I. Lambino vs.
COMELEC ISSUES:
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC
to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change
the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%)
of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by
at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified
the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)
and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These
proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition
with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC
declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
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1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring
RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution; and
HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing
constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three
per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown”
to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly
stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign
on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its
face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements
must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the
entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must
be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express
their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus,
an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with
the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in
Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will
not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court
must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735
does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to
implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the

constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that
the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full
text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this
Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative
petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a
signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006
when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

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DIGEST WITH NOTES
LAMBINO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006(CARPIO, J.)
• Requirements for Initiative Petition
• Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision
• Tests to determine whether amendment or revision
FACTS:
The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to changethe 1987 Constitution and then filed
a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite forratification under
Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under
thepetition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentaryform of government. COMELEC did not
give it due course for lack of an enabling lawgoverning initiative
petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago
v. Comelecruling.
ISSUES:
• Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment
or revision
• Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance
withthe constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the
people
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RULING:
Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct
proposal by peopleSec. 2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that
allows a people’s initiative to proposeamendments to the
Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that
thepetition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments, the deliberations of theframers of our Constitution
clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt
relevantAmerican jurisprudence on people’s initiative; and (b)
in particular, the people must first seethe full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign ona
petition containing such full text. The essence of amendments
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon apetition”
is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means twoessential elements must be present.2 elements
of initiative1.First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent orrepresentative can sign on their behalf.
2.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if
the full text of the proposed amendments isfirst shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal
in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be
either written on the face of thepetition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must stated the fact of suchattachment. This
is an assurance that everyone of the several millions of signatories
to thepetition had seen the full textof the proposed amendments
before – not after – signing.Moreover, “an initiative signer must be
informed at the time of signing of the nature andeffect of that
which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and
misleading” whichrenders the initiative void.In the case of the
Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a single word, phrase, or
sentence of text of the proposedchanges in the signature sheet.
Neither does the signature sheet statethat the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks aquestion
whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential
to theUnicameral- Parliamentary system of government.
The signature sheet does not show to thepeople the draft of
the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature
sheet. This omission is fatal.An initiative that gathers signatures
from the people without first showing to the peoplethe full text
of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can
operate as agigantic fraud on the people. That’s why the
Constitutionrequires that an initiative must be“directly proposed by
the people x x x in a petition” - meaning that the people must sign
ona petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue asamending the nation’s
fundamental law, the writing of the text of
the proposedamendments cannot be hidden from the people under
a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and
unelected individuals. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution disallowing revision throughinitiativesArticle XVII
of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the
Constitution. The firstmode is through Congress upon three-fourths
vote of all its Members. The second mode isthrough a constitutional
convention. The third mode is through a people’s initiative.Section 1
of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to
“any amendmentto, or revision of, this Constitution.” In contrast,
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Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to thethird mode, applies only to
“amendments to this Constitution.” This distinction wasintentional
as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Apeople’sinitiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of theConstitution and not to its revision. In contrast,
Congress or a constitutional convention canpropose both
amendments and revisions to the Constitution.Does the Lambino
Group’s initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution? Yes. By
any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-
Presidential to aUnicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the
abolition of the Office of the President andthe abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a
mereamendment.
Amendment vs. RevisionCourts have long recognized the distinction
between an amendment and a revision of aconstitution. Revision
broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in
theconstitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers
or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of theconstitution, as when
the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On
theother hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes withoutaltering the basic principle involved.
Revision generally affects several provisions of theconstitution,
while amendment generally affects only the specific provision
being amended.Where the proposed change applies only to a
specific provision of the Constitution withoutaffecting any other
section or article, the change may generally be considered
anamendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing
the voting age from 18years to 15 years is an amendment and not a
revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipinoownership of mass determine whether amendment or revisionIn California where the
media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to
arevision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional theconstitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed
qualification for electionto the Presidency is an amendment and not a two-part test: thequantitative test and the qualitative test.
a revision. The changes in these examples do not entail any The quantitative test asks whether the proposedchange is so
modification of sections or articles of theConstitution other than the extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial
specific provision being amended. These changes do not alsoaffect entirety of the
the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances
among or withinthe three branches.However, there can be no fixed
rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. Achange
in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be
a revision and not anamendment. For example, the substitution
of the word “republican” with “monarchic” or“theocratic” in Section
1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire
structureof government and the fundamental ideological basis of
the Constitution. Thus, each specificchange will have to be
examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other
provisions,as well as how it affects the structure ofgovernment, the
carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying
ideological basis of the existing Constitution.Since a revision of a
constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of
aconstitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is
best suited to undertake arevision. A revision requires harmonizing
not only several provisions, but also the alteredprinciples with those
that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally
authorizedeliberative bodies like constituent assemblies
or constitutional conventions to undertakerevisions. On the other
hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which do not have
fixedand identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings,
to undertake only amendmentsand not revisions. Tests to

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II. Marbury vs. Madison
Facts of the case
In the last days of President John Adams’ presidency, he nominated
a number of people to serve as justices of the peace for the District
of Columbia. The Senate confirmed the nominations, and the
commissions were prepared. President Adams’ Secretary of State,
John Marshall, did not deliver all of the commissions before
President Thomas Jefferson took office. President Jefferson then
ordered his Secretary of State, James Madison, not to deliver the
commissions. The plaintiffs, men whose commissions were not
delivered, sued Madison in the Supreme Court and argued that, in
refusing to deliver the commissions, the Secretary of State was
neglecting his Constitutional duty.
appointment process. (2) The Court also held that, upon
appointment, the officers have acquired rights to their positions
under the law. If those rights are denied, then they may seek
redress in the courts. (3) Marbury and others sought an original
action for their commissions in the Supreme Court. But the
congressional act conferring that authority conflicts with Article III
Section 2 of the Constitution. The judicial power in the United
States extends to all cases under the Constitution and the Supreme
Court is bound to decide cases according to the Constitution rather
than the law when the two conflict. So if a law is found to be in
conflict with the Constitution, then the law is invalid. In this case,
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act ran counter to the Constitution and is
therefore void. Thus, lacking authority, the Supreme Court canceled
Marbury's claim.

Question

(1) Do the plaintiffs have a right to receive their commissions?

(2) Can they sue for their commissions in court?

(3) Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the delivery
of their commissions?

Yes, yes, no. Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the unanimous
opinion. (1) The Supreme Court held that the Constitution grants
the president the power to appoint and commission officers of the
United States. Because the only evidence of the appointment is the
commission, the two actions are tied together. Without the
commission, the appointment is not complete, and so the
president’s signature on the commission is the final step in the

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SYLLABUS
Syllabus
The clerks of the Department of State of the United States may be
called upon to give evidence of transactions in the Department
which are not of a confidential character.
The Secretary of State cannot be called upon as a witness to state
transactions of a confidential nature which may have occurred in his
Department. But he may be called upon to give testimony of
circumstances which were not of that character.
Clerks in the Department of State were directed to be sworn,
subject to objections to questions upon confidential matters.
Some point of time must be taken when the power of the Executive
over an officer, not removable at his will, must cease. That point of
time must be when the constitutional power of appointment has
been exercised. And the power has been exercised when the last act
required from the person possessing the power has been
performed. This last act is the signature of the commission.
If the act of livery be necessary to give validity to the commission of
an officer, it has been delivered when executed, and given to the
Secretary of State for the purpose of being sealed, recorded, and
transmitted to the party.
In cases of commissions to public officers, the law orders the
Secretary of State to record them. When, therefore, they are signed
and sealed, the order for their being recorded is given, and,
whether inserted inserted into the book or not, they are recorded.
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When the heads of the departments of the Government are the
political or confidential officers of the Executive, merely to execute
the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the
Executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can
be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically
examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and
individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself
injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.
The President of the United States, by signing the commission,
appointed Mr. Marbury a justice of the peace for the County of
Washington, in the District of Columbia, and the seal of the United
States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive
testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of
the appointment; and the appointment conferred on him a legal
right to the office for the space of five years. Having this legal right
to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal
to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for which the laws
of the country afford him a remedy.
To render a mandamus a proper remedy, the officer to whom it is
directed must be one to whom, on legal principles, such writ must
be directed, and the person applying for it must be without any
other specific remedy.
Where a commission to a public officer has been made out, signed,
and sealed, and is withheld from the person entitled to it, an action
of detinue for the commission against the Secretary of State who
refuses to deliver it is not the proper remedy, as the judgment in
detinue is for the thing itself, or its value. The value of a public
office, not to be sold, is incapable of being ascertained. It is a plain
case for a mandamus, either to deliver the commission or a copy of
it from the record.
To enable the Court to issue a mandamus to compel the delivery of
the commission of a public office by the Secretary of State, it must
be shown that it is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or that it be
necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises
and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does
not create the cause.
The authority given to the Supreme Court by the act establishing
the judicial system of the United States to issue writs of mandamus
to public officers appears not to be warranted by the Constitution.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of
necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each.
If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is
superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and
not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both
apply.
At the December Term, 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay,
Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper, by their
counsel,[p138] severally moved the court for a rule to James
Madison, Secretary of State of the United States, to show cause why
a mandamus should not issue commanding him to cause to be
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delivered to them respectively their several commissions as justices
of the peace in the District of Columbia. This motion was supported
by affidavits of the following facts: that notice of this motion had
been given to Mr. Madison; that Mr. Adams, the late President of
the United States, nominated the applicants to the Senate for their
advice and consent to be appointed justices of the peace of the
District of Columbia; that the Senate advised and consented to the
appointments; that commissions in due form were signed by the
said President appointing them justices, &c., and that the seal of the
United States was in due form affixed to the said commissions by
the Secretary of State; that the applicants have requested Mr.
Madison to deliver them their said commissions, who has not
complied with that request; and that their said commissions are
withheld from them; that the applicants have made application to
Mr. Madison as Secretary of State of the United States at his office,
for information whether the commissions were signed and sealed as
aforesaid; that explicit and satisfactory information has not been
given in answer to that inquiry, either by the Secretary of State or
any officer in the Department of State; that application has been
made to the secretary of the Senate for a certificate of the
nomination of the applicants, and of the advice and consent of the
Senate, who has declined giving such a certificate; whereupon a rule
was made to show cause on the fourth day of this term. This rule
having been duly served,[p139]
Mr. Jacob Wagner and Mr. Daniel Brent, who had been summoned
to attend the court, and were required to give evidence, objected to
be sworn, alleging that they were clerks in the Department of State,
and not bound to disclose any facts relating to the business or
transactions of the office.
The court ordered the witnesses to be sworn, and their answers
taken in writing, but informed them that, when the questions were
asked, they might state their objections to answering each
particular question, if they had any.

Mr. Lincoln, who had been the acting Secretary of State, when the
circumstances stated in the affidavits occurred, was called upon to
give testimony. He objected to answering. The questions were put
in writing.

