991 to 2001, there were,
106
as previously mentioned, only a few conflicts that were of the nature of classic
international warfare, i.e., that two internationally recognised states conducted
an armed battle over a politically defined situation. The most common conflicts
in the period have been internal disputes over political control of the country,
and therefore almost civil wars, or disputes with regard to political control of the
territory, something that could be described as ‘state formation conflicts’.150
As previously demonstrated, the number of armed, restricted and largely
internal conflicts in the Third World is, at the same time, a manifestation of
the often growing problems that these countries have faced over the last 30–40
years. It has often been typical of developments that there has been a gradual
weakening of the traditional social and economic bonds in the new states, com-
bined with the disintegration of the traditional system of authority. In countries
such as the former Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Indonesia, we have seen
that the breakdown of authoritarian forms of government that have tradition-
ally oppressed ethnic antagonism makes it possible for ethnic minorities to
attempt to establish their own nations – something that has led to strong reac-
tions from previously dominant sections of the population. In addition, there is
a growing gap between rich and poor and between the machinery of power and
those it is used against and, in particular, a growing desperation where people
see no way out of their difficulties. This situation is often given as an explana-
tion when one attempts to understand why so many local wars have been able
to take place in the period since 1945.151
149. On 9 April 1999, the German Ministry of Defence published a document with reference
to ‘Operation Horseshoe’ which was probably the codename for the Serb plan to empty
Kosovo of Kosovo Albanians. Which element of the ethnic cleansing was planned and which
element was spontaneous was described in a report to the British Parliament, <http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2811.htm>.
150. Often these so-called ‘conflicts by proxy’ were influenced by at least one of the parties nor-
mally having outside support.
151. It may be logical to point out here that political and military analysts should note here that
the ongoing globalisation is actually a transformation of the international economic order
– nothing less. One of the consequences here is that ‘the new order’ also means a redistribu-
tion of economic resources within the individual society, i.e., that this benefits the most
adaptable people and those most mentally ready for what is happening, while those who are
least ready to tackle the rapid development become the losers. In so-called advanced societies
– such as the European ones – the resulting conflicts could largely be dealt with politically
while this horizontal tension would probably be expected to be resolved by insurgency and
armed force in the majority of developing countries. The question one can ask oneself is
obvious: is it definitely the case that this could only occur in the Third World? As previously
indicated, it is the general trend in Europe that the state’s security forces are reduced, com-
bined with the growth of other security mechanisms (privately controlled). How will the
state deal with any new forms of internal insurgency, possibly combined with well-organised
criminal groupings that are highly skilled at using the media?
107
In the world outside Europe, the Cold War did not consequently auto-
matically lead to increased stability but could instead often work as a catalyst
in several areas for maintaining the conflicts over time through the superpow-
ers coming in with support to one or more of the parties in a local or regional
conflict.
108
5. Guerrilla Warfare
A guerrilla war is an intimate affair, fought not merely with weapons but
fought in the minds of the men who live in the villages and hills.
– W. W. Rostow, U.S. National Security Advisor, 1962152
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will look more closely at how factors previously discussed in
Chapters 3 and 4 can influence what is perhaps the most common and impor-
tant form of present warfare: guerrilla warfare.
5.2 The basis of guerrilla warfare

Different forms of guerrilla warfare, where different forms of terrorist campaign
are also involved, are today a common phenomenon and are much discussed in
both specialist literature and various media. During the entire 20th Century,
guerrilla warfare was the most common form of warfare, even if it is the two
World Wars that, from a European reference point, are best described and com-
mented on in literature. This form of warfare is also constantly changing. The
fact that new insurgencies are frequently being started suggests that insurgent
organisations see the use of guerrilla warfare, where the use of terror may be
152. W. W. Rostow, ‘Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Areas’, reprinted in Fleet Marine

Force Reference Publication 12-25, The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him (rpt.; 2 January
1990 [originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, January 1962]), p. 59.
109
included, as an effective way to take over power in a country, or at least make

the country’s own citizens, and perhaps also the world outside, aware of the cir-
cumstances that have led to armed conflict breaking out in the first instance.
So-called revolutionary warfare was, in the period from about 1950 to 1980,
typically organised by Communist-inspired cadres on the basis of theorists like
Vladimir I. Lenin and very different leaders such as Mao Zedong, Vo Nguyen
Giap and Saadi Yacef. Today, the picture is far more varied and complicated,
even if Socialist ideas and Communist organisational techniques may still be
an important tool in some of the many local wars in which guerrilla tactics are
used. Guerrilla warfare is probably the best known of the many concepts that
have been used to describe a civil war like situation (but without outside help),
and where one or more insurgent groups are attempting to overthrow the ruling
regime with armed force. Words like ‘people’s war’, ‘war of national liberation’,
‘revolutionary war’ or quite simply ‘insurgency’ are other names for this com-
mon phenomenon.153
The end of European colonial power and the disintegration of the Soviet
Union have both contributed to the disappearance of the political causes behind
the long series of guerrilla wars that went on in the period from the end of the
1940s and up to the 1990s. We have, however, also seen a series of new wars
since the fall of the Soviet Union where other political, economic, ideological,
religious or ethnic causes in various constellations are the decisive factors for the
choice of pursuing armed insurgency. It is particularly in the Third World that
we have seen these new wars, typically in the form of civil wars where non-state
actors can play an important part. There are obviously a number of reasons for
these new developments and each individual conflict always has it own previous
history and background.
5.2.1 There is a long previous history of guerrilla warfare

Guerrilla warfare is therefore not a new historical phenomenon. In connection
with this, it may be of interest to look more closely at where the concept of
guerrilla warfare originates. The word guerrilla has, in its modern form, been
taken from Spanish (guerra) and means ‘small war’ (or actually, more precisely,
a small war conducted by partisans). The concept was used in connection with
the campaigns that the British Duke of Wellington conducted on the Iberian
153. The following sources discuss different aspects of guerrilla warfare and revolutionary war-
fare: Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (London: Macdonald
and Jane’s Publ. Ltd., 1975); John R. Barnett, ‘Non-state War’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.
78, Iss. 5 (May 1994), pp. 85–89; Ian F.W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-
Insurgencies, pp. 70–182.
110
Guerrilla Warfare
Peninsula in the period 1809–1813. The term became used to describe the
Spanish and Portuguese irregular troops (guerrilleros) who helped to drive the
French forces out of the area. It is typically warfare that is conducted by others
than regular soldiers. Usually guerrilla warfare is characterised by it not being
conducted against other guerrilla movements but against regular soldiers, even
if clashes between guerrilla factions obviously also occur.
The situation is more usually characterised today by ethnic or religious
dividing lines than by classic ideological differences. But the situation today is
obviously no guarantee that attitudes associated with concepts such as Marxism-
Leninism, class allegiance and class conflicts will not enjoy a new renaissance
internationally. If we look at developments over the last few years, there are
several signs that traditional class-consciousness is on the way back, particu-
larly within more academic debate in Europe. We have also seen developments
where ‘reformed Communists’ have returned to the centre of politics in Central
Europe. This ‘new-old’ thinking has particularly enjoyed a certain renaissance
within the new forms of left-wing radical groupings that have been organised
in protest against, for example, globalisation, the EU and American cultural
dominance. This shows that, even if Marx is dead, many of his ideas live on.
There are also still Communist-inspired guerrilla movements in the Second
and Third Worlds. The best known guerrilla organisations and insurgent move-
ments of this kind of the last few years are the ‘Khmer Rouge’ in Cambodia,
‘Shining Path’ (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru, the Maoists in Nepal and the ‘Tigers’
in Sri Lanka.154 The three latter organisations are still active while the ‘Khmer
Rouge’ has, in practice, been shut down.
5.2.2 Guerrilla tactics are indirect

Guerrilla warfare is often a method of combat that is used by people who live
in an area that is either occupied by, or surrounded by, forces they see as their
adversaries. In addition, the adversary will often be defined as the sections of the
community that, by virtue of their privileges and power supremacy, maintain or
develop what the insurgent movement sees as injustice and inequality. A section
of the population that feels suppressed, and that cannot practice its religion or
work politically towards its beliefs and ideology, may take to arms to achieve
greater influence over its own situation. Guerrilla tactics are most often indirect,
154. In connection with this, see also Thomas P. M. Barnett’s book on the Internet: Pentagon’s
New Map, which has, as its starting point, globalisation as the basis for his theories with
regard to conflicts and how to meet future challenges: <http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/
published/pentagonsnewmap.htm>. At this time, Barnett is considered one of the ‘hottest’
names in Washington and has access to the Pentagon’s ‘think tanks’.
111
i.e., the guerrillas strike where the opponent is weak. Then the attacking force
retreats and gets out of the way so that it does not itself become a good target for
the opponent. Without using relatively safe tactics such as this in the beginning,
a guerrilla movement will normally not be able to survive. Compared with the
regular forces that they wish to attack, the guerrillas are almost always poorly
equipped and trained. They will normally not have good, safe bases and will
always be threatened with being wiped out if, at an early phase, they try to hold,
for example, geographical areas or towns/villages against the superior force.155
Mao’s theories about ‘safe bases’ can perhaps be regarded as a myth in today’s
situation where modern fighter planes and helicopters can reach any corner of
a country at war. Then the insurgent movements must decide either to be con-
stantly on the move, use only concealed base areas, or only to operate in such
small groups that the enemy rarely knocks out more than a handful of guerrilla
soldiers in an air attack. The modern ‘safe bases’ of today are when an insurgent
force can go over the border to another state where the opponent cannot pursue
them for political reasons.
During the latter half of the 17th Century, Apache Indians, for instance,
could move over the border to Mexico to avoid the American soldiers. We know
from modern insurgencies how various groups have used a neighbouring coun-
try as a ‘safe haven’. In the 1980s, the Afghan Mujaheddin were able to seek
refuge in Pakistan and the Nicaraguan ‘Contras’ were able to retreat over the
border into Honduras. In 1998–1999, Albania was a sanctuary for the UCK
guerrilla forces from Kosovo.
A greater problem arises for a guerrilla movement when it is forced to pro-
tect the population because the opponent sees the latter as a military target.
This is an extremely common problem in ethnic conflicts but has also been
noted in some political insurgencies such as in Guatemala and El Salvador.
5.3 What are the characteristics of an insurgency?

An important condition for insurgency is that the ruling elite opposes the neces-
sary and fundamental reforms that will reduce the elite’s own power and privi-
leges. In a situation like this, it is difficult over a period of time to avoid some
form of confrontation between the traditional power elite and the new politi-
cal (or religious) forces. It is most likely that the confrontation will be increas-
ingly characterised by violence. Social insurgencies often begin with strikes and
155. Christopher C. Harmon, ‘The Purpose of Terrorism within Insurgency: Shining Path in
Peru’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 3, No. 2, (1994), pp. 170–90. For example, the war
in Sri Lanka has been going on for 20 years but the parties here can perhaps now reach a
peaceful conclusion.
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Guerrilla Warfare
demonstrations. If these are met with great violence and arrests, something that
often happens, the next escalation is that activists organise themselves into vari-
ous forms of armed groups. All the while that the regime shows itself unwilling
to satisfy popular demands or expectations, it will lose legitimacy and the regime
will be subsequently forced to continually increase the use of forcible means
in order to ensure that the population is law-abiding. ‘Law and order’ often
becomes the most common catchword.
If a revolutionary leadership emerges that is both motivated and well-edu-
cated, this will naturally further reinforce the tendency for the regime to exer-
cise force against all forms of opposition. The regime will implement measures
that will easily reinforce the differences within the existing social system and
thereby widen the gap between those who govern and those who are governed.
In this type of conflict, splits may develop within the ruling elite, between, for
example, moderates and reactionaries, something that will contribute to weak-
ening the effectiveness and the solidarity within the elite.
A key theme in working towards a successful revolutionary movement is
how to increase the gap between the power elite and the expectations of the
majority of people. This is usually achieved by the insurgent leadership point-
ing out the narrow self-interests of the regime’s supporters and ‘exposing’ how
the regime neglects the welfare of the ordinary people. Once a revolutionary
movement has been successful in establishing itself as a political force that the
ruling regime has not been able to eliminate or control, the next phase can
begin, i.e., taking to organising guerrilla forces.
When an insurgent movement switches to the guerrilla phase it will, if it is
well led, see as its main mission to ‘out-administer’ the established authorities.
In most developing countries, the main aim of this ‘fight for the rural districts’
will be to gain control of the farming population which constitutes the majority
of the population and is where the direct influence of the regime in question is
normally limited. Often the farmers associate the central power with ‘negative’
activities such as the conscription of soldiers and tax demands. Such activities
may be interpreted as exploitation, as the local population feels that it gets very
little in return for what it contributes. It will traditionally be the village or clan
chieftain and their councils that become intermediaries to the central authori-
ties. It is normally considered extremely important within successful insurgent
movements to break the traditional ties between the farmers and government
representatives.156 It is consequently common to put pressure on intermediaries
to ‘convert’ to the revolutionary cause and they will possibly be the first victims
of the gradually increasing political violence. The political arm of the insurgent
156. Rekkedal (1980), ‘Destruction of Oppression’, pp. 108–114.
113
movement will then be either directly controlled by the ‘converted’ local offi-
cials or they will replace/eliminate the ‘uncontrollable’ local leaders/chieftains
with loyal people from the insurgent movement. This systematic elimination of
government control over rural districts will also further contribute to isolating
the population from having any meaningful contact with the central power.
At first there may be few major military skirmishes between the guerrilla
and the government forces and/or police. The guerrilla/insurgent movement is
still too weak for extensive operations. Instead they will, if the insurgent move-
ment is well led, try to avoid the majority of large confrontations with con-
ventional military units. It is also typical of a threatened regime to try to play
down the killing of their local representatives or supporters. The police will deal
with the killing of government representatives as traditional police matters and
a lack of tax revenue and the refusal to pay ground rent will often be explained
away as ‘administrative problems’. Threatened regimes are often not willing to
admit that the problems they face are due to the fact that the insurgents are in
the process of taking over control of the rural districts (a similar pattern may be
developed for taking over cities, see Chapter 9). As no one is willing to admit
the problems, there is no one either who is in any great rush to introduce the
necessary reforms! This may also be a case of a lack of insight into local cultural
conditions or a lack of good intelligence, not to speak of an unwillingness to
share or relinquish privileges. This behaviour is obviously not very effective
and makes it difficult to plan and implement the necessary countermeasures.
The increase in violent incidents will also often be an argument that is used by
reactionary groups that see any new reform as a threat to their political and/or
economic interests. Violence then becomes an excuse to prevent any change
‘until the insurgency is suppressed’. Normally, attitudes like these will indirectly
contribute in the long run to strengthening the insurgents’ cause. Often the
same reactionary forces will exploit the situation in order to eliminate (kill,
arrest) non-violent opposition, trade union leaders and other activists. In this
way, an increasing number of activists are driven closer to the insurgent and
their ideology at the same time as the non-violent opposition is weakened.157
5.3.1 Phases of guerrilla warfare

As suggested earlier, guerrilla warfare normally leads to a protracted and
bloody conflict. In ‘classic’ Maoist or Marxist-Leninist theory on the topic it is
common to operate with three stages of ‘the protracted war’ where great
157. Rekkedal (1980), ibid., pp. 108–114 and 165–168.
114
Guerrilla Warfare
emphasis is normally placed on explaining why it is important to prolong the

war, namely to win. According to Communist (especially Maoist) military
theory, the protracted war is developed according to the following stages:
• A defensive phase – Since the enemy is initially stronger than the insurgents,
the regime has an offensive strategy while the insurgents are on the defensive.
The enemy (read: the regime) will ‘occupy’ a number of towns, communica-
tions systems, important industries (if there are any), etc. During this phase,
the guerrilla will very often surrender so-called safe areas and parts of the
rural districts due to counteroffensives from the government forces. If the
insurgents try to retain areas like these, they are simply overpowered after a
while. Instead, successful insurgent movements often use a defensive strategy,
while trying all the while to behave offensively as regards military tactical
operations. This is seen as the best strategy, as the revolutionary force is
as yet weak in terms of numbers and inadequately equipped. During the
first phase of an insurgency, the insurgents’ members are normally poorly
trained, but their morale may nevertheless be high and they may enjoy the
local support of the people. The intention is clear: tire out the enemy by
using simple, but flexible tactics. These constant, but minor, hostilities also
contribute to weakening the regime’s prestige as its forces may be accused
of both ‘cracking a nut with a sledgehammer’ and at the same time showing
themselves incapable of overpowering the insurgents.
• The balance of relative strengths – The government and guerrilla forces
gradually become more militarily equal. The government army is gradually
forced to go on the defensive while the guerrilla’s capacity to conduct offen-
sive operations increases. The goal of the insurgents is to become strong
enough to be able to carry out a general offensive. As the government forces
are no longer able to easily tidy up a so-called ‘safe area’ or recapture a small
village if it is lost, the guerrilla no longer needs to always quickly retreat
from his base areas, even if these are attacked. Both sides seem to be appar-
ently able to keep each other in check. However, during this phase there
are hostilities going on almost all the time. The guerrilla carries out major
and minor attacks on the enemy’s areas. A series of limited attacks on the
government’s garrisons and positions will contribute to wearing down the
government forces perhaps just as effectively as winning one or more major
battles and at much less risk to the guerrilla forces. During this phase, regu-
lar military units, local military units for ‘self-defence’ (militia) and guerrilla
units/bigger and more professional units are also organised. Overall, this
creates the groundwork for the last phase which often takes the form of a
general counteroffensive. It is traditionally this second phase that is the most
115
difficult to organise, and it may be lengthy, something that could easily wear
down morale among both the insurgents and the civilian population.
• General counteroffensive – In this last and decisive phase, it is the insur-
gents themselves who go on the offensive. The strategy of the insurgents
during this phase of the war is to carry out a counteroffensive, while the
regime’s strategy is now to become defensive and is often characterised by
retreat. This phase will come when the government forces and the popula-
tion under their control are weakened and demoralised. Correspondingly,
the insurgent forces are now well motivated after what they see as steady
progress and can now count, at least to some extent, on the support of
the people. The insurgents have now created regular and relatively well-
equipped units that will, together with the guerrilla units, be able to conduct
regular strikes to overpower the government army’s larger units. Even if the
material resources are not yet always on a par with the government army’s,
morale is normally good because the guerrilla sees steady progress and senses
victory.158 This is also the phase where many insurgent movements suffer
a permanent blow because they switch to offensive warfare too early. The
balance of relative strengths obviously varies from conflict to conflict, but
a guerrilla movement can normally keep a government force in check even
if the proportion of insurgents versus government soldiers is 1:10. During
offensive warfare, the balance of relative strengths should, however, be up to
3:1 in the guerrilla’s favour. Offensive warfare also requires a different type
of arms and tactics than during the first phase of the war. When a guerrilla
movement begins to operate in larger formations, it may also become an
easy target for the government force’s planes, helicopters, armoured forces
and artillery. Two insurgent offensives that led to great losses in this manner
were the NLF’s support for the North Vietnamese regular forces during the
Tet Offensive of 1968 and the Salvadoran FMLN guerrilla forces during
their ‘final offensive’ in 1981–1983.
The above explanation describes developments where the government forces

face a politically conscious and relatively effective insurgent movement. There
are, however, many local insurgencies that are more characterised by ‘come as
you are’ developments, where it may be difficult to clearly see ideological or
political objectives behind the insurgency. In these insurgencies, it is more often
family and clan affiliations that create loyalty and antagonism than political
158. Rekkedal (1980), ibid., pp. 12–14. Also note the following key sources on this form of
insurgency: Natan Leites, The Viet Cong Style of Politics (Santa Monica, CA: Memorandum
RM-5487-1-ISA/ARPA, RAND Corp., 1969); Zedong, Om den langvarige krigen.
116
Guerrilla Warfare
ideologies. It is also typical here for the insurgency to be led by various ‘strong
men’ as the main leaders – often called warlords.
In these conflicts, it is often the question of control over local resources
that is the triggering factor. In some cases, those resources may even be traded
internationally. Whether control ought to be seen as a goal in itself or merely
as a means of providing resources for the contending groups varies, but today
we often see combinations of local power struggles/political antagonism and
ethnic and/or religious antagonism. This means that a detailed study of each
individual country or area would be necessary to be able to assess the subject
matter of the conflicts in question and their causes. It is also important to ask
why the leaders in question opt to take the paths they do. What, for instance,
do they actually talk about in the speeches they give and how are they able to get
people behind them? On what basis will people more or less voluntarily choose
to follow the leader in question? It is very important for anyone, e.g., peace-
keeping forces coming from outside to an area of conflict, to quickly obtain an
insight into the attitudes, symbols and myths the actual leaders use.
The killing of local leaders has always been part of the activities that insur-
gents have used, but this terror has not as such normally been the actual basis
for civilian support for guerrilla movements. It may be more correct to see the
use of terror as just one of many weapons used by an insurgent movement
as part of its work towards safeguarding its political interests and its military
progress. Typically, the use of terror in connection with a successful guerrilla
movement will be both sociologically and psychologically selective. If not, the
use of terror can rebound negatively on support for the insurgent movement
among the people.159
5.4 Evaluation
The forms of conflicts outlined here are often regarded as the ‘classic structure’
for a change in power through force. A frequent mistake is to look at nation
states where these conflicts take place in total isolation from impulses and the
influence of the world around. In reality, at least one, and probably both par-
ties, will have received support in the form of weapons, equipment and even
personnel from outside. A point that Peter W. Singer, for instance, makes in his
book, Corporate Warriors, is that he indicates the significance that the reduction
in the UN’s own military operations has had. Among other things, he reminds
us here of the great optimism that prevailed and the future importance of such
159. For a modern study as to how warfare and terror have functioned in, for instance, the
Balkans, see Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, Chapter 1.
117
operations in the aftermath of the Cold War. These ambitions reached their
peak in 1992, symbolised by the UN Secretary-General’s document, An Agenda
for Peace. The many setbacks that the UN experienced in the following years
in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia did, however, have consequences. While there
were 82,000 UN soldiers in action in 1993, the figure was down to about 1,000
soldiers in 1999. Singer writes:
Now, the UN no longer even undertakes peace enforcement opera-
tions. In addition, the dominance of the Security Council by Western
powers has meant that certain conflicts, such as that in Bosnia, tend to
receive greater attention than those outside Western interest areas, such
as Liberia.160
One of the big changes as regards warfare since the Second World War is
obviously the development of military forces that are not under government
control. While the conventional wars, for example, the First and Second World
Wars, all required a massive effort in terms of equipment, supplies, and logis-
tics, today’s protracted internal conflicts have acquired a different character. In
the industrial age, it was only states that were in a position to provide the nec-
essary amounts of soldiers and materials that could have any hope of military
success. The nature of the wars made it possible for states to dominate all other
forms of insurgency or other forms of active resistance to government forces.
If one is to explain the significant change and relative weakening of the state
as the clearly dominant institution in the Third World in particular, we can at
least find part of the explanation by studying the changes in technological and
economic realities over the last 20–30 years. As previously indicated, the avail-
ability of ‘marketable’ military expertise, combined with relatively inexpensive
technology in a ‘free’ market, simple but nevertheless effective weapon systems
and various forms of availability of funding from the control of natural resourc-
es, has made it much easier to carry out an insurgency than ever before. Nor
should we underestimate the military experience the guerrilla soldiers may have
acquired during their previous military service through having participated in
an insurgent movement in another country, or simply by reading books that
describe how insurgency can be planned and led. One example that it is logical
to use is how UNITA in Angola managed to maintain a large, partly mecha-
nised army force year after year, even after losing their external ‘sponsors’ when
peace was officially reached in the country. Funding was possible through the
160. Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 59.
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Guerrilla Warfare
control of diamond mines, something that guaranteed the insurgents about

USD 2 billion a year.161 (The significance of technology, see also Chapter 6.)
The greatest difference between the course of events during the Cold War
and in the world of today is that the two outside parties trying to exert influ-
ence on the parties in a conflict were much easier to predict 30 years ago than is
the case today. This uncertainty is perhaps in itself enough for the surrounding
world to consider intervening in an attempt to steer the conflict in a direction
that is to their advantage. External contributions are part of the reality of today
and are probably often more important than deep-rooted popular support in
many local conflicts. Alliances with regard to access to resources in particu-
lar will probably become increasingly more important for weak states which,
ironically enough, often control great natural resources while the government
lacks the ability to develop them. The contrast between two ‘states’ such as Iraq
and Liberia speaks for itself in this respect – both have access to great natural
resources, but only Iraq has managed to exploit these in an effective manner.
A short overview of what one could call ‘core activities’ with regard to ‘tra-
ditional’ guerrilla warfare is provided below:
• Even if the development of guerrilla forces and the conducting of guerrilla

warfare are of central importance to any competent revolutionary leader-
ship, whether this is a success or a fiasco will ultimately be determined
through political developments. Popular support for the insurgents is crucial
for success here, something that means that fighting for this support and
maintaining it will be a main objective during the entire struggle. Without
popular support it is hardly possible for a guerrilla movement to win. It is
particularly problematic organising and maintaining regular forces without
solid popular support, something that must be seen as a particular necessity
if one is to be able to implement the third phase: the counteroffensive.
• The revolutionaries’ main objective is to activate and subsequently main-
tain what we might call the ‘moral isolation’ of the central authorities in a
country until this isolation becomes total and irreversible. The revolutionar-
ies will consequently concentrate on ‘out-administering’ and not primarily
overpowering their enemies militarily. This should not, however, be seen
as just a destructive undertaking, as a successful revolutionary movement
must be able to build up its own new infrastructure with a view to replac-
ing the old system. There are several examples where guerrilla movements
161. Singer, ibid., p. 61. Singer refers here to Steven Metz, Armed Conflict in the Twenty-First
Century: The Information Revolution and Postmodern Warfare (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army College, April 2000).
119
have shown themselves not able to implement this social construction. The
chances of them then succeeding politically are correspondingly slim.162
• The circumstances that lead to the outbreak of a (revolutionary) war cannot
simply be explained by means of conspiracy theories. One should instead
look for the explanation in rapid social change, where the actual outbreak
of war is often a result of the ruling regime not having been able to meet the
new challenges that modernisation has thrust upon it. What then separates
a modern revolutionary war from a local insurgency is that a typical peasant
insurgency or an insurgency in a slum area in a large city only has short-term
objectives while a revolutionary war is led by a very motivated leadership
that has developed a long-term strategy with the objective of taking over
social power and implementing a new political and economic order.
• It is also relatively typical for the use of terror and other acts of violence
carried out by a successful revolutionary movement to be very selective.
Terror is used, for instance, to divorce the regime (and its supporters) from
the population. This type of activity will initially normally be carried out
in rural districts where the regime’s supporters are often few and sparsely
deployed. The use of terror ought not, however, to be seen as the actual
main reason for the population possibly having a positive view of the revolu-
tionaries’ cause.163 Historically, it is often the case that if a movement loses
162. Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (New York: William Morrow
and Company Inc., 1994). This is a new edition based on a previous two-volume edition
from 1975. (The book provides a broad outline of different guerrilla wars from about 700
B.C. up to the 1990s.)
163. In internal political debate in the U.S. it is often asserted that things have become safer
since the ‘war on terror’ began in 2001 and this badly distorts the true picture. Since the
U.S. began its war on terror, terror has been more extensive and more violent than at any
time since the Second World War. Apart from in the U.S., terrorist attacks have spread with
increasing intensity in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Europe. If one looks at the statistics
from the Terrorism Research Center, the ‘war on terror’ shows a relatively negative picture.
In the period since September 11, 2001, and up to August 2004, there have been 46 attacks
where more than 25 people have been killed – a figure that, according to the institute’s
recording system, qualifies for calling an event ‘terrorism’. According to the same source,
this is roughly the same amount of terrorist attacks with the same number of losses as there
were around the world in the 40 or so years between 1946 and 1987 – but the institute has
clearly not counted terrorist acts carried out by guerrilla forces. (Acts of terror committed by,
for example, the Communist guerrilla forces during the Vietnam War led to massive civilian
losses.) In another source, it is asserted that, in the three years that have elapsed from the end
of September 2001 to September 2004, there have been 369 terrorist attacks that have cost
between 1 and 26 people their lives. This means about 120 such attacks a year. In addition,
there are a number of unsuccessful attacks, which are either stopped by the police or security
forces, or where only the suicide bomber has been killed, etc. It is, however, also relatively
unclear here how acts of terrorism are recorded/classified. The large-scale massacres and
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Guerrilla Warfare
control over how the terror is used, this ‘weapon’ can quickly rebound on
the revolutionaries themselves, i.e., perhaps be the most important reason
for popular support for the insurgent movement waning or drying up.164
Examples of the loss of popular support for insurgents could be how things
developed in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
In connection with this, it is important to point out that, while modern con-
ventional forces and traditional military theory are primarily preoccupied with
war between nation states and alliances, as regards more or less ‘revolutionary’
military theory and the guerrilla movements that use long-term strategies based
on guerrilla tactics and campaigns of terror directed at a ruling regime, there
are two, to some extent, entirely different traditions. Seen in this light, there is
probably much to learn from the many mistakes and misunderstandings that
Douglas S. Blaufarb, for instance, has written about, with much authority from
what he has called the first ‘counter-insurgency era’ from around 1950 to about
1975. If Western forces are to be able to hope for progress during the lengthy
period of conflict the West now clearly faces, an insight is required into how
different guerrilla warfare, including terrorism, is compared with the Western
tradition of warfare. In the foreword to Blaufarb’s book, now more than 25
years old, William P. Bundy wrote:
The U.S. Army, in particular, must learn that guerrilla warfare is indeed
a distinct art and not one that can be delegated to a token (and ever-
suspect) force of Green Berets. The political structure of the government
to be defended must be one that responds to its people, and its political
base must extend well beyond its military elite. Put thus baldly, the les-
sons of the counterinsurgency era may seem obvious. But if there is one
underlying theme (…) it is the extraordinary difficulty, for the United
States in particular, of applying these lessons in practice.
“The fundamental lesson to draw from our misadventures of the ‘coun-
terinsurgency eras,’” he concludes, “is (…) the lesson of the limits of
American power (…) Too many have fallen back on the easy excuse that
we failed in Indochina because our power was constrained and leashed,
that (…) more firepower was the answer (…)”165
local acts of terrorism in various internal wars in Africa are not included sufficiently in the
two aforementioned surveys. (Source: Oslo: Dagbladet, article published on 11 September,
2004.) (This may, however, probably be explained by the fact that the war on terror has
‘opened the lid of a boiling pot’, that we will now experience for a period a relatively large
number of attacks before the situation stabilises and that the underlying factors can be
addressed with more long-term means directed at conflict resolution and lasting ‘changes to
systems’ in the areas of conflict.)
164. Rekkedal, ‘The Destruction of Oppression’, pp. 10–14.
165. William P. Bundy, ‘Foreword’, in Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. XIII.
121
Naturally enough the so-called success criteria must be, to some extent,
totally different when two clearly different forms of combat are to be com-
pared/evaluated. There is accordingly a need to put the two different forms of
warfare up against each other if one is to be able to define precisely what points
in the same direction and what does not.
As previously indicated in the introduction to this chapter, it is no long-
er Communist cadres that dominate most ongoing armed insurgencies.
Consequently, we can no longer have a ‘monolithic’ interpretation of what an
insurgency or a guerrilla war is. The irregular forces may be anything from well-
organised gangs to well-organised and splendidly equipped guerrilla forces led
by experienced leaders. Similarly, the reason for adopting armed force differs at
least as much from conflict to conflict. Depending on what sources and analysts
are studied, we see that the ongoing insurgencies have become divided up and
described quite differently.
The sources stated in the footnote below use words like apolitical, tradi-
tionalist, pluralist, reformist, spiritual, separatist, etc. Islamic fundamentalists
have become particularly well known due to media coverage over the last few
years. There is disagreement as to whether these movements can be regarded
as primarily religiously motivated or whether we should instead regard these
groups as ideologically based.166 Nevertheless, this is a new factor that strongly
contributes today to the insurgencies that we have seen and are still seeing in
countries such as, for example, Iraq, Indonesia, Chechnya, Sudan, Chad, the
Philippines and Palestine.167
166. The majority of insurgent movements today can probably be seen as ethnic movements or,
in the cases of Iraq, Palestine and Chechnya, a form of resistance movement. In the case
of Chechnya, it would be more correct to describe Islam as part of the Chechens’ national
identity. The Chechens have traditionally been more tolerant of other religions and tradi-
tions but also have a long tradition of opposing Russian rule. Ever since the end of the 16th
Century, insurgencies and resistance wars have broken out in the country at regular inter-
vals. In the same manner as the Serbs in Bosnia, the Russians have a tendency to describe
the war in Chechnya as a fight against Islam. The insurgents, on the other hand, seldom
describe the war as a fight against Christianity, but as a battle against occupation.
167. Sources that deal with the problems in question are, for instance, Steven Metz, ‘Insurgency
after the Cold War’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 (1994), pp. 63–82; B. O’Neill,
Insurgency & Terrorism, pp. 17–21; William G. Thom, ‘Congo-Zaire’s 1996–97 Civil War in
the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflicts in Africa in the Era of Independence’,
Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1999), pp. 93–123.
122
6. Asymmetric warfare and terrorism
Studying the past has a way of introducing humility, a first stage toward
gaining detachment, because it suggests the continuity of the problems
we confront and the unoriginality of most of our solutions for them. It
is a good way of putting things in perspective, of stepping back to take
in a wider view.
– John Lewis Gaddis168
6.1 Introduction
Asymmetric warfare is not an unambiguous concept, but covers a broad spec-
trum of theories, experiences, attitudes and, last but not least, a number of defi-
nitions. As early as in 1964, the Frenchman David Galula wrote of asymmetry
used in connection with what was then often called revolutionary warfare. He
described the phenomenon as follows:
There is an asymmetry between the opposite camps of a revolutionary
war. This phenomenon results from the very nature of the war, from the
disproportion of strength between the opponents at the outset, and from
the difference in essence between their assets and their liabilities.169
168. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconstructions,
Provocations (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992), p. 3.
169. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Foreword by Robert R. Bowie
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1964), pp. 5–6. The second edition of the
book, printed in 1965, has been used as a reference in this book.
123
One of the earlier definitions was prescribed by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff at the end of the 1990s and, here, they defined the phenomenon in the
following manner:
Asymmetrical Warfare is an attempt to circumvent or undermine an
opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses using methods that
differ significantly from the opponent’s usual mode of operations.170
Following the acts of terrorism of September 11, 2001, asymmetric war-
fare has been given many interpretations and is one of the concepts that have
attracted most attention in military journals. What is common to most inter-
pretations is that, in asymmetric warfare, one is facing something unknown
or unexpected when it comes to the opponent’s goals, procedures or practical
measures. The greater the differences in military strength and doctrines, the
more difficult it becomes to predict the form of action of the weaker opponent.
In order to take the right measures against a weaker and asymmetric opponent,
one’s own doctrine must therefore be flexible and predict the unpredictable.
The doctrine must therefore be based on what means one thinks an asymmetric
opponent may have, and developing the necessary countermeasures oneself.
A modern American way of looking at asymmetric warfare has been that it
is a form of ‘action-reaction-counteraction cycle’. It is assumed that the enemy
studies the American doctrine and wants to develop strategic and tactical coun-
termeasures against it. As any competent enemy can be expected to come up
with unexpected measures, this should be an assumption in one’s own military
planning. When one understands what the enemy’s countermeasures will be
against one’s own doctrine and tactics, one’s own doctrines should be adjusted.
If an enemy has, for example, acquired biological weapons and the means to
deliver, this threat can be dealt with on several levels. Measures may, for exam-
ple, be to improve one’s own forces’ protection level (force protection) combined
with medical countermeasures. In addition, one should possibly consider new
offensive measures so as to attack the enemy’s means of delivering the biological
weapons. Other measures may be based on protecting the civilian population
from a potential biological attack. It could also be an advantage to prepare the
population so it understands that such an attack could happen. Nevertheless,
such forms of preparation could in themselves be an obstacle to biological
170. Franklin B. Miles, ‘Asymmetric Warfare: An Historical Perspective’ (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army
War College, 1999), ‘Paper’, pp. 2–3. We must probably go back to the beginning of the
1980s to find the starting point for the use of the concept. Until then the concepts of
insurgency and counter-insurgency had mostly been used in English-speaking literature
and debate. One of the first newer American doctrines to deal with the problems discussed
in the chapter was Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,
1995.
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Asymmetric warfare and terrorism
weapons being used, as the enemy’s original weapon advantage, his asymmetric
advantage, has now been reduced.171
Historically, uncertainty and surprise have been important elements of the
nature of war. Throughout the ages, however, many people have nevertheless
allowed themselves to be blinded by their own warfare doctrines. The reasoning
is often that, as long as one follows well-established procedures for the planning
and execution of acts of war, this will ensure a victory. Obviously good prepara-
tion is useful in war, but this has altogether too often been based on experiences
from previous wars. If one is facing an inferior but competent opponent, the lat-
ter will probably have analysed earlier mistakes and will develop new measures
based on these. Such measures will then often be characterised by asymmetric
thinking.
It is a well-known fact that even the best battle plans must normally be
changed after the first shot is fired. If an opponent unexpectedly uses asymmet-
ric tactics, the battle plan should be flexible and open for one’s own counter-
measures against the new threats. It often takes a disproportionately long time
for the necessary changes to take place and, far too often, the first changes have
been barely thought through. Historical experience points to a lack of mental
preparation for meeting the unexpected. Consequently, it is often the case that,
when one is taken by surprise by something that one is not prepared for, one’s
own response is, by necessity, of an ad hoc nature and less effective.
6.2 Has war changed?

When the World Trade Center (WTC) was destroyed by the terrorist attack
of September 11, 2001, there were few people who had any doubt that there
would be a clear American reply. After less than a month of political and mili-
tary preparations, the attacks against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and
their allies, al-Qaeda, began. The following situations are included to charac-
terise developments since 2001:
• The al-Qaeda terrorist group had on its side the spectacular attack it wanted
and they had rocked the existing world order.
• The ‘war on terror’ has clearly dominated American foreign policy since
September 11, 2001, and the country now has a military presence in more
countries and areas than ever before.
171. Clinton J. Ancker III and Michael D. Burke, ‘Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare’, Military
Review, (July–August 2003), pp. 18–25.
125
• If they are to be successful in combating international terrorism, the

American administration must face protracted and complicated warfare.
During his first months in his new post, President George W. Bush had
done much to break international agreements that did not fit in with the new
American ambitions – the commotion about the Kyoto agreement and the
nuclear weapons agreement with Russia were not the only ones. Following the
events of September 2001, the Republican administration adjusted its attitude
to the surrounding world – at least for a while.172 The international commu-
nity again became important to the Bush administration, even if the U.S., with
its significant military power, probably felt that it could deal with its enemies
by itself.173 ‘The war on terror’ is now in its second phase. This phase began
by steadily increasing American political pressure on Iraq. In his State of the
Union address on 29 January 2002, President Bush branded Iraq as one of the
three countries in the world’s ‘axis of evil’. During the course of 2002, it became
increasingly clear that there would be a military invasion of the country.
Even if the United States had an enemy image of Saddam Hussein ever
since the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, an ‘ideological’ invasion such
as this would have been unthinkable in the years before the acts of terror-
ism on September 11, 2001. After the acts of terrorism American society was
characterised by patriotism and a siege mentality.174 When they began to focus
strongly on Iraq, compared with the other countries in the ‘axis of evil’, this
was mainly because intelligence sources claimed that the country was again
producing WMDs. In the spring of 2003, the regime in Iraq was toppled after
172. Rekkedal, ‘Nye trender innen krigføringen’. This text is an extended and reworked version
of the article from the book that was written in the spring of 2002.
173. But the U.S.’s ‘war on terror’ since September 2001 has, at the same time, revealed that the
U.S. needs allies, not primarily to conduct war on the ground, but to provide a campaign
such as that in Iraq with broad international legitimacy, i.e., a legitimacy also accepted by
others. It is only Europeans who can contribute significantly in connection with the mod-
ernisation and possible democratisation of Muslim society in the Middle East, an area that
is Europe’s and not the U.S.’s neighbour. Even if many people have asserted that a split is
on the way between Europe and the U.S., one should not write off the possibility of better
understanding and cooperation across the Atlantic in the future. And in important areas
of this cooperation things are even going well: the U.S. and Europe are ‘growing together’
economically and regular friction on trade issues has not so far been allowed to turn into
really serious political conflict.
174. When we come to assess the military realities of today, it is important to note that the U.S.
military budget is also equivalent to the military budgets of the world’s ten largest nations
put together. Today, the U.S. has less than 5 per cent of the world’s population but accounts
for 40 per cent of the world’s military costs.
126
a short conventional war. The change of regime did not, however, lead to peace
in the country.
A short time after the conventional phase of the war was over, various insur-
gent groups decided to start their own insurgencies against the Americans and
their allies. In the spring of 2004, it became clear that the insurgents could no
longer be dismissed as some remnants of the old regime and that the occupation
had led to entirely new insurgent movements. This warfare is still going on in
the spring of 2006, even although Iraq formally has a democratically elected
government and security forces of over 180,000 men.175
If we look back at the developments that led to the Iraq War in 2003, one
point is that, prior to the invasion, Iraq was only an ‘irritation’ and hardly any
serious military threat to either the U.S. or Iraq’s neighbours. It is, however,
important to understand the underlying fear that the U.S. had of a repeat of
September 11 during 2002 and 2003. In June 2005, Senator McCain stated
that they were sure that, sooner or later, they would have had to render the
Saddam regime harmless. Sooner was better than later as they saw it in the
Bush administration. They were clearly very preoccupied by the long-term
strategic implications of not removing Saddam. In short, by going in early,
the Americans wanted to influence developments in a positive direction and
thereby avoid a ‘possible and probable’ major war in the region. In the U.S.,
there is still a majority who believe that the attack on Iraq was necessary, but all
the while there has been some disagreement about methods and strategies.
The invasion and occupation have, however, themselves contributed to cre-
ating a new generation of so-called jihadists who may be a threat to the United
States and other Western states in the next round, and not just the country’s
soldiers.
The war in Iraq is creating a new breed of Islamic jihadists who could
go on to destabilise other countries, according to a CIA report. The CIA
believes Iraq to be potentially worse than Afghanistan, which produced
thousands of jihadists in the 1980s and 1990s. Many of the recruits to
Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda had fought in Afghanistan.
The sobering caution came as a senior British anti-terrorism source
warned that those trained in terror techniques in Iraq could use their
newly-acquired skills in Britain at the end of the war. The CIA report,
completed last month, remains classified. But a CIA source yesterday
175. According to the website Global Security. The figures quoted are stated as being up to date as
at October 2004, and the number of Iraqi soldiers and police is growing. The forces passed
the 200,000 mark in late 2005. The problem is: how trustworthy and loyal are they?
127
confirmed that its broad conclusions, disclosed by the New York Times
yesterday, were accurate.176
Within those circles working on modern terrorism, insurgency and coun-
ter-insurgency in particular, there are increasingly more people who understand
that today’s religiously motivated terrorists do not represent the most important
trends within Islam. Many then use the term jihadist to distinguish between
ordinary supporters of Islam and the more extreme sections. How accurate or
correct this term is can, however, be discussed. We also see that extremists and
often also political leaders with their own agendas use the term to promote their
own interests. The true meaning of jihad is not ‘holy war’ as it is often trans-
lated, but ‘struggle’ or ‘exertion’, i.e., it is incumbent upon devout Muslims to
make a great effort in all areas in order to have God’s will executed, in practice
within social areas as diverse as the economic, intellectual, social and spiritual
spheres. But, now and then, military efforts cannot be avoided if one is to
ensure the accepted standards of decency in the Koran. Tradition is that the
Prophet Muhammad is to have said after one of his military victories (translated
into English): ‘We are coming back from the Lesser Jihad [i.e., the battle] and
returning to the Greater Jihad.’ By this is meant that, after military victory was
secured, they would return to the day-to-day struggle of improving the society
they lived in, which included trying to become a better person oneself.
The term Jihad consequently represents more than warfare for the majority
of Muslims – so there is no clear connection between Islam and the extensive
use of violence against others. Even though the term jihad has now entered
daily use and is probably viewed negatively by Western listeners, there are per-
haps grounds for reflecting on whether this use of the word could damage the
cause – terms that have a negative connotation rarely help those the term is
being used against seeing themselves in a more positive light. (I have, however,
opted to use the term in this book – after this introductory explanation. The
term is now in international use and I have not been able to find a good alterna-
tive.) It was actually among the so-called jihadists in Afghanistan in the 1980s
that al-Qaeda had its origins. These groups gained their battle experience by
fighting what could later be characterised as second-rate forces. Today, the Iraqi
176. Ewen MacAskill, Duncan Campbell and Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Iraq creating new breed
of jihadists, says CIA’, The Guardian, 23 June 2005. The authors of the article also assert
that: ‘If there was to be a spill-over, Saudi Arabia is potentially vulnerable because many of
the Arab fighters in Iraq originate from there. Jamal Khashoggi, media adviser to the Saudi
ambassador in London, said yesterday he agreed in part with the U.S. assessment. “It will
be worse than Afghanistan”, he said. “We are talking about a very brutal type, a very weird
version of Islam in Iraq. It is very scary.”’
128
jihadists are learning to fight against a considerably more sophisticated enemy

and the hostilities are played out in cities rather than in mountain areas. The
question is what kind of attacks we can expect to see from the new generation
of Iraqi jihadists in a 10–15 year perspective if they decide to conduct a global
war. (See also the description of terrorism in points 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 here and
in Chapter 7.)
What actually is ‘the big picture’? The short description of the situation
above demonstrates a change in thinking as regards the threat assessment over
the next few years. Conventional warfare can obviously not be ruled out, espe-
cially when superpowers face each other or intend to combat another state’s
conventional armed forces. Today, however, it is other forms of warfare, con-
flicts and disputes, which are perhaps of a non-military nature, that dominate
the international picture. Liberalisation in several previously autocratic states
has led to significant challenges for the new regimes. Among other things, the
reduction in the police and security forces in the former Soviet Union has made
the increase in organised crime in the same areas possible. This has again created
a need for ‘privatised’ security (see Chapter 3). As the government police forces
are not able to safeguard the people and their properties in a satisfactory man-
ner, those who can afford it hire private security.177 This has indirectly led to
the state’s traditional monopoly on power becoming weakened. In other areas
of the world, e.g., in large parts of Africa, it is difficult to see that there is any
state governed by law at all, with the consequences this has for the day-to-day
situation for ordinary people.178
177. In most Western countries, the trend has also been towards the ‘privatisation’ of security,
even if there have been great local variations. The problem with the reduction of official
security forces was illustrated in an editorial in the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter
on 28 December 2004: ‘In Sweden the state is taking on more and more duties. On
Stockholmsbörsen (the Stockholm Stock Exchange), the public sector is today the largest
owner. At the same time, the state is neglecting its core business: the judicial system, the
armed forces and education.’ We see here that the government is not able to concentrate
on its main tasks – with major consequences for the state over a period of time. In contrast
to this, as part of the political progress of the so-called NeoCons in the U.S., we have seen
the ideological conception that ‘private is better’ where they, almost independently of the
realities of the matter, want private investors and companies to take over former government
activities. This phenomenon has led to ‘corporate warriors’/civilian employed defence and
security specialists having taken over many of the armed forces’ traditional roles. This has
been very apparent in Iraq today.
178. Rekkedal, ‘Nye trender innen krigføringen’, pp. 22–23.
129
6.2.1 Weapons of mass destruction and ‘cyber-terrorism’ in connection

with asymmetric warfare
In the situation we face today, with asymmetric warfare, the risk of the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction gives an entirely new dimension. The
U.S. in particular has focused on the danger of terrorists or ‘rogue states’ getting
hold of and using such weapons.179 An increasing number of actors have such
weapons available, also in the Second and Third Worlds. Both weapon systems
and cheap delivery systems are also being developed in several countries in the
Middle East and in Asia. The rapid proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles
in particular to states with anti-Western attitudes is a serious potential threat.
This threat has already led to the U.S. resuming its plans for developing an
anti-ballistic missile defence system, although, so far, they have come up against
significant technological and economic challenges.
As increasingly more states are acquiring weapons of mass destruction, it
would be naive not to believe that terrorist groups will be able to acquire such
weapons at some point. The likelihood of this happening is increasing if we
look at it within a 5–10 year perspective. What is most likely is the use of simple
chemical weapons but we cannot totally rule out biological weapons.180 The
nerve gas Sarin has already been produced and used by the Japanese sect Aum
Shinrikyo in two different terrorist attacks. The best known of these was carried
out on Tokyo’s underground system in 1995.181
Alternatively, a terrorist group could detonate a so-called ‘dirty bomb’ con-
taining radioactive material and ordinary explosives. In contrast to a ‘genuine’
nuclear bomb, the explosive only has the function of spreading the radioactive
material as a dust cloud over the greatest possible area – a city, for example.
For those who wish to strike at a modern society, there are, however, also
methods other than the direct use of violence.
179. The so-called rogue states is an expression the Bush administration uses for undemocratic
and anti-Western states. The term has also come into use for North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya
and Sudan.
180. Kevin O’Brien and Joseph Nusbaum, ‘Intelligence Gathering Asymmetric Threats’, <http://
www.icsa.ac.uk>, 2001.
181. On 20 March 1995, liquid Sarin in plastic bags was left at five different places on the
Tokyo underground system. Even though about 6,000 people were injured in the attack,
only 12 people died. A probable reason for the low number of fatalities was that the sect
Aum Shinrikyo had not managed to produce Sarin with a sufficiently high concentration.
The year before, seven people had been killed in a less well-known terrorist attack using
Sarin in the city of Matsumoto in Japan, but it was not until after the attack in Tokyo that
the Japanese authorities chose to pounce on Aum Shinrikyo. Although the motives for the
attacks were never established with certainty, these are the only known occasions where a
terrorist group has carried out attacks using chemical weapons.
130
25 January 2000: Jon Johansen, the 16-year-old accused by the police of having developed software that
made it possible to decrypt and copy DVD films onto the hard drive of a PC. Johansen and his assistants
made the software available on the Internet. The international film industry stated that he had broken the
security code for the copying of DVD films. (Photo: AP Photo/Tor Richardsen/Pressens bild)
Modern states are, to a greater extent, dependent on advance communica-

tions and information technology. This dependency makes these societies also
extremely vulnerable. There was a so-called ‘wake-up-call’ at the beginning of
May 2000 when the ‘I love you’ email virus reportedly caused several billion
dollars worth of damage. The virus was developed by a 23-year-old Filipino
hacker who had no clear political motives. The fact that a single person with
computer and programming skills could cause such great economic damage
has presumably not gone unnoticed in those circles that would like to strike
at the Western world.182 In this context, the rapidly growing importance of
182. John J. Fialka, War by Other Means: Economic Espionage in America (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 1996). In his book Fialka describes how a group of Dutch hack-
ers offered to hack the logistics system of the American forces for the Iraqi Government
prior to the Gulf War in 1991. Even if the story has never been officially confirmed, it shows
the danger of competent hackers being able to offer their services as cybermercenaries. In a
discussion on the book, Kirkus Reviews, for example, claimed: ‘An investigative reporter’s
cautionary overview of a persistent problem for American industry: the theft of its vital
technology by friend and foe alike.’
131
information systems and electronics in general may be of great significance

in the somewhat longer term. Although the West is the clear leader in this
field, this is, in itself, no guarantee that information technology cannot be used
against the West. There is much to indicate that the world has barely seen the
start of what could develop into regular cyberwar during the course of the next
decade.
For more than a decade, American governmental organisations such as the
Pentagon and NASA have been popular targets for hackers. Daily attempts at
hacking obviously lead to this type of organisation developing a high level of
security in connection with communications and information technology. If an
insurgent movement really wants to conduct cyber-warfare, it will probably be
more appropriate to avoid this type of difficult target. By, on the other hand,
striking at information technology associated with, for example, a modern
society’s electricity supply, transport system, telecommunications network or
the banks’ payment system, a cyberterrorist could probably cause great damage.
What is more important than the actual damage is the uncertainty that such
an attack could lead to in the society. The terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, clearly showed how psychological factors affected the society’s economy.
The finance and stock exchange markets in particular were heavily hit after
the attacks. However, we did not see a similar impact in London after the
bomb attacks of 7 July 2005. The damage to the underground system was
obviously limited, but it is probably just as likely that they were, as a result of
IRA activities, quite simply better prepared mentally for something happening
in London. Terrorism was nothing new.
It should be noted here that probably no one has been killed as a result
of cyber-terrorism. As long as the terrorist movements of today measure their
success by the number of ‘enemies’ killed, we will continue to see traditional
terrorist attacks using weapons and explosives. It cannot, on the other hand, be
ruled out that, in the future, more sophisticated terrorist and insurgency leaders
will measure their success by the financial losses inflicted on a state. Seen in this
light, there are grounds for assuming that, as long as terrorists wish to both scare
and kill people, they will make use of various forms of destruction as they have
already demonstrated, including weapons and explosives and possibly weapons
of mass destruction in the longer term.
As regards weapons of mass destruction, active and forward looking intel-
ligence and security work could make it difficult for a terrorist group to gain
access to the necessary components, means of production or people with the
necessary technical skills. At the same time, a number of defensive measures can
be taken to protect a society from this type of attack. This could be anything
from more effective border controls to placing sensors at strategic places to a
constant raising of skills within support services. In this respect, a particularly
132
important contribution would be a real knowledge among society’s political

and administrative leaders with regards to what characterises terrorist move-
ments and organised crime. It is these leaders who will have to carry out and
direct any action. During the gas attack in Tokyo in 1995, for example, the
management at several hospitals refused to admit patients because they thought
they were dealing with an epidemic. This is despite the country having been
subjected to a similar terrorist attack with Sarin the year before.
6.3 What do the concepts asymmetry and asymmetric warfare

stand for today?
As pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, there are several definitions
of asymmetry and asymmetrical warfare. As recently as in 1999, the term asym-
metric warfare was not in the official glossary of the American Department of
Defense.183 Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the chal-
lenge has been to find the most relevant definition of the term.
U.S. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of Armed Forces of the United States, is
a key doctrine document that deals with the subject. Here asymmetric warfare
is defined as:
(…) asymmetric engagements are battles between dissimilar forces.184
The American U.S. Joint Forces Command uses the following definition
as at March 2005:
Asymmetric Warfare – The waging of unbalanced or un-proportioned
armed or unarmed war against the enemy.185
The American research institution, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), stresses on its part that asymmetric warfare is:
(…) ‘warfare activities with fewer and less-easily specified objectives’,
that normally involve, (…) ‘small numbers of actors and/or force-
participants, using unconventional tactics that often have high impact
(political or material) relative to the force level involved’.186
183. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military Terms, New
Revised and Expanded Edition (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999).
184. This is the American armed forces document that describes warfare at a so-called joint
operational level. (The document is available on the U.S. Armed Forces website using the
code JP 0-1.)
185. Definition as at March 2005, (U.S.) Joint Forces Command Glossary, <http://www.jfcom.
mil/about/glossary.htm>.
186. This statement from DARPA is based on how the concept was described in an article writ-
ten by Kevin O’Brien and Joseph Nusbaum, ‘Intelligence Gathering Asymmetric Threats’,
<http://www.icsa.ac.uk>, 2001.
133
Although there is an enormous technological gap between modern Western

states and developing countries, elements of new technology have been more
accessible to groups and states in the Third World. This applies to both weapon
systems and technology with so-called ‘dual purpose characteristics’, i.e., a spe-
cific advanced technology that can be used for both military and civilian pur-
poses. Additionally, almost anyone can gain access to military knowledge on
the Internet such as, for example, how to produce simple but relatively effective
explosives. One reason for the increased effectiveness of even smaller terrorist
groups is probably that new technologies such as advanced mobile telephones,
computer equipment and satellite telephones are on the way to becoming avail-
able to everyone. An important cause of the increasing effectiveness of terror-
ism is probably that new technologies such as advanced cellphones, computer
equipment and satellite telephone have been easier to gain access to. This can
be seen as an important assumption for the planning, training and supreme
command and control of modern terrorist campaigns. These new, and often
extremely scrupulous, actors have today easy access to a much better range of
technology and new light weapon systems that can be used against Western
targets than was the case for similar groups during the Cold War, when military
technology (and technology in general) was often well guarded by the super-
powers. It is not uncommon for terrorists/insurgents to have better equipment
than the local police and military forces they are up against, particularly in
the Second and Third Worlds (see the problem regarding funding of train-
ing/equipment in Chapter 3). In addition, the rapidly increasing international
availability of ‘cheap’ air transport and the increasingly freer transfer of know-
ledge and information via the Internet have made it much easier for asymmetric
actors to use this new ability to act internationally. We should also note, in this
respect, that a series of military handbooks and books on producing your own
explosives can be bought quite openly over the Internet. And the sellers are
often companies in the United States. Perhaps there is a lot of truth in what two
Chinese officers have written:
When a nation state or national armed force, (which adheres to certain
rules and will only use limited force to obtain a limited goal), faces off
with one of these types of organizations [the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult;
and… terrorist groups like Osama bin Laden’s] (which never observe any
rules and which are not afraid to fight an unlimited war using unlimited
means), it will often prove very difficult for the nation state or national
armed force to gain the upper hand.187
187. Written by two Chinese colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare,
taken here from a quote in Barnett, Asymmetrical Warfare.
134
Generally, asymmetric means are something used when one realises that one
is not capable of taking on an adversary using conventional resources. There
may be several reasons for this. The inability to obtain the necessary political
or military strength that makes it possible to directly take on the adversary
is probably the main reason for asymmetric methods being used. By acting
unconventionally and using means other than pure military strength, the
asymmetric actor hopes to be able to withstand pressure from the enemy. The
right choice of asymmetric approach can, at least in theory, make it possible to
take on even a superpower like the U.S., something that would be an almost
hopeless undertaking with conventional military resources. In its purest form,
asymmetric warfare is, as already indicated, exploiting one’s own competitive
advantages by using the available unconventional means against the opponent’s
assumed weaknesses.
In today’s political reality it is often challengers from the Second and Third
World countries who want to fight a ruling regime that decide to take the
asymmetric route. Others have great ambitions and want to inflict damage on
or fight what they see as the Western world in general.
Here, one should note the following objection: if there is to be any real
value in explaining the concept of asymmetric warfare, we have to say more
than just that it involves emphasising one’s own strengths and exploiting the
enemy’s weaknesses. This is actually a matter of course in all forms of strategic
and tactical thinking. ‘Genuine asymmetry’ is, in contrast to the more common
explanation, when the attacks an opponent carries out are of such a nature that
his adversary cannot perform the same actions, or is unwilling to perform them.
This type of asymmetric action can create two major problems for the adversary
for two reasons:
1. As one is not in a position to reply effectively to the challenge, this is an

obstacle to mounting a counterattack, something that will always be seen as
problematic or directly dangerous.
2. Many asymmetric measures are difficult to evaluate and follow up – they are
perhaps seen as directly ‘lacking culture’. The majority of Western military
and political leaders will then also see many of these possible asymmetric
means as ethically unacceptable. The feeling that an adversary is not ‘fight-
ing clean’ may in itself lead to one being more easily surprised. The events
of September 11, 2001, can be seen as an excellent example of this type of
‘strategic surprise’. The use of large, fuel-laden passenger planes as ‘bombs’
was clearly a breach of what we see as legal weapon systems according to
Western norms.
135
Asymmetric thinking and attack methods could possibly also be relevant

in other contexts than those dealt with so far. Asymmetric means could, for
example, be an actual tool for combating a multinational company, transna-
tional financing companies or other forms of international organisation, also
including the UN. A well-organised user of such methods will normally employ
a course of action where tactics and the use of weapons are adapted to the target
and, at the same time, include an element of surprise. The intention is that the
target one wants to strike should not be able to meet the attack in a planned
and structured manner. A person employing asymmetric means, including the
choice of well-suited forms of combat, succeeds, according to theories now
dominating discussions, in reducing the significance of the opponent’s real
technological superiority. At best, the terrorists succeed in turning the techno-
logical superiority against the adversary.
Forms of asymmetric attack assume, however, that the attacker wants to
exploit the adversary’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and that he has knowl-
edge of these. A clever actor using asymmetric weapons will formulate his strat-
egy with the intention of fundamentally changing the battlefield on which
battles are fought. The attacker may, among other things, decide to operate in
environments that make it difficult for the adversary to use his heavy equip-
ment effectively, including modern air forces. He may, for example, choose to
fight in urban areas. (There have been a number of these types of campaign in
Iraq.) By forcing the enemy to fight in an environment that is unfavourable to
him in order to achieve his military goals, he must accept the loss of human
life – especially civilians. This conscious degradation of a strong adversary by
making it difficult for him to use his military capacity, in terms of weaponry, in
an effective manner renders the initially clearly superior military capacity that
he had to begin with less relevant. The stronger party has fewer good targets
to fight against as long as it wants to keep its own and the civilian population’s
losses down.188
188. An example that could perhaps be used of this type of problem is Iraq, who tried to take
on a U.S.-led coalition with conventional resources during the Gulf War in 1991. Over the
course of barely two months of warfare, Iraq was beaten militarily and had to accept Kuwait
re-emerging as an independent country. The regime in Baghdad did not, however, ever
accept that it was politically defeated and consequently now decided to continue the confron-
tation with the U.S./West by other means. Iraq ignored, for instance, the criticism of the
international community and a great number of UN resolutions, and despite sanctions and
sporadic military efforts against the country, the regime continued to fight the U.S./West.
This led to the U.S. having to maintain a large and expensive military force in the region
and, on the part of the U.S., it looked as if there could be no peaceful solution to the Iraq
problem. This then ended with a new war in 2003.
136
If, on the other hand, we define asymmetric warfare too narrowly, we may
end up with a description of only the type of actions normally deployed by
terrorist groups. Such a definition should obviously be avoided. One of the
potentially new features of an asymmetric ‘philosophy of war’ may be just this
lack of physical demarcation lines around the theatre of operations. One may
have a geographic dimension associated with one’s final goal, but one risks
these limitations possibly having to be abandoned when it comes to the action
stage where one operates/acts in front of a global audience in order to maximise
the effect, e.g., in New York, Madrid or London. It is then one risks, without
wanting this, ending up with so-called ‘strategic corporals’ or, if possible, even
more unnecessary, ‘hands-on’ generals involved in the lower-level tactics at an
operational level. In a situation like this, one can easily lose sight of what one
had actually planned to achieve – and then go over to acting instinctively.189
6.3.1 ‘Asymmetric threats’ – what are these?

So-called asymmetric threats can manifest themselves in many ways. At a stra-
tegic level, those employing asymmetric, unconventional means often play on
fear or dissatisfaction within the civilian population.
For example, it is the general understanding among Europeans that the
countries taking part in the occupation in Iraq are more likely terrorist targets
than other European states.190 The terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004
and in London in July 2005 appear to confirm this assumption. So the actual
fear of terrorism could be an important motive if the population demands a
country’s forces to be pulled out of Iraq. (Peace movements are not included
here, because they have such differing motives for their involvement.)
Another course of action may be to undermine popular support for a regime
over a period of time. This method is particularly applicable in an undemocrat-
ic country. Normally, the local opposition will use human rights and the unfair
distribution of benefits as an argument for a change of regime. Over the last
year, we have seen the rapid and non-violent fall of unpopular governments in
countries such as the Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Lebanon. After a long period of
189. Professor Eric Swyngedouw has, in his social perspective, constructed a new concept that
combines the local dimension in social belonging with the global context one must often
take a position on or operate within. He describes it as ‘glocal’.
190. In an opinion poll carried out by the Danish market research institute Vilstrup in March
2004, 60 per cent of those Danes asked said that the country’s involvement in Iraq had
increased the risk of terrorist attacks. Only 32 per cent were of the opinion that this involve-
ment had reduced the risk. So far, however, the Danish Government has not chosen to
change its involvement in Iraq.
137
dissatisfaction with a regime, a clearly ‘rigged’ election, for example, can trigger
popular resistance. In Lebanon, the killing of the popular opposition politician
Rafik Hariri was such a triggering factor, something that led to Syria seeing
itself forced to pull its military forces out of the country.
Clever insurgents seek to compromise the ruling regime’s alliances and part-
nerships with other groupings and adversaries of the insurgents. It is in con-
nection with this that the use of threats can have a strong psychological effect,
as well as the use of physical destruction obviously, in most cases, frightening
the sections of the population that are less affected or involved. If people begin
to feel that the government cannot give them the necessary protection, loyalty
to the ruling regime will also be quickly undermined. An example of a simple
form of asymmetric warfare with victory for the anti-Western coalition is UN
operations in Somalia in the period 1992 to 1994. This ended, as previously
mentioned, in the U.S., and thereby the West, giving up when the Clinton
administration decided to pull its military forces out of the country.191 Here,
one of the clan factions became able, through a conscious campaign directed
at the international forces, and particularly against the American element, to
prevent the situation normalising – a situation that could threaten this faction’s
position of power, as it saw developments.192
As regards the deployment of international forces, attacks are targeted at
these, or, in general, against citizens with a Western background (particularly
Americans), against Western property or against territory that belongs to the
superpowers; possible asymmetric means that insurgents can play on. The mere
191. Ralph Peters, ‘In Praise of Attrition’, Parameters, Vol. 34, No. 2, (Summer 2004), pp. 26–
27. Quote: ‘We hit a low point in Mogadishu, when Army Rangers, Special Operations
elements, and line troops delivered a devastating blow against General Aideed’s irregulars
– only to have President Clinton declare defeat by pulling out. One may argue about the
rationale for our presence in Somalia and about the dangers of mission creep, but once we’re
in a fight, we need to win it – and remain on the battlefield long enough to convince our
enemies they’ve lost on every count.’ See also Clark, Against All Enemies, p. 88. His account
is that the Americans had never intended to remain there. Peters and Clark are therefore ‘at
two different ends of the scale’ when it comes to their interpretation of the administration
under President Clinton.
192. In the book that he wrote with USMC General Zinni, Tom Clancy provides another pic-
ture of the situation. Zinni was a so-called ‘envoy’ with the intention of finding a basis for
a political solution. He writes that developments could have been avoided if General Aidid
had been accepted as an important other party. But the UN’s Pakistani envoy would not
accept this. Aidid was identified as the problem, and a pragmatic solution was subsequently
not possible. But, as pointed out above, Somalia was never of strategic significance to the
U.S. and they pulled out after the ‘Black Hawk Down’ episode. Tom Clancy (with General
Tony Zinni (ret.) and Tony Koltz), Battle Ready (New York: Putnam Publishing Group,
2004), pp. 273–285.
138
threat of such campaigns can increase the need to use unconventional meas-
ures at times in order to provide the necessary security for the forces deployed.
Possible forms of action where asymmetric measures are likely are, for instance,
in connection with Peace-Support Operations (PSO).193 Today, all Western
states and their military forces should be prepared for being subjected to vari-
ous forms of asymmetric measures, not least with regard to all forms of military
participation in current areas of conflict. An additional problem with this is
that the measures implemented to establish an acceptable degree of protection
could tie up such great resources that it is beyond one’s ability to perform the
mission the forces have actually been deployed to take care of.
At a tactical level, an opponent can force an actor to rearrange his tactics by,
for example, playing on the Western fear of having to sustain military losses, or
by carrying out attacks that it becomes difficult for the Western forces to deal
with or prevent. One example could be the carrying out of sporadic terrorist
activities or major attacks, both physically and electronically, on a national
infrastructure critical to the West. The perhaps most spectacular attack so far
is the terrorist attack on American symbols such as the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon in September 2001. Threats and terrorist activity, negative
references to complicated Western-dominated crisis management and Peace-
Support Operations, activity that supports economic collapse, civil disobedi-
ence and organised crime are all examples of less drastic activities that could
nevertheless function as asymmetric measures in order to confront a stronger
opponent.194
6.3.2 Asymmetric warfare – in more tangible terms

As indicated previously, large armed forces are required in order to meet the
types of threat that a well-organised insurgent movement has available. It will
normally take years and not months to combat such an insurgency. For the
same reason, it is an increasing problem ensuring popular support at home for
193. The English abbreviation is PSO for the Norwegian abbreviation FSO. For an official
Norwegian definition, see the Norwegian Defence Staff ’s Forsvarets doktrine for landoperas-
joner [The Armed Forces Doctrine for Ground Operations] (Oslo: the Norwegian Defence
Staff/Forsvarsstaben (FST), 2004), Chapter 9.
194. The colonial wars of the 1950s and 1960s can perhaps be used to illustrate the potential of
asymmetric warfare, but also show its limits. Today, there are also similar challenges in about
25 ongoing low intensity conflicts. It is, however, likely that the main threats of the future
will be of a somewhat different nature to what we have seen previously. What is totally new
is that we can no longer exclude guerrilla movements, and terrorists in particular, being able
to use weapons of mass destruction.
139
this type of long-term effort outside the West. It is particularly difficult to fore-
cast the role that the modern media will play. While there was initially much
popular support for the war in most countries in the West as regards the run-up
to and execution of the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, there are
today few people who write in a positive vein about what is now going on in the
country. Perhaps we are getting fed up with the whole war? There are grounds
for believing that this will eventually lead to it becoming politically difficult
to continue to actively support the new regime in Kabul. Protracted wars are
difficult to sustain given the form of ‘around-the-clock’ coverage focusing on
events, and with next to no analysis that modern television in particular is the
main exponent of.
Political and military leaders do not communicate strategies and objectives
well enough to public opinion at home and are therefore subject to the influ-
ence of the adversary’s resolve. Is the question quite simply: is there a lack of
insight into, and understanding of the conflict and a lack of knowledge (or
skills) regarding the necessary decisions and activities involved in a commit-
ment such as this? Or is the question rather whether the political leadership
that all too often has a window for action of a maximum of one election period
(about 4 years) really able to see which consequences its shrinking political sup-
port will have, seen in a 10–15 year perspective.
A grouping or an organisation (e.g., a terrorist group) that masters a simple
technology can implement well-adapted tactics with the intention of weakening
the adversary’s superior weapon systems and associated communication tech-
nology, thereby avoiding a direct battle with ‘the main forces’, i.e., the insur-
gents decide to attack the adversary’s weaknesses and weaken his forces over a
period of time. Both high and low technology countermeasures may exploit any
known weaknesses, even in advanced Western weapon systems. One should, for
example, as previously indicated, be prepared for information operations to be
used to damage critical infrastructures in the West, including major computer
networks, which could lead to communications and transport systems, electric-
ity production and industrial production being paralysed for at least a period
of time. Other possible forms of information operations could, for example,
involve the manipulation of media and psychological warfare, i.e., the enemy
benefiting from the basically ‘uncontrollable’ international news industry.
It has already, with regard to several conflicts in the 1990s, proved to be rela-
tively easy to influence Western decision-makers through the use of the mass
media, demonstrated, for instance, in connection with the Kosovo conflict in
1999 and by al-Qaeda’s use of the Arab news media to communicate threats to
execute hostages in Iraq and warn of forthcoming terrorist campaigns in order
to weaken confidence in government authorities in Western countries: threats
that make it easy for either politicians or sympathisers to argue, in a populist
140
way, for pulling out of conflict areas, ‘to avoid being attacked by terrorists’,
etc.195
One nightmare scenario is obviously so-called non-conventional attacks
carried out by specially trained forces equipped with chemical or biological
weapons. Such weapons – if they were deployed against Western military opera-
tions, for instance, – would play havoc with these. But this form of warfare
is, in practice, much more dangerous if so-called ‘rogue states’ were to find it
expedient to give terrorist groups access to such weapons. This kind of measure,
directed at civilian targets in order to undermine, for example, popular support
for interventions against rogue states and against terrorist organisations, is on
the way to becoming a more probable future scenario than just a short while
ago. This is also potentially an effective means of preventing Second and Third
World countries from supporting or joining Western coalitions.196 The fear of
Iraq having developed weapons of mass destruction was also one of the argu-
ments for the British supporting the U.S. desire to remove Saddam Hussein
from power in the country. Seen in this light, there is an element of fear in the
entire Western world that terrorist groups will use weapons of mass destruction,
something that is used as an argument for further strengthening security forces
in Western Europe, among other places, but particularly in the U.S.
The U.S. Department of Defense warned as early as the spring of 2001 that
the Department was of the opinion that the national information infrastructure
was extremely vulnerable. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had also on
several occasions sent out assessments and warnings that there were two main
threats to U.S. national security: one was hostile information operations, and
the other was the use of weapons of mass destruction. It was this type of threat
that the American authorities saw as being most realistically directed against
the U.S. before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Various forms of
unconventional weapon could be the resources that an adversary would use to
take on U.S. conventional and nuclear superiority, i.e., to strike directly at the
U.S. in a manner surprising the Americans.
195. It may be interesting here to remember what a U.S. officer stated in the aftermath of the
Kosovo conflict. NATO had a clear superiority as regards information but, in many ways,
this became irrelevant for the outcome of the war, was how he saw it. (Based on the author’s
own notes from an IO technical conference in London on 23 May 2000.)
196. In connection with this, a representative of the British Ministry of Defence has stated: ‘Our
British increasing dependence on high technology to provide our battle-winning edge, and
the widening disparity between our military capabilities and those of potential adversaries,
may lead potential aggressors to adopt alternative weapons or unconventional strategies,
(including) asymmetric warfare.’ Based on notes taken during a conference in London on
23 May 2000. The text was taken from an overhead slide used during the presentation.
141
In the American report, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), of autumn

