SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private respondents’ petition for
(RULE 62 – RULE 71) declaratory relief was properly filed.
38. G.R. No. 204603 September 24, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Vs.
HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE, ET.AL.
FACTS: On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing the constitutionality of the
following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3, for being void for
vagueness; (b) Section 7, for violating the right to privacy of
communication and due process and the privileged nature of priest-
penitent relationships; (c)Section 18, for violating due process, the
prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended; (d) Section 26, for violating the right to
travel; and (e) Section 27, for violating the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings, averring that certain
petitions (SC petitions) raising the issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality have
been lodged before the Court. The said motion was granted in an Order
dated October 19, 2007.
On October 5, 2010, the Court promulgated its Decision in the Southern
Hemisphere cases and thereby dismissed the SC petitions.
On February 27, 2012, petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss,
contending that private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for
declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the constitutionality of RA
9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the Southern Hemisphere
cases.
In their Comment/Opposition, private respondents countered that: (a) the
Court did not resolve the issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality in Southern
Hemisphere as the SC petitions were dismissed based purely on technical
grounds; and (b) the requisites for declaratory relief were met.
On April 23, 2012, the RTC issued an Order which denied the subject
motion to dismiss, finding that the Court did not pass upon the
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the
RTC in an Order dated July 31, 2012. The RTC observed that private
respondents have personal and substantial interests in the case and that
it would be illogical to await the adverse consequences of the aforesaid
law’s implementation considering that the case is of paramount impact to
the Filipino people.
ISSUE: WON the requirements for declaratory relief have been satisfied.
RULING: No.
The following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief:
First , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance; Second , the terms of said documents and the validity thereof
are doubtful and require judicial construction; Third , there must have been
no breach of the documents in question; Fourth , there must be an actual
justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons
whose interests are adverse; Fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and Sixth , adequate relief is not available through other
means or other forms of action or proceeding.
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while
the first, second, and third requirements appear to exist in this case, the
fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable
controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one exists in this case.
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be
inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the
possibility of abuse, based on the above-discussed allegations in private
respondents’ petition, remain highly-speculative and merely theorized.
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to
proceed with a discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no
impending threat or injury to the private respondents exists in the first
place.
 39. G.R. No. 181873 November 27, 2013 subject property. Thus BPI filed a supplemental answer with counterclaim,
SPOUSES PIO DATO and SONIA Y. SIA alleging therein that with the expiration of the period of redemption, BPI is
vs. entitled to a writ of possession over foreclosed property and the occupancy
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS of Spouses Sia on the foreclosed property entitles BPI to a reasonable
compensation which is conservatively pegged at ₱10,000.00 per month
FACTS: Petitioners Spouses Pio Dato and Sonia Sia applied for a from the date of the issuance of the certificate of sale in favor of BPI.
₱240,000.00 loan which was granted by the BPI with a term of 6 months ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial foreclosure is proper.
and secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land owned by
Spouses Sia situated in Labangon, Cebu. Subsequently, Spouses Sia RULING: Yes. It is a settled rule of law that foreclosure is proper when the
availed of a ₱4 Million Revolving Promissory Note Line with a term of 1 debtors are in default of the payment of their obligation. As the CA had
year, secured by the same real estate mortgage. appositely considered, due to Spouses Sia’s failure to pay their loans
Before the ₱240,000.00 and ₱4 Million loans matured, Spouses Sia covered by Promissory Notes Nos. 90/98 and 90/152, the extrajudicial
approached BPI through Mona Padilla, account officer of BPI for additional foreclosure of the real estate mortgage is valid and binding against them:
loans. After some discussion with Padilla, Spouses Sia agreed to obtain a Finding for the non-payment of obligations covered by PN Nos. 90/98 and
Credit Facility of ₱5.7 Million using the same collaterals offered in their 90/152, Sps. Sia’s prayer to declare null and void the extrajudicial
previous loans and 4 additional parcels of land. foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage is now foiled. Therefore,
Spouses Sia obtained ₱800,000.00 from their Credit Facility of ₱5.7 Million the extrajudicial foreclosure and the corresponding certificate of sale
which was credited to their current account with BPI after executing a executed on August 9, 1993 for the subject real estate property covered
Promissory Note for the same amount. While Spouses Sia paid some of by TCT No. 102434 which sought to reach the property and subject it to
the interest on their loans, the amount was insufficient to cover the principal the payment of Sps. Sia’s obligations was valid and binding. SC further
amount of said loans. rule that for failure of Sps. Sia to exercise the right of redemption, the right
Padilla sent a written reminder to Spouses Sia to settle all unpaid to consolidate ownership on the foreclosed property was validly exercised
interest. Yet the spouses failed to pay the same. Their principal loans of by BPI.
₱240,000.00 and ₱4 Million loan also remained unsettled. BPI, through
Padilla and Assistant Vice President, Danilo A. Quinto sent another Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction must be denied. The
demand letter to them requesting payment of the outstanding loan. pending suit questioning the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of
Spouses Sia still failed to pay the principal amount of ₱4,240,000.00 mortgage does not entitle Spouses Sia to a suspension of the issuance of
exclusive of interest, penalties and other charges. But the amount of writ of possession.
₱800,000.00 from the ₱5.7 Million Credit Facility was paid through a Letter
of Credit. As the ₱240,000.00 and ₱4 Million loans of Spouses Sia were
not yet settled, BPI cancelled the ₱5.7 Million Credit facility. To facilitate
and assist Spouses Sia in paying off their loans, the four lots which secured
the ₱5.7 Million Credit Line Facility were released.
Spouses Sia filed a complaint with the RTC of Cebu City praying for the
issuance TRO to maintain status quo, award of damages and litigation
costs.
Spouses Sia failed to pay notwithstanding the numerous demands made
by BPI, leading to the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
which secured Spouses Sia’s loans of ₱240,000.00 and ₱4 Million. The lot
was sold at a public auction held on August 9, 1993, with BPI as the sole
bidder in the amount of ₱10,060,080.20. The certificate of sale was issued
on August 10, 1993 upon payment of all the required registration fees.
During the pendency of the instant case, the one-year redemption period
had lapsed without Spouses Sia exercising their right to redeem the
 PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
(RULE 57 – RULE 61)
40. G.R. No. 188768 January 7, 2013
TML GASKET INDUSTRIES, INC.,
vs.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.,
FACTS: TML obtained a loan from the Bank of Southeast Asia, Inc. (BSA),
which TML can avail via a credit facility of P85M. As security for the loan,
TML executed a real estate mortgage over commercial and industrial lots
-Parañaque City. BSA required TML to execute a promissory note for each
availment from the credit facility.
From September 1996 to 31 July 1997, TML executed several promissory
notes (PN). During the period of the loan, BSA changed its corporate name
- merged with BPI. TML defaulted in the payment of its loan so BPI extra-
judicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties. TML's indebtedness to BPI
ballooned. The Sheriff of RTC issued a Notice of Extra-judicial Foreclosure
Sale. TML filed a "Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Plus Damages, with
Prayer for the Issuance of (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
against BPI.
The trial court denied TML's application for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction as the testimony of [TML] casts [doubt] on its right over the
property. Furthermore, [TML] has in its favor the right of redemption. On
M/R, the trial court ordered the issuance of the writ in favor of TML, subject
to the posting of a bond in the amount of P300,000.00.
BPI filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before CA seeking to annul
and set aside the twin Orders of the trial court. The appellate court found
grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's issuance of the orders. TML
filed an M/R which was denied by CA. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is proper?
HELD: NO
We subscribe to the appellate court's ruling.
(1) Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lists the grounds for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. x x x As such, a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual
existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action.
The requisites of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual
or threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right
to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown.
Verily, [TML's] failure to comply with the terms and conditions of its credit
agreement with [BPI], as embodied in the [real estate mortgage] and the
promissory notes it issued in favor of the latter, entitles [BPI] to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties.
The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion
of the court taking cognizance of the case and is generally not interfered
with except in cases of manifest abuse. For the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of
the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the
absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of a writ of injunction constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
Clearly, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual
existing right is no ground for an injunction. Once again, our holding
in Selegna is relevant and sound: x x x Injunction is not designed to protect
contingent or future rights. It is not proper when the complainant's right is
doubtful or disputed. x x x x
Petitioners do not have any clear right to be protected. As shown in our
earlier findings, they failed to substantiate their allegations that their right
to due process had been violated and the maturity of their obligation
forestalled. Since they indisputably failed to meet their obligations in spite
of repeated demands, we hold that there is no legal justification to enjoin
respondent from enforcing its undeniable right to foreclose the mortgaged
properties. In any case, petitioners will not be deprived outrightly of their
property. Pursuant to Section 47 of the General Banking Law of 2000,
mortgagors who have judicially or extrajudicially sold their real property for
the full or partial payment of their obligation have the right to redeem the
property within one year after the sale. They can redeem their real estate
by paying the amount due, with interest rate specified, under the mortgage
deed; as well as all the costs and expenses incurred by the bank. The
Petition is DENIED.
 41. G.R. No. 185595 January 9, 2013
MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON represented by her Attorney-In-Fact,
Marycris V. Baldevia
vs.
JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS and COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio
F. Roxas, were married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced
four children. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
While the action was pending, the trial court granted Calderon’s request
for support pendent lite (while the action for nullity is pending).
are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did
they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to
the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child
custody, support and conjugal assets.
Moreover, private respondent’s obligation to give monthly support in the
amount fixed by the RTC in the assailed orders may be enforced by the
court itself, as what transpired in the early stage of the proceedings when
the court cited the private respondent in contempt of court and ordered him
arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support
pendente lite. A few years later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce
support while petitioner filed her own motion to increase the same, and in
addition sought spousal support and support in arrears. This fact
underscores the provisional character of the order granting support
pendente lite.