The court said there was nothing confidential required to be

disclosed. If there had been, he was not obliged to answer it, and if
he thought anything was communicated to him confidentially, he
was not bound to disclose, nor was he obliged to state anything
which would criminate himself.

The questions argued by the counsel for the relators were, 1.

Whether the Supreme Court can award the writ of mandamus in
any case. 2. Whether it will lie to a Secretary of State, in any case
whatever. 3. Whether, in the present case, the Court may award a
mandamus to James Madison, Secretary of State.

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III. Angara vs. Electoral Commission
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain
and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents,
from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua,
another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as
member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of
the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted
by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose
A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member
of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers,
proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National
Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number
of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of
office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session
assembled, passed the following resolution:
[No. 8]
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RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS
CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra
quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes
de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la
presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua
filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against
the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only
protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted,
and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared
elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a
resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya
presentado en o antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before
the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging
(a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the
period during which protests against the election of its members
should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its
object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period;
and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro
Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that
there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation
of a protest against the election of a member of the National
Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral
Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying
herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for
the issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested
elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power
to regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which power
has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government
or the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in
pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates
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solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for
decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the
Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the
National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so
regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore,
valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended
to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-
McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as
well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article
VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass
upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an
interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an
answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission
interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department
invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935,
fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests
against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it
acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the
implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and
regulations essential to carry out the power and functions conferred
upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the
petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring
itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in
the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the
Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the
judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3,
1935, confirming the election of the members of the National
Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could
not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction
to take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that
might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-
judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an instrumentality
of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or
corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226
and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition
would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an
answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the
following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral
Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing
the period within which protests against the election of members of
the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9,
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1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the election of
members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was
exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution,
by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the
Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by
paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction
over the protest filed by said respondent and over the parties
thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January
23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an
act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not
reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation
by the National Assembly of the election of its members, and that
such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which
protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of
jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created
by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose
decision are final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is
not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the
terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and
that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II
(should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of
section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition
from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No.
127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no application to
the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was
submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral
Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the
merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the
following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing
related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the
election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the
merits of the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction
having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue.
Being a case primæ impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with
13 | P a g e
our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question
and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the
industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the
question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this
assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
subject to the further check that a bill may become a law
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote
of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly
in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the
National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense
that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is
necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define
their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the
several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just
where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power
of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
14 | P a g e
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels, for then
the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and
restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be
in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of
this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In
our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who
is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in
this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not
only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the governments of the
government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power
provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be
remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system
itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the
people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . .
. their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . .
. aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and
ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the
unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds
and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of
December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner
to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has
by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the
last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National
15 | P a g e
Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the
resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the
power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of
the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage
and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the
Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its
proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the
resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission
fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a
conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the
other. From the very nature of the republican government
established in our country in the light of American experience and
of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall
have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is
not a separate department of the government, and even if it were,
conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.
Discarding the English type and other European types of
constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted
the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and
given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which
have declined to follow the American example, provisions have
been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from
exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken
as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the
absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is
logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of
1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to
examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former
Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries
whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed
this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South
Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29,
1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the
Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to
pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of
the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies
created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance
of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the
conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be
thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long
16 | P a g e
run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these
questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we
avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle,
reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the
admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope
and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission
as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now
proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine
whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election
of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able
counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the
interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three
Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of
six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and
three by the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman.
The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve
into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and
inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who
adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning,
import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the
assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5,
Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that
"Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House
of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ."
apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over
the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion
to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete"
(Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil.,
886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for
the purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was
taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which
sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934,
recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security
empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of
executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is
17 | P a g e
required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against
specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing
legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three
justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the
house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds, three
members to be designed by the majority party and three by the
minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief
Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The
foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15,
1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the
legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to
be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate
and two representatives to be designated one each from the two
major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding
representation to the executive department in the persons of two
representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing
its report. As submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934
subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative
Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either
house and all cases contesting the election of any of their members
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each
House, by three members elected by the members of the party
having the largest number of votes therein, three elected by the
members of the party having the second largest number of votes,
and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated
by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with
comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the
Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of
1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the
Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with
reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be
designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee
modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with
respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made
further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a
unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally
submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its
Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having the largest number of
votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of
the party having the second largest number of votes, and three
justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates
Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the whole
subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members",
the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the
Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of
the said draft:
18 | P a g e
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope
of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the
draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the
election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz
whether the election and qualification of the member whose
elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the
members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word
"judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question
about the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to
the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral
Commission shall confirm also the election of those whose election
is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman
knows, the action of the House of Representatives confirming the
election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly.
It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his
credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his
election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have
observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election
of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his
pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal
president who is elected? What happens with regards to the
councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election?
The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims —
in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been elected,
and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there
is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a
contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the
gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in
place of another who was declared elected. From example, in a case
when the residence of the man who has been elected is in question,
or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in
question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the
commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first
meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The
purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers
exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and
qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is
nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that
propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a
while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate
19 | P a g e
from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases
contesting the election as separate from the first part of the
sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of
contested elections are already included in the phrase "the elections,
returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections"
was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral
Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the elections of
the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that
unless this power is granted to the assembly, the assembly on its
own motion does not have the right to contest the election and
qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this
draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe
that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they
cannot remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained
by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the
members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the
assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must
go to the Electoral Commission and make the question before the
Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide
whether the election is contested or not contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the
Electoral Commission has power and authority to pass upon the
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even
though that question has not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they
can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading
"The election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship
Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates
Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In
explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as
20 | P a g e
amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee
said:
xxx xxx xxx
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste solamente en
obviar la objecion apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que la
primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece que
da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la
eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar
esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido,
si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All
cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la
Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya
habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of
Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation also
took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la
mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, ¿no
cree Su Señoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a
los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission
esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria
como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema
consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que
el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese,
podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria
prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el
triunfo.
xxx xxx xxx
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and
others seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of
ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought
to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority
party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two
members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority
party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of
seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-
partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as
follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the National Assembly shall be judged by an
21 | P a g e
Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the
party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly,
three elected by the members of the party having the second
largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over
by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as
follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three
Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and
of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes,
and three by the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman.
The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National
Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February
8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President Recto, to
effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert
the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of"
and the words "the elections", which was accordingly accepted by
the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in the
legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan
tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of
government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth
edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the
"scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in
the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the
following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his
printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be
the exclusive judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of
their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding
prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights
of membership. One of the standing committees appointed at the
commencement of each session, was denominated the committee
of privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and
investigate all questions of this description which might be referred
to them, and to report their proceedings, with their opinion
thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election
petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and
their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the
evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of
resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by
the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the
bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was
heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner
as by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections
although a select committee. The committee of privileges and
elections although a select committee was usually what is called an
open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a
22 | P a g e
quorum of the members named was required to be present, but all
the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee
and vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions
relating to the right of membership gradually assumed a political
character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770,
controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house
of commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of
contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir
Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government,
resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the
Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election
cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of
decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from
whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too
successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more
serious matters, and in questions of higher importance to the public
welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the
house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil,
and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of
the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted
elections, or returns of members to serve in parliament." In his
speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville
alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of
trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the principal
dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it
is scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to
attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-
elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the
discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is well known,
that in every contested election, many members of this house, who
are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the
competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the contention, and
take upon themselves the partial management of the very business,
upon which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr.
Grenville brought in a bill which met with the approbation of both
houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770.
This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the
Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the
nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the
security of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister
or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the
apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the
contemporaries of the measure to the information of a judgement,
which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of
the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent
experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey,
afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson,
who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly
on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an
essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total
abrogation of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of
the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the
problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the
controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative
to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice
23 | P a g e
selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the
purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become
imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act,
1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections
and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt
and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s.
70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws
of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of
Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the
Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the
courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election
contests which were originally determined by each house, are since
1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides
that all protests against the election of members of the Upper
House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative
Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of
Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free
City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide
contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the
Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the
Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the
Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art.
19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927
(art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is
recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means
unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876
there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by
each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no
adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law
on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap.
37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed
of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the
House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court,
the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The
decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the
two houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a
moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this
regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a
member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court
(Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its
Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] —
Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the
experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our
fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history
and political development of other countries of the world. When ,
therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as
a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of
passing upon and determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must
have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also
having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the
world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to
remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were
cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some
members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove
24 | P a g e
stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All
that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional
the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the
wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident
that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and
appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however,
as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of
partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through
their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as
the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body
in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was
created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in
its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with
the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the
limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it
is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the
legislative department than to any other. The location of the
provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under
Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is
very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is
constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a
body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative
power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis,
45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B,
1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National
Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the
Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to
lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant
of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral
Commission in such case would be invested with the power to
determine contested cases involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject
at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not
only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally
transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated,
but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable
clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be
presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority
of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the
necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and
whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation
worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our
25 | P a g e
Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National
Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate
control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be
permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned
counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of
respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly
as a coordinate department of the government and of according
validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be
practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission
of protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we
have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral
Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its
cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that
where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary
for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the
petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative
authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the
disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of
the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument
against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not
susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been
committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in
investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought
through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible
abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the
judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the
Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in
the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as
they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted
to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed
by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each
constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of
discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same
zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they
were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these
constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given
instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the
third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not
follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be
challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise
jurisdiction.
26 | P a g e
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the
present case, there are considerations of equitable character that
should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits
of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was
inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution,
except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV
thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on
November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the
election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by that
body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on
December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the
Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear
that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the
first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day
for the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the National
Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body
had actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to
certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of
the National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the
petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court
the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral
Commission were respectively designated only on December 4 and
6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming
non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had
the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of
protests, the result would be that the National Assembly — on the
hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in
such cases — had already barred the presentation of protests
before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and
deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter
entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result
was not and could not have been contemplated, and should be
avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming the election of members against whom no protests had
been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not
be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of
election contests. While there might have been good reason for the
legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of
the legislature at the time when the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by
the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power
to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix
the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the
National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose
election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes,
unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein
petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required
by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such
member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial
board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat
in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in
27 | P a g e
said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted
December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons
and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither
necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The
return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-
elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a
member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of
England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title
2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of
contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of
the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in
controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of
Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate
or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the
Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the
return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying
into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31
& 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the
order or decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded
as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the
return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed.,
sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force,
each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when
protests against the election of any of its members should be filed.
This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making
each house the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications
of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387)
empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the
time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of said
bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for
the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a
resolution confirming or approving the returns of such members
against whose election no protests had been filed within the
prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of
further protests against the election of those members not
theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second
Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, p. 89;
Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature;
Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record
— First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District,
Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 1121,
1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature,
Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The
Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387,
section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated
also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contest
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to
prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus
no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the National
Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935,
the time for the filing of contests against the election of its
members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it
could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
28 | P a g e
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows
fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the
legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of
functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the
powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and
among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power
and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional
creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform,
closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of
the other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present
Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members,
to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral
Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex
necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission
was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National
Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and
regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only
section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine
Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act
No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the
time and manner of filing contests against the election of its
members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and
bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and
expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is
contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may
29 | P a g e
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of
any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said
confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within
which protests against the election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within
the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming
to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara,
and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3,
1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against
the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the
rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of
the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the
scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the
Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral
Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably expressed in
the preceding opinion. I am, however, constrained to withhold my
assent to certain conclusions therein advanced.
The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the Constitution
of judging of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, is judicial in
nature. (Thomas vs. Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed., 949, 951.) On
the other hand, the power to regulate the time in which notice of a
contested election may be given, is legislative in character.
(M'Elmoyle vs. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312; 10 Law. ed., 177; Missouri vs.
Illinois, 200 U. S. 496; 50 Law. ed., 572.)
It has been correctly stated that the government established by the
Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of the separation of
powers into legislative, executive, and judicial. Legislative power is
vested in the National Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the absence
of any clear constitutional provision to the contrary, the power to
regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be
given, must be deemed to be included in the grant of legislative
power to the National Assembly.
30 | P a g e
The Constitution of the United States contains a provision similar to
the that found in Article VI, section 4, of the Constitution of the
Philippines. Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United
States provides that each house of the Congress shall be the judge
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members.
Notwithstanding this provision, the Congress has assumed the
power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election
may be given. Thus section 201, Title 2, of the United States Code
Annotated prescribes:
Whenever any person intends to contest an election of any Member
of the House of Representatives of the United States, he shall,
within thirty days after the result of such election shall have been
determined by the officer or board of canvassers authorized by law
to determine the same, give notice, in writing, to the Member
whose seat he designs to contest, of his intention to contest the
same, and, in such notice, shall specify particularly the grounds
upon which he relies in the contest. (R. S., par. 105.)
The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law,
also contained a provision to the effect that the Senate and House
of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
Notwithstanding this provision, the Philippine Legislature passed
the Election Law, section 478 of which reads as follows:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall by resolution
respectively prescribe the time and manner of filing contest in the
election of members of said bodies, the time and manner of
notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if
any, and shall fix the costs and expenses of contest which may be
paid from their respective funds.
The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the Electoral
Commission was not to erect a body that would be above the law,
but to raise legislative elections contests from the category of
political to that of justiciable questions. The purpose was not to
place the commission beyond the reach of the law, but to insure the
determination of such contests with the due process of law.
Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, Article XV, section 2, of which provides
that —
All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the
inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter,
such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this
Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the
National Assembly, and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed,
in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this Constitution.
The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was to insure
the orderly processes of government, and to prevent any hiatus in
its operations after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. It was thus provided that all laws of the Philippine
Islands shall remain operative even after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, unless inconsistent with the
Constitution, and that all references in such laws to the government
or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as
31 | P a g e
applicable, to refer to the government and corresponding officials
under the Constitution. It would seem to be consistent not only
with the spirit but the letter of the Constitution to hold that section
478 of the Election Law remains operative and should now be
construed to refer to the Electoral Commission, which, in so far as
the power to judge election contests is concerned, corresponds to
either the Senate or the House of Representative under the former
regime. It is important to observe in this connection that said
section 478 of the Election Law vested the power to regulate the
time and manner in which notice of a contested election may be
given, not in the Philippine Legislature but in the Senate and House
of Representatives singly. In other words, the authority to prescribe
the time and manner of filing contests in the elections of members
of the Philippine Legislature was by statute lodged separately in the
bodies clothed with power to decide such contests. Construing
section 478 of the Election Law to refer to the National Assembly, as
required by Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the authority to prescribe the time and
manner of filing contests in the election of members of the National
Assembly is vested in the Electoral Commission, which is now the
body clothed with power to decide such contests.
In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the National
Assembly of December 3, 1935, could not have the effect of barring
the right of the respondent Pedro Ynsua to contest the election of
the petitioner. By the same token, the Electoral Commission was
authorized by law to adopt its resolution of December 9, 1935,
which fixed the time with in which written contests must be filed
with the commission.
Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolutions, the
Electoral Commission has jurisdiction to hear and determine the
contest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the petitioner
Jose A. Angara.