2001, it was predicted that American Armed Forces, and the U.S. as a nation,
could be faced with ‘increasingly sophisticated asymmetric challenges involving
the use of chemical, biological and possible nuclear weapons; attacks against the
information systems of our forces and national infrastructure’.197 According to
the report, the U.S. must be prepared to meet insurgency, terrorism and major
environmental catastrophes. The document also claimed that future enemies
could ‘employ asymmetric methods to delay or deny U.S. access to critical
facilities; disrupt our command, control, communications and intelligence net-
works; or inflict higher than expected casualties in an attempt to weaken our
national resolve’. This QDR was also characterised by the complicated opera-
tions research models and flow charts that have traditionally dominated this
type of Pentagon study, but the study is not just to be seen as an ‘academic exer-
cise’. The study was based on roughly the same type of technology dominated
planning that has traditionally formed the basis for the procurement of new
materials since the 1960s. The fact that the Soviet Union has, in the interim,
become history has not led to planning methods being significantly changed.
What was new was that this time it was hoped to get away from what was seen
as ‘Grand Armies’ and to invest even more consciously in high technology as a
‘problem solver’. The reality of this is keenly disputed today and the direction
has clearly had to be adjusted in the new QDR that is now underway. The
experiences of Iraq in particular have influenced the view of what will be needed
in the near future. We see this, for instance, in connection with how they have
been forced into a possible reprioritisation benefiting the U.S. Army at the
expense of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy.198 In the details from the report
that are known so far, it is suggested that the U.S. now needs more soldiers, less
high technology, lighter forces, a larger army, fewer marines and air forces, more
intelligence, language and communication specialists, greater concentration on
home defences against, for example, terrorists, and an end to the ‘two-war strat-
egy’, the ability to fight two conventional wars simultaneously.199
This is the main content of what could be a new direction for the American
Armed Forces. Internal debate has been taking place within the Pentagon, but
197. U.S. Defense Department, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001, <http://
www.defenselink.mil/ pubs/qdr2001.pdf>. A similar report was produced in 2005, in which
they studied the American military capacity and the new political and military challenges.
Published in February 2006.
198. Leader, ‘Defending America’, The New York Times, 10 July 2005.
199. The updated version of NMS: Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the
United States of America. A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow (Washington D.C.:
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004).
142
not so quietly as to prevent the debate leaking to the American press. They are,
however, clearly extremely ‘technology-focused’ in their priorities.
The U.S. Department of Defense has, in other words, been in the process
of an extensive review of the entire basis of the U.S. defence strategy. The bitter
experiences the Americans have had in Iraq and Afghanistan and a change in
assumptions on their home ground since September 11, 2001, is part of the
background. But it is also due to the increasingly higher costs of acquiring high
technology defence materials.
Many states have a tendency to copy American solutions and the American
way of thinking, although on an infinitely smaller scale. Those critics, includ-
ing those in Sweden, who think, for example, that the army is too small to deal
with both national and international assignments will now find some support
for their perception in leading defence circles in the U.S. The realities of Iraq
and Afghanistan have turned some of the earlier theories on their head. The
Americans, supported by Great Britain, easily won the campaign against the
Saddam regime with the assistance of their high technology but small forc-
es. The problems arose, as previously demonstrated, afterwards. With about
138,000 men in Iraq in late 2005, only about 13,000 fewer than during the
war in the spring of 2003, the Americans are not managing to deal with their
opponents. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the insurgents have demonstrated
an ability to adapt themselves and their tactics to developments. This again has
forced the United States to adjust their way of doing warfare.
The new QDR 2006 shows that the reprioritisation may have consequences
for both the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force and that some of the high
technology and extremely expensive prestige projects may see cutbacks if the
strategy is changed. The two branches of the military services are not involved
in the same manner as the ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the chapter
called ‘Reorienting Capabilities and Forces’, the Department writes: ‘During
the QDR, the senior leadership of the Department considered potential adjust-
ments to capabilities and forces in light of the four focus areas and refined Force
Planning Construct. They identified desired future force characteristics prior
to developing proposals for the following capability portfolios: joint ground;
special operations forces; joint air; joint maritime; tailored deterrence; com-
bating WMDs; joint mobility; ISR and space capabilities; netcentricity; and
joint command and control. As part of a process of continuous change, the
Department’s capabilities and forces will be reoriented over time to reflect these
desired Characteristics.’200 The political consequences of the review are not yet
200. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.;
February 6, 2006), see the Chapter ‘Reorienting Capabilities and Forces’, pp. 41–62.
143
clear, but the future reprioritisation will nevertheless also be of significance for
Europe.
It can otherwise be noted that there is a relatively common argument that
many people have put forward that asymmetric or unconventional threats are
primarily due to extremists from the Middle East. Another common argument
is that terrorist organisations have a limited ability to inflict damage upon
Western interests. In the real world, the picture is obviously much more com-
plicated. It has also been common to see the many terrorist campaigns as a man-
ifestation of locally and/or regionally triggered conflicts, primarily targeted at
the ruling regime locally. After the events of September 11, 2001, opinions have
probably become more varied, particularly as a result of a growing insight into
how terrorist organisations recruit and form networks between themselves.201
For instance, in the year 2000, China’s People’s Liberation Army published a
series of military theory studies where they looked more closely at their version
of theories regarding asymmetric warfare and tactics adapted to new develop-
ments. The use of this form of warfare and means was put forward as poten-
tially important in any future conflict with the West (read: U.S.). Among other
things, the authors describe possible tactics in the following manner:
(…) hacking into web-sites, targeting financial institutions, terrorism,
assassinating US financiers, using the media and conducting urban war-
fare are among the methods considered by the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA), these studies are driven by the efforts of the PLA to modernize
their IW/IO capabilities.202
According to the military thinking described, the Chinese authors claim
that China is not today able to cope with the strength of the West’s conven-
tional and nuclear capability. This is probably the reason the People’s Liberation
Army has placed such great emphasis on developing new information technol-
ogies for so-called cyber warfare. This includes, among other things, the use
of computer viruses to neutralise and possibly wipe out the enemy’s political,
201. Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘Homegrown Osamas’, The New York Times, 9 March 2005. ‘After
the Oklahoma City bombing, American law enforcement authorities cracked down quite
effectively on domestic racists and militia leaders. But Mark Potok of the Southern Poverty
Law Center, which monitors 760 hate groups with about 100,000 members, notes that after
9/11, the law enforcement focus switched overwhelmingly to Arabs. The Feds are right to be
especially alarmed about Al Qaeda. But we also need to be more vigilant about the domestic
white supremacists, neo-Nazis and militia members. After all, some have more W.M.D. than
Saddam.’
202. Published 16 October 2000: ‘Year 2000 China Defense White Paper Document’. Translated
by World News Connection, <http://wnc.fedworld.gov/subscription.html>. This is an
excellent source that describes the Chinese view and their opinions in, for instance, journals
and official documents.
144
economic and military information and his command and control infrastruc-
ture. The Chinese term used in connection with the new military theories has
been translated as ‘unrestricted warfare’. The People’s Liberation Army’s spokes-
men argue that China could, in this manner, outmanoeuvre the West’s high
technology sensors and electronically guided weapon systems and the associated
countermeasures by making systematic use of information operation meth-
ods. The People’s Liberation Army also claims in some of its papers that China
would be able to put the potential enemy’s population in a kind of state of panic
through an advanced and well-prepared IO campaign, combined with systemat-
ically carrying out attacks on the enemy’s computer networks. The aim could be,
among other things, to paralyse the enemy’s supply of electricity, banking system
and financial system, telephony and communications and mass media.203 This
form of asymmetric thinking could, theoretically, influence most conditions in a
modern society and also require that adapted strategies and tactics be developed.
It is sought to create a battlefield where one’s own contribution of various forms
of weapon/weapon systems and the trained personnel associated with this seek
to compensate for the adversary’s recognised strengths.
It is probably useful to define asymmetric threats as attempts to turn an
adversary’s strengths around so that they become his weaknesses, including mak-
ing use of methods that are clearly different from the enemy’s normal manner
of carrying out operations. In the future, two enemies that clash in a war will
have to be able to deal with a great number of threats. If one is to be able to
protect oneself, one must be prepared to, for instance, distract, take on, weaken
or directly combat the adversary’s military power. It has been common to clas-
sify possible goals by means of thinking about what are modern, often very well
defined, Centres of Gravity (CoG) where a plan is drawn up, focusing on the
regime/enemy’s critical vulnerabilities. This method of planning is today domi-
nant in NATO and is based on an applied ‘Clausewitzian’ modernised view of
what so-called ‘total war’ could be in our present time. Another problem that
is constantly raised for discussion in debate concentrating more on military
theory is whether a concept such as Centre of Gravity can be used to describe
what critics see as the new reality. The American Steven Metz, for example,
argues that, as regards complicated military operations in the 21st Century,
we will see networks of private actors who attack states, and states that will, in
turn, be dependent on private support in order to meet the attack.204 Those
203. Major General Wang Pufeng, ‘The Challenge of Information Warfare’, and Senior
Lieutenant Colonels Wang Baocun and Li Fei, ‘Information Warfare’. Both articles are
included in Michael Pillsbury (ed.), Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1997).
204. Metz, Armed Conflict in the Twenty-First Century, p. 14 and 54.
145
responsible for this view often assert that it is impossible to see today that the
enemy has one nationally strategic CoG, in the manner in which the concept
was developed by Clausewitz. Instead, the American Michael Mandelbaum, for
example, has stated that:
Guerrillas, terrorists, members of private militias – even malevolent com-
puter hackers – seem to be displacing the formally trained, well-equipped,
publicly funded soldier.205
Debate about ‘the correct doctrine’ as regards the use of Clausewitzian the-
ory is by no means finished and nor is there agreement on how decisive tech-
nology, for example, will be in warfare of the future. Consequently, there is no
agreement either on how classicists like Clausewitz and his system of concepts
should be interpreted. Is it even possible that one theorist can cover the needs
we have for a functional military philosophy framework? The answer to this is
probably no – we always need more sources and we ourselves have to try to cre-
ate a functioning whole in order to meet the fresh challenges discussed here.
If we take our starting point as the newer studies that I have previously
discussed with regard to asymmetry, we could possibly divide up the problems
into the following main groups:
• The increasing number of Second and Third World countries that have
weapons of mass destruction at their disposal is today a significant challenge
to Western military dominance, especially when these weapons are combined
with long-range ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. Even if there are grounds
for believing that the states in question do not, in the short-term, have the
knowledge to be able to use these weapon systems effectively, their very
existence is a great challenge to regional security. Even allied nations would
hesitate to intervene militarily against regional aggression if they themselves
could be subject to the threat of weapons of mass destruction. This type
of thinking is an important driving force behind the American attitude to
countries like North Korea and Iran, who they fear would be able to use such
weapons in any future crisis situation. This fear is also important if we are to
205. Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Is Major War Obsolete?’, Survival, No. 40, (Winter 1998), pp.
20–38. The quote is on p. 35. According to the theme in Survival, the reason is: ‘Major war
– war waged by the most powerful countries drawing on all their resources and using all
their weapons over a period of years, with revolutionary political consequences – is obsolete.
In the twentieth century, the costs of fighting such a war have soared, while the perceived
benefits of winning one have shrivelled. While out of fashion, however, major war is not
impossible. Although neither is eager for such a conflict, Russia and China, two powerful
nations less affected by the social forces that have reduced the incentives for war, are the
countries most likely to begin one.’
146
understand the American attitude to the regime in Iraq and why they decided
to go to war against the regime in Baghdad in the spring of 2003.
• The use of so-called cyber-based warfare and the amassing of a selected range
of high technology sensors and communications systems with the associated
weapon systems are themselves a significant challenge. This form of niche
strategy, with its obvious emphasis on technology that is able to tear apart
the adversary’s information technology capacity for military and civilian
systems at the same time as being able to release an attack on the enemy’s
systems of command and infrastructure, could, if successfully carried out,
possibly destroy the information-based Western economies.
• By choosing the correct asymmetric strategy, an adversary could, at least in
theory, possibly take on the superior Western military capacity with the hope
of a good result. The decision, for instance, could be taken to fight in large
cities with millions of inhabitants or in inaccessible jungle areas. In large
built-up areas, it is difficult to use traditional conventional forces effectively.
In practice, major restrictions will also be placed on the use of Western air
forces – with the possible exception of the use of precision weapons. So-
called ‘targeting’, i.e., the ability to find and analyse target data before attack-
ing tangible targets is extremely difficult under such circumstances.
• These new challenges probably require the concept of command and con-
trol warfare to be subject to reconsideration. The term is certainly associated
with levels today, i.e., operational and tactical levels. It will nevertheless
normally be most effective to go after the leaders of a terrorist organisation
when combating guerrilla warfare and terrorism. The leadership will, in this
case, be the opponent’s operational and militarily strategic Centre of Gravity.
This particularly applies to the organisations where the killing/arrest of the
leader would have a great psychological effect on their members, i.e., organ-
isations with a strong cult of the individual such as those we have seen in
the Kurdish PKK, within al-Qaeda, the ‘Tigers’ in Sri Lanka, or within the
Maoists (PCP) in Peru. Both the PKK and the PCP ‘lost their crowds’ once
their leaders ended up in prison.
• As regards the huge focus there has been on the terrorist leader bin Laden
in the media, the key issue is not whether he himself plans the terror, but
that his person – and he probably also sees himself in this way – appears as
a ‘god-like figure’, a sort of Arab ‘Saladin character’ or a rallying symbol for
many orthodox Muslims. It is this form of charismatic leadership, which,
adapted to its own environment, often inspires ‘angry young men’ in par-
ticular to become foot soldiers in terrorist and insurgent movements. Unless
this type of leader can be neutralised, the insurgency is likely to continue.
147
A subtle distinction that is important to emphasise here is that killing a

charismatic leader is not always enough to suppress an insurgency. If it is well
organised, the insurgency will acquire new leaders and they could additionally
play on the previous leader now being a martyr. Seen in this light, it is not easy
to know how the measures one takes will pan out in the long-term without
having a thorough insight into the culture and the rules of play that apply in a
given area. Perhaps nothing is better than arresting the leader. This had major
consequences for the Kurds in Turkey and for Peru’s Communist Party. Leaders
who die in battle will often become martyrs at a time when the movement
needs rallying symbols (for example, Adem Jashari in the Kosovo Albanian
guerrilla organisation, the UCK).
These challenges, which can be characterised by the concepts of weapons
of mass destruction, information operations and non-conventional operations,
have probably always existed in another form for as long as organised warfare
has been practiced. What is new is that these options have obviously increased
in the last 10 years and the importance of this form of unconventional warfare
has thereby increased correspondingly.
6.3.3 The importance of information and information control

As already previously pointed out, rapid developments in computer technology
provide new possibilities – for both insurgents and those opposing them. In
the course of the last 5–6 years, how to be able to meet potentially devastating
so-called ‘cyber attacks’ or ‘cyber-based attacks’ has become one of the priority
questions in most Western states.
Although it is Western states (or Western-owned companies) that control
the majority of satellites with infra red (IR) and radar equipment, which con-
tinually monitor large parts of the Earth, the vulnerability of these same states
has increased with regard to various forms of information operations. This
applies to not only network-based information operations, but also the more
‘traditional’ tasks of IO such as psychological and perception managing warfare.
Ironically enough, it is the case that the more the world becomes digitalised,
the more vulnerable it becomes to electronic attacks. When it comes to military
and governmental aspects, developments have become continually more threat-
ening. Modern weapon systems are normally constructed around mini comput-
ers and are used in connection with precision attacks. E-mail has become an
absolute necessity for military communication and the entire logistics system
has been digitalised. Something that could intensify Western vulnerability as
regards the dependency on digitalisation is the transition to commercial think-
ing based on the ‘just in time’ principle. This form of logistics is already a prob-
lem in industry even in times of peace and even a minor industrial dispute can
148
quickly bring production to a standstill in a third country, something that there

have already been examples of in Norway and other Western countries.
So-called ‘insiders’, ‘rogue hackers’ and hostile military jammers and bug-
ging systems can exploit this development.206 As regards recorded breaches of
security that have led to a loss of data with economic consequences, it is actually
the case that when we come to single out the guilty party these are actually dis-
loyal employees in the vast number of cases. It is therefore not outside hackers
who are the greatest offenders, even if it may appear so from media publicity.
The use of non-technological information operations targeted at conventional
forces that appear on paper far more capable and technologically advanced was
demonstrated in a frightening manner in connection with the air campaign in
Kosovo in 1999. Belgrade was winning the psychological and opinion-forming
information war against NATO.207 The stream of Albanian refugees and the
countless stories of attacks that came out of Kosovo were perhaps what pre-
vented such a ‘victory’ for the regime in Belgrade.
As regards network-based information operations, the West is probably on
the way to becoming more vulnerable as capacity within this area increases. As
previously indicated, this development is not something that only concerns the
military sector, but the civilian and commercial sectors equally so. One of the
best-known computer virus attacks so far is the one that launched a so-called
distributed denial of service attack against Internet-based companies such as
Yahoo, Amazon and eBay during the course of 1999 and 2000. The e-mail
virus ‘I love you’ caused a similar amount of damage in May 2000. Even if the
industry and private users now spend billions each year on protecting them-
selves against this form of attack, there is still a perpetual battle between those
who design operative systems and software and those who want to ‘hack’ into
the computers and server systems in question – either to show how clever they
are or to wreak havoc and/or earn money.208
For example, in the spring of 2001, the FBI reported that the number of
‘cyber attacks’ in the U.S. had doubled in the course of a year. It is also a poten-
tial threat that competent opponents can make use of information operations
206. These concepts often have somewhat different definitions, depending on which sources one
uses. Generally, an ‘insider’ will be a person who has access to a company or a governmental
organisation’s ‘inside life’ either on his own or after being ‘planted’ there from outside. As
a result of this unique knowledge, he has a particularly great opportunity to cause major
damage. The concept ‘rogue hackers’ is often used of hackers who have the aim of going in
and causing direct damage when they get in through various ‘firewalls’ and other protective
measures.
207. Rekkedal, Moderne krigskunst, pp. 355–359.
208. Rekkedal, ibid., pp. 360–361.
149
as a strategic means in the ‘cyber arena’ and the so-called psycho-political arena.
The intention may possibly be to create mass hysteria in the civilian community,
perhaps combined with a small number of chemical or biological weapons that
are greatly exaggerated by the media. This may have the overall effect of trigger-
ing panic reactions. This form of ‘cyber warfare’ may, for instance, be deployed
to reduce the government leadership’s ability and capacity when they come
to try to make rational decisions. While amateur hackers have achieved most
publicity so far, the real threat is the knowledge that professional hackers may
use.209 It is extremely competent and well-trained people who normally work
in this profession. This type of expert can either work for a state institution
or for a private intelligence centre working against the open market, but this
activity will be most dangerous when this type of specialist works for criminal
organisations or for terrorist organisations. An example of this is the use that
the Colombian drug cartels are supposed to have made of technical specialists
in order to install and operate extremely advanced anti-bugging communica-
tions systems. While the typical amateur hacker, with his ‘small picture of the
world’, actually has little reason to travel around – they are quite happy ‘play-
ing in their own office’ – professional hackers are usually extremely mobile and
work for those who pay best, almost like ordinary ‘craftsmen’. For this reason,
links between terrorist organisations and hacker environments are of steadily
increasing interest in intelligence circles. In Russia and elsewhere in the former
Communist Eastern Europe, many clever hackers were previously trained and
information warfare was developed as a potential ‘weapon system’. Even if the
Soviet Union and Communist bloc are now history, there are still many ‘mav-
ericks’ from the earlier monitoring and intelligence environments available on
the criminal market.210
A well-organised asymmetric adversary can – at least theoretically – start a
strategically targeted operation of economic warfare at any time against eco-
nomic interests in parts of the West. What is perhaps feared most is that the
attacker will attack the series of different E-payment or electronic money trans-
fer systems that exist: systems that we have in reality now become entirely
dependent on with regard to international trade. A situation like this is difficult
to deal with effectively in the short-term when we think of the limited security
that existing financial systems have built-in. But the many attacks have led
to something positive. The conscious investment in the area of security over
209. The term ‘cyber mercenaries’ has been used for this type of ‘technological mercenary’.
210. Several computer magazines and other open sources have reported that it is probably rela-
tively easy to purchase so-called directed-energy weapons that can be used to ‘fry’ unprotected
circuit boards.
150
the last few years will probably clearly improve the situation over a period of
time, but it will take time for the Western superpowers and the international
community to fight this form of threat. It is quite simply no longer a realistic
alternative to just turn off the computer. The very fact that there has been a
clear increase in the use of virus attacks has necessitated that the systematic
investment in professionally developed countermeasures be brought forward.
Even Microsoft, which for a long time did little to protect its enormous user
group from virus attacks, has realised that it must do something. Microsoft has
begun to develop its own, more reliable countermeasures against hackers, and
the increasing threat has, in itself, made it possible for a series of computer pro-
tection companies to develop and sell more or less effective countermeasures.
This will probably eventually lead to the relative protection of the Western
computer networks gradually becoming better.
Information operations are generally actions carried out to support fixed
objectives. Normally, an attacker will attempt to influence decision-makers by
manipulating the actual information or information systems that belong to the
counter-party, while protecting his own information and his own information
systems. The actual execution of offensive IO is today a clear asymmetric threat
against Western states and interests, as we become more and more dependent
on information and information systems to be able to make the necessary deci-
sions. This increasing dependency makes it possible for people, or an organi-
sation with a hostile attitude, to implement actions to cause damage to the
adversary. This form of operation could be a threat if it is combined with the
use of terrorism and/or chemical weapons. As an example, one can imagine a
capital city’s telephone system for emergency services being hacked at the same
time as a terrorist act that could lead to significant personal injury being carried
out. This could, combined with the planned manipulation of the media, have a
strong synergic effect compared with if only one of these options was used.
Even today, a large number of instances have been documented where infor-
mation operations have been used to infiltrate or interfere with military and
civilian IT systems, including systems used for control and logistics manage-
ment. It has been most common to go into the system and modify data, prefer-
ably without the user immediately noticing the problems. Offensive informa-
tion campaigns can be roughly divided into the following categories:
1. Psychological operations – the ability to influence the will of an adversary.

This manipulation covers both political and diplomatic positions/attitudes,
the issuing of bulletins and more traditional methods such as the distribu-
tion of flyers, radio broadcasts and TV broadcasts. Today, data communica-
tion is also used for the extensive ‘dumping’ of information by, for example,
people in authority, politicians, journalists and various forms of ‘useful idiot’
151
who, together, can influence public opinion. The message can be reinforced
by using underhand or public acts of terror, including hostage taking and
threats of genocide. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focus
on security has dominated most aspects of American society. The result has
been that there is often an overreaction, even where the indications of an
impending terrorist attack are weak. This is an unfortunate development that
must be taken seriously if society is to be prevented from becoming extreme-
ly vulnerable to psychological operations. For example, we should endeavour
to avoid overreacting. A letter with a little white powder addressed to a gov-
ernment building can, without a better analysis and evaluation system, lead
to the building being evacuated. This type of overreaction obviously costs
money and scares the staff unnecessarily. Eventually, there will probably be
a new balance in the form of reaction; so that reactions to the constant mes-
sages received – false ones and correct ones – are not exaggerated.
2. Attacks on infrastructure – this refers primarily to activities that lead to
damage to information or information systems in such a manner that this
influences, for example, military operations or greatly interferes with the
running of the civilian community. Today, there is a broad spectrum of
possible operations – from attacks on computer networks to attacks on an
adversary’s electronic capacity to conduct warfare to physical devastation of
fixed or mobile installations. These measures involve everything from tradi-
tional hacker activity to co-ordinated reconnaissance, computer infiltration
and manipulation and can also include so-called ‘slow down’ attacks on
private companies or government institutions of various kinds.
3. Diversionary manoeuvres (deception, maskirovka) – the aim of this kind of
operation is to confuse the enemy by manipulating, distorting or falsifying
the reports or intelligence pictures he has. The main aim is always to make
the adversary act – entirely voluntarily – contrary to his own objective inter-
ests. This may involve the manipulation of various media by, for example,
sending to ‘weak’ journalists what it is assumed they want to hear and will
consequently publish, and adapting information so that some of it can be
checked against specified sources. Propaganda can also be used if this is
adapted to the audience one wishes to reach.
4. Manipulation of pictures – a new and potentially potent means is the
significant ability that modern digital film and video have to manipulate
pictures and film, something that could potentially strongly influence how
TV ‘slants’ its reports in the future. We can subsequently expect digital pic-
ture editing/picture manipulation to become more and more common in
connection with information operations, i.e., the systematic use of digitally
152
processed picture material that has been ‘doctored’ to give it the ‘correct’
content.211 At the moment, this problem is more of a ‘commercial’ nature,
cf., the first forged pictures of British soldiers abusing prisoners (see below)
or of Western sources serving up manipulated pictures/facts. Insurgent
movements in the Third World had, up to the year 2000, only used this
form of information manipulation to a limited degree. There is, however,
every reason to believe that we will, in the future, see guerrilla movements
and international terrorist groups in particular making extensive use of
modern information technology. As digital media has a relatively short his-
tory, we have probably, as yet, a limited insight into the opportunities and
consequences that this technology will lead to. For the West’s part, we are
learning every day about the opportunities and limitations that there clearly
are in connection with ongoing operations.
It should be noted here that so-called ‘cyber terrorism’ will not simply be
a matter of who will be most able to destroy electronic systems but includes,
to an equal extent, information gathering, i.e., information that can be con-
verted into intelligence. The intense focus there has been on various forms of
electronic destruction often ignores the more effective use of IT in connection
with terrorist warfare.
This refers to the relationship between the gathering of intelligence, coun-
terintelligence and disinformation, but it is nevertheless a factor that will be of
importance in connection with future warfare. As the military bureaucracies in
the West and in the U.S. in particular are extremely cumbersome and formalis-
tic in their developmental and ordering procedures, years can pass from a devel-
opment being started until the military equipment in question can be commis-
sioned. Terrorist organisations – if they have access to money and experts – do
not have restrictions like this to struggle against and consequently have a rapid
pace of readjustment when they are well led. Everything points to al-Qaeda’s
technical equipment being of a good standard and often more modern than the
American forces had with them. This is demonstrated by the material that was
seized in Afghanistan.212
Some factors are constantly being developed. So-called Internet Blogs are
now on the way to becoming an extremely common medium for communi-
cating news, which journalists, private individuals and intelligence personnel
use as an information base. It is uncertain to how great an extent resources
are used to verify this type of information, but with its catchments area across
211. Rekkedal (2003), Moderne krigskunst, pp. 361–363.

212. Rekkedal, ibid., p. 363.
153
the Internet and the inherent speed of distribution, this could potentially be
an excellent medium for information operations – from both sides! A British
example that can be recalled of quick reactions was when one of the newspa-
pers in Great Britain published allegedly authentic pictures of British troops
abusing prisoners in Iraq. Within 24 hours, the authorities had picked enough
holes in the story that it lost its credibility within leading circles in the UK.
The problem is also that editors in the ‘tabloid’ press are in daily competition
for readers. In the UK, there is often little loyalty to newspapers which are
normally only sold in single copies. It is the first page that sells – the creation
of sensation generates income, sometimes at the expense of credibility. Today’s
international IT network means that information like this that has been proved
to be incorrect can be spread around the world in just a few minutes.213 The
adversary will be able to follow up on this by using the falsified pictures with a
view to reinforcing the desired negative effect and stating that these come from
a ‘reliable’ English newspaper, etc. (In this example from the autumn of 2004,
the editor fell on his sword: he had to resign from his post.)
The use of Internet Blogs is still mainly an elitist activity that cannot be meas-
ured alongside newspapers, TV and radio. If influential individuals uncritically
take their information from sources such as these, then there will be little con-
trol over what one reads, apart from the restrictions that good press etiquette,
‘house styles’ and editors can exercise. On the other hand, daily newspapers are
quick to criticise others in the media who dare to tread too far from the beaten
path. The system therefore has a kind of built-in control system, even if it is a
weak one. Hardened politicians do not then rely on the short-term memories
of ordinary people: yesterday’s news really belongs to the past. Being active in
PSYOPS or deception requires thorough planning, solid implementation and an
understanding of ‘sell-by dates’, i.e., having an understanding of the relatively
short ‘lifespan’ of individual operations.214 A lengthy campaign therefore also
requires solid resources and good actors. The three-week long hostage-taking
of the British citizen Kenneth Bigley in September–October 2004 – with the
release of several video messages – is an excellent example of how a group with
relatively small resources can almost hold an entire country hostage. The fact
213. Jonathan Glater, ‘At a Suit’s Core: Are Bloggers Reporters, Too?’, The New York Times, 7
March 2005.
214. According to U.S. Joint Forces Command, Psychological Operations are a component of
Information Operations: ‘PSYOP are actions taken to convey selected information and indi-
cators to foreign audiences. They are designed to influence emotions, motives, reasoning,
and ultimately, the behaviour of the adversary. Examples of PSYOP include distribution of
leaflets, loud-speaker broadcasts, radio and television broadcasts, and other means of trans-
mitting information that encourages adversary forces to defect, desert, flee, or surrender.’
<http://www.jfcom.mil/about/ glossary.htm#G>.
154
that the insurgents finally decided to behead the man demonstrates, first and
foremost, that those responsible for this act of terrorism did not fully under-
stand what a propaganda scoop they were sitting on.
6.3.4 The combination of information, information operations

and intelligence
Many who write today about this relationship call for the improved and more
cost-effective gathering of information and the processing and analysis of this
with the associated assessment of courses of action, and adaptation of the intel-
ligence to the needs of the recipients so that users can quickly use this with
a view to being able to meet asymmetric threats. This is a reason for asking
whether the traditional means of gathering intelligence information are the best
options one has for meeting the new forms of asymmetric threats. Should one
attempt to create tailor-made/user-adapted intelligence or should intelligence
organisations supply ‘raw products’ that users must themselves interpret and
evaluate? The latter is hardly the way to go in the area of asymmetric warfare,
given the great experience and insight required if one is to possibly predict this
type of ‘diffuse’ threat.
Traditional intelligence activity based on the use of technology is still an
extensive activity for all superpowers and is also one of the main activities in
the majority of smaller Western military powers. Even if the information this
activity generates is still important in order to be able to record and monitor the
more traditional challenges, this type of intelligence hardly creates a sufficient
basis for being able to tackle a number of threats from the more low technology
insurgent movements, or the different kinds of terrorist organisations.
Technological monitoring is still important in order to be able to moni-
tor electronic activity and communications traffic, including the electronic use
of space. This is also a reason for emphasising that localisation through, for
instance, electronic eavesdropping of transnational terrorist bases in Afghanistan
or monitoring what is happening in countries such as North Korea and Iran, is
a necessary and important activity if surprises are to be avoided.215 The essence
is that the gathering of electronic data is still of value and, even against ter-
rorists in the category that bin Laden, for example, belongs to, necessary, but
electronic intelligence is not sufficient if these organisations are to be opposed.
New methods must also be developed for obtaining the information and facts
needed, but the knowledge and competence to understand the new general
conditions that apply are at least as necessary. Great knowledge of foreign
215. O’Brien and Nusbaum, ‘Intelligence Gathering Asymmetric Threats’, <http://www.icsa.

ac.uk>, 2001.
155
languages, cultures, etc., is required in order to be able to perform an analysis

within a relevant context, draw the relevant conclusions and present practical
intelligence to users, including the general public where it is directly threatened.
Effective intelligence activity directed at asymmetric threats must involve more
than operations carried out with electronic means of gathering information. It
may be of interest here to emphasise what Thomas X. Hammes has stated with
regard to the new requirements (see also Chapter 2):
Fourth generation war will require much more intelligence gathering,
analysis, and a greater dissemination capability to serve a highly flexible,
interagency command system. At the same time, the fact that fourth gen-
eration war will include elements of earlier generations of war means our
forces must be prepared to deal with these aspects as well (…) therefore, it
will be essential for leaders to make an accurate analysis of the war they are
about to enter. The complex mix of generations of war with their overlap-
ping political, economic, social, military, and mass media arenas makes
determining the type of war we are entering more critical than ever.216
Hammes indicates here that the requirements for intelligence will not
decrease in ‘the new wars’ but rather the opposite. His point is that the Western
forces, instead of continuing as if nothing has happened, must now master
intelligence methods that will function in both conventional wars and in wars
in the Third World where they may possibly become involved. The require-
ments will consequently become increasingly greater in this area.
The steadily increasing awareness with regard to the importance of intel-
ligence in connection with so-called PSOs has meant that several nations have
also worked on adapting their investments in this new reality in the field of
intelligence. This type of operation is expected to take place in an area where
one can expect hostilities and where it has proved, in fact, to be difficult to
practice the more traditional military division into rear, close and deep opera-
tions. As regards so-called peace enforcement operations that have often been
based on the so-called Chapter VII of the UN Charter in particular, one must
expect huge and, to an extent, high intensity battles. The possible division of
intelligence support could be based on the following three-way division:
1. Strategic intelligence which is mainly general background information

about potential conflict areas. When a conflict has been triggered, the
intentions, goals and attitudes of local/regional political decision-makers
will always be of strategic interest. Strategic intelligence may cover the col-
lection of data with regard to:
216. The quote is taken from Thomas X. Hammes, ‘The Evolution of War: The Fourth
Generation’, see <http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes.htm>.
156
• topography, communications, climate in the area in question;

• political attitudes and the view that the various groupings in the area in
question hold. It will also be of interest who is allied to who and what
ambitions the main leaders possibly have;
• any ethnic, religious and cultural antagonism;
• military forces (military capacity, discipline, loyalty of government-con-
trolled troops, but the same also applies to militias, guerrilla units or
other improvised or, for instance, clan-controlled ‘insurgent units’);
• information regarding the overall economic and social conditions and
about more local economic symbiotic relationships.
2. Operational intelligence will mainly be concentrated on an actual conflict
area that is, or is expected to be, a theatre of operations. Within the actual
theatre of operations, it is common to focus on details within the factors
mentioned in point 1 above. An example of this might, for instance, be
infrastructure of major importance to the parties, local relative strength and
especially changes to the security situation for one’s own forces in the area
(with a view to so-called Force Protection).
3. Tactical intelligence will normally cover circumstances that will soon
directly concern the forces within an allocated theatre of operations (or
strip of land). An example of such intelligence could be an insight into local
political conditions, attitudes and particularly changes to these, as well as
various forms of military activity carried out by the parties.
But when one becomes involved in, for example, a PSO in a Third World
country, the factors that will directly influence developments here will, to
an extent, be different to those that apply in an industrialised country. One
should, among other things, think through the fact that in parts of the Third
World orderlies/messengers, the use of tom-toms and smoke signals are still
alternative means of communication in daily use and which function excellently
under local conditions. Access to local expertise is required if one is to ‘moni-
tor’ a message sent using tom-toms. Our Western electronic-based monitoring
systems become less relevant in a situation like this. Only a few people with a
Western background can today ‘read’ this form of communication between the
different forms of insurgent movements. Consequently, the efforts of people,
such as agents (so-called HUMINT)217 and the extensive use of open sources
217. HUMINT stands for Human Intelligence, and refers to intelligence gathering by means of:
interrogations, espionage and using a network of secret agents from the local population.
157
(so-called OSINT) are required today if one is to build up well functioning

intelligence systems in the Second and Third Worlds.218 Without this func-
tioning satisfactorily, we would hardly be able to uncover the more educated
terrorist groups’ plans directed at our own interests or against our allies. The
challenges are therefore big ones. Consequently, in connection with this type
of conflict, there is still a central resource one must have access to: area experts
and/or sector specialists who know the local culture and mentality. Language
skills are also very important. Without such an insight, it is difficult to find
the correct, well-adapted countermeasures in a given conflict. A lack of cul-
tural understanding and respect for local traditions is a classic example of how
to turn the local population into adversaries. American forces have repeatedly
come up against this problem in Latin America and, more recently, in the
Middle East without being able to find effective countermeasures.
In an increasingly global world, Western states will possibly fight threats,
to an increasing extent, through involvement in other parts of the world, i.e.,
in other states’ territories. An insight into cultural differences and similarities
will consequently become increasingly more important to the manner in which
information is converted into intelligence material. This also means that both
HUMINT and OSINT, for example, can be interpreted differently by actors
from the two sides of the Atlantic.219 The problem with intelligence, particu-
larly from the Third World, is the lack of reliable and detailed information
about ‘the inside life’ of insurgent movements and terrorist groups. If they are
well led and still well motivated, it is difficult to penetrate the ‘cells’ that the
cadres normally form. The infiltration of an insurgent movement’s leadership
so that one gains access to the planning and way they think has historically
often provided the best results. This form of HUMINT, together with a good
ability to analyse the material one actually obtains, has, however, proved dif-
ficult to acquire. During the Cold War, it was also electronic intelligence that
both the Soviet Union and U.S./NATO countries invested in most, with much
success. Electronically gathered information has proved to be inadequate, and
one can probably see the limited HUMINT efforts as a structural problem in
the existing intelligence structures. During the Cold War it was possible for
218. The term ‘open sources’ has often been synonymous with the media, i.e., TV, radio, news-
papers, magazines and the like. Today, we should look a little more closely at this. U.S. Joint
Forces Command defines Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) as: ‘Information of potential
intelligence value that is available to the general public.’ A steadily increasing source of infor-
mation – particularly for those who can use the Internet – is so-called ‘blogs’, eavesdropped
radio conversations, pictures, interviews, etc., that are put on the Net. Some people have
spoken of ‘open’ SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, etc.
219. Rekkedal, Moderne krigskunst, p. 354.
158
either side to recruit operatives willing to work based on their political convic-
tions. In more recent conflicts, e.g., in Iraq, this has been far more difficult. In
some of the former CIS countries that are predominately Muslim for example,
it has been advantageous to rely on help from friendly Muslim countries, rather
than to attempt to deploy western operatives.
Intelligence should, of course, form the basis for the planning and imple-
mentation of future activities. At the same time, we see an increasing interest
in effects within so-called ‘preparatory operations’ (as part of IO). An exam-
ple of this form of activity could be misleading information and psychologi-
cal operations (PSYOPS) in particular and the increased understanding of the
importance of organising a controlled so-called ‘public information policy’. This
approach, together with developing solid intelligence foundations, creates in
many ways the basis for any success where asymmetries are encountered. The
use of traditional kinetic effects/use of arms, supported by so-called Public
Affairs and Civil-Military Operations, is to supplement/underpin more ‘soft’
means. Last but not least, the time factor is taken into consideration.220 Effect
is best achieved quickly by a rapid transition from observation of an event/
activity to the targeted influencing of the goal.
Here we should, however, remember that what we in the West interpret as
asymmetry could perhaps be symmetry for the opponent. A basic understanding
of the conditions upon which the adversary builds his philosophy, strengths and
strategy therefore helps to ‘demystify’ the concept of asymmetry as such. A pro-
longed asymmetric campaign will gradually become symmetrical, as Western
forces will also adapt to the prevailing (local) conditions. Asymmetric threats
220. The U.S. Joint Forces Command’s definitions are (2005): ‘Public Affairs (PA) – Those
public information, command information, and community relations activities directed
toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense.
PA activities expedite the flow of accurate and timely information to the internal audience
(the SJFHQ and the JTF) and the external audience (the public). Increasing availability of
this information to these audiences may have a significant effect on national will, politi-
cal direction, and national security objectives and policy. PA activities will not be used in
support of military deception capability or to provide disinformation to either audience.’
Similarly, ‘Civil-Military Operations’ are defined as follows: ‘The activities of a commander
that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmen-
tal and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace
in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to
consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include
performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the
local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or sub-
sequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other
military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs,
by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.’
159
must be opposed using resources that reflect the local conditions. It is here that
intelligence resources should be deployed to improve the understanding of the
local situation.221
In general, technological developments within computer technology, tel-
ecommunications and data transmission capacity have clearly influenced the
international security agenda. The various groupings that constitute a threat to
the existing order have also, as a result of developments in civil technology over
the last few years, improved their ability to operate.
Together, these factors have also led to a great change in the need for infor-
mation and intelligence. This again sets new requirements for the gathering,
processing, presentation and use of data. These features are reinforced as a result
of society having become more open so that information and knowledge are
becoming more easily accessible to the majority of people. Information can
now be shared on networks all around the world ‘at the click of a mouse’.
It was on the basis of this more general explanation that the concept of
‘asymmetric threat’ became established and discussed increasingly more often
during the 1990s. This threat often refers to the challenges that are in contrast
to how we have previously interpreted war: one heavily equipped military force
facing a force of approximately the same complexity and design. During the
entire Cold War, there existed a form of ‘symmetric threat’ from the Soviet
Union. This was seen as the main challenge to the West and its defence and
security systems. These new forms of asymmetric threat have a different nature
to those that were in focus in the period after the Second World War: the threat
of a conventional invasion from the Soviet Union. Examples of new threats are,
as previously indicated, the increasing number of capable actors in chemical,
biological and electronic warfare, combined with increasing activity from sever-
al forms of extremist group. These are extremist groups that normally have one
or a few matters close to their heart that they narrow-mindedly fight for. These
extremist groups may, for example, be radical environmental groups, funda-
mentalist religious groups, ethnically recruited groups and more traditionally
based political and ideological groupings. Viewed overall, these groups have
been responsible for an increasing number of attacks on the forces they wish
221. Experiences from the exchange of intelligence between participants in military coalitions
show that it is often the case that one does not exchange in time. Often there is a strong
interest in the best possible protection of national intelligence, even between allies. This is a
problem that could lead to undermining the effectiveness of the exchange of information in
military operations and make effective collaboration between nations taking part in opera-
tions more difficult. Perhaps this cannot be entirely avoided, but, in general, there has, on
many occasions, been a lack of robust agreements on the development of intelligence at an
operational and tactical level in connection with international operations.
160
to oppose, e.g., the government’s police and military capacity, the adversary’s
religious symbols, state-owned and private property and anything else they see
as an adversary of the attitudes that they themselves represent.
Today, an almost perpetual series of large and small terrorist attacks is being
carried out, most of them in the Second and Third Worlds. Only a few of these,
occasionally large and serious, attacks are reported on in detail in the Western
press, while even smaller incidents are often made a great deal of if they happen
in the vicinity of a CNN reporter. They report what they see or hear about – the
rest remains, at least to begin with, unknown. This is a factor we should take
into account when we try to assess the threat the various insurgent movements,
terrorist groups and more or less criminal groups represent to the local situa-
tion or to Western interests as such. If we are to manage to meet this growing
challenge, we need to be better able to map, analyse and investigate this form
of threat, i.e., an increased understanding of and insight into the conditions
that form the basis for the asymmetric methods of attack being developed and
used must be created. Today, this is seen as the job of most Western intelligence
organisations and for the police’s analysis and intelligence capacity.222
In Western countries in general, and the U.S. in particular, considerable
resources have been put into studies of the main features of asymmetric threats
as they have developed over the course of the 1990s and the possible conse-
quences of the new attitudes and trends we are now seeing in the aftermath
of the acts of terrorism in the U.S. on September 11, 2001. The American
intelligence organisations have traditionally focused on leadership, capability,
capacity and organisation as the basis for their analyses and predictions. This
same pattern has dominated in the corresponding Western European services.
After the major ‘clean-out’ of the CIA’s leadership in the autumn of 2004, the
CIA will now also focus (i.e., by expanding the context) on the social and cul-
tural trends that can directly and indirectly influence a conflict/war or political
developments. It obviously remains to be seen whether such a powerful reor-
ganisation of ‘the inner traditions’ within the CIA and, in the long-term, within
the other American intelligence operations will succeed.223
One question that should be asked is: is the threat against the West and
against Western interests increasing today? It is difficult to answer with a clear
222. Kevin O’Brien and Joseph Nusbaum, ‘Intelligence Gathering Asymmetric Threats’, <http://
www.icsa.ac.uk>, 2001. Kevin O’Brien was Deputy Director of the International Centre
for Security Analysis, ICSA. Joseph Nusbaum was a researcher at ICSA and was involved in
‘cyber threats presented by sub-state actors’ when the text was written.
223. The major area of investment appears to be an increase in capacity within languages. As an
example, the number of students studying Arabic languages has increased dramatically in
the last two years in the U.S.
161
yes or no here as the developments are a combination of the internal conditions

in individual countries, both in the West and in the Third World, and of threats
that are ‘imported’ to Western countries from the Third World in particular.
Nevertheless, the attacks on New York, Madrid and London all indicate that
Western policies as implemented in the Second and Third Worlds may trigger
violent responses. These responses are increasingly likely to be executed in First
World locations. Globalisation, for instance, has, for better or worse, made it
easier to physically move to and from areas of conflict (perhaps also disguised?),
cf., the large streams of refugees that we see internally in many countries today
and which often influence neighbouring countries to a significant extent. These
are streams of refugees that also often have the aim of reaching ‘the promised
land’, i.e., to Europe or the U.S. The fact that it is easy today to travel and, in
particular, to convey one’s message by electronic means, gives Western security
services and the military establishment entirely new challenges to tackle.
6.4 The different forms of insurgency – an evaluation
6.4.1 ‘Revolutionary war’ after the Second World War –

two important cases
Two wars that have often been compared in specialist literature in connection
with revolutionary warfare or guerrilla warfare are the protracted British war
against primarily Chinese insurgents in Malaysia during the period 1948 until
about 1962, and the other is the Vietnam War that must actually be seen as a
war conducted in several phases.
First, there was France’s colonial war in Indochina during the period between
1946 and 1954 that resulted in the Communist-controlled Vietminh move-
ment taking power in North Vietnam and eventually also Laos. Then, after
a relatively quiet period from 1955 to about 1958, came the major ‘continu-
ation war’ in South Vietnam. In the period from 1958 to 1964, we saw con-
tinual battles between the NLF/Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese regime’s
forces, with North Vietnam playing the role of sponsor for the NLF and the
U.S. for the government forces. The third phase, with the U.S. and North
Vietnam in the main roles, followed during the period from about 1965 to
1973. The last phase of the Vietnam War ended with the North Vietnamese
defeating the regime in South Vietnam in the spring of 1975 after the U.S.
chose not to intervene militarily when North Vietnam captured South Vietnam
by means of a conventional invasion. It can also be noted in this respect that the
Vietminh changed its character over a period of time. For example, by the time
of the clash at the Dien Bien Phu fortress in the spring of 1954, the Vietminh
no longer had the character of a guerrilla movement but was operating as a
162
CHINA
Dien Bien Phu
Hanoi
NORTH VIETNAM
LAOS
Vinh
Vientiane
Dong Ha
Hue
Da Nang
THAILAND
Mekon
g
SOUTH VIETNAM
Pleiku Qui
Nhon
CAMBODIA
Ban Me Thuot
Da Lat
Phnom Penh
Bien Hoa
Saigon
Area controlled
by NFL
Area controlled
by the government
Controversial area
Ca Mau
Tet Offensive 1968 100 km
Key map of South-East Asia: the map shows who controlled the different parts of South Vietnam around
1967. The asterisks * mark which areas were attacked by NLF forces during the Tet Offensive.
(Map: Samuel Svärd)
163
conventional infantry division able to carry out a siege ending in the storming
and capture of the forts in question. In the last phase of the protracted Vietnam
War (1975), the guerrilla elements were almost non-existent in South Vietnam
– it was North Vietnam’s conventional forces that decided the war.
In Malaysia, the British were successful in adapting to local conditions and
the British forces also overpowered the Communist rural-based guerrilla move-
ment here. Things were not, however, to go as well in Vietnam where first
France and, later, the U.S. were to prove to be less successful in their lengthy
‘counter-insurgency’. As regards Vietnam, it proved to be impossible to win
against the highly motivated Communist leadership with its centre in North
Vietnam. Factors that gradually became of major importance were that South
Vietnam and the Americans were never able to prevent new supplies of weapons
continually coming into the guerrilla forces in the South. In this regard, we also
see the importance of a military sponsor for an insurgency, in this case in the
form of North Vietnam which, in turn, received significant assistance in the
form of weapons from, first, China and, later, the Soviet Union. This was long-
term military support that those leading the insurgency in Malaysia could not
hope for. The regime in North Vietnam was also willing to accept great losses,
something that their American opponents were not willing to do. But factors
other than motivation and a strong political line were also of importance for the
outcome. A very controversial issue in the literature has been whether the U.S.
Army was willing to adapt to local conditions during the Vietnam War and
whether it was actually able to understand how a Communist-led insurgency
actually worked.
There were several problems. Many writers have particularly pointed to the
lack of so-called ‘unity of effort’ and the lack of an overall long-term strategy.
In operational terms, this led to major problems, even if they learned a lot tacti-
cally from the extensive battles. Another problem was the standard of training
and composition of the American forces – the establishment of the American
National Training Center (NTC) was a consequence of this.224 Instead, the
Americans chose, in the opening years (the period from 1958 to about 1968),
to see the war as primarily a conventional war similar to the Korean War. Nor
had the USA chosen to adapt during the war against the Indians in Northwest
America. Despite this, the American Army eventually won against the country’s
divided Indian tribes.
224. Nils Marius Rekkedal and Niklas Zetterling, Grundbok i operationskonst: utvecklingen av
operationskonsten och dess teorier [An Introductory Book on Operational Art: Development
of Operational Art and Its Theories] (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2004),
pp. 163–200.
164
From 1968, the war changed character by way of North Vietnam itself, in
practice, waging war with its more conventionally arranged main forces. From
this point on, the local freedom movement took on a more marginal role. In
military terms, the Tet Offensive in 1968 was also a clear military defeat for
the NLF and the North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. (See also the dis-
cussion in point 9.4.) Politically, it proved nevertheless to be the case that the
offensive would give the Communists a decisive advantage in the long-term.
Theoretically, the clear military successes that American and South Vietnamese
forces enjoyed against North Vietnamese forces and the NLF should have been
a clear disadvantage to the insurgents. They had, amongst other things, to suffer
significant losses. But, after Tet, it was, however, too late politically. American
public opinion at home and the political elite had tired of the war and the
international mood had turned against the United States.225
As many people have pointed out in the series of specialist books, mem-
oirs and literature of a more propaganda nature that were published during
the war and subsequently, it is a fact that the U.S. Army scarcely lost a sin-
gle major battle during the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1972. But as Colonel
Harry G. Summers has stated in the book On Strategy, tactical superiority and
greater access to firepower were not sufficient to guarantee victory in Vietnam.
By making themselves dependent on firepower, the American military chiefs
became, at the same time, little inclined to seek conflict outside the range
of their artillery. Here, they were more on the same terms as the NLF/Viet
Cong or North Vietnamese forces. Tactical behaviours and attitudes like these
225. Sam C. Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and
Vietnam (London: Contributions in Military Studies, No. 134, Greenwood Press, 1993),
see Chapter 8, pp. 167–168. See also John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya
and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (London: Preager, 2002), Chapter 7, pp.
167–168. In general, I would state that American military operations in Vietnam were
mainly successful. An important negative factor was that the American forces operated
without an independently co-ordinated leadership – operations were in reality focused on
branches of the armed forces. In addition, there was a lack of an overall political strategy
and, due to this, effective political support for the war. The many tactical operations were
consequently not put into an overall context where they could build on the military suc-
cesses actually achieved in the period from 1965 to 1968. In addition, the media became
an important factor over time, particularly since the local military authorities were lacking
a cohesive policy for the organisation of the media and the subsequent flow of information.
In retrospect, these weaknesses were thoroughly analysed and formed the basis for the later
reorganisation of the top military command structure and the establishment of regional so-
called CINCs. (The world was divided into regions – all new staff were led by a general who
had overall military responsibility.) However, as regards this book, it is not discussed how
the Vietnam War was fought but, instead, I look more at how it was organised and led. (See
my account later in the text.)
165
obviously reduced American losses but, at the same time, made their own
manoeuvres and offensive operations more difficult.226
British warfare in Malaysia was also characterised by other traditions than
the American warfare. The British Army had a long tradition and experience as
a ‘colonial police force’ and the existing organisational culture and even British
historical tradition, and the mentality it had created, proved better able to deal
with the experiences gained and translate them into a functioning programme
for counter-insurgency in connection with what was called the ‘Malayan
Emergency’ in Great Britain.227 One could, of course, ask whether the British
were cleverer at finding trustworthy local forces and listening to them than the
Americans and French, for example, were? It could perhaps be claimed that the
British were able to develop a uniform strategy and established uniform targets
that fitted their strategy. In this way they achieved ‘unity of effort’ – something
that made it possible to achieve effective and long-term co-operation between
the many government offices and units of the military leadership. The British
also made use of these experiences later – in Northern Ireland, for instance.
But as no two conflicts are the same, we should be careful when attempting to
226. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA:
Presido Press, 1982). This book had a significant influence on American doctrinal thinking
when it came out and since the book was in many ways a ‘commissioned work’ and at the
time was published with support from the U.S. Army’s top leaders and was used in teach-
ing in the years to come, Summers’s interpretation can be seen as ‘acceptable’ to the U.S.
Army. It is significant that Summers laid the main responsibility for the war being lost on
politicians. Other factors that are often emphasised in this literature focusing on ‘counter-
insurgency’ are, for instance, that many of the reasons for the defeat lie at a strategic level,
symbolised by a lack of a strategic framework and ‘disjointed’ campaign plans. It is pointed
out that the Americans and the South Vietnamese lacked a uniform command-and-control
organisation and that not even the branches of the American Armed Forces were properly
co-ordinated. Probably a greater problem was that they failed to establish a political interest
in Vietnam among the American people. It was also significant that they exercised ‘self-
imposed’ restrictions by choosing not to combat the ‘source of power’, North Vietnam, with
ground forces while the strategic bombing of targets in North Vietnam was not linked to
other operations, etc. The U.S. did not want a new ‘Korean War’ – something that could not
be totally ruled out if they were to go into Vietnam with large ground forces. However, none
of these explanations is adequate on its own. This war was obviously not waged in a political
vacuum and strong ‘players’ such as the Soviet Union and China became very important in
that they, among others, supported Hanoi politically and with large amounts of war material
– support that the NLF in South Vietnam was ultimately dependent on.
227. Books that provide a good picture of the war in Malaya (today’s Malaysia) are: Nagl,
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, see particularly Part II, pp. 59–111;
Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the
Present (New York: The Free Press, 1977). Chapters 1 and 2, pp. 1–51 in particular deal with
Malaya and the more general characteristics of counter-insurgency.
166
Two soldiers from New Zealand belonging to the 22nd Squadron Air Service on patrol. Even although Malaysia
had become independent in 1957, Great Britain supported the new regime by combating the mainly Chinese
insurgent movement in the country. (Photo: Horace Abrahams/Keystone Features/Getty Images.)
directly transfer experiences from one conflict to the next one. It will always be
necessary to adapt to local conditions.
6.4.2 ‘New world disorder’?

As I see it, what has been demonstrated in this chapter is the existence of a ‘new
world disorder’. In European military tradition, which the American tradition
should also be seen as part of, irregular or unconventional warfare has not felt
comfortable. It was obviously the major battles that dominated the Second
World War, and if we ignore the danger of nuclear war, it was a major conven-
tional war in Europe that preparations were made for during the Cold War. The
Korean War was also a major conventional war. The Vietnam War was a bit of
a departure for the U.S. from its preferred style of warfare and was a traumatic
experience, particularly for the U.S. Army. As discussed previously, the great
‘lesson learned’ from the Vietnam War was that the U.S. Army never again
wanted to fight a limited war against irregular forces. Instead, they wanted
167
to develop a new form of conventional warfare based on new military think-

ing where advanced new technology was of great importance: war conducted
with precision weapons, delivered at a distance. They wanted to use these new
weapon systems to be able to quickly achieve a decisive victory in conventional
combat. The Gulf War in 1991 was also ‘evidence’ that they had come close to
the objectives they had set.
The problem has always been, and still is, that irregular forces and pro-
tracted guerrilla-like wars do not stop occurring! The American forces in par-
ticular, but also the European forces, have, since 1991, become involved, to an
increasingly greater extent, in these ‘Third World wars’. In the wars we have
seen in areas as different as the Balkans, in Africa (e.g., Somalia, Sierra Leone,
Liberia) and in Haiti, where Western forces have been involved, they have been
preoccupied the entire time with avoiding being dragged into ‘endless’ peace-
keeping operations. There has also been extensive political debate in places like
the U.S. on whether one should become involved in ‘peace operations’ like this.
Despite the aforementioned doubts, they have actually now stepped into this
great quagmire: first in Afghanistan – a country with an endlessly long tradition
of internal warfare, and, most recently, Iraq. How would a military force that is
actually created to fight short wars with superior precision weapons be able to
perhaps reorganise itself so as to be able to effectively combat irregular forces in
the protracted and low intensity wars that are ongoing? There are at least some
circumstances that one can describe and learn some lessons from.
Civil wars of the protracted variety, with the associated guerrilla campaigns
and (local) use of terror against the civilian population, always constitute a great
social problem. In addition to many human lives being lost in direct acts of
war each year, wars of this type have a number of barely controllable extended
effects. As previously pointed out in Chapter 2, some of the most common
problems we encounter are:
• In contrast to wars between states, civil wars/low-intensity conflicts/guerril-

la wars since the Second World War have often lasted many years – typically
about 10–15 years. This can be illustrated by a few examples: the so-called
‘Malayan Emergency’ lasted from 1946 to 1960. In the period from 1942 to
1951, a war went on in the Philippines between the ‘People’s Army’ (Huks)
and different forms of Filipino security forces. In Indochina, battles went
on in the period between 1946 to 1954 involving the French colonial forces
and the Communist-controlled Vietminh and this war actually continued
with partly new participants up to 1975. In Cambodia, we saw a protracted
and changing war between the regime in the officially neutral Cambodia
and the Khmer Rouge. The latter, with support from North Vietnam and
East Germany from 1954, first fought the U.S.-supported regime of Prince
168
Sihanouk in Phnom Penh. Later, when the Khmer Rouge, under its leader
Pol Pot, took over power in the country in 1975, it carried out its own
extreme ‘Year Zero’ revolution aimed at its own population. Perhaps as
many as two million Cambodians were killed in the period 1975–1976,
but the figures are disputed. In December 1978, the Communist Vietnam
then invaded Cambodia and deployed its own anti-Khmer Rouge regime
in Phnom Penh. However, Communist Vietnam was never successful in
crushing the Khmer Rouge and the war did not come to an end until the
leader Pol Pot gave up many years later and the situation became normal-
ised at the end of the 1990s. The UN became involved in peace attempts
from 1991 in what eventually became one of the biggest UN missions ever
carried out. By the time of its conclusion, the war had lasted almost 40
years with constantly changing sponsors of those who held power in Phnom
Penh.
• The acts of war, which are often combined with acts of terrorism directed at
the civilian population, also lead to streams of refugees (both internally and
possibly to neighbouring countries).
• These war-torn areas often become a sanctuary for extremely violent politi-
cal groups. Today, such groups may often be ‘imported’ from abroad, as
happened with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and during the ongoing guerrilla
and terrorist activity in Iraq.
• The war/conflict normally leads to poor economic growth in the area dev-
astated by war, as almost no one dares to invest under such conditions. The
problem of poverty is often closely associated with the lengthy consequences
of warfare in this respect and this may in itself contribute to the war con-
tinuing.
• Warfare in a country can indirectly influence, or directly contribute to creat-
ing political instability in neighbouring countries.
• Historically, war has often proved to lead to the spread of epidemic diseases
– and this is a problem today in Africa in particular.
• When a lengthy war has first occurred in an area, the experience of history
suggests that there is a great danger of new conflicts breaking out in the
same area, even many years after the formal conclusion of peace. There
is much hatred and bad blood between the actual ethnic and/or political
groups and it often does not take much before one sees a fresh outbreak of
acts of war.
169
Indochina, circa 1954: a French Foreign Legionnaire walks along the dry edge of a paddy field in connection
with clean-up action in the Red River district of North Vietnam, between Haiphong and Hanoi. Behind the
legionnaire, we see a T-24 light tank. This was part of the American military aid after the Second World War.
(The photograph was taken by an unknown photographer. Taken from the ‘War and Conflict’ CD issued by
the U.S. Army Defense Virtual Information Center.)
As previously indicated, there are many reasons for this type of civil war/
insurgency breaking out. In practice, it is difficult to identify any fixed pattern
with regard to how and why this type of war starts and is possibly brought to an
end. Research has, however, been able to identify some main types of conflict,
and can provide some pointers with regard to what may help to bring such
conflicts to an end. Nevertheless, a locally acceptable and permanent solution
must be created – or else it is likely that a fresh conflict will break out again
within a relatively short time.
An insurgent movement also requires major resources in order to be able to
maintain a military organisation with the ability to defend, for example, a ‘lib-
erated area’ against larger government forces. This factor in itself leads to many
wars of this type ‘burning out’ and there being at least a let-up in the acts of war.
It is also important to establish that insurgent movements can only continue
their resistance for as long as they have access to funding – funding that must
by necessity happen outside the channels controlled by the state under attack.
170
During the Cold War, the superpowers were important contributors to many of
the ongoing conflicts. Today, smuggling and the export of valuable raw materi-
als are particularly important sources of funding (e.g., the fight for control of
the mining and sale of jewels/diamonds in the Congo and Angola, and cocaine
in Colombia). Nor should we underestimate today contributions from emi-
grants living in the West with the same ethnic and political backgrounds as the
insurgents. Such funding has been an important factor in historical conflicts
like the one in Northern Ireland – here in the form of financial contributions
from Irish Catholics in the U.S. Today, it is more likely to be money from for-
eign workers who, living in the West and sending a large part of their money
back to the Third World country in question, will be important indirect con-
tributors to ongoing conflicts. The Albanian UCK and the Tamil ‘Tigers’ can
serve as good examples of insurgent groups financed by collections/contribu-
tions from countrymen abroad.228
In some of the ongoing wars/conflicts the actual warfare may be so profit-
able for the insurgents that war gradually becomes a goal in itself. The term
‘warlordism’ is often used for this phenomenon which is common in both
Africa and Asia. It is, however, more normal for the insurgents to have enough
support among the local population to be able to keep things going without
major income from abroad. This particularly applies when there is a conflict
between two sections of the population. One of these has often lived in the area
for a long time. The other is often an ethnic group that has recently moved in
and which, with the support of the central authorities, is given access to land
and resources in the area in question. The war in Sri Lanka and several of the
conflicts on smaller islands in Indonesia are examples of this type of conflict. In
Indonesia, we have, for example, seen large government subsidised emigrations
from the densely populated main island of Sumatra to other islands within the
country – where the current local population feels itself partly neglected by the
newcomers. In the Aceh province, the insurgent movement GAM has, since
1976, been fighting for the independence of the oil and gas rich province from
Indonesia. A peace agreement has in 2005 been signed between the guerrilla
movement and the regime in Jakarta. It remains to be seen whether it will hold.
The insurgency is largely based on resistance to the new large ethnic groups
coming in and dominating the economy.
If we ignore the significance of financing facilities, the insurgent’s moti-
vation does not seem to be of any obvious significance to the length of the
228. Both these groups have, however, been accused of financing the insurgencies by means of
drug smuggling. These accusations are very common in insurgencies and often have their
origin in the adversary or people sympathising with the latter.
171
conflict. There is little to suggest that conflicts are always particularly lengthy
in places where the goal is the total upheaval of the system of government, or
where there is a struggle over political control of a particularly rich state. But
ethnic conflicts have traditionally been much shorter because:
• the objective is not to take over control of the state but to safeguard control
over one’s own ethnic area, and
• conflicts of this type are seldom resolved through normal political reforms.
What has normally been an option for resolving these conflicts is autonomy
or self-government for the part of the contested territory where the popula-
tion desires/demands independence.
Normally military coups and revolutions are short clashes, and the military
coup in particular is typical of internal clashes between different factions within
a state’s elite. Such confrontations are also often of a different nature to those we
see in lengthy conflicts. The many colonial wars of the 1950s and 1960s were
normally of a short duration, but there were exceptions in the war in Malaysia
(1948–1960) and the French colonial wars in Indochina (1946–1954) and
Algeria (1954–1962).229
Some people probably react to a particular phenomenon, namely that wars
seem to last longer the poorer the countries are, but it is probably difficult
to document any clear reasons for this. It could, for example, be because the
machinery of government in a poor country is normally weak, i.e., the govern-
ment does not have an effective police organisation and military force available
to quickly suppress an insurgency.
As figures may tell us something about this type of war/insurgency, it is
interesting to note that the African states south of the Sahara, for example,
which are today plagued by many such conflicts, spend a smaller percentage of
their state budgets for military purposes than is the case in the richer parts of the
world. But the most important factors are probably that the military apparatus
is often poorly equipped, organised and led and the military forces are often
dominated by one ethnic group in states that have several competing ethnic
groups.230 Many governments also struggle with a lack of legitimacy and can
229. Democracies do not appear to particularly stand out in this respect. Their wars are about as
long as wars in non-democracies. See, for instance, various discussions on the phenomenon
of protracted wars in Journal of Peace Research (London: Journal of Peace Research, May,
2004).
230. One possible context is also the following combination of factors: too little money leads to
poor/outdated equipment, which leads to a drop in morale and this is reinforced by poor
leadership and a weak organisational structure.
172
be suspected of preferring to have a military apparatus that is weak but loyal in

order to avoid an internal military coup. In other situations, governments will
have problems mobilising the armed forces in an internal conflict due to loyalty
problems. Tribal allegiance is often stronger than loyalty to the government.
On several occasions, it has proved to be the case that African military forces
have often performed more effectively in conflicts with other countries than in
internal conflicts.231 A sluggish and barely effective military mobilisation of the
people in support of the government also gives insurgents the opportunity to
establish sources of finance and a relatively effective military organisation. This
can naturally lead to the war against the insurgents being lengthy.
As previously mentioned, wars have been shown to be particularly long last-
ing in poor countries. There are probably a number of reasons for this, but it
has proved easier for insurgent movements here than in other parts of the world
to recruit their ‘angry young men’ with rather bleak future prospects. Access to
relatively simple hand weapons, even to a modest extent, may, in such circum-
stances, provide a disproportionately strong basis for the execution of power
by those who have access to such weapons, something that may contribute to
conflicts dragging on. Poor countries not only have the longest wars – it is also
there that living conditions are so poor that the wars will, in all likelihood, flare
up again, even after formal peace agreements have been entered into between
the warring parties.232 It should be noted in this respect that conflicts in Africa
not only last longer than conflicts on other continents but they also end more
rarely in the government side winning.
How successful have the new high-tech armed forces actually been with
their operations? Has the new so-called ‘standoff precision strike warfare’, which
theorists such as John A. Warden, David A. Deptula, Steven Metz and David S.
Fadok are all theoretical contributors to, worked as they envisaged? Behind this
thinking there is the concept that the U.S. should, with the assistance of expedi-
tionary forces, be able to quickly intervene and force an adversary to surrender.
These include Warden’s thinking that they could immediately strike against
the enemy’s leadership and at the same time against what he has (misleadingly)
called the ‘Centres of Gravity’, his ‘five rings’. In this he scarcely saw any need to
analyse the enemy’s social system, culture or the more subjective causes behind
the conflict. As they were, at the same time, extremely preoccupied with avoid-
ing losses of their own, they wanted to preferably deal with matters without
231. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is an example of how two former allied African
insurgency movements ended up in a protracted conventional war. The Ethiopian forces in
particular demonstrated good military proficiency here.
232. See, for example, the SIPRI yearbooks from 2003 or 2004. In the 2003 edition, see Appendix
2 for figures regarding the various wars in Africa and Asia.
173
putting their ‘boots on the ground’. It has also been shown that they have not
been successful in ensuring a lasting politically stable situation by means of this
preferred form of warfare in the two serious ‘cases’: first, Afghanistan and, most
recently, in Iraq. Up against forces trying to fight conventionally, the Americans
have recorded quick and spectacular victories in both places. But against the
‘second wave’ of irregular forces, there has actually been no decisive advantage
from the modern precision weapons. The wars are also still going on unabated
and there is nothing to suggest a quick conclusion, even if they have lots of the
new weapon systems they have deployed available.
In other words, there are grounds for once more carefully thinking through
what will be required if Western (professional) forces are to be able to achieve a
decisive military success against irregular forces and terrorist groups who have
suicide bombers at their disposal (see discussion in Chapter 7). The answer is
perhaps to again adopt a more ‘Clausewitzian thinking’ where no clear distinc-
tion is made between political and military means? The two sides of the war
should instead be seen as two sides of the actual war and both must be used
simultaneously. Today, it is often difficult to see any clear distinction in the
actual areas of conflict between war and peace and it is consequently difficult to
maintain the clear distinction between war and politics that has been tradition-
ally desired/preferred in Western capitals.
174
7. Terror and terrorism – a part of modern
insurgency
7.1 A short introduction

In this chapter, some aspects of the trends in modern terrorism are presented
and analysed. The chapter is based on the discussion in Chapter 6 on the term
‘asymmetry’, but I have also chosen here to look in greater detail at what ter-
rorism is today. The reason for this is, as already indicated, that terrorism as a
modern phenomenon is something that there has been more and more focus on
in the entire Western world in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.
Today’s international debate on the reasons for terrorism is extremely inco-
herent. Over the last few years, there has often been much focus on ethnic and
religious antagonism, on poverty and exploitation, but also on globalisation
and its opponents. But there is nothing to say that these conditions will auto-
matically be the main reasons for modern terrorism. One reason for this is that,
the smaller a terrorist group is, the more extreme its ideology and ‘doctrine’
will often be. It is exactly this extreme doctrine that may be the reason for the
group remaining small. There will be no strong popular support for something
that most people perceive as incomprehensible ideas or which appears to be a
direct threat to what they see as traditional norms. Even more extreme views
will end up dominating within the group. Groups like this will then not nor-
mally be easily reintegrated into a more moderate political system so the likeli-
hood of extremist groups like this, given their psychological fixation with their
own ideas, being violent obviously exists. I will attempt to assess developments
below – including how the nature of insurgency and terror could change.
175
7.2 Terrorism and the effect of acts of terrorism
Fundamentalism is often a form of nationalism in religious disguise.

– Karen Armstrong233
What is new is not that national groups or states use armed force against each
other but that the new technology today gives even small and politically mar-
ginal groups the opportunity to implement their visions and measures in a far
more spectacular and devastating manner than just a few years ago.
Often insurgent or terrorist movements may be astonishingly late in utilis-
ing available knowledge and technology. The acts of terrorism on September
11, 2001, were maybe not particularly innovative in a technological sense,
but innovation is nevertheless critical for a successful insurgency or terrorist
organisation. In theory, these acts could have been carried out almost half a cen-
tury ago. Even Western insurgent groups have not totally managed to exploit
the technology and knowledge that surrounds them in connection with their
attacks, but they have often been innovative in using the media. It has also
been claimed that a great number of the IRA’s bomb mechanisms and bombs
were rather simple constructions. One would not believe that the bombs were
designed and put together in a Western country. One exception is the Tamil
‘Tigers’ who have repeatedly introduced sophisticated technological solutions.
An example is where the Tamil forces are said to have made use of satellite-based
communication and fire direction by means of GPS long before the govern-
ment forces in Sri Lanka.234
If this applies to fanatical groups with a strong will to use means of violence,
it is not always necessary for these to have advanced technology available to
them in order to achieve a great effect. It is actually unnecessary to construct
advanced bomb mechanisms when the person carrying the bomb is himself
aiming at the target which gives limitless operational advantage. As the sui-
cide bomber does not want to survive either, no advanced support apparatus is
required – the bomber will not be returning to his own lines. The suicide bomb-
ers of latter years, and their activities, have played a major part in the ‘perpetual’
233. Karen Armstrong, ‘The label of Catholic terror was never used about the IRA’, The Guardian,
11 July 2005.
234. Rohan Gunaratna, ‘International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil
Insurgency’, 2 December 1998, <http://www.tamilnation.org/ltte/98rohan.htm>.
176
Terror and terrorism – a part of modern insurgency
war between the Palestinians and Israelis and have, in many ways, blocked all
attempts to achieve a more permanent political solution in the region.235
Even simple means can be sufficient to achieve a significant asymmetric
effect at a local tactical level. Is a good supply of suicide bombers for fanatical
terrorist organisations the reason? It is not quite that simple. The blame is laid
by many ‘at the media’s door’. The increasingly more rapid communication
of news, which is often little thought through and analysed, is probably one
factor. One must, however, accept that the entire new Western lifestyle is an
important factor in itself. What is new is that our Western ‘comfort zone’ is now
being threatened by terrorists who are using global mobility to transport their
local conflicts over to our backyard.
Nor should we forget that it is still machetes, explosives and Kalashnikov
automatic rifles that are the more important resources in most low intensity con-
flicts, and this is also the case in the many extremely devastating Chechen-led
terrorist attacks against targets in Russia. What is new is that, if the insurgents
(or terrorists) are able to select real high tech facilities and carry out satisfac-
tory planning, the effect can be great, even in local scenarios, as most recently
demonstrated in the town of Beslan in North Ossetia in early September 2004
where more than 300 people were killed and about half of these were infants. It
is also important to clearly differentiate between acts of terrorism in the form
of bombs and pure hostage-taking. Bomb attacks create insecurity among the
population but the authorities are seldom subjected to huge criticism. In fact,
attacks like these can sometimes act as a ‘propaganda gift’ for the ruling regime.
Hostage-taking, on the other hand, creates enormous pressure on the govern-
ment to resolve the issue ‘in a peaceful manner’ and save the lives of the hos-
tages. The longer the matter goes on, the more difficult the situation becomes
for the government. Russian authorities only allowed two and a half days before
Special Forces stormed the Dubrovka theatre during the hostage situation in
October 2002. During the hostage situation in Beslan, the school was stormed
235. One of the most informative books written about rebellions and suicide bombers in the
Muslim world is Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel. Repression and Resistance in the
Islamic World (New York: Lynne Rienner Robl., 2003). This book makes the case that you
cannot understand Islamic violence without comprehending the repressive environments
of Muslims. It rejects several theories like economic impoverishment, ideology, or jihad as
explanations of why Muslims turn to violence. He writes that if people are excluded from
politics and repressed brutally, it makes sense that some will turn to violence. The book’s
limitation is that the author does not try to explain why Muslims turn against the West (espe-
cially the U.S.), or why some (very) repressive countries do not experience violence like some
of the countries in his case studies from Algeria, Egypt, Kashmir, the Philippines, Tajikistan,
and Chechnya. This book still gives a good explanation for the growing use of violence.
177
after two days.236 In the aftermath it proved to be the case that only two of the
128 hostages, who died during the storming of the theatre, were killed by the
terrorists; the rest died directly or indirectly from the gas used by the Special
Forces. Questions have also been asked with regard to the storming of the
school whether a number of the hostages may have been killed by the security
forces. Investigations show that tanks fired at the school and, in all likelihood,
weapons in the form of the Shmel (a kind of flamethrower) were used. The fact
that the Russian authorities chose, on both occasions, to take action at an early
stage indicates a great fear of coming into a situation where they would have to
negotiate with hostage takers. The fact that they also used extremely primitive
methods during the storming seems to only serve to reinforce this impression.
In this context, there are also grounds for asking questions about how acts of
terrorism in Russia have been reported over the last three years. Today, the
Russian media is subject to clear restrictions and their presentations are often
strongly ‘slanted’ to the benefit of the Putin regime.237
If we look at the act of terrorism targeting the transport system in London
on 7 July 2005, where 56 people were killed and about 700 injured, we see
how difficult it is to prevent this type of strike against a modern city. Another
attempt at terrorism took place on 21 July, but the 4 detonators did not work
as they were supposed to. After an intense police hunt, the suspected bombers
were arrested. Those responsible for London’s protection have also been criti-
cised, but whether this criticism is justified is difficult to answer. The respon-
sible ministers in Great Britain and the police have stated that this is not the
case. The quick clearing up of the two series of bombings has, however, been
impressive. If, as they now assume, it has been a previously unknown British
extremist group (or two co-ordinated groups) consisting of terrorists with
British nationality, it would be difficult to criticise the MI5 security service.
But if it were to prove during the investigations now going on that important
information available had been overlooked, this would be grounds for criticism.
236. By comparison, the hostage situation at the Japanese Ambassador’s house in Lima, Peru,
lasted all of 126 days before Special Forces took action on 22 April 1997. Only one of the
72 hostages died in the attack.
237. During the storming of the school in Beslan on 3 September 2004, most Western TV edi-
tors covered the events live; Russian TV channels did not. The two state channels continued
their ordinary schedules for an hour after the storming had begun. Channel 1 chose to
present the news in its ordinary news broadcast before continuing its programme, ‘Women
in Love’. The other state channel showed a longer news broadcast from Beslan, but the
reporter denied that the school was about to be stormed. The semi-private TV channel
interrupted its live broadcast when it heard the first explosion but resumed its live broadcast
again after about half an hour. ‘Russian TV Slow to Report the News’, The Moscow Times,
6 September 2004, <http://web.themoscowtimes.com/stories/ 2004/09/06/011.html>.
178
This could then have consequences with regard to how the British intelligence
services’ work is organised. One of the newer UK organisations to fight terror-
ism is the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). It was established in June
2003 and was created as the UK’s centre for the analysis and assessment of
international terrorism. It is based at the British Security Service’s headquarters
in London. Within the Security Service JTAC works especially closely with the
International Counter Terrorism branch, which manages investigations into
terrorist activity in the UK. This enables it to assess the nature and extent of
the threat in the UK.238
This series of bombings is not the first time that terrorists have carried out
attacks on London, but the attack of 7 July was so widespread that the city’s
activities almost came to a standstill for a short time. The attack occurred at
the same time as the G8 conference in Gleneagles, and Great Britain is the
U.S.’s closest ally. Several commentators believed they could see a connection
here during the first few days but, gradually, as the police work progressed and
they quickly discovered the identities of the people who had operated as suicide
bombers, the media began to concentrate on the actual incident. The police
authorities in London had also been involved in exercises with a view to dealing
with a major act of terrorism, in fact the police had practiced only two weeks
prior to the attack.239
The attack on 7 July 2005 came a year after the attacks on the local train
service in Madrid and about 4 years after 9/11, something that suggests that
the so-called ‘war on terror’ has had limited success. On 23 July 2005, a major
attack also took place in Egypt or, more exactly, against hotels in Sharm el-
Sheikh and Naama Bay on the southern tip of Sinai. It is assumed that a total of
238. Under MI5 on the web you find the following text: ‘JTAC analyses and assesses all intelli-
gence relating to international terrorism, at home and overseas. It sets threat levels and issues
warnings of threats and other terrorist-related subjects for customers from a wide range
of government departments and agencies, as well as producing more in-depth reports on
trends, terrorist networks and capabilities. The establishment of the JTAC brought togeth-
er counter-terrorist expertise from the police, key government departments and agencies.
Collaborating in this way ensures that information is analysed and processed on a shared
basis, with the involvement and consensus of all relevant departments. Existing departmen-
tal roles and responsibilities are unaffected.’
239. Another important part of the London protection system against terror and other emergen-
cies is the London Resilience Team (LRT). It is a multi-agency team with a large number
of secondees from outside organisations, including all the emergency services, transport and
utility providers. Team members address a wide range of issues, often beyond their immedi-
ate areas of specialism. According to the website: ‘Secondees are promised an interesting
experience, working on an important and high profile subject, at the centre of Government,
dealing with a wide variety of organisations at senior level, as well as Ministers and the
Mayor.’
179
88 people were killed here and many were injured.240 This at least indicates that
there are still major global security problems. In practice, it is almost impossible
for the world’s security organisations to prevent more such attacks happening
as it is the terrorists who have the initiative in most cases. Consequently, we
can only come a little way in bringing international terrorism under control by
using a ‘pure’ security-focused approach. In addition, we must look for politi-
cally backed national and international counter-terrorism (C-T) responses so
that organisations such as al-Qaeda can be cut off from their ‘bases’ (al-Qaeda
can be translated as ‘the base’).241 In practice, attempts must be made to pre-
vent fresh recruitment continually taking place from the Muslim sections of
the population. It is this section of the population that must clearly reject that
this type of extremism is an acceptable response to their frustrations and their
hatred of the West and more moderate Muslim forces than exist today.
It has also been claimed that the terrorists have such an easy time because co-
operation between the intelligence organisations is poor. The London attacks
will probably increase pressure on the national authorities and the intelligence
organisations in Europe in particular to work better over country borders in the
fight against terrorism. There will be pressure regardless of whether it proves
to be the case that a hitherto unknown terrorist group was behind the plan-
ning of the coordinated bomb attacks.242 Ever since the attacks on New York
and Washington DC on 11 September 2001, there has been talk of a better
exchange of intelligence. A number of improvements have also taken place.
But, in reality, it is extremely difficult to make intelligence circles open up more
in order to achieve a more successful hunt for the terrorists. These are integrated
circles and the national intelligence organisations are reluctant to share their
sources and methods with others.
Also in the EU attempts at establishing a network for intelligence co-
operation have proved tougher than planned, something that the Italian EU
Commissioner Franco Frattini (responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security
in the European Commission) indicated to the reputable Italian newspaper La
Repubblica on 8 July. Frattini promised that the EU would increase its efforts
to establish the network. The Commission will also submit a proposal for a
240. A similar act of terrorism took place at Teda in the vicinity of the Israeli border in October
2004. 34 people died here. Everything points to the group that carried out the Sharm el-
Sheikh attack using the same tactics and planning methods as we saw in Taba. See TT/ATF
reports from 28 July 2005, printed in Dagens Nyheter.
241. The UN has a ‘C-T-strategy’ – United Nations Terrorism Prevention Branch.
242. Aasmund Willersrud, ‘Terrorjegere får kritikk’ [The terrorist hunters are criticised],
Aftenposten, 9 July 2005.
180
database network to the Ministers of Justice. ‘The challenge from the terrorists
is forcing us to exchange everything possible’, according to Frattini.243
Immediately after the Madrid attacks on 11 March 2004, which claimed 200
lives, politicians and political leaders had promised that co-operation would be
further improved. The intelligence people do exchange information with each
other, but preferably bilaterally, i.e., between two countries in Europe. In intel-
ligence circles, it is a common view that they would get more out of this by
submitting their information to larger bodies and would also feel more secure
that the info would not leak out if the matter were bilateral. It is appropriate to
remember at this point that following the Madrid bombings the EU appointed
a co-ordinator in the fight against terrorism, the Dutchman Gijs de Vries.244
The EU has also adopted the principle of the European Arrest Warrant, which
will make it easier to arrest and hand over terrorists and major criminals between
the EU member states. Different political views and priorities have nevertheless
come to the surface in Europe. This applies, among other things, to how the
Hezbollah and Hamas organisations in the Middle East are viewed.245
7.2.1 Modern terrorist organisations

In an attempt, by means of introduction, to try to describe terrorism/acts of ter-
rorism, the American David Rapoport has tried to create a pattern for modern
insurgency and non-state terrorists. He has described terrorism as a phenom-
enon that has developed through four successive waves. Each period has its
own clear characteristics if we look at the objectives, methods of organisation
and tactics. Seen in this light, a unique relationship will be developed between
the terrorist group(s) and the country that is attacked. This relationship will
have consequences and will affect how the country attacked conducts itself
both internally and internationally. Rapoport has chosen the following main
divisions and trends:
1. Terrorism developed and carried out by anarchists. This phenomenon was

relatively prominent in, among other places, Russia, at the end of the 19th
Century.
2. The second wave – with its focus on anti-colonialism. Activity in the first
part of the 20th Century.
243. La Repubblica, 8 July 2005.

244. Today there is a so-called ‘European Action Plan’ with about 150 measures. The EU has also
appointed a ‘counter-terrorism czar’ (Gijs de Vries) to lead the work.
245. Willersrud, ‘Terrorjegere får kritikk’.
181
3. Third wave – developed and carried out by left-wing radical groups. Most
activity during the period from the end of the 1960s and up to the 1990s.
4. The fourth wave is called ‘the religious wave’. We can see the start of the new
wave at the end of the 1970s, but the trend begins to take off in the 1990s.
This wave is still in full swing.246
More than 6,000 people lost their lives during 2004 due to terrorist attacks,
according to new figures from the American Government. In 2004, the world
was subjected to 3,192 terrorist attacks, according to a press release from the
United States National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), dated Thursday 5
July 2005.247 In June 2005, the U.S. chose, however, to redefine what is seen
as terror/terrorism and this will have consequences with regard to how high
the figures are for victims of terrorism. In comparison, the previous official
figure for 2004, published in April 2005, was 651 deaths.248 From now on,
domestic attacks and so-called ‘less serious attacks’, where damage is caused
to a value of less than USD 10,000, will be included in the statistics. The
Director of the NCTC John Brennan stated on Thursday 5 July 2005 that the
previous basis for the official definition had not provided a sufficiently precise
basis for figures. According to the new definition, terror is planned political
violence against civilian and non-combat forces, including the police and mili-
tary in non-combat surroundings. This means, for example, that attacks on the
American forces in Iraq will not be included in these statistics.249
International terrorism has, as indicated above, gradually changed greatly
over the last few years. The significant fanaticism that today often characterises
terrorist organisations across the belief systems they belong to is an important
246. David Rapoport (ed.), Terrorism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, 4 Volumes (London:
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005). Based on Foreword and Introduction, Volume
1.
247. Press release from the Danish Ritzaus Byrå, 6 July 2005.
248. According to the American Government’s press service, April 2005.
249. At the conference on the ‘Initial state of the art review of research on terrorism and coun-
ter-terrorism’ at the Swedish National Defence College on 22 March 2005, Professor Paul
Wilkinson of the University of St. Andrews referred to it being possible to speak of 4 ‘waves’
of terrorism in Europe since the 19th Century. Each of these had lasted about 40 years
before ‘dying out’. The four can roughly, with the oldest wave first, be characterised as
‘anarchists’, ‘nationalists’, ‘left-wing radical’ and now ‘religious-based’. Yet another feature
has been that terrorism often begins cautiously, only to later increase in violence, until it
culminates. See similar theories from David Rapoport in the introduction of this point on
terrorism.
182
part of new developments.250 If we are to try to understand terrorism, we must

spend some time understanding its roots and not become one-sidedly preoc-
cupied with how acts of terrorism are carried out. This is obviously an old adage
and very many of those who have written about terrorism over the last 20–30
years have also stated that this is the case. But, like all catchwords, they lose their
meaning after a while. We also see that there has often been a tendency to study
individual groups in great detail while relatively few have tried to study terror-
ism as a political phenomenon in any great depth. The latter is also extremely
demanding and difficult, but this type of literature is available to those who
would like to try.251
In the not too distant past, actual insurgency leaders saw terrorism as one
of several available forms of struggle. The main focus was, however, normally
directed at political and social change and the consequences for the insurgency’s
image and similar factors. But previous experience of terrorism is no longer the
only key to attempting to understand today’s terrorism. Important new ele-
ments are, as previously indicated, the increasing danger of terrorist organisa-
tions getting hold of weapons of mass destruction like the Japanese group Aum
Shinrikyo and the increasingly great significance of political-religious fanati-
cism as a driving force. At the moment, radical Islamism is probably the most
important driving force behind international terrorism and there is much to
suggest that it will continue to be so in the coming years.
But there is always a certain danger here of becoming blinded by what is
happening in our present time. Radical Islamists have not always been seen as
a ‘main threat’ and there are no grounds for believing that this will be the case
forever. It is difficult to see that there is any modern theorist ‘leader figure’ à
la Clausewitz or Jomini who could fill the role of a clear guiding star, which
has often been the case within Western military thinking. In other words, it is
difficult to see that there is any theoretical ‘systematic guide’ to terrorism today.
The reason is that there has never been and nor is there today one clear reason
for terrorism, but a great number of contemporary terrorist trends. What looks
like being a set pattern for one terrorist organisation does not simply fit in
with regard to another terrorist organisation. It is also important that what one
250. Matthew J. Morgan, ‘The Origins of the New Terrorism’, Parameters, Vol. 34, No. 1, (Spring
2004), pp. 29–43. This article provides a good overview of the development of modern ter-
rorism. It should be noted here that the number of terrorist attacks was still clearly higher in
the period 1985–1988, with over 600 acts of terrorism annually. Losses are, however, greater
today per attack than in the 1980s.
251. Walter Laqueur, The History of Terrorism, New Edition (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 2001) and The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction
(Cambridge, MA: Oxford University Press, 1999).
183
political group may see as terrorists are heroes to another group. This obviously
leads to strong feelings, making it extremely difficult to reach acceptable politi-
cal compromises.252
It is important to note here that many of those who now write about ter-
rorism as a phenomenon seldom do anything other than describe a group that
they are preoccupied with, ethnically or politically, and are often less preoccu-
pied with the phenomenon of terrorism as such. There can be several reasons
for this. One important reason is probably that those who write and publish
are preoccupied with ‘milking’ this new niche in the book market. While, prior
to September 11, 2001, there were relatively few ‘terror experts’ who wrote
good books on the subject, we now have a steadily growing group which, prior
to 2001, did not know a great deal about the people and groups we are now
describing. An example of this new trend is the growing number of books
written about the al-Qaeda group over the last 2–3 years. This is an interesting
contrast to the situation prior to 2001, when they concentrated on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and hardly mentioned terrorism in Algeria, Kashmir or Sri
Lanka, for example, which was at least as extensive if we look at the number
of victims.
For the same reason, it becomes increasingly more difficult today to speak of
‘left-wing terrorism’ and ‘right-wing terrorism’ as time goes by. In an age, which
is increasingly more characterised by populism, we also see that opinions that
were often previously seen as ‘left-wing’ have today been adopted by aggressive
nationalists while opinions that were previously seen as ‘extremely right-wing’
can today be both anti-capitalist and anti-American. Seen in this light, it is
interesting to see that so-called ‘Trotskyists’ have, in their writings, provided
support for the clergy in Iran and the Taliban regime since these totally different
groups were seen as ‘anti-imperialist’ – positive words in these circles. In this
context, it is perhaps appropriate to remember that large elements of Europe’s
left-wing took a relatively uncritical stance on NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia
in 1999. It is actually an interesting phenomenon when political groupings
side with or against ethnic conflicts. A possible reason for this occasion could
be that:
• Yugoslavia represented a kind of ‘nostalgic shadow’ of a socialist state.
252. A good example of how difficult it can often be to try to draw great parallels with regard to
the different forms of terrorism is demonstrated in the following book: Norman Friedman,
Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America’s New Way of War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2003). Chapter 5, ‘The Terrorist International and Its Predecessor’, and Chapter 10,
‘Lessons’ show that it is extremely difficult to see what could possibly keep international
terrorism at bay, if anything.
184
• Personal contact networks ‘from bygone days’ between groups from Europe’s
left-wing and Yugoslavian Serbs (who dominated in Tito’s state).
• That many people almost automatically see it that everything NATO (and
in the long-term the EU) does is wrong and that the West’s use of power
always has a hidden agenda.
Similarly, anti-Semitic rhetoric, which was previously seen as ‘pure neo-

Nazism’, is today something also found in left-wing radical and other forms
of anti-Western groupings. Despite what has been demonstrated, the majority
of left-wing radicals are probably able to see the difference between opposition
to Zionism/Israel and anti-Semitism based on racial theories. Among ordinary
Muslims in the Middle East, there is, on the other hand, no clear distinction.
Does then a terrorist leader such as Osama bin Laden belong to the left or the
right? A question like this should actually be dismissed, as it is of no relevance.
He is obviously more of a kind of religious nationalist (cf., his dream of an
Arab/Islamic caliphate with its centre in Saudi Arabia) and he has, in reality,
little in common with the political ideas that have been associated with the
secular-oriented world of ideas on the European left, but his views have perhaps
something in common with certain fascist features? But it is important here
that this type of comparison is of limited relevance as this type of religious-
based thinking hardly squares with modern Western philosophical and political
thinking.253
Obviously fascism is not anything new historically, but, today, it has clearly
been ‘reborn’ – something that has surprised many people in both Europe and
the U.S. where we have liked to see it as something belonging to history. This
is where the fear of fanatics wishing to use weapons of mass destruction as
terrorist weapons comes in. As previously indicated, this will provide a new
dimension to ‘new’ terrorism if these are used. As yet, neither ordinary political
leaders nor the majority of people have accepted the fact that very small groups
of fanatics are able to cause such enormous devastation to society and kill/injure
many more people in a short time than terrorists of times gone by were ever able
to. The new phenomenon can perhaps be described as an ideological moving of
boundaries. In extremist circles, it has now become acceptable to commit acts
of terrorism like the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. U.S.
military actions after these terrorist attacks have also demonised the nation for
253. The books written by Faisal Devji, Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005) and Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy:
Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), give together an
interesting introduction to these new trends.
185
large groups of the world’s Muslims. Osama bin Laden has undoubtedly moved
the boundaries and those groups wishing to strike at the U.S. know that tak-
ing out civilian targets is in a way ‘acceptable’ today. Nor do I believe that we
should underestimate competition for attention among Muslim groups. What
insurgency leaders do not want to achieve the same status as bin Laden? To be
remembered as a hero figure or perhaps ending up a great martyr? We should
never underestimate the need of Islamists to achieve a good posthumous repu-
tation and be remembered by other fellow believers.
It probably suited the American administration to personify the enemy
in the aftermath of September 11. Not all Muslims were to be enemies, just
Osama bin Laden. When he is dead or rendered harmless, the victory will be
more or less won. The problem is simply that he is still at large, like a kind of
Muslim ‘Robin Hood’. In retrospect, it is easier to see that the Americans have,
in this respect, indirectly contributed to creating a myth about the man, which
he certainly enjoys himself, and which other insurgency leaders envy. There are
two matters here that we should note:
• It is important to avoid a generalisation of all Muslims where they are seen

as potential extremists. By means of personification, one can at the same time
reach out to more moderate forces – forces one is dependent on in the long-
term if extremists operating within Muslim circles are to be combated.
• Another matter also comes into this: you personify ‘the bad guy’ in order
to direct/channel ‘anger’ at guilty people and not at an ethnic group (it is
desired to avoid general agitation directed at Muslims). A description of the
adversary is also part of increasing the motivation for one’s own involve-
ment/efforts in security tasks.
These two points are actually not the same as a ‘single-minded’ approach.
The problem arises when the actual strategy is too short-sighted, as in, ‘we will
remove Saddam Hussein and the problem will be solved’. As regards Iraq, at
least small sections of the Bush administration have seen the problems caused
by not immediately developing long-term strategies for rebuilding Iraq.
This is also another important difference between earlier terrorism and the
new features that have sprouted up over the last few years. Previously, normal ter-
rorism was discriminating, i.e., the targets they went for were kings, presidents,
higher officers, leading politicians, rich supporters of a regime, etc. We can per-
haps see acts of terrorism like this as ‘propaganda by action’. What is new is that
some of the newer terrorist organisations are simply not concerned with being
selective about choosing their victims. They are no longer satisfied with getting
attention but want at the same time to cause the maximum destruction. Another
186
new feature is also the clearly paranoid characteristics that we see among extrem-
ist terrorists, and this applies whether they consider themselves right or left-wing
and this is most obvious if we study religious fanatics and their actions. Major
acts of terrorism that do not discriminate between soldiers, women and children
have traditionally occurred in connection with ethnic conflicts where the adver-
sary’s people nevertheless belong to the ‘wrong side’. The religious element does
not prevent the trend we see today having acquired a certain look of ‘classic’
ethnic warfare, but with the difference that this may now go on globally.
National subjugation is not a temporary state and was often the reason for
insurgencies in previous times. But there is still a big difference between a well-
organised insurgent movement that has clear political goals, where its aspiration
is to usurp power from the ruling regime, and the type of terrorism we now often
see, where individuals and groups of religious-nationalistic extremists take on
the task of ‘sorting things out’. This group is characterised by an aggression and
hatred against others that is often uncontrollable and the great preoccupation of
these individuals/groups with the alleged hidden motives of others (conspiracy
theories) means that they easily lose their grip on reality.254 And it is difficult to
be optimistic about the immediate future here: there is unfortunately no known
cure today for fanaticism and militant paranoia. This ‘new’ terrorism reflects a
world where it is global influence that is often attacked. Much less publicity was
generated in the world press, for example, when a couple of dozen American
sailors were killed in the Gulf (USS Cole) than when the United States was
attacked on its home ground in Manhattan. At the same time, a new dimension
in developments is a relatively local problem can be conveyed in such a way that
it will influence how key Western departments and military headquarters plan
for war and intervening in conflicts. Those who are, for example, accused of an
atrocity in a remote corner of the world, whether this is in an unknown town
in Africa or a city in the West, can today hit the front pages of newspapers or be
on TV. A so-called ‘global juxtaposition’ (global meeting place) has arisen, which
was unthinkable a few years ago.
If we are to try to understand the different forms of terrorism, we must first
try to understand the psyche of Muslims who decide to take to arms. One basic
question is what actually these objectives are. Their rhetoric is almost always
about Islam being under attack from Israel or the U.S. and Muslims having to
254. There has probably been an internal debate in al-Qaeda about regime change: should they
go for regime change internationally, i.e., in all Muslim countries, or only in the Arab world?
The organisation now probably wants to stop support from outside to the ‘worldly’ regimes
in the Arab part of the world.
187
fight for their rights.255 If we go a little deeper and try to find out what the
so-called jihadists have as their objective, we often get a surprising answer: they
want to die an ‘honourable death’.256 A good reputation after death is therefore
an important motive for many of those who become ‘foot soldiers’ in this type
of operation. The fact that a jihadist is remembered as a martyr and brings hon-
our to his family then becomes an important motivating factor. If we compare
this with another group of insurgents, namely ‘strict’ Communists, we can see
how the different motives work. As an atheist, a Communist insurgent will not
expect any ‘reward’ if he dies in the insurgency. If he is willing to die, then it
is because the revolution is more important than a single life. Greatly simpli-
fied, we see, therefore, that Communists fight to win, while jihadists fight to
die. They can also be regarded as having some of the same attitude to war as
European militarists had at the end of the 19th Century.257
Rhetoric and propaganda are important weapons in all conflicts. There is,
however, no hope of ‘converting’ a person like Osama bin Laden so that he
abandons his ideology, which emphasises violence. A more realistic approach
would be to try to prevent an increasing number of young men becoming
fascinated by the hate-based ideology that he and his supporters represent, so
that they do not join organisations like those that al-Qaeda and similar groups
represent. An important element in this respect is probably trying to avoid the
routine lumping together of Islam as a religion with a desire to use violence
against one’s opponents. Unless a distinction can be made between Islam as a
religion and the use of what could be called ‘immoral violence’, this will serve to
provoke Muslims and could contribute to fresh recruitment to the extremists’
cause. Incorrect assertions about Islam have contributed to many people in the
Muslim world seeing the West as an irreconcilable enemy of their religion.
There is probably a need for terms that are more precise than what we
often just call ‘Islamic terror’ in English-speaking sources. The point is that,
even if terrorism is carried out by people who call themselves Muslims, they
255. An interesting presentation of how one can interpret the Koran in connection with war and
peace can be found in a book written by T. P. Schwartz-Barcott, War, Terror & Peace in the
Qur´an and in Islam, Preface by General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Carlisle, PA: Army
War College Foundation Press, 2004).
256. Based on conversations with foreign journalists who themselves have interviewed jihadists
in Iraq (2003) and Chechnya (1990, 2003). See also the portrayal of these groups in the
book by the German journalist Christoph Reuter, My Life as a Weapon: A Book about Suicide
Bombers (Lund: Historiska Media, 2003). The phenomenon of suicide bombers has devel-
oped in countries as different as India, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Russia and the U.S.
257. Antulio J. Echevarria II, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000). See Chapters 3 and 4 of the book in
particular.
188
are actually violating several basic Islamic principles. In the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005, both Islamic and Christian leaders
have tried to point out this fact during the debate. It is expressly clear in the
Koran that aggressive warfare is forbidden, while it is permissible to wage war
in self-defence.258 It is also claimed that the genuine Islamic values are peace,
forgiveness and atonement. It also says in the Koran that force is not to be
used in connection with religious disputes and it is important to remember
here that, for many hundreds of years, Islam had a far more liberal attitude to
nonconformists than Europe. But, like the Bible, the Koran contains a number
of aggressive texts and, as in all major religions, the majority of the text is
preoccupied with people having to behave properly and in a forgiving man-
ner towards their fellow men. It is interesting to note that, in Islam, war is
forbidden against countries where Muslims are allowed to freely practice their
religion. If war is waged, a Muslim is not allowed to use fire, destroy buildings
or kill innocent civilians. Obviously, we have seen, in practice, that Muslims
have often breached these ideals but so have Christians and Jews. Seen in this
light, it is not religion as such that is aggressive – it is those who interpret and
practice it that occasionally cross the line.259
An interesting factor has been broached by the expert on Islam Karen
Armstrong. She has pointed out that, in the West, the IRA’s bombs were not
called ‘Catholic terrorism’ – probably because we knew enough to understand
that this was not primarily a religious bombing campaign. It was realised that
the IRA could in many ways, like many other fundamentalist movements, par-
ticularly in the Second and Third Worlds, be simply seen as a form of modern
nationalism but with what she calls a ‘highly unorthodox religious guise’. It is
easy to see the same features, for example, among the often offensively inclined
fundamentalists in Israel or among the extremely ‘patriotic’ Christian funda-
mentalists in the U.S.260
Education will be able to accelerate globalisation while the difference
between secular and clerical/theoretical impulses will play a smaller role.
This is not an automatic development though. If we look at trends in ‘classic’
Communist insurgencies, it has often been highly educated intellectuals who
have been most fanatical. Education is not necessarily synonymous with a bet-
ter perception of reality.261 Both trends would, however, be able to be used to
258. Schwartz-Barcott, War, Terror & Peace in the Qur’an and in Islam, pp. 265–300.
259. Ibid., pp. 307–325.
260. Armstrong, ‘The label of Catholic terror was never used about the IRA’.
261. Examples of this are, for instance, the leadership of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the
leadership in North Vietnam, the leadership of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the
‘inner core’ of the lengthy Communist insurgency in Peru.
189
exploit or construct a philosophy of life based on unsatisfied aspirations and

unfair materialistic stagnation. Obviously circumstances like these could be
exploited by terrorists. After the London bombings, the press highlighted the
widespread poverty amongst British Muslims who were three times more likely
to have been unemployed than the rest of the population. At the same time, al-
Qaeda supporters have been busy recruiting amongst those who have escaped,
namely young university-educated Muslims from middle class backgrounds.
Knowledge can actually be a double-edged sword to the extent that it can has-
ten the outbreak of a conflict while knowledge can also provide a greater insight
into a problem and thereby provide a basis for a better understanding of the
substance of the problem that must be tackled in order for the society to be able
to be improved/further developed.
An increasingly more common phenomenon among today’s terrorists is
suicide bombers, i.e., terrorists who voluntarily seek death and destruction on
their own behalf and that of ‘the cause’. This was previously only a very mar-
ginal phenomenon. Suicide bombers have now become routine in the Middle
East and we can also see similar features among others such as the extremist
Chechen groups. The terrorist attack in the town of Beslan in North Ossetia in
September 2004 was not a suicide bomb attack. Those who took part in Beslan
should be described as terrorists. On the other hand, suicide bombers blew up
two Russian domestic flights a week before Beslan, on 24 August 2004.262
This new form of terrorist attack also has the characteristic that several of
the terrorist organisations can be seen as ‘stateless’, something that contributes
to them no longer having the same natural reserve that one has when operating
in one’s own area and within one’s own section of the population. Their pro-
claimed ‘cause’, on the other hand, has in the case of such organisations taken
on a transnational appeal, such as merely an unspecified hatred of ‘the West’.
New material has gradually come out that describes the terrorist attacks
on suburban trains in Madrid on 11 March 2004.263 When this was written
in the summer of 2005, the Spanish and foreign investigators were still sifting
through the remains left from the terrorist attacks in order to gather evidence
and to try to better understand the terrorists’ motives. The investigations have
so far led to the discovery of hiding places and ‘safe houses’ in such different
cities as Casablanca in Morocco, Paris, Damascus in Syria and Amsterdam.
262. See the following source on the Internet: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_airplane_

bombings_of_August_ 24%2C_2004>.
263. Sebastian Rotella, ‘Terrorists at the Table: Islamic militants in Europe blend political sophis-
tication and crude violence to influence events, as the bombings in Madrid showed’, Los
Angeles Times, 6 March 2005, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-
euterror6mar06.story>.
190
The investigations have provided a good picture of the group that was behind
it, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), which they have hunted
in the past year. This was, after all, one of the most devastating attacks ever
carried out by terrorists in the history of modern Europe, matched only by
the attacks on London in July 2005. An interesting feature of the GICM is
that the extremists were either born in Europe or have lived here for a long
time after emigrating from North Africa. We later also saw this pattern in the
attacks carried out in July 2005 in London. In the case of London, on the
other hand, indigenous British Muslims carried out the attacks. An estimated
3,000 young British Muslims have been trained by al-Qaeda in camps outside
Europe. Spanish police have also stated that the new generation of extremists is
more violent and technically able to pursue its plans and is, in particular, more
sophisticated than we have seen before. In a letter home to his family, one of
the extremists who was involved wrote:
‘I ask you to have faith in God and that you follow your brother mujahe-
din in all the world and that perhaps you join them, since that is what I
expect of you’, Kounjaa told his daughters in the three-page letter found in
an accomplice’s gym bag, according to an Oct. 17 Spanish police report.
‘Religion has come with blood and dismembered [bodies] … I cannot
stand to live this life as a weak and humiliated person under the gaze of
the infidels and the tyrants.’ (…)
’If my enemies jail me it will be my retreat and if they free me it will be
tourism and if they kill me it will be martyrdom’, Kounjaa wrote in his
farewell letter. ‘I prefer death to life … May God curse the tyrants.’264
It has been speculated that the terrorists were following orders from, or that
they were only ideological followers of, al-Qaeda’s leadership. Nevertheless, the
French anti-terrorist chief Jean-Louis Bruguiere, for example, is of the opinion
that we are seeing what he characterises as an increasingly more calculating
political strategy on the part of the terrorists. He stated, for instance, in an
interview with the American newspaper the Los Angeles Times that:
It’s not the result of a command structure giving direct orders, but of
people talking: scattered networks in which operatives talk and a strategy
develops, (…) It focuses on political agendas of Western nations … It was
as if the terrorists kicked down the door and invited themselves to the
table along with politicians and diplomats. It’s a sophisticated approach.
The paradox is that the methods and the suspects in the field were rus-
tic.265
264. Sebastian Rotella, ibid.

265. Ibid.
191
There have also been attempts to find out whether there was any connection
between the terrorism in Madrid and the murder in November 2004 of the
controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh who was an outspoken oppo-
nent of Islamic fundamentalism. Those who were arrested are also suspected of
planning the killings of Dutch politicians. A frightening aspect – and perhaps
one reckoned on by the terrorists – was the reactions to Islam and immigrants in
general that followed in the otherwise liberal Netherlands, including attacks on
mosques and churches.266 This can be seen as a counter-reaction from extreme
political Dutch groups, which was triggered by the killing of Van Gogh. Seen
in this light, a single high profile murder can trigger what is called a Fitna in
Arabic, i.e., a violent counter-reaction targeted at Islamic groups and symbols
with no connection to the terrorists.267 This is a reason for being aware that a
reaction will often create a counter-reaction, something that will, in turn, be
able to strengthen the extremists’ working conditions, cf., with a short discus-
sion on the phenomenon earlier in the book.268
Terrorists are obviously also dependent on funding. Even terrorists need a
roof over their heads, something they often achieve by drawing on the national
economic systems where they operate. But what is new is that terrorists are,
to a greater extent than previously, operating on their own and the number of
dangerous terrorists is increasing. Terrorist groups often make use of network-
ing and network thinking, but are normally hierarchically organised, even if it
has been noted that Osama bin Laden has, on several occasions, clearly given
broad directives with the ‘boss’s intention’ to his followers. Local groups have
then, on this basis, in turn, formulated, planned and carried out attacks. It is
266. Petter Nesser, The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker – Religiously Motivated Violence or Islamist
Terrorism in the Name of Global Jihad (Kjeller: FFI/Rapport – 2005/00376); see Chapter 3,
pp. 11–15.
267. A ‘Fitna’ (or fitva – depending on the local spelling) is what all Islamists always fear could
‘break out’ when a ‘Jihad’ possibly goes wrong. Fitna roughly means major disagreement,
civil war within Islam. It is the Islamic so-called ‘ulema’s’ nightmare scenario (the term
ulema can be translated as ‘scholars’). This may arise when a ‘jihad’ has been launched in
an unfortunate manner. Many ulema are today afraid that what is now going on may turn
against them. ‘Fitna’ is violence that, instead of being outside the Muslim world, strikes back
like a boomerang. The traditional great ‘fitna’ within Islam is the ‘eternal’ fight over ‘the true
doctrine’ between Sunni and Shia Muslims.
268. But at the same time, there is also the seed for attacking this problem at the root here. By
locally working against the forces that sympathise with terrorists/insurgents, support for
their cause can be undermined by, for instance, preventing recruitment of local sympathis-
ers. Counter-insurgency means that it is not only military forces that are involved in the
fight, but the whole of society can actually contribute to it. (This is perhaps a little reminis-
cent of the ‘dead’ total defence thinking that we had in the Nordic countries throughout the
entire Cold War?)
192
not accurate to see modern terrorist groups as ‘flat organisations’, something

that is not uncommon in more modern literature about the phenomenon. They
have, however, clearly different priorities to the groups that operated during the
Communist-led insurgency in the period from 1960 to the end of the 1980s.
However, this ad hoc structure in, for example, Iraq does not look efficient
enough for their present intentions, which are to create the greatest number of
problems possible for the opponent. It would appear that their goal is destruc-
tion as it is difficult to see any attempt to build up an alternative state system
that would be able to take over power.
The consequences of these developments are, however, difficult to predict.
One cannot, for example, rule out that the new and often fanatical terrorist
groups could get a hold of weapons of mass destruction and that they would
then have few objections to using these weapon systems. Their hatred and
fanaticism are so violent that some terrorists take no account of the fact that
the majority of victims will be innocent, if we see this through Western eyes.
The major Chechen terrorist attack on a school in the town of Beslan in North
Ossetia could serve as an example of the absence of such inhibitions. In an
interview given by the insurgency leader Shamil Basayev at the beginning of
2005, he stated that he was ‘shocked’ by what happened in Beslan. Despite
the fact that Basayev himself had ordered the hostage taking in Beslan, he puts
the blame on the Russian authorities for storming the school.269 Actual acts of
terrorism will probably continually increase in size unless we are successful in
combating the terrorist organisations and/or isolating these with regard to the
normal population and their supporters there.
The al-Qaeda organisation has been seen by some commentators as some-
thing totally new to history. It could be more correct to see al-Qaeda as a new
stage of development within terrorist and insurgent movements. What is really
new about al-Qaeda’s activity is perhaps instead the organisation’s geographic
range from the Gulf area to Zambia and on to New York and Madrid, and
how effectively the organisation has survived Western attempts at infiltration
and physical devastation. Certain features seem to refer back to the structure
and methods of previously known terrorist groups, but al-Qaeda’s attacks also
contain new elements. Most of them are naturally connected to the era we live
in. At the same time, they have managed to recruit vast numbers of sympathis-
ers within Western society. The infamous ‘Shoe Bomber’, for example, was
educated at an expensive British private school. It goes without saying to point
out here that the damage that terrorist groups cause has become greater and
269. The entire interview is reproduced on the Chechen website Kavkaz Center, see <http://www.
kavkazcenter.com/eng /content/2005/02/04/3500.shtml>.
193
could increase further as a result of the opportunities provided by technologi-

cal developments. Americans in particular fear that terrorists could get hold
of ‘dirty’ atomic bombs or other weapons of mass destruction. The attempt
at ‘Anthrax terrorism’ that followed in the wake of the events of September
11, 2001, revealed how easy it can be to create mass psychotic anxiety. The
American authorities have tried to find out who sent the letters and who was
behind this. Was this, as some people in the media have claimed, a frustrated
scientist who wanted to emphasise what he felt was a lack of readiness in the
defence against bioterrorism? The investigations have not given us any answers
so far. As previously mentioned, there are, today, many who are thinking about
the paralysis of modern society that terrorists could cause by sabotaging elec-
tronic means of communication. In addition, there is the previously indicated
potential for paralysis of the network infrastructure that important social func-
tions in many Western countries have become entirely dependent on.270
Al-Qaeda seems to be organised as a so-called network, if we choose not
to see the phenomenon as the British reporter for The Observer, Jason Burke,
chose to describe developments at a conference in London in February 2005.
His words were as follows: ‘The good news is that al-Qaeda does not exist.
The bad news is that the threat now facing the world is far more dangerous
than any single terrorist leader with an “army”, however large, of loyal cad-
res.’271 What he probably wanted to convey with this short and apt wording
was that the concept of al-Qaeda is only an inexact term used to describe the
real phenomenon, given the lack of a more precise term. Al-Qaeda obviously
does exist, but bin Laden’s group is not a cohesive/integrated group with its
tentacles everywhere, even if many people portray it as such. Seen in this light,
there are perhaps grounds for asking whether we should primarily see al-Qaeda
as an organisation or does it perhaps cover developments better if we see it as
a ‘religious ideology’?
What bin Laden succeeded in, however, during the time he was in Afghanistan
(1996–2001) was to give a focus and direction to the many extremist Islamic
groups that already existed – not building up a well-disciplined new organisa-
tion. Afghanistan acted as a gathering point for people and groups within the
270. See Magnus Ranstorp, ‘Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future
Direction’ (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2005). This is a paper edited
by Dr. Magnus Ranstorp, and will probably be published by Routledge, Taylor & Francis
Group in 2006. The paper describes the development of terrorism research, commenting
on trends and gaps in this research today.
271. Jason Burke. The text refers to the author’s notes from Burke’s presentation at a RUSI con-
ference in London on politics and terrorism on 24–25 February 2005 and from a conversa-
tion with him on Thursday 24 February 2005.
194
military section of Islam.272 Al-Qaeda itself is assumed to have been established

in the period 1988–1989 by bin Laden and his immediate circle in Peshawar
in Pakistan. In several sources, it has been stated that almost 100,000 ‘sol-
diers’ went to various training camps in Afghanistan during the period 1980 to
2001. Such figures are, in practice, difficult to verify and are more of a ‘worst
case scenario figure’, which, together with the hundreds of millions of dol-
lars bin Laden allegedly has available, make good front page material for the
newspapers. It is also stated that the majority of these travelled back to their
homelands once the training was finished, and that by far the majority of course
participants came from Arab countries. This figure has turned up in a number
of contexts but, in my opinion, it would be wrong to use the term ‘al-Qaeda’
for a large element of this training activity. What we are talking about here are,
among other things, ISI’s (the Pakistani intelligence service) training camps in
Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghanistan war in the period from 1979 to 1989
(when the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan). The majority of these par-
ticipants were Afghans, i.e., forces that were able to come under the command
of various local warlords, the ISI, or, somewhat later, the Taliban. Some of the
training camps also came under bin Laden’s control in the period from about
1996–2001. It has, however, not been documented that al-Qaeda itself had
training camps in Afghanistan in the period between 1990–1996.273
Bin Laden himself had, however, retreated to Saudi Arabia in 1989 and,
after various attempts at changing developments in the country, he escaped
to Sudan after the Gulf War in 1991. He was here until 1996, when he again
returned to Afghanistan. The ‘soldiers’ al-Qaeda itself managed and trained did
not become a force in Afghanistan until after 1996, when bin Laden re-estab-
lished himself in the country. After the war against the Soviet Union was over,
there was no longer a common cause to hold the group together, even though
the regime in Kabul did not fall until April 1992. The aim was clearly, regard-
less of developments in Afghanistan, to attempt to keep the group together by
developing an ‘international action force’.
Jason Burke, for example, states in his book that there were ‘several tens
of thousands’ who received training at various camps over the last 15 years,
272. Many of these people may today belong to, or be leaders of, local terrorist groups or insur-
gent movements, and several of them have been inspired (and possibly also funded) by
Osama bin Laden. The terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia is an example of such
a group. It was members of this group that, among other things, carried out a series of bomb
attacks in Indonesia in 2002 and 2003. The probably most well-known attack in Indonesia
so far was carried out in Bali in October 2002 when 202 people were killed.
273. Burke, Al-Qaeda, pp. 8–9.
195
without defining how many al-Qaeda itself may have trained.274 The point
here is not how many bin Laden’s group itself is responsible for but that it
should be seen as a fact that thousands of foreigners came to Pakistan and
Afghanistan to obtain their training and basic experience here before return-
ing to their homelands. The quality of training the ‘soldiers’ have received has
probably been very uneven. In this respect, it is the quality of the instructors
that is most important and this has probably varied a lot in Afghanistan. What
is probably most important about these camps is the acquaintances made and
developed and how these can be used later.
Today, we should avoid interpreting al-Qaeda as a strong and cohesive ter-
rorist organisation with cells ‘everywhere’. It is more a series of terrorist groups
we are talking about, all of which have their origin in a militant version/inter-
pretation of Islam.275
What does the term network mean in this context? Terrorist organisations
that communicate via the Internet need not be the ‘flat and non-hierarchical
organisations’ that several Western theorists have gone in for with regard to
the introduction of so-called network-based defence (NBD) or network-centric
warfare (NCW). Terrorist groups obviously have their own personal networks,
but they are often organised as cellular structures, which, in turn, are normally
part of ruthless hierarchies with their own rules. This is exactly what makes
them able to survive the devastation al-Qaeda had to suffer in Afghanistan.
Consequently, those who, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in 2001,
asserted that a form of terrorism like this could be restrained by eliminating the
home bases, where the attacks are coordinated, are probably wrong. The prob-
lem can be illustrated by the fact that none of the 19 hijackers who took part on
September 11, 2001, were from Afghanistan. In addition, the majority of the
hijackers had lived and trained for a long time in Western countries.
One danger when we analyse phenomena such as this is that we may find
ourselves seeing an order where one doesn’t actually exist. We always try to
find a meaning, preferably a conspiracy in everything the group has done or
asserted that it will do. When I read various analyses of terrorist groups that I
have studied myself, I often find that statements and actions by them are often
emphasised too much. The actual structures of such groups have often been ad
hoc and what they say and do is perhaps often without any ‘deeper strategic
meaning’. Perhaps there are no ‘hidden instructions’ in Osama bin Laden’s
video messages? Perhaps the number of insurgents in a group is not always
the result of careful planning but, instead, the result of the men in the group
274. Burke, ibid., p. 5.

275. Burke, ibid., p. 6.
196
knowing each other from childhood. Perhaps the insurgents did not carry out
a planned attack because it was raining that very evening and the command-
ing officer did not want to make an unpopular decision. The purpose of these
examples is to illustrate the danger of ‘overanalysing’ what an insurgent group
does or says. The simplest explanation is often the most correct one for perhaps
most smaller terrorist groups. But what they do often have is a strong internal
team spirit based on hatred of others’ values and a ‘religious ideology’ that justi-
fies their acts of terrorism. In particular, it looks as if we in Europe have more
‘copycats’, i.e., groups that, based on locally recruited people with an Islamic
background, copy and organise their own groups/cells with a view to attacking
targets in major European cities. It remains to be seen to what extent this is
really based on a superior design. It is probably their rambling ideas that form
the basis for the new groups that appear and are organised – not that the entire
thing is steered by an internationally co-ordinated network going by the name
of al-Qaeda.
Even though the Taliban regime in Kabul collapsed relatively quickly, the
Americans and their allies have only been partly successful in permanently neu-
tralising the Taliban movement as a political factor in Afghanistan. As regards
al-Qaeda’s forces in Afghanistan/Pakistan, this grouping has been able to con-
tinue its activity. An important reason for both organisations surviving was
probably that key leaders and their supporters could make it over to parts of
western Pakistan. The Americans quite simply did not have enough troops
to close off the border. They also used local forces that often had their own
agendas and – as it has been stated in connection with the Tora Bora operation
– took payment from both sides. It is obviously difficult to verify this kind of
report so they have to be regarded as ‘field rumours’. Perhaps this actually has
more to do with what strategic choice one makes before a war is started. The
main problem was perhaps not the lack of American soldiers to close the bor-
ders and thereby isolate the Taliban regime and the al-Qaeda forces. In his day,
the Chinese Sun Zi wrote about the possibility of guarding oneself everywhere:
‘He who guards everywhere guards nowhere.’ Perhaps more important than
anything is the problem establishing an extensive strategy that includes and
safeguards Pakistani and Iranian interests with the U.S.-led coalition in such
a manner that all parties can achieve their strategic objectives. The solution
in Afghanistan cannot be seen in isolation from the interests of neighbouring
countries. This is where the Americans have not succeeded.
Additionally, because of the impending war against Iraq, the Special Forces
that would have been able to carry out a protracted fight against the enemy were
also pulled out too early. Now both the Taliban and al-Qaeda are operating
once again in eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan and they are probably
working in partnership again with local warlords who see it as serving their
197
interests to work against the establishment of a strong central power. This will
not make it any easier for the new regime and their Western supporters to win
real control of the country. In a country like Afghanistan we must not forget
either the importance of ethnic factors.
Continual discussion is also ongoing about the al-Qaeda terrorist organi-
sation’s ‘global structure’. It has been stated that it is similar to the Internet,
something that is not quite the same as operating as a hierarchical structure.
A ‘network’ should, as we already know, survive even if one or more nodes are
neutralised, something that the Internet has achieved easily so far. It is difficult
to effectively destroy a structure; a network without any clearly defined centre.
According to statements from President Bush, al-Qaeda is now operating in
about 60 countries. And the cells can be coordinated through key people, even
if the individual groups and cells are not aware of each other’s existence. In the
period leading up to September 11, 2001, the hijackers are said to have com-
municated through the Internet via private messages hidden, for instance, in
graphics.276 Osama bin Laden can be said to represent the central ideological
core. Outside of this, there are independent isolated/local cells that operate
autonomously, based on a form of directing intentions. If ‘strategic guidelines’
do exist, it is likely that no details are known in the West. Perhaps we can see
al-Qaeda as a hybrid matrix organisation.
Government authorities in the West and in the Middle East have actually
had little success in combating Islamic extremists with links to al-Qaeda, even
if they have been successful in preventing a number of planned attacks and
have been able to arrest or overcome several known leaders. The majority of
experts have also been sceptical about the relatively optimistic statements from
the Bush administration from early September 2004 where a positive tone was
introduced and attempts were made to convince the sceptics that things were
now going better.
276. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002). Rohan Gunaratna has characterised al-Qaeda as follows: ‘(Al Qaeda
has) a very diverse membership that cuts across ethnic, class and national boundaries. It
is neither a single group nor a coalition of groups: it comprises a core base or bases in
Afghanistan, satellite terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamist political parties,
and other largely independent terrorist groups that it draws in for offensive actions and
responsibilities.’ See also Jason Burke’s book Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam. On
the backcover it states, among other things: ‘al-Qaeda is merely a convenient label applied by
the West to a far broader – and thus more dangerous – figure or group of Islamic militancy,
and shows how eradicating a single figure or group will do nothing to combat terrorism.
Only by understanding the true, complex nature of al-Qaeda (…), can we address the real
issues surrounding our security today.’
198
A more sober assessment is probably that they have neither been able to
understand nor to combat the development of the al-Qaeda phenomenon.
Even before the attack of September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda was a rather loosely
organised ‘network’ but everything points to the main leaders exercising, in
practice, strict control over all operations.
After al-Qaeda had lost its main base in Afghanistan and several of the
leaders there, the organisation has probably dispersed its leaders and has re-
emerged more as an ideological movement. Osama bin Laden’s role has also
changed. Today, he appears as a source of inspiration – not as an operative
leader. Without doubt, the ongoing war in Iraq is acting as a good means of
focusing the militant forces’ anger and hatred towards the West, including those
who collaborate with the Western forces.
Some people have also asked the question of whether the war in Iraq is in the
process of creating a completely new generation of terrorists: terrorists who will
appear in a couple of years as ‘the new al-Qaeda’: younger, more dangerous and
full of contempt for ‘the old guys’ in the present terrorist network. In this respect,
it is obviously important how everything turns out in Iraq. We should also note
that European countries and moderate Islamic countries, in particular, are today
also seen as legitimate and natural targets for terrorist attacks. And instead of, as
before, sending young recruits to Afghanistan for lengthy and thorough military
and Islamic training and indoctrination, the new recruits have received a short
but clearly effective indoctrination in their homelands so as to be able to be
deployed in various attacks. The U.S. is probably still an important target but
it appears that groups linked to al-Qaeda have, for the moment, moved away
from large and well-planned attacks. Instead, they are investing in many smaller
attacks, often directed at ‘soft targets’ that are lightly defended and which do not
require the lengthy and expensive preparations based on help from abroad. An
alternative interpretation could be that the U.S. (and Israel) is ‘the path to the
main goal’ which is to assemble the Arab nations under a common leadership
with its base in Saudi Arabia, which is seen as the core area of Islam. The jour-
ney there would possibly be by means of reducing/removing Western influence
from the Middle East. The attack in Madrid could perhaps be seen in the same
perspective? As Spain had troops in Iraq and only three days remained until the
election, the attacks probably achieved what the terrorists had wanted.277 The
277. The general conclusion is that the governing People’s Party lost the election as a direct or
indirect consequence of the terrorist attacks. Whether this was due to the actual attacks or
the fact that the retiring premier José Maria Aznar incorrectly blamed ETA for this is prob-
ably difficult to establish. The new premier José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero from the Spanish
Social Democratic party, the PSOE, kept his election promise and pulled Spanish troops out
of Iraq after a short time.
199
reason that the U.S. has been ‘dragged’ into this objective is obviously due to the
U.S. being the country that could most effectively influence the regime in Saudi
Arabia so that it collapses. Then the arguments previously referred to about the
pent-up anger and hatred, frustration and cultural subjugation in the area could
instead be seen as factors that the insurgents have exploited in order to rally sup-
porters of an ‘Arab coalition’.
The consequences of smaller attacks can often be just as big as major ones
– provided they are well timed and effectively carried out. The effect of the
bombings in Casablanca in May 2003 had major consequences for the rather
fragile democracy in Morocco and triggered mass arrests and allegations from
liberal groups in the country of widespread police abuse. But the greatest politi-
cal effect came undoubtedly, as previously mentioned, from the bombing of
four commuter trains in Madrid in Spain on 11 March 2004, which contrib-
uted greatly to the government in power losing the election and to the new
government in Spain quickly pulling its troops out of Iraq. Could the terrorists
really have hoped for a greater impact from the coordinated bomb attack?278
The American authorities have, of course, long been clear about develop-
ments and several theoretical works have been written, the theme of which is
that the wars of the future could take the form of ‘government against network’.
But how do we defend ourselves against this threat? In a democratic society,
openness itself is a basic value, while, in connection with this, openness can be
seen as an actual Achilles’ heel. One could, for instance, ask oneself the follow-
ing questions:
1. How to prevent terrorism without risking at the same time destroying one’s
own society? Stricter checks are being carried out at, for example, airports
but what actually is an ‘acceptable level of controls’?
2. How long can this monitoring go on? Should we accept that, for example,
postmen, librarians, staff at social security offices, teachers, etc., tip off the
police and security authorities as was suggested in the U.S. in the aftermath
of September 11?
3. Wouldn’t ‘everyone’ end up going round suspecting each other of being
terrorists if an informer culture such as this was established? How can we
avoid measures against terrorism becoming an excuse for every kind of
278. Douglas Frantz, Josh Meyer, Sebastian Rotella and Megan K. Stack, ‘The New Face of Al
Qaeda – Al Qaeda Seen as a Wider Threat’, Los Angeles Times, 26 September 2004. A quote
from the article: ‘The network has evolved into a looser, ideological movement that may no
longer report to Bin Laden. Critics say the White House focus is misdirected.’
200
offensive campaign we ourselves consider carrying out, even against other

countries?279
The phenomenon of September 11, 2001, has undoubtedly led to a

rethink in several areas. There is discussion about the measures that the new
International Criminal Court (ICC) can contribute, what diplomacy can do,
and how far one can go with financial restrictions, i.e., ‘the war on terror’ being
extended to the stock exchange and banking systems. It has proved to be dif-
ficult to get to grips with the economic resources, as most of them are actually
legal! How far should the authorities be able to go to prevent acts of terrorism?
Can we, for example, allow the torture of members of an organisation such
as al-Qaeda as the CIA tacitly does by surrendering them for interrogation in
countries that do not hesitate to use tough methods?
As previously mentioned, President Bush has declared ‘war on terror’ in a
series of speeches.280 But how is this ‘war’ to reach a final conclusion? As long
as there are places in the world where people feel that they are experiencing
injustice, such as Chechnya, Kashmir and Palestine, recruitment to terrorist
organisations will probably continue. The collective will to cause damage to
those seen as the enemy, carried out by people who feel trampled on, should
not be underestimated. Nor should one underestimate their willingness to sac-
rifice with regard to the losses that this will possibly lead to when the enemy
strikes back.281 This hatred, combined with religious or ideological notions,
is probably the actual core of the endless attacks and counterattacks that have
characterised the clash between Palestinians and Jews throughout the years.
A lack of respect and recognition is something one can understand and have
a dialogue about. Many debaters have, therefore, stated that social reforms and
democracy are the best preventive weapons against terrorism. Other critics have
stated that this is a manifestation of ‘concept imperialism’ and that one must
also bring the views from several cultural areas other than Western ones into the
discussion on morals and ethics. This form of reasoning may perhaps appear
somewhat naive, as democracy in itself is hardly any sure ‘vaccine’ against
279. It follows naturally here to draw parallels with the well-known ‘informer cultures’ that exist-
ed in, for instance, the Soviet Union during the Stalin period, in China under Mao Zedong
and especially in Communist East Germany.
280. As mentioned earlier, representatives of the Bush administration in early 2006 have started
using the term ‘The Long War’ instead of ‘Global War on Terror(ism)’ (GWOT).
281. It is attitudes like this in particular that are behind the lengthy Palestinian terrorism directed
primarily at Israel. And the heavy-handed Russian treatment of the Chechens has led to
there still being a hard core of guerrilla soldiers and terrorists in this area; groups that carry
out more and more large-scale and spectacular attacks on Russian civilians.
201
terrorism, something the ‘Red’ terror in the 1970s in countries such as West
Germany, France and Greece (after the junta rule of the 1970s) are good exam-
ples of. However, democracy in more countries could have a positive effect, as
democratic procedures enable the legal transfer of power from a non-function-
ing elite to new power groupings that, through lengthy (and peaceful) political
work and organisational ability, find their way into ‘the centre of power’. This
is, in many ways, the pattern in which the social democratic parties took over
power in the Scandinavian countries more than 60 years ago. A fairer global
distribution of the world’s resources would obviously not contribute to increas-
ing terrorism but ‘fresh justice’ is not in itself sufficient to deal with political
or religious fanatics. Fanatics often have their own logic and, once violence has
initially been used, it will normally take a long time before any new form of
normal state can be established. In the Muslim areas, there are also traditions
and forces that oppose terrorism as a legitimate (political) weapon. One could
perhaps begin with trying to encourage these forces?
If we look at the development of terrorism in a historical light, there is little
to suggest that international terrorism can be combated in a short-term per-
spective. It took, for instance, 15 years to overcome the ‘Red’ terror in Germany
in the 1970s and early 1980s (the most active period was actually shorter). In
Northern Ireland, the two main actors, the IRA and the UVF, have now kept
things going since 1969, even if little remains of the extreme violence from
that time. In Spain, the Basque separatists, ETA, have been active for a similar
period and they are still continuing their campaign. There are consequently
grounds for being prepared for a lengthy battle against terrorism and it is more
likely that it will take three decades rather than three years for it to ‘burn out’,
perhaps in a similar manner to what we have seen in Germany? In Germany,
they gradually cracked the terrorist activity as the leaders were imprisoned and/
or killed, sometimes at their own hands.282 In Northern Ireland, activities have
been much more widespread and terrorist activity has been rooted much more
deeply among the local population over a historically long period. In this case,
the terrorist groups’ political wings have gradually been allowed to gain the
upper hand. Both sides have become more active in politics although the vio-
lence is never far away, as seen in the killing of Robert McCartney in January
2005. The most interesting development in Northern Ireland is probably the
282. The RAF’s ‘war’ against the German state was abandoned in 1998. Many of the leading
figures had by this time been either killed in battles with the German police or been impris-
oned. Some of them, such as Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Jan-Carl Raspe and Irmgard
Möller agreed upon a suicide pact. The first three succeeded, while Möller survived the
suicide attempt.
202
police allegations that the terrorists have become increasingly involved in crime,
such as, for example, control of the drug trade and, most recently in December
2004, robbing banks.
If one is to combat the type of organisation that, for example, al-Qaeda is
and deal with the advantages that a secret organisation actually has, it is neces-
sary to maintain close and, hopefully, effective international cooperation. A
realistic assessment is probably that it will be possible, through international
intelligence and police cooperation, to reduce the danger of major and extreme-
ly devastating acts of terrorism, but not to eradicate terrorism in the next few
years.
On their part, the Americans have expressed the fresh challenges represent-
ed by modern international terrorism in the following manner in the relatively
new ‘9/11 report’:
In the post-9/11 world, threats are defined more by the fault lines within
societies than by the territorial boundaries between them. From terror-
ism to global disease or environmental degradation, the challenges have
become transnational rather than international. That is the defining
quality of world politics in the twenty-first century (…).
Now threats can emerge quickly. An organization like al Qaeda head-
quartered in a country on the other side of the earth, in a region so poor
that electricity or telephones were scarce, could nonetheless scheme to
wield weapons of unprecedented destructive power in the largest cities
of the United States.
In this sense, 9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American inter-
ests ‘over there’ should be regarded just as we regard terrorism against
America ‘over here’. In this same sense, the American homeland is the
planet. (…)
Islam is not the enemy. It is not synonymous with Terror. Nor does
Islam teach terror. (…) The present transnational danger is Islamist ter-
rorism. What is needed is a broad political-military strategy that rests on
a firm tripod of politics to
– attack terrorists and their organizations;
– prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism; and
– protect against, and prepare for, terrorist attacks.283
283. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, Authorized Edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004),
pp. 361–363.
203
Some of the defenders of extremist groups have stated that, for the entire
part of the world that is not affiliated with the West, terror is the only option for
resistance to Western domination. Working against terrorism is consequently
extremely dependent on one’s view of the cause of terrorism. The attack on
the WTC was justified by religious arguments, but could there also be other
motives behind the event? Poverty is mentioned by many as a reason for ter-
rorism. It is, in any case, a fact that there is much sympathy for those who flew
into the WTC among the section of the West’s Islamic population that feels
that we in the West value human life somewhat differently. Poverty may be of
significance to terrorism and it would be naive to believe otherwise. But the
actual hijackers simply did not come from poor families, so perhaps it is a feel-
ing of humiliation rather than poverty that stands out as a stronger motive for
becoming a terrorist? The Palestinian human rights champion Eyad el-Sarraj,
for instance, stated that desperation is today an important driving force for
many Arabs. When one feels that one’s dignity has been violated, one will want
revenge.284 Behind the religious motives expressed, there are therefore prob-
ably also other factors such as dissatisfaction and disappointment and a lack of
ability to push through reforms on the part of the ruling regime. An interesting
observation has been made by David Brooks:
Humiliated and oppressed, they lash out against America, the symbol
of threatening modernity. Off they go to seek martyrdom, dreaming of
virgins who await them in the afterlife.
Now we know that story line doesn’t fit the facts. We have learned a
lot about the jihadists, from Osama bin Laden down to the Europeans
who attacked the London subways last month. We know, thanks to a
database gathered by Marc Sageman, formerly of the C.I.A., that about
75 percent of anti-Western terrorists come from middle-class or upper-
middle-class homes. An amazing 65 percent have gone to college, and
three-quarters have professional or semiprofessional jobs, particularly in
engineering and science.
Whether they have moved to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, England or France,
these men are, far from being medieval, drawn from the ranks of the
284. John Kifner, ‘Massacre Draws Self-Criticism in Muslim Press’, The New York Times, 9
September 2004. The attack on the school in the town of Beslan has also provoked negative
reactions in parts of the Islamic world: ‘The brutal school siege in Russia, with hundreds
of children dead and wounded, has touched off an unusual round of self-criticism and
introspection in the Muslim and Arab world. “It is a certain fact that not all Muslims are
terrorists, but it is equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are
Muslims”, Abdel Rahman al-Rashed, the general manager of the widely watched satellite
television station Al Arabiya said in one of the most striking of these commentaries.’
204
educated, the mobile and the multilingual. The jihadists are modern psy-
chologically as well as demographically because they are self-made men (in
traditional societies there are no self-made men). Rather than deferring to
custom, many of them have rebelled against local authority figures, reject-
ing their parents’ bourgeois striving and moderate versions of Islam, and
their comfortable lives.285
It should be noted here that terrorism against targets in, for example, Europe
will not necessarily be carried out by people who travel here from the Middle
East. Over the last few years we have seen that terrorist acts have been planned
by people who have lived for a long time in France and Spain, or who were born
there and have gone to school in these countries. There will often be several
reasons for someone possibly becoming a terrorist. Several of them have, for
instance, been influenced by radical religious leaders. Some feel that they have
been marginalised in their new homelands and feel powerless and that they do
not have any legal means of influence. It is also an important factor whether one
comes oneself from an environment where the use of violence is accepted and
where relatives have previously been activists. Given contributory factors such
as these, the use of terror may be the answer one chooses.
When the ‘war on terror’ was declared after September 11, 2001, it repre-
sented, at the same time, a shift in attitude towards terrorism. In the Western
world, we have always tried to unveil and deal with political violence, whether
it is from anarchists, left-wing groups, ‘fascist’ nationalists or terrorist groups
with roots in the Middle East, etc. What was new was not that they wanted to
fight terrorists, but this time there were two new elements included in the ‘war
on terror’ as America saw it. Great Britain has now used soldiers in Northern
Ireland for over 30 years, something that is the basis of their expertise in the area
of LIC. It is not so long ago that soldiers were deployed around Heathrow air-
port outside London in armoured vehicles – something that is seen as a natural
use of soldiers in the UK. The new elements are:
• Firstly, terrorism was now seen as a warlike problem, in contrast to the previ-
ously predominant view that terrorism was something that the police and
judicial systems should deal with.
• Secondly, and probably more importantly, the Americans and their allies
went from a reactive and more ‘observant’ attitude towards terrorism as a
phenomenon over to what can be characterised as a preventive position.
While they had previously primarily attempted to uncover and prevent
285. David Brooks, ‘Trading Cricket for Jihad’, The New York Times, 4 August 2005. (Subtitle:
‘Nothing has changed during the war on terror as much as our definition of the enemy.’)
205
acts of terrorism, preferably in connection with the planning of, or most

recently, in conjunction with the carrying out of acts of terrorism, they now
actively go out and define on an ad hoc basis various political factions as
goals in the ‘war on terror’.
As a result of the Bush administration’s growing problem with the term

‘war on terror’, we have seen President George Bush and other leaders begin to
change their use of terms in their speeches. The new official phrase may perhaps
be ‘global struggle against violent extremists’ and the term is clearly to include
all combating of al-Qaeda and other militant Islamic groups/groupings. At least
the term covers somewhat more than the American terms ‘war on terror’ and
the hardly appropriate ‘war on drugs’ from the 1990s. The term ‘global struggle
against violent extremists’ also suggests a growing understanding that this type
of conflict cannot be won by purely military means. Another little nuance is
that President Bush has now begun to talk of terrorism as more of a human phe-
nomenon as his speechwriters have now introduced the term ‘violent extrem-
ists’ into the president’s speeches. The Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has
clearly tagged along with the trend as, in July, he used the phrase ‘enemies of
freedom, the enemies of civilisation’, and General Richard Myers, the recently
retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon, went even further
when he stated that ‘the long term problem is (…) more diplomatic, more eco-
nomic, more political than it is military’. There are grounds for assuming that
these changes to official usage are a result of waning support for both President
Bush and his leadership of the war in Iraq in particular.286
It looks like it will be too difficult to create a new joint executive strategy
for NATO and the EU. As they did not manage to withstand the pressure to
act on the basis of their own interests with regard to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq,
is it not unrealistic to believe that French interests, for example, would allow
themselves to be set aside in order to achieve a common platform for Western
military activities in, for example, Africa?
Traditionally, preparations have been made for conventional military action,
but obviously without it being possible to point across a border and state ‘there
is the enemy’ as in conventional warfare. A problem with this traditional method
of thinking is that it has been difficult for the Americans to set themselves clear
and achievable political and strategic goals. It is probably more correct to state
286. Rupert Cornwell, ‘The “war on terror” slips out of Bush vocabulary’, Independent News &
Media (UK) Ltd., 28 July 2005. Cornwell probably made a good point when he stated in
the article that: ‘In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military most certainly is at war. But on
the home front, the only visible manifestation is tightened security. It has become harder to
convince the public that the country is indeed at war in the generally accepted sense.’
206
that their goals have been unclear, at the same time as an attitude such as this
to the surroundings makes it difficult to make a real distinction between those
who are real enemies, those who are neutral and those who are willing to support
the fight against terrorism. Without being able to clearly distinguish between
friends, neutrals and enemies and, at the same time, having clear objectives one-
self, there is a danger that the ‘war on terror’ could end up as a ‘perpetual’ crisis
situation, as it will be extremely difficult for the political system and the majority
of people to work out when it is possible to ‘call-off ’ the ongoing war. In other
words, there is still clearly a lack of an executive, long-term strategy.
What actually is the goal of the declared war? We should not underestimate
here the danger associated with declaring who is the enemy. If this were to be
done somewhat belatedly today, this would probably lead to a great number of
Islamic groups and regimes being on the list as enemies – something that could
give the impression that a ‘war against Islam’ has actually been declared, i.e., a
form of cultural struggle between the secularly dominated West and the Islamic
world. The fact that there is no such attitude among Western sources would then
be uninteresting – this could nevertheless be the conclusion drawn in the Islamic
world. In Islamic propaganda, the ongoing ‘war’ has already been described as a
‘battle between civilisations’, something that is also highlighted in the internal
propaganda of the majority of the extremist groups. It is common in this respect
to speak of combating Western goals in a holy war, etc. Several circumstances
suggest that we could see a further radicalisation of developments and there is
obviously a risk of the entire issue finally taking the form of a clash of cultures.287
As emphasised previously, the ongoing conflict will be lengthy, but slowly but
surely the U.S. and its allies will probably be able to overcome the various ter-
rorist cells, mainly as a result of the global strategy that the U.S. has prepared.
Developments in Iraq have been a so-called ‘mission creep’ and will be dealt with
accordingly. The U.S. should now ‘succeed’ in stabilising Iraq if it is to have any
hope of maintaining long-term strategic credibility in the Middle East and in
the international community in general. Even although it may be difficult to
287. George Friedman, ‘Naming the War’, Stratfor, 3 August 2004. This analysis provides an
interesting perspective and criticism of developments in the ‘war on terror’. A comment: the
point discussed here has been disputed in the ongoing debate. More optimistic commenta-
tors would perhaps assert that the argument does not take into account that there are actu-
ally generally positive developments regarding the democratisation of many of the countries
in the Arab world, most recently in Lebanon. The multitude and intensity of the ongoing
conflicts could possibly be compared to taking the lid off a boiling pot. But as the effects of
democratisation and globalisation gradually become visible, it is possible that political and
religious rhetoric will be toned down and the present leaders will focus, to a greater extent,
on the possibilities that exist within global integration. In that case, we will not get any
‘Huntingtonesque clash of cultures’.
207
understand several of the less clever measures that the Americans have imple-
mented in the now almost 3 years that have passed since the war in Iraq in the
spring of 2003, it is possible to see a sort of strategy behind it all. This lies under
a ‘tapestry of catchwords’ such as ‘democratisation’ and ‘globalisation’.
One of the paradoxes in the ‘war on terror’ is that it is actually a war declared
against a tactic. Terrorism is not a goal, it is a means that an inferior adversary
exploits against a superior military power, aimed at creating a psychological
impact. As long as the U.S. and the West present their strategy as a war on ter-
ror, and do not direct their efforts at the underlying causes of terrorism, it is
difficult to see a solution in the near future to this phenomenon.
A so-called ‘Fourth-Generation War’ cannot, according to the thinking the
theory is based on, be won ‘purely militarily’. This type of war can only be ‘won’
by attacking the insurgents or ‘terrorists’ support base by, for instance, open-
ing up and involving these relatively ‘archaic’ societies and cultures in the global
community, seeking economic, cultural and political partnership and inspiring
locally adapted democratisation and bringing about a local form of ‘the rule of
law’. Military activity will then possibly gradually change to championing the
‘forced reorganisation’ in the areas that oppose the international community. The
objective then becomes to press on with what is called, in international rhetoric,
democratisation, in the sense of a society that lives in keeping with internation-
ally accepted laws. And the strategy used to achieve this is, somewhat simplified,
globalisation. The paradox is that Europeans (and the UN) are ‘undermining’ this
development, from an American point of view, by constantly opposing the poten-
tially positive gains from military influence in this area. The consequences of the
U.S. and Great Britain failing in Iraq could be great for the international com-
munity. Political prestige should consequently not be dimensioned for individual
nation’s policies in this area, even if there was opposition to the war in Iraq from
day one. If the possibility of influencing developments in a positive direction
through dialogue, cooperation and possible support within individual areas is
renounced, this may have rather unpredictable consequences in the longer term.
One can obviously ask whether a successful counter-insurgency campaign
is not simply a traditional military campaign with elements of democratisation
and social and economic reforms including economic reconstruction? In the
sense of the description given in Chapter 2 of the USMC’s Small War Manual,
this is correct, but it remains to be seen whether one would be able to execute
this type of theory in practice.288
288. Draft of the new USMC doctrine document, Small War Manual, Chapter 2, 2005. In the
U.S. Armed Forces, there is probably also a bit of a gap between theory and practice. The
American attack on Fallujah in November 2004 is perhaps more reminiscent of the Russian
attack on Grozny in the spring of 1995 than a ‘completely new type of warfare’, see Chapter
8 on urban warfare.
208
If the Americans were to be unsuccessful in combating the insurgents in

Iraq, there is a clear danger of civil war breaking out between the three major
ethnic groups. Then we could have a new ‘Lebanon’, but 40 times bigger and
with borders with six countries instead of two. The battle for the oil wealth and
ethnic/religious antagonism may then drag Iraq’s neighbours into the civil war.
We can thereby conclude that the insurgency in Iraq is now about more than
just the credibility of the Bush administration.
If the extent of acts of terrorism is increased in the time to come, this in itself
will raise the temperature of the battle. Even civilians will then become more
and more directly involved both physically and emotionally, something that
would have political consequences. Such a development could itself benefit the
terrorists’ objectives, as the increasingly tougher measures that those combating
terrorism must use in order to deal with this destruction could in themselves
contribute to uncertainty and the alienation of the civilian population. This
applies in both the Western countries affected and in the terrorists’ homelands
where the ruling regimes will attempt to suppress all forms of sympathy for the
terrorists. In Islamic tradition, this could lead to the civilian population feeling
that there is a clear link between the use of violence and the so-called ‘righteous
use of terror’ against ‘the others’, i.e., a form of false link between the people’s
cultural and religious affiliations and sympathy for terrorism. Military meas-
ures would obviously work in the short-term but, in the long run, a political
solution that takes account of the local social and economic conditions in the
individual areas of conflict must always be found. It might, however, be naive
to believe that terrorism is a natural answer to local political and economic
injustice, but terrorists will always try to exploit developments for their own
purposes. Seen in this light, hopeless local conditions are of importance to how
terrorist organisations recruit – the ‘reproduction’ of new terrorists must be
stopped if the ongoing ‘war’ is to be ‘won’ in the long-run.
7.2.2 Insurgency and terror – Afghanistan as an example

As we know, the Taliban regime was relatively quickly overcome in Afghanistan
in the autumn of 2001, even though many commentators warned and stated
that this would take a long time, be very bloody, etc. Peace has not exactly
come to the country, but at least there is a new regime in place in Kabul. It is
now perhaps time to attempt to understand the world picture that the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan based itself on, and the international consequences this
was to have?
For modern European Christianity and its followers, and also for the
majority of other larger religions, historical events such as the Crusades, the
Inquisition and the burning of witches are things that belong to the past. But
209
in parts of Islam, which was at one time perhaps the most tolerant of all major
religions, fanaticism has found a new place in modern times. Variants such
as Wahhabism and Salafism in particular and the Shia interpretations that
Khomeini was responsible for in Iran have enjoyed great success over the last
few years. Along with this advance in the more fundamental interpretations of
Islam, we have also seen a clear increase in fanaticism among followers of those
who represent the new and more extreme interpretations. Fanaticism is always
an important part of terrorism. A certain fanaticism will always be required for
a follower, on the basis of a strong and unshakeable belief in his own cause, to
both kill opponents and accept that he will be killed himself. Herein probably
lies one of the reasons that terrorists have used so-called barbaric methods as
part of their terrorism, such as beheading their enemies and desecrating dead
opponents. This is in contrast to the message in the Koran that even an enemy
has the right to a decent funeral. It is even more important to note that Islam
forbids the killing of elderly people, women and children.289 Islam has prob-
ably the most detailed rules for warfare of all the major religions. This includes
bans on, for instance, the execution of prisoners of war and the looting or
destroying of homes. However, extremists obviously interpret a book, like the
Koran, in their own way. For some of them, the Koran is perhaps their ‘military
doctrine’.
The fact that Osama bin Laden chose ‘war against the United States’ was
perhaps not ‘politics by other means’ in the Clausewitzian sense of the concept
of warfare. The acts of terrorism can rather be seen as part of the so-called
‘cosmic battle’ that would, according to its followers, introduce a revolution in
the world based on an Islamic doctrine of salvation.290 Or as Karen Armstrong
describes his religious and ideological background:
Bin Laden was not inspired by Wahhabism but by the writings of the
Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb, who was executed by President Nasser
in 1966. Almost every fundamentalist movement in Sunni Islam has
been strongly influenced by Qutb, so there is a good case for calling the
violence that some of his followers commit ‘Qutbian terrorism’. Qutb
urged his followers to withdraw from the moral and spiritual barbarism
of modern society and fight it to the death. (…) The story of Qutb is also
289. Abu Dawud, Book 14, nr. 2608. Abu Dawud is said to have recorded the Prophet
Muhammad’s words and actions in a so-called Hadith which is seen by Sunni Muslims and
most Shia Muslims as a supplement to the Koran, with the same status.
290. The main source here is Dr. Torkel Brekke, a research fellow at the Department of Culture
Studies and Oriental Languages at the University of Oslo and at the Norwegian Academy of
Science (Oslo: Aftenposten, articles in the newspaper on 21 September 2001 and 8 January
2002).
210
instructive as a reminder that militant religiosity is often the product of

social, economic and political factors. Qutb was imprisoned for 15 years
in one of Nasser’s vile concentration camps, where he and thousands of
other members of the Muslim Brotherhood were subjected to physical
and mental torture. He entered the camp as a moderate, but the prison
made him a fundamentalist. Modern secularism, as he had experienced
it under Nasser, seemed a great evil and a lethal assault on faith. (…)
The story of Qutb is also instructive as a reminder that militant religios-
ity is often the product of social, economic and political factors.291
It is, however, clear that various motives have probably influenced the
Taliban’s choice of political direction throughout the 1990s and, most recently,
in the autumn of 2001 when they decided on a ‘war against the U.S.’ instead
of abandoning bin Laden after the acts of terrorism on September 11, 2001.
A key element that has, perhaps, not so far been well-enough presented in the
media is the movement’s fundamental religious world picture, while the regime’s
extreme views of women and culture, for example, were reported on relatively
widely in the Western mass media.
Dr. Torkel Brekke, a research fellow from Norway, has referred to an
American expert on Islam Richard Eaton, who has a theory that the move-
ment was inspired by so-called ‘messianic vision’. A common feature among the
majority of messianic groups is that they believe in an upheaval of the existing
world order. This is to be the beginning of a period of, for example, ‘righteous
rule’, ‘a state of perfection on Earth’ or a similar notion. The group’s leader
often appears as ‘the messenger of God’ who has the task of initiating these
upheavals. Before the Taliban movement, it was Mullah Mohammed Omar
who assumed the role of ‘the new Messiah’. Eaton has presented a number
of aspects of the Taliban regime that he believes show how this theory could
explain their world picture and their actions. The Taliban maintained – as is
usual with similar movements – a puritanical morality and they largely lived in
a ‘Manichean world’ where they saw themselves in an eternal battle against the
forces of darkness. The Taliban’s violence against others with different beliefs
was consequently a natural element of the battle against internal and external
enemies (real or imagined).292
But the Taliban most clearly appeared as a so-called messianic movement
in the movement’s theories with regard to the caliphate. The caliphate can be
seen as an idealised Islamic form of government. It was established in A.D. 632
292. Torkel Brekke, ‘Talibans voldelige messianisme’ [The Taliban’s Violent Messianism],
Aftenposten, 8 January 2002.
211
after the Prophet Muhammad had died. For perhaps the majority of today’s
Muslims, even in centres of disquiet such as Afghanistan and Iraq, Muhammad’s
own time and the government of the first four caliphs appear to be the perfect
model of how the Islamic state should be governed spiritually, politically and
economically. Later, and militarily more powerful, Islamic states with their cen-
tres in Damascus and Baghdad carried on the philosophy of the caliphate, but
obviously based on other conditions as factors of power politics were changed.
This earliest period constitutes, even today, the natural historical reference for
later attempts at reforming Islam as a world religion. This was also the case for
the Taliban movement and Mullah Omar.293 Mark Juergensmeyer in his book
Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence also discusses
these problems. (This book was published before 9/11.)294
Messianic concepts are a feature of the majority of major religions, perhaps
especially within the three ‘revelationary religions’ and these concepts often
appear as a positive force in the lives of their followers. The expectation that
Jesus (or a similar religious figure) will come back to Earth and establish his
righteous kingdom gives many people strength and hope in their everyday lives.
At the same time, there are many historical examples of such concepts being
important as regards the legitimisation of warfare, particularly in the 14th and
15th Centuries in Europe. Messianic movements often relate to the surround-
ing world in two ways:295
• Their followers may withdraw from an existing social system that they
believe will be ruined and wait peacefully for the return of the Messiah.
• On the other hand, the expectation of a total upheaval of the world may be
a strong motivation for political action and for insurgency against a regime.
The faithful see themselves as actors in the political process that is to lead to
the revolution and they are involved in accelerating this process by under-
mining or attacking the existing political system so that the adherents of
the system, a corrupt power structure, are forced to give way to ‘the new
order’.296
293. Brekke (2002), ibid.

294. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2000). See also the following article on the Internet: Kimberly
Dannels Ruff, Dennis J.D. Sandole, and Evis Vasili, ‘Identity and Apocalyptic Terrorism’,
<http://www.gmu.edu/departments/icar/sept11/Identity&Apocolypic_Terrorism.pdf>.
212
The religious struggle against ‘Satanic forces’, symbolised by the U.S., was
central to the Taliban vision. The struggle was about recreating a political and
religious order in accordance with an almost mythical model, the caliphate. In
other words, the Taliban wanted nothing less than to change the world, and
that is why war became almost politically unavoidable. The first thing that the
Taliban had to take care of, if the caliphate around Mullah Omar was to achieve
a basic religious legitimacy, was taking control of the Muslims’ holiest places:
Mecca and Medina. And it is probably here that the Arab Osama bin Laden
comes into the picture. He was given the task of forcing the Americans, who
symbolised ‘the Great Satan’, out of the holy land, i.e., out of Saudi Arabia.297
The next natural step would have been to attack Saudi Arabia in order to estab-
lish a new regime there that was not ‘religiously corrupt’ in bin Laden and
Omar’s eyes. Osama bin Laden, who was Omar’s friend, was clearly given the
responsibility for leading the actual fight for the caliphate and thereby the fight
against the ‘corrupt’ Islamic states outside Afghanistan’s borders.298
In his articles in the Norwegian press, Torkel Brekke has presented the
world picture that bin Laden has put forward in his so-called fatwas against
the U.S., with the emphasis on the strategic and political aspects. As he sees
it, it is only in a so-called ‘messianic perspective’ that the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, have any logical meaning.299 This terrorism can be seen
here as part of the ‘cosmic battle’ that, according to the interpretation of this
school of thought within Islam, is to begin a totally fundamental upheaval of
the world. The inner logic of this terrorism can probably be best understood
by studying how the Islamic doctrine of salvation and apocalyptic thinking is
preached among the modern radical Islamists in their schools. It is Brekke’s
understanding that it is only within a messianic universe that many of the
Taliban’s apparently absurd choices of political direction and actions have any

298. One could take a critical standpoint here with regard to whether this is an accurate portrayal.
It has also been asserted that Osama bin Laden used the Taliban regime as the base for his
vision of overthrowing the regime in Saudi Arabia and establishing the caliphate there. In
many ways, the Taliban grew out of the war against the Soviet Union. The focus on the U.S.
only began after the U.S. stationed forces in Saudi Arabia in connection with the Gulf War
in 1991 and the subsequent influence the U.S. achieved in the border states around Saudi
Arabia.
299. The choice of target in 2001, the World Trade Center, can perhaps tell us something about
their intentions, depending on whether we see the towers as purely symbolic targets or as
the centre of the U.S. influence over the international community. Another perspective is
that the WTC was the symbol/represented globalisation and American domination of the
globalised economy. So the attack cannot just be interpreted as a direct attack on the U.S.,
but on the entire international community.
213
meaning. Such an interpretation is not necessarily totally accurate. As previ-

ously indicated, George Friedman has demonstrated another form of logic
here. He points out that the attack on the U.S. was carried out with the inten-
tion of dragging the U.S. into conflicts in the Middle East, so that this develop-
ment would indirectly contribute to the collapse of the regime in Saudi Arabia
and so that it would have the secondary effect of uniting the Arab nations in
a common cause. In this event, the attack was following a ‘pure’ political and
military strategic logic. If this is the case, Dr. Brekke maybe has gone too far
in his interpretation of bin Laden’s ‘information operation’.300
Why, for instance, was the Taliban so preoccupied with destroying
Afghanistan’s art and actively persecuting intellectuals in Afghanistan? Why
did it smash the archaeological treasures in the museum in Kabul? Why did the
Taliban government destroy books and pictures, and why did they blow up the
special Buddha statues in the Bamiyan Valley? Messianic movements often have
a rather special relationship to the concept of time and they often look forward
to a state of affairs where everything is changed, when existing society is more
or less levelled to the ground.301 Afghanistan is a country where just over a
third of the population can read and write.302 Such a low level of education will
obviously contribute to the majority of Afghans having little or no knowledge
of the world outside their own immediate area.
These movements, and it is not only radical Islamists who have thoughts like
these, are waiting for the breakdown of existing social structures and for a whole
new world to come. Consequently, the past should be destroyed for the benefit
of the future. This destruction of the art and culture of the past can be expressed
in many unusual ways: messianic movements in Europe have burned books and
art on several occasions and elevated ignorance and a lack of (valid) knowledge
to being a virtue. Pol Pot’s radical Communism in Cambodia (which had the
same clearly fanatical features) killed all intellectuals and monks they could get
their hands on, i.e., society’s foremost bearers of the past and traditions. By
removing the past, the ideological leaders believed they could create a perfect
new society. The Taliban movement also did its best to destroy Afghanistan’s
non-Islamic past during the years that it was in power in Kabul. The Taliban
300. George Friedman, America’s Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle between America
and Its Enemies (New York: Doubleday, 2004), pp. 151–190.
301. Torkel Brekke, ‘Osama bin Laden i krig også mot Norge’ [Osama bin Laden also at War with
Norway], Aftenposten, 21 September 2001. See also Brekke’s more detailed article ‘Talibans
voldelige messianisme’ [The Taliban’s Violent Messianism], Aftenposten, 8 January 2002.
302. According to ‘CIA – The World Factbook’, 36 per cent of the population over 15 years of
age is able to read and write. For men, the percentage is 51 per cent and, for women, it is 21
per cent (the figures are from 1999).
214
expected Muslims all over the world to rally behind Mullah Mohammed Omar
in the fight against ‘the infidels’.303
But that is not how things went in Afghanistan. Mullah Omar in particular
clearly overestimated support for his version of the Islamic doctrine of salvation
among the world’s Muslims and the brutal internal policies that the Taliban
regime carried out in Afghanistan provoked the majority of other main ethnic
groups outside the Pathans304 who dominated within the movement. For his
part, Osama bin Laden underestimated the U.S.’s ability to strike back mili-
tarily in an effective manner.
But, even in this part of the world, it should not be forgotten that this type
of argument and philosophy has often been developed in order to establish and
retain political power and control the population. Rhetoric and propaganda are
often techniques that religious leaders use when they have political ambitions.
But different forms of radical sects are also a phenomenon that occurs in
places other than Afghanistan. As previously mentioned, one of the best-known
recent examples is the Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo (‘The Supreme Truth’),
believed to have released Sarin gas for the first time in the city of Matsumoto
in June 1994 where 8 people died and subsequently in a more large-scale attack
on the Tokyo underground system on 20 March 1995 where 12 people were
killed and about 3,800 injured. The sect has been characterised as an apocalyp-
tical, ‘millennialist’ cult, the religion of which is based on a mixture of Tibetan
Buddhism, Hinduism, yoga and science fiction. The sect was very much char-
acterised by the cult leader’s extremely eccentric character. He had, for instance,
a fascination with Adolf Hitler who was hailed as a prophet. Those who became
members had to surrender all their savings to the sect. The extensive ‘brain-
washing’ of new members ensured loyalty to the leader Shoko Asahara. The
goal of the sect was probably to hasten a political breakdown in Japan, some-
thing that the sect’s leader saw as necessary for its own progress.305
303. It is still difficult to predict what Afghanistan’s future will be, but conditions are now poorer
for the extreme culture of violence that flourished in the country in connection with the
Taliban’s messianic fantasies. However, the many warlords in the country will obviously have
their own priorities in the time to come. There is not much hope of peaceful developments
in the near future.
304. Also known as Pashtun. This ethnic group makes up 42 per cent of the population and is
therefore the biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan.
305. The Aum Shinrikyo sect (‘Supreme Truth Sect’) or AUM is also discussed in Stephen E.
Atkins, Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 2004), pp. 30–31. See also D. W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in
Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, 1996).
215
7.2.3 Terrorism as a substitute for reconstruction activity?

The problem of who is loyal to whom has been discussed previously, in, for
instance, connection with the discussion on the importance of good intelli-
gence with regard to counter-insurgency. The quote below has been taken from
an article published in Newsweek in June 2005 about the fact that there are real
security problems in the Iraqi police and military forces:
Over dinner last week in a fashionable Baghdad neighborhood, Iraqi offi-
cials were shaking their heads over news that 176 Iraqi police officers
were found to have terrorist connections in the past two weeks. ‘[Some
of ] their fingerprints were found on bomb debris examined by special-
ists’, said one official, requesting anonymity because he wasn’t cleared
to talk to media. ‘The Americans [have been] taking fingerprints from
bomb cars and matching them with police records.’ But Iraq’s Security
minister, Abdul Karim al-Inizi, says the ones who got caught are only a
fraction of the total number of infiltrators. ‘A number way bigger than
that is still active and still in service’, al-Inizi told NEWSWEEK. He’s
especially concerned about moles from Saddam Hussein’s elite intelligence
corps, the Mukhabarat. ‘They penetrated easily because [the former Iraqi]
government brought them back without asking enough questions.’ Inizi
criticizes the Americans, too, for failing to cultivate reliable Iraqi sources
and ignoring repeated warnings about the loyalty of the Iraqis they had
recruited. ‘Yes, they needed to have sources with the former regime’, Inizi
says. ‘But they needed other sources of information as well.’306
If nothing else, such a large number of officials with rather dubious loyalty
to the new Iraqi regime indicates that there will be major problems in main-
taining acceptable security if the American forces are quickly pulled out of the
country. Although the new regime in Baghdad has also established a system
of its own where it is trying to make use of agents and informants, there are
grounds for asking how effective this is. Major General Mohammed Qureishi,
who leads the Iraqi elite force the ‘Wolf Brigade’, states in the previously quoted
article from Newsweek that:
We are sending our spies inside the terrorist groups before attacking
them. We have our regular ways to get the information from our sources
about the terrorist locations.307
Qureishi is also the creator of Iraq’s most popular TV show, a ‘reality’ series
titled ‘Terrorists taken care of by the Law’. In this, insurgents taken prisoner
confess their ‘sins’. Some human rights groups have, perhaps with good grounds,
306. Scott Johnson and Melinda Liu, ‘The Enemy Spies’, Newsweek, 27 June 2005 (<http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/8272786/site/newsweek/).
307. Scott Johnson and Melinda Liu (2005), ibid.
216
asked questions about how these confessions are obtained. Qureishi has also been
the target of assassination attempts, including a suicide bomber who tricked his
way through the Iraqi security system and blew himself up in the headquarters
of the ‘Wolf Brigade’. This incident, which took place on 11 June 2005, led to
the Ministry of Defence in Iraq setting up a ‘lessons learned’ centre with a view
to preventing anything like this happening again.
But, nevertheless, it does not look as if there is any lack of recruitment for
the insurgents in Iraq and the figure is probably growing more quickly than the
allied forces are able to defeat the insurgent forces. In June 2005, the coalition’s
leaders claimed that they assumed they had killed 15,000 insurgents over the
course of a year. Despite this relatively high figure, they estimated that there
remained 12,000 to 20,000 active insurgents. On the basis of information that
Newsweek had obtained from sources within the U.S. Special Operations, this
estimate included about 1,000 foreign jihadists, about 500 Iraqi jihadists, some-
where between 15,000 and 30,000 former supporters of the Saddam regime and
perhaps as many as 400,000 ‘support troops’ of various types. These figures do
not, however, include the large number of criminal organisations assumed to be
operating in at least 12 of Iraq’s 18 provinces. The following sub-conclusions
were drawn: ‘All told, the insurgency is believed to include upwards of 40 reason-
ably distinct groups that sometimes join forces for particular operations.’308
As yet, however, there is not a single official person either in Baghdad or in
Washington willing to say that the battle against the insurgents in Iraq is hope-
less. Nor does it appear that the American intelligence operations are willing
to draw such conclusions. However, after two years of warfare, there cannot
be many who are particularly optimistic either. They are clearly particularly
reflective with regard to the so-called jihadists. The training they received in
the Taliban-governed Afghanistan was often somewhat rudimentary and per-
haps the most important aspect of them was the contact networks that this
provided for the participants. The situation is totally different in today’s Iraq.
The combination of realistic training and the fact that ‘everyone’ hates the
Americans before enlisting for duties with the insurgents is somewhat of a con-
trast to the situation in Afghanistan where it was not until they had received a
lengthy indoctrination that they had learned to hate the U.S. This hatred of the
Americans is probably just about the only thing that all insurgents are agreed on
– this applies to both the foreign ‘soldiers’ and those locally recruited.
In Iraq, it is the urban battle that is important and it is a highly qualified oppo-
nent that the insurgents are coming up against every day. The new jihadists receive
real ‘on the job training’ here in the ongoing insurgency. This provides them with
308. Scott Johnson and Melinda Liu (2005), ibid.
217
practical experience in, among other things, how to make bombs, sniping and
all the other skills one needs if one is to achieve success in urban warfare. This is
in contrast to the often rather casual training they received in camps ‘out in the
sticks’ in al-Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan during the Taliban period. For
American intelligence teams in particular, it has become clearer that theirs and the
West’s problems with radical jihadists will not end if there is a peaceful solution
in Iraq. What is now happening in Iraq is the training of relatively clever terror-
ists who have ‘been stamped’ with a hatred of the U.S. and everything Western.
They have even established a new term for the impending danger: ‘the class of
’05 problem’. What does this mean? These are the insurgents and terrorists who
will survive the ongoing counter-insurgency in Iraq and who will look for new
opportunities to damage Western interests when the war in Iraq ends: the war on
terror will not come to any quick end even if the U.S. decides to pull out. Instead
we are facing a lengthy and probably extremely ruthless period of terrorism out-
side the two aforementioned countries. It is enough that one represents what the
extremists see as Western values or Arab disaffection in relation to their own special
interpretation of the Koran in order to become possible victims of terrorism for
many years in the future. The rationality of the extremists is completely different
to how traditional Western rationality functions/operates.
The second-generation immigrants or young people who came as children
to their new homelands and who may become terrorists are in the process
of becoming a fresh challenge for European police. Three of the four suicide
bombers in the London attack of 7 July had close links with Pakistan, while
those now suspected of the attempted bombings of 21 July were all from East
Africa – one of the regions it is assumed that al-Qaeda and its supporters have a
certain influence in. The Americans first became aware of this development in
this region in the aftermath of the bomb attacks on their embassies in Nairobi
and Dar es-Salaam in August 1998. Another attack took place on a hotel with
Israeli tourists in Mombasa in November 2002, while the terrorists tried to
shoot down a passenger flight with a handheld (SA-7) surface-to-air missile, but
the plane, which was taking tourists back to Israel, was not hit.
While suicide bombings and terrorist attacks were previously reserved for
well-organised networks and inhabitants of countries in the Middle East or else-
where in the Third World, we now see a trend where young people who can be
regarded as integrated into the West are committing acts of terrorism, i.e., a form
of ‘home-grown terrorist cell’ is now appearing. This may, for example, be groups
of friends who, through reading or the direct influence of extremists, are inspired
by other acts of terrorism. Inspiration is obtained from local radical circles and
they then get the desire to take part in the ‘confrontation’ with the West. Contact
over the Internet with larger networks may take place, but they are perhaps not
as dependent on this as was the case a few years ago. It has been difficult for the
218
police to demonstrate any clear link to al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups in con-
nection with several plans revealed for terrorist strikes in Europe, including those
in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. There is also much to suggest that the
Internet can become an increasingly more important part of recruitment work,
monitoring and leadership of future potential terrorists.
Once there were tapes, videos and leaflets used to bring in new recruits
or keep the old ones on message. For extremists, jihadist websites are a
step up since they allow all these elements to be combined and accessed
by anyone with an Internet connection. They also allow the extremists in
the field to communicate with their friends and enemies outside. The Iraq
war has seen statements and videos, such as that of the horrific execution
of British engineer Kenneth Bigley, quickly dispatched to the wider world.
The addresses change as security services or individuals chase them from
one service provider to the next, but the sites – a mix of articles, photo-
graphs and message boards – are as eagerly followed to their new homes by
the devotees. Most are in Arabic, large numbers are hosted in south-east
Asia, but some are springing up in Europe.309
What is it that creates the motivation to become a terrorist? It is probably
a combination of individual ambition and taking part along with others in a
group that causes people to become involved. When a person first becomes
involved, they are also influenced by the group’s collective motivation. Perhaps
not unlike the mechanisms that individuals are attracted by when, for example,
taking part in criminal gangs while others concentrate on political involve-
ment? When they first become involved, the participants read texts and watch
videos about jihad, they carry out Internet searches and discuss religion togeth-
er. We should not ignore the fact that, in closed circles such as these, people
will develop the belief that taking part in terrorism gives prestige, something
that means that so-called ‘martyr attacks’ have become increasingly more com-
mon. One feature that suggests this trend is that little is done to conceal their
own identities once the attacks have been carried out, so that the participants
can appear as ‘heroes’ to like-minded people. Palestinian groups in particular
have systematic procedures for the indoctrination of suicide bombers in which
video recordings of ‘heroes’ are included. With reference to developments in the
Middle East, we should note the following:
In the West Bank and Gaza, portraits of dead suicide bombers and graf-
fiti extolling their deeds are plastered all over walls. Videos of their last
interviews are on sale on street stalls. Their funerals are occasions for
mass mourning.
309. Simon Jeffery, ‘“An aura of threat”: Jihadist websites offer incitement for potential recruits
and intimidation for the wider public’, The Guardian, 14 July 2005.
219
That celebrity factor helps in the recruitment of suicide bombers, young

men and women brought up in the occupied territories. ‘It does not mat-
ter whether it is Britain or Syria or the West Bank, they are highly roman-
tic figures’, (…) 310
Those who become caught up in this type of group eventually see the out-
side world through the eyes of an extremist. When developments reach a certain
point, they decide to ‘punish’ those the participants (in practice – the leaders)
believe are standing in the way of their own notions of ‘the good life’. These new
trends in the recruiting of terrorists from second-generation immigrant families
could, however, contribute towards the battle against terrorism becoming very
complex. Acts of terrorism can then be perpetrated by locally recruited small
but well integrated groups built up by indoctrinated fanatics. In connection
with the terrorist attacks on London on 7 July 2005, it has been made public
how Islamists have been attempting to recruit suicide bombers in Great Britain
too. This recruitment is consciously aimed at people they hope can be recruited
and trained as terrorists as shown in the extract from the article below:
(…) The 18-year old tells how he could have been the right person to
convince.
– I was prime recruitment material. I was young and malleable; I had
never been in trouble with the police and I’d never had anything to do
with extremist groups. I attended a good Muslim school and came from
a respected family from North London, he explains.
The two men who wanted to recruit the 18-year-old [who was 14 at the
time] came over to him after a service in the mosque he regularly visited
after he had lost his father. They tempted him with heaven. (…)
– They promised that if I died that way, I would get 70 virgins in heaven
and even talked about how I would be given a place to have sex, covered
in diamonds and pearls, where even the angels couldn’t see me.311
310. Ewen MacAskill ‘“The suicide bomber is the smartest of smart bombs.” Killers are moti-
vated by quest for glory, experts say’, The Guardian, 14 July 2005. There is reason to note
the following extract from the aforementioned article: ‘Anne Marie Oliver, an American aca-
demic who has spent years studying the phenomenon in the West Bank and Gaza, believes
the “star factor” and the acquiring of glory could also have motivated the Yorkshire bombers.
They will not have posters up in Britain or mass mourning, but they will attain glory on
internet sites across the Muslim world, according to Ms Oliver, who has co-written with
Paul Steinberg the newly published The Road to Martyrs’ Square: A Journey into the World of
the Suicide Bomber.’
311. Christine Jensen, ‘De prøvde å gjøre meg til selvmordsbomber’ [They tried to turn me
into a suicide bomber], Verdens Gang, 14 July 2005. Based on the story of an 18-year-old,
taken from the English newspaper The Daily Mirror, and who goes under the false name of
Muhammed Yusuf.
220
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on London, the British police have
made major efforts aimed at preventing more attacks. In connection with this,
they are also in the process of thinking afresh about who could be potential
future terrorists both among those who are permanently legally resident in the
country and different categories of refugees who are legally or illegally resident
in Great Britain. In August 2005, the UK police chiefs and heads of the secu-
rity services went to politicians with a warning. Several matters were raised but
some of the new elements that the police wanted to focus on were:
Intelligence chiefs are warning Tony Blair that Britain faces a full-blown
Islamist insurgency, sustained by thousands of young Muslim men with
military training now resident in this country. The grim possibility that
the two London attacks were not simply a sporadic terror campaign is
being discussed at the highest levels in Whitehall. Fears of a third strike
remain high this weekend, based on concrete evidence supplied by an
intercepted text message and the interrogation of a terror suspect being
held outside Britain, say US reports. As police and the security services
work to prevent another cell murdering civilians, attention is focusing on
the pool of migrants to this country from the Horn of Africa and central
Asia. MI5 is working to an estimate that more than 10,000 young men
from these regions have had at least basic training in light weapons and
military explosives. (…)
Even though the vast majority (of the immigrants) had come to Britain
to escape the lawlessness of their homelands, the source added, there
remained an alarmingly large pool of trained men who could be lured into
violent action here. This threat had been largely neglected while attention
focused on British-born militants who had been through training camps
run by al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan. ‘There has been a debate on whether we
are facing an insurgency or terrorism’, said the source, ‘and the verdict is
on the side of an insurgency.’312
There is real disagreement between the experts as to what are the best meth-
ods for combating terrorism. As previously indicated, there are two ‘schools of
thought’ in this respect. One places its faith in being able to fight international
terrorism using offensive measures where the integrated efforts of police and the
military forces are used as the main method, but where, in addition, emphasis
is placed on studying and trying to influence the element of the population
being recruited from. In practice, this will take the form of a series of military
and paramilitary operations – often also outside their own territory, if they
believe that this will serve the purpose. Everyone assumes that they have good
312. Raymond Whitaker and Francis Elliott, ‘Intelligence chiefs warn Blair of home-grown
“insurgency”’, The Independent, 7 August 2005.
221
basic intelligence to build on if there is to be lasting success. Both the U.S. and
France have tried this method – often with some success. The U.S. in particular
has made huge investments in technical intelligence in order to be able to moni-
tor opponents and the groupings it considers itself at war with.
Great Britain has often been responsible for another version of this. After
achieving rather limited success in the colonial wars in, among other places,
Kenya and Malaysia, they re-evaluated their tactics. They continued to make
use of military forces but the operations became increasingly characterised by
police operations carefully combined with intelligence work, including the
massive use of agents and local supporters (HUMINT). They attempted to
adapt to local conditions. They achieved a particularly great deal of success
in Malaya in this manner. In many ways, it was the gradual adaptation of
this ‘police-based’ way of thinking that was used against the IRA and against
Protestant extremist groups in Northern Ireland. The IRA’s campaign of ter-
ror, which culminated in London with the bombing of a double-decker bus
in 1996, could not be combated by inflicting a decisive military defeat on
the adversary. But the Provisional IRA was a locally rooted political separatist
organisation that used violence as an instrument to achieve political goals they
did not think they could achieve in any other way. The IRA’s terrorism was
finally combated through a combination of police operations and negotiations
as the IRA’s political wing gradually realised that there was perhaps a possibility
of political success without violence. The IRA, as a political/military organisa-
tion, will now probably not revert to the armed struggle. The fact that the
Republicans are tough negotiators (as are the British), and will not hand over
a single cartridge without getting what they want is another matter. Nor have
things become totally quiet in Northern Ireland as yet. Some individuals who
do not want a peaceful solution or who want a ‘pension scheme’ in the form
of proceeds of robberies have not yet given up. But popular support for both
the IRA and the Protestant extremists has been greatly reduced today. In other
words, there may be new developments in the area, based on political processes
instead of violence.
The two trends outlined above are, however, not as simply effective against
the new forms of extremism as they are often based on religious concepts,
hatred of everyone who thinks differently and radical cultural interpretations.
There is little to suggest that those behind the attacks of 7 July 2005 in London
have the type of objective that separatist movements often have: to create an
independent area or state of their own. Acts of terrorism with the objective of
achieving the greatest possible civilian damage and loss of human life often do
not have a clearly articulated desire to force political change. If we look at the
conflicts in the three areas/countries of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the ‘perpetual’
struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians, they are clearly different. In
222
Saudi Arabia, there are two matters that are important: the country is Islam’s
‘capital’ and extremists want all foreign influence to cease. Additionally, some
groups want to take over government themselves, but there is no political agree-
ment between the groups on future goals for the state of Saudi Arabia. As
previously pointed out, in Iraq there is a clear three-way split of the country in
terms of religion and population. In addition, all insurgent groups are against
the U.S. and Western influence. Otherwise, there is little common agreement
on Iraq’s future – civil war is probably the most likely solution if the central
powers established are unsuccessful in uniting the country. As regards Israel, its
willingness to use force against the Palestinians has become routine. Similarly,
the willingness to compromise is minimal in many Palestinian factions – and
they are not agreed internally with regard to what Palestine actually should
have as its objective for the future. In this type of conflict, it is difficult in the
short-term to see any simple methods where it could be possible to transform
the conflict in a more ordinary way – it is difficult to see what could act as the
bridge between widespread violence and a negotiated solution in these three
conflicts.
As previously indicated, it is difficult to see any overall pattern for the forms
of insurgency that exist today. Some are clearly ethnic and perhaps also separatist
in form. Others are more of an internal insurgency between classes – between
those who have and who want to safeguard their rights and those who want
access to the existing benefits. Many of the colonial and post-colonial wars in
the period from about 1950 to 1990 contained a mixture like this of social
insurgency, Marxist-Leninist leadership and nationalism as important driving
forces. There are now few of these revolutionary wars. Instead, we have seen a
large number of wars in the Third World where ethnicity and religion, mixed
with local cultural and financial conditions, have formed the basis of a series of
local insurgencies, often in the form of lengthy guerrilla wars.
There are also the more ‘international’ conflicts. The term is obviously impre-
cise but suggests something along the lines that those who become involved in
such groups see themselves as messengers of a religious-based state system (i.e.,
the participants are at least preoccupied by existing nation states), although few
of these extremist groups can be seen as having been able to articulate politically
feasible goals. Here, the insurgents are difficult to characterise. An ideology such
as that which al-Qaeda is responsible for may have certain similarities to the
internationally focused one that Marxist-Leninists had during the early years of
the Soviet Union in the 1920s. The Marxists/Leninists/Internationalists then
wanted to spread ‘the true doctrine’ to all nations so that they could establish
the dictatorship of the proletariat – the fair, classless state governed by the work-
ers. But, as with all sectarianism, we eventually see a number of divisions and
great disagreement between the groups. In this respect, it is not always so easy
223
to try to negotiate sustainable agreements when at least one of the sides is based
on what many people would characterise as fundamental extremist attitudes – it
is then difficult to reach compromises.
Terrorism as a ‘method of combat’ is simply not vulnerable to physical com-
bat in normal military terms. The extent to which they are dependent on bases,
supply lines or complicated command and control systems will vary from group
to group and is normally extremely dependent on local conditions. As regards
urban-based and recruited terrorist movements, it is possible to ‘live off the city’
by simply helping oneself to the city’s surplus. It has then also been common for
this type of operation to carry out bank robberies, drug dealing and extortion
– not unlike the pattern of work that organised criminals make use of. Terrorist
organisations are often organised into cells, something that makes it possible to
suffer losses without losing too many members in connection with the secret
premises being revealed, so-called ‘safe houses’ and technical support facilities
that are needed to carry out bomb production, weapons maintenance, etc.
The fact that extremist Islamic groups in particular have begun to make
extensive use of suicide attacks means that they have actually found a means of
terror that no open state can actually protect itself against 100 per cent. As long
as the extremists can recruit volunteers to be suicide bombers, we can probably
never eliminate the problem. In other words, this type of attack cannot be
avoided as long as there is a recruitment base and a sufficiently clear overall goal
that the insurgents find some sense in to continue the struggle. A functioning
indoctrination apparatus is also obviously required and leaders who are willing
to send their own ‘foot soldiers’ out on suicide missions.313
Seen from this perspective, there is much today to suggest that the Western
world and those who are against the extreme culture that jihadists and similar
extremist groups stand for must prepare themselves for a lengthy and, in many
ways, barely comprehensible conflict. This will require increasingly greater
resources for security forces and other forms of preventive measures. Much
effort that could have been used on building activity for the international com-
munity will have to be used to combat what are actually extremely marginal
but violently inclined groups. It is extremist groups, in contrast to the often
more socially conscious and nation-building guerrilla organisations from the
period during and after the period of decolonisation, that are primarily intent
on demolishing or destroying the existing order and hardly inclined to develop
a free and open society.
313. Christopher Dickey, ‘Untrue Believers’, Newsweek, 22 July 2005. His view is: ‘The real glo-
bal war is not between different faiths. It’s against the madness of those like Atlanta bomber
Eric Rudolph, who believe that their violence is noble.’
224
Perhaps the Swedish feature-writer Per Ahlin has got it right when he writes
in an article of 8 July 2005:
The main, everyday fight against terrorism must, of course, be conducted
along other lines. A good deal can be achieved through police co-opera-
tion, with targeted measures against suspected persons, with effective sanc-
tions, with security arrangements and with clever foreign policies on the
part of the ‘civilised’ countries. Today’s terrorists – as shown by New York,
Madrid and London – are not desperate, poor and rejected people. They
are individuals who have money, who are able to plan and execute compli-
cated operations. These are people who are out to destroy democracy and
the day that democracy does not defend itself will be a sad one.314
It was four Muslims with Pakistani and Jamaican backgrounds but who
were born or grew up in Great Britain who were responsible for the acts of ter-
rorism on 7 July 2005 in London. This may suggest that there could be a poten-
tial problem with ‘angry young men’ from Muslim British immigrant families.
When ethnic factors like this emerge, there is always a risk of white extremists
taking the opportunity to strike at immigrant groups. They are given the excuse
they want to themselves attack people they regard as unwanted in the country.
British police look as if they understand the potentially negative consequences
of these developments and have said that they will come down hard on all forms
of violence against Muslims in Great Britain.315
Faced with such complicated problems as this, a little time is required for
reflection. The answer is perhaps there, just under the surface: one must com-
bine the effective gathering of intelligence with a sufficiently large and trained
machinery of power that can deal with the crises that will probably arise, at the
same time as those who have political power understanding that many prob-
lems cannot be resolved simply using policing methods.
When it comes to most conflicts in the world today, we see one form or
another of lengthy guerrilla war, often based on lengthy ethnic or cultural
antagonism, perhaps reinforced by social injustice and economic problems.
Many of these can be resolved by coming up with acceptable compromises.
These may often be brutal wars, but it will normally be the case that both
314. Per Ahlin, ‘Terroristerna ligger alltid steget före’ [The terrorists are always one step ahead],
Dagens Nyheter, 8 July 2005.
315. Vikram Dodd, ‘Call for calm as fear of severe backlash grows’, The Guardian, 13 July 2005.
‘The announcement that the London blasts were the work of men police believe were
British-born Muslim suicide bombers sparked fears of a backlash yesterday. As the direction
of the anti-terrorism investigation became clear, a parallel operation was launched by police
chiefs to brief community leaders and prepare for any reprisal attacks on Muslims.’
225
parties in the conflict want the state to survive – and the group they represent
to itself to govern the state in the future.
When faced with the newer forms of international extremist groups, it is
often difficult to see or understand what they actually wish to achieve if we
see this from a state perspective. If it is a matter of pure ‘ideologies of hatred’,
religious fanaticism or a mixture of ethnicity and religion, everyone who does
not conform to their definition is an enemy. It becomes impossible to be neu-
tral or not involved in these often extremely specific conflicts. As we saw in the
passage on the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda in Chapters 3 and 6, these move-
ments have messianic tendencies. If groups like these take power, they have no
understanding of other philosophies of life – nor are they interested in there
being other philosophies. Opposition is often the same as idol worship and is
punished hard.
At a time when even small extremist groups have the ability to cause great
damage, it is important to have flexible forces available and access also to civil-
ian resources. Civilian organisations and experts can be seen as an essential
addition if one is to be able to intervene in the conflicts that are current today
– domestically and internationally. It is obvious that it is demanding for both
current politicians and military leaders and their machinery of power to be able
to understand and use their current resources in the best possible manner. It is
particularly demanding taking part in military coalitions that look increasingly
like becoming the international form of co-operation that will be the frame-
works one operates within. This applies whether it is the UN, the EU or NATO
that is the formal client.
An interesting observation is that, in today’s continuation war in Iraq, there
is clearly a need for greater security forces than the military forces that were
needed to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in Baghdad. Seen in this light,
the nature of the war has changed – there is only a limited similarity between
wars like the Second World War and the actual Gulf War in 1991 and the coun-
ter-insurgency now going on in Iraq. If we choose to take seriously the ‘apoca-
lyptical’ goals that, for example, Osama bin Laden has stated that he desires
and the practices of the Taliban regime against those who think differently from
them in Afghanistan, we should try to understand that here we are facing a dif-
ferent form of adversary than, for example, Gerry Adams and Sinn Fein.
Another trap we must avoid is thinking that because the scale of the
London attacks did not approach those of 9/11, they are somehow less
worrisome. The execution of simultaneous attacks requires sophisticat-
ed planning, because with each team the risk of exposure and mishap
increases exponentially. It seems likely that the perpetrators were them-
selves low-level local operatives following orders from more sophisticated
leaders who financed the enterprise, secured the timers and explosives,
226
and planned the attacks with a shrewd political sensibility. This effort to
affect political events makes the London attacks more like the Madrid
bombings last year than like 9/11, and it indicates that further attacks can
be expected.316
7.3 Experiences so far

The United States is in the process of learning from the experiences of what
happened on September 11, 2001. For so long, there has been a lot of emphasis
on the more technical aspects of things, such as what conclusions one should
now draw regarding the further transformation of the American Armed Forces.
The most authoritative report so far is America’s so-called ‘9/11 Commission
Report’.317
This author has noted at least one fact: those who now wish to draw far-
reaching conclusions on the importance of technology and new tactics, often
combined under the terms like NCW or EBO, should first study the long list
of reservations one could draw up. Afghanistan is really ‘somewhere else’ and it is
difficult to learn clear, universal lessons on the basis of warfare under such spe-
cial circumstances as we have seen in this politically, ethnically and geographi-
cally fragmented country. This must, however, not be interpreted as it being
of no significance which conclusions should be now drawn in the U.S. and
Great Britain with regard to, for instance, technology, tactics and the training
of soldiers. But an enemy with much greater military capacity than the Taliban
regime and their ‘mercenaries’ in al-Qaeda would need to take completely dif-
ferent action in order to force through a change of regime using military means.
This was also demonstrated two years later when the U.S. and its allies invaded
Iraq. Even though the conventional part of the war was over in a month and
with a total military defeat for the Saddam regime as the result, this did not
mean that peace was brought to the country. Now there were other forces that
took up weapons, often together with supporters of the old regime, and partly
also with foreign Islamists as voluntary participants. This warfare, based on
guerrilla tactics and terrorism, is still going on, directed at the Americans and
their allies in Iraq.
It is also clear that the fight against the regime in Kabul could not have gone
so quickly without the U.S. and Great Britain having a supply of well-trained
soldiers. Rapid military success was initially achieved with a minimum of losses
and limited civilian losses, taking circumstances in Afghanistan into considera-
316. Philip Bobbitt, ‘Facing Jihad, Recalling the Blitz’, The New York Times, 10 July 2005.
317. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 361–363.
227
tion. Both the British and the Americans had Special Forces and intelligence
officers with, for instance, local language skills and some knowledge of the coun-
try and culture. This type of knowledge was an important assumption for a
successful partnership with the Taliban’s main internal adversaries, the Northern
Alliance. However, as is usually the case when one works together with people
from other parts of the world, there were a number of misunderstandings in
Afghanistan also. Some of them had serious consequences and there were, for
instance, examples of groupings that, by means of manipulating information,
managed to make the Americans attack their political rivals.318
After ‘9/11’, it was probably a major problem for the American intelligence
organisations that the field agents with personal experience of Afghanistan in
the 1980s had either moved upwards in the system or had left the service.
The new generation had little insight into and understanding of the country’s
intricate system of tribes, clans and alliances. Nor should we forget the impor-
tance of sacks full of dollars and Russian arms supplies. Russian intelligence
was probably also important. (The Russians had wanted to bomb the Taliban
long before 9/11, and the supply of arms to the Northern Alliance was not a
new phenomenon either.) Those who are familiar with Russia’s course of action
know that it doesn’t do anything without acting in its own self-interest.
During the 1980s, several Western intelligence organisations developed
considerable knowledge of Afghanistan and the Mujahedeen. During the fol-
lowing decade, much of this was forgotten, contact networks went into decline
and field agents took other jobs. After the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, there was again a need for intelligence in Afghanistan. At that time, we
can say that Russia was sitting on the best knowledge of the situation in the
country. As early as in May 2000, the Russian authorities threatened an air
attack against Afghanistan319 and the Northern Alliance had received arms sup-
plies from Russia for several years.320 In the period before the attack began in
October 2001, it is therefore likely that both the Northern Alliance and Russia
were main suppliers of intelligence material to the U.S. As stated in the extract
above, one does not use information from ‘the enemy’s enemy’ without there
being an element of risk attached.
There is a view that one of the reasons for the continuing war in Iraq is that
there is still a great lack of personnel in the American forces with sufficient
318. Milan Vego, ‘What can we learn from “Enduring Freedom”’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
(July 2002). Translated into Norwegian and adapted by Nils Marius Rekkedal under the
title ‘Hva kan vi lære av “Enduring Freedom”’, and printed in Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, Oslo,
No. 8/9, (2002), pp. 23–27.
319. See <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/4323.html##10>.
320. See Moscow Defence Brief, <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/6-2001/ns/ada/>.
228
language skills. The fact that the ideological and attitudinal divide between
the Western parties and the Iraqis is so great that very few people have crossed
the ‘ideological dividing line’ has created additional difficulties. A lack of local
knowledge has, in turn, led to a dearth of good intelligence from local circles.
Initially this can lead to problems tackling local political, religious or ethnic
factions. It then becomes difficult to prioritise properly, both during the actual
conflict and during the subsequent rebuilding phase. A potential problem is
that the Americans are often seen as disrespectful and arrogant towards other
cultures. An 18–19 year old soldier will not always have the necessary attitudes
and skills to understand complicated cultural matters/codes. This is a problem
that most military forces struggle with. Disrespectful behaviour will be inter-
preted in many Muslim countries as just as offensive as if the soldiers kill, for
example, people belonging to the local population.321
The use of airpower closely combined with Special Forces has in many
ways been innovative. Despite flying long distances, combined with the dif-
ficult mid-air refuelling of attack planes at night, there have nevertheless been
extremely few losses. All this demonstrates that there is a high standard of train-
ing within the forces, something that is perhaps a more important factor than
great emphasis on new technology and ‘objects’ with regard to modern warfare.
The point is: the technological state-of-the-art is greater today than during the
Gulf War in 1991, but today, as then, it is the quality of the soldiers and their
ability to use the equipment in a sensible and flexible manner that will be the
decisive factor.322
As demonstrated earlier, in the U.S. debate on defence, the war in Afghanistan
has been used to defend the proposed reorganisation of the U.S. Army in par-
ticular from a heavily armoured so-called ‘power protection force’ to a new
form of organisation where, for instance, more lightly armoured vehicles and
easily moveable artillery will dominate production. On the part of Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, it has been an important requirement that the forces are to
be able to be transported by plane – while the requirement for survival on the
battlefield has been subdued. There are grounds for asking whether the lessons
learned so far from Afghanistan and Iraq in particular are a reason for drawing
such conclusions. Criticism of the American Defense Secretary in particular has
321. A press interview from 2004 with an Iraqi commander with the nickname ‘the sharpshooter’
can serve to illustrate some of this. His ‘first American’ was a soldier who had the habit of
urinating from the roof of the vehicle even when local women could see this. An old man
arranged a fatwa and gave ‘the sharpshooter’ a few thousand dollars to kill the soldier. The
conduct of a foolish soldier has thereby contributed towards creating a resistance leader.
322. Rekkedal, ‘Hva kan vi lære av “Enduring Freedom”’, pp. 25–26.
229
increased greatly during the course of 2003/2006. Due to developments dur-

ing the continuation war in Iraq, the U.S. Army has been forced to invest large
sums in, among other things, personal equipment for all soldiers. In addition,
they have had to review the requirements for the protection of combat vehicles.
The question has also been asked: is the most important thing for a superpower
to be able to quickly fly ground forces to the theatre of operations, or is the most
important thing still to have adequate forces that can take on almost every form
of opponent, including those who possibly have large armoured forces and lots
of artillery support for these?323
What is interesting and new about developments after September 11,
2001, is that, in the aftermath of the terrorist attack, the U.S. probably saw
its interests best attended to, as a superpower and ‘No.1 hate object’ among
extremist groups almost everywhere in the world, by actively dealing with its
adversaries. Without being willing to see this American logic, it can be diffi-
cult to understand why the Americans have attacked and overcome the ruling
regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq – without the wars in question having secured
lasting peace so far. But also parts of the Bush administration have at least con-
stantly insisted that one should get close allies involved in connection with the
two wars. Most recently, during the attack on Iraq, the American administra-
tion saw it as an advantage that they had close allies and the UN system with
them in the attack, but what was new was their declared willingness to take
action on their own if this was found to be necessary to safeguard their own and
323. Anthony Cordesman has stated: ‘US Army Special Forces and Ranger units illustrate that
the so-called lessons of Task Force Hawk and the failure to commit US Army light and
attack helicopter forces in Kosovo may not be lessons at all, but rather the result of political
decisions and unique training and readiness problems. Certainly, the US Army’s ability to
airlift and drop more than 200 Rangers and intelligence officers into Taliban controlled ter-
ritory in Operation Rhino on October 19, 2001 indicates that properly planned operations
can be very effective. There seems to be a good case for examining the expansion of SF and
Ranger units, modernizing their equipment, and tailoring attack helicopter and airmobile
forces for counter-terrorism and asymmetric warfare missions. As part of this examination,
there seems to be an equal case for reexamining the role that CIA operations should play and
the interface between the CIA and Special Forces. The same is true of how Special Forces
are commanded and integrated into policy. At present, there seems to be a gap between the
service commands, military command of SOF, role of the civilians in SOLIC, and the policy
offices under the Secretary. In practice, it is clear that Special Forces are primarily a tool for
joint warfare, but the issue of exactly who is in charge at the top is one that needs to be
resolved in a way that puts someone clearly in charge. The last thing on earth Special Forces
need is either an overcomplicated chain of command or one that is overpoliticized.’ Source:
CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., acordesman@aol.
com.
230
‘mankind’s’ interests.324 The ‘description of sentiment’ below from January

2003, i.e., before the war in Iraq had begun, can serve as an illustration of what
the disagreement between the United States and Great Britain on the one hand
and various European powers on the other was actually about:
Unilateral US action against Iraq might make the international commu-
nity less willing to help out with other American geopolitical priorities
– such as the overall war on terror. That is the blunt warning France,
Germany, and other US allies are delivering to American diplomats as
the UN Security Council debate over Iraq heats up this week. And the
US badly needs the help of other nations as it pursues al Qaeda remnants
around the globe. Defeating Saddam Hussein’s massed armies in combat
is one thing. Cracking terrorist cells whose funds and people move freely
across frontiers is another. ‘If we thumb our nose at others, they will be
less willing to cooperate ... and if you’re looking at the war on terror, we
can’t do it alone’, says Joseph Nye, dean of Harvard University’s John F.
Kennedy School of Government.
This dilemma reflects the temptations the United States faces as the
world’s sole superpower, says Mr. Nye. The nation’s overwhelming mili-
tary and economic might convinces its leaders that they can accomplish
important goals without allies, if need be. But while that may be true for
some issues, it is not true for all. And if the US acts as if it does not need
friends, it won’t have any. ‘That’s the paradox of American power’, says
Nye. ‘We’re the sole power, but not to the point we can do [everything]
alone.’ 325
In order to illustrate some of the features that we observe today in connec-
tion with ongoing and potential future conflicts, it may be useful to devote
some space to making reference to an important American document.326 This
324. This is obviously not a completely new development, but something that has been more and
more noticeable since the Cold War ended. In the 1990s, we saw frustration among some
American officers and politicians over how NATO was being used to solve some ‘European’
problems such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo. This is despite the fact that it was the U.S. that
pushed for this in both involvements. This, combined with scepticism of the general lack of
ability among Europeans to establish an adequate capability to go into military battle, was
again reinforced when several European countries did not want to be involved in the war
against Iraq. This is perhaps where some of the reasons for the tendency towards splits lie.
325. Faye Bowers/Peter Grier, ‘War in Iraq could fray unity against Al Qaeda. Blunt words by
France and other U.S. allies hint at the risks of going it alone in Iraq’, Los Angeles, The
Christian Science Monitor, 22 January 2003.
326. One of the conclusions the Americans have drawn is to create strong bonds with countries
with similar interests and attitudes as themselves, such as the UK, Canada and Australia. The
latest development in this partnership is a document that is similar to NATO’s STANAG
system as a basis for collaboration on doctrines, training, procedures, capabilities and espe-
cially command and control (K2).
231
was developed precisely in order to give the U.S. political and military authori-
ties a certain insight into the features that could affect the U.S. and conse-
quently the rest of the world in the years to come.327 It is always common
sense to know a little about the thoughts, doctrines and plans the world’s only
superpower works with.
Future Conflict. The United States will maintain a strong technological
edge in IT-driven ‘battlefield awareness’ and in precision-guided weapon-
ry in 2015. The United States will face three types of threats: Asymmetric
threats in which state and non-state adversaries avoid direct engagements
with the US military but devise strategies, tactics, and weapons – some
improved by ‘sidewise technology’ – to minimize US strengths and exploit
perceived weaknesses; Strategic WMD threats, including nuclear mis-
sile threats, in which (barring significant political or economic changes)
Russia, China, most likely North Korea, probably Iran, and possibly
Iraq have the capability to strike the United States, and the potential for
unconventional delivery of WMD by both states or non-state actors also
will grow; and Regional military threats in which a few countries maintain
large military forces with a mix of Cold War and post-Cold War concepts
and technologies.328
At the same time the CIA report assumes that the danger of war between
the industrialised countries will remain small. We will, however, as the CIA sees
it, witness a series of conflicts and small wars in the Third World in particu-
lar. These will often take the form of internal confrontations, but we cannot
rule out regional wars between nation states. It is assumed that larger wars are
most likely in Asia, and there is a danger of war between China and Taiwan
and between India and Pakistan in particular. In addition, there are grounds
for following developments in the Middle East. Another aspect here is that
many of the actual ‘war candidates’ in these areas now possess weapons of mass
destruction, and some have means of delivery based on missiles with increas-
ingly longer ranges. The many internal conflicts are also commented on and it
states that it will be a mixture of religious, economic and political disagreements
that will be the cause of these conflicts. It is also feared that the number of these
internal conflicts could easily increase in the coming years.329
327. CIA/NIC, ‘Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Non-Government
Experts’, NIC 2000–02, December 2000. The text can be purchased from the GPO, stock
number 041-015-00211-2, U.S. (‘This paper was approved for publication by the National
Foreign Intelligence Board under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.’)
328. CIA/NIC, ‘The Drivers and Trends’ in ‘Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future
With Non-Government Experts’ (2000). (The source is a hard copy of a PDF file; the web-
site has been deactivated. See also earlier footnotes about the CIA/NIC.)
329. CIA/NIC, ibid.
232
At least the CIA study quoted indicates a certain insight into themselves
on the part of the Americans. It obviously remains to be seen how the U.S.
will use its present role as the world’s dominating superpower in the coming
years. The more ambitious regional superpowers should probably note what is
quoted above if they wish to avoid getting in the way when the superpower is
on the march.
7.3.1 Possible future developmental features

On the basis of the challenges that asymmetric conflicts, terrorism and infor-
mation operations, for instance, will probably represent in the first part of the
21st Century, the question of what should be included in a concept like infor-
mation superiority and how to achieve this are a fundamental problem. Much of
what has been published on this subject so far is for ‘public consumption’ and
contributes little to any new strategic thinking with regard to these problems.
There has, for instance, been little discussion on the extremely difficult areas
of intelligence and intelligence requirements and how one can support opera-
tions logistically. We see the developments in connection with the U.S. Army’s
major new investment in command, control and information systems where
it is almost automatically assumed that all intelligence data will be available
‘ready-made’ in digital form – ready to be loaded onto the extremely expensive
new communications systems that are on their way. This is obviously far more
complicated in the real world. There are no plans with regard to how the actual
input about the enemy or terrain will be produced or be transferred to and
from allies that do not possess this type of modern technology and without
access to the bandwidth that Americans more or less assume for their future
operations. It is easy to see here that we could quickly face quite fundamental
problems regarding the future coalition warfare that is expected in political
quarters, including the NATO alliance.330
Another side to this is that what can be learned from the Gulf War in
1991, from the Kosovo conflict in 1999 and from Afghanistan in 2001–2002
has perhaps been overestimated in some circles. Many people have emphasised
these conflicts as high points in the ongoing so-called revolution in military
330. An important problem area when other countries work together with the Americans is a
good supply of information and intelligence. Such access is a precondition for obtaining
an insight and influence at an operational level and integration at a tactical level and is
important for being able to lay the foundations for dialogue and cooperation on strategy and
targets at a strategic level. This lack of access to information is at this time a ‘bottleneck’ in
international cooperation. This is a matter that the U.S. must deal with in practical terms
in order for Norway and other European units to be able to support operations.
233
technology. There are good reasons for asking here how representative the three
conflicts have been. Developments in both Afghanistan and Iraq have not been
particularly positive in the aftermath of the conventionally dominated part of
the war. The wars in question have shown what the U.S. can do when the coun-
try decides to deploy its forces, but even the U.S. has a limited military capacity
and has only really intervened in a small number of the ongoing conflicts in the
world. Most of today’s conflicts are, as previously indicated, more of a local
nature and are characterised by an insurgent movement that is attempting to
overthrow the ruling regime. Another problem is how one should interpret the
more high-tech wars we have seen since 1990. For instance, in 1991, Iraq suf-
fered a clear tactical and operational defeat but this did not lead to the regime
collapsing immediately. Seen in a strategic perspective, the Islamic opponents
of the West have probably not strengthened their position during the course of
the 1990s or up to now in this new century.
The exaggerated confidence that a massive air attack will quickly crush any
adversary has, particularly among politicians, led to the unfortunate belief that
air power can solve problems by itself, i.e., that it avoids deploying ground
forces. One lesson that was particularly based on desert warfare proved not to
hold true for Kosovo.331 During the campaign against the Taliban regime we
saw that it was a combination of the air offensive and the Northern Alliance,
thirsting for revenge, which provided the necessary ground forces, that, in col-
laboration, quickly led to the collapse of the Taliban regime’s defences. But cap-
turing or killing a sufficient number of leaders and ‘foot soldiers’ belonging to
bin Laden’s organisation proved to be much more difficult. It is likely that the
majority of al-Qaeda’s leadership also lived to fight another day. Four years later,
the consequences are now easier to see: opium production is again financing
the various warlords in Afghanistan,332 something that makes it difficult for the
central government in Kabul to gain control of the country. Both al-Qaeda and
the Taliban are again operating relatively freely in south-eastern Afghanistan
and in the mountain areas of western Pakistan. This is both Russia and Europe’s
neighbourhood. The same areas also have another neighbourhood, namely the
Middle East where al-Qaeda has the majority of its sympathisers.
331. See Benjamin S. Lambeth, ‘Operation Allied Force: En strategisk utvärdering’ [Operation
Allied Force: A Strategic Evaluation] in Bo Hofvander and Nils Marius Rekkedal, Luftmakt:
Teorier och tillämpningar, Revised edition [Air Power: Theories and Applications] (Stockholm:
the Swedish National Defence College, 2004), pp. 255–258.
332. According to the annual surveys carried out by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, opium
production in Afghanistan has increased from 8,000 hectares in 2001 to 131,000 hectares
in 2004. In 2003, the opium economy constituted an estimated 60 per cent of the country’s
Gross National Product; see, for instance, <http://www.unodc. org/pdf http://www.unodc.
org/pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2004.pdf>.
234
For the same reason, there is now a clear need for more closely studying the
possibilities and limitations that air power and other forms of deployment of
modern conventional forces have regarding asymmetric conflicts.
When we come to determine what are the challenges of the future, it can
always be sensible to look backwards first. Perhaps the following points are of
special interest on the basis of the circumstances and interpretations previously
discussed and accounted for:
1. An educated enemy will, in the future, probably simultaneously attack many

places, something that could make it difficult for the adversary to protect
himself everywhere.
2. Technological solutions are of limited value without, at the same time, hav-
ing access to good and up-to-date intelligence, obtained by human beings,
combined with military geographic data with the necessary resolution.
3. The relative importance of flexibility and mobility will probably constantly
increase, particularly in connection with interventions in conflicts. It is only
regarding (larger) conventional conflicts that traditional heavily mechanised
forces will still play a key role.
4. Weapon systems must be adapted to the actual targets. It is, for instance,
hardly cost effective to take out many targets that are of little value using
extremely expensive precision ammunition.
As regards so-called ‘non-state’ threats, it is natural to point out some key

points. The list below indicates some of the more current threats but is by no
means complete:
1. Few states (if any) have a well thought out strategy for dealing with threats
to computer networks and communications networks. One of the main rea-
sons for this is that there are no well thought through plans for the procure-
ment of data equipment that provide sufficient protection against human
error and sins of omission, including attacks from insiders in an organisa-
tion or from external adversaries.
2. Vulnerability to asymmetric attacks is probably greatest in the civilian utili-
ties sector (e.g., energy supply, bridges and large communications instal-
lations). Most exposed are perhaps computer systems in the banking and
financial sectors and large suppliers of logistics services, including increas-
ingly centralised trade in goods and fuel distribution. In several states, the
tourist industry has also been subjected to terrorist attacks or threats of this.
After terrorists had killed 58 tourists in Luxor on 17 November 1997, it
235
was about five years before the Egyptian tourist industry got back up to the
same level as before the terrorist strike. Something similar is feared in Egypt
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on Sharm el-Sheikh in July 2005.
3. An enemy wishing to cause damage to the West’s interests would normally
encounter problems if he directly challenged the West’s military (opera-
tional) capacity. It is obviously easier and less of a risk for an attacker to
use ‘indirect methods’. One example could be exploiting gaps in the legal
system by using the media to create sensation and the impression that the
authorities themselves are those behaving irresponsibly and clearly unlaw-
fully. On the other hand, we should be careful about suspecting that there is
always a hidden agenda behind critical journalism. For example, it is seldom
the case that in an insurgency the guerrilla has neither the ability nor the will
to manipulate the media picture outside his own vicinity.
4. An educated attacker will, in the future, probably always carefully assess and
choose between so-called indirect (often anonymous) and more direct attacks
(e.g., bombs and the use of weapons) on society. Political, technological and
economic developments actually favour ‘insurgents’ who want to use either
terrorism or asymmetric attacks. This could possibly reinforce what is already
an obvious trend in the West: security is no longer something that is only
provided by the state. Evidence for this assertion is the enormous growth in
private security firms in the last 25 years – particularly in the U.S.333 This
may often be the main reason for an insurgent movement deciding to attack
economic – or other so-called ‘soft targets’. The government is thereby forced
to use major resources to protect this type of target. During the latter half
of the war in El Salvador, one in three soldiers was involved in guarding
bridges, factories and electricity networks. This was because the FMLN guer-
rilla forces consistently attacked economic targets.
5. As regards low intensity conflicts, it is almost impossible to achieve ‘quick
and great victories’, i.e., quick victories where the military power suffers
few losses as in the Western intervention in Kuwait in 1991. It is rare for
an insurgent movement to operate in such a concentrated form that the
counter-insurgents can make use of their advantage in firepower. In history,
333. But even in the Scandinavian countries there are now more people employed in private
security firms than in the police forces; security is slowly but surely being ‘privatised’ with a
clear decline in the respect the majority of people have for the state’s machinery of power – a
machinery of power that is no longer felt to be able to safeguard people’s lives and values in
a satisfactory manner. This may also lead to a form of ‘militarisation’ of the police retained
(‘gendarmisation’) and may also lead to the military system becoming more like the police
where soldiers must step in more and more often to safeguard society’s interests?
236
we only find a few examples of this happening. When the NLF occupied
Saigon Airport during the Tet Offensive in 1968, they became an easy target
for American fighter planes. In March 2000, Chechen forces allowed them-
selves to be surrounded in the village of Komsomolsk and lost hundreds
of guerrilla soldiers over the course of a few days. The majority of Western
countries are also vulnerable to campaigns where the adversary manipulates
international media and thereby also influences public opinion which is
barely aware of this. It is particularly effective to play on alleged or real
breaches of human rights and cruelty, and the tendency of Western pub-
lic opinion to be against war in general unless it is obvious that domestic
interests are threatened. In contrast, the matters that have been discussed
by the Iraqi media have not been the result of any planned or manipulative
campaign on the part of the insurgents. It is more the case that the revela-
tions have come from ‘inside’ the American system.
6. Another not insignificant factor is that perhaps the majority of actors who
are willing to make use of asymmetric warfare and terrorism have little hesi-
tation in using all forms of violence. Within several non-Western cultures
in particular, which now see their interests threatened, there is a willingness
to use most forms of forcible means. In other words, the human factor is
important here – not all groupings see Western human rights ‘forced’ upon
them as a natural part of the rules of play in everyday life.
As regards state versus state conflicts, we should also note that what a super-
power regards as only a limited conflict might be seen by a smaller state as total
war – the state’s existence may be threatened. An example that illustrates this is
the U.S. which has practically seen information operations as a kind of warning
to an adversary (or, at most, a limited attack on the adversary). This view is not
shared by Russia. The Russians state in their new doctrines that major attacks
on their command and control systems are to be seen as a main attack on the
country. It is easy to see that one could quickly interpret the same signals very
differently during an early phase of a conflict, with a danger of serious misun-
derstandings – misunderstandings that could lead to the rapid escalation of an
originally ‘insignificant’ conflict.
The factors discussed above mean that, in the years to come, it will also
be more important to understand a potential adversary’s motives and inten-
tions than to penetrate his computer equipment. The point is that one must
always seek to understand the adversary and the circumstances that dominate
his political perspectives, including the distinctive features of the culture in
question. Perhaps such an insight is at least equally as important as dominat-
ing technologically – particularly if one chooses to see asymmetric warfare as a
237
way of thinking, i.e., that these factors are just as important as military action
using armed force. Perhaps this can be aptly worded as follows: technology may
equally well become a burden as a military advantage regarding asymmetric
conflicts.
In the U.S., there is now a debate underway on the phenomenon of asym-
metry where several critics have claimed that the extremely heavy and one-sided
investment in expensive and complicated weapon systems developed and pro-
duced with a view to symmetric warfare makes it difficult to procure equipment
specially made to deal with the various forms of asymmetric conflict now faced.
Major General Robert H. Scales (then Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine and
Training at the U.S. Army’s TRADOC headquarters) has presented the following
objections. Obviously the problem is seen through the eyes of a superpower:
1. At the moment there are few states that dare to directly defy the U.S. (and
the West in general) with conventional military means. These states want to
defy the U.S. all the time however, but will normally not risk the possibility
of taking things too far.
2. The American military system seems to be divided into two camps: the U.S.
Navy and the U.S. Air Force invest in air power as a ‘problem solver’, while
the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps see land power as the decisive
factor.334
3. The U.S. is now looking further ahead to 2010–2020 because many people
in the Bush administration are of the opinion that the country will need a
new military system in order to deal with fresh problems. In this respect, a
period of 10 years goes amazingly quickly. (Major General R. Scales claims
regarding this that they can now ‘calm down’ the technological reforms and
investments in the next 10 years while they wait to see how international
developments go.)
4. It will consequently now be required to completely re-think joint operations
– a re-thinking that will have to take time. He uses the word ‘interdepend-
ence’ to describe which direction this should take – interoperability does not
suffice.
334. States in the Second and Third Worlds and other forms of ‘non-state actors’ have real-
ised since the Gulf War in 1991 that it is difficult to take on American forces directly.
Consequently, as previously demonstrated, several of these actors are searching for alterna-
tive methods to undermine American and/or Western dominance, i.e., force the U.S. to
rearrange its policies by exploiting political and asymmetric forms of action, directed at
American and Western interests.
238
5. Soldiers should not be policemen. Police work requires a totally different

way of thinking, another culture and another way of using armed force.
In specialist military debate, it is often discussed how effective these new

and expensive ‘smart’ weapon systems are or possibly will be. In reality, these
weapon systems, which are totally dependent on good intelligence, are a form
of rapid processing of information from ‘sensor-to-shooter’.335 A modern form
of effective architecture within this field is today in its infancy. The Americans
state themselves in open sources that, in 2001, they had good geographical data
for only 10 per cent of the world. Similarly, accurate 1:50,000 maps have not
yet been developed for most places in the world. It is on just such maps that one
can coordinate the use of firepower today and in the foreseeable future.336
Modern insurgents have noticed how American losses are made a great deal
of in the American (and European) media. The impression that they no longer
have the stomach to accept losses has probably stuck. It is assumed that the
335. There are, however, still many unsolved problems in this area. Theoretically, this is probably
an option, but one can always risk firing on the wrong targets – it will never be possible to
totally eliminate this type of friction. When there are no people in the ‘loop’ who could, for
instance, bring to a halt firing at one’s own forces, there could be political consequences from
this form of ‘uncontrolled shooting’ when it is first triggered off. Who then is responsible?
It is difficult to blame machines.
336. Another factor – and it is probably a factor of increasing importance – is that already today
almost 50 per cent of the world’s population lives in urbanised areas. Demographic research
points to a continuing increase in population in the rapidly growing urban areas in the
Third World. This is going on in areas with little or no planning with a view to meeting
the challenges of the rapidly growing population by improving public services and the local
infrastructure to meet future problems. This is often seen as a problem caused by poverty,
but developments are also characterised by the ruling elite in the part of the world in ques-
tion showing little interest in the plight of ordinary people. There is also much to suggest
that most of the population growth will be concentrated on the outskirts of cities without
effective access to the city’s infrastructure and range of services. This is in itself probably a
significant source of future unrest as demands will also be made on the authorities in these
slums, even if poverty prevents those who live there paying charges or taxes to cover what it
will cost to develop this type of service. Previous experience also shows that areas with sig-
nificant poverty and overpopulation are extremely exposed to epidemics and plagues and are
often ruled by organised criminals. The daily use of violence then becomes almost a neces-
sity in order to survive. It is then difficult to avoid large or small riots that could turn into a
well-organised insurgency over a period of time. Note too: the tsunami catastrophe during
the Christmas season in 2004 may illustrate the lack of willingness or ability on behalf of
anyone other than the Americans to operate with major forces in ‘coastal environments’
far from their own coastal waters. This disaster will probably play a part in the defining of
future military capacity which will enable greater effectiveness in such an environment (see
Chapter 9). The Chinese Navy was by then equipped with numerous suitable landing craft,
but chose not to intervene.
239
Americans in particular are in the process of becoming totally dependent on

their high-tech weapons, especially as a means of avoiding losses of their own.
Seen through the eyes of the insurgents, it would then make sense to find ‘forms
of combat’ where the Americans – if they wish to use military resources – are
forced to deploy personnel or risk creating major local devastation, primarily
through air bombing.337 In some ways, it is precisely battle in densely popu-
lated areas that is the ‘new ideal battlefield’ seen through the eyes of insurgency
leaders. If control over, for example, slum areas is required, much of the modern
(often airborne) high technology quickly becomes irrelevant to the aim of the
mission: control of the population.
There is also much to suggest that the world’s more successful guerrilla
movements will rearrange their strategies to attempt to gain control over dense-
ly populated (slum) areas at least as a supplement to ‘classic’ control of the rural
districts. Densely populated areas are traditionally located in capital cities or
major cities. Winning control of such areas will provide more potent resources
than a peripheral rural region. In addition, densely populated areas will reduce
the effect of the advanced force’s mobility, firepower and command and control
superiority. In doing so, the defender buys himself time, and the media can be
left to do its job: reporting that the superior force caused fires and death in the
built-up area, while the guerrilla’s actions are obviously more difficult to report
on. The term ‘collateral damage’ is now of increased importance in the West
– particularly in the political sphere regarding international conflicts. Examples
of this type of reporting that show the government forces in an unfortunate
light could be the coverage of the Macedonian government forces’ so-called
‘counteroffensives’ in Northern Macedonia in the early part of the summer
of 2001, and the description of the armed Israeli forces, which, without too
much provocation, shoot Palestinian snipers with cannons and missiles and
level Palestinian houses to the ground. The political strain from this type of
reporting from combat zones can be extremely serious for the ruling regime
– particularly if the conflict becomes protracted and it does not look as if the
government forces will be able to crush the opposition. It could perhaps be of
interest here to remember what Sun Zi wrote at one time about attempts to
storm fortified towns. Here is the English translation:
The worst policy of all is to attack cities. Attack a walled city only when
there is no alternative (…) The commander who loses his patience orders
337. For a ‘technology-focused’ but nevertheless interesting commentary on ongoing develop-

ments within the American Armed Forces where terms such as ‘Transformation’ and ‘Joint
Expeditionary Warfare’ are the key concepts in the debate, see Douglas A. Macgregor,
Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights (London: Praeger, 2003).
240
his troops to assault like swarming ants, with the result that one third of
his men are slain and the city remains untaken. Such is the calamity of
attacking walled cities.338
It is, however, the case that cities have traditionally been political, cultural
and economic power centres. And their geographical positions were often his-
torically chosen on the basis of military-strategic conditions. In practice, it is
hardly likely to be the case that battles for cities will be avoided in the future
either, particularly since the use of urban areas makes it difficult for an attacker
characterised by his use of technology to fully exploit his weapons. Today, there
is not the option either for Western military forces to allow their artillery and air
forces to level a town to the ground as the Russians did in Grozny in Chechnya
in the middle of the 1990s and again in 1999–2000. Despite the fact that it
was, in many ways, contrary to the principles of ‘the new type of warfare’, the
Americans finally chose ‘the Russian method’ when they took control of Fallujah
in November 2004, namely, a massive use of firepower (see Chapter 8).
Although many theorists have traditionally warned against using heavily
mechanised forces in connection with combat in large towns, the situation
in Iraq forced, in practice, a re-evaluation of this view. In order to keep their
own losses down, the Americans chose to go in with infantry with armoured
vehicle support when they wanted to secure control of an urban area.339 This is
because urban warfare leads to such great devastation and risks and this has been
traditionally avoided. Armoured vehicles, artillery and air power have always
been part of the urban concept. What is new is collaboration between Special
Forces and the use of so-called guided weapons systems with a limited effective
area. This moves possible targeting closer to one’s own forces and has therefore
reduced the potential problems traditionally associated with the use of heavy
units in cities (‘blue on blue’, etc). The other aspect of the changes is an increas-
ing awareness that the wars of the future will take place in urban environments
and that training and preparations are now, to an increasing extent, reflecting
338. Quote from Sun Zi. The book is called: Two Great Chinese Military Classics in One Volume:
Sun Zi: The Art of War; Sun Bin: The Art of War (Beijing: People’s China Publishing House,
1995), p. 29.
339. The use of heavily mechanised forces is regarded as problematic unless they are supported
by infantry. The first Russian attack on the Chechen capital of Grozny, in December 1994,
consisted of mechanised forces. They lost 105 out of their 120 armoured vehicles. During
the second attack, the Russian forces lost 140 out of 200. It is worthwhile noting that build-
ings in Iraq often do not consist of more than one to three floors, something that can be seen
as a clear advantage for the attacker when using mechanised forces in urban environments.
On the part of the Americans, the use of tanks and armoured vehicles has generally gone
through a renaissance – few people talk today of ‘the dinosaurs’ from the Cold War not being
useful any more.
241
this opinion. The war in Iraq is often called ‘the company commander’s war’,
something that illustrates the emphasis on decentralisation and the reduced
effect/importance of large formations.
Technological solutions will typically be chosen in connection with the
combating of guerrilla forces. Often there is no real option other than to carry
out personnel-intensive operations. One’s own losses could easily be so great
that the political costs would become unacceptable.
It should also be noted that the relative importance of flexibility and mobil-
ity is probably steadily increasing, particularly in connection with interventions
in conflicts. Many commentators have, however, been constantly critical of the
American Defense Secretary’s interpretation of the demands made by modern
warfare – grouped under the catchword ‘transformation’. Over the last few years
there have been several critics who have seen the more heavily mechanised,
conventional forces as ‘dinosaurs’ that can only be used in connection with
conventional conflicts, the conflicts we are seeing fewer and fewer of. The war
in Iraq in 2003 and especially the ‘continuation war’, which is still ongoing,
have, however, shown that there is still a great need for armoured or at least
reinforced vehicles when dealing with counter-insurgency.340 ‘Combat in built-
up areas’ as we saw it in the cities of Najaf in Iraq in the summer of 2004 and
in Fallujah in the autumn of the same year will also require heavy forces if it
is to be possible to attack and overcome urban guerrillas with small losses of
one’s own. In Najaf, the USMC equipment was too light and it became neces-
sary to rethink tactics. The negotiations became a way out for the Americans
from an extremely difficult military dilemma. This initially ended in a clear
prestige victory for the local religious insurgency leader, something that later
forced the Americans and the temporary Iraqi Government to take off the kid
gloves, when they decided to overcome the much stronger defence of the city
of Fallujah. The result was that large parts of the city were destroyed.341 The
initial phase was, on the other hand, a conventional battle fought in a densely
populated urban location. It was not a ‘Low Intensity Conflict’, where asym-
metric tactics were deployed. Instead, this was a regular battle fought in the full
340. David Zucchino, Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad, Foreword by Mark
Bowden (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004). This book provides an unusually con-
crete insight into how one can use modern armoured forces against an urban area. The
book is based on interviews with those who participated and provides a fascinating picture
of combat in built-up areas.
341. Alex Berenson, ‘Fighting the Old-Fashioned Way in Najaf ’, Tyler Hicks/The New York
Times, 29 August 2004. See also: Tom Regan, ‘Three years after 9/11, negativity towards
US policies spreads beyond “the usual suspects”’, csmonitor.com, posted 6 September 2004.
See also: Patrick Cockburn in Baghdad and Kim Sengupta, ‘Fallujah: The Homecoming and
the Homeless’, Independent Digital (UK) Ltd., 11 December 2004.
242
glare of the world’s media. For the cleric leaders, it was a gamble that paid off
handsomely in terms of propaganda value. (This type of war is presented in
greater detail in Chapter 8.)
Asymmetric conflicts and low intensity conflicts/guerrilla wars in general
and the challenges they now represent to Western military efforts have now
become a ‘nutrient’. Normally, this type of warfare does not lead to ‘quick
solutions’ and the complexity of the problem can be seen as a series of related
conflict challenges that have been increasingly better described and analysed
since the end of the 1990s. However, one unresolved problem still remains:
which forces are the best to use in connection with this type of counter-insur-
gency? The answer is perhaps that there are no such forces and that one must,
each time, analyse and assemble forces that can be suited for solving the actual
mission under the given local conditions. Practice during the ‘continuation war’
in Iraq has shown that it is necessary to use both light and heavily equipped
forces in a constantly shifting composition in order to try to take on an adver-
sary using ambush and terror attacks as his main form of combat. The decisive
weakness of the Americans and their Iraqi allies has not been that they have
been too heavily equipped but that they have not had enough forces available
given the size of the population and the internal split in Iraq.342 In retrospect,
it is easy to point out that, in the transition from the offensive campaign against
Baghdad to the stabilisation of the situation in Iraq, the forces were far too small
and the U.S. lost momentum during these stabilisation efforts. There were sim-
ply too few of them to be able to ensure stability in such a large territory with
such a large population. But, in practice, it was impossible to obtain political
acceptance for sending enough forces. This is probably still the position. What
then remains is to choose flexible solutions as regards organisation, missions
and localisation and investing in a structure with the ability to react quickly,
with decisive capacities. The other side of this argument is closely connected
to the civilian security structure with, among other things, enough police and
a functional legal system. By choosing to remove the old security structure, the
Americans actually opened up a ‘Pandora’s box’ and have lagged behind ever
since.
My personal view, based on talking to some British officers and reading
many of the personal stories and newspaper articles published after 2003, is that
military and political (local) success can be best achieved during the course of
342. Seen tactically, the use of so-called ‘combined effects’ is probably the most realistic way
forward. Full integration of all available forms of combat and functions is necessary, as illus-
trated in the previously discussed USMC concept of ‘the 3-Block War’. At the same time,
operations are carried out kinetically or non-kinetically depending on the actual target and
desired effect to be achieved.
243
the first 100 days, i.e., during the period that the hopeful local population often
supports the liberators. But after 100 days, and when it can be seen locally that
little has happened, their expectations turn to frustration, anger and eventually
to creating resistance. The British found that every pound spent during the first
100 days had significantly greater impact than the subsequent investments.343
In this respect, it is interesting to compare this with what the Russians have
done in Chechnya. Their warfare has been extremely ruthless and they take lit-
tle account of civilian losses. By comparison, Russia has perhaps 70,000 soldiers
in Chechnya, a country of 15,000 square kilometres and with between 500,000
and a million inhabitants.344
Peter W. Singer has tried to sum up some of the problems discussed earlier
in the following manner:
It is important to note that the strengthening of actors other than states
is not just about weapons but encompasses the entire spectrum of war-
fare. In many fields, such as microelectronics, software engineering, and
biotechnology, the civilian sector has already become more advanced that
the military. Intelligence of the quality available to state agencies is increas-
ingly available on the open market. Already, commercial satellites are pro-
viding high-resolution images for sale, heretofore the exclusive province
of the intelligence agencies of the superpowers. Likewise, key military
technologies such as GPS and FLIR (Forward Looking Infra Red) are
commercially accessible.345
We should, as regards the points described above, note the common factors
that exist. Firstly, we should be aware that all forms of military threats could
be carried out in different ways. Secondly, the range, speed and accuracy con-
nected to the use of weapons have increased over the last few years. Thirdly, the
343. Carl Conetta, ‘Radical Departure: Toward A Practical Peace in Iraq’ (Cambridge, MA:
Commonwealth Institute Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report #16, 07 July
2004). (The problem has also been debated in British open sources.) <http://www.comw.
org/pda/0407br16.html>.
344. Prior to the outbreak of the first Chechen war in 1994, the population count was up to
1,000,000 in the country. In the course of ten years of war, it is estimated that between 10
and 20 per cent of the population have lost their lives. In addition, thousands of Chechens
have fled to other parts of Russia or abroad. Out of a pre-war population of 269,000 ethnic
Russians (1989) only an estimated 60,000 are still in Chechnya. Despite these factors,
an official census carried out by the Russian authorities in 2002 showed that the popula-
tion had increased to about 1,100,000 inhabitants. The Moscow Times described the alleged
increase as ‘miraculous’. Depending on which figures one chooses to use, the number of
civilians per Russian soldier in Chechnya is either 16:1 or 7:1. In comparison, the number of
civilians per foreign soldier (including private ‘security personnel’) in Iraq is about 130:1.
345. Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 61–62.
244
traditional methods of delivery are associated with planes, missiles, rocket sys-
tems and Special Forces while alternative methods of delivery in connection
with, for example, terrorist campaigns include suitcase bombs, commercial
vehicles, means of public transport and the use of various kinds of planes, ves-
sels and private cars. The most devastating asymmetric attacks/terrorist cam-
paigns against civilian targets in North America, Europe and Japan since 1960
have never been carried out by means of military platforms. At the same time,
threats based on the following factors have acquired an increased significance:
1. High technology sensors, communications equipment and weapon systems

supplied by ‘rogue states’ or non-state actors, e.g., international terrorist
organisations and organised crime.
2. The use of civilian resources such as, for example, the Internet and com-
mercial satellite pictures and increasing access to advanced weapons since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, have made it easier also for smaller terror-
ist groups or insurgents to do more complex operational planning, based
on more qualified targeting. Access to this type of technical support makes
greater damage possible when asymmetric actors carry out guerrilla or ter-
rorist campaigns.
3. Ironically enough, the West has indirectly made it increasingly easier for
asymmetric actors by making itself dependent on the use of enormous
amounts of information, distributed on the generally unregulated Internet.
4. The increasing importance of information warfare (IW) which covers such
different forms of activity as electronic warfare (EW), psychological warfare,
different forms of military radio deception operations and so-called ‘cyber
attacks’. The combination of the use of high technology IW, which requires
few staff, is ‘tailor-made’ for a non-state actor who wants to cause damage
to a nation state. In connection with this, private ‘information soldiers’
who are willing, at a price, to develop and carry out attacks against major
companies and/or government bodies on behalf of a client can also be men-
tioned.346
346. Two sources that have written about this are Chris Westwood, ‘Military Information
Operations in a Conventional Warfare Environment’, Air Power Studies Centre Paper, No.
47, 1995, <www.defense.gov.au/apsc/ publish/paper47.htm>. Even if the text is a few years
old and was a little optimistically written, it still provides a good overview of the problems.
See also Metz, Armed Conflict in the Twenty-First Century, which was discussed earlier. See
pages 14 to 20 in particular.
245
5. In general, both government bodies and the population in Western countries

have become totally dependent on nationally critical infrastructures. This
refers to the importance of governmental and private computer servers, tel-
ecommunications and Internet providers. All these together represent a great
number of potential targets for asymmetric attacks/information warfare.
The consequences of the trends described above are rather bleak. We will
probably now see a lengthy campaign of violence where the different extrem-
ist groups will occasionally collaborate and occasionally fight each other – a
similar pattern to what we earlier in the modern history have seen within left-
wing extremist circles. Their activities will be targeted at all those groups and
nations that the fanatics believe they have a ‘right to punish’. But, as we have
seen during earlier periods of terror and/or other extremist activity, we can
assume that this new form of Islamic extremism will also reach its zenith and
then subside. But there will probably be a few restless years ahead before this
eventually happens.
246
8. Urban warfare – the new challenge?
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will present important features of so-called urban warfare.
The term urban warfare is introduced earlier in this book, with some of the
problems being mentioned in Chapter 7, but here we intend to give a broader
presentation of this military challenge.
There are grounds for assuming that, as regards future insurgencies and
counter-insurgency, battles for control of cities and the so-called ‘mega-cities’
could become almost routine. Accordingly, some of the definitions, theories and
problems that are often part of the debate on urban warfare are presented.
8.2 The background