32 | P a g e
IV. Francisco vs. House of Representatives
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no
matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear
to be, over the determination by the independent branches of
government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective
constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the
means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often
frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among
these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such
today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn
legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our
countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that
the present controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether
the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls
within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether
the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a
political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was
brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is
sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns
that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that
the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is
neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and
33 | P a g e
protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure
from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this
Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate
doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or
judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances
which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper
the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect
without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican
government, intended as they are to insure that governmental
power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a
relationship of interdependence and coordination among these
branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and
enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance,
guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the
people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal
of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles
of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
34 | P a g e
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall
be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is
on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but
shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the
Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by
the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two
Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following
tabulation:
 11TH CONGRESS RULES
RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment. – Impeachment shall
be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House.
35 | P a g e
12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES substance.
In cases where a verified complaint
RULE V or a resolution of impeachment is
BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF filed or endorsed, as the case may
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the
Members of the
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
House, impeachment proceedings
Section 16. – Impeachment are deemed initiated at the time of
Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In the filing of such verified complaint
cases where a Member of the House or resolution of impeachment with
files a verified complaint of the Secretary General.
impeachment or a citizen files a
verified complaint that is endorsed
by a Member of the House through
a resolution of endorsement againstRULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of
an impeachable officer, Impeachment Proceedings. –
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
impeachment proceedings against Within a period of one (1) year from
such official are deemed initiated onSection 14. Scope of Bar. – No the date impeachment proceedings
the day the Committee on Justice impeachment proceedings shall be are deemed initiated as provided in
finds that the verified complaint initiated against the same official Section 16 hereof, no impeachment
and/or resolution against such more than once within the period of proceedings, as such, can be
official, as the case may be, is one (1) year. initiated against the same official.
sufficient in substance, or on the (Italics in the original; emphasis and
date the House votes to overturn or underscoring supplied)
affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verifiedOn July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
2
complaint and/or resolution,Resolution,
as the sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
case may be, is not sufficientFuentebella,
in which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of
this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen
Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article
XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not
yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
36 | P a g e
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the
first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and
Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging
that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental
importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right
to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and
approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives
and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5,
6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court
issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of
Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3)
and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment
complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with
the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent
House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of
transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate;
and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents
Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for
Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public
funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of
37 | P a g e
prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings
on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this
Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of
this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition
for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as
taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their
petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House
of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and
transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and
respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina
and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of
the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring
that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated,
pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second
impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming
that they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless
spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to
protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of
the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House
Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as
all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2)
this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking
cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second
impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition
commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from
conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose
members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T.
Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both
allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount
public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment
complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a
citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N.
Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin
the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and
38 | P a g e
Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be
permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in
his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation
Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which
they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v.
Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of
Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents
House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this
Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment
complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in
interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan
Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of
national and transcendental significance and that as an official of
the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial
interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its
officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the
Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House
of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the
impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer,
alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella
and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment
complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as
they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment
assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse
the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and
Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an
abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they
are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the
House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the
Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without
alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment
complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial
Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that
the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in
the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare
Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and
Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared
null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging
that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment
complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
39 | P a g e
complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null
and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and
(3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of
Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint
as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the
respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and
(2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the
Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that
they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and
160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this
Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for
the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment
Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and
160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief.
In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged
that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into
the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct
violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second
impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but
it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned
for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of
Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were
filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered
to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice
Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to
participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its
Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the
petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the
Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the
petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the
petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.;
and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In
addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to
maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting
for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would
render the petitions moot.
40 | P a g e
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of
Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its
co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a
Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear,
much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is
an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated
duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino
Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex
Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the
issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole
power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment
court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one
where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld
pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this
Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated
petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later
than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate
President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that
insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and
have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing
of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since
(1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment
court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of
Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised
by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House
of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave
to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,
160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued
by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would
unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional
deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the
matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in
Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in
G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-
Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator
Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's
Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici
curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator
Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo
Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by
this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
41 | P a g e
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-
vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive
issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad
arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the
reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be
as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the
power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3)
the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be
discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the
power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial
branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present
1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded
upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara
v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did
not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on
what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
42 | P a g e
several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power
of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels,for then
the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and
restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be
in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of
this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In
our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by
clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who
is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify
or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner,
the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to
"determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different
branches of government and "to direct the course of government
43 | P a g e
along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review
is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such
power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803
leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial
review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring
what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is
first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but
those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution,
have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments,
are bound by that instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express
grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was
exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm
acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and
former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive
and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is
indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and
balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation
of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government
and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of
the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme
44 | P a g e
Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments
in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to
declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him,
"[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in
that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave
abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of
government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block
letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this
Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the
following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent,
former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of
our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is,
the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees,
and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law
failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we
have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary
feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved.
It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the
people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. x x x
xxx
45 | P a g e
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions,
this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which
employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for
its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily
a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain
that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the
cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words
of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if
any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will
be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the
framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and
the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that
reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
46 | P a g e
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where,
speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera,
it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by
the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court,
through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not
have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others.When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction
with all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this
Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made
to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear,
resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at
the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto
may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning
is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of
the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
47 | P a g e
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood
by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding
thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional
refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial
review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor
Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has
excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De
Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot
assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident
arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the
reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's
"sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the
application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the
Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment
proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely
heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in
the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try
crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which
impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it
would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US
Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in
cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American
jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the
Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as
provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power
of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions
incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the
American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no
longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is
concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n
resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled
by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings
and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace
its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development
48 | P a g e
have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas,
"[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine
Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the
power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the
Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided
for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it
was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct
any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch
or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution
and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the
House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While
the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the
House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power
to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to
the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and
(5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to
conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon
this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the
people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of
judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted
the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows
that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided
for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the
validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of
judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited
by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment
power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These
cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to
compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not
concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the
power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago
v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its
officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine
Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held
that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty
of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this
49 | P a g e
Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of
whether the House representation in the Commission on
Appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held
that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the
petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to
judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under
the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass
upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly
of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election
is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that
the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not
to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of
the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that
insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers
assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts'
power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
50 | P a g e
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions,
contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief
Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus
curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito
Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners
have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving
paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and
that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and
that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72 Amicus
curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the
same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-
entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is
unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in
the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners
standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-
interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil
procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In
view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the
Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify
what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-
in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in
interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note
. . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy
underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether
a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring
that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing
restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary
in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some
cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the
public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such
parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is
whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the
51 | P a g e
judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the
suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by
the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives,
none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal
rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke
the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of
Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the
bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly violated by
the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when specific requirements have been met have been
given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must
be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is
invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that
he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason
of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a
citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage
of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial
review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all
members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not
a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant
standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment
and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of
any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its
members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers
and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere
invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of
the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe
it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other
groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions
52 | P a g e
shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax
the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all
citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully
protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal
properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a
class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under
the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class
whether or not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly
appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as
shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions
before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers,
however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole
ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U.
Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance,
the following instructive determinants formulated by former
Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the
character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the
presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of
the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the
issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude
on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to
craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when
the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such
liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a
party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A
party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such
interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In
petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case.
He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties,
or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is
not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R.
No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same
issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as
earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and Petition-in-Intervention.
53 | P a g e
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No.
160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that
"they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of
the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the
requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of
transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of
the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the
second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and
based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the
matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby
granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene
for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of
view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that
submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does
will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an
impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly,
Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein
petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all
substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to
Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to
argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must
be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to
meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set
forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent
in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to
allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of
public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper
purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar
does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando,
held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what
54 | P a g e
was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate
legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the
filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted
by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned.
The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before
suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the
instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate
President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent
need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the
final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first
be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College
of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going
attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment
complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House
Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to
raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of
Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to
the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles
are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue
of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the
House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither
would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second
impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit
of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and,
therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from
either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is
shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House
of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule
with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether
concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power
is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I,
Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a
body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
55 | P a g e
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly
without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of
taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In
some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question
doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In
other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the
therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it
found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case
of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of
whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this
Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance
thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political
question, it being a question decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question
doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the
Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he
became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power
of judicial review and its application on issues involving political
questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I
suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest
among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature
holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has
nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the
power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects
the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers
without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will
proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the
Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
56 | P a g e
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain
principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that
is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect
of martial law failed because the government set up the defense
of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on
the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the
members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the
benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers,
allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court
in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am
not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22,
although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious
reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration
had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September
21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the
media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could
not publish any story not only because our main writers were
already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them
in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath
of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun
on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the
Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the
Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial
law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens
of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague,
Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution
was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they
finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention
had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of
the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around
December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling
a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in
the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less
public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose
was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the
Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in
January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague,
Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of
the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling
effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the
President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and
announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be
held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be
submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of
its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the
Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as
"citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into
existence. The questions to be propounded were released with
proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to
hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum
should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a
motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of
the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard
before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the
Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new
57 | P a g e
Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming
majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the
Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of
Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was being
heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential
proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified
by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that the
court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to
January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution.
Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of
Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in
their respective places of residence, much less did they participate
in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum
proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a
majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no
referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a
big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another
group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political
question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only
major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up.
There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because
the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its
functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power?
What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to
settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are
demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are
guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a
decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to
perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife
what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with
them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by
law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual
compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I
provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .
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The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,
hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government,
the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The
powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each
one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a
given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject
of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief
Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power,
thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but
judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in
other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to
identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there
is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary
cases but where there is a question as to whether the government
had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question.
Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided
by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for
votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with
the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
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MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of
discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not
intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define
what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says,
"judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition
that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems
arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that
truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only
a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section
1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2)
those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly
political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the
UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken
jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the
effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame
Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which
the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to
the political departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice
Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court
must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the
1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away
with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this
Court ruled:
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In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes
even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were
to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are
justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions,
however. Identification of these two species of political questions
may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The
American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.112(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not
separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that
the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are
also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the
American concept of judicial review is radically different from our
current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether
they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question
from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in
accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on
Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
61 | P a g e
infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of
the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional
for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense.
Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such
an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six
grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes
and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the
boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard
therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-
justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever
possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on
Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when
it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted
and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until
a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of
Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due
process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over
a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
62 | P a g e
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality
unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking
the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively
raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this
controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether
one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be
passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of
adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that,
among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid
since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative
inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry
petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a
violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence
of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims,
it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the
constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative
inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the
second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said
issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of
legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is
required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is
further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised
other grounds in support of their petition which would not be
adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of
legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court
in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus,
Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution.
Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure"
and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify
against one's self.123
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In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the
second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella,
the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article
XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of
Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment,
the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the
afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of
all the Members of the House." With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said
Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a
"Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the
"Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of
Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives
Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the
Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment
complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment
and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least
one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not
having complied with this requirement, they concede that the
second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and
referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2),
Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who
opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply,
there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and
verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants,
signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment.
Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the
resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such
resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one
Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
64 | P a g e
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and
Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to
the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations
militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present
controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised
this issue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment
complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for
deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render
for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262,
but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as
unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made
easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have
joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's
arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not
unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably
linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant
controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI
of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on
the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has
the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again,
this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue
that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume
jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof
are subject to impeachment."125But this argument is very much like
saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with
penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives
are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an
option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because
this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be
renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy
may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from
its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More
than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to
take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words
of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is
a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if
it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our
system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the
challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.128 On
the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the
65 | P a g e
controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as
always, with detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the
judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to
pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason,
they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to
be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be
equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest
had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent
Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition
of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution
of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were
interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would
have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-
Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to
decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the
substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but
to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its
entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal
be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the
power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public
interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than
the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the
framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—
elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon.
Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992
elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the
Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or
mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from
sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates,
refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are
merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
66 | P a g e
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court,
particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro
tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of
his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the
Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case
with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial
power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the
court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would
leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the
Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan
cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial
review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in
a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide
such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a
necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy
between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a
friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the
courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the
Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has
found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on
either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution
are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on
an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more
striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a
personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official
interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be
entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the
dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional.
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In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity
Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on
behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at
the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized
in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as
required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the
operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this
Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for
judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of
impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between
the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the
appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and
humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad
if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an
impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by
alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against
Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and
erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As
correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to
refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases.
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Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because
their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court
refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or
executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has
passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment
has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those
political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to
grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the
necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one
way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent
and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was
split and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant
the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing
constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes
that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a
lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to
believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a
precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and
anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the
land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well
guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of
justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries
within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their
office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of
men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those
acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are
guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it
without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments,
political parties, or even the interference of their own personal
beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia,
argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present
Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to
file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of
Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly
mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the
Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by
a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House
of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the
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members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives
concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have
been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the
House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to
act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the
term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in
order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an
Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate"
as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission
proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus
curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions
held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of
"initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint,
dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice
appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as
dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action,"
which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father
Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant
petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The
end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the
formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the
initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment
is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal
fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual
initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution
is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the
procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these
would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the
Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of
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which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne
out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last
impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang
Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution
covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with
initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate,
trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking
that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out
earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the
committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is
the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor.
If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was
the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on
that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging these words because we have to be very technical
about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me.
The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have
submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of
the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all
affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact
formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of
this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we
delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the
letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so
that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of
all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee
or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as
the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified
complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it
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the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles
of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct
filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the
House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment
will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the
uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United
States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was
clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of
Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with
the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner
Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the
phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the
text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment
proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of
one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated
by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2),
Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same
view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in
Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the
filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint
moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified
that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis
supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment
proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common
verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is
"impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is
"impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo
singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the
term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy
that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision
provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members,
can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has
"exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other
body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case
in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which
comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other
hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle,
and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and
72 | P a g e
consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint
either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private
citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives;
(2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper
Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3)
whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the
complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for
further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same
complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a
favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary
resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one
third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at
this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at
this point that an impeachable public official is successfully
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is
not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for
trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the
beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on
the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the
House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation
or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice
for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps
that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its
ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor
proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment
proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line
was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No
impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year," it means that no
second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the
meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the
Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and
sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read
ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning,
they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated
lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body
can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says
"The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said
provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula
singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment
proceeding."
73 | P a g e
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is
without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action
of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of
the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary
General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is
a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once
the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee
on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before
the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5)
of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning
different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this
Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the
interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v.
Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions
(referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution
Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our
deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly
recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing
said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of
the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in
their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more
about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present
petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who
participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice
Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken
part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court
has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by
members of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the
records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3
(8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the
power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its
argument is premised on the assumption that Congress
has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption,
however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules
on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out
74 | P a g e
the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene
the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended
to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly
provides for other specific limitations on its power to make
rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles
of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which
is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule
making power, then it would by necessary implication have the
power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the
province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it
was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its
members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando,
speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States
v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to
a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the
question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De
Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice
Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints
or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of
method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the
same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he
stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for
courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize
75 | P a g e
the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over
he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation
of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as
a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where
the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of
the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house
may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in
pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed
this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the
hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and
recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in
determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal.
Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of
such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the
courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of
the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is
no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the
validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found
to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be
attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its
jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle
of separation of powers.154
xxx
76 | P a g e
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense when
its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article
VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower
courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This
power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and
1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM
granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state
power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the
political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the
checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this
Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as
a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the
checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the President
and the legislators being elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the
courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by our
experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and
more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts
of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not
merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987
Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court is mandated to
approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it
should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this
solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar
once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review
violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust
77 | P a g e
as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to
exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure,
it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that
has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed
the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on
inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the
lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the
instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of
private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v.
US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment
Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply
provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No
limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court
concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to
impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives
since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several
provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be
exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning
of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may
not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003
and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
78 | P a g e
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is
always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual
and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair
for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to
demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide
impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to
be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting
experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to
articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position
or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as
demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the
Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans
and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of
society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and
denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state
of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental branches
affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of
national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of
Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically
asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and
form with respect to the prosecution by the House of
Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject
respondent public official. When the present petitions were
knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same
clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the
arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial
self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may
have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as
the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate
what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in
full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its
constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an
issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land.
What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material
which only this Court can properly and competently address and
adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers
under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or
problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other
course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem
head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself
with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of
judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and
resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
79 | P a g e
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had
none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court
to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of
the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to
complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their
own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of
having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of
constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief
Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to
protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said
issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing
could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other
courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to
resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities
involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice
over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to
benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or
speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment
according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to
wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest
ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible
fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a
government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the
Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any
member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified
instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit
at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
simply a non sequitur. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on
in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI
law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to of the Constitution.
secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there
is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most SO ORDERED.
zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the
Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of
the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief
Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this
Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he
gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of
every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt

been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief
Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no
other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many
feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed
immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our
bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went
through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover
that it can resolve differences without the use of force and
aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure

in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of

80 | P a g e
V. Mariano vs COMELEC
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Makati."1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory
relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo
Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza,
Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano,
Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan,
Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the
following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area
or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of
Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law
(the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a
81 | P a g e
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three
(3) years following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title
of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only
450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as
senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section
52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as
aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of
the proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be
converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of
Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the
present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan
Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast
by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of
Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution
by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or
cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City
of Makati and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis
supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates
sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require
that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes
and bounds with technical descriptions.2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits,
its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the
boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the
people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local
Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local
government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this
evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of
R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will
cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation
did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by
Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or
82 | P a g e
multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that
cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area
"shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate
reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not
defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the
time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute
between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio
was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to
co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute
should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which
could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the
land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions.3 We take judicial notice of the fact that
Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds
description of land areas of other local government units with
unsettled boundary disputes.4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per
se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress
from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of
a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained
the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act
of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the
courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not
prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional.
We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this
regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it
is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the
territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be
described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions" — was
made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities
may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on
metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of
local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the
territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e.,
by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities,
as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent
behind the law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities
must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those
appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require
such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its
validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local
Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the
Code is to empower local government units and to give them their
rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to
the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a
vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on
the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in
the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It
then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the
other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter
of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when
83 | P a g e
to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or
would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Tañada v.
Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105).
Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for
purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve,
and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry
out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520).
The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of
section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective
officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials
of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions
until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected
officials shall have already qualified and assume their
offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall
likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they
shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City
of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and
section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials,
including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of
three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than
three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the
new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A.
No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials
of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In
particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent
Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served
for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor
Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming
elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek
another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year
consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus,
84 | P a g e
petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently
crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of
section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he
would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections.
Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen
to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the
constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52
of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-
urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2)
legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2)
existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No.
7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence
at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this
Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas and Forbes
shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo
which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment6cannot made by
a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed
in the title of the bill7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990
census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias
v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative
districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter
of a new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides that Congress shall
be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in
Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment
can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a
review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation
where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of
time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new
city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot
85 | P a g e
admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever
whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of
the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the population
of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased
since it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the
creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have
been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case
of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court
favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so
as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not
command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should
be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject
and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
No costs. SO ORDERED.
VI. Montesclaros vs COMELEC
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
The petition seeks to prevent the postponement of
the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK for brevity) elections originally
scheduled last May 6, 2002. The petition also seeks to prevent the
reduction of the age requirement for membership in the SK.
Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a
taxpayers and class suit, on their own behalf and on behalf of other
youths similarly situated. Petitioners claim that they are in danger of
being disqualified to vote and be voted for in the SK elections
should the SK elections on May 6, 2002 be postponed to a later
date. Under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
membership in the SK is limited to youths at least 15 but not more
than 21 years old.
Petitioners allege that public respondents connived, confederated
and conspired to postpone the May 6, 2002 SK elections and to
lower the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but less than 18
years of age. Petitioners assail the alleged conspiracy because
youths at least 18 but not more than 21 years old will be summarily
and unduly dismembered, unfairly discriminated, unnecessarily
disenfranchised, unjustly disassociated and obnoxiously disqualified
from the SK organization.[1]
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Thus, petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction -
a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law, decree,
Comelec resolution/directive and other respondents issuances,
orders and actions and the like in postponing the May 6, 2002 SK
elections.
b) To command the respondents to continue the May 6, 2002 SK
elections set by the present law and in accordance with Comelec
Resolutions No. 4713 and 4714 and to expedite the funding of the
SK elections.
c) In the alternative, if the SK elections will be postponed for
whatever reason, there must be a definite date for said elections,
for example, July 15, 2002, and the present SK membership, except
those incumbent SK officers who were elected on May 6, 1996, shall
be allowed to run for any SK elective position even if they are more
than 21 years old.
d) To direct the incumbent SK officers who are presently
representing the SK in every sanggunian and the NYC to vacate their
post after the barangay elections.[2]
The Facts
The SK is a youth organization originally established by Presidential
Decree No. 684 as the Kabataang Barangay (KB for brevity). The KB
was composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18
years old, without specifying the minimum age. The KB was
organized to provide its members with the opportunity to express
their views and opinions on issues of transcendental importance.[3]
The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK and
limited SK membership to those youths at least 15 but not more
than 21 years of age.[4] The SK remains as a youth organization in
every barangay tasked to initiate programs to enhance the
social, political, economic, cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and
physical development of the youth.[5] The SK in every barangay is
composed of a chairperson and seven members, all elected by
the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Katipunan ng Kabataan in every
barangay is composed of all citizens actually residing in the
barangay for at least six months and who meet the membership age
requirement.
The first SK elections took place on December 4, 1992. RA No. 7808
reset the SK elections to the first Monday of May of 1996 and every
three years thereafter. RA No. 7808 mandated the Comelec to
supervise the conduct of the SK elections under rules the Comelec
shall promulgate. Accordingly, the Comelec on December 4, 2001
issued Resolution Nos. 4713[6] and 4714[7] to govern the SK elections
on May 6, 2002.
On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros
(Montesclaros for brevity) sent a letter[8] to the Comelec,
demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6,
2002. Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter
within 10 days upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will seek
judicial relief.
On February 20, 2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo (Chairman Benipayo for
brevity), then Comelec Chairman, wrote identical letters to the
Speaker of the House[9] and the Senate President[10] about the status
of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. In his letters, the
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Comelec Chairman intimated that it was operationally very difficult
to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the
Comelec Chairman expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin
Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002
and postpone the SK elections to November 2002.
Ten days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of
Montesclaros. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy of
Comelec En Banc Resolution No. 4763[11] dated February 5, 2002
recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to
November 2002 but holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as
scheduled.[12]
On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives
passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. On March
11, 2002, the Bicameral Conference Committee (Bicameral
Committee for brevity) of the Senate and the House came out with
a Report[13] recommending approval of the reconciled bill
consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050[14] and House Bill No. 4456.[15] The
Bicameral Committees consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay
elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the
SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of age.
On March 11, 2002, petitioners filed the instant petition.
On March 11, 2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committees
consolidated bill and on March 13, 2002, the House of
Representatives approved the same. The President signed the
approved bill into law on March 19, 2002.
The Issues
Petitioners[16] raise the following grounds in support of their
petition:
I.
RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN THEY INTENDED TO POSTPONE THE SK
ELECTIONS.
II.
RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN THEY INTENDED TO DISCRIMINATE,
DISENFRANCHISE, SINGLE OUT AND DISMEMBER THE SK MEMBERS
WHO ARE 18 BUT NOT LESS[17] (SIC) THAN 21 YEARS OLD
COMPOSED OF ABOUT 7 MILLION YOUTH.
III.
RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN THEY WILLFULLY FAILED TO FUND THE SK
ELECTION PURPORTEDLY TO POSTPONE THE SAME IN ORDER TO
IMPLEMENT THEIR ILLEGAL SCHEME AND MACHINATION IN SPITE
OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR THE
PURPOSE.
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IV.
THE INCUMBENT SK OFFICERS WANTED TO PERPETUALLY SIT ON
THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES CONTRARY TO THE ENVISION (SIC) OF
THE CREATION OF THE SK ORGANIZATION, HENCE, IN VIOLATION OF
LAW AND CONSTITUTION.[18]
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, the Court takes judicial notice of the following events
that have transpired since petitioners filed this petition:
1. The May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay
elections were not held as scheduled.
2. Congress enacted RA No. 9164[19] which provides that voters and
candidates for the SK elections must be at least 15 but less than 18
years of age on the day of the election.[20] RA No. 9164 also provides
that there shall be a synchronized SK and Barangay elections on July
15, 2002.
3. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 4846, the rules and
regulations for the conduct of the July 15, 2002 synchronized SK and
Barangay elections.
Petitioners, who all claim to be 20 years old, argue that the
postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections disenfranchises
them, preventing them from voting and being voted for in the SK
elections. Petitioners theory is that if the SK elections were
postponed to a date later than May 6, 2002, the postponement
would disqualify from SK membership youths who will turn 21 years
old between May 6, 2002 and the date of the new SK
elections. Petitioners claim that a reduction in the SK membership
age to 15 but less than 18 years of age from the then membership
age of 15 but not more than 21 years of age would disqualify about
seven million youths. The public respondents failure to hold the
elections on May 6, 2002 would prejudice petitioners and other
youths similarly situated.
Thus, petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public
respondents to hold the SK elections on May 6, 2002 and should it
be postponed, the SK elections should be held not later than July 15,
2002; (2) prevent public respondents from passing laws and issuing
resolutions and orders that would lower the membership age in the
SK; and (3) compel public respondents to allow petitioners and
those who have turned more than 21 years old on May 6, 2002 to
participate in any re-scheduled SK elections.
The Courts power of judicial review may be exercised in
constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied
with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or
controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case.[21]
In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the
exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a
postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are
nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date
not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections
to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. With respect to
89 | P a g e
the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy
requiring judicial intervention.
Petitioners prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a
proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not
present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not
subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill
creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the
Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no
constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a
proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would
be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act
of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be
exercised in vacuo.[22] The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution states
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the
constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power
of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.
Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress
from passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill
according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress
in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial
restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of
bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the
Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval
into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent
a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of
constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its
power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures
of Congress.[23]
The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or
subject of bills that Congress should enact into law. The judicial
power to review the constitutionality of laws does not include the
power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact.The Court has no
power to compel Congress by mandamus to enact a law allowing
petitioners, regardless of their age, to vote and be voted for in the
July 15, 2002 SK elections. To do so would destroy the delicate
system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for
the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of
government.
Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement
in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the
maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years
old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the
age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code
of 1991. Every law passed by Congress is always subject to
amendment or repeal by Congress. The Court cannot restrain
Congress from amending or repealing laws, for the power to make
laws includes the power to change the laws.[24]
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The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters
to vote or be voted for in an election that is limited under RA No.
9164 to youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is
needed to allow all those who have turned more than 21 years old
on or after May 6, 2002 to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK
elections. Youths from 18 to 21 years old as of May 6, 2002 are also
no longer SK members, and cannot participate in the July 15, 2002
SK elections. Congress will have to decide whether to enact an
amendatory law. Petitioners remedy is legislation, not judicial
intervention.
Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining
this suit. A party must show that he has been, or is about to be
denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled.[25] A party must also show that he has a real interest in the
suit. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent,
subordinate, or inconsequential interest.[26]
In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally
conferred by law on those who were at least 15 but not more than
21 years old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is
limited to those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15
but less than 18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the
SK to this specific age group. Not falling within this classification,
petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer
qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly,
petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial interest in the
SK elections.
This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time
petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK
elections and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was
not yet enacted into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164,
petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could
be unconstitutional. To grant petitioners prayer to be allowed to
vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections necessitates
assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164.This, petitioners have
not done. The Court will not strike down a law unless its
constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and
adequately argued.[27]
The only semblance of a constitutional issue, albeit erroneous, that
petitioners raise is their claim that SK membership is a property
right within the meaning of the Constitution.[28] Since certain public
offices are reserved for SK officers, petitioners also claim a
constitutionally protected opportunity to occupy these public
offices. In petitioners own words, they and others similarly situated
stand to lose their opportunity to work in the government positions
reserved for SK members or officers.[29]Under the Local Government
Code of 1991, the president of the federation of SK organizations in
a municipality, city or province is an ex-officio member of the
municipal council, city council or provincial board,
respectively.[30] The chairperson of the SK in the barangay is an ex-
officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay.[31] The president of
the national federation of SK organizations is an ex-officio member
of the National Youth Commission, with rank of a Department
Assistant Secretary.[32]
Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK
membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an
91 | P a g e
amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a
proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK
members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act
disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK
elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the
Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by
law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even
withdraw the statutory right.
A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly
states, a [P]ublic office is a public trust.[33] No one has a vested right
to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of
holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,[34] decided in 1920, the
Court already ruled:
Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law
prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a
property. It is, however, well settled x x x that a public office is not
property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due
process of law, but is a public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of
the government x x x is that of a popular representative
government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the
people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or
contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office
pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust
for the people he represents. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should
realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to
public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-
officio member of a local government legislative council, the law
does not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a
proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The
constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust precludes
any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy directing
equal access to opportunities for public service[35] cannot bestow on
petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary
expectancy to ex-officio public offices.
Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youths
involvement in public affairs,[36] this policy refers to those who
belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the
power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK, which
itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because
they are past the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on
being part of the youth. In government service, once an employee
reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke any property
right to cling to his office. In the same manner, since petitioners are
now past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they cannot
invoke any property right to cling to their SK membership.
The petition must also fail because no grave abuse of discretion
attended the postponement of the SK elections. RA No. 9164 is now
the law that prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters
for the SK elections. This law also fixes the date of the SK
elections. Petitioners are not even assailing the constitutionality of
RA No. 9164. RA No. 9164 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality and will apply to the July 15, 2002 SK elections.
Petitioners have not shown that the Comelec acted illegally or with
grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the
postponement of the SK elections. The very evidence relied upon by
92 | P a g e
petitioners contradict their allegation of illegality. The evidence
consist of the following: (1) Comelec en banc Resolution No. 4763
dated February 5, 2002 that recommended the postponement of
the SK elections to 2003; (2) the letter of then Comelec Chairman
Benipayo addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate; and (3) the Conference Committee
Report consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050 and House Bill No. 4456.
The Comelec exercised its power and duty to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall[37] and to
recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending.[38] The Comelecs acts enjoy the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties.[39] These acts cannot constitute
proof, as claimed by petitioners, that there exists a connivance and
conspiracy (among) respondents in contravention of the present
law. As the Court held in Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec,[40] the
Comelec, as the government agency tasked with the enforcement
and administration of elections laws, is entitled to the presumption
of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections.
The 1987 Constitution imposes upon the Comelec the duty of
enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections. Petitioners failed to prove that the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress
the postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections. The evidence
cited by petitioners even establish that the Comelec has
demonstrated an earnest effort to address the practical problems in
holding the SK elections on May 6, 2002. The presumption remains
that the decision of the Comelec to recommend to Congress the
postponement of the elections was made in good faith in the
regular course of its official duties.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise

of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law.[41] Public respondents having acted strictly pursuant to their
constitutional powers and duties, we find no grave abuse of
discretion in their assailed acts.

Petitioners contend that the postponement of the SK elections

would allow the incumbent SK officers to perpetuate themselves in
power, depriving other youths of the opportunity to serve in
elective SK positions. This argument deserves scant
consideration. While RA No. 9164 contains a hold-over provision,
incumbent SK officials can remain in office only until their
successors have been elected or qualified. On July 15, 2002, when
the SK elections are held, the hold-over period expires and all
incumbent SK officials automatically cease to hold their SK offices
and their ex-officio public offices.

In sum, petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in

maintaining this suit. This petition presents no actual justiciable
controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is
alleged to be unconstitutional. Lastly, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

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VII. Estrada vs. SB
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 148560, November 19,
2001Facts:Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,wishes to impress upon the Court
that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that itcrosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. Hiscontentions are mainly based on the
effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and itabolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Codesaying that it
violates the fundamental rights of the accused.The focal point of
the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the
terms it uses.Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and
unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial
challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.Issue:Whether or not
the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the
law usingthe facial challenge. Ruling:On how the law uses the terms
combination and series does not constitute vagueness.
Thepetitioner’s contention that it would not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what the
lawseeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-
vagueness doctrine is manifestlymisplaced under the petitioner’s rel
iance since ordinary intelligence can understand whatconduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie
of legislation thatis utterly vague on its face, wherein clarification by
a saving clause or construction cannot beinvoked. Said doctrine may
not invoked in this case since the statute is clear and free
fromambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable
94 | P a g e
degree of certainty for the statuteto be upheld, not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude.On the
other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees
that governmental purpose may not
beachieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and there
by invade the area of protected freedoms.Doctrine of strict scrutiny
holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague
statuteand to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling
effect upon protected speech.Furthermore, in the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of freespeech. A
facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfullysince the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists.Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools
developed for facial challenge of a statute in freespeech cases. With
respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to who
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack
the statute on the ground that impliedly itmight also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its
applicationmight be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation
of statues results in striking them downentirely on the ground that
they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose
activitiesare constitutionally protected. It is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law ismore imagined than
real.The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been
resolve in the Congress’decision to include it among the heinous
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.Supreme Court
holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for
lacking merit.
VIII. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President
These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread
of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove
from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of
independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they
belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks to
declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which
gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of
the Office of the Ombudsman.
FACTS: G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct
(robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries) was
filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector
(P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others.Private complainant,
Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a
similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the
Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned
over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication.
Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S
Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the Office of
the Ombudsman.Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the
city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material
allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated
95 | P a g e
"by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of
the offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the
PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without
prejudice of the administrative case against the same police
officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3)
consecutive hearings despite due notice. However, upon the
recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S
Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave
Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman.Mendoza and his
colleagues filed for a motion for reconsideration which was
forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in whose
office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S
Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful
day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself
reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the
tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of
seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public
outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the
creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).
It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through
the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC
found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and
inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of
procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to
languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification,
in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions
for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five
(5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is
no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the
desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from
service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232:Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of
the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife
Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and
Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder
and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for
bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the
grant of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner,
Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and sought the Sandiganbayan's
approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into
with the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding
the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with
jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General
Garcia to get off the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand
notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of
his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of
Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings
on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the
Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution
No. 3, recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner
Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate
charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the
appropriate government office for having committed acts and/or
omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution
and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-
96 | P a g e
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from
office under the Ombudsman Act.Hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to
exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the
constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
HELD: YES. The Ombudsman's administrative
disciplinary power
over a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not
exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline
administratively is extensive and covers all government officials,
whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those
officials removable by impeachment such authority is by no means
exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and
directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman.
For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's
disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on
the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over
a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious
construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A.
No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had
intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent
disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, respectively.Indubitably, the manifest intent of
Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 -
in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority,
through the person of the President, that would exercise the power
of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the
constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all
government officials and employees. Such legislative design is
simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the
lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his
Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative
liabilities.
By granting express statutory
power to the President to remove
a
Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor, Congress
merely
filled an obvious gap in
the law. While the removal of the
Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same
Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly
dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a
Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A.
6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul
of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the
Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide
for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to
impeachment.
The Power of the President to
Remove a Deputy
Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor is
Implied from his Power
to
Appoint.In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in
express terms an authority that is already implied from the
President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials
in the Office of the Ombudsman.The integrity and effectiveness of
97 | P a g e
the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog
looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale
and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial
importance in relation to the President's own role asCommander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for
Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary
authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other
law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power
to Remove a Deputy
Ombudsman
does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office
of the
Ombudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770
granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman
from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The
independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with
was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the
Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is,
essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than
that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline
of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the
whims of politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not be
removed from office where
the
questioned acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do
not
constitute betrayal of public trust.Petitioner's act of directing
the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the
Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be
considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that
would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking from office as provided
for under the Constitution and
cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or the
Ombudsman Act.
private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of
the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the
The factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with
administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension
even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is
statements; that the decision was immediately implemented; or directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the
that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, WeAFFIRM the
more than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor
petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to
evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business affiliation culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust,
with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the
that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable
Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
motivation.The OP's pronouncement of administrative
accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the
corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside,
as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not
amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he
may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of
petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional
wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal
of public trust.

The Office of the President is vested
with statutory authority to

proceed
administratively against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit to
determine the
existence of any of the grounds for
her removal

98 | P a g e
IX. Gonzales vs Narvasa
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on
December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of
the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and
of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was
created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of
Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and
recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987
Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.”
Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the
grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can
create by way of a law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43
HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if
he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury
is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not
shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any
99 | P a g e
personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is
only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” in this
case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached
upon the legislature’s powers to create a public office and to
propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR.
Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury.
Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are
in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly,
petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him
to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a
constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have
been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by
the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70.
Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is
“appropriated” for its operational expenses “to be sourced from the
funds of the Office of the President.” Being that case, petitioner
must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to
the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner
presume to make such a representation.
X. Lacson vs. Perez
FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an armed
mob assaulting andattempting to break into Malacañang, issued
Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in
NCR. She also issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the
PNP to suppress therebellion. Warrantless arrests of several
alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion"
followed. Aggrieved, 4 related petitions were filed before the Court.
The case at bar is for prohibition,injunction,
mandamus
, and
habeas corpus
(with an urgent application for the issuance of temporaryrestraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction). Petitioners assail the
declaration of a state of rebellion by PGMA and the warrantless
arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basisboth
in fact and in law.On May 6, 2001, PGMA ordered the lifting of the
declaration of a "state of rebellion" in MetroManila. Accordingly,
the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. As to
petitioners'claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is
being used by the authorities to justifywarrantless arrests, the
Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to
arrest specificpersons in connection with the "rebellion."
ISSUE:
100 | P a g e
Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest against the
petitioners.
HELD:
No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may
only resort to warrantlessarrests of persons suspected of rebellion,
as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by
petitioners is, thus, not based on thedeclaration of a "state of
rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent
danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort
to the extraordinary remediesof
mandamus
and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest
is not withoutadequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The
prayer for prohibition and
mandamus
is improperat this time. As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold
departure orders issued against them be declarednull and void
ab initio
, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the
validity of thesubject hold departure orders in their petition. They
are not even expressing intention to leave thecountry in the near
future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper
proceedingsinitiated for that purpose. Anent petitioners' allegations
ex abundante ad cautelam

in support of their application for theissuance of a writ of

habeas corpus

, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is
torelieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which
remains speculative up to this very day. Petition is DISMISSED.
However, respondents, consistent and congruent with their
undertakingearlier adverted to, together with their agents,
representatives, and all persons acting for and in theirbehalf, are
hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners therein without the
required judicial warrant forall acts committed in relation to or in
connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.

101 | P a g e
XI. Defunis vs Odegaard
Brief Fact Summary. Marco DeFunis, Jr. applied for admission as a
first-year student at the University of Washington Law School, a
state-operated institution. When he was denied admission, he
brought suit in a Washington trial court claiming that the
admissions committee procedures were racially discriminatory.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. In federal cases before the Supreme Court,
there must be an actual case and controversy which exists at the
stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date
the action is initiated.
Facts. Marco DeFunis, Jr. sued the University of Washington Law
School, a state operated university. DeFunis argued that the
University’s admissions policies and criteria were racially
discriminatory. However, DeFunis was allowed to attend the law
school during the case and was in his third year when the case was
heard by the Court. Further, the University has agreed to let him
graduate upon completion of his last year.
interest would be sufficient to create an actual case or controversy,
and the case was rendered moot because DeFunis was going to
graduate from the law school regardless of the Court’s ruling. Thus,
the case was rendered moot. “[T]he controversy between the
parties has thus clearly ceased to be definite and concrete.”
Dissent. There were numerous potential litigants who would be
affected by a decision on the legal issues presented. Further, 26
amici curiae briefs were filed by parties in this case. The public
interest would be best served by reviewing these issues now, as
they would inevitably find their way back into the federal court
system. There was a stronger interest in litigating these issues
immediately to avoid repetitious litigation that would inevitably
occur due to the high public interest in this issue.
Discussion. A case is considered “moot” if a justiciable controversy
existed when a case was filed, but circumstances after filing indicate
the litigant no longer has a stake in the controversy. In such a
situation, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is not invoked, and the
Court will not even hear the other issues presented.

Issue. Does an actual controversy exist between the parties, capable

of redress by the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court)?

Held. The Court ordered the parties to address the issue of

mootness before they proceeded to any other claims in the petition.
The Court reasoned that “federal courts are without power to
decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the
cases before them.” This requirement stems from Article III of the
Constitution, under which the exercise of judicial power depends
upon the existence of a case or controversy. No amount of public

102 | P a g e
XII. CHECK PDF
XIII. KMU Labor Center vs Garcia
FACTS:
public utilities – privately owned and operated businesses whose
service are essential
tothe general public; enterprises which specially cater to the needs
of the public andconducive to their comfort and convenience
DOTC Sec. issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB
Chairman allowingprovincial bus operators to charge passengers
rates within a range of 15% above and 15%below the LTFRB official
rate for a period of 1 year
PBOAP – pursuant to Memo. Cir. it filed an application for fare rate
increase. An across-the-board increase
of eight and a half centavos (P0.085) per
kilometer for all types of provincial buses with a minimum-
maximum fare range of fifteen (15%) percent over andbelow the
proposed basic per kilometer fare rate, with the said minimum-
maximum farerange applying only to ordinary, first class and
premium class buses and a fifty-centavo(P0.50) minimum per
kilometer fare for aircon buses, was sought
103 | P a g e
respondent LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate
increase in accordance with aspecified schedule of fares on a
straight computation method
DOTC Sec. issued Department Order No. 92-587 defining the policy
framework on theregulation of transport services. It provides inter
alia that “Passenger fares shall also
bederegulated, except for the lowest class of passenger service (nor
mally third classpassenger transport) for which the government will
fix indicative or reference fares.Operators of particular services may
fix their own fares within a range 15% above andbelow the
indicative or reference rate.”
LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-
009 promulgating the guidelines for theimplementation of DOTC
Department Order No. 92-587, which provides, among
others,that:“The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is
determined by public need. Thepresumption of public need for a
service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, whileburden of
proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the
oppositor’s.”“The existing authorized fare range system of plus or
minus 15 per cent for provincialbuses and jeepneys shall be
widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorizedfare to
be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the
expanded farerange”
PBOAP - availing itself of the deregulation policy of the
DOTC allowing provincial busoperators to collect plus 20% and
minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first havingfiled a petition
for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced afare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing
fares
KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward
adjustment of bus fares.
ISSUE:
WON the above memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the DOTC
and the LTFRBwhich, among others, (a) authorize provincial bus and
jeepney operators to increase ordecrease the prescribed
transportation fares without application therefor with the LTFRB
andwithout hearing and approval thereof by said agency is in
violation of Sec. 16(c) of CA
146,and in derogation of LTFRB’s duty to fix and determine
just and reasonable fares bydelegating that function to bus
operators, and (b) establish a presumption of public need infavor of
applicants for certificates of public convenience and place on the
oppositor theburden of proving that there is no need for
the proposed service, in patent violation not onlyof Sec. 16(c) of CA
146, as amended, but also of Sec. 20(a) of the same Act mandating
thatfares should be “just and reasonable”
HELD:
Yes.
104 | P a g e
Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, reads:Sec. 16.
Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. — The
Commission shallhave power, upon proper notice and hearing
in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to
the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to
thecontrary:xxx xxx
xxx( c ) T o f i x a n d d e t e r m i n e i n d i v i d u a l o r j o i n t r a t e s
, t o l l s , c h a r g e s , c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , o r schedules thereof, as
well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special
rateswhich shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by
any public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its
discretion, approve rates proposed by public
servicesprovisionally and without necessity of any hearing; but it
shall call a hearing thereon
withint h i r t y d a y s t h e r e a f t e r , u p o n p u b l i c a t i o n a n d n
o t i c e t o t h e c o n c e r n s o p e r a t i n g i n t h e territory
affected: Provided, further, That in case the
public service equipment of anoperator is used principally or
secondarily for the promotion of a private business, the netprofits
of said private business shall be considered in relation
with the public service of such operator for the purpose
of fixing the rates.
LTFRB is authorized under EO 202, s. 1987 to
d e t e r m i n e , p r e s c r i b e , a p p r o v e a n d periodically
review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related
charges, relativeto the operation of public land transportation
services provided by motorized vehicles
LTFRB – not authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier,
a transport operator,or other public service
authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a
fare range over andabove the authorized existing fare, is
illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an unduedelegation manner. On thecontrary, the policy guideline states that
of legislative authority the presumption of public need for a publicservice shall be
deemed in favor of the applicant.
rate should not be confiscatory as would place an
operator in a situation where he willcontinue to operate
at a loss; rate should enable public utilities to generate
revenuessufficient to cover operational costs and provide
reasonable return on the investments

CPC - authorization granted by the LTFRB for the operation of land

transportation servicesfor public use as required by law. Pursuant to
Section 16(a) of the Public Service Act, asamended, the following
requirements must be met before a CPC may be granted, to wit:
(i)the applicant must be a citizen of the
Philippines, or a corporation or co-
partnership,a s s o c i a t i o n o r j o i n t -
stock company constituted and organized under th
e l a w s o f t h e Philippines, at least 60 per centum of its stock or
paid-up capital must belong entirely tocitizens of the Philippines;
(ii) the applicant must be financially capable of undertaking
theproposed service and meeting the responsibilities
incident to its operation; and (iii)
thea p p l i c a n t m u s t p r o v e t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n o f
t h e p u b l i c s e r v i c e p r o p o s e d a n d t h e authorizati
on to do business will promote the public interest
in a proper and suitablemanner; there must be proper notice
and hearing before the PSC can exercise its power toissue a CPC

LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, Part IV is

incompatible and inconsistent withSection 16(c)(iii) of the
Public Service Act which requires that before a CPC will be
issued,the applicant must prove by proper notice and
hearing that the operation of the publicservice proposed
will promote public interest in a proper and suitable