Cities have traditionally symbolised human progress within areas such as social
organisation, culture and architecture. When cities cease to function and,
instead, become hotbeds of violence and general chaos, this has a very negative
impact on the inhabitants of the city and possibly also the country’s citizens. In
the last century the conflicts we saw which centred around cities were the battles
of Stalingrad, Warsaw and Berlin, the French recapturing of Algiers in Algeria
in 1956 from the FLN and, most recently, the major Russian attack operations
in Grozny in Chechnya. The city was captured by the Russians in the winter
of 1995, recaptured by the Chechens in 1996 and, most recently, the Russians
again took the city in January 2000. These are all examples of urban warfare that
have resulted in great losses of human life and extensive material damage.
In the period 1992–1993, Mogadishu had become a hotbed of crime. This
was often the only source of income for the ‘armies’ and their ‘soldiers’ who
247
drove round in camouflaged Toyota pickups armed with automatic weapons

and anti-tank missiles/RPGs.347 In many new conflicts, the ongoing operations
are conducted with the assistance of various types of commercially available
radio equipment and mobile telephones in particular.348 The equipment and
the manner of carrying out military operations in the many ongoing civil wars,
particularly in the Third World, are often a mixture of everything from the
most modern equipment on the market to features of warfare and tactics that
belong to both the 19th and 20th Centuries.349
The city is, to a greater extent than other forms of battle arena, the place
where new and old forms of warfare meet to create what looks like becoming
central to modern warfare: the urban war. There is much to suggest urban
warfare becoming the most common form of warfare in the 21st Century: the
reason is easy to understand – it is in the major cities (the so-called mega-cities)
that an increasingly greater percentage of the world’s population lives. But, so
far, we have avoided major insurgencies in the mega-cities that are now sprout-
ing up. But the danger of insurgency and guerrilla activity is increasing as the
major cities grow, often in an uncontrolled manner.
Already about half of the world’s population lives in urban areas, and, if
forecasters are right, we will, in 2015, have a situation where there are 7.2
billion people in the world and the figure will increase to about 7.9 billion in
2025. It is assumed that almost all of this increase will be absorbed into cities
in the Third World.350
By comparison, in 1970, there were only 8 cities with more than 5 mil-
lion people in Eastern Asia. By 2003, the figure had increased to 30 cities with
more than 5 million inhabitants in this same area. Examples of such mega-cities
347. The RPG (Rocket-Propelled Grenade) was the most common anti-tank weapon. In reality,
the term ‘RPG’ is most commonly used for the anti-tank weapon, RGP-7, of which there
are enormous numbers in all the conflict areas of the world.
348. For example, General Mohamed Farah Aideed who was one of the leading warlords, and his
alliance, the Somali National Alliance (SNA), based on two groups of clans that were loyal
to him, used military communications equipment. Most of it originated from the Somalian
Armed Forces which had been disbanded by this time.
349. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War, Collector’s Edition (Norwalk,
CT: The Easton Press, 1999/2004). The book provides a direct and expressive description of
how a battle looks in a city in Somalia. The action deals with an unsuccessful American raid
in October 1993 and the consequences this was to have. In October 1994, in Somalia, we
saw a primitive clan militia armed with older weapons but with the will to carry out urban
warfare, indirectly succeeding in getting the world’s leading military power to pull out of
the area.
350. Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman & Daniela Anastasion, The Security Demographic:
Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Population Action
International, 2003), Chapter Two, ‘Transition from Turmoil’. See also the analysis, ‘Risk
Assessment: Rapid Urban Growth’, pp. 54–55.
248
Urban warfare – the new challenge?
with more than 10 million inhabitants are Karachi, Jakarta and Calcutta, while
Beijing has over 15 million. Tokyo now has over 30 million and Shanghai has
over 20 million. Cairo, with its 15.2 million people, is an extremely likely can-
didate for future hostilities, given the many extremist organisations that take ref-
uge there. The enormous demographic pressure and the significant movement of
people have led to an increasing risk of local insurgencies arising targeted at, for
example, hopeless social conditions or undemocratic regimes. Social problems,
together with the increase in criminal ‘warlords’ who dominate their own parts
of major cities, have become a steadily growing problem in connection with
rapid urbanisation. It is feared that local terrorism (probably with ethnic ele-
ments) and lengthy warfare in particular with a low level of intensity could break
out. Obviously no one knows how great the problems will be that we will see in
the urban areas now sprouting up, but the international community should be
prepared for there being a series of insurgencies or wars centred on this type of
city in the next few years.351
In this respect, we should note that the rapid-response task forces that the
EU has decided should be set up would have, as one of their tasks, to take con-
trol of important communications centres in conflict areas. The most impor-
tant of these could be controlling airports, ports, important roads and other
hubs. These are often located in or around urban areas. A result of these devel-
opments is that this type of task force should be prepared to be able to oper-
ate in a city environment. Traditionally, trained Scandinavian forces have not
normally conducted exercises that involve fighting in major cities and hardly
have combat techniques developed with a view to being able to fight in major
city environments in the Third World. In this respect, it is interesting to note
that, in the Norwegian Armed Forces’ new doctrine for ground operations;
you barely find a mention of the problems Norwegian soldiers will probably be
faced with during combat in urban areas if we are to participate in, for example,
peace support operations abroad. Nor has any thinking been developed on this
in the doctrine’s discussion on the carrying out of the different types of military
operation.352 As this type of use of forces is no longer an unthinkable scenario,
fresh thinking is actually needed in this area.
8.3 Methods and framework

When we come to study the challenges that urban warfare will probably lead
to in the years to come, it is natural to take as our starting point some of the
351. Cincotta et al, ibid., pp. 70–79.

352. The Norwegian Defence Staff, Forsvarets doktrine for landoperasjoner, see pp. 104–140.
249
historical examples that exist. However, I have chosen not to include older
examples, such as Stalingrad and Berlin, and have, instead, decided to con-
centrate on examples of the wars/conflicts that dominate today – the differ-
ent forms of protracted guerrilla wars. The possible consequences of insurgent
movements deciding to make use of cities (i.e., with more than 100,000 inhab-
itants) and/or the so-called ‘mega-cities’ (with more than a million inhabitants)
as central areas for future insurgency and terrorism are of particular interest.
In this chapter we will look, among other things, at the following factors:
• How is urban warfare usually described in modern literature?

• How, for instance, have the Americans and Russians applied their doctrines
to this theme?
• The battles in Fallujah and Grozny are used as examples, with the emphasis
on Fallujah in Iraq as it is most recent.
• The military challenges that urban operations look like creating for Western
forces have been emphasised in my presentation.
Battles in cities of more than a million inhabitants are no longer something

that only concern Western great powers or Third World regimes as this can also
be a challenge for Norwegian and other Nordic armed forces today. The reason
is obviously that the Nordic countries have become increasingly more active
participants in demanding international operations than at any time before.
Behind the problems discussed here, there is also a desire to look a little at the
theories and practice that have been used by others if our own forces are to
function satisfactorily in this form of warfare.
8.3.1 A little about source materials and problems

Dr. Alice Hills at Leeds University has written an interesting book about the
problems outlined above.353 An important observation that she makes is that,
if we compare urban warfare with other forms of warfare practiced today,
this has perhaps changed least in the period since the Second World War. It is
also important that urban warfare challenges several of today’s more popular
353. Alice Hills, Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
She is a lecturer in Conflict, Development & Security at Leeds University. Other newer
works of Hills’s are: Border Security in the Balkans: Europe’s Gatekeepers, Adelphi paper No.
371 (London: OUP for IISS, 2005); Policing Africa: Internal Security and the Limits of
Liberalization (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
250
military theories. Several of these are based on conceptions of future warfare

that we can find under headings such as Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
as these theories were worded in the U.S. in the 1990s. There were visions that
the combination of advanced and digitalised communications systems, robotics
and long-range precision weapons would, together, give warfare a revolutionary
design.354
In addition to the term urban operations, several other terms have been
used to describe combat in built-up areas. In English, the term ‘Military
Operations on Urban Terrain’, or MOUT, has often been used – a term that is
often associated with urban ground combat conducted at a tactical level. The
terms ‘Fighting in Built-up Areas’ (FIBUA) and ‘Operations in Built-up Areas’
(OBUA) have also been common in English literature, but the two terms are
now disappearing from doctrine documents. The older concepts have some of
the same content as the new term ‘Urban Operations’, or urban warfare which
I mainly use here. The term ‘Urban Operations’ refers to the current military
operations going on in built-up areas and then means everything from large cit-
ies down to villages of a certain size. (The term ‘hamlet’ normally only describes
a few houses/a cluster of houses and is not included in the term.) In U.S. Joint
Publication 3-06, it says of ‘Urban Operations’:
Operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations
on, or against objectives within, a topographical complex and its adjacent
natural terrain, where manmade construction or the density of non-com-
batants are the dominant features.355
In the period since the Second World War, Western forces have seldom
attached any importance to urban warfare. Where they have trained in this
form of warfare, combat techniques and lower-level tactics, i.e., up to company
level, have been prioritised. It has been more common to emphasise different
forms of peace support operations. In countries with a terrorism problem, some
of their forces have probably also been trained in anti-terrorism (Great Britain
could be an example, cf., their experiences in Northern Ireland).
In connection with urban operations, the significance of the environment
one is operating within is often emphasised – urban areas have a great influence
on all forms of military operation. As this is a man-made environment, the area
has other qualities than, for example, open landscapes or the desert. It is the
354. Rekkedal, Central Features of the Debate on RMA and Network-Centric Warfare, pp. 43–56.
355. Joint Publication (JP) 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations (Washington, D.C.: 2002),
p. 1-1. Although this definition is from a Joint level, the content is more or less identical to
that applying within the U.S. Marine Corps which has been given the task of developing
urban operations within the American Armed Forces.
251
trend towards steadily more cities with millions of inhabitants that makes many
people now fear that these will be the new arenas for large military confronta-
tions. Although there were battles over some cities during the Second World
War (particularly in the final battles for Berlin in the spring of 1945), there have
been relatively few similar operations since 1945. There has also been disagree-
ment in military debate on the need for developing individual techniques and
operational courses of action to meet the military challenges that an intense
battle for a city would undoubtedly involve. There are many who have claimed
that adaptation to local conditions would suffice if well-trained forces were
deployed. One reason for these attitudes is the experiences many have drawn
from the Cold War, when urban operations were considered less important
with regard to the final result. What, nevertheless, most people will agree on is
that the infantry, the force most used to control streets and buildings, includ-
ing clearing up houses, tunnels and sewage systems of adversaries, would be
likely to suffer great losses. Although if this was a case of low-level conflicts in
which the Western forces were deployed as peacekeeping forces, they would
be demanding operations for those taking part. As previously pointed out in
Chapter 6, there would be a number of challenges in terms of international law,
media and public opinion associated with operations in large urbanised areas.
Keywords such as Rules of Engagement (RoE), collateral damage, the degree of
violence and continuing discussion on what ought to be the military objectives
would have to be thought through before deploying forces in city areas.
8.4 Urban warfare – modern examples
8.4.1 Two modern examples

Few people who follow military theory and specialist military debate are in any
doubt that there is now a discrepancy between the thinking dominating within
Western military theory and the military realities we have seen in the ongoing
insurgency in Iraq and partly also in Afghanistan.
Here, I have chosen to use Fallujah and Grozny as examples, as the two
campaigns, which were carried out in two different geographical areas, never-
theless have one clear feature in common: insurgents holding a relatively large
city and being attacked by conventional forces. The preferred American opera-
tional thinking and tactical adjustment during the battle for Fallujah in Iraq in
November 2004 have been documented and will be used as an example. There
is quite a lot of written English-language material on Fallujah.
One problem is that it is mainly Western sources and analyses that are avail-
able, but it is my opinion that this material provides a good insight into both
plans and the execution of the operations described. There is not as much
252
material on Grozny. However, this also provides a good basis to generalise on

the important features of modern urban operations.
8.4.2 Fallujah – first round

The decisive battle for Fallujah does, however, have a previous history. The first
battle for the city was in April 2004. In many ways, it ended up in a stalemate.356
In order to avoid a decisive battle against the different insurgent groups that
held the city, an agreement was reached whereby responsibility for security in
the actual city, which had around 280,000 inhabitants, was transferred to the
virtually makeshift Iraqi ‘Fallujah Brigade’. The latter was then to try to gather
in weapons and equipment from the insurgents. This never worked and, after
a short time, the city developed into an important base area for the insurgency
in the whole of Iraq. More and more foreign Mujaheddin went to Fallujah and
arms, ammunition and money were transferred to this base area. Here, the
insurgents had a feeling that the Americans could be forced to give up.
In real counter-insurgency it is, however, vital that insurgents are not
allowed to keep their ‘safe bases’. A so-called ‘counter-insurgency campaign’
cannot actually be executed until the government forces/intervention forces
have themselves taken back control of all the towns/areas in which the insur-
gents control the local population. Here, we see that those who led the opera-
tions on both the American and Iraqi sides did not actually have any deep
understanding as to how insurgency in the Second and Third Worlds normally
works. The steadily growing problem with security in Iraq has its roots in the
errors that have been made – several of these even during the preparations for
the war in 2003. Some matters that can be brought up when explaining the
negative developments in Iraq are:
• The Americans and the Iraqi leaders they collaborated with ahead of the
conventional war in the spring of 2003 were not able to draw up sustain-
able and long-term plans attending to internal security in the country once
356. An extremely authoritative source written by the general who led the attack on Fallujah, Lt.
Gen. John F. Sattler, along with another person, provides a good overview of the American
planning for the attack in November 2004. Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler and Lt. Col. Daniel
H. Wilson, ‘Operation Al Fajr: The Battle of Fallujah – Part II’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.
89, Iss. 7, (July 2005), pp. 12–24. For a description of the combat technique level, see, for
example, Michael D. Skaggs, ‘Tank-Infantry Integration: Company C, 1st Tank Battalion’s
Participation in the Battle of Fallujah’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 89, Iss. 6, (June 2005),
pp. 41–45. For a critical evaluation of the unsuccessful attempt to capture Fallujah in April
2004, see the article written by F. J. West, ‘The Fall of Fallujah’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.
89, Iss. 7, (July 2005), p. 52.
253
the Saddam regime was defeated. Nor had they organised and ensured the
necessary expertise in order to develop fresh internal stability in the coun-
try which would include ensuring the necessary infrastructure since much
would be destroyed during the opening battles.
• In the U.S. Central Command’s first draft, they had asked for about 500,000
soldiers. This was to be enough for both the actual war and the effective
occupation of Iraq so that they could avoid a major insurgency. Rumsfeld
and those closest to him believed that only a fraction of this was necessary
– they had already invested billions in modern airborne systems that would
defeat the Iraqi forces. General Tommy Franks did not accept the guidelines
he was given and forced it through that at least 175,000 soldiers were neces-
sary in order to carry out an invasion, with further troops stationed in the
area around Iraq.
• Another factor that was involved in undermining stability was the U.S.
decision to disband the Iraqi Army and large parts of the police. Instead
of having a local security force available from the first day of the occupa-
tion, they instead chose to make tens of thousands of military-trained Iraqis
unemployed. Many of these later became cadres in the popular insurgency
that broke out in the summer of 2003.357 Similarly, they got rid of many
civil servants in the previous government administration. The result of the
near collapse in ordinary government services is something from which Iraq
is still suffering. This measure has also created many bitter former civil serv-
ants who have seen their statuses and finances completely ruined.
It is of great significance that they were hardly able to communicate with

the local clan or tribe leaders and with local religious leaders. These have tra-
ditionally had great influence, particularly in the rural areas and small towns.
Without the support of local leaders like these, there was not anyone either to
encourage local law and order. Instead, we have seen that there has often been
recruitment to the insurgency from this type of leader and their supporters/clan
members.358
357. The loss of status and a steady income obviously creates strong hatred towards those one
considers responsible for this. Soul-searching is not this leadership’s strong point!
358. Some of these problems have been discussed in an article written by David E. Cooper, ‘An
Organizational Model for Marines Fighting an Insurgency’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 89,
Iss. 6, (June 2005), pp. 48–50. The article gives good examples of what has and has not
worked in previous American efforts.
254
8.4.3 Fallujah – second round

In the Fallujah area, the number of attacks on American and Iraqi targets
increased slowly but surely from May 2004 without them being able to effec-
tively intervene against those who had control of Fallujah. At the same time,
the insurgents increased pressure on the city’s population and they established
a rather brutal regime. Those who did not support them were often whipped,
tortured or executed. More and more of the city’s population then also began
to flee. As the ‘Fallujah Brigade’ quickly lost its grip on the city, there were
many commentators who saw this as an unsuccessful experiment. This is prob-
ably too simple an interpretation. In retrospect, there are many people who see
what has happened here as an American opportunity to gain an insight into the
insurgency, something they did not have previously. As the Fallujah Brigade was
an unsuccessful Iraqi attempt to take control of Fallujah themselves, it was no
longer possible to blame the Americans or the coalition forces. This also opened
up opportunities for implementing psychological operations to split the insur-
gency from the people, something they came a long way in doing. It was also
important that developments showed that the insurgents were in an internal
battle against each other and that they lacked a common leadership. This was
their real weakness. Once the Americans had pulled out of Fallujah, there was
no obvious foreign enemy and then the insurgent groups began to fight among
themselves for power in the city.359
The threat in Iraq comes from a variety of insurgent, terrorist, tribal,
extremist, and criminal networks – each with its own agenda. Foreign
fighters are mixed in with these networks, with the primary foreign threat
represented by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his al-Qaeda terrorist network.
While there is no single unifying leader of the insurgency, these various
groups cooperate with each other in a loose alliance when it is convenient
to do so.360
It gradually became clear to both the Americans and the new Iraqi
Government that they could not live with developments in Fallujah. From the
summer of 2004, they began to plan a major campaign to regain control of
the city. As Lieutenant General Sattler saw it, ‘Operation Al Fajr’, as it became
known, was ‘Joint and coalition warfare at its finest. The best capability set
was quickly assembled from throughout Iraq and massed for the battle’.361
359. Sattler and Wilson, ‘Operation Al Fajr’, p. 12. (Here, Lt. Gen. Sattler is writing as chief of
the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in Iraq.)
360. Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler and Lt. Col. Daniel H. Wilson, ‘Operation Al Fajr: The Battle of
Fallujah – Part II’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 89, Iss. 7, (July 2005), pp. 12–24.
361. Ibid., p. 16.
255
About 6,000 American soldiers from the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps
were deployed to recapture the city, along with 6 Iraqi battalions and various
air support from all the branches of the armed forces. A British mechanised
infantry battalion also took part (The Black Watch). There were a total of
about 12,000 soldiers involved during the operation. It proved to be the case
during the battles that several of the advanced American weapons systems were
of limited use. The side that had its basic military disciplines in order and that
could make use of so-called combined arms tactics (where all kinds of troops
were assumed to co-operate in an effective manner) and that had good basic
skills in infantry training and close combat would get the upper hand. In this
case, it was the American forces. Since the Americans, in particular, wanted to
avoid the unnecessary loss of civilian lives, it became difficult, in practice, to
deploy some of their most effective weapons systems. In the aftermath of the
attack we saw – at least for a while – a 40 per cent reduction in the number
of terrorist attacks in this area. The insurgents who had survived were fleeing
westwards across the Euphrates River and many also later ended up in cities
such as Ramadi and Mosul, etc.362
However, the American forces captured Fallujah with ‘only’ 51 dead and
425 wounded among their own forces.363 This yields an American casualty
rate of approximately 8 per cent, calculated in relation to the combat troops
deployed, while the insurgents had at least 1,200 casualties but the figure could
be higher than 1,600.364 On the basis of interviews in the aftermath of the bat-
tles, one source has concluded that the insurgents’ losses were probably closer
to 2,000 dead, but there is obviously no exact list of losses.365 A casualty rate
of about 8 per cent is not particularly high, given the intensity of the battles
in the barely two weeks that it took to secure the city. Still, this is clearly less
than the Russians had to suffer in connection with their own repeated military
operations against Grozny (see presentation).
It is easy to see here that there is a difference between the often extremely
optimistic ‘near zero’ casualty rates that the most enthusiastic RMA spokesmen
362. Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler and Lt. Col. Daniel H. Wilson, ibid., p. 24.
363. These are the official American figures. See <http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles05/
Pro01Keiler-2.htm>. Losses inflicted in the period after the main battles increased the figure
of those who fell to about 70 Americans.
364. Cockburn and Sengupta, ‘Fallujah: The Homecoming and the Homeless’. The figures in
this article for American soldiers who fell is set at 70 and the insurgents’ losses at about
1,600. The figures in the main text are the official American ones. Nevertheless, the figures
say something about those fighting against modern equipped and trained Western forces
having to expect great losses – particularly when the Western forces opt for air bombing and
armoured vehicles as in Fallujah.
365. F. J. West, ‘The Fall of Fallujah’, Marine Corps Gazette, July 2005, p. 55.
256
spoke of in the 1990s and what we saw most recently in Fallujah. An important
reason for so few civilians being killed in Fallujah was that they had prepared
the population for the fact that the attack would happen. The majority had
therefore also fled before the main assault took place (there were probably only
about 1,200 civilian inhabitants left in the city). Civilian losses were conse-
quently minimal, something that also minimized the danger of media criticism
based on the so-called ‘collateral damage’ problem that always exists.366
As described above, Fallujah became a serious challenge for the Americans and
their coalition partners. Four so-called civilian contractors being shot, burned
and subsequently left hanging from a bridge triggered the American interven-
tion. The American Armed Forces clearly felt compelled to exact revenge for
this act, even though it did not involve soldiers belonging to the armed forces.
Future developments simply did not, however, go as planned. A mixture of
wavering and a refusal to make decisions on the part of the Americans in April
2004 was interpreted by the insurgents as the American military leadership in
Iraq being weak and reluctant to suffer losses, something that contributed to
giving the insurgency fresh impetus. In reality, the Americans were holding
back because the marine infantry that had been given the task did not have
access to sufficient tank support.367 This was intensified by Iraqi politicians
wanting to show that they could sort things out themselves through negotia-
tions with the insurgent groups. Overall, this meant that they were not getting
anywhere, although it is interesting to read some ‘explanations’ that want to
tone down the fact that the whole thing was rather unsuccessful.368 One of the
main problems for the Americans in April 2004 had also been keeping open the
supply lines to and from the area.
In November 2004, the Americans had learned from their earlier mistakes.
Now, abundant quantities of supplies were driven forward to an area they con-
trolled in advance and they spent about two months preparing the attack. As
they were faced, in practice, now with an empty city, they could make extensive
use of both aircraft and artillery based on the advanced use of the coordination
of firepower and leadership of the various forms of air support.369 Massive fire-
power was used against the insurgents. About 2,000 buildings were destroyed
and about 10,000 others were damaged. The Americans and their allies pushed
366. West, ibid.

367. Bing West, No True Glory. A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York: Bantam
Books, 2005), see Part I, pp. 9–52.
368. See Michael D. Skaggs, ‘Tank-Infantry Integration’, pp. 41–43. The article focuses on the
tactical adjustment to local conditions, while the author does not say anything about the
entire operation not succeeding in achieving its goal.
369. Sattler and Wilson, ‘Operation Al Fajr’, pp. 19–20.
257
on at a high tempo so that the insurgent forces were never able to co-ordinate
themselves properly. On the basis of his interviews with about 200 marines,
‘Bing’ West has written a relatively detailed assessment of what happened:
The enemy was a loose conglomeration of semi-independent cells of 4 to,
say 20 fighters. They would pop up at odd places and had to be hunted
down and killed, small pack by small pack. Overall, on any given day,
about 100 squads were searching among 39.000 buildings. In some sec-
tions, (…terrorists) were lurking in 1 out of every 70 buildings searched;
in other sections, they were lying in wait in 1 out of 15 houses. And they
wound sneak back to sectors already searched. (…) 370
We see here that it is the efforts of the various types of ground forces that
clearly dominate the day-to-day military action in connection with urban war-
fare.
8.4.4 Grozny – a Russian example

As previously indicated, the repeated battles for Grozny can be seen as a foretaste
of a form of warfare that will become more common in the future. In the winter
of 1995, the Russians had to deploy about 50,000 men, 700 armoured vehicles
and large amounts of artillery in order to take control of the city that, at the
time, had almost 500,000 inhabitants. For the Russians, who had established
the theoretical concepts and problems that are part of the RMA concept by as
early as the 1970s, it proved to be just wishful thinking that they could retake
control of a city by means of ‘surgical operations’ carried out at a high tempo,
terminology that has also been regularly used in the West since the Gulf War
in 1991. Urban warfare, where one faces a motivated and sufficiently equipped
insurgent force, is normally characterised by intense infantry-dominated bat-
tles. In addition to machine guns and automatic guns, basic equipment provid-
ing the necessary firepower is, for instance, artillery, tanks with high-explosive
shells, portable anti-tank weapons and flamethrowers. For those defending
themselves, various forms of mines and minefields are important weapons. In
the case of one side that also has air support, cluster bombs, Fuel Air Explosives
(FAE) and guided bombs are of assistance. Each time the Russians have gone
into Grozny they have encountered a great number of skilled marksmen and
mobile groups fighting with automatic weapons and RPGs. When the Russians
advanced through streets that had often been shot to bits by their own artillery
or aircraft bombs in advance, they used self-propelled artillery and tanks to fire
370. West, ‘The Fall of Fallujah’, p. 55.
258
accurately at buildings they were shot from or where they assumed guerrilla
groups were located. Seen in this light, armoured forces were a crucial part of
their warfare. According to Hills, tactics like these are also used in other urban
battles:
Armour will probably continue to play a significant role in the coming
years, especially when special assault teams are used; it can successfully
breach concrete and steel structures for infantry when forming part of
a combined arms team. Indeed, it was a key technology in Iraq (and
Jenin) because it provided protection and survivability against sniper and
machine-gun fire.371
But the use of armoured vehicles in built-up areas needs co-operation with
other types of troops.372 Armoured vehicles, first and foremost, team up with
infantry and engineers and it is essential that artillery and mortar support are
available at short notice. This was a lesson the Russian forces learned during
the first attack on Grozny over the New Year weekend in 1994. Columns of
armoured vehicles, almost entirely without artillery support, managed to get
into the city before Chechen forces attacked them. Almost 70 per cent of the
armoured vehicles were destroyed over the course of a few days.373 The Russians
then reorganised their tactics for the second Chechen war in 1999/2000 and
reintroduced the use of combined tactical operations where combat groups
consisting of armoured vehicles relieved infantry and engineer soldiers with
clear-up, and explosive equipment became the core of their adjusted tactics.
The heavy bombardment of the city prior to attacking became an important
element during both the first and second wars. Similar Israeli operations against
the Palestinian cities of Jenin and Ramallah have also led to the Israelis having
to make tactical adjustments. Close co-operation between tanks, heavy engi-
neering machines (the so-called D9 armoured bulldozers) and the infantry in
particular has been developed in order to be able to combat well motivated but
lightly equipped Palestinian groups.
371. Hills, ibid., p. 160.

372. Steven Komarow, ‘Tanks adapted for urban fights they once avoided’, USA Today, 30 March
2005.
373. This footnote refers to the second war in Chechnya. For the first one, see <http://fmso.
leavenworth.army.mil/documents/battle.htm>, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/docu-
ments/chechpt3.htm>, and <http://fmso.leavenworth. army.mil/documents/grozny2000/
grozny2000.htm>.
259
8.4.5 Some important trends in urban warfare

Action involving standoff precision weapons, which the supporters of air power
in particular have great faith in, is, however, not always the solution that can be
chosen. The battle for Fallujah has also acted as a ‘wake-up call’ for at least some
of those now working on military theory issues in the U.S. In urban combat, the
difference between the technologically well-equipped side and the more simply
equipped opponent is evened out. In theory, an insurgent movement, equipped
with weapons from the Second World War, could stand its ground against a
modern adversary. This is because, among other things, the weaker party can
gather in buildings and mix with the civilian population, which greatly reduces
and, in fact, at times eliminates the advantage the Western forces otherwise
have from advanced weapon systems and technical monitoring and intelligence
resources. This is reinforced by the individual guerrilla soldier normally being
first in position and thereby obtaining a good knowledge of how the local
buildings and streets look. This local knowledge can then be used in connection
with planning and the execution of attacks on selected targets.
Battles that take place in urban areas have one special feature that it will
never be possible to avoid: it is normally short combat distances combined with
many smaller/demarcating spaces that characterise warfare in urban areas. Even
the buildings are often constructed in reinforced concrete and it is the countless
streets, tall buildings, cables/cable ducts, pipelines and especially sewage sys-
tems that characterise the landscape. All this makes it difficult to use weapons
systems that have actually been developed for combat in open country and over
greater distances. Modern forces make use of anti-tank systems, ground-to-air
and air-to-ground missiles but as the Western forces are ‘always’ expected to
have air superiority, interest in anti-aircraft defences has waned regarding inter-
national efforts against ‘second-rate military powers’. Long-range missiles are
normally difficult to use against targets on the ground in cities with tall build-
ings. Obviously, 1,000 or 2,000lb guided aircraft bombs are effective when they
strike, but the problem is that the effect can often be far too great – something
that is simply not politically desirable. Heavier weapons are generally difficult
to use effectively in urban environments if the area is full of civilians, but also
because the combat distances are often so short that firing can also be a danger
to one’s own forces. One side’s heavy fire striking its own forces has proved to
be common in urban areas – you never know in what house or at what street
crossing your own forces are located at any time.
The weapons systems that have been standard equipment for almost all
insurgent movements over the last 15 years are relatively simple but tried and
tested weapons. In Mogadishu, as in Grozny and, most recently, in Fallujah, the
now 30-year-old Russian RPG-7 has been the favoured weapon of insurgents.
260
The RPG-7 is actually an anti-tank weapon, but is, in practice, used against all
forms of vehicles, defences, and personnel in buildings or against positions out
in the open country.374 In Somalia, the weapon was successfully used against
American helicopters. The RPG-7 is used in a combination with automatic
weapons, mortars, mines and (possibly remotely detonated) bombs of various
sizes. Overall, this provides insurgents with sufficient firepower. The weapons
mentioned can be combined with commercially available communications sys-
tems such as cell or satellite telephones, ‘walkie-talkies’ and laptop computers
connected to the Internet. This gives the insurgents the inexpensive and easily
accessible ‘basic equipment’ to be able to start and sustain an insurgency. These
simple but reliable systems are almost perfect for urban warfare and are also in
regular use around the world by both terrorist groups and the more developed
insurgent movements.
8.4.6 Urban warfare – some experiences

There is much to suggest that there is a need for a change in Western attitudes to
urban warfare. If one is to be able to operate effectively against insurgent forces
in this type of environment, it may be necessary to see this as something more
than a combat technique. In urban warfare, it is more or less the human factor
that is crucial to the final result. The city greatly influences how acts of combat
can be performed – it creates its own interaction between soldiers, insurgent
forces, civilians and, especially, the city’s enormous mass of buildings that pro-
vide countless potential areas of cover, storerooms, resting places, etc.
Large urban operations assume, as previously indicated, that the soldiers are
skilled in combined arms warfare and everything suggests that it is necessary to
make extensive use of one’s own armoured vehicles if one is to keep one’s own
losses down. It is the combination of armoured infantry, tanks, engineer troops
and ordinary infantry working together that provides the synergy effect. The
armoured infantry, along with tanks, is responsible for direct firepower although
these types of unit are often associated, first and foremost, with combat in open
country. The engineer forces are responsible for clearing up/exploding barri-
cades and improving roads (or the equivalent). A logistics apparatus that works
is a precondition for being able to carry out combat and keep operations going.
Armoured vehicles, various forms of ‘fire-raising equipment’,375 and mortars
are also seen as more useful weapons systems than fighter-bombers and attack
374. See also <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/weapon.htm>.

375. The approximately 11kg-heavy so-called RPO ‘Shmel’ shoulder-fired weapon with so-called
thermobaric ammunition (‘flamethrowers’) is popular.
261
helicopters in this type of warfare. As insurgents often have anti-aircraft mis-

siles at their disposal and fire at helicopters with various handheld or heavier
weapons, both the Israelis and the Russians have become more careful about
using attack helicopters in urban areas. In her book, Dr. Hills refers to an
Israeli officer who claimed that a tank is always the best weapons system in
urban warfare. They can accurately shoot at a target and are difficult to destroy.
Statements like this will always be countered by arguments that other weapons
systems are at least as important. One of the systems that many speak highly
of is transport helicopters and, in particular, attack helicopters equipped with
advanced sensors. The helicopter works as long as it can manoeuvre and is very
suitable for troop transport (e.g., putting soldiers down on the top of a tall
building). Helicopter support is also useful for quick, short strikes targeting
personnel on, for example, roofs or against small gatherings of insurgents that
have been spotted. But if a helicopter has to remain in an area for a period of
time, it quickly becomes a vulnerable target itself.376
In the short-term, it is difficult to see that any new form of dynamics can
be developed between ground and air forces. An important assumption for the
effective use of ground forces and their weapons systems is having access to
detailed information on where the opponent is located. Today, it is a combina-
tion of data gathered by electronic means and Forward Air Controllers (FAC)
that is the most common method of providing the air forces with the necessary
intelligence in urban areas. The modern form of co-operation between ground
forces and air forces that has been developed in the U.S. in particular over the
last 20 years works well.
Even today, the superpowers are making extensive use of precision weapons
and sensor technology but the effect of the input of such weapons must always
be seen in relation to political goals. As yet, there is little to suggest that we will
see any developments that will, in the short or medium-term, revolutionise the
methods now used in connection with air support in urban warfare. The great-
est changes over the last few years have been the result of constantly improv-
ing sensors – particularly equipment for night-time operations. The increasing
use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and the associated instrumentation are
becoming increasingly more important, particularly on the intelligence side.
376. Hills, Future War in Cities, p. 78. See also Mark Bowden’s book about the battle in Mogadishu
on 3 and 4 October 1993: Bowden, Black Hawk Down. See also the French General Paul
Aussaresses’ The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955–1957
(New York: Enigma Books, 2002). In the book, a detailed and frightening picture is pro-
vided of how French soldiers were defeated in the insurgency in Algiers, led by the Front
de Libération Nationale (FLN). The description of the ‘Battle of Algiers’ provides a brutal
close-up of what future battles in cities with more than a million inhabitants could lead to.
262
Several theorists have also pointed out the opportunities the use of ‘smart’ mis-
siles supplied with data obtained from UAVs could provide, with a view to
supporting their own ground forces’ urban operations. But even if accuracy has
been greatly improved over the last 30 years, there are limits to even the most
advanced precision weapons systems. One example is the problem with preci-
sion weapons when these are not used from a great height. It can be difficult
to avoid things like tall buildings that are in the way of the missile heading
towards the target. Another problem is the actual precision. If an airborne mis-
sile has a likely accuracy to within 10 metres, this actually gives a diameter of 20
metres. Consequently, it cannot be ruled out that the missile will then hit the
wrong target. At the same time, experiences of combat in built-up areas show
that there is also a clear need for indirect fire. An important reason is that the
relatively high degree of protection that large concrete buildings afford those
defending makes it necessary to have access to artillery that fire indirectly, i.e.,
grenades that strike roofs and penetrate down into the buildings before they
explode. Mortars with low calibres, typically 81mm, do not normally have the
firepower required to breach strong building structures made from reinforced
concrete. Self-propelled artillery and tanks take aim, firing directly at buildings,
so that they are in a position to shoot into buildings from where there is firing
against one’s own forces – for example, a window on the 4th floor. Without
this form of direct and indirect firepower support, infantry losses will often be
high.
One point that can also be emphasised is that warfare in urban areas often
takes place over short distances, usually in the form of close combat. Seen in
this light, it has many similarities to the extremely physical forms of warfare of
previous eras. This makes warfare both physically and psychologically intense
for the participants. Western forces have now experienced this in places like
Afghanistan and Iraq. Warfare like we saw during the Gulf War in 1991 has
another character, although it is also hard for participants to take part in opera-
tions like that. The impression one gets, nevertheless, is that urban warfare is
perhaps the most common form of warfare, particularly as there is a great deal
of close combat in this type of warfare. Hills was probably one of the first to
actually comment on the major challenges that the Americans would encounter
in Iraq when, in the autumn of 2003, she wrote (i.e., before widespread guer-
rilla warfare had broken out):
(…) the West will still have to face the fact that operations in cities are at
best manpower intensive and at worst brutal, regardless of the promotion
of liberal values or humanitarian war, or, indeed, the sophistication of
the technologies available. And urban war remains the prototypical war,
with street fighting continuing at a state that would be recognisable by
the great-grandfathers of today’s soldiers. Effective urbane war depends
263
on combined-arms teams, but infantry remains the critical element, and

the pre-modern nature of close combat ensures that future infantry capa-
bilities will remain based (…) on the philosophy that ‘What I find, I can
Kill’.377
How do you combat a well-led and organised insurgent movement in con-
nection with protracted urban warfare? In this respect, it is likely that Western
forces have some demanding developmental work ahead of them. The continu-
ation war in Iraq from the late summer of 2003 in particular suggests this. Hills’
most important theoretical contribution is perhaps when she demonstrates that
the West must now try to establish a more effective way of analysing what will
be required in connection with urban warfare. If one is to be able to hope for
quick success in this area, co-operation will be required across the traditional
areas of expertise. In order to get any further, it will be necessary to combine
military history, security studies, military theory, studies of an anthropologi-
cal nature and studies of catastrophes with more traditional military studies
such as the development of tactics, doctrines and new operational concepts.
Perhaps it is a real so-called paradigm shift we are now facing. When it comes
to deploying military forces to combat a guerrilla movement or terrorist groups
that have their hide-outs in large cities, this will require a different thinking to
that traditionally preferred by Western forces – combat where getting ‘caught
up’ in cities is avoided.
In order to fight over large built-up areas, it will be necessary to be able to
plan and execute complicated advances in urban areas and be able to lead and
carry out security operations against, for example, important streets, tall build-
ings and similar strategically important facilities in the city. To be successful, it
is necessary to quickly advance and occupy the desired targets, while being able
to defeat the opposition present in a flexible manner. It is then necessary for the
military organisation to have been trained to be able to quickly interpret new
situations and change missions. It will also be necessary to be flexibly organised,
so that one has secure and well-functioning communications systems at one’s
disposal. This form of combat also assumes, to a certain extent, that one’s own
forces operate using the same principles as the insurgents, i.e., in small mobile
groups with good communications between them.
To be successful with regard to urban warfare, technical skills and tactical
insight must be co-ordinated in an overall plan. This will require the ability to
develop operational and strategic plans, so that the entire organisation works
towards reaching the operational/strategic targets. Real cities with perhaps
377. Hills, Future War in Cities, p. 243.
264
millions of people in many ways have a life of their own and a couple of thou-
sand soldiers quickly disappear into the ‘concrete jungle’. One must therefore
be clear about what is to be prioritised and what one does not have the capacity
to do anything about.
If one is to meet the challenges associated with urban operations and par-
ticularly if acts of war break out in a city, one will not get far with only one com-
bat perspective of the challenges. If one is to meet the challenges that lengthy
hostilities in a city environment will require, one must develop an operational
strategic approach to the problem. It is one thing to develop theories about this,
but it must also be practiced in order to achieve the complicated co-operation
between the various types of troops and specialists, including civilian partners
that military progress requires. A potential major problem in urban warfare is
‘blue-on-blue’ – shooting at each other because combat co-ordination is too
poor, or breaking up for either technical or leadership reasons.
8.4.7 Warfare in urban areas – what experiences are emphasised?

In many ways, urban warfare is a departure from the normal modern Western
notion of what warfare is and should be. As demonstrated earlier, this often ends
up in short range combat and this easily leads to civilian losses and destruction.
Seen in this light, this form of warfare will also become a challenge with regard
to how politicians and the media think and write about warfare. The entire
thing will quite simply be bloody – far from the ‘ideal’ that the most eager
spokesmen for the use of airborne precision weapons argued for in the 1990s.
The normal liberal notion of what is acceptable in combat will be challenged.
Is it, for example, morally acceptable to become involved in warfare that is
guaranteed to lead to the loss of civilians, probably in great numbers? Both the
Russians in Grozny (1999/2000) and the Americans in Fallujah managed to
frighten or convince large sections of the civilian population to flee before the
main attack started. It is important for the Americans in particular that there
are not great civilian losses, something that is emphasised in propaganda from
the insurgents and also in the Western media. It is a common understanding
that major losses will also have consequences for support for the war in public
opinion at home. In addition to the likelihood of many non-combatant civil-
ians being killed or wounded, large parts of the infrastructure will be destroyed,
with the social consequences that this would quickly lead to in a city when
electricity, water, the collection of waste and sewers do not work.
It looks like new thinking within urban warfare will be difficult as, today,
there can hardly be said to be any military-strategic thinking on this type of
challenge and even the military theory and the doctrinaire status of this field
are rather rudimentary. Seen in this light, there is a clear need to begin new
265
research and the development of theories in order to meet the future battles that
the control of large cities will require.
Today it is mainly manuals/books written by insurgent movements that deal
with the challenges involved in taking over the control of cities. There are also
a number of books written by counter-insurgents and their critics that deal
with the subject but they usually, with few exceptions, describe wars from the
1950s and 1960s.378 Here, it is necessary to take account of the fact that what
were acceptable combat methods in the 1960s are perhaps not so today. In this
context, something can perhaps be learned from what happened in Fallujah,
particularly as a result of several main leaders now looking like writing about
and publishing what happened. But it looks like it will be another few years
before there will be more ambitious and analytical work available in the form of
articles and books. We saw this in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991. The
best-documented and more analytical books went on sale from 1993 and there
is still new work being published about this war.
Of the newer theories, it is probably the U.S. Marine Corps’ more doctri-
naire work from the late 1990s under General Charles C. Krulak that should be
presented as important contributions. Krulak described his theories as ‘Three
Block Wars’, i.e., the way he saw it was that one had to be prepared to simulta-
neously fight three different kinds of war, all within the space of a few blocks.
Elements of those theories that the American military theorist William S. Lind
and his supporters are now championing may also be of significance.379 Lind’s
term is ‘Fourth-Generation Warfare’, and this thinking has several similarities
to that represented by Krulak. So far, the problem has been that the ‘Three
Block War’ has primarily had a tactical perspective but with certain thoughts
incorporated about which consequences this should have for the operational
art. If this is only to be used as a basis for conducting lengthy campaigns in
urban areas, this thinking/theories will need to be incorporated into an overall
political strategy.
378. Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah; Mouloud Feraoun, Journal 1955–1962: Reflections
on the French-Algerian War (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, Bison Books,
1962/2000); Leroy Thompson, The Counter-Insurgency Manual (London: Greenhill Books,
2002); Jeffrey A. Sluka (ed.), Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror (Philadelphia,
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000); United States Marine Corps, with an introduc-
tion by Ronald Schaffer, Small Wars Manual (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press,
facsimile copy of a declassified version from 1972, original from 1940); Harlan K. Ullman,
Finishing Business: 10 Steps to Defeat Global Terror, Foreword by Newt Gingrich, Afterword
by Wesley Clark (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004).
379. William S. Lind, ‘Modern War Symposium, Part I + II’, Military.com, 3 and 10 August
2005.
266
The important point here is that, even if a functioning combat technique

and tactics that can be used in urban operations are developed, this in itself is
not enough to achieve success at an operational and military strategic level. If
we look at British experiences, it took about 30 years to get to something that
could prove to be a peaceful solution in Northern Ireland. The Russians cap-
tured Grozny at the beginning of 2000, but the conflict is by no means over.
Over the last few years, the Israelis have carried out several militarily effective
operations in Gaza and the West Bank but are no nearer to a solution in the
‘perpetual’ conflict against the Palestinians. Nor do the Americans have any
solution to the complicated Iraqi insurgency in the Sunni-dominated areas of
Iraq.
Without developing overall new strategic thinking where it is assumed that
one will, in the future, face lengthy insurgencies based in urban areas, it is dif-
ficult to see how they will be able to achieve military and political success in this
type of warfare. For her part, Hills asserts that the West is facing here a lengthy
and hardly solvable problem if no attempts are made at developing new think-
ing and practices with regard to urban warfare. She writes:
For just as the Cold War placed security studies at the centre of the intel-
lectual and political challenges confronting the West, so urbanisation may
result in urban operations shaping many of the critical security issues of
the twenty-first century. The West’s ability to address these challenges
effectively will depend to a large extent on the skill with which it under-
stands the phenomenon of military operations within the broader context
of security.380
There is much to suggest that Hills will be right in this respect. If this becomes
the new trend, Western defences will be faced with major challenges in the years
to come. How should conflicts that are based in urban areas be dealt with? The
lessons from places like Mogadishu, Fallujah and Grozny are that it could be
expensive when faced with a militarily inferior, but nevertheless well-motivated,
adversary. If we look at what is being written about in today’s military debate,
there is not much that can be read about the challenges that urban warfare
provides. It appears that officers writing about military matters and researchers
working on military issues have not yet seen a need to update their thinking on
urban warfare. Clearly the huge battles in cities like Stalingrad, Leningrad and
Berlin during the Second World War, and later in Hué in Vietnam, are only of
historical interest. What dominated military debate from the early 1990s up
to the autumn of 2001 was research that was often extremely technologically
focused. The keywords were, as previously mentioned, RMA, Network-Centric
380. Hills, Future War in Cities, p. 260.
267
Warfare (NCW) and most recently, Effects-Based Operations (EBO),381 is now

in the United States about to be changed to Effects-Based Approach (EBA).382
It is typical of this thinking that it often centres around command and con-
trol functions, new missiles and guided weapons systems in general and air
power and modern procurement systems on the intelligence side with a view
to ‘targeting’. Few of these writers have offered many thoughts about ‘the new
Stalingrad’ which could occur in the future – particularly in cities with millions
of inhabitants in the Third World.
It is, therefore, difficult to see that any form of coherent theory exists for
the operational and military strategic level that covers urban warfare in a sat-
isfactory manner. Systematic studies into which military challenges the rapid
growth of cities with millions of inhabitants with all their potential conflicts
could entail are even less the subject of military studies. On the other hand,
several countries have developed new combat techniques and weapons systems
suited to combat in densely populated areas. Studies have also been carried out
into the use of various types of so-called ‘non-lethal weapons’ with a view to
counter-insurgency in built-up areas. Tactical manuals from many countries
about combat in built-up areas are also available. This type of challenge can also
be read about in several military journals that primarily focus on what is hap-
pening at a tactical level. There is a clear need for those who are going to study
developments security-wise and those responsible for operational planning to
deal with these problems.
The development of a theory and doctrines for combating insurgency and
terrorism in urban areas will require fresh research where combat technique and
tactical challenges are not the only things looked at. Urban areas, and cities with
millions of inhabitants in particular, are extremely complicated areas consisting
of a great number of different social, ethnic and religious groups. It is difficult,
even with the skills and insight to gain the necessary perspective, to intervene
in a developing or ongoing conflict. A so-called geopolitical insight will always
be required. It may become necessary to rope in specialists in research areas
that have not traditionally been involved in security policy or defence studies.
The specialities that it could become appropriate to involve are, for example,
anthropology, police skills, disaster management, sociology, geography includ-
ing demography experts, architecture and an insight into how major infrastruc-
ture such as power supplies, the road network and sewage systems are designed.
381. Rekkedal, Central Features of the Debate on RMA and Network-Centric Warfare, see RMA,
pp. 43–54 and NCW, pp. 59–66.
382. EBA: (The philosophy of using an) ‘effects-based approach’, see the recent publication of
the ‘Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations’ (24th
February 2006 by the USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center), are seen as a ‘success’.
268
The military and those responsible for the maintenance of law and order have
many common interests. And there will, therefore, always be a need to combine
military knowledge with what is more police work, if one is to be successful in
a politically acceptable manner in capturing and retaining control of built-up
areas. It was exactly this that the Americans failed at in Iraq in the spring and
summer of 2003 and which made it possible for the initially divided and unco-
ordinated insurgent groups to develop themselves further into what are today
well-working insurgencies.
Those who are to lead and plan operations where it is likely that resistance
groups will develop should always ensure that they have with them, from day
one, the necessary expertise across the entire breadth of specialist areas within
planning work. Quite simply, they must have access to expertise that can ensure
they have sufficient knowledge of the human geography that applies in an actu-
al area. Similarly, they must have an insight into the technical infrastructure of
the place in question. This type of insight is a fundamental precondition for
the planning that must be carried out. It is also important to have studied what
has happened before, during and after there have been similar attack opera-
tions against large cities. Much can also be learned from how urban areas have
been cleared up after natural disasters. It will be absolutely necessary to restore
important elements of the infrastructure destroyed once the city is captured. If
one is not successful in this, as in Iraq, whoever is responsible for the occupa-
tion will probably even lose the initiative to potential insurgents. What we see,
in practice, is a battle for the will of the people. My impression is that, after an
invasion/intervention, it is important to demonstrate an ability to act, particu-
larly during the first 100 days, when the inhabitants of the area captured are
very insecure about the future and are more easily influenced to sympathise
with the peace enforcement forces or the occupying power. It is, in many ways,
probably the case that everything one plans and gets working over the first 100
days will be of more importance with regard to the final result and one’s own
ability to control the area than everything one does later. Planning should take
place with a view to exploiting the chaos that war will nevertheless lead to one’s
own advantage.
It is almost obvious that there must, in this respect, be interdisciplinary co-
operation between the military forces and the different civilian support func-
tions mentioned above. It will normally be the case that the military has lead
responsibility but the civilian functions that traditionally lead and control what
happens in a city should, as quickly as possible, resume their traditional duties.
Only the functions or groups that cannot be expected to cooperate are to be
removed or at least be prevented from having any future influence in the con-
flict area in question. If one takes over a city, one also takes over responsibility
for its inhabitants.
269
8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, it is the challenges in terms of security from insurgency and
widespread terrorism in urban areas that are presented. Emphasis has been
placed on the challenges that Western forces may encounter if they take part in
combat in urbanised areas in the Second and Third Worlds.
If Western forces are to intervene in an internal conflict, this will normally
happen after at least one of the parties has asked for outside help. Western forces
have previously been involved in operations in other parts of the world in roles
such as peacekeeping forces, peace enforcement forces or as occupying powers.
Involvement outside of the U.S./Europe requires a good cultural understanding
and thorough knowledge of the areas one is deployed in. Another important
point is that it will not be the Western civilian population that will suffer dur-
ing this type of warfare, but the population in the country/area in question in
which the Western forces are deployed.
No two conflicts are the same – particularly those that take place in urban
areas. It is important to clarify the conditions before deploying forces. Elements
that usually recur when one attempts to obtain an overview of the situation
could be:
• Is the conflict due to a fight between local resistance forces and an interven-
tion force?
• Is the conflict an insurgency directed at an adversary who is seen as a con-
queror/occupant by the local population, as in Grozny in the 1990s and in
Baghdad in 2003?
• It is always important to clarify what the starting point of the conflict is. Is
it primarily a confrontation between ethnic or religious groups? What other
local conditions of a social, economic or power political nature are to be
taken into consideration?
• Is it the guerrilla forces/the insurgents that are themselves on the offensive?
Do the insurgents want to gain control locally or does the insurgent move-
ment have ambitions of taking over power in the country from the ruling
regime?
• Is the conflict about counter-insurgency in cities performed by the states
ordinary forces, where an insurgent regime has already taken over power?
Is anything less than the total defeat of the insurgency an option for the
government authorities?
When planning a military attack, one makes tactical and military strategic
preparations at the same time. An important assumption is that the Western
270
military forces will come in as a foreign element in another country. Normally,

interventions like this happen after, for example, the UN, NATO, the EU or
another form of political coalition has given its approval. A common objective
has been to prevent a state collapsing due to a civil war situation and wide-
spread guerrilla activity. The intervention may come following a formal invita-
tion from a ruling regime or it may be the result of a so-called ‘humanitarian
invention’, of which we have seen many over the last 15 years. The assumption
may also be that a superpower simply cannot go in and topple a regime that
it deems unacceptable without the strong support of the UN or international
public opinion. This was the situation for the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq in the
spring of 2003. Both American and Russian forces have carried out the success-
ful capture of cities over the last few years, but have then encountered major
problems with insurgents in the cities captured.
There are also normally great differences with regard to how the conflicts
in question develop. The battles in Iraq have primarily been centred on cities/
built-up areas because the insurgents actually do not have any other alternative
than to use this type of area. In central Iraq, for example, there are no mountain
or jungle areas for the insurgents to conceal themselves in. The cities thereby
become both their camouflage and base areas.
If we try to look ahead, there is much to suggest that Western forces will
become involved in conflicts based on insurgencies in urban areas in the Second
or Third World. As a result of this, one should also prepare so as to be able to
take part in this type of conflict. Participation such as this will take the form of
multidimensional operations directed at adversaries who will exploit compli-
cated urban structures to their own advantage. If we are talking about interven-
tions in the Third World, the city will be a rather complicated and not very clear
area in which to operate. Large parts of such cities consist of makeshift small
houses or shanty huts, often without any organised access to water, electricity
and sewers. There are hardly any up-to-date maps. It is necessary to get by with
local, often makeshift, solutions.
Given the often liberal attitudes that prevail in most Western countries, it is
not very likely that they will make use of extensive air bombing or other forms
of maximum violence directed at the civilian population living in an area – and
which will indirectly often act as a shield for the insurgents. As it is unaccept-
able to use the solutions we find in the Old Testament, the military will have
to accept to operate in accordance with strict RoE. They will often be given
clear restrictions on the use of weapons – for example, that they cannot use
their own weapons systems unless fired on. The military strategy that will then
have to be used will probably have to be based on strategic reserve, combined
with quick tactical operations when necessary. This is a difficult requirement
to relate to when one can, and probably will be, constantly subjected to attacks
271
from various resistance groups. Both a cool head and good discipline will then
be required to avoid too much undesirable use of violence against the differ-
ent insurgent groups in the population who will be part of the diversity of the
city.
If the map is not in accordance with the terrain, it is obviously the map that
must be changed. Over the last fifteen years, Western military doctrines have
gone through several major rewrites. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Western forces have had to continually act as a ‘global police force’ and so-
called humanitarian intervention is no longer reserved for the UN. The greatest
‘changes to the map’ came after the acts of terrorism of September 11, 2001,
but, four years on, we see again the clear need for a new military doctrine. Over
the course of these four years, we have seen that technological superiority is not
enough if one is to combat terrorist organisations or so-called ‘rogue states’.
Ground forces are necessary if one is to be able to control the population and
it is in the cities that one finds the highest concentration of inhabitants. Urban
warfare is a difficult and risky form of warfare but, if it is desired to control the
population of a country, there is often no way out of it. The battles for Fallujah
in November 2004 show that the American military leadership has realised this.
Seen in this light, Fallujah can be regarded as a clear ‘redrawing of the map’ for
the military doctrine of the future.
As previously demonstrated, research into urban operations has as yet been
barely systematised. As I see it, it is not enough to content oneself with develop-
ing combat drills and combat tactics for small units. If one were to be forced
to take part in connection with future attempts at suppressing insurgencies or
widespread terrorist activity in a city, this would require both planning and the
carrying out of large-scale urban operations.
We often see in military literature that a 3:1 advantage in military forces is
preferred when carrying out offensive operations. As regards combat in built-
up areas, a 6:1 advantage is often recommended. One important reason for
this is that more soldiers will be required to carry out lengthy operations in
urban areas than in open country. There are at least two factors to be taken
into account here. The first is that the urban environment is full of possibilities
for those defending – there are countless potential hiding places that must be
checked and possibly cleared of adversaries. The other factor is that this type
of combat is extremely physically demanding. It is necessary to run at a great
speed, climb walls, clear room after room, rush up floor after floor in high-rise
buildings, balance on roofs, etc. There is also a great need for ammunition and
hand grenades – equipment that the soldiers must carry with them the whole
time.
Since forces from even small Western countries are continually involved
in operations in the Third World, it is necessary to be prepared to be able to
272
also operate effectively in the type of environment that a city of several million
people or similar but smaller urban centres represent. This will require slightly
different skills, competences and prioritisation than the armed forces required
during the Cold War. In particular, urban operations will probably mean fresh
challenges at operational and military strategic levels as these will be conflicts
of a different nature to those we have prepared for here in Europe in the period
from about 1949 to 1991. It is likely that we have no choice other than to pre-
pare and implement the development of military forces with a view to meeting
the challenges presented here.
273
9. Counter-Insurgency
The myth of Sisyphus is a recurrent nightmare for the counter-insurgent.
– David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 1964
9.1 Introduction
An overview of various ‘classic’ and more recent specialist literature concerning
insurgency and counter-insurgency is necessary if we are to study this specialist
area. Despite the fact that the U.S. is probably the nation in the world that has
most experience of counter-insurgency in modern times, reports from Iraq sug-
gest that they perhaps still have a lot to learn.383 This has unfortunately been
fully demonstrated in the aftermath of the war in Iraq in the spring of 2003.
It has proved difficult in practice for the American forces, with support from
smaller allied contingents, to ‘eliminate’ the many, only partly organised insur-
gent groups in the country. This has gone on at the same time as attempting to
build up confidence among the relatively fragmented Iraqi population and at
a time when the Americans also had a clear desire to play down their role as an
occupying power. Although the new Iraqi Government is now attempting to
build up its own forces, it has taken time to establish new local and competent
security forces. (At the end of the book, there is a short overview of this type of
specialist literature.)
383. When it comes to the amount of experience from different insurgencies, the U.S. is probably
superior. On the other hand, several countries have fought against ‘their’ insurgent move-
ments for a great number of years, e.g., Colombia, Burma and Israel.
275
The French counter-insurgency expert and military theorist David Galula

wrote, 40 years ago, something that is still topical today. This is how it sounds
in an American translation:
Since antagonizing the population will not help, it is imperative that
hardships for it and rash actions on the part of the forces be kept to a
minimum. The units participating in the operations should be thoroughly
indoctrinated to that effect, with misdeeds punished severely and even
publicly if this can serve to impress the population. Any damage done
should be immediately compensated without red tape.384
And without getting the majority of the population behind you, there is
hardly any hope of a victory for more moderate forces. Galula also made anoth-
er important observation – ordinary people by and large want to live in peace
and this means that if one must (or is forced to) take sides in a conflict, one will
support the side one assumes will be the winner! He worded his observation in
the following manner: those fighting the insurgency will not be able to achieve
broad popular support until the majority of people are convinced that those
fighting the insurgency have the will, the resources and the ability to win. This
is a natural way of thinking, given the risk a person opting for the wrong side
is taking. It could quite simply cost him his life. Ordinary propaganda is not
enough to get a careful person to take sides against the insurgents.385 On the
basis of his own experiences in the period from 1956–1958 during the Algerian
War,386 he stated that, without popular support, a peaceful solution based on a
non-radical social order would be difficult to achieve.
In many ways, Galula was describing a clearly perpetual feature of insurgency
when he stated that disorder is cheap to create and very costly to prevent.387
384. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger Publishers, second printing, 1965), pp. 108–109.
385. Thomas E. Ricks, ‘Excerpt: A 1964 Classic’s Lessons for Iraq in 2005’, The Washington Post,
17 July 2005, p. BW08.
386. David Galula was a lieutenant colonel in the French Armed Forces (died 1967). In his
book, he has created a synthesis of his experiences as a soldier in places like China (where
he was taken prisoner by Maoist guerrillas), Algeria and Indochina in such a way that his
work stands as an overall theory with regard to so-called ‘counter-insurgency’. The actual
core of his theory is his description of how an area/country can be divided up into smaller
controllable parts and then military forces can be used to defeat the insurgents there. But
an important point was that, at the same time as carrying out the military operations, it
was necessary to use political measures aimed at the civilian community and to reinforce
the civilian structures. Once the insurgents were defeated or had fled from the area now
controlled by the military forces, it was the new civilian administration’s most important
task to ensure that the insurgency did not re-emerge. Once stability was achieved in the
‘liberated’ area, the military and civilian structures could be moved to the next area. The
same operational pattern would then be carried out here.
387. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, pp. 74–81.
276
Counter-Insurgency
A relatively simple theoretical construct underlies the theory and practice of

counter-insurgency warfare. It is the essence of what today’s theorists and strate-
gists term asymmetric warfare: although an asymmetric distribution of resources
and abilities actually favours counter-insurgent forces, they are often inappro-
priately wielded. The conflict is asymmetric because there is a ‘disproportion
of strength between the opponents at the outset, and from the difference in
essence between their assets and liabilities’.388
At the conceptual level, ‘the insurgent has a formidable asset – the ideologi-
cal power of a cause on which to base his actions. The counter-insurgent has a
heavy liability – he is responsible for maintaining order throughout the coun-
try’, without undermining the ideals on which the new government is making
its pleas for support.389
An interpretation of David Galula’s view of differences between insurgents

and counter-insurgents, based on his Chapters 5 and 6 390
Component Insurgent Counter-insurgent
Resource asymmetry Limited resources/power Preponderance of resourc-

es/power
Objective = population Solicit government oppres- Show that insurgency is

sion destabilising
Political nature of war Wage war for minds of the Wage war for minds of the
population population, and to keep
legitimacy
Gradual transition to war Use time to develop cause Always in reactive mode
Protracted nature of war Disperse; use limited vio- Maintain vigilance; sustain
lence widely will
Cost High return for investment Sustained operations carry

high political/economic
burden
Role of ideology Sole asset at beginning is Defeat root of cause or idea

cause or idea
388. Galula, ibid., p. 6.

389. Ibid., p. 7.
390. Ibid, Chapter 5, pp. 70–86, and Chapter 6, pp. 87–106. The concept for this table, see
Robert R. Tomes, ‘Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare’, Parameters, Spring 2004,
<http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04spring/tomes.htm>.
277
The figure above shows the differences that David Galula saw between insur-
gents and counter-insurgents. Exploring the practical implications of those
dyadic relationships is the underlying theme of Galula’s military writings,
which reinforce the image of counter-insurgency as a ‘special’ war:
Revolutionary war, (…), represents an exceptional case not only because,
as we suspect, it has its special rules, different from those of the conven-
tional war, but also because most of the rules applicable to one side do
not work for the other. In a fight between a fly and a lion, the fly cannot
deliver a knockout blow and the lion cannot fly. It is the same war for
both camps in terms of space and time, yet there are two distinct war-
fare’s – the revolutionary’s and, shall we say, the counterrevolutionary’s.
This is where Mao Tse-tung is misleading. What he calls ‘the laws of
revolutionary war’ are in fact those of the revolutionary side, his side.
The one who directs a war against a revolutionary movement will not
find in Mao (…) the answers to his problems.391
According to Galula, a confluence of military and non-military operations
defeats the insurgents. This requires a functioning organisation invested with
the power to coordinate political, social, economic, and military elements. For
Galula, counter-insurgency efforts require unified command – a single source
of direction. This means a ‘tight’ organisation is needed: ‘A single boss must
direct the operation from the beginning to the end.’392 The military, moreover,
cannot be allowed a free hand in the overall direction of the war. At the opera-
tional level, ‘it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians’.393 That means that,
‘Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its
primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work
safely with the population’.394
When a large element of the population in a country feels insecure, this
normally affects developments and especially the initiative in the warfare: the
initiative is gained by the insurgents. An important dilemma that the Western
states will probably always face is the political desire to secure the various forms
of freedom for the majority of people, at the same time as having to fight the
actual insurgents who threaten the inner stability of society. Here, historical
examples may be useful as it is possible to demonstrate certain recurring pat-
terns from the many wars since 1945. A number of military and political meas-
ures do not appear to have worked as hoped – they should probably be avoided.
It is, however, always an assumption that those who make use of this type of
391. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, see his “Introduction”, p. xi.