105 | P a g e
XIV. IBP vs Zamora
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of
the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the
AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for
the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only.
The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the
military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
106 | P a g e
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court
can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual
and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of
the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case
constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of
joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.
It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the
Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of
the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is
supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of
the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion”
of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section
5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
XV. Tañada vs. Tuvera
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners
filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the
dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal
personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before
any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give
the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of
107 | P a g e
injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even
a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be
published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes
upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of
general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application which
have not been published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on
April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of
general circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval,
or in any other date, without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of
the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual,
or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
108 | P a g e
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its
purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be
made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement
for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule
upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as
possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead
of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice
to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
XV. Ople vs Torres
FACTS:
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System," was issued by
President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996.
Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate A.O. No.
308 on several grounds. One of them is that: The establishment of
a National Computerized Identification Reference System requires a
legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the President is an
unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of congress.
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative
order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to
issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and
liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more
particularly, violates their right to privacy.
On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308 was
issued within the executive and administrative powers of the
president without encroaching on the legislative powers of
congress.
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ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate.
RULING:
Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them. The Constitution has vested this power in the
Congress. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad,
general, and comprehensive. Any power deemed to be legislative
by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless
the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.
The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the President.
It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance. As head of the Executive
Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by
the officials and employees of his department. He has control over
the executive department, bureaus and offices. Corollary to the
power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and
public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus
and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct
of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules
and regulations.
From these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a
subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative
order.
The Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate
to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his
duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders.
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An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for
the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy. The Court rejects the argument that A.O. No. 308
implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of
1987. The Code is a general law and incorporates in a unified
document the major structural, functional and procedural principles
of governance and embodies changes in administrative structure
and procedures designed to serve the people.
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely
implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the
first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System.
Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending
state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of
privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the
choice of policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the
parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State
as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the
President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it
ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be
covered by law.
Petition is granted and A.O. No. 308 is declared null and void for
being unconstitutional.
XVI. Information Technology Foundation vs COMELEC
International Technology Foundation of the Philippines v.
COMELEC
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Facts:
• June 7, 1995: Congress passed R.A. 8046, authorizing
COMELEC to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a
computerized election system and allowed the poll body to
test the system in the March 1996 elections in the ARMM.
• December 22, 1997: Congress enacted R.A. 8436
authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election system
(AES) for the process of voting, counting votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and
local elections. It also mandated the acquisition of
automated counting mechanisms (ACMs), computer
equipment, devices and materials.
• During the May 11, 1998 elections, COMELEC decided not
to pursue a national implementation and instead limited
implementation of the AES to the ARMM. However, due to
the failure of the machines to read some of the automated
ballots correctly, the poll body later ordered a manual count
for the entire province of Sulu.
• October 29, 2002: COMELEC adopted in its Resolution 02-
0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It
resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its
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Automated Election System; namely, Phase I — Voter
Registration and Validation System; Phase II — Automated
Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III — Electronic
Transmission.
• January 24, 2003: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5
billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon
the request of COMELEC, she authorized the release of an
additional P500 million.
• January 28, 2003: the Commission issued an "Invitation to
Apply for Eligibility and to Bid”
• February 17, 2003: the COMELEC released the RFP to
procure the election automation schemes.
• February 18, 2003: The Bids and Awards Committee
convened a pre-bid conference and gave prospective
bidders until March 10, 2003 to submit their bids.
• Out of the 57 bidders, BAC found MPC and the Total
Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. After
being referred to the BAC’s Technical Working Group and
the DOST, it was found that both of them obtained failed
marks in the technical evaluation.
• April 15, 2003: COMELEC promulgated Resolution no. 6074
awarding project to MPC. The Commission publicized this
resolution and the award of the project to MPC on May 16,
2003.
 • May 29, 2003: five individuals and entities (including the
herein Petitioners Information Technology Foundation of
the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M.
Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of
the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring
irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process
had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance
with eligibility as well as technical and procedural
requirements (many of which have been discussed at length
in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding.
2. No, the petition is not premature. The respondents claim
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi.
2. WON the instant petition is premature.
3. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
the bidding process and the awarding of the contract to
MPC.
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes, petitioners have standing.According to the court, the
matter at hand is “a matter of public concern and imbued
with public interest” and possesses “transcendental
importance.” Moreover, the court has held that taxpayers
are allowed to sue when there is a claim of “illegal
disbursement of public funds,” or if public money is being
“deflected to any improper purpose”; or whenpetitioners
seek to restrain respondent from “wasting public funds
112 | P a g e
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.” In the case, the petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assert
a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are
properly and lawfully used. In the petition, they claim that
the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a
qualified entity, and the award of the contract contrary to
law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek to restrain
respondents from implementing the contract and from
making any unwarranted expenditure of public funds.
that the petitioners acted prematurely, given the fact that
they had not first utilized the protest mechanism available
to them under RA 9184, otherwise known as the
Government Procurement Reform Act. The court disagreed
with this assertion. The letter addressed to Chairman
Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 28 serves to
eliminate the prematurity issue as it was an actual written
protest against the decision of the poll body to award the
Contract. The letter was signed by/for, inter alia, two of
herein petitioners: the Information Technology Foundation
of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M.
Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol. Such letter-protest is
sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies particularly because it hews closely
to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184. Even
without the letter of protest, the Court still holds that the
petitioners need not exhaust administrative remedies, citing
Paat v. Court of Appeals. The case enumerates the instances
 when the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
may be disregarded, as follows:
"(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention."
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According to the court, the issue falls within the exception within
nos. 7, 10 and 11.
3. Yes, there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC.
• Bidding:
a. The Certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what
manner and by what standards or criteria the
condition, performance and/or readiness of the
machines were re-evaluated and re-appraised and
thereafter given the passing mark.
b. The Automated Counting and Canvassing Project
involves not only the manufacturing of the ACM
hardware but also the development of three (3)
types of software, which are intended for use in the
following:
1. Evaluation of Technical Bids
2. Testing and Acceptance Procedures
3. Election Day Use."
c. In short, the COMELEC evaluated the bids and made
the decision to award the Contract to the "winning"
bidder partly on the basis of the operation of the
ACMs running a ”base" software. That software
was therefore nothing but a sample or "demo"
 software, which would not be the actual one that
would be used on Election Day.
d. The COMELEC violated the public policy on public
biddings by (1) allowing MPC/MPEI to participate
in the bidding even though it was not qualified to
do so and (2) by eventually awarding the contract
to MPC/MPEI. The further desecrated the law on
public bidding by allowing the winning bidder to
change and alter the subject of the contract
(software), in effect allowing a substantive
amendment without public bidding.
e. According to the Court, the “whole point in going
through the public bidding exercise was completely
lost. The very rationale was totally subverted by the
commission.”
• Awarding:
a. The public bidding system designed by
COMELEC under its RFP (Request for
Proposal for the Automation of the 2004
Election) mandated the use of a two-
envelope, two-stage system. A bidder's first
envelope (Eligibility Envelope) was meant to
establish its eligibility to bid and its
qualifications and capacity to perform the
contract if its bid was accepted, while the
second envelope would be the Bid Envelope
itself.
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b. The Eligibility Envelope was to contain legal
documents such as articles of incorporation,
business registrations, licenses and permits,
mayor's permit, VAT certification, and so
forth; technical documents containing
documentary evidence to establish the
track record of the bidder and its technical
and production capabilities to perform the
contract; and financial documents,
including audited financial statements for
the last three years, to establish the
bidder's financial capacity.
c. However, there is no sign whatsoever of
any joint venture agreement, consortium
agreement, memorandum of agreement,
or business plan executed among the
members of the purported consortium. So,
it necessarily follows that, during the
bidding process, COMELEC had no basis at
all for determining that the alleged
consortium really existed and was eligible
and qualified; and that the arrangements
among the members were satisfactory and
sufficient to ensure compliance with the
contract.
Ruling: The Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL
and VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074
XVII. Kilosbayan vs Guingona
Facts:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the
Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery
system, also know as lotto.
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery
system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It
submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No.
1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not
violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of
wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department
are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners
have no standing to maintain the instant suit.
of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and
prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of
laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or
instrumentalities.
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners
whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the
PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided
on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the
intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of
the contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of
the party is the soul of the instrument.
Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged
Contract of Lease is hereby declared contrary to law and invalid.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the
instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.

RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside

the procedural technicality in view of the importance of the issues
raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow
the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association

115 | P a g e
XVIII. Mirasol vs CA
Facts:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.Philippine National
Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM
1973-1975 under a crop loan financingscheme. The Mirasols signed
Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgageon Standing Crops, and
a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. TheChattel Mortgage
empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter'ssugar and to apply
the proceeds to the payment of their obligations toit.President
Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizingPhilippine
Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocatedfor export
and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. Thedecree
directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to
beremitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were
morethan enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for
anaccounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners
continued toavail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded
withdrawalsfrom their accounts with said bank. PNB asked
petitioners to settletheir due and demandable accounts. As a result,
petitioners, conveyedto PNB real properties by way of dacion en
pago still leaving anunpaid amount. PNB proceeded
to extrajudicially foreclose
themortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.Petitioner
s continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds,insisting that
said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding
obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance thatunder P.D. No.
579, there was nothing to account since under saidlaw, all earnings
from the export sales of sugar pertained to
116 | P a g e
the National Government.On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a
suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a
statuteunconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General
where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for
the resolution of the
TrialCourt.(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof ar
eunconstitutional.(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial re
view.
Held:
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the
authorityand jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statut
e, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests th
e power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,inter
national or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,instruct
ion, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in
allRegional Trial Courts.The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule
64, Section 3 is toenable the Solicitor General to decide whether or
not his interventionin the action assailing the validity of a law or
treaty is necessary.
Todeny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount tode
priving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary
to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not
limited toactions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies.
The ruleitself provides that such notice is required in "any action"
and not justactions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no
ambiguity inthe words used in the rule, there is no room for
construction. 15 In allactions assailing the validity of a statute,
treaty, presidential decree,order, or proclamation, notice to the
Solicitor General is mandatory.Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579
and its implementing issuancesare void for violating the due process
clause and the prohibitionagainst the
taking of private property without just
compensation.Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its
power of judicialreview.Jurisprudence has laid down the following
requisites for the exerciseof this power: First, there must be before
the Court an actual casecalling for the exercise of judicial review.
Second,
the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, t
he personchallenging the validity of the act must have standing to
challenge.Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been
raised at theearliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of
constitutionality must bethe very lis mota of the case.

117 | P a g e
XIX. Salonga vs Cruz Pano establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. We grant
the petition.The respondents call for adherence to the consistent
FACTS:The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to rule that the denial of a motion to quash or todismiss, being
life and liberty guaranteed by the dueprocess clause, alleging that interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari; that
no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing since the question of dismissal will again be considered by the court
of aninformation for subversion against him. Petitioner asks this when it decides the case, the movant has a plain, speedyand
Court to prohibit and prevent therespondents from using the iron adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that public
arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of
interest dictates that criminalprosecutions should not be
thedemocratic opposition in the Philippines.Jovito Salonga was enjoined.The SC held that infinitely more important than
charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act after conventional adherence to general rules of criminalprocedure is
he wasimplicated, along with other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely in respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary
the series of bombings in Metro Manila. Hewas tagged by Lovely in
arrest and punishment butalso from unwarranted and vexatious
his testimony as the leader of subversive organizations for two prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if
reasons (1)because his house was used as a contact point; and (2) aperson is carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons
because of his remarks during the party of RaulDaza in Los Angeles. when on the very face of the record noevidence linking him to the
He allegedly opined about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the alleged conspiracy exists.
Philippinesif reforms are not instituted immediately by then
President Marcos.When arrested, he was not informed of the
nature of the charges against him. Neither was counselallowed to
talk to him until this Court intervened through the issuance of an
order directing that hislawyers be permitted to visit him. Only
after four months of detention was the petitioner informed forthe
first time of the nature of the charges against him. After
the preliminary investigation, the petitionermoved to dismiss the
complaint but the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent
judge issued aresolution ordering the filing of an information after
finding that a prima facie case had been establishedagainst the forty
persons accused.Hence, this petition questioning the resolution of
the judge.HELD:After a painstaking review of the records, this Court
finds the evidence offered by the prosecutionutterly insufficient to

118 | P a g e
XX. Serrano de Agbayani vs PNB
FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939,
maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage. On July
13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, defendant instituted
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the
balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his
suit against both alleging that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed
had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of
maturity. PNB on the other hand claims that the defense of
prescription would not be available if the period from March 10,
1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948,
when the subsequent legislative act 2 extending the period of
moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the
computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps
for the recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find such
contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.
ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act
extending the Moratorium Law before the same were declared
invalid tolled the period of prescription (Effect of the declaration of
Unconstitutionality of a law)
HELD: YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision:
“The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.” 4
119 | P a g e
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or
executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact
to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because of the
judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental
response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this
Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in their
number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that
Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force,
prescription did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus
manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13,
1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by
appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years.
The prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945,
the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the
decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years,
two months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had
extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there
was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a
defense.
XXI. Salazar vs Achacoso
FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of
Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the
Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a
complaint against petitioner. Having ascertained that the petitioner
had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE
AND SEIZURE ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement
the order. There it was found that petitioner was operating
Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served
said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who
voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar
informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with
Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show
credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the
team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance
number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team
confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by
Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding
the return of the confiscated properties. They alleged lack of
hearing and due process, and that since the house the POEA raided
was a private residence, it was robbery.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition.
Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli,
120 | P a g e
thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one
for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or
the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure
(or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants
of search and arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting
body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no
longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must
go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article
38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no
force and effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex
gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of
a general warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify clearly
the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and voidFor the
guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following
principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is
only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest
and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following
a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.