392. Ibid., p. 87.
393. Ibid., p. 88.
394. Ibid., p. 89.
278
Counter-Insurgency
historical lesson have the self-insight not to try to directly copy something that
may have been successful in an earlier war without always taking the necessary
account of local realities. As previously indicated, no two wars are the same in
practice, and they are always coloured by local political, social, economic and
other topical factors.
The war against the regime in Iraq in the spring of 2003 with the subse-
quent ‘continuation war’ that was still going on when this book was written,
will be used as an example here.
Baghdad fell, after only token resistance, on 9 April 2003. The Sunnis
in particular felt that the army had betrayed them and they felt humiliated.
Almost overnight, the world, as they knew it, had been turned upside down.
Despite this, it would be almost a year before resistance to the American
occupation would result in a more organised openly armed insurgency.395
However, even as early as in the summer of 2003, the American coalition had
seen a number of terrorist attacks directed at the coalition forces. In retrospect,
one can obviously ask oneself whether the ongoing insurgency would have
broken out if the Americans has prioritised at an early stage a free election,
had not immediately disbanded the Iraqi military forces and had prioritised
the rapid restoration of water and electricity supplies during this first year.
The Americans also had an insufficient number of troops to exercise control
over large parts of Iraq – the area north and west of Baghdad in particular.
As regards the resolution of conflicts, there are often four important matters
that determine the long-term outcome:
1. The nature of the victory (This is where the extent, type and whether it was
a total victory and similar factors count);
2. The character of the winner (How does the winner communicate with the
loser? How do they behave and what is their attitude towards the losers?
The ability to take action in the local community to look after security in
general, being respected as ‘hard but fair’, etc.);
3. The nature of the defeat (loss of core military capacities, no possibility of
continuing the war, etc.);
4. The character of the losing side (Did they really lose [in their own eyes]? Do
they see themselves as losers? Do they accept a defeat and get on with things
– or do they want revenge?).
395. In April 2004, battles broke out between American forces and the Shi’ite Muslim Mahdi
militia. At almost the same time, forces from the U.S. Marines carried out an abortive opera-
tion to take control over the Sunni Muslim city of Fallujah (see the discussion in Chapter
9).
279
Although insurgent groups began the ‘continuation war’ in Iraq in the sum-
mer of 2003, this is by no means a unique war. As previously demonstrated,
there have been more than 80 major wars since 1945 and the majority of these
have been of the nature of guerrilla wars. For the same reason, for those who
would like to study how these earlier wars were conducted, there is extensive
literature. The quality obviously varies, but there is always something to be
learned by studying earlier conflicts. Some examples of what is often discussed
in literature with regard to insurgency and counter-insurgency are:
1. What is the use of routine patrols? Adherents often emphasise that there are
many areas where patrolling is effective, particularly as a ‘confidence build-
ing measure’ and also in connection with the intelligence gathering. But the
picture is not so entirely positive if we study a great number of conflicts.
We have often seen that the soldiers are almost ‘going on a trip’ and they are
given no clear mission that forms part of any executive strategy for the war-
fare. Although it has been stated that this is a way in which to demonstrate
one’s presence (‘showing the flag’), the impact of patrols like this have been
debated. If this is to function as intended, it is necessary to operate accord-
ing to a clearly formulated mission and for activities to be effectively led and
controlled by the local military leadership.
2. ‘Clean-up operations’ and similar activities carried out on a large scale, what
the Americans in Vietnam called large-scale sweeps, have seldom led to last-
ing progress for the security forces. (See point 9.6.) It is obvious that one
should attack the insurgents when things look promising, but normally this
type of raid only leads to a few of the adversary’s soldiers being taken out.
Experience points instead to more cost-effectively capturing base areas – and
then ‘permanently’ controlling this area. The adversary cannot then come
back in a week or two and use the area again as if nothing had happened.
The French and, later, the Americans also used great resources on this type
of operation directed at the opponent’s units and they often managed to
temporarily capture their base areas but got little reward for their efforts.
3. Isolated outposts in many small garrisons just sitting and waiting for the
insurgents to ‘come back and get them’ have a very disruptive effect on soldier
morale and are tactically unwise. If an outpost is to work, it must be used in
connection with the safeguarding of communication lines and it must be easy
to reinforce the outpost if there is a threat of attack. Here, it is also important
what forces are used to man the posts. If they are manned by locally recruited
forces, this affects the situation. If the insurgents are provoked to use their
resources to fight their own countrymen, the war will take on a different char-
acter than if the insurgents are fighting against a foreign occupying force.
280
Counter-Insurgency
4. Nor should any of the activities mentioned be used to establish so-called

‘front lines’ – the traditional type of front line actually does not exist in this
form of warfare. On the other hand, the active use of sentry guards a few
times can provide a positive result, as this may contribute to denying the
insurgents the opportunity of using certain areas and routes for an advance.
In so doing, they can be channelled through the areas that the government
forces want them to use, where, for example, the Special Forces are active.
If a threatened regime is, possibly with support from the West, to have
any hope of winning against a well-organised insurgent movement, it must
be equally well organised and have the political will to keep going for a long
time. Without such a will, it is likely that the ruling regime (or more tangibly:
the regimes that have now been established in both Afghanistan and Iraq) will
ultimately fall.396
At the beginning of a conflict it is vital that both the top political and mili-
tary leaders work out what type of warfare they will face and do not decide to
believe that they will encounter any other type of warfare than that most likely.
Another unfortunate tendency has been to try to assert that the insurgency
will soon be overcome, i.e., trying to turn the conflict into something that it is
not: a confrontation over control of a country or, at the very least, a contested
area. This is the most important strategic task that the political and military
leadership should be faced with, and also the most demanding.397 This point
obviously applies with regard to the waging of all forms of war, but, as the
United States and a few other states have normally preferred to wage conven-
tional war, they will probably also continue to try to do so in the time to come.
Another unfortunate trend is that they will attempt, as far as possible, to ‘force’
the enemy into their own preferred form of war, instead of accepting that the
enemy has probably never intended taking them on with conventional forces.
9.2 Insurgent warfare is common

Different forms of insurgent warfare have been more common in the history of
warfare than warfare between nations/nation states, i.e., conventional warfare
396. With reference to Martin van Creveld, if one is to win against a low technology adversary
who fights on other terms, one must, according to the same author, organise oneself in
accordance with this, and fight on the same terms. See van Creveld, The Transformation of
War.
397. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(London: David Campbell Publishers Ltd, Everyman’s Library, 1993). See the Third book
‘On Strategy in General’, pp. 207–214.
281
where government-financed armies fight battles with each other on the bat-
tlefield.
Another interesting feature is that, at least in the European form of warfare,
those who took to arms against the machinery of power were seen as bandits or
criminal gangs, right up until the Second World War. We saw a change in atti-
tudes during the course of the Second World War when resistance movements
against the German occupation became an accepted activity. It is probably a
combination of the development of modern nationalism, and governments
eventually accepting that individual rights and liabilities existed, that made it
possible to accept the use of violent means against the state. In practice, insur-
gent groups were not seen as ‘genuine’ warring participants in irregular warfare
until after 1945 and gradually obtained their status in international law.398
As previously suggested, a feature of all successful guerrilla warfare is that an
attempt is made to avoid direct and decisive clashes with the state’s main forces
while concentrating on attacking, and possibly overcoming, the enemy’s out-
posts, smaller garrisons and logistics systems – often at unexpected places and
times. This principle has often been called ‘asymmetric’ in modern literature
but this manner of thinking and fighting is at least as old as irregular opera-
tions/guerrilla operations as a form of combat.
9.2.1 Two wars – different results

As previously demonstrated, two modern attempts in particular at combating
well-organised insurgent forces have often been dealt with in literature. These are
the protracted British war against primarily Chinese insurgents in Malaysia in the
period from 1946 to 1961 and, before that, France’s colonial war in Indochina in
the period from 1946 to 1954, then the U.S.’ ‘continuation war’ on the side of
South Vietnam from about 1958 to 1973. In Malaysia, as previously mentioned,
the British were successful in adapting to local conditions and the British forces
also overcame the Communist rural district-based guerrilla movement here.399
Things were not, however, to go as well in Vietnam where, first, France and,
later, the U.S. were to prove to be less successful in their attempts at learning how
to emerge victorious from a lengthy ‘counter-insurgency’.400
398. What is probably, in many ways, the best overall historical portrayal of irregular warfare is
Asprey, War in the Shadows.
399. Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948–60 (London: Frederick Mullen
Ltd., 1975). This book provides a good historical account of the war.
400. Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History 1946–1975 (Novato, CA: Presido Press,
1988). The book provides a study of the 30-year long period of war in Vietnam.
282
Counter-Insurgency
As regards Vietnam, it proved to be impossible to win against the highly

motivated Communist leadership with its centre in North Vietnam. The regime
here accepted, for instance, great losses, something that proved difficult for the
Americans in the long run. But factors other than motivation and an effective
political line were of importance for the outcome. The U.S. Army in particular
showed itself barely willing to adapt to local conditions during the Vietnam
War, and to learn how a Communist-led insurgency should be combated. It was
also important for the outcome in Vietnam that North Vietnam could act as a
safe base area for the war in South Vietnam and that they could use eastern parts
of Laos and Cambodia to get supplies through and soldiers to the battle areas in
the south (see the map of the so-called ‘Ho Chi Minh Trail’, p. 62).
On their part, the Americans chose, during the first years (the period from
1958 to about 1968) to see the war as primarily a conventional war as during the
Korean War. From 1968, the war changed character by way of North Vietnam
itself, in practice, taking over the active waging of war with its more conven-
tionally arranged main forces. From that point on, the South Vietnamese free-
dom movement the NLF took on a more marginal role. As previously indi-
cated, the Communist military defeat in 1968 should theoretically have been
a clear advantage for the U.S. and their South Vietnamese allies but, by then
it was, however, too late – American public opinion and the political elite at
home had tired of the war, and the international mood had turned against the
United States.
British warfare in Malaysia was also, as previously demonstrated, charac-
terised by different traditions from American warfare. The British Army had
a long tradition and experience as a ‘colonial police force’ and the existing
organisational culture, and even British historical tradition and the mentality
it had created, proved better able to tackle and translate the experiences gained
into a functioning programme for counter-insurgency with regard to what, in
Great Britain, was called the ‘Malayan Emergency’.401 The long British tradi-
tion of closely linking military operations to the overriding political objectives
was of much importance for the end result here. Another important reason
was that the Communist insurgents were mostly recruited from the Chinese
minority, and thus easily isolated from the Malay population. As an old colo-
nial power, the British had a tradition of using local forces (here mostly ethnic
Malayan) and acquainting themselves with local traditions. The Americans
often have more limited objectives, such as, for example, base rights and letting
401. Two interesting comparative studies of the wars in Malaya and Vietnam are: Sarkesian,
Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era; Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya
and Vietnam.
283
local authorities govern as they please, as long as they do not interfere with the
American military forces.
Of what relevance are these wars to developments today? Undeniably, the
world has, of course, changed greatly since the 1960s. Here, one would have to
say that many of the fundamental features of this form of warfare, in the Third
World in particular, have obvious features in common with the conflicts we also
see today. A more active military undertaking directed at the Third World also
requires a totally different understanding of other forms of warfare than the
military operations the Soviet Union and NATO’s conventional forces would
have conducted if war had broken out in our own region during the Cold War.
For the same reason, this requires other insights and knowledge on the part of
both officers and soldiers than was the case only 15 years ago.
9.3 ‘Modern warfare’ – differences and similarities between the

various forms
As Carl von Clausewitz indicated in his book, On War, it is important to under-
stand what kind of war one is getting involved in.402 Even if the so-called
nature of a war can be seen as a constant, the methods and techniques involved
in war will be subject to continuous change in order to meet the strategic con-
text in which the war is fought and, especially, to be able to meet the opera-
tional challenges one faces. After the Second World War, the United States in
particular, and also the Soviet Union up until the 1990s were each in their own
way responsible for the unusually rapid development of warfare methods and
technology. In particular, the U.S.’s enormous technological advances in the
period since 1991 have, however, forced enemies of the U.S. (and enemies of
the West in general) to seek alternative methods with which to wage war. As
previously discussed, the concept of asymmetry comes into the picture here
through asymmetric methods and measures being developed in order to take
on a basically superior opponent in combat.
Some of the new adversaries are actually almost ‘perfectly asymmetrical’.
What are called ‘non-state actors’ in American terminology will, in practice,
never take the form of a mirror image of the nation state model we ourselves
often perpetuate as normal. These groups are instead asymmetric both when
it comes to action and motivation, i.e., they do not regard what we perpetuate
as normal and good – on the contrary. What we fear, these groups do not fear
and, while our control structures are hierarchical, these groups operate more as
402. Clausewitz, On War. See, for instance, Book One, Chapter One, points 23 to 28, pp 98–
101. Clausewitz discusses ‘On the Nature of War’ in Book One, Chapter 9.
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networks without fixed lines of command.403 While we in the West are continu-
ally developing RoE in order to be able to better control tactical destruction and
reduce as far as possible so-called ‘tactical collateral damage’, the participants in
such groups feel that they are entitled to make use of any suitable measure in
order to be able to achieve their strategic objectives. The best organised of these
groups have also shown themselves to be both extremely adaptable to counter-
measures and able to maintain their motivation when pursuing an ideological
assumption. At the same time, they rarely take the form of sitting duck targets
as they are not normally dependent on large infrastructures or permanent insti-
tutions in the same manner as a state regime normally always is. It is appropri-
ate here to point out that, if we study the existing spectrum of insurgent groups
we find in the world today, it is perhaps only al-Qaeda and ‘al-Qaeda franchises’
that match the description above. The majority of insurgent groups that are
attached to only one place and who fight among their own people are a good
deal more traditional with regard to how they fight. This also applies, to a great
extent, to the ‘new’ Islamic insurgent movements in the Middle East.
In order to understand such warfare, one must study the broad context that
forms the basis of the conflict in question: the contest between the fundamen-
tal concepts of those involved with regard to how society should look. There
are, however, several ways of doing this. The most important point here is that
counter-insurgency cannot normally be easily categorised into clearly distinct
levels of conflict. An armed attack enacted at the lowest tactical level has, time
after time, shown itself able to have major operational and even strategic conse-
quences. It is perhaps the case that each military patrol that is dispatched during
certain phases of modern conflicts is planned and controlled at an operational
level because it is of great importance how even each individual soldier behaves
and carries out his mission. The soldier’s actions, no matter how insignificant
they may appear to be, seen at a tactical level, could be blown out of propor-
tion by the media. Something that could objectively be seen as a less important
event could become ‘major news’ on the international TV networks if it were
otherwise a quiet day for news. A minor incident could, in the course of a short
time, be blown out of all proportion and seem an important international mat-
ter, even if this is scarcely merited seen in a more objective light.
The media uses whatever material it has available. When a Serb mortar shell
struck an outdoor restaurant in Tuzla in May 1995, killing 68 young people,
this did not become a ‘big story’ in the media. When a similar shell struck a
market place in Sarajevo three months later, killing 28 people, this received a
403. Barnett, Asymmetrical Warfare, pp. 1–24. This book provides a good introduction to the
various American assessments with regard to modern insurgency.
285
lot of attention and triggered NATO’s air war against Serb forces.404 The dif-
ference is partly that the international press corps was stationed in Sarajevo
and was not present in Tuzla. The aim of this example is to demonstrate that
the imperfection of the media can go in both directions. It is correct that indi-
vidual events may be blown up out of all proportion by the media. But it is just
as important to note that other events are not blown up, simply because the
media are not present.
In conventional warfare, it has normally been the case that officers have
expected that, when the broad political guidelines have been put in place, it
will be up to the military chiefs to determine how to achieve tactical success.
Today, this is not necessarily the case any longer and is definitely not the case
with regard to counter-insurgency. It is easy to see that this could have major
consequences for both the actual waging of the war, and for the political leaders
who stick their noses into the tactical waging of the war. Military chiefs obvi-
ously also retain their traditional roles as advisers to political leaders regarding
counter-insurgency but it is rare – at least in the West today – for military chiefs
to have full tactical freedom over military measures that would be seen as inter-
nal military matters in conventional warfare. There are certainly many reasons
for this, but one important reason is the relationship between ‘success’ and what
is often the centre of gravity in connection with so-called counter-insurgency
operations. The term success will be defined here on the basis of the political
objective that it is desired to achieve at the end of the campaign.
As an insurgency can principally be seen as a political struggle, it has, since
the Second World War, proved necessary, time after time, to set a lower target
for this form of warfare than the concept of ‘total victory’ represents in a more
military context. This does not mean that tactical defeat is acceptable, but this
signals to the military (and other security forces) that there will be clear restric-
tions associated with the actual warfare and may also be a signal that the goal
is quite simply not a clear military victory as this is not part of the political
goals set for the campaign. It may be the case that the intention is to put so
much pressure on the insurgents that they will negotiate a political solution and
give up their hope of a final military/political victory. An important difference
between counter-insurgency and the situation where two state armies come
together in a major battle is that, in counter-insurgency, there is almost always
a civilian population to take into consideration. If we look at the restrictions
404. It is important to note that the attack on the market place was the reason that triggered
the air war. The actual basis for NATO’s involvement had, by this time, been building up
over several years. The massacre of Muslims in Srebrenica at the beginning of July 1995 in
particular was a decisive event.
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Counter-Insurgency
that armed forces have imposed on them during counter-insurgency, these are
almost always there to prevent an unnecessary loss of civilian lives. It is difficult
to find examples where government forces have restrictions imposed on them
by politicians against killing insurgents (apart from during periods of peace
negotiations). Restrictions on warfare with the intention of sparing the civilian
population cannot be seen as something negative, either from a humane point
of view or in a counter-insurgency context.
In other words, regarding counter-insurgency, the word success normally
means much the same as having enough military and political success that one
can allow the civilian police to continue to attend to internal security in the
future. Or in many cases perhaps the best one can hope for is not to lose the
war?
As an example, one course of military action could be the political leaders
opting to buy themselves time while attempting to deal with the circumstances
that have contributed to the insurgency breaking out in the first place. This
is not necessarily the same thing as being forced to make concessions to the
insurgents and, in order to avoid giving this impression, it may appear counter-
productive if the military push hard to achieve clear tactical military victories.
El Salvador is a good example of a successful counter-insurgency, although
with an initially ‘hopeless’ political, social and military situation for the ruling
regime. It is also very often impossible to say how long the military forces will
be involved in the actual confrontation.
Counter-insurgency is normally a lengthy battle and it is probably always
almost impossible to say how long a conflict will last. It is also almost impos-
sible to create one campaign plan where one plans for a quick, decisive victory
in the style taught at military colleges. As a successful counter-insurgency will
probably take years, experiences from most such conflicts show that the actual
warfare will change greatly over a period of time. A tangible sign as to how
effective an armed force is, is its ability to change tactics and combat techniques
and the time it takes for a change like this to be made. My impression is that
American forces in Iraq have an open dialogue up and down the chain of com-
mand, which ensures that it will normally not take more than a few days/weeks
for tactical adjustments to be made when the soldiers have noted that some-
thing does not work.
This leads to the military mission having to be correspondingly changed in
order to satisfy the political ambitions that one must also expect to be altered
over this period. It is consequently of the greatest importance that politicians
and military chiefs attempt to identify which phase they are in at any time with
regard to the ongoing insurgency and that they are able to adjust both political
assumptions and military efforts in order to counter the insurgents’ adjustments
to their own strategic and tactical plans and measures. These problems are, seen
287
through American eyes, commented on as follows by Steven Metz and Raymond

Millen:
The United States must make clear whether its approach to counterin-
surgency is a strategy of victory or a strategy of containment, tailoring
the response and methods to the threat. A strategy of victory which
seeks a definitive end makes sense when facing a national insurgency in
which the partner government has some basis of legitimacy and popular
support. In liberation insurgencies, though, a strategy of victory is a very
long shot; hence a strategy of containment is the more logical one.405
A central point that Metz and Millen make is that, as the insurgents will
always attempt to avoid becoming involved in so-called decisive battles at a time
that does not suit them, they will, instead, attempt to develop operational meth-
ods where political and psychological factors are given a central place in further
warfare – something that clearly differs from thinking with regard to ordinary
conventional warfare. Their recommendation is that the Americans should now
try to move in the direction of an ‘effects-based approach designed to fracture,
de-legitimize, de-link, demoralize, and de-source insurgents’.406 What the
authors are trying to ‘sell’ here is a new and more holistic way of thinking, where
one consciously puts together several specialist groups, e.g., regional special-
ists, intelligence people, police, officers with operational experience, so that they
are able overall to perform the complicated evaluations and plans that will be
required if one is to achieve political and military success in a given area. On the
part of the Americans this process is underway. Depending on who becomes the
‘owner of the problem’, the American Armed Forces as a whole, the Pentagon,
the State Department, etc., the ‘problem owner’ will establish a so-called task
force in order to co-ordinate activities between all those who will participate, put
together with a view to meeting the needs of the individual case. How successful
this turns out to be obviously remains to be seen.
An insurgency normally goes through several stages, particularly as a result
of the political and military countermeasures that the ruling regime and, possi-
bly, its allies implement. Successful insurgent movements have all demonstrated
a great ability to vary their efforts over a period of time and have also been
able to adapt to the terrain in which they operate. Similarly, the military must
be able to deal with these developments and attend to and adjust the military
405. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century:
Reconceptualizing Threat and Response’ (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute (SSI) Monograph, November 2004), p. vii, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/
ssi/>.
406. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, ibid., p. vii.
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Counter-Insurgency
role they play in counter-insurgency. Three factors are normally considered

important:
• It is important to continually analyse one’s own fatality figures and the

results of one’s own activity. This will later form the basis for tactical adjust-
ments.
• A feedback system must be established that captures experiences all the way
down to ‘grass roots level’ in the military organisation and ensures that there
is constant dialogue with them.
• It is the low-level users who know best what is not working in the field.
The military chiefs must be able to choose adapted military measures over a
period of time and must accept that they will never gain full control of a heav-
ily guerrilla infested area. Seen in this light, perhaps the taking and holding of
terrain or towns means less in connection with counter-insurgency than it does
in connection with conventional warfare. Historical experience shows, on the
other hand, that the supply lines have been a serious bottleneck for many insur-
gent movements. Food, weapons and the evacuation of the wounded are often
a main concern for the leader of an insurgency and much of the insurgents’
resources are used up safeguarding supply lines. Seen in this light, denying the
insurgent movement access to large towns, villages, the road network, border
areas, etc., will be an important element for those fighting an insurgency. But
this is also a resource-demanding task for the armed forces. This has proved to
be an important point. It will normally be critical for later developments if one
can isolate the adversary from his supply lines. This will force him into active
measures to break this impasse, something that can later be exploited using flex-
ible rapid-reaction forces.
Often, there will be a strategic centre of gravity (CoG) with regard to an
insurgency: who has clear popular support? Maybe the real strategic CoG for
the insurgents is the actual government’s legitimacy? Popular support is one
of the elements of the so-called ‘supporters/backers’, and an important one.
It is through weakening the popular support for the government that insur-
gents can indirectly attack the enemy’s CoG. For the government, the enemy’s
strategic CoG is the insurgency’s top leadership plus their ‘ideology’ (normally
built on a political or religious foundation). The insurgents’ supporters/backers
are normally various domestic and/or international so-called ‘front organisa-
tions’, such as urban cells and rural organisations, and must include sources of
financial funds, i.e., money laundering, bank robberies, drugs trafficking, the
diamond trade, etc. Such a centre of gravity is actually very difficult to attack
directly by conventional military means, even if insurgent movements normally
289
use force to control the population. An insurgency can be seen as an attempt to

force political changes and, as a logical result of this, one must try to influence
ordinary people so that one can influence the actual CoG by means of political
measures.
An insurgent movement always needs some form or another of ‘popular coa-
lition’, where an attempt is made to gain the sympathy of various layers of the
population. It will be too narrow to only concentrate on the poor, for example.
A coalition like this will only be able to be kept together over a period of time
if there is someone who keeps it together. In reality, this means that an enemy
image must be created. The ‘enemy’ may, for example, be an undemocratic
regime or an occupying force – but we also see other ethnic groups acting as an
enemy in connection with some insurgent movements. If the government side is
able to break down or entirely remove the enemy image created by the insurgent
movement, then the insurgent movement’s days are probably numbered.
The government side’s countermeasures against an insurgency should always
– at least if we look at this ideally – assume as their starting point that the actual
core of the threat lies in the insurgent’s political potential and not in his, ini-
tially, rather limited military capacity. But it is often the insurgents’ limited
military efforts that are concentrated on, which can be counterproductive in
the longer term. The reason for this is easy to see: if one does not safeguard one’s
own population against raids and terrorist attacks, one will encounter strong
criticism from newspapers and political groups that normally see warfare in a
short-term perspective.
We saw a concrete example of an offensive counterstrategy from the British
side in Malaysia in the 1950s. Here, they did not try to control the CoG by
making extensive use of jungle patrols or military offensives but by consciously
taking and subsequently making public the political decision that Malaysia
would be given its political freedom. Military efforts were obviously important
but were hardly, by themselves, decisive in the insurgency being overcome. The
military campaign should obviously put military pressure on the insurgents,
but military efforts are only part of a total solution.407
Military efforts are planned as only one of several forms of co-ordinated
‘attack’ directed at the overriding objectives that the insurgents have declared
it their desire to achieve. If this is to be successful, it is necessary for the actual
regime to itself understand the danger and be able to develop a suitable ‘coun-
terstrategy’ where both military and all satisfactory forms of political measures
are included in the plan. If one has been successful in drawing up a function-
ing counterstrategy, one should then next be able, relatively easily (at least in
407. Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era, Chapter 3, pp. 55–78.
290
Counter-Insurgency
theory), to prepare the necessary and adapted operational and tactical assess-
ments and concrete plans. While military forces will normally play a central role
in certain phases of this counteroffensive against the insurgents, their efforts
will nevertheless only be secondary efforts compared with the necessary social
and political measures that will be required if the regime is to survive in the
long-term. Here in particular, it has proved historically difficult to succeed in
achieving this balance.408
Depending on how strong the insurgents are, these military efforts will
be adapted to developments. A problem that we have seen with many mod-
ern insurgencies is that the government side’s soldiers are given this not very
glamorous nor particularly gratifying mission to carry out, often characterised
by watches, patrols where little happens, and routines. They never know when
they will be shot at, as they are not normally on the offensive themselves in this
warfare. There may be the rare opportunity for striking offensively and they
may then succeed in overcoming a guerrilla group, but it will usually be the case
that they are preoccupied with stabilisation operations and trying to control
the insurgents’ activities. This is not, however, the same as being forced to play
a reactive role out of necessity. If one can explain to and motivate soldiers and
officers that this is the reality of this kind of warfare, this will help them to see
the bigger picture that they themselves are part of, and this will also help the
military units involved to understand the role they should play. The soldiers
must be made to realise that the absence of attacks/hostilities is success in itself.
It is also important that, if one is successful in getting the military units to
understand their role, they can also become more effective and will acquire a
realistic picture of what ‘success’ is regarding counter-insurgency.
If one can get the military to accept that the objective will not normally be
a major victory but, more often than not, smaller local successes in the area of
the actual counter-insurgency they represent, one will have come far. However,
we have seen historically that it is often difficult for the military to see them-
selves as only a part of a number of primarily civilian measures directed at the
insurgent movement. Without the military being willing to see themselves as
a vital, but perhaps not the most important, element on the long road towards
a political solution, they have often had problems with both direction and
morale in connection with the protracted wars that the majority of insurgent
movements prepare for.
According to the existing U.S. and NATO military doctrines, the military
planners may use CoG and decisive points during planning and execution of
408. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, ‘Part III, Vietnam’, pp. 124–
142.
291
military operations. As already indicated, insight will be required into the fact
that effective counter-insurgency will assume one has several so-called ‘lines
of operation’ on the go at the same time, i.e., military, social, economic and
legal lines, where one is working towards laying down interim goals (so-called
decisive points [DP]), where the DPs lead towards the CoG. All efforts should,
according to the doctrines, be co-ordinated so that one can keep focusing the
entire time on the main targets of the campaign which must be the political
goals one has set oneself.409 It is the military chief ’s goal to identify these so-
called decisive military points which one then organises in such a manner that
they can be included in the chosen lines of operations with a view to achiev-
ing the military goals set. The military planning in connection with the com-
bating of a guerrilla could, seen in this light, follow NATO’s ‘Guidelines for
Operational Planning’ (GOP). Obviously on the condition that one is duly
aware that there will be great differences between conventional warfare and the
combating of guerrillas! There is also a need here for the military plan to be
devised based on a number of so-called ‘operational objectives’ which, in turn,
will be interpreted and adapted at the different levels, something that should
make an overall contribution to combating the insurgents by marginalising
them. This assumes that the military are trained to combat selective targets so
that unnecessary destruction can be avoided and so that the military efforts are
involved in supporting the efforts of other state or private institutions/organisa-
tions. In this form of warfare the DPs could be to ‘restore public law and order’,
‘control roads/communications’ or ‘clean up in ‘prohibited’ areas used by guer-
rilla units’. The term prohibited areas is used for areas where the government
side wants to have complete control. The term is also used by some guerrilla
movements – these are then often called ‘liberated zones’, where the guerrilla
exercises full control. In order to achieve this level of control the forces deployed
must have clear plans for resource allocation so that they are able to follow up
on the plans created.410 If we look at the ongoing counter-insurgency opera-
tions, I must admit that I am not yet convinced that the current doctrines and
planning methods, really are the best for COIN-operations.
The strategic plans must obviously be led and implemented in such a man-
ner that one is in phase with and co-ordinated with all current civilian units and
efforts, and aware that one must be prepared to adjust the plans made over a
409. Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, U.S. Army, ‘Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: It’s
Not What We Thought’. Text received in the form of an e-mail, June 2003. (Echevarria has
later published the text, but under another title.)
410. NATO’s so-called ‘Guidelines for Operational Planning’ (GOP) may be an example of this
type of ‘operational goal’ that is made use of today. This includes the military theory terms
that are referred to here briefly.
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Counter-Insurgency
period of time so that sight of the strategic goal is not lost. The intention might
be to create all operational plans in such a way that each overlaps the other (they
arise as the result of natural phases in the campaign).411 This is the only way of
doing this: it will never be possible to create a great ‘master plan’ that will apply
to a war that will probably last many years. This conceptual thinking is neces-
sary if one is to take on a well-led insurgent movement, but could probably be
interpreted as being in contrast to the more traditional military thinking with
regard to what the goals are in connection with warfare. The military chief and
leaders of such a campaign also have much more complex and ‘undisciplined’
task forces from the civilian community available, and have different options
to call on than ‘pure’ military operations have. Here, military efforts will take
the form of a campaign in the broadest sense of the term.
In order to illustrate this way of thinking we can assume that, in connec-
tion with counter-insurgency, a common initiative from the threatened regime
will have succeeded in clearly improving the internal security situation in the
country, something that can be seen as vital progress if we look at the political
‘lines of operation’ established. The military chief sees it as an important new
goal to exploit the new security situation to regroup with a view to reducing the
supply of weapons and ammunition that previously flooded in from country X
– something that can be seen as a military ‘decisive point’ (DP). This will then
be able to be seen as a shift in the so-called ‘main effort’ (a demonstration of
the strength of the factored inputs) since fresh tactical progress after the armed
forces along the border with country X have been strongly reinforced will, in
the long-term, contribute to there being fewer guerrilla and terrorist attacks
inside the country. Such developments will, in turn, possibly lead to being able
to adjust the political tactics which will again be able to contribute to a better
relationship with the local community which was previously kindly disposed
towards the guerrilla. (We can possibly see this political feature as a political
‘decisive point’.)
An historical example of this type of use of military power is the British use
of offensive operations over the border with Indonesia when the strong nation-
alist regime in Indonesia wanted to drive the British out of their colonies of
Sarawak and Northern Borneo, areas that Indonesia felt it was entitled to since
411. See also Metz and Millen, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century’, pp.
vi–viii. One should, however, note here that, when establishing DPs, planners often forget
that these arise as the result of analysis concerning the identification of critical vulnerabilities.
This is often not how things are done in practice where DPs are a kind of ‘division’ of the
CoG into its individual factors which can subsequently be influenced by military means.
The result of this misunderstanding is that the actual design of the operation and criteria for
success may differ from the real military challenges and the fundamental relative strengths.
293
the country became independent in the 1950s. Here, even decisions on smaller
operations at a company level were taken at a high level so that these operations
were well in line with the chosen political tempo. Eventually, Indonesia chose
to abandon its political and military pressure.412
In contrast to this method, and even if French operations in Algeria were
carried out on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the military ‘decisive
points’, these were, in reality, never sufficiently well harmonised with the over-
riding political strategy and consequently they never established the actual cen-
tre of gravity.413
9.3.1 Assumptions one should have some knowledge of

Developments in the ongoing wars in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and
Chechnya in Russia, all play a part in illustrating the central problem with
regard to modern warfare: the wars are unconventional, are guerrilla-led and
the use of acts of terror is routine. Another common feature is that the insur-
gents are mainly fighting against what they see as foreign occupying forces. This
has often had a unifying impact on different insurgent factions and has given
them a certain legitimacy among the population.
An important factor to take into account when attempting to interpret and
understand ongoing wars in the Third World is that the modern Western form
of conventional warfare took in many ways its present form during the Second
World War. The three ingredients that have later dominated this form of war-
fare have been based on the following key conditions:
1. Land warfare where armoured combat vehicles and self-propelled artillery

have dominated the picture, including air support.
2. Naval warfare where aircraft carrier groups and submarines are the domi-
nating platforms at sea. It is assumed that these seagoing platforms have air
support.
3. In air warfare, the combination of fighter escorts, fighter-bombers and
bombers has dominated the picture.
These combinations are, in turn, associated with various communications

systems and supported by sensors. Together, these combinations have been at
the heart of modern military thinking until the present day. It should be noted
412. For a general discussion on nationalism and political developments in Indonesia, see Asprey,
War in the Shadows, pp. 817–824.
413. Rekkedal and Zetterling, Grundbok i operationskonst, pp. 245–264.
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Counter-Insurgency
here that it has not been the weapon systems in themselves that have defined
warfare but, rather, a fundamental assumption or concept that technology was
decisive for the outcome of a war. The armed forces of all great powers in the
20th Century have also been organised with a view to themselves being able to
exploit the mass investment in technology in the most effective possible man-
ner. The military structures developed were obviously designed to be able to use
the material one had obtained, but it was equally important that the structures
developed were there to ensure the best possible use of the equipment on the
battlefield. The swift introduction of the nuclear weapon in the 1950s would
fundamentally change the way great powers thought about organising their
military powers. The armed forces remained technically focused on a military
organisation built up around the technology they had based themselves on.414
Seen in this light, preparing for two different forms of war is perhaps nothing
new. During the Cold War, the states involved were, at least theoretically, pre-
pared to be able to both conduct a conventional war and warfare where the use
of WMDs was involved. In our time, it is conventional war and battles against
insurgent movements/terrorists that dominate – but, in practice, the conduct-
ing of conventional warfare is what most Western states prepare for.
In many ways, we can see a modern armoured division or mechanised divi-
sion or an aircraft carrier group, a fighter or bomber unit as symbols of the
optimal organisation in order to be able to take on and combat similar technol-
ogy-based forces that other industrial countries have built up. These forces are
also today the actual basic structure regarding modern conventional warfare
– and this structure has also functioned excellently up until now in this form of
warfare, principally targeted against other industrialised states.
It has, however, proved to be the case that when the forces of industrial
states are deployed against organised guerrilla forces, they have only proved to
be effective to a limited extent. Both the U.S. in Vietnam and, later, the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan discovered that the contingency they had available had
limited success against guerrilla forces, even although they normally won the
individual battles they took part in. A fundamental problem has been that,
since the ‘base units’ in most guerrilla movements are individuals, teams or
quantities of troops, this is not normally much to deploy superior technology
against. It is rarely that a sufficient concentration of insurgents can be found
to be able to fully exploit one’s own superiority in firepower. As previously
mentioned, there are some exceptions, such as the recapturing of the airport
at Saigon and the Citadel in Hué during the Tet Offensive (1968) during the
Vietnam War, and Komsomolsk (in Chechnya) in March 2000.
414. George Friedman, ‘Military Doctrine, Guerrilla Warfare and Counter-Insurgency’, The
Stratfor Weekly, 13 August 2003.
295
A guerrilla force will not normally ‘fight clean’. For periods, the guerrilla
soldiers’ weapons may even be buried or at least carried concealed. When they
gather to carry out a raid or a local attack, they produce the weapons they have
and combine these with mortars, hand grenades or light anti-tank weapons
such as the Russian-made RPG. When the guerrilla solider appears without
weapons, it is, in practice, difficult to distinguish him from ordinary civilians.
On their part, the insurgents in Chechnya claim that they lose more soldiers
in the winter when the men trek down to the villages as ‘civilians’ or try to
reach another country than during the hostilities in the summer. It is not just a
case of burying the weapons and strolling down from the mountains. It is also
important that it is normally the guerrilla forces that have the initiative – it is
they who choose the time and place of a raid or ambush, not the opponent.
This itself contributes to reducing the risk of being discovered or, for example,
bugged in such a way that their orders are known, something that would make
it easier for the government forces to go on the offensive themselves. Safety in
the field is important in an insurgent movement. In both the FMLN (in El
Salvador) and with the Chechens, the individual soldiers often did not know
the target of an operation until a short time before it.
A guerrilla war that is well led is, in practice, particularly during the early
phase difficult to combat with conventional military forces. The traditional
manner of mustering firepower in connection with conventional operations is
actually not very suitable for combating smaller dispersed guerrilla forces, and
one does not normally have reliable, detailed intelligence about the insurgents
during this phase of the war. And even if one does not mind one’s own forces
destroying civilian property and accepts that there will be civilian losses, it
has shown itself to be the case in many of the wars we have seen since 1945,
that the actual mass exodus of civilians and punitive expeditions against areas
where there is much popular support for the insurgency are not in themselves
any guarantee of success for the ruling regime and the government forces.
Deportations and punitive measures are not enough to eliminate an established
guerrilla movement, as those who survive will normally resume their activities
as long as weapons are available and they maintain their motivation.415
For the same reason, we have also seen that, in order to deal with an insur-
gent movement in a more effective manner, it has often been necessary to organ-
ise one’s own so-called ‘counter-insurgency troops’. Such thinking is based on
another school of thought within modern military thinking, in which the study
415. Major Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army, ‘Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly’, Military
Review, (September–October 2002). Cf., the U.S.’s ‘strategic villages’ during the Vietnam
War and the British internment of IRA members in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, both of
which provided limited results.
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Counter-Insurgency
of guerrilla forces and terrorist organisations are central. Without ‘alternative

thinking’ such as this, and access to good, current intelligence, it is difficult to
be able to combat the guerrilla movement. If the government forces are to be
successful, possibly together with conventional forces from an external ally, this
requires these forces to be trained and deployed/organised in such a way that
they can deal with local challenges. It is often a mixture of Special Forces, locally
recruited forces and police forces that will, together with a good supply of local
knowledge about attitudes, culture, religion and social conditions, provide the
overall ‘mix of forces’ that will be required in order to be able to penetrate ‘safe
areas’ for the insurgents. On the basis of these resources, one should be able
to combat the insurgent forces over a period of time. Normally such ‘counter-
guerrilla forces’ deal with and perform a great number of functions such as:
1. They must be able to deal with the guerrilla forces in a ‘symmetric’ manner,
i.e., be strong enough to be able to go to battle and win (at least survive) if
the guerrilla leadership decides to muster huge forces and attempt to over-
come the government forces’ outposts and smaller garrisons. This is where
the availability of armoured units and air support comes in as an important
military factor, particularly in connection with military attacks/counterof-
fensives.
2. It is very important that they are able to recruit and train local forces with a
view to being able to take on and overcome guerrilla forces operating in the
area. The local knowledge that this type of locally recruited force represents
is also of importance for obtaining information and intelligence.
3. It is important in connection with counter-insurgency that a good intel-
ligence service can be established. It must have access to information about
how the guerrilla recruits, who are recruited, how and where they train, who
acquires weapons and ammunition along the way and how propaganda and
the indoctrination of guerrilla soldiers and of their civilian networks are car-
ried out. If one is to be able to attack and combat guerrilla units, access to
information on where they are, where they are going, and what plans they
might have is necessary. It is also important to try to prevent the guerrilla
from establishing his own ‘safe areas’, whether in the jungle, in mountain
areas or in villages/urban areas. All areas should be just as accessible for both
one’s own and the adversary’s forces. It is also important that the insurgents
do not have a monopoly on moving or attacking at night.
4. If the counter-insurgents are to have lasting success, they must try to split up
the insurgents and the civilian population. If one uses Mao Zedong’s old say-
ing about ‘the fish in the water’, the counter-insurgents must be able to catch
the ‘fish’ (the insurgents) in the ‘water’ (the people). If they are unsuccessful in
297
creating a split between the insurgents and their civilian networks, the guer-
rilla is likely to survive and simply grow stronger over a period of time. The
idea of splitting the insurgents from the population sounds easy. In reality, it
is then necessary for the government forces and their local allies to control the
country villages and towns, something that is demanding. It is not enough for
the government forces to be there during the day if it is the insurgents who
dominate at night. As it is often the insurgents who have organised the popu-
lation first, it will be a difficult and time consuming task to create a network
of informers when the insurgents’ network is already in place and to make a
note of all people who speak with the government soldiers.
This will be particularly difficult if one is involved in an ethnic conflict and

one’s local allies are not from the same ethnic group as the dominant section
of the population. In Iraq, for example, it cannot be taken for granted that the
local Sunni Arab population will have anything to do with government soldiers
who often are made up of Kurds and Shias.
It is obviously normally a distinct advantage for an insurgent movement to
have a local population to rely on, but the supply element does not always have
to rely on the local population. From a supply point of view, we can, in connec-
tion with many modern conflicts, steal a little of Mao’s old saying and state that
the ‘fish’ do not actually need ‘water’. In several guerrilla wars, we have seen the
local population actually become a burden for the insurgent movement. This
is particularly the case if the government forces’ tactics for counter-insurgency
are based on terrorising the population and the insurgents are, at the same time,
very much pre-occupied with protecting the population that they themselves
come from. This problem is most frequently seen in connection with ethnic
conflicts where the population belongs to other ethnic groups than the govern-
ment forces. Then the ‘fish’ must carry the ‘water’, something that again makes
the guerrilla very vulnerable to attacks from the counter-insurgents. This hap-
pened in El Salvador at the beginning of the 1980s416 and, most recently, in
Kosovo in 1999.
The military units that usually carry out counter-insurgency missions nor-
mally consist of two main components among their forces:
1. Maybe the most important military force are well-trained Special Forces,
i.e., well-motivated light infantry forces that use heavy firepower/air support
through access to the existing communications networks. These forces have
several tasks, including intelligence, raids against the guerrilla, monitoring
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Counter-Insurgency
of enemy activity and, in particular, trying to establish good contact with

the local population and acting as instructors for locally recruited soldiers,
etc. Special Forces will, on the other hand, normally try to avoid contact
with the civilian population for security reasons.
2. In addition, more conventional forces are always included, either under
the control of the main units of the Special Forces that are involved, or
under their own command. These forces represent various forms of heavy
firepower support and such forces will constitute the main force if they have
to overcome large bands of guerrillas.
For example, during the introductory phases in the Vietnam War (before
1965) specialised ‘counter-insurgency’ units were normally those who carried
out the two kinds of task described above. (Special Operation Forces [SOF] or
‘Green Berets’ were often the names given to the American Special Forces that
had begun to arrive in South Vietnam from early 1962, as instructors and advis-
ers for the conventionally trained South Vietnamese government forces.)
This way of doing things had, however, at least two fundamental weaknesses
when we look retrospectively at the strategic rational behind this:
• Most importantly, the supply of specially trained counter-insurgents during

the Vietnam War was never sufficient to be able to base the warfare on their
methods and style of warfare – and the number of these Special Forces has
probably never been sufficient enough in later wars either.
• It should be noted here that it is not how many guerrilla soldiers the enemy
has that is decisive, but how large the actual civilian population is in a con-
flict area.
It is probably relatively uninteresting where the civilian population stands

politically during the first phase of the conflict. The political situation changes
all the time and political moods may change several times on the way to the
final goal. What counts is whether those who are to combat the insurgency
have enough suitable forces to be able to ‘penetrate the sea of people’ down to
the guerrilla. Why is this an important assumption? There are almost always
‘openings’ in the security network that the counter-insurgents may try to find
and this may need a significantly larger number of forces on the regime’s side
than the often limited number of insurgent soldiers that exist if one is to hope
to establish an acceptable and credible local and/or regional security situation.
The guerrilla always operates in an environment where, almost regardless
of what the security forces do, there will be enough targets to attack and not
even the best-trained forces loyal to the government could prevent civilians
299
and groups loyal to the government (particularly leaders) being attacked under
normal circumstances. We see this clearly today in Iraq where never a day goes
by without a significant number of attacks against the new regime and those
who support it, and against American forces and civilian employees who work
for foreign companies in Iraq. In addition, large forces are required in order
to deal with the passive security that is expected – particularly by the civilian
population. (It is estimated that [in the spring of 2005] about 20,000 security
personnel were working in Iraq as private contractors and this is actually greater
than the entire British military contribution.)417 Another term that can be used
to describe the situation is ‘preventative security’.
These operations often appear to the government side’s soldiers as a rather
boring and hardly motivating service, but extremely essential work. An impor-
tant task for the armed element of the government is to defend or protect the
civilian population, the machinery of government and/or economic targets so
that they can live an almost normal life without the ideals that the government
professes to being undermined.418 Seen in this light, security forces are what
one must have most of – it then becomes the task of the elite forces to actively
pursue and overcome the military and political cadres as well as the guerrilla’s
core troops. An operational pattern such as this is itself a problem, as the elite
forces are often those that are noticed, while the traditional infantry and police
experience an often dangerous day-to-day existence, which is hardly inspiring,
out in the rural areas or in the town and, as previously demonstrated, they will
also feel that they are given little credit for their efforts.
The large number of soldiers that will normally be required in order to
begin to combat the guerrilla forces in an effective manner can rarely be led and
financed by a foreign superpower, except perhaps with the exception of those
occasions when an insurgency has broken out in a small country, in terms of
population or measured in square kilometres. As we are now seeing in Iraq, and
previously in Vietnam, the logistical costs of major involvement can be signifi-
cant – perhaps large enough that it would be ill-advised to continue, regard-
less of how the war goes. Put bluntly, this means that, if one is to have any
hope of defeating a well-led guerrilla movement, one should invest everything
in developing a locally recruited military force (including police forces) that
can themselves eventually take over responsibility for combating the insurgents,
or at least be strong enough for the adversary to understand that he can never
win. Until then, an insurgent movement will normally not be interested in real
417. For a very thorough discussion of this phenomenon, see Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp.
230–242.
418. Robert R. Tomes, ‘Relearning Counter-insurgency Warfare’, Parameter, (Spring 2004), pp.
17–19.
300
Counter-Insurgency
TURKEY
Zäkhu
Dahuk
Aqrah
Mosul
SYRIA
Erbil
Kirkuk
Ti
Sulaimaniya
gr
Halabjah
is
Bayji
Tikrit IRAN
Al Hadithah Samarra
Euf
ra
t Baghdad
Ar Rutbah Al Falluja
JORD. I R A Q Karbala Al Hillah

Al Kut
An Najaf Ad Diwaniyah
Nukhayb Al Amarah
As Samawah
An Nasiriyah
As Salman Basra
Safwan
Al Busayyah
SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT
100 km
The most important roads, rivers and towns in Iraq. (Map: Samuel Svärd)
negotiations. The role of the locally recruited forces will then be to operate as
main forces/security forces and they will normally be trained as infantry. These
forces will not only defend important infrastructure but also operate as support
troops when one combats large guerrilla units. Another aspect of this is that the
locally recruited troops know the local culture better than any foreign troops
can be expected to. Seen in this light, these forces are, if they are trained in an
acceptable manner, important ambassadors for the regime and can deal with the
civilian population in a natural way. Secondly, this will be of great importance as
301
intelligence can be obtained from the area ‘the fish [the guerrilla] is swimming in’
through day-to-day contact with civilians. This will also be key information for
the Special Forces that are to try to identify and overcome the many large and
small guerrilla units and the political/religious leaders of these.
However, recruiting from a previously heavily guerrilla infested area is
always associated with problems. Can the people recruited be trusted? This has
obviously been a major problem for the Americans in Iraq in 2004.419 Several
freshly recruited Iraqi units simply ‘disintegrated’ when they were deployed
against the city of Fallujah in Iraq (see Chapter 8). The causal relationship here
is created in such a way that it has not been easy to determine why the Iraqi
units, led by Iraqi officers, did not work. But there are probably two particu-
larly significant factors. The Iraqi forces had not yet reached a sufficiently high
standard of training to be able to carry out complicated and intensive urban
operations and political guidance was given to the local USMC commander
not to carry out operations under the conditions at that time. Gradually, as
the training of the Iraqi forces has continued, the emphasis has been on three
things: leadership, individual skills and the ability to carry out division opera-
tions at battalion level. As of the spring of 2006, it is assumed that this basis
has been somewhat improved.
Historically, it has proved to be extremely easy for guerrilla cadres to become
enlisted in the new security forces that are set up and this has been particu-
larly common in situations where the guerrilla war is already a reality and the
government forces are desperate to try to deal with this by expanding their
own forces.420 Under wartime conditions, an actual security check on all new
recruits is often something that is impossible, even with the huge foreign forces
present in Iraq today. Seen in this light, it can almost be assumed that, when
one recruits for new forces in the middle of a war, one will get guerrilla forces
in both the police and ground combat forces. One of the consequences of this
is that it becomes extremely difficult to keep one’s own offensive operations
secret. And, as it is, in practice, impossible to distinguish what the actual politi-
cal opinions of recruits or officers are by means of any known technical aids,
there is no effective manner of avoiding infiltration. This will be particularly
bad if recruitment has mainly been carried out under the supervision of the
external ‘supporting power’.421 A foreign force has, in practice, extremely lim-
ited local knowledge about things like attitudes, traditional loyalty and culture
419. Waleed Ibrahim, ‘Rebels Strike Iraqi Forces After Bin Laden Call’, Reuters report, 28
December 2004.
420. Rekkedal, ‘The Destruction of Oppression’, see also ‘The Building of the Underground
Organization’, pp. 76–94, and Appendix 1.
421. The Associated Press, ‘Iraq Infiltration on U.S. Bases Well-Known’, 28 December 2004.
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Counter-Insurgency
– and, without this kind of insight, it is almost impossible to ‘weed out’ the
adversary’s infiltrators.
What is described above shows that, historically, it has often been the case
that the insurgents have had a built-in advantage. When they have infiltrated
government forces, the insurgents will have a good supply of basic information
on tactical, operational norms and general military assumptions. In practice, it
is almost impossible to guard against infiltrators. Something that can be done
is to ensure that information on forthcoming operations is kept back until such
time as it is impossible for any infiltrators to take this to the insurgents. This is a
tactic that several insurgent movements also use. The ‘need to know’ principle is
a good protective mechanism in most contexts. If it is assumed that the infiltra-
tors are operating individually and do not know each other, it is also important
that no soldier/officer finds himself alone in a situation where he could cause
great damage, for example, while guarding an important object, as a commu-
nications operator, on admission checks. This information will obviously be
exploited by the insurgency’s political and military leaders and they will often
have a better intelligence picture than the government forces. The guerrilla who
can either decide to hide in the terrain or ‘disappear’ into a loyal or at least non-
informant population now has a clearly superior operational starting point with
a good supply of information on future military operations. The insurgents are
free to choose whether they themselves will use military means or whether to
avoid combat against a superior military force. In a situation like this, it is the
guerrilla forces that have acquired the operational upper hand because they can
normally assume that they will be able to surprise the enemy tactically.
It is, of course, always the objective of those attempting to combat the
insurgency to turn this clearly negative picture around. Most theorists who
have written about counter-insurgency have also asserted that one should try to
mirror the guerrilla’s capacity.422 There are, however, grounds for being scepti-
cal about whether this is possible at an operational level, particularly when it
is almost impossible for foreign forces to infiltrate a guerrilla movement. It is
obviously difficult for a white person or a black person to pretend to be Asian.
There is probably a better chance of succeeding in this at a tactical level if local
forces are used. This means that, if good information is to be obtained on what
the insurgents are planning at a high level, it can be hoped that they will give
themselves away through communications systems or using electronic means
422. Some of those who have themselves both practical experience of, and have written about,
counter-insurgency are the Englishman Sir Robert Thompson, the Frenchmen Roger
Trinquier and David Galula and the Americans John S. Pustay, Jeffrey Race and Douglas S.
Blaufarb. Please refer to the bibliography for the actual books.
303
of gathering intelligence. The alternative is if the security forces can them-

selves recruit people who are negatively disposed to the guerrilla’s cause, but
who, nevertheless, have access to the guerrilla leadership. Practice from modern
guerrilla wars has shown that it is difficult to succeed in ‘planting’ an agent in
the guerrilla leadership, while it has often been very easy for the insurgents to
obtain access to information from the adversary’s operational level. During the
Vietnam War, for example, operations were disclosed on several occasions as the
result of poor communications security – on both sides.423
Historically, attempts have often been made to deal with this handicap by
using the often less correct intelligence held and compensating for this by plan-
ning and carrying out major military operations. Then if the government forces
did not, for example, know exactly where the guerrilla was located or were
not sure of who actually were active members, they undertook large so-called
mobile operations where they went in and occupied a given area in an attempt to
engage, identify and finally overcome the guerrilla units located in the selected
area. Both the French in Indochina and, later, the Americans in Vietnam made
extensive use of this type of ‘heavy raid’ with generally limited military suc-
cess.424 Several military or civilian researchers who have written about this have
demonstrated that this type of warfare had at least three consequences:
1. They were normally large and not very cost-effective operations where rein-
forced battalions were, in practice, often used to overcome a group of 10
men. In such a situation it is difficult to see that the efforts are in proportion
to the result and it becomes extremely difficult to see if a minimal ‘tactical
success’ such as this will have any positive strategic effect at all, since a large
guerrilla unit normally split up into smaller groups and usually decided to
flee and not ‘fight to the last man’. The guerrilla unit could, in practice, not
then be defeated and the rest of the units would gather their thoughts and
reorganise as soon as the enemy’s main forces had pulled out.
2. Another factor was that the operations they carried out often contributed
to heightening political problems. Large operations of the type described
above will not normally be carried out by specialised units to combat insur-
gent forces. Special Forces are normally trained to be able to carry out very
selective military operations.
423. James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency from the
Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century (New York: Doubleday, 2002), p. 306.
424. Gen. Lt. Harold G. Moore, Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once, and Young: Ia Drang:
The Battle that Changed the War in Vietnam (Norwalk, CT: The Easton Press, 1992/1995).
The book describes the Battle of Ia Drang, a hilly area in South Vietnam, which can be
described as a ‘heavy raid’ into an area held by a North Vietnamese division.
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Counter-Insurgency
And this brings us to what is probably the fundamental problem when

attempting to counter an insurgency that is already well underway. During the
opening phase, the guerrilla movement is normally a small group of people who
have decided to use violent methods to change what is to them an unacceptable
economic or political situation. It will always be a while before the next stage
of developments is reached, where the guerrilla is able to develop a complex
organisation with its own logistics and tax system and where they possibly
obtain weapons and other special support from abroad.
During the first phase, the guerrilla is mainly preoccupied with surviving
and developing his own political base, i.e., the nature of the guerrilla war must,
by necessity, appear more political than military. Historically, it has also often
proved to be the case that the guerrilla movement has become more vulner-
able when it reaches its second stage and becomes more militarily potent than
it was in the militarily weak introductory phase. If the government forces are
well-led and have decided on a sensible ‘counterstrategy’, the army’s heavy
equipment will, however, come into its own – particularly if the guerrilla arro-
gantly attempts to attack and/or hold areas or cities before he is at least as well
equipped and trained as the conventional forces deployed against him.
But it has often proved to be the case that this has not been a problem
for the guerrilla, as the threatened regime’s political situation has often greatly
deteriorated in the meantime. Even if it is now possible to inflict great losses
on the guerrilla, the supply of new recruits is so good within the increasingly
hostile local population that the guerrilla can relatively easily compensate for
the losses incurred in clashes with the government forces. In reality, it is often
difficult for the regime to continue the war as before and it realises that it is
not possible to win purely militarily against the guerrilla forces. At this stage
it has often been seen as necessary to begin negotiations – possibly through
intermediaries. Sometimes this leads to progress, but perhaps equally often we
will see a new round of warfare before either the regime realises it has lost or
a superpower intervenes in the war on the side of the government in order to
try to turn the war around again. The Vietnam War is a good example of this
kind of military intervention, when the Americans realised that the regime in
South Vietnam was succumbing to pressure from the NLF and North Vietnam
in the spring of 1965.
If one loses the political battle there are actually one of two alternatives
remaining: one could obviously give up the struggle, or attempt a war of attri-
tion against the insurgents. As, first, the Americans and then, later, the Soviet
Union were to experience, it is, in practice, difficult for even a superpower to
sustain great losses over several years in a war, particularly in the Third World.
There is always a danger here of politicians getting fed up or of the build up
of popular opinion against participation in the war over a period of time. The
305
question that will always come up is whether this war is actually of crucial
importance to one’s own interests. If the answer to this is no, we will probably
see a withdrawal from the actual war, even if this means that the regime one
initially entered into the war to support now risks falling. South Vietnam is a
classic example of this.
The fact that a superpower is supporting and has great influence on the
government’s policies is something that can very much provide the insurgent
movement with the sympathy and support from sections of the population.
For example, in the Philippines, the promise to close down the American bases
(and the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986) were important elements in the
fight against the Communist NPA guerrilla. Similarly, it took three years for
the Afghan Mujaheddin to take Kabul once the Russians had first begun to
retreat. This was despite the fact that most Western observers and journalists
assumed that the Kabul regime would collapse like a house of cards as soon as
the Russians had left the country.425 As we already know, once the Russians
were finally out of Afghanistan, the various Mujaheddin groups began to fight
each other.
The insurgent movement normally has an astonishing willingness and abil-
ity to accept the losses that are required if the insurgents are well-led and have
a strong political will to continue.426 Although it cannot be documented, I
would state that a well-motivated insurgent movement has no problems accept-
ing losses equivalent to its entire force over the course of a period of 3–5 years.
In practice, we are not talking about the force being ‘replaced’ but the guerrilla
being able to compensate for losses he suffers as quickly as they are inflicted.
There are great problems associated with finding reliable casualty figures in an
insurgency. Insurgent movements seldom release figures on their own losses.
The adversary often issues exaggerated reports of the insurgent movement’s
casualty figures. In El Salvador, the capital’s (San Salvador) conservative news-
papers used casualty figures that (if they were correct) would have meant that
the FMLN would have had to renew its force every 12–24 months – something
that is hardly possible for any insurgent force if it is to be combat fit. By com-
parison, the insurgents in Chechnya would, if the Russian figures were correct,
have had to renew their fighting force on at least an annual basis.
When we talk of casualty figures, the casualty rates (or alleged casualties)
between the sides are a topic in themselves. During the Vietnam War, the
American forces stated that the number of insurgents killed was about 12 times
425. Another important reason for the Mujaheddin’s lack of progress could be that they could not
handle the adjustment from defensive guerrilla warfare to offensive warfare. Cf., Chapter
5.3.1 on ‘General Counteroffensive’.
426. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, see Chapter 6, ‘The Vietnamese Modification’.
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Counter-Insurgency
higher than Americans killed.427 In Iraq, the relative figures look somewhat
similar. In a normally developing insurgency in the Third World the casualty
figures of the government forces will – during the guerrilla phase – almost
always exceed the insurgents’ casualties. It is not uncommon for the relative
figures to be 1:2–1:4 or higher in the insurgents’ favour. In many guerrilla wars
the claimed casualty figures for the insurgent forces will be much higher than
the government forces’. When the casualty figures also stem from operations
initiated by the insurgent forces there is every reason to regard the figures with
scepticism. In Nepal, the government is constantly issuing reports which claim
that the Maoist guerillas have casualty figures several times higher than those
of the government forces. For their part, Russian authorities claim that the
Chechens are losing about three times as many soldiers as they are.
Obviously, those combating the insurgency may come unexpectedly upon
a base belonging to the insurgents or ambush a supply column, but these are
often exceptions in an insurgency. An advantage will also be gained when the
forces fighting the insurgency are far ahead in terms of technology, training and
tactics – as in Iraq.428 We see a dilemma here for the ruling regime: if, at an early
stage, it realises the danger to the regime as a result of the guerrilla war that has
been initiated, it may nevertheless be difficult to take the political strain that
will often ensue from implementing widespread repression/combating of the
guerrilla forces who are still at an early phase and are consequently weak, both
politically and militarily. If they proceed in too hard a fashion, this could inten-
sify the underlying political ill-feeling towards the ruling regime. If, on the other
hand, they choose not to intervene with speedy political and military measures,
the insurgency will obviously survive and probably slowly grow stronger! This
is actually a real dilemma that arises in most guerrilla wars. If it decides to
wait before taking ‘tough’ countermeasures, the regime instead risks meeting
an increasingly better politically developed adversary who will also eventually
increase its real military fighting capability. As previously indicated, the guer-
rilla forces could be regarded, at this later stage, more as regular military units.
But without receiving significant weapons support from outside they will not
normally have any hope of taking on and defeating large conventional forces.
427. William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, Second Edition (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1996). In Chapter 10, there is an extremely interesting report on
American and North Vietnamese thinking on casualties and inflicting casualties. There is
no doubt that the North Vietnamese and NLF casualties were significantly greater than the
Americans’.
428. In Iraq, the mentality of the insurgents is also an important element when discussing their
casualty figures. This is because many of the so-called jihadists can almost be said to have
what they see as ‘martyrdom’ as their primary goal.
307
As regards the many insurgencies we have seen since the Second World War, we
have often seen that the government side has managed neither to take an early
decision nor deal with the reasons for the guerrilla initially deciding to begin an
armed insurgency by way of political, social or economic measures/reforms.429
This dilemma looks difficult to avoid in parts of the world and this is in itself a
source of inspiration for constantly new insurgencies, particularly in the often
less well-governed new nations in the Third World.
If we take developments in Iraq from the summer of 2003 as an example, we
see here that the U.S. has not been able in any way to ‘surgically’ remove what
was a rather unorganised and weak terrorist campaign directed at American
and other foreign forces in Iraq when it began in the summer of 2003.430 The
long series of terrorist attacks from the summer of 2005 has assumed a different
character. It is clear that the warfare can no longer be seen as a temporary terror-
ist campaign conducted by random Saddam supporters, foreign ‘holy warriors’
and suicide bombers. In Iraq, we are seeing a guerrilla war that is beginning to
approach ‘phase two’, as described earlier in this book.431 The attacks are now
better planned and increasingly directed at the segments of Iraq that want the
Americans to stay, or that actively work for them, and the new Iraqi regime that
is establishing itself.
Overcoming this type of guerrilla organisation requires, in practice, a pro-
tracted war if one is to have any hope whatsoever of succeeding. It is also becom-
ing increasingly more important that some American public opinion already
feels that the war has gone on more than long enough and that it is already time
to withdraw.432 A desire like this – to be able to get home quickly – is in clear
contrast to what we see from the historical experiences of similar insurgencies.
This type of complicated war will be protracted, particularly now that Iraq
429. Hammes, ibid., see Chapter 7, ‘The Sandinista Refinement’, p. 82: ‘The greatest threat to
the Sandinistas was the democratic reform movement. If it succeeded while the Sandinistas
were still getting established in the mountains, the cause of the insurgency would be neutral-
ized.’ This very well may be true – the umbrella that the people gather under is often the
hatred of a ‘strong man’ or an occupying power. In the case of ethnic insurgent movements,
the enemy’s political system is not of decisive importance (but it will be important if it has
a look of apartheid as in South Africa).
430. The reason for this may be that the U.S. (perhaps principally Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
himself ) could be accused of having broken the ‘first commandment’ of any analysis of
warfare: what type of war are we fighting?
431. Stratfor, ‘Iraq: The Implications of a United Insurgency’, 6 October 2004.
432. At a press conference in the summer of 2003, Rumsfeld denied that the U.S. had plans to
keep its forces in Iraq for two years. The two years have passed and the Americans do not
actually see any possibility of a quick withdrawal. See, for example, the article written by
David S. Cloud and Eric Schmitt, ‘U.S. General Sees No Ebb in Fight’, The New York Times,
24 June 2005.
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sees that sympathy has been established for the insurgents among the coun-
try’s Sunni Muslims. Additionally, we can see that the insurgent groups have
changed their strategy on the basis of new experiences. It is, for example, not
very likely that they will again attempt to defend large population centres like
the city of Fallujah (see the discussion on developments in Fallujah in Chapter
8). As Iraq is split into three different ‘cultural areas’: Sunni, Shia and Kurds,
and also has other minorities, there is much to suggest that it will be difficult to
find a new political foundation that will unite the nation, even if the Americans
and their Western allies pull out. Violent attacks between the three main ethnic
groups have become part of day-to-day warfare in Iraq and there is much to
suggest that the country will be overtaken by a civil war once the occupying
power pulls out. It is probably now too late to prevent this happening: ‘The
genie is out of the bottle.’ The front lines in any civil war will probably consist
of Sunni Muslims and Shi’ite Muslim groups in Baghdad and southern Iraq.
In the North, battles will break out between Sunni Muslim groups and the
Kurdish Peshmerga militia.433 In the summer of 2005, probably four of Iraq’s
18 regions had major problems, including the Baghdad area and Mosul, while
both the Iraqi authorities and the Americans state that there had been fewer
attacks in the other regions. The danger of a protracted war is clearly present,
almost regardless of what the Americans now do.
The picture described above is rather gloomy, seen through the eyes of both
the new Iraqi regime and the Americans. But, as in all wars like this, the picture
is by no means constant. Some features actually point in a new direction, but it
is difficult to separate facts from wishes and opinions without local knowledge.
In an optimistic analysis with the heading ‘The Beginning of the End for Sunni
Insurgents?’ the American ‘think tank’ Stratfor, which normally has been suc-
cessful so far in interpreting local trends in Iraq, wrote:
Iraq’s Sunni religious leaders April 1 urged their community to join the
country’s security forces. This move not only indicates that negotiations
with the Sunni community to co-opt them into the political process are
going well, but enhances the chances of containing the insurgency. That
said, the Sunnis – like the Shia and the Kurds – will likely keep their
433. It is a paradox that the Sunni Muslim insurgents, who, due to their attacks on the two
other ethnic groups, are increasing ethnic antagonism, would probably be the weakest
party in such a conflict. Shi’ite Muslims constitute between 60–65 per cent of the popu-
lation and would be very likely to count on assistance from the neighbouring country,
Iran, in the event of any civil war. Today, the Kurdish Peshmerga militia already consti-
tutes a formidable force of an estimated 100,000 soldiers, according to The New York
Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/27/international/middleeast/27militia.html/
?ex=1120276800&en=1c13f12534e1ba54&ei=5070>.
309
militias, but this move will isolate the Iraqi militants from the foreign
jihadists.434
One of the reasons that there was a little more optimism in Baghdad was that
a large group of Sunni Arab clerics, including a group of ‘hard liners’ who have
continually opposed the Americans being in the country, had issued a declara-
tion where they called on Sunni Arabs to enlist for service in the Iraqi Army and
police force. This was actually a significant change of course for the 64 imams
and other scribes who signed it, as they had previously stated that it was only
‘traitors’ who would enlist for these services. However, one of those regarded as
having close contact with insurgent groups, Harith al-Dari, the leader of the
Association of Muslim Scholars, did not sign the appeal. But, as the majority
signed it, it could have some importance. Over the last few months, the insur-
gents have primarily attacked Iraqi police and soldiers and the majority of these
are today, Shias and Kurds. Sheik Abdul Ghafour al-Samarrai, who presented the
appeal, said at the time that he believed this new directive would help to reduce
the number of attacks on Iraqi forces and civilian targets. We have, however, not
as yet seen any ‘reduction’ in warfare in Iraq. But, probably just as important to
the current Sunni clerics is their desire to achieve a certain influence in the new
security forces – not their interest in the lives of Shias. In Iraq, the Sunnis have
traditionally been the dominant group, something they no longer are since the
fall of the Saddam regime. One of the most important reasons for the insurgency
was that the Americans, with their then political leader Ambassador Paul Bremer
decided to disband Saddam’s army and security forces. And it is particularly from
these former cadres that the insurgents have recruited their people.
Although there are clearly not just peaceful motives behind this ‘turnaround’
among some of the Sunni leaders, both the American and Iraqi official spokes-
men at the time choose to regard this initiative positively, particularly as the
same leaders had largely boycotted the election of a new parliament in January
2005. In war and politics, almost anything is possible – even in Iraq.435
434. Quote from the article: ‘[The Leader of the Insurgency] Al-Zarqawi must have taken serious
note of this development, as his men have been concentrating their attacks on Iraqi security
forces. For him, this is a nightmare come true. In a communiqué with al Qaeda central
leader Osama bin Laden, al-Zarqawi had warned that should the jihadist forces not consoli-
date themselves in Iraq, they would have to leave the country to other lands conducive to
their jihadist enterprise or stand their ground in Iraq and die fighting. In essence, it seems
this new fatwa has made it clear that it is only a matter of time before Sunni Iraqis turn their
guns against the foreign jihadists.’ Stratfor, 1 April 2005. The later developments in Iraq
seems to confirm the trends described in this Stratfor analysis.
435. Robert F. Worth, ‘Sunni Clerics Urge Followers to Join Iraq Army and Police’, Los Angeles
Times, 2 April 2005. See also the Stratfor analysis ‘Iraq: Turning Up the Heat on Jihadist
Operations’, Stratfor, 28 March 2005.
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9.3.2 The importance of intelligence

As previously demonstrated (Chapter 6), this type of war can hardly be won by
the government side without it being able to establish an effective supply of rel-
evant intelligence – and, at the same time, being able to deny the guerrilla forces
a similar supply of intelligence from its own side. Maybe a regime/government
cannot win a war against an insurgency/guerrilla because of good intelligence
– but they will probably lose if they do not have good intelligence.
It is probably impossible to win without being successful in turning around
the trend that is now dominant in, for example, Iraq. Here it is the guerrilla
organisations that now have a good supply of intelligence about the govern-
ment side (mostly based on HUMINT), while the government side and the
Americans are very dependent on technical intelligence. For example, the
Americans have not yet managed to control the ten-kilometre long road from
Baghdad to the airport, although they have worked hard towards controlling
this area for more than two years.436 Without succeeding in ‘blinding’ the
guerrilla and, at the same time, having a good insight into what the guerrilla
or terrorist group is planning and doing, it is difficult to achieve military and
political success in this type of conflict.
In connection with this, I will briefly describe and comment on develop-
ments in Iraq since 2003, developments that will later be assessed from an
intelligence perspective.
As most Iraqis who have, until now, been part of the various guerrilla groups
in Iraq have themselves little previous experience as guerrilla soldiers, they have
had to learn the ‘trade’ along the way and have learned from their experiences
and those of others. However, some of the officers and former soldiers from the
Saddam regime’s security and army forces, who are now taking part, have some
experience of the regime’s previously extremely heavy-handed counter-insur-
gency against Kurds and Shia supporters.
The core of the insurgency has been based in urban areas and the insurgency
has so far had a clearly urban character. Larger cities like Baghdad, Fallujah,
Mosul, Al-Sulaymaniyah, Samara and Saddam’s hometown Tikrit have been
one of the most important theatres of operations for the insurgents (see Chapter
8). It is reasonably clear that these insurgents enjoy a certain popular support,
particularly since it is the traditional Sunni-based elite that dominates in these
areas. We then also see that this limited rural-based guerrilla activity has mainly
gone on in the Sunni-dominated areas, while the rural districts in the Kurdish
and Shia Arab areas have largely been quiet.
436. See, for example, ‘The World’s Most Dangerous Road’, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/
World/The-worlds-most-dangerous-road/2005/06/07/1118123840061.html>.
311
The urban guerrilla has also used makeshift bombs based on artillery gre-
nades or aircraft bombs and raids against Iraqi police stations and attacks on
foreign contractors or Iraqis who have been working for the foreign forces or
for the temporary Iraqi Government. They have probably chosen to invest
in makeshift bombs (so-called ‘Improvised Explosive Device’, IED) since the
shooting skills and the general soldiering skills among the new recruits who
have taken part in the guerrilla groups so far appear to be rather limited. The
insurgents have received support from so-called jihadists with training and expe-
rience from Afghanistan.437 Use of suicide bombings has also been part of the
picture. Overall, this guerrilla and terrorist activity has contributed to making
everyday life for ordinary Iraqis relatively difficult and dangerous in the cities
mentioned and along major communication lines. The guerrilla has, however,
succeeded skilfully in destabilising the situation in Iraq and has contributed
to it proving very difficult to develop a new stable internal Iraqi Government.
Since the central parts of Iraq are characterised by desert, interspersed with
fertile and built up areas, this is where the population is densest. As there are
few suitable large mountain or forest areas that could function as ‘safe areas’
for insurgents in the Arab areas in the southern and central parts of the coun-
try, they have concentrated on developing and waging war in the urban areas.
Since they clearly have had ample access to the dollars controlled by the previ-
ous regime so far, they have up to now been adequately financed. In addition,
everything suggests that the insurgents do not have any problems either get-
ting money from Islamic circles in, for instance, Saudi Arabia and Syria, etc.
As the Americans were clearly barely able to secure or destroy the many large
stocks of weapons and ammunition during the early phase of the occupation,
the insurgent groups have an almost unlimited supply of such material.438 The
Americans and their allies simply had too few soldiers in the country during
this early phase, in relation to the area of the country and size of population.
Nor were they able to demonstrate to the population as such, and especially
to potential insurgents, that they had control. The wrong signals were already
being sent at an early stage when American forces largely ignored the looting in
Baghdad and other cities. Have they, perhaps, now also begun to realise their
earlier mistakes in Washington? In an interesting interview with one of those
who took part at a high level in the Pentagon planning, the developments have
been clearly thought through. There were clearly disagreements – and, finally,
they decided on what was hardly the best solution:
437. Peter Beaumont and Patrick Graham, ‘Rebel war spirals out of control as US intelligence
loses the plot’, The Observer, 2 November 2003.
438. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, ‘Facts and Questions About Lost Munitions’, The
New York Times, 30 October 2004.
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Counter-Insurgency
Douglas J. Feith, a top Pentagon official who was deeply involved in

planning the Iraq war, said that there were significant missteps in the
administration’s strategy, including the delayed transfer of power to a
new Iraqi government, and that he did not know whether the invading
U.S. force was the right size. (…) He said mistaken actions and policies
in Iraq resulted in frequent ‘course corrections,’ pointing to two that he
considered significant – both resulting from an early failure to put Iraqis
in charge. (…)
Even more important, Feith said, was the reluctance among some U.S.
officials to transfer power early on to an Iraqi government and disman-
tle the U.S. occupation authority, the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), headed by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer. ‘How would Iraq have
been different if we had terminated the CPA in May or June of ‘03?’ and
created an Iraqi government, he asked. ‘Some people said if you do that
and it fails, you’ll set the country back irretrievably and ... the only way
you could set up a government early on would be to rely unduly on the
‘externals’’, he said, referring to Iraqi exiles. ‘My views were generally in
favor of transferring responsibility to the Iraqis earlier. I thought there
were ways of getting the ‘internals’ involved earlier’, he said, speaking of
prospective Iraqi leaders inside the country who were not well known to
the United States before the invasion.439
In a complicated war situation of the type that guerrilla wars normally are,
one becomes totally dependent on good intelligence if one is to have any hope
of military success – something that, in the case of Iraq, is a prerequisite if one is
to succeed in bringing the situation under control. In this context, it is impor-
tant to emphasise that military intelligence in connection with counter-insur-
gency must take a completely different form than with regard to conventional
warfare. Basically, different priorities will be required if one is to have success
in this type of warfare compared with conventional circumstances. Standard
procedures such as those that are included today in what are called ‘intelligence
preparations of the battlefield’, ‘order-of-battle’ and ‘templating forces’ cannot
just simply fit in here and one is forced to adapt the procedures to the situa-
tion.440
439. Ann Scott Tyson, ‘Official Admits Errors in Iraq. Feith Cites Delay in Transfer of Power,
Size of U.S. Force’, The Washington Post, 13 July 2005, p. A12. He also stated in the inter-
view: ‘On troop levels in Iraq, Feith said U.S. military commanders – not the Pentagon
– determined the flow of and number of forces into the country. “I don’t believe there was
a single case where the commander asked for forces and didn’t get them ... the commander
controlled the forces in the theater”, he said. Senior U.S. Army officers dispute this view,
saying the Pentagon cut off the planned influx of nine division-equivalents into Iraq in the
war’s initial phase.’
440. See U.S. Army, FM 34-130, Chapter 3.
313
Electronic-based intelligence, with its emphasis on measuring and estab-

lishing electronic signals, also requires a significant reorganisation before it can
function effectively in connection with counter-insurgency. Experiences from
Afghanistan and Iraq in particular dictate that, at a lower level, i.e., for intel-
ligence officers at battalion and brigade (S2) and division levels (G2), one must
think differently to how one would if this was ‘traditional’ manoeuvre-based
conventional warfare. Here, it is oneself that is statically misplaced in an area
and the mission is to try to avoid major acts of violence directed against oneself
or the local administration and population. Naturally, it is also other rules of
play that apply, and it has clearly proved difficult to change these. Here, it is
perhaps this pattern of operations that one has tried to follow during the many
peace support operations that one should try to ‘reinvent’ and further develop?441
In this type of lengthy guerrilla conflict, S2 and G2 sections will have more
than enough to do trying to create a local picture of who has power, who actu-
ally rules a housing district, who is related to who, and, obviously, ethnic and
religious factors in particular must be taken into consideration. This often has
more similarities to how normal police work functions than to traditional field
intelligence.442 In an article in Foreign Affairs on developments in Iraq, James
Dobbins has taken as his starting point his earlier experiences as a special envoy
to places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Somalia. Under the heading
‘Picking the Right Battle’, he describes in the following way the challenges in
connection with interventions:
Counter-insurgency campaigns require the close integration of civil and
military efforts, moreover, with primacy given to political objectives
over military goals. They require detailed tactical intelligence, which
can be developed only by Iraqis and is best gathered by a police force in
daily contact with the population. Training the Iraqi police and building
a counter-terrorist ‘special branch’ within it should take priority over
all other capacity-building programs, including the creation of an Iraqi
military.443
441. Timothy L. Thomas, ‘Preventing Conflict Through Information Technology’, Military

Review, (December 1998/January–February 1999), pp. 44–57; Timothy L. Thomas, ‘IT
Requirements for Peacekeeping’, Military Review, (Sept–October 2001), p. 29. The articles
give a good overall insight into what American thinking was in this area while they were still
heavily involved in the Balkans. (Note: in Norwegian, peace support operations are not only
peacekeeping but also peace enforcing and humanitarian operations.)
442. Lt. C. Lester W. Grau, ‘Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis’, Military Review,
(July–August 2004).
443. James Dobbins, ‘Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War’, Foreign Affairs, (January/February
2005), p. 19.
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Counter-Insurgency
If I am not mistaken, this advice is almost the opposite of what the Americans
had done in Iraq until the end of 2005. The police forces seem to have a lower
priority than the Iraqi military forces. The methods that have been shown to
provide success in this type of war clearly have many similarities to attempts in
Western cities today to combat organised criminal networks or drug rings.444
Any success they have had has been based on culture and language skills, the
development of matrices in which it is charted ‘who-socialises-with-who’, sev-
eral forms of (electronic-based) network analyses (including mobile phone tap-
ping), cultural analyses, analyses of money transactions, etc. This work should,
in turn, result in one obtaining a list of, for instance, the local people who have
been hired in or given management positions. Are they loyal to those they work
for, or have they instead been ‘planted’ by the guerrilla? The latter is, as previ-
ously indicated, a prerequisite in order for the insurgents’ own organisation to
be able to obtain the intelligence they need in order to be able to avoid being
effectively defeated by the conventional forces.
In the real world, it would be extremely demanding to do what has been
briefly described above. Much depends on to what extent local military com-
manders are able to operationalise the gathering and analysis of information
that will be required and achieve reasonable co-operation with the local police
forces. All of this depends largely on their own training background. Many of
the Marine Corps’ troops and company commanders in Iraq are, for instance,
reservists with a background as police officers in American cities. They have
actively tried to adapt their own police experience to the situation in Iraq and
there are several good examples of more cautious and non-violent approaches
being more successful, than the use of military resources. This will normally
also encourage better relations with the local population, something that again
increases the opportunities for better local intelligence with a consequently
improved understanding of the situation. In David Galula’s description of local
factors, he has emphasised the importance of the civilian police. He writes as
follows about the role of the local police:
The eye and the arm of the government in all matters pertaining to inter-
nal order, the police are obviously a key factor in the early stages of an
insurgency; they are the first counter-insurgent organization that has to
be infiltrated and neutralized. Their efficiency depends on their numeri-
cal strength, the competency of their members, their loyalty toward the
government, and, last but not least, on the backing they get from the
other branches of the government – particularly the judicial system. If
444. Rekkedal and Zetterling, Grundbok i operationskonst, pp. 258–264. (Cf., also the statement
from the FBI agent Colleen Rowley, who, following ‘9/11’ went out publicly and stated that
al-Qaeda should be fought against in the same way as the Mafia.)
315
insurgents, though identified and arrested by the police, take advantage of

the many normal safeguards built into the judicial system and are released,
the police can do little. Prompt adaptation of the judicial system to the
extraordinary conditions of the insurgency, an agonizing problem at best,
is a necessity.445
Historically, it has also proved to be the case that it is of limited use to make
extensive use of electronic means of gathering intelligence when the adversary is
recruiting from peasants who are not normally dependent on electronic means
of communication. An equally serious problem is that many of those who are
willing to co-operate with Western forces often have their own agendas. They
are often seeking this type of position in order to get the opportunity to line
their own pockets, either through corruption or pure theft from government
funds or international aid.
Even if one works hard to achieve this alternative collection of information
in comparison with traditional forms of field intelligence, it has often proved
difficult to create a sufficiently good intelligence picture to be able to attack
and possibly defeat the actual insurgent groups. It has been possible to destroy
certain groups, but there is much to suggest that the insurgents’ networks are
nevertheless becoming increasingly stronger in, for example, Iraq. An impor-
tant factor here is that an intelligence officer with a Western background will
need a long time to penetrate the ‘local laws’ that apply in, for example, a Sunni
Muslim environment still heavily dominated by tribes and clan thinking. And
when the person in question has begun to understand some of what is going
on around him, his period of service in the war zone will often be over and he
will be sent home.
Another point is that, in a war-ravaged country like Afghanistan, it becomes
almost hopeless to try to draw up traditional ‘Order-of-Battle’ outlines with the
associated organisational outlines that are absolutely central aids to traditional
field intelligence developed for conventional warfare. Drawing up this type of
overview will normally be more or less a ‘work of poetry’, and this type of infor-
mation has often proved to be of little tangible value in the actual combating
of the insurgency. What we are talking about here is the mapping of networks,
which is in itself a far more demanding task than structuring hierarchical mod-
els. The analogy with ordinary police work is probably useful again. If organised
gangs or well-organised criminal groups are to be exposed and combated, a
special approach to the problems is required. As this does not involve ‘ordinary’
(often unorganised) criminals, one must even think differently if one’s side is to
make progress. Normally, in connection with the combating of well-organised
445. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, p. 31.
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Counter-Insurgency
criminals, the police aim to find out who is involved in which gang/group,
which part of the city/district the individual gang controls, what weapons they
have, what tactics they prefer to use and how they normally conduct them-
selves. Similar techniques can be employed to ‘separate the insurgents from
ordinary citizens’ if one paraphrases Chairman Mao’s old notion of ‘catching
the fish in the water’. It must also be clarified what information is actually
needed and what information is unnecessary with regard to counter-insurgency.
The standard of intelligence reports is then tailored so that it is ensured that
really important information reaches the different types of user.
Culture obviously has a significant influence on attitudes and the operational
pattern one chooses to employ. Consequently, in practice, there is little chance of
being successful without intelligence personnel involved in counter-insurgency
either having good language and cultural skills themselves or at least access to
loyal people with these skills. An insight into the local culture and history is
almost a prerequisite for real success in this type of war. Ideally, in all battalions
and brigades, one should have a good supply of this type of expertise with local
knowledge and, if possible, also at a lower level. But we have often seen in earlier
similar operations that, as this type of expertise is often a commodity in short
supply, it has been concentrated at a high level (often at corps headquarters or
higher). Access to this type of expertise is obviously not enough to win when
combating an insurgency where foreign troops are heavily involved but, in prac-
tice, it becomes almost impossible to achieve success without this form of exper-
tise being available and functioning well. One aspect of using locally recruited
interpreters is that they will naturally enough have their own local loyalty to
think about. Interpreters who operate in their local environment can often have
problems with local rulers if they do not act loyally towards them. We see here
that the very fact that one is interested in recruiting local people can also lead to
other problems. These matters should, in any case, always be thought through
when considering employing the services of locally recruited interpreters.
An interesting feature, particularly with regard to Afghanistan, and it is
also clearly an operational factor in Iraq, is that both societies have lengthy and
relatively ‘militant’ traditions. The environment has developed attitudes in the
population where, as part of their own ordinary strategy for survival, they have
learned to avoid problems either by trying to evade, confuse or outmanoeuvre
their adversaries. Loyalty is nothing permanent here, except to one’s own fam-
ily, clan or other close and long-lasting connections.446 In Afghanistan, they
446. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons of Afghanistan: War Fighting, Intelligence, and Force
Transformation (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2002), see especially Chapters 3 and 4.
317
say: ‘You cannot buy an Afghan, just rent him.’ An interesting point to make is
also that because of strong loyalty to their own clan, people tend to hold their
tongue until the clan leader gives his permission to talk to ‘outsiders’. This is,
of course, a problem in connection with the collection of intelligence. It is also
very important to have access to well trained analysts – information without
properly trained analysts to evaluate the information will be of limited value for
the military and political operations.
It also proved to be the case in Iraq that the census data was rather worthless
when they began to prepare for the recently held election for the new national
assembly in the country. As regards the preparations for the election, they had
to create a new list based on sources as dissimilar as Ba’ath party membership,
police lists, military rolls and various local municipal or religious lists. It is on
this basis that they then developed the foundation for the electoral register used
during the election. Such census data is in itself important intelligence data
when one is to attempt to develop a strategy to combat an ongoing insurgency.
But the most important information about who is who and who actually makes
the decisions in a given area would perhaps be better produced by studying
family ties, by drawing up matrices of who associates and trades with who,
and particularly if one can find out who controls the cash flow. As previously
indicated, it is necessary to develop and employ police methods if success is to
be achieved, as local knowledge based on information from the local popula-
tion has traditionally proved to be perhaps the most important individual factor
regarding effective counter-insurgency. And when the necessary intelligence
picture has been created, it is obviously a prerequisite that one possesses well-
trained forces that can quickly and effectively move in and neutralise or arrest
known insurgents.
But the type of technique described above only works if one has much local
knowledge and these techniques are not always useful when one is attempting
to expose foreign infiltrators and border crossers. In the last two cases, an effec-
tive and non-corrupt border control is probably the most important factor,
along with a requirement that everyone must have, and possibly carry around,
valid identification papers. In the case of Iraq, we can assume that identification
papers from the old regime are not reliable instruments. The implementation of
a new system for identifying the population cannot be carried out by corrupt,
and often infiltrated, local security forces. During the phase in which new ID
papers are registered and issued, there is always a great danger of the insurgents
being able to obtain false or dual identities. In this context, it is also important
for intelligence work that one has good maps and knows something about who
really owns land and buildings. Traditionally, such information, together with
analysis work and an insight into how the local or key leaders think, has been
important as regards the more successful counter-insurgencies. Finding out
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Counter-Insurgency
who are the secret supporters when combating an urban guerrilla also has much
of the characteristics of detective work. The questions one usually asks are:
1. Who is this? (The identity is to be investigated – leaders of insurgencies

often have several aliases.)
2. Who does the person usually associate with?
3. Who is the person’s closest working partner?
4. What actually is his background?
5. Which people are closely related to the person in question and where do
they live?
6. Allies willing to be involved (and/or who can be assumed to be loyal to
whom)?
The Americans constantly state that good intelligence, a better capac-

ity for joint and combined operations, better co-operation between the many
intelligence organisations and the CIA in particular should be combined with
increased flexibility/adaptability to carry out so-called ‘just in time’ opera-
tions.447 Developing, systemising and classifying this type of large amounts of
data is a demanding and often not very exciting job for those given this task;
however, without being able to develop this classification and using it, it is
extremely difficult, particularly in large cities, to find and overcome terrorist
and guerrilla groups.448 Here, good computer support and adapted software are
a prerequisite for effective work. The data will, in turn, be used as the basis for
analysis work, provide the basis for how one should prioritise police and military
efforts and provide the foundations for the evaluation of threats and so-called
‘force protection’, etc. This is nothing new. As early as in the 1970s, British
intelligence developed a system of archive pictures of houses in Republican
areas of Northern Ireland. Soldiers, who were to examine these houses, could,
447. Direct access to detailed quality information at lower levels from ‘Other Government
Agencies’ (OGA), such as the CIA paramilitary forces and Special Forces, is becoming more
and more important in the U.S. military system. See an interesting description of the new
way of doing intelligence operations in Robin Moore, Hunting Down Saddam: The Inside
Story of the Search and Capture, Foreword by Mark Vargas (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
2004), last chapter, pp 227–257.
448. A possible problem is the traditional way of organising Western S2 and G2 sections in the
headquarters at battalion, brigade and divisional level, which are designed to function well
in modern conventional warfare. In counter-insurgency warfare analysing many ‘bits and
pieces’ coming in from a lot of different sources requires a robust staffing. One needs to
tailor the staff according to the actual needs in the different conflicts.
319
by means of this system, find out whether the house had a cellar or how the
various items of furniture were arranged. Eventually, this information was put
on computer along with information such as the movements of suspected IRA
terrorists.449 But British intelligence probably had more resources and time per
insurgent in Northern Ireland than the Americans have in today’s Iraq.
On 12 September 1992, Peruvian intelligence swooped on a house in the
capital, Lima. After thorough intelligence work, which included the monitor-
ing and analysis of household waste from the house, they managed to arrest the
Maoist guerrilla’s uncontested leader ‘President Gonzalo’. This would prove to
be a decisive blow against the guerrilla forces that were extremely dependent on
this leader figure.450
As previously demonstrated, the need for intelligence will be particular-
ly great in connection with all forms of counter-insurgency. Intelligence has
always been extremely demanding and dangerous for those carrying out these
tasks with regard to counter-insurgency. It is also clear that this type of intel-
ligence work is, in reality, very different from the type of field intelligence work
that is normally carried out at a tactical and operational level in connection
with conventional warfare. One main difference is that the guerrilla war is nor-
mally of a lengthy duration and this form of conflict takes its character from
the local community it takes place in. Obviously, modern technology and the
use of more police collection and analysis methods can be good aids and these
measures, combined with traditional collection methods such as patrols and
the use of agents, contribute overall to the necessary intelligence picture. It is
important for the local population to be able to tip off the authorities without
having to walk into a police station or be seen talking to a patrol. This is usually
done by means of a system using an anonymous ‘tip-off phone’. The danger
is obviously of this being abused during private vendettas. If, however, one is
dealing with a sophisticated insurgent movement, the latter will make sure that
the tip-off phone is inundated with false tips.
As already indicated, a large amount of different data is required in order to
be able to organise and lead an effective counter-insurgency and this data must
be classified, analysed and, finally, one must have the will and ability to strike
and render harmless (or at least neutralise) the insurgent groups and leaders one
449. Mark Urban, Big Boys’ Rules: SAS and the Secret Struggle against the IRA (London: Faber and
Faber, 2001), pp. 116–117.
450. More systematic presentations of successful collection and analysis methods are described in
two articles. See, for instance, Colleen McCue, Emily S. Stone, and Teresa P. Gooch, ‘Data
Mining and Value-Added Analysis’, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, (November 2003), pp.
3–4. See also the article written by Farnaz Fassihi, ‘Two Novice Gumshoes Charted the
Capture of Saddam Hussein’, The Wall Street Journal, 18 January 2004, p. 1.
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is up against. There is also good reason to take note of the following wise words
of Karen Armstrong:
Precise intelligence is essential in any conflict. It is important to know
who our enemies are, but equally crucial to know who they are not. It is
even more vital to avoid turning potential friends into foes. By making
the disciplined effort to name our enemies correctly, we will learn more
about them, and come one step nearer, perhaps, to solving the seemingly
intractable and increasingly perilous problems of our divided world.451
Gradually, as more information about the planning of the Iraq War in 2003
has emerged, it has proved to be the case that the American side had clearly not
undertaken the necessary consideration about how they would tackle the period
after the actual war was won. The major European colonial powers, and from
the late 1950s also United States, conducted many lengthy so-called COIN
campaigns from 1940s to the 1970s. In Vietnam and elsewhere in South-East
Asia, in Africa and in Latin America a series of wars have been conducted
during the entire period mentioned – wars that are, in some cases, ongoing.
Theoretically, we should have lots of historical experiences to make use of, but
it has often proved difficult to learn from the earlier mistakes of others. Some of
the previous lessons will, however, be emphasised further on in this book.
In the aftermath of the apparently effective conventional war against Saddam
Hussein’s regime in Iraq in the spring of 2003, it has proved difficult to create
a new, stable political and economic development in the country. The U.S. is
at the head of a broad coalition where Great Britain is the only other Western
state contributing large military efforts in Iraq. The other participating states
are all making smaller military contributions.
9.4 Counter-insurgency – what is important?

Are the United States and Western forces in general able to combat lengthy
guerrilla warfare? Debate over this question has been going on constantly dur-
ing the entire period since 1945. The large number of conflicts of this type is in
itself evidence that it is really political and social antagonism that is trying to be
resolved by military means through the aforementioned wars/conflicts.
The large number of conflicts of a guerrilla nature itself suggests that there
must be clear advantages associated with fighting a guerrilla or insurgent war.
When an insurgent movement is well led and one chooses the right strategy
and manages to adhere to realistic objectives, it has proved possible to win this
type of war, i.e., force the desired political, economic, psychological and finally
321
military collapse of the ruling regime in the state under attack. It is necessary for
the ruling regime to put in significant effort if it is to be successful in combat-
ing this type of warfare. This will require lengthy efforts, and the psychological
efforts necessary in order to regain positive control of its own population should
be seen as particularly demanding.
Normally it will be an objective of a competent regime threatened by a large
insurgency to attempt to divide the population from the insurgent movement.
Even if it were to be successful in dividing the population from the insurgent
movement, this does not, however, automatically mean the regime gaining legit-
imacy among the people. It has proved particularly difficult to establish durable
legitimacy where the regime deploys physical methods such as, for example, the
compulsory movement of the population to ‘strategic villages’. There are also
several types of insurgent movements that do not necessarily need a population
in order to support themselves. A guerrilla force with a strong foreign sponsor
will belong to this group. An ethnically based insurgent movement that oper-
ates in another ethnic national group’s area will normally have to force support.
Without the ruling regime having legitimacy among the majority of people,
psychological defeat may eventually be what causes the ruling regime to fall,
not necessarily a clearly defined military defeat.
A constant problem, particularly during the early phase of an insurgency, is
that the insurgents cannot expect to win in combat against the regime’s ordi-
nary military forces, and there are probably few historical examples of many
small guerrilla attacks in themselves being enough to defeat a militarily strong
regime. This is also one of the reasons why most successful guerrilla organisa-
tions that have succeeded in taking over government in a country have con-
ducted a lengthy war, something that requires a long-term perspective of the
political struggle and warfare. In other words, it requires both patience and a
strong will to keep the war going. It has also proved to be the case that the theo-
ries concerning guerrilla war that exist are hardly of a ‘universal’ nature. This
applies, to a greater or lesser extent, to most theories that have been used by
both guerrilla and terrorist movements and those fighting against these.452 The
452. It is not uncommon for some insurgent groups to be accused of being involved in criminal
activity, such as the drugs trade. The Colombian insurgent movements FARC and ELN are
often presented as examples of drug-funded insurgent movements, something both groups
deny. In 1980, the Maoist guerrilla movement in Peru began its armed struggle and was
almost immediately called ‘narco-terrorists’ by the country’s authorities. An alleged or real
combination of insurgency and drug trading would obviously mean the boundaries between
counter-insurgency and the fight against drugs becoming correspondingly hazy. If we study
the U.S. security policies vis-à-vis some Latin American countries, it is not always easy to
see where the fight against drugs stops and counter-insurgency begins. For example, a great
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participants that have been able to make good local adjustments on the basis
of available theories and historical experiences and who have, at the same time,
been able to carry out the necessary changes in both tactics and their long-term
strategies have normally succeeded best.
When it comes to Mao’s theories on protracted warfare, where the insur-
gents base themselves in rural areas and then encircle the towns in the next
phase, it is difficult to see that things have worked this way in Latin America.
In Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala and Colombia, so-called long-term strategies
have only served to give the governments time to react, reform and develop a
strategy for counter-insurgency. Obviously, the U.S. has not been standing on
the sidelines waiting for a country to fall to an insurgent movement. The two
revolutions that actually have taken place, in Cuba and Nicaragua, have both
ended in victories for the revolutionaries as a result of the insurgent movements
exploiting a time-limited situation where there were serious political crises in
the two countries.453
It has proved to be the case historically that insurgency through guerrilla
warfare has often been successful, but there is absolutely nothing to say that
a lengthy insurgency will automatically always succeed. Guerrilla groups have
their own weaknesses and limitations. For instance, if a guerrilla movement has
to survive under difficult physical and psychological conditions, particularly
in those insurgencies that have a strong core group of ideologically motivated
leaders, it is not uncommon to see factionalism, and a factionalisation and an
internal split, after a period.
deal of assistance has gone to Colombian ‘anti-drugs battalions.’ (See, for example, Angel
Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its
Implications for Regional Stability [Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001], pp. 62–63.) From
the end of the 1980s, there was, in Peru, a risk of being stopped by Peruvian DEA forces
in areas in which the Maoists were active. At a time when American support for a counter-
insurgency would have been controversial, these forces were armed and uniformed like a
military force. It is important to understand this link between counter-insurgency and the
fight against drugs as it has broad political and popular support in the U.S. Afghanistan also
falls within this context. The U.S. would perhaps like to establish bases in the long-term,
not just as a means of having a presence in order to politically influence Pakistan and the
region in general, but as a means of reducing opium production.
453. If we compare Maoist strategy for guerrilla warfare with Che Guevara’s so-called ‘foco’
theory for guerrilla warfare, we see that this is not based on the same fundamental ideas.
Both Cuba and Nicaragua were the result of a revolution in accordance with foco principles,
not a Maoist people’s war as such. It is outside the framework of this book to go into the
differences in greater detail. See also Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: ständig mot segern
1928–1959 [Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life] (Stockholm: Leopard förlag, 2002), and
particularly Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Vintage, 1969).
323
It is probably possible to establish some fundamental guidelines with regard

to what one should/should not do but, if an insurgency is to succeed, the prin-
ciples one follows must be adapted to the individual situation. The same obvi-
ously applies to those combating an insurgency. One must have an insight into
local conditions and the conceptions and attitudes that apply here.
9.4.1 Counter-insurgency – must it be relearned each time?

In many ways, we can see that the debate on counter-insurgency has been given
fresh impetus and new content as a result of the ‘continuation war’ in Iraq
from the summer of 2003. One symbol of this could be how the American
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld described further developments in Iraq
in a memorandum from the middle of October 2003. Here, he speculated
whether the American forces were prepared to deal with a lengthy guerrilla war
in Iraq. The memorandum has triggered lengthy debate in U.S. military circles
and the debate has focused on what is required of modern counter-insurgents
and what works in connection with COIN as a form of combat. From April
2004, the debate picked up fresh momentum given the rapid escalation of the
use of violence against the coalition forces and Iraqis who supported and helped
them in Iraq.
An examination of several of the leading Western journals has shown that,
during the period from about 1990 to today, in clear contrast to the peri-
od from about 1950 to 1980, almost no theoretical works have been written
about the more important aspects of counter-insurgency.454 Instead, in these
same journals in the 1990s, they wrote of phenomena such as Revolution in
Military Affairs (RMA) and RMA-associated technologies, with the main empha-
sis normally on command and control developments, the introduction of vari-
ous forms of precision weapons systems and the associated so-called ‘targeting’
processes. In particular, the American debate on what was seen as the battle-
ground of the future and the description of the operational art that would fit in
there has been extremely focused on technology and organisation, particularly
up to September 11, 2001.
In other words, it is primarily the conventional battleground with war
between states that has been at the centre of this development – not how war
would look in the Third World or when well-organised terrorist groups were at
454. This applies to most leading journals that are receptive to so-called strategic studies and
similar political and military theory works. Frank Cass (taken over by the Taylor & Francis
Group in 2004) in London has, however, published some smaller ‘simple’ journals that are
receptive to articles about the various forms of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, where coun-
ter-insurgency is part of the content of the articles in the journals.
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Counter-Insurgency
large against Western states or their allies with ‘other means’ than conventional
forces.
Apart from the introductory American RMA debate of the 1990s and
the later, equally technically focused discussion on Network-Centric Warfare
(NCW) from the end of the 1990s the debate is now changing. The catchwords
Effects-Based Operations and Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) have forced their
way into the debate since 2001, and especially EBO (and the ‘coming’ EBA)
has partially dislodged RMA and RDO. Together, these four concepts could be
said to represent the core of Western military debate in the period after the end
of the Cold War. Parallel with this ‘pure military’ debate, another debate has
been going on where concepts such as ‘nation-building’ and the various forms
of ‘peacekeeping’ have been discussed. It is also of interest for developments
today that the so-called ‘nation-building operations’ of the 1990s, like those we
saw in the Balkans, were not, in practice, faced with a determined and violent
insurgent movement that deliberately attacked those who came to ensure new
social developments. The developments in the wars in the Balkans coincided
with the not insignificant skills developed, for instance, in the U.S. with regard
to counter-insurgency in the 1960s and 1970s within the political leadership
being now on the wane. A new generation of officials without political or per-
sonal experience of the earlier so-called ‘counter-insurgency era’ that can be
considered to have ended at the end of the 1970s had, in the 1990s, taken over
the majority of top positions.
Similarly, if we look at the specialist literature dealing with insurgency and
terrorism from the period from about 1980 to 2000, a lot has been written
about terrorism in extremely general terms but little about the problem that
has now become much more acute: how a determined insurgent movement
organises and implements strategic campaigns of terror in order to destabilise
the actual nation-building, as we now see happening in Iraq. Here, it is often
enough for the insurgents that the state forces fail to re-establish the govern-
ment – the insurgents do not need to take over the administration of the state
themselves, and the government collapses.
It is clearly uncertain how the insurgents have actually been able to develop
long-term plans in Iraq. Some groups are probably most preoccupied with get-
ting the Americans out, something that is most in keeping with the ‘short-term
ideology’ we typically find in insurgent movements. But there is probably an
element of more ambitious plans in some of the active resistance groups – often
with thinking that takes its inspiration from a mixture of ethnicity and religion.
According to adherents of these visions, a new ‘state of God’, ‘righteous social
order’ or ‘Caliphate on Earth’ will arise from the chaos prevailing, depending on
the country or area studied. This ‘new order’ will then be led by the insurgents/
terrorists or their ‘chosen ones’ as most insurgent movements probably see it.
325
9.4.2 What can we learn from the past?

Due to developments in Iraq during 2005, we increasingly saw more frequent
references to what are rather inexact historical parallels with the Vietnam War.
The majority of contributions that I have seen to the ongoing debate, particu-
larly in the media, but also in individual articles in journals, have been less able
to draw convincing parallels between the war in Indochina and later in South
Vietnam, and what is going on in Iraq.
The world has actually changed greatly in the intervening period, particu-
larly through the superpower confrontation between the Soviet Union and the
U.S. now being gone, something that makes it almost impossible for insurgents
to play on the clear political lines of confrontation from the 1960s. This was a
situation that the Communist leadership in Vietnam in particular was able to
exploit in a convincing manner in the 1960s and early 1970s. The lessons from
Vietnam and, for example, Northern Ireland have in the intervening period left
their mark on military experiential material, something that has contributed to
increasing the distinction between American and British attitudes to how one
should deal with LIC.
The different insurgent factions in Iraq have not, so far, been able to develop
a countrywide and consistently led insurgent movement, even if certain forms
of ‘tactical cooperation’ between militant factions were seen for the first time in
April 2004. The different militias and other forms of insurgent groups actually
only agree on the coalition troops leaving Iraq as soon as possible – a rather lim-
ited basis on which to build any future collaboration. There is actually no agree-
ment on what they agree on politically, who should lead the insurgency, which
religious interpretation should dominate and how the state of Iraq should look.
In a situation like this, the possibility of a civil war as soon as the coalition
troops have pulled out is extremely great.
Knowledge, insight and experiences from the many previous guerrilla wars
mean that these should be studied afresh. There is every reason to believe that,
over the next few years, we will be faced with a greater number of terrorist move-
ments with ‘global’ perspectives to their terrorist activity, in clear contrast to the
patterns that have dominated since the Second World War, i.e., that a locally
recruited and oriented guerrilla or terrorist organisation primarily attacks the
local government’s forces and symbols in a situation similar to civil war. Help
was, however, often available from abroad, such as practical and moral sup-
port from groups (and possibly countries) outside the area in which the war
was going on, but there was less danger of the conflict ‘spreading’ to other
parts of the world. The local insurgents’ cause was often too much of a local
nature for people without a background from this given country/area to want to
become involved in the cause. Some examples of this type of ‘international, but
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Counter-Insurgency
nevertheless primarily local’ struggle are the Basque’s terrorism through ETA
in Spain, the IRA in Northern Ireland (and sporadic attacks elsewhere in Great
Britain) and the ‘Red Army faction’ in West Germany (in the 1970s).
Without studying previous insurgencies and the attempts at counter-insur-
gency that have gone on – including understanding that the historical condi-
tions for the individual insurgencies will obviously be subject to change – it
is difficult to know what one can possibly learn from previous attempts at
combating insurgencies or controlling these. In particular:
• Which lessons from previous counter-insurgencies are of relevance to a cur-

rent insurgency/insurgencies?
• Which operational and theoretical problems are topical for today’s situa-
tion, e.g., in Iraq or the Middle East in general?
• It is also important to find an answer as to whether the same factors will
have equal importance in, for example, Africa or Asia.
The Americans in particular used a lot of resources and undertook research

efforts in Vietnam in order to better understand what was happening there.
They developed various so-called counter-insurgency campaigns but it proved to
be difficult to implement these, particularly when both the South Vietnamese
political leadership and sections of the American military and political admin-
istration were, in practice, more interested in more conventional military solu-
tions. All in all, the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 became a symbol of
something that the Americans did not, in the ‘spirit of the age’, want to have
any more of: large-scale American involvement in a Second or Third World
country of minor importance.
But there was one area where the Americans continued to spend money and
that was the intelligence sector. During the entire period, they attached great
importance to the use of and requirement for functioning intelligence services.
The U.S. also took note of developments in the many Third World conflicts
during the period, but if we ignore conflicts in the U.S.’ backyard of Latin
America in particular, the Americans were, after 1975, rarely directly involved
outside Korea and in Europe at least as long as the Cold War went on.
Nor can one have any hope of ‘winning’ or achieving success in the many
smaller conflicts going on without the well-developed use of the collection of
information and the analysis of intelligence. Another experience could pos-
sibly be that governments (presumably) in Spain and (definitely) in Northern
Ireland, at the same time as using military means, also had a secret political
dialogue with the actual terrorist organisations.
327
As previously indicated, in our present time, a great number of insurgen-

cies directed at ruling regimes have been going on, mostly in the Third World.
In addition, there have been various terrorist activities and the majority of
the actual terrorist groups still have an internal focus. But the activity repre-
sented by the more internationally organised and recruited terrorist systems, of
which al-Qaeda is the foremost symbol, have other ‘forms of combat’ and are
more international than the more typical local (or, at most, regional) guerrilla
and terrorist organisations. The latter normally operate within the territory of
a country or, at most, in neighbouring countries, while al-Qaeda has ‘taken
responsibility for’ fighting Western interests (particularly American ones) and
‘unfaithful’ Arab regimes where the opportunity presents itself. The latter activ-
ity requires a more advanced theoretical and technical superstructure than local
insurgency. Those groups ‘belonging to’ al-Qaeda have also demonstrated a
great aptitude for long-term planning and a more conscious selection of both
targets and victims than the more internal insurgent movements. The will-
ingness to use violence is, however, the same: ‘anybody’ seen as an ‘enemy of
the insurgents’, and what they stand for, is to be threatened and, if necessary,
destroyed by means of the systematic use of violent methods.455
9.4.3 What will the challenges be for those combating terror and
insurgency?
If Western forces are to be able to be used effectively against the ongoing insur-
gent and terrorist activities, either in the West or as ‘advanced operations’ in the
Second and Third Worlds, where the most violent conflicts are going on today,
it is necessary to have knowledge of what characterises this form of lengthy
conflict: what causes it to break out, who normally leads and recruits for the
actual guerrilla or terrorist organisations, what the conflicts are alleged to be
about and, especially, whether there are other or previous conflicts that one
could possibly learn something from.
If one assumes that one’s soldiers (and possibly also police) may become
involved in this type of conflict with or without NATO, the UN or the EU
as a ‘legitimising authority’ – it is important that both one’s own political and
455. The establishment of a common leadership (abbreviated to SOCOM) for consistent leader-
ship of all Special Forces had/has the objective of building bridges between the conventional
forces and unconventional missions. This force, about 30,000 in size, has in many ways
trained exactly for direct collaboration with other countries’ political and military institu-
tions (called Foreign Internal Defence activities). The United States has, therefore, to some
extent, seen the need, which has been discussed previously in this point, and has tried to do
something about it.
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Counter-Insurgency
military leaders at least have some insight into what characterises this type of
operation. They should also know something about what counter-insurgency
is and understand what will be required if one’s own troops are to be deployed
in a conflict that may often be far from home.
Seen in this light, both research and fresh military insight will be required
if one is to be able to meet the new challenges. Research and the necessary
adjustment to the existing forces so that they will be able to carry out military
operations in other parts of the world, based on other operational art and tactics
than they are used to at home, will also be necessary if one is to be able to deal
with the violent and clearly anti-Western bias.
One must obviously also have an insight into what characterises the modern
forms of insurgency:
• Changes in our present time, seen in comparison with what was experienced
during the decolonisation conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s.
• Similarities and differences with regard to what the Americans learned from
the attempts to ‘stem the flow of Communism’ from the middle of 1960s
to about 1975 (the first ‘counter-insurgency era’).
• The possible consequences of the more diffuse and often religiously inspired
insurgencies and terrorist schemes with their base in the Middle East that
are, primarily, directed at the West and Western values in general and, sec-
ondly, at the local groups that want to modernise society in a Western way.
We now see clear features of this nature in the ongoing insurgencies in
places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine.
• Conflicts must also be seen in relation to the integrated position that the
Nordic countries and others have in the global community and a country’s
military exposure and the subsequent potential vulnerability that today’s
participation level could result in should be taken into account.
9.5 Can we learn anything from past and contemporary examples

and thinking?
At this point, I will, by means of a few examples and a short presentation on ear-
lier thinking on counter-insurgency, attempt to describe some ideas that have
been used in connection with earlier attempts at bringing insurgency under
control. There is much to suggest that it is not new technology that is decisive,
but being able to set realistic targets and following up these objectives over a
long period of time. However, there is hardly any ‘miracle method’ that ensures
that those making use of this method/these theories will win in the end.
329
9.5.1 Northern Ireland – an example of a lengthy conflict/LIC

Can we learn anything from this conflict? Developments in Northern Ireland
have been studied by many people and this LIC in Western Europe has cost
more than 2,000 lives over the last 30 years. Without a doubt, this ‘war’ satisfies
the requirements for being an LIC, in the manner in which this type has been
previously defined here. There are undoubtedly differences in maturity from
one regime to another, something that can obviously be seen when they are
challenged. The manner in which the British have attempted to limit/control
the conflict has also varied over a period of time.
During its reign of terror in Northern Ireland, the IRA often ignored the
element of the local population that remained passive to the terrorist activity.
However, the terrorists focused broadly and ruthlessly on those they regarded as
disagreeing, even if they remained passive. The Englishman Richard Clutterbuck
has, in one of his books, stated that, after a little more than three years of ‘war-
fare’, they had used four times as many explosives as The Special Operations
Executive had used for sabotage attacks in France during the entire Second
World War, but no details of the operations are presented in the book.456
The terror in Northern Ireland is rather unique for other reasons: the actual
guerrilla warfare and the associated terror were conducted somewhat differ-
ently in urban areas than in rural areas. The conflict was also characterised
by the media campaigns of both sides while secret political negotiations with
the British and Irish Governments were ongoing. The breadth of non-violent
activities demonstrated in the IRA’s campaign may be an interesting contrast
to all the conflicts in rural districts in the Third World we otherwise have
gained experience of. As a result of having lasted so many years, the conflict in
Northern Ireland has gone through so many stages over such a long time that
changes in technological and political maturity can really be measured here.
Entire political careers have actually run their course within the time frame of
today’s conflict.
It cannot be emphasised strongly enough that, in order to tackle the ‘glocale’
problems of today, i.e., which are both local and international at the same time,
we should also study our own multicultural society in the West. Large streams
of refugees to Western Europe over the course of the last few decades have
created a number of small ‘ghetto communities’ where the ethnic minorities’
cultures and languages dominate. Other refugees and immigrants who are more
broadly integrated will often have ties within these micro societies. If one or
more of these ‘societies within society’ were to introduce an LIC in a European
456. Richard Clutterbuck, Protest and the Urban Guerrilla (New York: Abelard-Schumann,
1974), p. 100.
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Counter-Insurgency
country, the lessons from Third World countries with their more ‘primitive’
conflicts would probably be of reduced value.457 The limited ability (and will)
of most European countries to integrate foreign cultures is seen as providing
potential conflict.
9.5.2 The relevance of earlier French theories about insurgency?

The Vietnam War during the period that the United States was militarily heav-
ily involved (from 1965 to 1972) is probably the best-documented conflict in
the Third World. It is, however, the case that those wishing to study ‘classic’
counter-insurgency campaigns that are not altogether too far back in time can
find a lot of ‘alternative thinking’ in the French wars in Indochina and Algeria
respectively. A book written by the controversial French colonel and military
theorist Roger Trinquier (born 1908) is one of the books documenting French
experiences and points of view: ways of thinking that may appear controversial
today.
Trinquier served in China, Indochina and Algeria, and it was against this
background that he wrote his controversial book.458 His book from 1961 was
soon translated into English, something that facilitates studies for most people
who have a rather limited knowledge of French. The English translation of the
book is called Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency.459 The book
has, without doubt, been one of the most influential books of its kind ever writ-
ten and was a bestseller in France, something that is not very common for this
type of specialist literature. The book is unusually direct and realistically writ-
ten and provides a unique insight into how the French paratrooper forces, with
their reference point being their previous participation over many years in the
war against the Vietminh in Indochina (1946–1954), developed and carried out
their campaign in Algeria in the period from 1956–1959.460 They had learned
from the Vietminh in Indochina and subsequently made use of the combat tech-
niques they themselves had gained personal experience of in the colonial wars,
including the use of torture (which was naturally enough extremely controversial
457. Cf., the South Moluccas’ various frustrated ‘freedom movements’ which perpetrated several
acts of terror in the Netherlands in the 1970s.
458. The title of the original is La guerre modern [Modern Warfare], and can be seen as an overall
attempt at creating a French counter-insurgency theory. Opponents have seen the book as
a ‘blueprint’ for military totalitarianism. See the next footnote for details.
459. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, translator Daniel Lee,
with an introduction by Bernard B. Fall (New York: Praeger, 1964).
460. Nils Marius Rekkedal, ‘Fransk operationskonst’ [French Operational Art] in Rekkedal and
Zetterling, Grundbok i operationskonst, pp. 210–278.
331
Colonel Roger Trinquier, paratrooper, military

theorist and former colleague of General
Massu. (Photo: AFP Photo)
in France). Even if the French troops can, in many ways, be seen to have won
the battle against the local liberation movement (the FLN), they were not able
to win the war politically. President de Gaulle and his political circles decided
to end the war and concentrate on developing France as an atomic power – the
illusion of still being a European superpower became the priority.
In our recent time it is probably Mark Bowden’s book, Black Hawk Down: A
Story of Modern War,461 about the attempt by the American Ranger and Delta
Force to capture one of Somalia’s warlords in October 1993 that is of most
popular interest, symbolised by the significant sales of the book.462
Even if there must, by necessity, be a difference between a liberation war
towards the end of the colonial world as Trinquier describes and the civil war
like situation that Bowden describes about 40 years later in Somalia, there are
nevertheless several similar features between the wars of the two eras. If we also
study the conflicts in the Balkans early in the 1990s, in Afghanistan after 2001
and the developments after the war against the Saddam regime was declared
won by President Bush on 2 May 2003, all have several fundamental features
in common:
461. Bowden, Black Hawk Down.

462. As an illustration of the lack of interest in writing books on this subject, the USMC’s manual
from 1940, Small Arms War, is still seen as ‘current’ by many people and new editions are
always being printed.
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Counter-Insurgency
• The lengthy operations we also see today reflect many of the ‘non-linear’
and ‘unconventional’ features that Trinquier also wrote about in his time.
• Trinquier called the form of warfare he described ‘modern warfare’ to dis-
tinguish it from the traditional European form of warfare: war between
sovereign states. What he wanted to emphasise was that the war was of a
different nature to the form of warfare that had characterised ‘the war to end
all wars’: the Second World War.
• Trinquier probably believed that modern war consisted of a battle between
the forces that wanted to modernise the state and create a modern society
and their opponents who wanted to prevent the new thinking that ‘the
modern forces’/the Western ideas represented being allowed to dominate
the future.463 It was implied that those who took up this form of destructive
insurgency were fundamentally against modernisation. The counter-forces
would either defend the traditional forces and values or were adherents of
‘Communism’, a modern form of ‘reactionary religion’ as he and many
others who led counter-insurgency saw it. These organisations’ methods of
combat were based on guerrilla warfare and terrorism.
French theorists such as Roger Trinquier and several of his contemporary

French military leaders were confronted by revolutionary warfare in Indochina
during the lengthy war against the Vietminh.464 In 1951, the French had set
up a special unit in Indochina, called the Groupementde de Commandos Mixtes
Aéroportés (GCMA), an organisation that would try to fight the Vietminh’s
increasing control over the population in the rural areas. Everything was organ-
ised as a resistance movement against the Vietminh and they wanted to mobi-
lise different minorities, which would be set up as small self-defence areas and
indirectly contribute to the Vietminh losing control of their own rear areas.
The group was to infiltrate the local population, gather intelligence and set
up small guerrilla units. The GCMA quickly grew in size through the delib-
erate recruitment of minorities that were traditionally most sceptical of the
Vietnamese, such as the T’ai and Meo tribes. In May 1953, the then Major
Trinquier took over as GCMA commander, a force that had grown to almost
20,000 men covering several thousand square kilometres by the spring of 1954.
463. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, pp. 5–7.

464. Rekkedal, ‘Fransk operationskonst’, pp. 245–266. See also Paul-Marie de la Gorce, The
French Army: A Military-Political History (New York: George Braziller, 1963), pp. 440–449.
Gorce characterised the war as follows: ‘The Algerian War was to be the last, probably, and
certainly the greatest and most dramatic of colonial wars.’ (p. 447)
333
Few majors have commanded such an important force. He had already previ-
ously been a regional commander for assignments in North Vietnam and had a
good knowledge of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla activities. On the basis of his
own experiences he felt that a local maquis (resistance area) should consist of a
maximum of 1,000 guerrilla soldiers supported by between 2,000 and 3,000
support troops from the actual tribes. Based on the experiences they had gath-
ered, the Vietminh were not able to defeat a force like this without deploying an
even bigger conventional force. As he saw it, the mission of a maquis was to:
• prevent the local population collaborating with the Vietminh;

• develop an atmosphere of permanent insecurity within the Vietminh’s own
area;
• eventually invite the local population to become more and more active in
operations directed at the Vietminh’s established infrastructure and political
structure within their own area.465
His own operations were obviously strongly influenced by the defeat at

Dien Bien Phu in 1954, or as it says in an excellent understatement in the book:
‘The regrettable Dien Bien Phu incident (…)’466 It was during his latter years
in Indochina that Trinquier began his comprehensive study into what he later
called ‘modern warfare’. He was finally promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in
1956 and later served under General Massu in the 10th Paratrooper Division in
Algeria in 1957. By then, he already had several decades of service and what he
experienced in Algeria, particularly the fighting against the FLN in the capital
of Algiers in 1957–1958, was what inspired him to write about how insurgent
movements could be dealt with.467 Clearly inspired by what these elite forces
believed they had learned from the lost war in Indochina, there was one require-
ment that had to be satisfied if one were to have any hope of winning: securing
the support of the local population. One had to at least avoid the population
turning against one if one was to achieve any military and political success at
all. If one was to succeed, hard and systematic efforts were required. Counter-
insurgency, if it is to lead to the desired political goal, assumes that:
Warfare is now an interlocking system of measures – political, econom-
ic, psychological, and military – that aims at overthrow of the established
465. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, pp. 107–111.

466. Ibid., p. 110.
467. For a general historical presentation, see Alexander and Keiger (eds.), France and the Algerian
War 1954–62; see particularly Alexander and Keiger, ‘France and the Algerian War: Strategy,
Operations and Diplomacy’, pp. 1–34.
334
Counter-Insurgency
authority in a country and its replacement by another regime. To achieve

this end, the aggressor tries to exploit the internal tensions of the country
attacked – ideological, social, religious, economic – any conflict liable to
have a profound influence on the population to be conquered (…)
On so vast a field of action, traditional armed forces no longer enjoy
their accustomed decisive role. Victory no longer depends on one battle
over a given terrain. Military operations, as combat actions carried out
against opposing armed forces, are of only limited importance and are
never the total conflict. This is doubtless the reason why the army, tra-
ditionally attracted by the purely military aspect of a conflict, has never
seriously approached the study of a problem it considers an inferior
element in the art of war.468
Trinquier writes openly about the difficulties the French had using a tra-
ditionally trained and equipped modern, armoured force that had been devel-
oped and trained to be able to combat a similarly equipped enemy. If such a
force is deployed to take on a guerrilla force ‘it is reminiscent of the situation
that arises if one lets a lorry driver try to run over a fly and who is constantly
forced to try again’. In Indonesia, the French military leaders had ‘tried to force
the Vietminh into a decisive battle, the only form of battle the French mastered,
in the hope that their material superiority would then give them a cheap vic-
tory’.469 The only way possible to avoid this form of mistake was, according
to Trinquier, to combat the hostile organisation that most insurgent groups
develop in order to be able to challenge the status quo. ‘Victory will only be able
to be achieved through the complete destruction of (the secret) organisation
(that wishes to dominate the population). This is the main concept that must
guide us in our studies of modern warfare.’470
It is never enough for patrols to walk (or drive) through cities if one is to
be able to deal with and combat an urban insurgent movement that is being
formed. If one is to succeed, one must gain access to good intelligence and be
able to infiltrate the enemy’s organisations by means of local agents. It is neces-
sary to penetrate the enemy’s secret organisations and cells. Equipped with the
insight that this type of personal experience provides, the government forces
can remove or weaken the insurgents’ ability to frighten or persuade the peo-
ple to join the insurgent forces or their political/religious organisations. It is
assumed that the successful organisation of an insurgency will normally consist
of the four following elements/components:
468. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, p. 6.

469. Trinquier, ibid., p. 3.
470. Ibid., pp. 8–9.
335
French Foreign Legionnaires are taken to

prison by the French Army after they had,
together with the paratrooper units, revolted
against General/President de Gaulle decid-
ing that the war in Algeria should end,
something that resulted in a victory for the
insurgent movement, the FLN.
(Photo: UPI/Pressens bild)
1. The establishment of so-called ‘secret cells’ that function as a hidden net-

work.
2. They carry out acts of terror to show the majority of people that they are
not safe, i.e., they wish to create a feeling of insecurity among the popula-
tion and thereby show that the central authorities are not able to control
developments. Only the insurgents can provide safety!
3. They implement a series of measures to gain the support (or at least the
sympathy) of the majority of people.
4. They implement the measures they see themselves being able to carry out
with a view to undermining support for the new regime (as in Iraq today)
in order to demonstrate that those governing are not in control of the situ-
ation. It is only if the insurgency is victorious that there can be peace in the
area!
Here, the claim can be made that, even if much of French thinking on insur-
gency may probably seem less than topical today, there is still something that
could be learned from their extensive experiences from the colonial period, and
particularly from Algeria. The groundwork for military theory and associated
operational patterns must, however, always be adapted to modern reality. The
336
Counter-Insurgency
importance of the mass media in particular and the greatly changed political
situation in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War make it necessary to
carefully think through which of the French experiences could possibly still be
relevant.
9.5.3 The need for alternative military thinking

Historically, it has proved to be the case that, if a new regime is not able to
identify and systematically overcome the infrastructure that the insurgents have
built up, the new and, initially, weak regime will simply not be able to survive.
In conventional warfare one cannot win the war by fighting individual soldiers
and small units. The entire warfare has the aim of overcoming the enemy state’s
military capacity and will to continue the war. Two terms that have become
increasingly common are anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism respectively.
The first term was used to describe the more passive or defensive measures the
government forces implement and, at the same time, it is used for the measures
that individuals and companies can implement to reduce their own vulner-
ability or to protect private property against devastation. Counter-terrorism
is a newer term that covers the more active, often offensive measures that are
implemented to prevent, deter and/or foil terrorism.
Similarly, in counter-insurgency with regard to the various forms of guer-
rilla warfare/low intensity warfare, one must attempt to overcome the insur-
gents’ organisation as an entity and one cannot satisfy oneself with overcoming
small armed groups or other peripheral elements if one is to have any hope
of winning. Without those leading the military and civilian efforts of states
being able to understand this important distinction, even a superpower can
have problems defeating a well-organised insurgent movement. Taking out the
leadership is more important in counter-insurgency than in ordinary warfare.
This is because:
• An insurgent movement will, for security reasons, have as much informa-

tion as possible stored centrally with its leadership. The troops will seldom
be given access to imminent military plans and never access to the strategy
for winning.
• An insurgent movement does not have the same ability to replace its lead-
ership as regular forces (where you have a system of ranks, procedures for
appointments, etc.).
• An insurgent leader needs to have special charisma and a cult of the individual
is often built up around him. Without a leader, the actual organisation may
collapse, as happened in Peru (PCP), Angola (UNITA) and Turkey (PKK).
337
In addition, the leadership of an insurgency rarely has any special physical

protection. They often live in a base area or concealed among the population.
If one has good intelligence, there is a chance of taking out the persons in ques-
tion.
In 1991, the Israeli historian and military theorist Martin van Creveld
claimed in his book Transformation of War something similar to what Trinquier
discussed in his day.471 Creveld asserted here that we would see a decline in
traditional warfare between conventional state forces while warfare where guer-
rilla forces, insurgents, terrorists and other forms of undermining states would
dominate the picture. Today, this is a not uncommon point of view and many
modern analysts do as Trinquier did: they realise that, if one is to be able to
deal with the actual problems in connection with warfare, one must be able to
distinguish, on the one hand, between traditional conventional warfare and
what works in this respect and, on the other hand, the political methods and
objectives, tactics, combat techniques and, not least, norms that apply within
guerrilla and insurgent movements. In his time, Trinquier described develop-
ments as he saw them, after he had, by way of introduction, compared the
relative resources between a state and an insurgent movement. He described
the problem as this:
By studying this table [Note: on table – ‘traditional army versus guerrilla
band,’ p. 62 in his book], we can see that the guerrilla’s greatest advan-
tages are his perfect knowledge of an area (which he himself has chosen)
and its potential, and the support given him by the inhabitants.472
If one is to be successful in turning an imminent defeat into a victory, those
combating the insurgency must understand the following:
We have already seen how indispensable the support of the population is
to the guerrilla. It is possible for him to exist only where the people give
him their unqualified support. He cannot live among a populace he has
not previously organized and subjected to his will, because it is from it that
he must draw his sustenance and protection. (…) But this total depend-
ence upon terrain and population is also the guerrilla’s weak point.473
This experience has been repeated later by very many authors who have
studied guerrilla wars. If a government is to be able to hope for lasting progress
against a well-organised and led guerrilla movement, it must work actively and
systematically the entire time to get the local population on its side, at the same
time as maintaining the military, police and administrative pressure on the
471. van Creveld, The Transformation of War.

472. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, p. 62.
473. Ibid., pp. 62–64.
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Counter-Insurgency
guerrilla’s military forces and political cadres. In practice, this is an extremely

complicated operation that will need to go on for many years in most cases. It
will not be until the guerrilla movement realises that it cannot win militarily
that a lasting political solution can be arrived at.
An insurgent movement that wants to negotiate will often increase its mili-
tary activity before the negotiations. In so doing, they want to give the impres-
sion that they have increased in strength and are on the way to winning and to
thereby ensure a better negotiating position, cf., the FMLN’s ‘final offensive’
in 1989.474 ‘Poker tactics’ like these are not easy to see through if one does not
have good intelligence. Obviously, the government forces could do the same
prior to the desired negotiations.
Similarly, the ruling regime must be prepared to undertake the necessary
social, economic and political reforms to get the population on its side. This
is always a reason for this type of insurgency breaking out and, without being
able to accommodate reasonable demands from the areas that have supported
the insurgency, it will probably continue (or break out again, even if one has
achieved a temporary negotiated solution).
As already previously demonstrated, it is a historical lesson written about
counter-insurgency by several of the earlier theorists that these efforts will not
work if one is content with passive measures like patrols driving around in
built-up or rural areas. This type of activity is never sufficient to be able to
monitor and eventually overcome a well-organised insurgent movement. As
already previously indicated, it is necessary that the counter-insurgents try the
entire time to seek to neutralise both the insurgents’ open and secret organisa-
tions so that the insurgents will not succeed in forcing their will upon the local
population. The ruling regime must fight the insurgents’ infrastructure if it is
to survive. In other words, the insurgents must be fought with the means that
are available. Seen in this light, this is a feature of guerrilla warfare that bears
several similarities to how traditional warfare is fought. No effective warfare is
primarily based on ‘hunting’ individuals or small units. One assumes that it is
the state’s total resources and particularly its willingness to continue the war
that is most central. In ‘the new wars’ being fought it is probably vital to focus
on the fact that one is attempting to overcome an organisation and not just
be satisfied with combating the military power or other external symbols of
power. Without being successful in combating the insurgency’s central organi-
sational ability/leadership, the insurgents will, even after having losses inflicted
on them, always be able to reorganise and come back stronger.
474. Joes, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 143.
339
In the previously discussed book, Trinquier proposes three simple principles

as to how one should think with regard to political and military efforts:
1. Make sure that a distinction is made between the guerrilla and the popula-
tion that has initially supported the insurgency.475
2. Take (physical) control of the areas from which the guerrilla initially began
the insurgency, make it a dangerous area for him to operate from and focus
on turning the local population against the guerrilla movement.
3. Maintain long-lasting and well-coordinated campaigns in as big an area as
one is able to. This will contribute to it becoming difficult for the guerrilla
to regain control over important population centres that can provide real
support for the guerrilla.476 (It should be noted in this respect that this is,
to an extent, in contrast to the experiences the Americans had from their
‘sweep’ operations as described previously in point 7.1.)
The three ‘maxims’ summarised here are obviously worded rather generally.
Those who hold the political and military leadership in a given situation must
themselves formulate the necessary concrete plans and procure the resources
that the measures require. In reality, this is not an easy task, given the bureau-
cratic barriers that we have often seen when conventional forces attempt to
organise and maintain over a long period of time these actual forms of pressure
on an insurgent movement.
9.5.4 What is important for counter-insurgency operations?

If one is to have any hope of being successful in implementing and carrying
out operations based on the three recommended principles, one must also have
475. Probably he is thinking more about scaring the population from collaborating with the
insurgents than what the British have called ‘winning hearts and minds’ campaigns.
476. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, pp. 113–115. The problems dealt with in the above three points
run through today’s debate on control structures and the size of modern ground forces. If,
for example, the Swedish or Norwegian Army is to participate in operations of this nature,
it is necessary to look at the size of the ground forces that will be eventually required.
Continuity of involvement particularly requires staying power and staying power obvious-
ly requires a certain quantity and this quantity necessitates sufficient units organised and
trained for the purpose. A supply of modern materials and techniques is not enough to be
able to keep things going for a long time, cf., the major American problems in Iraq today.
It is the relatively modest numbers of forces given the size of a country and the size of the
population that will govern how effectively the hostile Arab population can be controlled
and which determines how large forces are required to control the population, more than
material factors.
340
Counter-Insurgency
developed a good intelligence capacity. It is not enough to have access to satel-

lite pictures and technical intelligence. There is, at least in the initial phase of a
counter-insurgency, a confrontation over who controls the population and has
the initiative.
If one is to have success, one must have both access to the thinking that
prevails in the population and one must have a deep understanding of the
cultural factors that have led to there being popular support for the insur-
gency. As a legacy of the Cold War, Western intelligence has normally primarily
concentrated on the technical gathering of information. There is rather little
capacity for good cultural and language skills – the two most important factors
if so-called ‘human intelligence’ (HUMINT) is to function as intended. Many
of the sources that have written about American intelligence problems dur-
ing the continuation war in Iraq point precisely to how weak they are within
HUMINT (see point 9.3.2).477
As previously mentioned, it was also Trinquier’s firm conviction that intel-
ligence was one of the most important factors if one was to succeed in combat-
ing insurgents. Similar points of view have also been expressed by Sir Robert
Thompson, Walter Laqueur, John S. Pustay and Douglas S. Blaufarb (see the
bibliography).478 But Trinquier points out that a successful insurgent move-
ment will require ‘safe areas’ that the guerrilla can operate from and that there
is a local situation where one can ‘gather in’ resources that one takes from the
ruling regime and the local population. As previously demonstrated, in mod-
ern times ‘safe areas’ are perhaps more of a myth, unless the insurgents have a
border with a kindly disposed state they can use.
It is also critical that the insurgent movement becomes able to keep the
initiative and makes sure it controls its own information/propaganda so that
it does have an adverse impact. Similarly, it will then be important for the rul-
ing regime to be able to deny the insurgents ‘free’ access to the community’s
477. One commentator who was clearly well informed was Matt Kelley. See, for example, his
article ‘U.S. Intelligence Effort Lacking in Specialists’, The San Diego Union-Tribune, 22
November 2003, p. 1. (Otherwise, please refer to the published extract from the Congress
hearings on the Iraq war that are on the Internet.)
478. Three ‘standard works’ on the war in Algeria are: Charles-Robert Ageron, Modern Algeria:
A History from 1830 to Present (London: Hurst and Company, 1991); John Ruedy, Modern
Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1992); Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962, Revised edition
(London: Penguin Books, 1987). For those wanting a more detailed read of the warfare
itself, see Alf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Algeria (Bloomington,
IN: Indiana University Press, 1972). An interesting work written by one of the central par-
ticipants is: André Beaufre, La Guerre Révolutionnaire [Revolutionary War] (Paris: Fayard,
1972).
341
resources in the form of infrastructure, access to financial support and food

items. It is also important to be able oneself to operate actively and wrench the
initiative from the insurgents and their supporters, and for one’s own informa-
tion and propaganda to be able to deal with and dismiss the insurgents’ corre-
sponding psychological warfare and desire to discredit the ruling regime.
If one is to be able to counter the insurgent’s control over the population,
those who are combating the insurgency must also organise ‘counter control’.
In practice, it has proved to be necessary to construct a list of what is happen-
ing in the population from the bottom up, and this requires that a strategy has
been developed for what one is about to do. As most areas in the introductory
phase take place down at a tactical level, there must be a willingness to think
differently to how one would in a traditional operational system. Probably the
first step is creating a list of who lives in an area and who is the natural leader.
Perhaps the local police have such lists. Perhaps the administration has them.
But in many developing countries there is often minimal control of who lives
there as the entire rural system is based on other criteria, e.g., belonging to a
tribe or a clan.
It is clearly at this lowest level that much can go wrong. If one does not, as is
necessary, take into account the local conditions, one will quickly fall out with
the local leaders. Consequently, a list of the local hierarchies, including the reli-
gious and secular leadership, must be obtained. This is particularly important
if it is a traditional farming community one is operating within, but similar
(informal) hierarchies normally also exist in cities, particularly in the Third
World. It is important to quickly get an overview of which local leaders are posi-
tive to the regime and play on this. Similarly, one must establish a system to be
able to follow what active enemies of the regime and/or guerrilla sympathisers
are doing. In practice, this type of measure requires that one maintains censuses
and issues identity cards with photographs, at the same time as developing
an intelligence system that can cover the entire country. This is where Mao
Zedong’s description of separating the ‘fish from the water’ applies, where the
‘fish’ are the insurgents – the insurgents are then ‘visible’ and can be fought.
One of the books that came out in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, writ-
ten by one of the leading officers in the U.S. Army, Lieutenant General John
H. Hay, has the title Tactical and Military Innovations. In the book, which was
published in 1974, we see how short a distance the Americans had come in their
insight into what revolutionary war/counter-insurgency was, even if they then
had, at least theoretically, gained about 10 years of military experience of con-
tinual warfare in South Vietnam. The general also writes here about the impor-
tance of technology and helicopters, etc., and claimed that ‘the widespread use
of helicopter (…) the most significant advance of the Vietnam War’. He also
stated that: ‘It is difficult to exaggerate the capabilities of the airmobile team in
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Counter-Insurgency
Vietnam; the team represented the most revolutionary change in warfare since
the blitzkrieg.’479 Since this opinion came from one of the highest-ranking gen-
erals and one of those who had been involved and led the Vietnam War, it pro-
vides us with cause for reflection. The opinion can be seen as an argument as to
why, as late as in 1974, after about 20 years of more or less active participation
in this form of warfare, the U.S. Army had still not yet understood what the core
of revolutionary warfare was. They probably did not realise what Mao’s form of
Revolution in Military Affairs actually was: revolutionary warfare that assumed
that it was oneself that was materially the weaker party. In order to compensate
for the logistical and technological shortcomings that they realised they had,
they focused totally on developing the political aspect of warfare. This new real-
ity was not yet understood within large sections of the U.S. Army’s officer corps
and they were consequently not able to understand that, in this kind of war, it
is not just first class materials and modified tactics that mean something. What
is important is to ultimately win (or at least avoid losing) the war, not necessar-
ily winning all skirmishes and battles. The so-called body count is of no great
importance if the population’s sympathies lie with the insurgents.
If one were to summarise the long story that ended in defeat for South
Vietnam in May 1975, ironically as the result of a conventional military inva-
sion by North Vietnam, it would have to be that, despite an endless series of
technological and organisational improvements and developments, they had
had only one main solution to all the problems they had encountered dur-
ing the attempt to stop the Communist insurgency, namely, a massive use of
firepower. And it was precisely firepower that General William Westmoreland
(1914–2005) had used as a reply, not a total rearrangement of the actual doc-
trine for counter-insurgency.480 What was lacking was the American officer
corps having an acceptable politico-military insight and experience, something
that, despite everything, the higher British officers had demonstrated the ben-
efit of, to a far greater extent, in connection with their many colonial wars in
Asia and Africa during the same era. The importance of such an insight is, if
possible, even more important today, particularly as a result of the new and
clearly more offensive media coverage as a reality of the world today.
The trick today is also to undertake the necessary political and military
measures without this being seen as clearly offensive to the majority of people.
479. John H. Hay, Jr., Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Material Innovations (Washington, D.C.:
Department of the Army, 1974), p. 179.
480. If one reads the general’s own memoirs, we see that he did not entirely understand, even in
the aftermath, what he had been up against in the shape of the Communist war leaders in
North Vietnam, see William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Da Capo Press,
1989), p. 275, 280–283.
343
It is definitely no easy task and can only be carried out if one has the necessary
local knowledge and combines this with the selective use of military force.
9.5.5 ‘A mixture of the use of force and persuasion’

If we are to try to summarise what normally characterises the various forms of
insurgency, we see that there are two features that almost always recur:
1. The insurgents will implement a series of measures aimed at those who live
in the actual area, with a view to directly influencing the population’s sup-
port for the insurgency.
2. In addition, they will implement a series of measures against the enemy,
i.e., against the ruling regime and the machinery of power the government
represents.
The two circumstances mentioned above will always be connected and it is

consequently often difficult to distinguish between them for those coming from
outside. If the insurgent movement is to have any success, its methods must
be adapted within both areas and it should be able to adapt its own methods
in such a way that they fit in with local circumstances. What is most common
is for insurgent movements to use a combination of pressure and persuasion
aimed at the population, i.e., success will be a result of how they manage to
achieve a successful mixture of the use of force and persuasion. Seen through
the eyes of the insurgents, success will be dependent on them achieving the
‘correct’ mixture of violence, political approaches, psychology and economic
pressure – adapted to the situation and the strength of the central power. If the
insurgents are to be successful in carrying out a coordinated programme like
this, the insurgents’ leaders must succeed in developing an adapted organisa-
tion. This may take place by them taking control of an established party or
largish organisation or, as is most common: they develop a new organisation.
The UCK, which was extremely apolitical during the war in 1999, appoint-
ed a political representative from within. The so-called UCK-Macedonia insur-
gents did the same three years later. In the case of ethnically based insurgent
movements like these, it is not strictly necessary to seek political allies in this
manner. This is because the insurgents will usually have support from their
own ethnic group nevertheless. Those who are to participate in counter-insur-
gency should have realistic objectives from the very beginning. As previously
indicated, there are many examples of less successful attempts that one could
possibly study and try to learn something from. It is important that all key civil-
ian and military leaders know something about this form of warfare if they are
to be able to prioritise properly. How should military organisations be designed
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in order to not only be able to meet the military objectives set but to also
accommodate the overriding political objectives? And, along the same lines,
are the political objectives that have been set sufficiently precise for the mili-
tary and their political taskmasters to design a comprehensive military, politi-
cal, economic and social approach to conflict resolution in ongoing or future
campaigns/operations? It is difficult to give an answer to the last question, but
it is of vital importance for future war planning that one has an insight into
the complexity of this and tries to see beyond the next battle. There are many
historical examples of leaders who become involved in wars where they had no
clear strategic goals and where they realised a bit into the war that they did not
really know why they were taking part. The Johnson administration, which
had begun the escalation of military support to South Vietnam from March
1965, can perhaps be accused of having ‘lost its direction’ after the Communist
Tet Offensive in the spring of 1968 – and eventually became unable to find
adequate policies and military responses to the developments that the escalation
of the war had led to.
If a regime and its supporters are to be able to resist a well-led insurgency,
they must eventually succeed in securing victory in the battle for the support of
the population. Then the methods one uses must eventually be adapted to the
real situation for these efforts to achieve the desired effect. There is hardly any
perfect ‘recipe’ for organising and leading counter-insurgency and, historically,
it has proved necessary to organise oneself in extremely different ways. This also
depends on the local geography, demography and climate, what form of society
is threatened and it is particularly important to what extent the insurgents actu-
ally receive support from the local population – if any at all.
As previously indicated several times, both the government and insurgents
must be able to combine political, economic and psychological measures with
directly influencing the population while, at the same time, carrying out armed
attacks against the adversary if they are to have success. We also see that those
who have personal experience of leading counter-insurgency, and who have
later written about this, all emphasise that several coordinated measures are
required. Operations carried out by the state’s security forces, including the
military forces, are useful if they are carried out within the defensive concept
that one assumes has been laid down in order to meet the new threat. If the
importance of a holistic view such as this is not understood, military efforts will
often contribute to consolidating negative developments.
The actual civilian leaders, officers, soldiers and other state bodies and offi-
cials participating in connection with combating terrorism must have access to
this type of knowledge and experience if they are to have success with regard to
counter-insurgency. But if the ruling regime is not able to adjust its policies in
order to meet the new challenges, the efforts of the existing security forces are
345
hardly likely to be enough to turn these negative developments around and the
regime will fall sooner or later.
If they cannot create a distinction between the terrorists/insurgents and the
‘normal’ civilian population that the insurgents recruit from and are supported
by, it will be difficult to achieve lasting success with regard to an ongoing coun-
ter-insurgency. Consequently, civilian efforts, including the political element,
are at least as important as purely military and police efforts when one is faced
with a largish and eventually well-organised insurgency.
9.5.6 Military and civilian measures should work in the same direction
The lessons from the ongoing war in Iraq will probably be important – both for
potential insurgent movements and terrorist groups, but also for the Western
countries and their allies in exposed areas. It is also important that the modern,
more successful, insurgent movements will probably now interpret the situ-
ation as being possible to win, even over a strong adversary, if one is able to
keep the war going for a long period of time. The most important thing, seen
through the eyes of the insurgents, will be to split the Western and/or other
major, militarily strong actors so that they are unable to establish effective col-
laboration and participation in operations in a conflict area.481 At the same
time, they will probably always try to avoid a massive American presence, i.e.,
make things so expensive in terms of money and human life for the U.S. that
the Americans give up attempting to win the local conflicts that are of less stra-
tegic significance to them. The ideal scenario might be to cause the American
withdrawal from an area of conflict (or a general withdrawal of Western forces)
as we saw in Somalia in 1993. An insurgent movement may try to achieve this
by, for instance, directing operations at ‘soft targets’, by influencing local sup-
port for ‘the foreigners’ and synchronising their activities, placing great empha-
sis on exploiting Western and regional pressure, i.e., by themselves making use
of information operations (through the use of different types of media and
direct contact with the targeted population). The ‘rule of thumb’ for propa-
ganda today is clear: to focus on attacks on civilians in the local press. In the
external/international (for example, the American) press it is the loss of their
own soldiers that perhaps provides the greatest impact.
481. This division is in many ways a reality in the Europe of today, something that insurgents,
however, can only partly take credit for. As during, for instance, the Vietnam War and the
Nicaragua conflict, these divisions often follow traditional party lines. A change of govern-
ment in Italy would probably also lead to this country leaving ‘the coalition of the willing’
as Spain and several other countries have also done.
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As previously indicated, these new conflicts will require extended coop-

eration between military and civilian authorities if one is to have any success
against a competently led insurgent movement. In concrete terms, a form of
‘integration’ of Civil Military Operations (CMO) and ‘pure’ Civil Affairs (CA)
is required, preferably so that they appear to be parallel activities but are nev-
ertheless coordinated. In addition, there are obviously the purely military and
police stabilisation and security tasks which also require that the national secu-
rity forces can operate side by side with foreign troops who have been sent to
a conflict area.
There is much to suggest that psychological factors are always of major sig-
nificance. When I have been involved in discussions about COIN with British
officers, I have heard on several occasions that in Great Britain many believe
that it is their experience that the effect of ongoing military operations dimin-
ishes dramatically after about 100 days. All the investments made during this
relatively short period, e.g., by means of CMO and CA, will have a substantial
positive effect but, if these investments are made later, the effect will clearly
diminish. If this observation is correct, this can only be due to psychological
factors. The general expectation among the local population of an improve-
ment in the situation as a result of the military intervention and clear military
resolution is initially a particular advantage for the victor. When the anticipat-
ed improvements do not materialise, attitudes change to disappointment and
gradually also opposition and hostility towards the foreign forces from sections
of the population. If those intervening do not ‘strike the right cord’ over the
course of the first few weeks after launching a military intervention in a rest-
less area, the intervention force risks being itself seen as the problem. This is not
exactly ‘fair’ but can nevertheless happen, and one should consequently plan for
this possibility. If one is to become involved in international operations, this is
a danger that all military and civilian planners should keep in mind.
When participating in the Third World in particular, in what is often an ad
hoc coalition, things can easily go wrong – and suddenly it is one’s own forces
that get the blame for things going wrong. We have seen this happen in par-
ticular in connection with several UN-led operations that were based on rather
unclear political mandates. From, at an early phase, being able to be seen as a
liberator, the intervention force may eventually be regarded as the main problem
– it is they who have become oppressors seen through the eyes of the insurgents.
If this is to be avoided, clear political mandates are necessary as well as access to
knowledge about the area in question and the parties involved in the conflict
and political support at home. A parallel to developments in Iraq, where we
have seen increasingly greater insurgent activity from the summer of 2002, is
what one should always attempt to avoid.
347
9.6 Summing up
Jeffrey Record in his article ‘Why the Strong Lose’ published in the 2006 Winter
edition of the U.S. Army’s periodical Parameter writes:
The continuing insurgency in Iraq underscores the capacity of the weak
to impose considerable military and political pain on the strong. Whether
that pain will compel the United States to abandon its agenda in Iraq
remains to be seen. What is not in dispute is that all major failed US uses
of force since 1945 – in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia – have been
against materially weaker enemies. In wars both hot and cold, the United
States has fared consistently well against such powerful enemies as Nazi
Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union, but the record against
lesser foes is decidedly mixed.482
As discussed earlier in this book, the United States fought ‘a kind of ’ coun-
ter-insurgency war in Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. Thirty years ago, Andrew
Mack wrote in a very interesting assessment published a few months before
the collapse in South Vietnam, that what made the great difference was the
political will to fight and prevail in war. Successful rebellions after the Second
World War against European colonial powers as well as in Vietnam against the
United States all had one thing in common: ‘the materially weaker insurgent
was more politically determined to win because it had much more riding on
the outcome of war than did the stronger external power, for whom the stakes
were lower.’483
Jeffrey Record commented:
Superior strength of commitment thus compensates for military inferi-
ority. Because the outcome of the war can never be as important to the
outside power as it is to those who have staked their very existence on
victory, the weaker side fights harder, displaying a willingness to incur
blood losses that would be unacceptable to the stronger side.484
There is no agreement in the long-lasting debate about the Vietnam War,
and analysts like Summers, Blaufarb, Nagl, Thompson, Record et al. all give
different perspectives on the developments. But Record has argued that after
Mao Zedong developed his theory and practice of irregular warfare known as
‘protracted war’ and ‘revolutionary war’ in the 1930s, a theory which made it
possible for the Communists to win, first, in China and later in Vietnam, the
theory has inspired insurgents in many parts of the Third World.
482. Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose”, Parameter, Winter 2005–06, p. 16.
483. Jeffrey Record, ibid, p. 17.
484. Record, ibid, p. 17.
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Counter-Insurgency
Probably, the American military and political leaders never really under-
stood the political nature of this warfare, nor the limits this brought to its own
conventional military power in the Vietnamese military and political setting.
The American forces were unable to corner and destroy an enemy with a supe-
rior will to win the war, and with a leadership that had no problem with taking
great casualties.485
The stronger side’s vulnerability to defeat in protracted conflicts against
irregular foes is arguably heightened if it is a democracy. (…) For
democracies, the strategy of ‘barbarism’ against the weaker side’s non-
combatant social and political support base is neither morally acceptable
nor, over time, political sustainable. Since 1945, wars against colonial
or ex-colonial peoples have become increasingly unacceptable to most
democratic states’ political and moral sensibilities. (…) Democracies
fail in small wars because, more specifically, they are unable to resolve
three related dilemmas: ‘how to reconcile the humanitarian values of a
portion of the educated class with the brutal requirements of counter-
insurgency warfare, … how to find a domestically acceptable trade-off
between brutality and sacrifice, (and) how to preserve support for the
war without undermining the democratic order.’486
Some of the critics of the American way of conducting the Vietnam War
have taken issue with the Johnson administration’s attempt at operating in a
‘counter-insurgency mode’ which they say almost guaranteed defeat. However,
there is a problem here, as Harry G. Summers has excellently shown in the
introduction to his book, On Strategy:
‘You know you never defeated us on the battlefield’, said the American
colonel (Colonel Harry G. Summers). The North Vietnamese colonel
pondered this remark (Colonel Tu, Chief, North Vietnamese [DRV]
Delegation) a moment. ‘That may be so’, he replied, ‘but it is also irrel-
evant.’487
Summers also argues that it was not until after the war had already been lost
on the American home front that the U.S. Armed Forces put counter-insur-
gency into a proper perspective, namely, ‘as a valuable adjunct to our military
operations against North Vietnam’.488
485. Record, ibid, p. 20.

486. Record, ibid, p. 21, with reference to Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, and the
Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 15.
487. ‘Conversations in Hanoi’, 25th April 1975, in Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy, p. 1 and
6.
488. Ibid., p. 156.
349
Some have argued that the difficulty that the U.S. has with counter-insur-
gency warfare is a result of especially the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force
not wanting to transform themselves in a way that would prioritise counter-
insurgency; instead, they prefer conventional warfare based on technology and
firepower superiority. This is an important and realistic claim. Some critics also
argue that Washington’s problem with counter-insurgency warfare is a result of
its unwillingness to be utterly ruthless. This is probably not a tenable explana-
tion; neither Nazi Germany during the Second World War nor the Soviet Union
could have been accused of ‘insufficient ruthlessness’. However, for example,
the Yugoslav Partisan detachments wore down the German troops throughout
their occupation, and the Afghan guerrillas did the same to the Soviet Army in
the 1980s. Counter-insurgency warfare is strategically and tactically difficult,
and as Summers wrote: ‘tactical victory, strategic defeat’ is always a possibility
in war.
The problem for a state and its political regime or for an occupying force
like the United States in Iraq today, is that, unlike the insurgents who merely
must not lose, the counter-insurgents must try to win. And because of asym-
metric interests, time is probably never on the counter-insurgents’ side. This
point can be illustrated as follows: the single most important strategic error
the Johnson administration made in Vietnam was in assuming that since they
could not be defeated militarily, they might not win the war, but it was impos-
sible that they could lose it.
They failed to understand the principles of political and military asym-
metry as an important part of revolutionary warfare, ‘North Vietnamese style’.
Unless the United States won the war in a reasonable time period they risked
problems: continuing to wage the war would have been political irrational.
Time is normally on the side of guerrillas/insurgents if they have a sustainable
force and here North Vietnam functioned as ‘the secure base’ for a long war the
Communist leadership in Hanoi intended to win.
Lessons learned during a long war are applied most quickly at the tactical
level. Squads, platoons and companies, which are most closely in contact with
the insurgents and have the most immediate thing at stake - their lives - tend to
learn and adapt very quickly. One measure of good morale is the speed at which
soldiers who are in contact with the enemy learn and change their behaviour,
and another measure is the extent to which these changes are incorporated into
new command flexibility, military concepts/doctrines. In addition, a measure
of command effectiveness is the speed at which the operational and military stra-
tegic lessons are learned and implemented in the military organisation.
Historically, it seems that normally it takes a longer time for generals/colo-
nels to understand what is really going on inside an insurgency than it does for
the junior ranks. Of course, there are exceptions, but this seems to be the most
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common development in a big bureaucratic organisation. And, naturally, in

the Western democratic structures, ultimately it is the political leadership who
decides on the next step during a war. Changes to the political- or military
strategy will take time, and all changes entail a possible loss of political credibility
for the ruling elite. This was the development the American leadership had to
deal with during the latter stages of the Vietnam War, and perhaps we today see
a similar development three years into the war in Iraq? At any rate, some of the
American political establishment and sections of the public have already lost all
hope of winning the war, and are pressing for a military withdrawal.
In the Iraq war in 2003, for instance, the Americans were surprised when
their military worst-case scenario did not materialise: the Iraqi Army did not
attempt to make a stand in Baghdad, forcing the U.S. military into urban
(attritional) warfare. And the Iraqi insurgents must also have been pleasantly
surprised by the length of time it took the Americans and their Iraqi allies to
realise that they were facing a flourishing insurgency/guerrilla war! The result-
ing slowness with which the U.S. military responded to the growing insurgency
made it much easier to organise and develop the insurgency groups during
2003 and early 2004.
On the other hand, the Americans were astonished by the tenacity of the
insurgency, both the guerrillas’ ability to sustain heavy casualties and their loose
command structure which provided autonomy to small units, yet, at the same
time, enabled the guerrillas to launch attacks at politically sensitive points.
Moreover, the insurgents must have been taken aback by the rapid tactical
learning curve displayed on the U.S. side, resulting in their guerrilla operations
incurring heavy losses of fighters, as well as the political acumen that allowed
the Americans and others to contain most of the insurgency to the Sunni regions
(which is still the situation in early 2006). This should be a very important les-
son from the war in Iraq until now – but it also heralds a real new danger for
the coming years when the American forces start to withdraw from the country:
a full-blown civil war is likely (as commented on in earlier chapters).
In a political/strategic sense, the Iraqi insurgents probably have the simpler
problems to deal with, as an insurgency has fewer options to choose from.
However, a successful insurgency must be able to face and find solutions to
upcoming challenges. Until now, the insurgents have been unable to build a
strong ‘united front’ against the Americans and their supporters in Iraq. And
without a strong leadership and a coherent political platform, they can hardly
win the war. But they can become the nucleus for a possible full-blown civil war
if the new and untested Iraqi Armed Forces cannot handle the developments.
At any rate, the following four points are very common in this kind of
war:
351
• The insurgents must be able to attack the target-rich environment of

administrative centres and enemy deployments, i.e., to execute unpredict-
able attacks, thereby increasing the losses sustained by the opponent. This
creates a feeling of insecurity in the enemy camp, and indirectly it also will
strike at the enemy’s morale.
• Maintain (good) relations with a host population that allows regrouping,
recruitment and re-supplying. While this population can be coerced, the
primary problem is political, namely, the need to align the insurgency lead-
ership with the interests of local leaders and other influential people.
• It is important to deny the enemy intelligence. This is done by using the
general population to ‘camouflage’ or conceal its operations. Thus, the
enemy is forced to mount (traditional) military operations that simultane-
ously normally fail to destroy the insurgents, and also alienate the general
populace. Alternatively, if the enemy refuses to attack the population, this
must be used to improve the insurgents’ security position.
The guerrillas’ purpose is to engender a sense of psychological helplessness

in their conventionally trained and equipped enemy (‘the state forces’), with
the goal of forcing the ruling political elite to abandon the fight, or at least to
engage in negotiations favourable to the insurgents, as a means of self-defence
for the regime. And, this is very important for the anti-guerrilla/COIN forces
to understand: the guerrillas/insurgents do not need to win militarily. As men-
tioned earlier, the insurgents’ goal may be modest: it will probably be good
enough not to lose!
The essence of so-called asymmetric warfare is not merely the different
means used to fight the war, but the different interests in waging the war. In
Vietnam, the fundamental difference between the two sides was this: the North
Vietnamese had a transcendent interest in the outcome of the war, nothing
mattered more for the Communist regime in Hanoi than winning. Whereas
for the Americans, Vietnam was simply one interest among many and was not
of overriding importance. Thus, the North Vietnamese could lose more forces,
including sustaining heavy casualties, without losing their psychological bal-
ance. The Americans, faced with much lower losses after the militarily success-
ful Tet Offensive in 1968, felt a greater sense of helplessness and uncertainty,
and sought to extricate themselves from a war that the North Vietnamese had
neither an interest nor the means of exiting.
All wars have ended either in the annihilation of the enemy force or in a
negotiated settlement. The Second World War was a case of the former, but the
outcomes of most other wars are negotiated. For the United States, Vietnam can
be seen as a political and military defeat under cover of a political negotiation.
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Counter-Insurgency
This is normally the case where insurgencies are waged: by the time the ruling
regime and its conventional forces begin to negotiate, it is maybe too late.
The ongoing war in Iraq has been slightly different, and it is an interesting
point that needs to be made: other (strong) parties are present who are capable
and motivated, parties other than the main adversaries today. I am, of course,
talking about the Shia and Kurd factions in Iraq. This suggests an eventual
negotiated settlement – but nobody yet knows when. The Bush administration
stated by late October 2005 that negotiations are under way. The key to the
negotiations is probably the threat of a major civil war and the potential that the
Shias, the main component of a home-grown Iraqi force, eventually will crush
the minority Sunnis. The very notion of this possibility has forced a number
of Sunni leaders to cooperate with the efforts to quell the insurgency, and thus
looking to secure their future in a post-occupation Iraq. But it is the volatility of
relations between the ethnic and religious groups underlying the negotiations
that can transform the outcome, in this case for the United States and its allies,
if the U.S. is willing to stay put in Iraq for many more years. With the Bush
administration in political trouble, this is a difficult question to answer.
Is it possible to learn from earlier COIN campaigns? It seems harder to learn
from the past than many maybe think, and counter-insurgents ‘always’ repeat
mistakes. The lessons of complexity, uncertainty, and risk assessment seem
always very difficult to handle. It seems that the subject of counter-insurgency
very often becomes problematic: planners often over-simplify the situation in
the actual country, underestimate the risks involved, and exaggerate the level of
control they can achieve over the course (and ultimate strategic outcome) of the
war/conflict. They try to deny to themselves the complexity of this kind of war,
and the full range of issues that must be dealt with politically and militarily.
As for the lessons of the Iraqi insurgency to date, there is the need for
objectivity in studying the actual problems in any country under threat from
an active insurgency, and to accept the political and military complexity of
counter-insurgency. Denying the complexity of most counter-insurgency cam-
paigns, and the full range of issues that must be dealt with, seems very common.
In doing so, many who writs about irregular warfare and insurgency, try to bor-
row ideas from past wars or historical examples, and they talk about ‘lessons’,
as if a few simple historical lessons from one conflict could be transferred easily
to another. The end result is that, far too often, they end up ‘rediscovering’ the
same old failed slogans and oversimplifications and trot out all the same old
case histories without really examining how valid they are today. For me, it is
an interesting phenomenon that before 2001 I had no problem buying cheap
second hand books on insurgency and counter-insurgency written in the first
‘counter-insurgency era’ from 1960 to 1975. After 9/11 the prices rocketed,
and today ‘classics’ cost a lot of money. Some of them are now printed again
353
like Galula and Thompson, because of the new interest in a ‘lost art’ – counter-
insurgency.
There is probably a great deal to be learned from past wars if the lessons
are carefully chosen and adapted as potential insights into a new conflict rather
than transferable paradigms. However, the Iraq War is not the Afghan War,
much less the same as Mao Zedong’s theory on revolutionary war, the Vietnam
War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or Northern Ireland. There is probably
little to be gained from efforts to revive the same old tactical and technical
solutions, without remembering past failures from the same conflicts! Words
like ‘oil spots’, ‘Special Forces’, ‘hearts and minds’, ‘protection walls and barri-
ers’, and ‘sensor nets’ are just a few examples of such efforts that now have been
applied (uncritically) to the Iraq War.
There is always a need for accurate military planning and risk assessment in
warfare, especially in counter-insurgency warfare. Much has been made in the
internal American debate of the intelligence failures in assessing Iraqi WMDs.
These failures pale into insignificance, however, in comparison with the failure
of U.S. policy and military planners to accurately assess the overall situation in
Iraq before engaging in war, and for misreading the risk of insurgency if the U.S.
did not carry out an effective mix of nation-building, good political handicraft,
and the new catchword: ‘stability and support operations’ (SASO). This failure
can hardly be made the responsibility of the American intelligence community.
It was the responsibility of the U.S. political and military leadership. Even the
former ‘Viceroy’ in Iraq Paul Bremer seems now to have understood this:
Paul Bremer, who led the US civilian occupation authority in Iraq after
the 2003 invasion, has admitted that the Americans ‘didn’t really see’
the threat coming from insurgents in the country. He also criticised
President George Bush and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, saying
they had not listened to his concerns about the quality of Iraq’s army,
and that ultimately the White House bore responsibility for decisions
that had led to the current violence. (….)
In the TV interview Bremer admits the insurgency was a surprise. ‘We
really didn’t see the insurgency coming’, he said, adding that he was wor-
ried about US plans, formulated in 2004, to begin reducing their troop
numbers in favour of relying on Iraqis. He said he raised concerns with
Bush and Rumsfeld, but they were ignored. ‘There was a tendency by
the Pentagon to exaggerate the capability of the Iraqi forces’, he said.
Bremer’s critics say that he is trying to shift the blame away from him-
self for the violence in Iraq. Many experts have attacked his decision to
disband the Iraqi army just after the invasion was complete as one of
the main factors behind the insurgency. However, Bremer said the ulti-
mate responsibility for the situation in Iraq lay at the door of the White
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Counter-Insurgency
House. ‘I believe I did everything I could do. ... The President, in the
end, is responsible for making decisions’, he said.489
The military leaders and their staffs had the responsibility of bringing
together policymakers, military planners, intelligence experts, and area experts
to provide as accurate a picture of Iraq and the consequences of an invasion as
possible. The planners can be accused of failing to exercise that responsibility.
The nation’s leading policymakers chose to act on a limited and highly ideo-
logical view of Iraq, as they planned for one extremely optimistic definition of
success, but not for risk or failure.
There was no real planning for so-called ‘stability operations’ after the
Saddam regime was militarily defeated. Key policymakers did not want to
engage in nation-building and chose to believe that removing Saddam Hussein
from power would leave the Iraqi Government functioning and intact. Plans
were made on the basis that significant elements of the Iraqi armed forces would
defect to the Coalition, remain passive, or put up only token resistance. No real
effort was made to ensure continuity of Iraqi government or stability and secu-
rity in Iraq’s major cities and throughout the countryside. A well-known history
of decades of serious sectarian and ethnic tension in Iraq was downplayed or
ignored.
Earlier actions by Saddam Hussein’s regime that had crippled Iraq’s eco-
nomic development since the early years of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s
were ignored. Iraq was probably assumed to still be an oil-rich country whose
economy could quickly recover if the oil fields were not burned, and would eas-
ily transform itself into a modern capitalist structure in the process. The U.S.’s
most senior military commanders compounded these problems by planning
for the conventional defeat of the enemy and an early exit from Iraq by mak-
ing a deliberate effort to avoid the so-called ‘Phase IV’ and SASO-operations.
The fact that they did so to minimize the strain on the American force posture,
and the ‘waste’ of U.S. troops on ‘low priority’ missions, probably played an
important role in creating the conditions under which the Iraqi insurgency
could develop and flourish.
The civilian and military area experts and the intelligence community may
not have predicted the exact nature of the insurgency that followed. Intelligence
analysis is never anything like ‘prophecy’. They did, however, provide ample
warning that there was a risk that Iraqi exiles were often failing to provide
a balanced or accurate picture of the situation, and that so-called ‘nation-
building’ would be both necessary and extremely difficult. The nation’s top
489. Paul Harris, ‘US “missed signs of rebellion”’, The Observer, 8 January 2006.
355
policymakers chose to both ignore and discourage such warnings as ‘negative’

and ‘exaggerated’, and to plan for a ‘quick’ military success. They did so after
having seen the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the sectarian
and ethnic problems of Afghanistan after the invasion in 2001.
The military situation did not improve until more than a year after the fall of
Saddam’s regime, and at least six months after it became apparent for everyone
who wanted to see, that a serious insurgency was developing. Major resources
did not flow into the creation of effective Iraqi forces until the autumn of 2004.
The U.S. aid effort operated for nearly a year and a half as if insurgency was
truly a small group of ‘Saddam diehards’ or ‘terrorists’. Even in late 2005, top
U.S. civilian policymakers were splitting hairs over semantics to try to avoid
even the word ‘insurgency’. They failed to perceive that many Sunni Arab Iraqis
see such an insurgency as having legitimate causes, and chose to largely publicly
ignore the risks of civil war and the developing problems in Shi’ite forces and
political structures.490
The failure to learn the need for an accurate characterisation of the nation
and region, where counter-insurgency may, or does exist, seems to serve as a
constant reminder of why nations choose to solve their problems by resorting
to war.
The failure to make realistic plans, which take into account both risk as well
as success, is equally significant. Use of ruthless objectivity is the cheapest solu-
tion to preventing and limiting insurgency, and planning and deploying for the
full range of what today is called stability operations and nation-building are
essential precautions wherever the stakes are high and the risk is significant.
Counter-insurgency normally falls into two main categories: unconventional
war 491 and direct action (DA):
• Unconventional war (warfare), though it sounds sinister, actually represents

the ‘soft’, humanitarian side of counter-insurgency, ideally (but rarely realis-
tically): ‘how to win without firing a shot.’ For example, it may include relief
activities that create good will among indigenous/local populations, which
in turn produces actionable intelligence.
490. This is, of course, not the first time in history. Israel denied the risks and realities of striking
deep into Lebanon in the 1980s, seeking to create a Christian-dominated allied state. Russia
denied the risks and realities of Chechnya in spite of all the brutal lessons of having denied
the risk and realities of Afghanistan. The U.S. had earlier denied the risks and realities of the
Vietnam War. European powers initially (after the Second World War) denied the realities
that forced them to end their colonial rule, etc.
491. Abbreviated to ‘UW’ in Special Operations lingo.
356
Counter-Insurgency
• Direct action represents more traditional military operations. The term

‘Direct Action missions’ refers to short duration strikes that are used when
Special Forces want to seize, capture, recover or destroy enemy weapons and
information, or recover designated personnel or material.
Unconventional warfare seeks to instil a belief that peace and security are
not possible without (political) compromise or concession. So-called ‘objec-
tives’ in this kind of warfare include war weariness, curtailment of civilian living
standards and civil liberties associated with greater security demands, and eco-
nomic hardship linked to the costs of war. The aim is maybe also to make the
opponent feel incapable of defending against assaults, create fear and depres-
sion, and undermine morale. Some important points are:
• The ultimate goal of this type of warfare is to motivate an adversary to stop

attacking or resisting, even if he still has the ability to continue the war.
• Methods used in this kind of limited warfare are many. On important capac-
ity is the use of conventional warfare tactics that can be used unconvention-
ally to demonstrate one’s own power, rather than to substantially reduce the
enemy’s ability to fight.492 In this kind of warfare Special Forces, inserted
behind an enemy’s area, can be used unconventionally to spread subver-
sion and/or propaganda, to aid local resistance fighters/insurgents, and to
ultimately build environments of fear and confusion on the insurgent side.
Tactics of destroying non-military infrastructure and blockading civilian
supplies have historically been used to weaken the morale of civilians and,
when applicable, also the soldiers in the field belonging to the insurgency
forces, through concern for their families.
• COIN doctrine, which ideally combines the political and military effort,
is intended to guide, and thus to help view the overall government cam-
paign and the military element of it through the prism of the core functions:
‘find, fix, and strike.’ The role of various agencies and the part they are to
play should be clearly expressed in the overall campaign director’s concept of
operations (CONOPS).
• The intelligence services, elements of the Armed forces (including covert,
overt, and clandestine), and other government agencies are used to ‘find’ the
492. In addition to the coercive use of traditional weapon systems, armaments that primarily
target civilians have been used, i.e., urban incendiary devices, white phosphorus, napalm
bombs, etc.
357
insurgent by gathering all available information on the political and military

elements of the insurgent organisation.
• The military services, the police, and the major departments of government,
combined with diplomatic efforts and an active ‘hearts and minds’ cam-
paign (including P INFO), ‘fix’ the insurgent.493 Locally raised/recruited
forces can also help to ‘fix’ and have been employed to good effect in numer-
ous earlier counter-insurgency campaigns.
Uniformed military and police units, Special Forces, psychological opera-

tions (PSYOPS), and not least the legal system, should spearhead the govern-
ment’s campaign to ‘strike’ at the insurgency. The campaign should also be
reinforced through socio-economic activities/reforms such as reorganising local/
regional government, creating jobs, and improving local social/medical serv-
ices, etc.
There is a clear relationship between force applied in conventional war and
force applied during a counter-insurgency campaign. Modern military doc-
trines based on so-called ‘manoeuvre warfare theory’ can be applied to both
types of warfare, but with some modifications. In both situations force has to be
applied selectively and in a controlled and measured fashion. Physical destruc-
tion is a means and not an end in a counter-insurgency campaign. The COIN
doctrine should seek to help create the conditions for political success with less
force, more quickly, and with reduced costs. The manoeuvre warfare/approach
theory shares a common ancestry with some of the most successful insurgent
strategies. The military planner who is fully acquainted with this theory and
doctrine is more likely to cope with the real and inherent complexities of a
counter-insurgency campaign than those who remain unaware of the doctrine/
theory.
But within the application of any military doctrine, it is vital for a com-
mander to know what law applies in a given set of circumstances, and what it
is that triggers any changes in the law to be applied. The answer to this type of
question relates directly to the sort of so-called Rules of Engagement (RoE) that
would be issued by a government and/or commander in the field.
In many countries government ministers provide political direction and
guidance to commanders by means of RoE that govern the application of
force. It follows that such rules that are approved by ministers may only be
changed by ministerial authority. Commanders will in turn wish to issue RoE
493. The NATO Glossary defines P INFO as ‘Information which is released or published for the
primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding
and support’.
358
Counter-Insurgency
to their subordinate commanders. These RoE will be devised within the dis-
cretion allowed by the rules approved by ministers.494
In discussing so-called ‘success criteria’, counter-insurgents need success as
early as possible to demonstrate the will, the means, and the ability to defeat the
insurgency. According to many of the ‘classical’ studies of earlier insurgencies,
counter-insurgents normally avoid negotiations until they are in a position of
strength. Potential supporters will flock to the insurgents’ side out of fear of
retaliation if the movement considers them disloyal. The relationship between
insurgents and the general population is always complex. Mao Zedong in his
time warned that ‘a revolution is not a dinner party’, and many insurgents,
including the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam, effectively used
terror – often selectively applied – against civilians to force segments of the
population into at least passive support.495
The vast majority of armed conflict today occurs inside states rather than
between them. ‘For many countries in the world simmering internal war is a
permanent condition.’496 Martin van Creveld predicts that ‘[a]s war between
states exits through one side of history’s revolving door, low-intensity conflicts
among different organizations will enter through the other’.497
In this new climate of ‘dirty’ and difficult wars, in which political and mili-
tary tasks intertwine and the objective is more often ‘nation-building’ than the
destruction of an enemy army, the ability to learn quickly during operations,
to create an organisational consensus on new ways of waging war (or of waging
peace), and then to implement those changes may be of more importance for
modern military institutions than ever before. It then requires military institu-
tions to accept as an integral part of their (organisational) culture the need to
function in this new conflict environment at all times as ‘learning institutions’.
(See the presentations of the different types of warfare in Chapter 2 and 5).
As mentioned earlier, there are different ‘schools of thought’, but almost
every leading work on counter-insurgency imparts the message that counter-
insurgency is one of the hardest types of warfare to wage. The more we study
the subject, the better we will understand the historical challenge presented by
494. RoE define the degree and manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure
that such application of force is carefully controlled. RoE are not intended to be used to assign
specific tasks or as a means of issuing tactical instructions. In passing orders to subordinates
a commander at any level must always act within the RoE received but is not bound to use
the full extent of the permission granted.
495. His perhaps best known and most studied book is: Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare
(Norwalk, CT: The Easton Press, Collector’s Edition, 1996. Original written in 1937.), see
‘What is Guerrilla Warfare’, pp. 69–76.
496. Metz, ‘Insurgency after the Cold War’, p. 63.
497. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, p. 224.
359
insurgency. Julius Caesar complained that his legions had trouble subduing the
roving Britons because his men ‘were little suited to this kind of enemy’. In the
early 1800s, Carl von Clausewitz wrote of ‘people’s wars’ in which ‘the element
of resistance will exist everywhere and nowhere’.
T. E. Lawrence, the British officer who, during World War I, led Arab fight-
ers against the Turkish rulers in the Middle East, described the campaign in his
‘classic’ insurgency book written in 1926, Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Lawrence’s is
one of the relatively few books in the COIN literature written from the point of
view of the insurgent.498 From his experience of inciting the Arab revolt against
the Turks, he concluded that insurgents needed only 2 per cent active support
from the population, and 98 per cent passive support. (Another important
book is Mao Zedong’s book On Guerrilla Warfare.) In a near-hallucinatory
state, suffering from dysentery and lying in a tent, Lawrence realised the key to
defeating the Turkish Army: ‘Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted,
nourished through long stems to the head’, he wrote. Lawrence’s guerrillas, by
contrast, ‘might be a vapour’. For the Turks, he concluded, ‘war upon rebellion
was messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife’. ’There is still much of this
old picture that fits in with many of today’s insurgencies. In particular, the cul-
tural dimension associated with the different forms of insurgent wars deserves
to be emphasised when studying insurgency and counter-insurgency.
Because of this, it is important for the government under threat to use
a combination of tools: military forces, police, economic incentives, political
reforms, diplomatic measures, i.e., every tool a government under threat can
bring into play. It is this combination of different but coordinated political/
military actions that hastens a permanent settlement in counter-insurgency.
My last reflection here on this difficult subject is this: the underestimation
of the complexity involved in the planning process for an upcoming war is
nothing new in military history. The German philosopher on war Carl von
Clausewitz called this ‘friction’, and there is little to suggest that military forces
will ever be able to avoid these problems. Modern technology may be of some
help here, but it is human decisions that are critical in war – especially if it is a
guerrilla war.
I also can see the need for a more systematic military debate with regard to
studies concerning how military operations should be designed. It is not enough
to be able to accommodate/satisfy more short-term military objectives. The real
problem, as I see it, is the difficulty all nations have with predicting the conse-
quences of their political and military ambitions. This always must include the
498. T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Norwalk, CT: The Easton Press, 1926/1935). (See
Chapter 9.)
360
Counter-Insurgency
objective of trying to win the peace. I realise that such thinking would perhaps
have political consequences; and hopefully, a realistic and objective planning
is completed before taking decisions to become involved in future wars in the
Third World or other military conflicts/insurgencies.
361
10. Epilogue
If one is to ultimately attempt to look more freely at some of the problems
described and discussed in this study, it may be of interest to the reader to hear
some of the thoughts that this author has on the characteristics of develop-
ments.
It strikes me how greatly important intelligence is in order to be able to deal
with organisations such as al-Qaeda and other well-organised insurgent move-
ments using functioning countermeasures. There is also much to suggest how
important use of the Internet and satellite communications have clearly become
for the international operations of al-Qaeda’s associated groups. Together with
other ‘communications systems’ such as, for example, the websites associated
with al-Qaeda this could perhaps be seen as their ‘command system’. In addi-
tion, al-Qaeda clearly makes great use of orderlies and so-called memorisation
of orders. It is also clear that the websites that al-Qaeda publishes act as a source
of inspiration for its followers and is part of the intentional control of operations
outside the core areas in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Some of those who have written about terrorism, and about al-Qaeda in
particular, claim that the physical distribution of training manuals and similar
specialist materials is probably seen as unnecessary because this information is
already available on the Internet (i.e., as the basis for the simplified training of
recruits and sympathisers). Some authors have also looked at how the gathering
of information is clearly done: they simply announce a need for intelligence on
the Internet and then they receive a reply from their followers! (See the biblio-
graphy for current literature on al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations.)
Another important point that has been raised by several critics of the Bush
administration’s leadership of the ‘war on terror’ is whether al-Qaeda’s ‘warfare’
can even be seen as (traditional) terrorism. It has been stated that this man-
ner of looking at the conflict is counterproductive with a view to effective
363
combating, because one then ends up in the formal (Western) loop: intelli-
gence-wanted notice-capture-court case (i.e., an outlook similar to that used
by civilian police when combating ordinary criminals). According to these
critics, one should instead conduct military operations, carried out and led as
a fight against insurgency. In other words, perhaps the wrong analysis has been
used to understand what is now happening and this is leading to the wrong
choice of measures to deal with the dangers?
An obvious problem with regard to the ongoing analysis of al-Qaeda and
other clandestine terror organisations is that they have not been able to draw
up any form of ‘Order-of-Battle’ for this organisation. The result could easily
be that all estimates of al-Qaeda’s strengths and those of similar groups could,
to an alarming extent, be similar to those the U.S. Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara and his supporters in the Pentagon, the so-called ‘the best and the
brightest’, in the 1960s carried out during the Vietnam War. This was a form
of ‘body count’ – a kind of paper exercise that proved to be totally counter-
productive on that occasion and probably still is today.499 The fact that the
Americans have tendencies that point in this direction was demonstrated on 11
September 2004 when President Bush announced in a broadcast address that
three-quarters of al-Qaeda’s leadership had now been captured.500 Whether
these losses have any effect on what al-Qaeda is involved in was not, however,
discussed. If the Americans do not have access to a real ‘Order-of-Battle’ with
regard to the organisation, what does a statement like this from the president
actually mean?
If we are to believe what has emerged about al-Qaeda’s own assessment of
what the American centre of gravity is today, then it is the U.S.’s strained econo-
my. They have probably attempted to assess what happened in the U.S. during
the Vietnam War and have rejected concentrating on what was the political
centre of gravity at that time, namely, the American people. The Bush admin-
istration is playing into al-Qaeda’s hands in many ways by scoring an ‘own
goal’ with regard to the rapidly growing American budget deficit. The rising
expenditure on defence, intelligence and security operations and a significantly
increased investment in security for U.S. inhabitants, combined with tax cuts
499. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1972).
500. President George W. Bush’s broadcast to the nation on 11 September 2004. Published the
same day. Quote: ‘(…) The United States is determined to stay on the offensive, and to
pursue the terrorists wherever they train, or sleep, or attempt to set down roots. We have
conducted this campaign from the mountains of Afghanistan, to the heart of the Middle
East, to the horn of Africa, to the islands of the Philippines, to hidden cells within our own
country. More than three-quarters of al Qaeda’s key members and associates have been
detained or killed. We know that there is still a danger to America. So we will not relent
until the terrorists who plot murder against our people are found and dealt with.’
364
Epilogue
primarily aimed at those who can best afford to pay, will probably lead to both
economic and political problems in a little while. Perhaps even the U.S. has a
‘ceiling’ with regard to what it can manage with expenditure on defence and
security, even though a superpower’s resources are in a totally different league
to those of smaller states.501
There is a clear link between the use of military power with regard to con-
ventional warfare and the use of force during a campaign aimed at insurgent
forces (‘counter-insurgency campaign’). It is probably also the case that ele-
ments of the fundamentals of military theory behind the manoeuvre warfare
doctrines can be used in connection with this type of warfare. However, in
both forms of warfare, it is important that military power is used in a selective
and controlled manner. Physical destruction is a method, and not a goal, with
regard to all forms of counter-insurgency and the doctrine should help create
the basis for political progress, ideally with a limited deployment of forces, at
a reduced cost and in such a way that the political objectives are achieved. The
theories that form the basis of manoeuvre warfare (or whatever one likes to call
this warfare) actually have much in common with several of the most successful
insurgency strategies. Those military planners and chiefs who have an insight
into the theories that underlie the existing manoeuvre theory-based doctrines
should be better able to deal with the real, and often extremely complex, reasons
that form the basis for modern counter-insurgency theory and which should
consequently form the basis for a counter-insurgency doctrine than those who
have no training based on this modern doctrinal belief.
The fact that the Americans were not able in advance to analyse the potential
consequences of the Iraq campaign in 2003 is probably due to two circumstanc-
es: a lack of leadership and quality within the key institutions that establish the
501. Bryan Bender, Globe Staff, ‘Arms Reductions, Troop Increase Eyed: War’s toll prompts shift
in priorities’, The Boston Globe, 17 December 2004, p. 1: ‘WASHINGTON – To meet a
pressing need for more ground troops, the U.S. armed forces have begun eyeing some of
the most dramatic cuts in high-tech weapons since the end of the Cold War, according to
defense officials and consultants. The Iraq war’s grinding toll has led to a vast reassessment
across all the branches of the military as they prepare to undertake a top-to-bottom review of
the Pentagon’s priorities in 2005, according to interviews with Pentagon officials who asked
not to be identified and private defense specialists. One Army study described by Pentagon
officials has concluded that the active-duty force of 500,000 needs to grow by as much as
30 percent. This year the Army was forced to borrow from the Navy and Air Force to pay
its bills, according to officials. The Navy and Air Force, facing their own financial pressures
amid burgeoning federal budget deficits, are considering deep weapons cuts. The sea service
is talking about cutting its fleet of aircraft carriers by a quarter, from 12 to nine, according
to a Navy official who was briefed on internal planning for the review. Meanwhile, the Air
Force is grappling with ways to slash its planned purchases of more than 2,500 fighter planes
by up to a third, according to two accounts of a preliminary briefing.’
365
data for decision-making and, in particular, what I would call an impatience to

confront the actual centres of gravity in the area. Perhaps it was never the U.S.
intention to preside over nation-building in Iraq? The fact that the Americans
had not created more detailed and workable plans for the so-called ‘Phase IV’
of the war may suggest this. The establishment of a new regime favouring the
West ‘would happen naturally’ is how the political and military planners in the
Bush administration probably saw things. In this case, they demonstrated a rare
inability to understand the culture and a lack of insight into the lengthy, violent
political trends in the area. Probably the text below gives a balanced view of the
development as it was in the winter of 2006:
As we reach the third anniversary of the start of the war, the confusion
on the ground in Iraq seems to have spread to American generals’ public
pronouncements. Last Monday, just days after saying that pacification
efforts with the Iraqis were going ‘very, very well’, Gen. Peter Pace, chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told an audience that Iraq is ‘a place that
is having some real difficulties right now’ and that ‘everything is in place
if they want to have a civil war’. Unfortunately, an examination of trends
in Iraq backs up General Pace’s later, more sober comments.
The country’s economy continues to disappoint. Although it had a fairly
quick recovery in 2003 and early 2004, when gross domestic product
was restored to Saddam Hussein-era levels, violence and instability
have prevented much further progress. And while subsidies for gasoline
and some other goods, which have been costing the Iraqi government
about $10 billion a year, or a third of gross domestic product, have been
reduced, projections that the country’s economy will grow by 10 per-
cent a year for the rest of the decade look increasingly suspect. Current
growth sputters along at less than 5 per cent despite sky-high prices for
oil exports. Most utilities (except telephones and Internet services) are
still performing below Baathist-era levels. Unemployment remains very
high.
Politically, Iraqis have been stalemated in forming a new government
since the impressive Dec. 15 elections, primarily over issues like ensur-
ing fair distribution of Iraq’s oil revenue and devising ways to reintegrate
lower-level former Baathists into society. This political inertia reinforces
the widespread Sunni Arab sense of estrangement. And it contributes
to remarkably high levels of Sunni Arab approval for violence against
coalition troops (almost 90 per cent) and even against their own gov-
ernment.
Paradoxically, most of what good news there has been this winter is on
the security front. American troop fatalities in Iraq have declined rela-
tive to last fall’s typical levels. Fatalities among Iraqi security forces have
also gone down, as have car bombings. Unfortunately, civilian casual-
ties have been as high as ever and, since the Feb. 22 bombing of the
366
Epilogue
Samarra mosque, sectarian violence is worse than at any time since the
invasion.
All that said, according to public opinion polls, more than 60 percent of
Iraqis (though very few Sunni Arabs) remain bullish on the future. And
Iraqi security forces continue to improve, with far higher percentages
having reached the upper half of the four-tier readiness rating system.
These statistics may point to the possibility of a troop drawdown strat-
egy for the United States – but while a strategically passable outcome
still seems within reach, it is increasingly hard to believe that there are
the makings of a major success for American foreign policy in Iraq.502
David Rieff has written that three years after the war against the Saddam
regime began, it is still impossible to know whether the United States has lost
the war in Iraq, as many critics and journalists there have long believed, or
whether disaster there might yet be averted. But what is clear is that the Bush
administration’s pre-war ambition to transform Iraq into a modern model for
a democratic Middle East has already failed.503 There have been elections, but
instead of demonstrating the ordinary Iraqi’s ‘thirst for democracy’, each poll
has confirmed what probably should have been clear from the start: Iraqis
would vote along ethnic and religious lines for ethnic or religious parties. This
can be seen as a verification of Newsweek International Editor Fareed Zakaria’s
theory of the rise of ‘illiberal democracies’.504 Iraq since the fall of Saddam
Hussein has provided a clear case in support of his theory. And although the
Bush administration pledges to ‘stay the course’ in Iraq, it has long since lost
the ‘battle of ideas’. It embarrassingly resorts only to Orwellian talk of a ‘war
on terror’ instead of addressing real issues, and its claims of success are not to
be taken very seriously.
As it enters its fourth year, the war in Iraq defies simplistic characterisations
from both ends of the political spectrum in the U.S. and elsewhere. We are now
seeing the consequences of the clear misjudgements made and it is still difficult
to see the more long-term consequences for both the actual area and Western
interests in Iraq and the Middle East region.
But it is unlikely that the war in Iraq will come to an end any time soon. The
Sunni factions probably saw voting in the December 2005 election as opening
another front, not as ending the armed resistance. As relations between Shias
and Sunnis deteriorate, both sides feel the need to have their own militias.
502. Nina Kamp, Michael O’Hanlon and Amy Unikewicz, ‘The State of Iraq: An Update’, New
York Times, March 19, 2006.
503. David Rieff, ‘Dreams turned to dust’, Los Angeles Times, 19 March 2006, <http://www.
latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-rieff19mar19,0,2568569.story?track=tottext>.
504. Rieff, ibid.
367
After the election, the political landscape of Iraq perhaps became ‘clearer’, but
probably no less violent. The inability of Iraq’s religious and ethnic factions to
cut a lasting power-sharing deal leaves the government incapable of responding
forcefully to the many sectarian attacks, that many in Iraq fear are pushing the
country toward civil war. Violent provocations have continued after the elec-
tion, with Iraq shaken by bombings, drive-by shootings and kidnappings.
368
Bibliography
Some comments on the sources used for this book

Without access to information or analysis on what went wrong or worked prop-
erly one is more or less destined to repeat earlier mistakes. The overview below
of the literature used for this book is also a ‘miniature library’ concerning insur-
gencies and suppressing them. The two initial parts below give a summary of
the literature, documents and the articles from periodicals or the Internet that
the text refers to.
The three parts consist of books or corresponding sources that mention
methods of immediate interest regarding insurgency warfare, terrorism and
suppressing insurgencies/counter-insurgencies. The last part has a different
function. It was done after the work on the text was completed, and indicates
the major themes from around 1960 until today in this field of study. This
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Overview of literature for research on insurgency, LIC, COIN, etc.

Below the reader will find ‘research literature’; books/corresponding sources
that mention/comment on different forms of insurgency warfare, terrorism and
suppression of insurgence. The list is organized according to the date of publish
and is consequently intentionally not organized in the standard alphabetic order
based on surnames.
• George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in

Indochina (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1962).
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with an introduction by Bernard B. Fall (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
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383
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387
Presentation of the author
Professor Nils Marius Rekkedal (born 1951) was

the Visiting Professor of Military Theory at the
Swedish National Defense College (SNDC) from
2001 to 2004. Since 2004, he has held the position
of Professor of War Studies, specialising in Military
Theory, at the SNDC.
Professor Rekkedal received a Cand. Phil.,
‘Hovedfag’, in History from the University of Bergen in
1980, in addition to the Norwegian degrees ‘Grunnfag
& Mellomfag’ in History and Social Anthropology,
as well as a degree, ‘Grunnfag’, in Nordic Languages.
He served in the Norwegian Army (Cavalry branch) as an officer from 1971 to
1983, and as a Staff Officer in the Army Reserve (Lt.Col.). From 1985 to 1996
he was a Scientist and later Principal Scientist at the Norwegian Defence Research
Establishment (NDRE), at the Department of Systems Analysis and later at the
Department of Electronics. From 1996 to 2001 he worked at the Norwegian
Defence Headquarters in Oslo as a Principal Scientist. He has also worked part-
time as a Distinguished Lecturer of Modern Warfare (Military Theory) at the
Army War Academy (‘Krigsskolen’) in Oslo, and also conducted lectures at other
Norwegian and foreign military institutions.
Professor Rekkedal has published approx. 80 pieces of scientific work, many
of those at the NDRE. In connection with his career at the NDRE he has
participated extensively in designing the Norwegian Chief of Defence Studies;
research reports published for special fields of studies that encompass military
theory and technical development. He has also been involved in research in
development of Norwegian and NATO command- and control systems. His
389
speciality during the 1980s and 1990s was the development of Soviet/Russian
military tactics and operational art. He has also published many articles in pro-
fessional periodicals and has contributed to several anthologies both in Norway
and abroad. Since coming to the SNDC, Professor Rekkedal has published a
number of books and military articles in Sweden and Norway on the subjects
of Military Theory and Operational Art.
He is a member of the Swedish Royal Academy of War Science and the
Swedish Commission on Military History (Commision Suedoise d’ Historie
Militaire).
390
Index
10th Paratrooper Division 334 coalition 138
9/11, see September 11, 2001 groupings 185
9/11 Commission Report 227 An Agenda for Peace 118
Apache Indians 112
ABC 105 Arab nomads 50
Abkhazia 15 Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA)
Abu Sayyaf 28 28
Aceh province 171 armour(ed) 259
action-reaction-counteraction cycle 124 division 295
Adams, Gerry 226 vehicles 259, 261
Afghanistan 7, 10, 51, 78, 87, 194, 227 Armstrong, Karen 189, 210, 321
Afghan War 354 Arquilla, John 41
Africa 20, 55, 77 Asahara, Shoko 215
agents 335 Asia 20, 76
agricultural structure 94 Association of Muslim Scholars 310
Ahlin, Per 225 asymmetric
aircraft carrier group 295 attacks 235
airpower 229, 234 conflicts 243
air warfare 294 means 135
al-Dari, Harith 310 strategy 147
al-Jazeera 104 thinking 125, 136
al-Qaeda 18, 29, 37, 44, 59, 125, 127– threats 155, 159–161
128, 140, 147, 153, 169, 180, 184, warfare 15, 123–124, 130, 133, 139,
188, 190, 193–199, 201, 203, 218– 155, 237, 277, 352
219, 226–227, 234, 255, 285, 328, weapons 136
363–364 asymmetry 133
al-Sulaymaniyah 311 attack(s)
al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab 255 helicopters 262
Albania 100, 106 on infrastructure 152
Algeria 60, 87, 97, 184, 294, 331, 334 Aum Shinrikyo 130, 134, 183, 215
Algiers 247 autocratic states 129
aliases 319
Amazon 149 Ba’ath party 318
American Armed Forces 142 Baader-Meinhof gang 33
anarchists 205 balance of relative strengths, the 115
Angola 25, 84, 90, 118, 171 Bamiyan valley 214
anthrax terrorism 194 Barnett, Thomas 27
anti-guerrilla forces 352 Barth, Fredrik 93
anti-Semitism 185 Basayev, Shamil 193
anti-terrorism 337 base areas 280
anti-Western Basque 11, 87, 202, 327
attitudes 130 Batalas, Achilles 11
391
battalion and brigade (S2) level 314 Caesar, Julius 360

battlefield awareness 232 Cairo 249
BBC approach 105 Calcutta 249
Belgrade 149 caliphate 185, 211–212
Berlin 247, 252 Cambodia 36, 168–169
Beslan 177, 190, 193 campaigns 340
Bible 189 Capitalism 24, 72
Bigley, Kenneth 154 Carter, Jimmy 22
bin Laden, Osama 59, 127, 134, 147, Casablanca 190, 200
155, 185–186, 188, 192, 194–196, casualty
198–199, 210–211, 213–214, 226 figures 307
biological weapons 124–125, 130, 142 rate(s) 256, 306
bioterrorism 194 Catholic church 58
Black Watch, the 256 CBS 105
Blaufarb, Douglas S. 36, 121, 341, 348 cellphones 134, 261
blitzkrieg 44 cells 335
blue-on-blue 265 Central Asia 77
body count 343 Central Europe 11
Boer War 35 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 127,
border control 318 141, 161, 201, 232, 319
Bowden, Mark 332 report 232
Boyd, John R. 13, 41 study 233
Brekke, Torkel 211, 213–214 Centres of Gravity (CoG) 145–146, 173,
Bremer, Paul 310, 313, 354 289–292, 364
British Chad 60
-born militants 221 Charlemagne 58
Army 166 Chechen separatists 7
Empire 101 Chechnya 15, 28, 87, 201, 244, 296
extremist group 178 chemical weapons 142
intelligence services 179 China 15, 36, 55, 67, 75, 164, 232, 331
Muslims 190–191 Chinese insurgents 162, 282
Brooks, David 204 Christian fundamentalists 189
Bruguiere, Jean-Louis 191 Civil-Military Operations (CMO) 159,
Buddhist civilisation 55 347
built-up areas 263–264 civilian networks 298
Burke, Jason 194–195 Civil Affairs (CA) 347
Burma 18, 87 civil war 17, 351
Burundi 87 clan affiliation 79
Bush, George H. W. 69 clash of cultures 207
Bush, George W. 58, 126, 354 Clausewitz, Carl von 284, 360
Bush administration 9, 206, 363–364 Clausewitzian (thinking) 145–146, 174
clean-up operations 280
Cable, Larry E. 32 Clinton administration 9, 138
cadres 110 close integration 314
392
Index
Clutterbuck, Richard 330 continuation war 279, 280

CNN 105 conventional
effect 104, 106 conflicts 235
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) forces 96, 284, 299
313 war(fare) 168, 283, 286, 289, 295,
coalition warfare 255 316
cocaine 171 corporate warriors 117
Cold War 15, 17, 50, 55, 68, 103, 108, corruption 80
158, 171 Corsica 87
collateral damage 240 counter-elites 99
Colombia 21, 84, 97, 171, 323 counter-forces 333
Colombian drug cartels 150 counter-guerrilla 334
colonial counter-insurgency (COIN) 7, 21–23,
powers 19 42, 218, 253, 270, 275–276, 286–
wars 223 287, 289, 291–293, 297–298, 303,
combat techniques 251 311, 313, 318, 320–321, 324, 327,
combined 329, 333–334, 337, 344–345, 347,
-arms teams 264 350, 353, 356, 365
-arms warfare 261 campaign 96
operations 319 doctrine 365
command effectiveness 350 era 36, 121, 325
communications forces 352
networks 235 operations 286, 292
systems 264 theory 365
Communism 24, 68, 81 troops 296
Communist counter-insurgents 277, 299, 339, 350
(Maoist) military theory 115 counter-terrorism 23, 180, 337
cadres 122 countercultures 81
doctrine 10 countermeasures 124, 140, 158, 290
insurgency 189, 343 counterstrategy 290, 305
-led insurgency 164, 283 coup d’etat 33
NPA 306 Creveld, Martin van 49, 338, 359
party 67 criminal(s) 19, 224, 364
philosophies 98 critical journalism 236
states 67 Cuba 323
Vietnam 169 cultural analyses 315
computer cultural antagonism 225
equipment 134 culture 301, 317
networks 235 cyber
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 357 arena 150
conflict environment 359 attacks 149
Congo 86–87, 90, 171 -based warfare 147
Congolese army 86 -terrorism 130, 132
conspiracy theories 120 war(fare) 132, 144
contain 351
393
D9 armoured bulldozers 259 ELN 79

Darfur 50 El Salvador 21, 52, 112, 236, 287, 298
Dar es-Salaam 218 emigrations 171
deception 154 environmental catastrophes 142
decisive point (DP) 291–293 epidemic diseases 18
decolonisation 329 Eritrea 18, 25, 86, 89
demographic pressure 95, 249 ETA 202, 327
demography 34 Ethiopia 86, 89
Deptula, David A. 173 ethnic/religious antagonism 209
de Gaulle 332 ethnicity 16, 91–93, 322
defensive phase, a 115 ethnic
diamond(s) 79, 84 antagonism 225
dictatorship of the proletariat 93 conflict 99–100
Dien Bien Phu 162, 334 factors 225
direct/indirect firepower 263 group 35
direct action (DA) 23, 356–357 identity 91–92
dirty bomb(s) 130, 194 leaders 99
disintegration 78 minority 91–92, 330
diversionary manoeuvres (deception, wars 97
maskirovka) 152 ethno-politics 92–93
division level (G2) 314 ethno-regionalism 92
Dobbins, James 314 Euphrates river 256
drugs trafficking 289 European Union (EU) 19, 65, 180–181,
Dubrovka theatre 177 206, 226, 271, 328
EW 245
e-payment 150 executive strategy 280
Eastern Asia 248 exploitation 113
Eastern Europe 76 exploiting the chaos 269
East Asia 72 external enemy 34
East Germany 34, 168 extremist groups 160, 204, 218, 224
East Timor 50 Eyad el-Sarraj 204
eBay 149
Echevarria, Antulio J. II 44–45 Fadok, David S. 173
ecological instability 95 failed slogans 353
economic pressure 344 Falkland Islands 60
Effects-Based Approach (EBA) 268, 288, Fallujah 241–242, 250, 252–253, 255,
325 257, 260, 265, 267, 272, 302, 309
Effects-Based Operations (EBO) 227, Brigade 253, 255
268, 325 fanaticism 202, 210
Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) FARC, see Revolutionary Armed Forces of
17 Colombia
Ekdal, Niklas 76 ‘fascist’ nationalists 205
electronic-based intelligence 314 fatwas 213
electronic warfare 160 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 149
394
Index
Feith, Douglas J. 313 global

Fighting in Built-up Areas (FIBUA) 251 distribution 202
Finland 52 instability 78
firepower 44, 261, 299 meeting place 187
first generation warfare 39 perspectives 326
First World 15 gold standard 73
Fitna 192 Gonzalo, President 320
flamethrowers 258 good discipline 272
FLN 332 GPS 176
FMLN 22, 236, 296, 306 Greater Jihad 128
Force Planning Construct 143 Great Britain 37, 208
force protection 124, 319 Green Berets 121
foreign Groupementde de Commandos Mixtes
aid 81 Aéroportés (GCMA) 333
sponsor 322 Grozny 241, 247, 250, 252, 258–260,
Forward Air Controllers (FAC) 262 267
Fourth-Generation opponents 47 Guatemala 17, 21, 52, 112
Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GW) 38– Guatemalan National Revolutionary
39, 41–49, 52, 156, 266 Unity (URNG) 17
FOX 105 guerra 110
effect 105 guerrilla 49, 224–225
France’s colonial war 60, 162, 282 activity 248
Franks, Tommy 254 forces 11, 300
Frattini, Franco 180–181 leadership 297, 304
French paratrooper forces 331 movement(s) 117, 119, 240, 292,
friction 360 297, 300, 303, 323
Friedman, George 214 tactics 111
front organisations 289 war(fare) 101, 109–111, 121, 243,
Fuel Air Explosives 258 339
Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) 17 Guerrilla Army of the Poor 17
fundamentalism 98, 176 guided aircraft bombs 260
guided weapons systems 241
G8 179 Guidelines for Operational Planning
Gaddis, John Lewis 123 (GOP) 292
Galula, David 7, 123, 275–276, 278, Gulf War 68, 168, 195, 226, 229, 233,
315, 354 263
GAM 171 Gurr, Ted Robert 30
gangs of bandits 11
general counteroffensive 116 hackers 150
Geneva Convention(s) 46–47 Haiti 68, 168
geopolitical insight 268 Hamas 47, 181
Germany 60, 88, 202 Hammes, Thomas X. 41–42, 45, 156
globalisation 70–76, 94, 162 Hariri, Rafik 138
395
Hauge, Hans Nilsen 33 superiority 233

Hay, John H. 342 infrastructure 80, 339
hearts and minds 104, 354, 358 insecurity 177, 278
helicopters 262 instability 80
Hezbollah 47, 181 insurgency 14, 16, 55, 58, 95–96, 112,
hierarchically 192 117, 142, 162, 170, 172, 175, 248–
high-tech armed forces 173 249, 275, 279, 290, 307, 316, 324,
high technology sensors 245 342
Hills, Alice 250, 259, 263, 267 leaders 240
Hitler 34 insurgent(s) 18, 20, 47, 94, 116, 138,
holy warriors 308 143, 208, 223, 256, 262, 270, 303,
Honduras 112 357
hostages 178 network 298
Howard, Michael 58–59, 67 forces 217
Ho Chi Minh 35 groups 253
Ho Chi Minh Trail 283 movement(s) 112–115, 170, 173,
Hué 267 176, 264, 266, 291, 293, 295,
Huks 168 298, 339, 344
human decisions 360 warfare 281
human intelligence (HUMINT) 157– intelligence 114, 155–156, 222, 228,
158, 222, 341 235, 239, 302, 304, 311, 316, 320,
human rights 237 335, 341, 352, 355, 364
Hungary 52 gathering 280
Huntington, Samuel P. 55–57, 88 officers at battalion and brigade (S2)
Hussein, Saddam 9, 60, 141 and division levels (G2) 314
operations 217
identity 319 preparations of the battlefield 313
ideological 335 service 297
movement 199 intelligence-wanted notice-capture-court
ideology 16, 35, 94 case 364
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 312 interdependence 238
India 15, 55, 75, 89 intergovernmental 77
indirect intermediaries 113
fire 263 International Counter Terrorism branch
methods 236 179
Indochina 162, 172, 304, 331, 333– International Criminal Court (ICC)
334 201
Indonesia 72, 86, 171, 293 international law 282
infantry-dominated battles 258 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 72
infiltrate 303 international terrorism 182
infiltrators 303 Internet 149, 245
information 155 Blogs 153
operations (IO) 148, 151, 155 interoperability 238
campaign 145 interpreters 317
396
Index
intervention(s) 271 Johnson administration 349

force 347 joint operations 238, 319
Irish Republican Army (IRA) 26, 37, 58, Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC)
80, 89, 132, 176, 189, 202, 222, 327, 179
330
Iran 85, 146, 155 Kabul 140, 195
Iran-Iraq War 355 Karachi 249
Iraq 7, 10, 51, 64, 85, 186, 207–208, Karen people 87
326, 346, 353–354, 368 Kashmir 15, 184, 201
war 351, 354 conflict 87
Iraqisation 61 Keegan, John 57
Iraqi Khmer Rouge 86, 111, 169
Army 254 Khomeini 210
forces 302, 356 Kitson, Frank 30
irregular Komsomolsk 237, 295
(armed) forces 11, 30, 167 Koran 128, 189
operations 282 Korean War 164, 167
troops 111 Kosovo 106, 149, 233, 298
warfare 282 conflict 140
ISI 195 Krulak, Charles C. 48, 266
Islam 188, 199, 203, 205, 210 kurd(s) 64, 148, 309, 353
Islamic Kuwait 69, 126
extremists 88, 198 Kyoto agreement 126
fundamentalists 122 Kyrgyzstan 137
insurgencies 67
parties 67 lack of legitimacy 95
world 207 Lall, Sanjaya 76, 77
Islamists 67 land power 238
Islamist insurgency 221 land warfare 294
ISR 143 Laos 18, 36
Israel 16 Laqueur, Walter 3, 341
Israeli-Palestinian conflict 184 large-scale sweeps 280
Israeli(s) 177 Latin America 55, 82
operations 259 latrunculi 58, 59
Ivory Coast 87 law-governed society 66
IW 245 Lawrence, T.E. 360
I love you-virus 131 law and order 84, 113, 269
leadership 339
Jakarta 249 Lebanese civil war 64
Japan 55 Lebanon 137, 138
Jenin 259 left-wing groups 182, 205
jihad(s) 36, 128, 219 legal system 358
jihadist(s) 127–129, 188, 204–205, legitimacy 59, 93, 95, 100, 172, 322
217–218, 224, 312 legitimising authority 328
397
legitimus hostis 58 maquis 334

Lesser Jihad 128 Marcos, Ferdinand 306
liberal economic order 73 Marine Corps Gazette 38
liberated zones 292 Marks, Thomas A. 32
Liberia 78, 86, 118, 121 Marxist-Leninism 24, 33, 92, 114, 223
Liddell Hart, B.H. 41 massacres 96
Lima 320 massed manpower 44
limited war 167 massive firepower 257
Lind, William S. 14, 38–39, 47, 51 Massu, General 334
lines of operation 292 mass hysteria 150
local hierarchies 342 Matsumoto 215
logistical costs 300 McCain, John 127
logistics 261, 305 McCartney, Robert 202
London attack of 7 July 2005 137, 179, mechanised division 295
189, 191, 218–219, 220, 222 media 286
long war 350 mega-cities 248, 250
losses 239 Meo tribe 333
low-level conflicts 252 mercenaries 11
lower-level tactics 251 Messianic concepts 212
lowest tactical level 285 methods 249
Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) 23, 30–31, of warfare 101
205, 330 Metz, Steven 145, 173, 288
loyalty 318 MI5 178, 221
Luxor 235 Microsoft 151
Middle East 77, 85
Macedonian 240 ‘militant’ traditions 317
Mack, Andrew 348 military-strategic thinking 265
Madrid 179, 181, 190, 200, 219 military/political victory 286
Madrid attack in March 2004 137 military
majority group 92 coup 95
major acts of terrorism 187 efforts 290
major cities 248–249 geographic data 235
Malayan Emergency 166, 283 intelligence 313
Malaysia 162, 164, 166, 172, 282–283 invasion 343
Manchester 106 operation 249
Mandelbaum, Michael 146 strategy 271
Maneuver Warfare Handbook 39 theory 265
Manichean world 211 (Principles of ) Military Operations Other
manipulation of pictures 152 Than War (MOOTW) 23
manoeuvre 44 militia(s) 11, 115
warfare theory 358 Millen, Raymond 288
Mao 33, 46 ministerial authority 358
Maoist(s) 24, 81, 111, 114–115 mobile operations 304
movements 32 moderate Muslim 180
398
Index
modern war(fare) 333, 335 Nazi Germany 31, 350

Modern Warfare: A French View of NBC 105
Counterinsurgency 331 NCW 46, 227
Mogadishu 105, 247, 260, 267 Nepal 53, 111
Moldova 15 Netherlands 88
Mombasa 218 network 196–197, 336
money transactions 315 analyses 315
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group thinking 192
(GICM) 191 network-based defence (NBD) 196
Morocco 60 network-based insurgency 42
Mosul 256, 311 Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) 196,
MOUT 251 267, 268, 325
Mozambique 86 networking 192
MRC 86 New World Order 57, 69
MSNBC 105 NGO 48
MTV 104 Nicaragua 323
Muhammad, Prophet 212 Nicaraguan ‘Contras’ 112
Mujaheddin/Mujahedeen 25, 228, 253, NLF/Viet Cong 61, 162, 165, 283
306 non-lethal weapons 268
Mukhabarat 216 non-linear 333
Muslim(s) 189 non-military infrastructure 357
Brotherhood 211 non-state actors 284
civilisation 55 Non-State Warfare 23
Myanmar 87 non-violent activities 330
Myers, Richard 206 non-violent approaches 315
Nordic countries 74
Naama Bay 179 Northern Alliance 228
Nagl, John A. 348 Northern Borneo 293
Najaf 242 Northern Ireland 11, 22, 37, 60, 80, 166,
Namibia 90 171, 202, 267, 330
NASA 132 North Kivu 86
Nasser 211 North Korea 146, 155
nation-building 325 North Ossetia 177, 190
nationalism 16 North Vietnam 61, 162, 164–165, 168,
National Liberation Front 359 283
National Training Center (NTC) 164 nuclear weapon(s) 142, 295
NATO 19, 184, 206, 226, 271, 284, Nye, Joseph 231
328
military doctrines 291 O’Neill, Bard E. 32
nature of the victory 279 occupying force 280, 290
nature of war 10 occupying powers 270
Naval warfare 294 offensive information campaigns 151
Nazi-inspired ideologies 88 oil spots 354
Nazi genocide 86
399
Omar, Muhammed (Mullah) 211–213, political 307

215 approaches 344
On Guerrilla Warfare 360 aspect of warfare 343
open sources (OSINT) 157–158 battle 305
operational intelligence 157 cadres 300
Operations in Built-up Areas (OBUA) credibility 351
251 will to fight 348
Operation Al Fajr 255 politico-military insight 343
order-of-battle 313, 316 Pol Pot 169, 214
Organisation of the People in Arms poppies 79
(ORPA) 17 popular support 119
orthodox civilisation 55 post-colonial wars 223
poverty 204
Pace, Peter 366 power elite 112
Pakistan 89, 112 power protection force 229
Palestine 16, 201 pre-emptive 103
Palestinian(s) 177, 204, 223, 240, 259 precision ammunition 235
factions 223 private contractors 300
paramilitaries 11 privatisation 84
Pathans 215 privileges 98, 114
patron-client 83 prohibited areas 292
relationship 79 propaganda 95, 276, 346
PBS 105 protracted war(fare) 31, 95, 309, 323
PCP 147, 337 Provisional IRA 222
peacekeeping/peace enforcement 23 psychological 263
forces 270 conditions 323
Peace of Westphalia 52 efforts 322
Peace Support Operations (PSO) 9, 23, measures 345
139, 156–157, 314 warfare 140
Pentagon 9, 132, 142, 185, 288 psychological operations (PSYOPS)
People’s Liberation Army 144–145 151–152, 154, 159, 255, 358
Perejil 60 psychology 344
Peru 21, 81 Public Affairs 159
Peru’s Communist Party 148 Pustay, John S. 341
Peruvian 320
phases of guerrilla warfare 114 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
phase IV 355, 366 142–143
phase two 308 Qureishi, Mohammed 216–217
Philippines 21, 28, 306 Qutb, Sayyid 210
Phnom Penh 169
PKK 147, 337 race 79
police 96, 320 radical Islamism 183
operations 222 Ramadi 256
Polisario guerrilla 28 Ramallah 259
400
Index
RAND Corporation 26 safe bases 112

Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) 325 safe houses 224
rapid population growth 80 Salafism 210
Rapoport, David 181 Samara 311
Rebel Armed Forces 17 Sarawak 293
Record, Jeffrey 63, 348 satellite telephone(s) 134, 261
recruits 302 Sattler, Lieutenant General 255
Red Army Faction (RAF) 26, 33–34, Saudi Arabia 185, 213, 223
327 Sayen, John 45
‘red’ terror 202 Scales, Robert H. 238
refugees 103, 330 second-generation immigrant(s) 218,
religion/religious 16, 35 220
affiliation 79 Second-Generation Warfare (2GW)
and ethnic factions 368 39–40
-based fundamentalism 98 secondary efforts 291
laws 29 second stage 305
wave, the 182 Second World War 15
resistance fighters 357 secularly 207
resistance movement(s) 31, 282 security forces 300
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia sensor-to-shooter 239
(FARC) 28, 47, 79 September 11, 2001 1, 36, 59–61, 102,
revolutionary movement 113 124–126, 132, 135, 143–144, 161,
revolutionary war(fare) 32, 110, 123, 184, 196, 199, 228, 230
354 Serb(s) 106, 285
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) nationalists 87
46, 251, 256, 258, 267, 324–325 Seven Pillars of Wisdom 360
-associated technologies 324 Sharm el-Sheikh 179
revolution in military technology 233– Shi’ite/Shia Muslim 64, 309, 353
234 Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) 111
Rieff, David 367 Shmel 178
rogue states 141 Shoe Bomber, the 193
Roman Empire 58 Sierra Leone 78, 87, 121
Ronfeldt, David 41 Sihanouk 169
RPG/RPG-7 49, 248, 258, 260–261 Singapore 75
Rules of Engagement (RoE) 252, 271, Singer, Peter W. 83, 117, 244
285, 358–359 Sinn Fein 226
Rumsfeld, Donald H. 8, 206, 229, 324, skirmishes 103
354 Small War Manual 208
Russia 83, 177, 237 socio-economic activities 358
Russian(s) 256, 258 Somalia 68, 78, 86, 105, 332, 346
intelligence 228 South Korea 75
media 178 south of the Sahara 172
Rwanda 86–87, 90 South Ossetia 15
Rwanda’s Patriotic Front (RPF) 100 South Vietnam 162, 164, 282, 345
401
Soviet Union 25, 84–85, 110, 164, 284 targeting 147, 241
Army 350 tax system 305
Soviet-Afghanistan war 195 technical intelligence 222
special branch 314 templating forces 313
Special Forces 177–178, 197, 228–229, terror 120, 175, 359
297–298, 302, 304 terrorism 23, 58, 121, 123, 126, 142,
Special Operation Forces (SOF) 299 175–176, 183, 203, 205, 209–210,
Special Operations Executive 330 220, 224
Sri Lanka 97, 100, 171, 176, 184 terrorist(s) 192
Stability and Support Operations (SASO) groups 70, 192, 205
23, 354–355 movements 176
Stalingrad 247 network 199
state monopolies 84 Tet Offensive 61, 165, 237, 295, 345
state terrorism 21 Thatcher, Margaret 83
strategic intelligence 156 theocracies 29
strong men 99 The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking
subsistence economy 81 of World Order 56
Sudan 50, 85, 87 The Transformation of War 49, 338
suicide bombers 190, 308 Third-Generation Warfare (3GW) 39–
Summers, Harry G. 165, 348–349 40, 47
Sunni(s) (Muslim) 64, 279, 309, 353 Third World 10–11, 24, 69, 74, 83, 85,
Arab 366 307
-based elite 311 Thompson, Sir Robert 341, 348, 354
clerics 310 Three Block War(s) 38, 266
Sun Zi 197, 240 Tikrit 311
superpowers 171 Tokyo 133, 215, 249
symmetry 159 Tora Bora 197
total war 237
T’ai tribe 333 Toyota pickups 248
tactical traditional elite 100
intelligence 157 TRADOC 238
level 285 transformation 242
military victories 287 Trinquier, Roger 331, 333, 335, 338,
Taiwan 75, 232 340–341
Taliban 195 Truong Chinh 36
movement 214 Truth Commission 80
regime 125, 140, 184, 197, 211, Turkey 64, 65
226 Turkmen 64
vision 213 Tutsis 86
Tamil Tigers 28, 100, 111, 147, 171, Tuzla 285–286
176
tank support 257–258 U.S. 52, 68, 208
target-rich 352 U.S. Air Force 142, 350
targeted 159 U.S. Army 142, 230, 233, 256, 283, 350
402
Index
U.S. Central Command 254 Vietminh 162, 168, 331, 333–334

U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Vietnam 22, 36, 61, 164
Agency (DARPA) 133 War 63, 94, 105, 162, 165, 167, 326,
U.S. Department of Defense 143 343
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 124 Vietnamisation 63
U.S. Joint Forces Command 133 violence 344
U.S. Joint Publication 1 133 Vo Nguyen Giap 35, 110
U.S. Joint Publication 3-06 251 Vries, Gijs de 181
U.S. Marine Corps 48, 256, 266
U.S. Navy 142 waging peace 359
UCK 100, 106, 112, 148, 171, 344 Wahhabism 210
Uganda 86, 90 walkie-talkies 261
Ukraine 137 Wallensteen, Peter 89
Ulster Defence Association 28 Waltz, Kenneth N. 7
Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) 28 Warden, John A. 173
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 28, 202 warlords 79, 85, 117, 195, 197
unconventional war 356–357 Warsaw 247
undemocratic regime(s) 249, 290 ‘war against Islam’ 207
unified command 278 war declared against a tactic 208
unilateral 231 war on terror 1, 25, 39, 45, 60, 64, 68,
UNITA 25, 79, 337 120–121, 125–126, 179, 201, 205–
United Nations (UN) 50–51, 66, 86, 208, 218, 231, 363, 367
169, 226, 271–272, 328 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)
-led operations 347 102, 126, 130, 132, 143, 295, 354
Charter 156 welfare state 72
Security Council 231 West, ‘Bing’ 258
United States National Counterterrorism Western civilisation 55
Center (NCTC) 182 Western colonial powers 10
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 262– Western Europe 11
263 Western Sahara 28
Uppsala Conflict Data Project 89 Westmoreland, William 343
urbanisation 72 white extremists 225
urban Wilson, Gary I. 37
areas 252, 265–266 withdrawal 346
guerrilla 312 Wolf, Martin 75
operations 251 World Trade Center (WTC) 125, 139,
warfare 247, 250–251, 260–261, 185, 204
264, 272
USMC 208, 302 Yacef, Saadi 110
USS Cole 187 Yahoo 149
UW 23 Yugoslavia 81, 184, 356
van Gogh, Theo 192 Zaire 86

Vatican 58 Zakaria, Fareed 71, 367
403
Zambia 193
Zedong, Mao 35, 43, 110, 297, 342,
348, 354, 359, 360
Zimbabwe 90
404

Rekkedal Insurgency and Counter Insurgency

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Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency

Nils Marius Rekkedal

© Swedish National Defence College and Nils Marius Rekkedal 2006

Picture editor: Elsa Johannesson

First edition, first printing, August 2006

For information regarding publications published by the Swedish National Defence

2. Concepts and problems 13

3. Factors that influence today’s international environment 55

4. What can cause wars? 91

5. Guerrilla Warfare 109

6. Asymmetric warfare and terrorism 123

7. Terror and terrorism – a part of modern insurgency 175

8. Urban warfare – the new challenge? 247

10. Epilogue 363

Presentation of the author 389

• Chapter 1 provides an overview of what this book deals with.

* The official Norwegian translation is ‘Høynivåpanelet for trusler, utfordringer og endringer’

• Chapter 4 builds further on the discussion presented in Chapter 3 and deals

increasingly more widespread use of so-called contractors – and these forces

Stockholm, April 2006*

Nils Marius Rekkedal

– David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 1964

1.1 Introduction to the subject

1.2 About this book

7. Anthony James Joes, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical

As also stated in the preface, I will, in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, describe funda-

– Colonel John R. Boyd (quote from one of his lectures)

and, if we nevertheless succumb to the temptation of doing this and introduce

against the weaknesses found in these. In my opinion, this is actually a relatively

2.3 Methods of insurgency – a brief overview

• In contrast to wars between states, civil wars, conducted as guerrilla wars,

forces also committed major breaches of human rights, including regular

2.3.1 Counter-insurgency and other concepts for countering insurgency

particular conducted a relatively successful counter-insurgency policy targeted at

25. Joes, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 141–145.

extent, involved in several of these conflicts. (See the description in Chapter 9

and diplomatic measures to be taken. A problem with the LIC concept in

32. Joes, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 161–165.

Afghanistan, year 2006. (Map: Samuel Svärd)

2.3.2 Factors that influence developments

• Ensuring that the political systems of the state survive.

In other words, the various forms of insurgent movements normally have

situation today requires a careful examination of each individual insurgency if

2.3.3 The concepts of irregular armed forces, LIC and insurgency

that the insurgents have introduced a Western concept/thinking in connection

• He assumes that different levels of warfare exist.

44. Cable, ‘Reinventing the Round Wheel’, in Note 2, p. 229.

2.4 What form does insurgency take today?

2.4.2 Today’s theories have a previous history

47. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, pp. 310–311.

48. Gary I. Wilson, USMCR Ret., wilson@aol.com (Washington, D.C.: Renaissance,

2.4.3 Theories regarding generations of warfare

Several military thinkers have attempted to understand the war on terror

partially in response to technological factors – the line maximized fire-

• ‘Idea-based warfare’ – which means that groups that actually have/could

military forces. Instead, combining guerrilla tactics or civil disobedience

a country/superpower that has concentrated very much on this type of activity

being tethered to an empty theory.’ Echevarria concludes his harsh criticism

63. Echevarria, ibid, p. VI.

alliances among themselves! Even today, states rarely obey international

2.4.4 Warfare for the 21st Century?

65. John Sayen, ibid.

The American General Charles Krulak, who served as Commandant of the

• Americans prefer conventional war as this type of warfare is normally to the