On May 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the
marriage null and void, awarding custody of the children to the mother and
ordering Roxas to provide support to the children. Several actions were
raised in court, with Roxas asking for a decrease of the monthly support
while Calderon asking for an increase in the amount and Roxas’ payment
on his arrears for support.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the orders on the matter of support pendent lite are
interlocutory or final.
Petitioner’s theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional
due to the arrearages incurred by private respondent is therefore
untenable.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning
the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner’s appeal was
correctly dismissed by the CA.

HELD:
A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto. Conversely, an
order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s
task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights
and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other
things remain to be done by the Court, is “interlocutory”.

Unlike a “final” judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed

out, an “interlocutory” order may not be questioned on appeal except only
as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment
rendered in the case.

The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and
support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition
of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and
 42. A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J FEBRUARY 19, 2013
ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO A. HENSON and ANGEL
S. ONG
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON M. BATO, JR.,
ISAIAS P. DICDICAN and EDUARDO B. PERALTA, JR.
FACTS: Complainants Ethelwoldo Fernandez, and Antonio Henson were
elected to the board of directors of NADECOR. In a regular stockholder’s
meeting where two groups were vying for control over the company,
Calalang, De Jesus, Romulo, Ayala, Lazatin, Fernandez, Nitorreda, Engle
were Elected. Gatmaitan was also elected as Corporate Secretary.
Thereafter, Ricafort/s, claiming to be stockholders of record, sought to
annul the said meeting held. They filed a complaint before the RTC of
PASIG. Ricafort/s alleged that they were not given due notice of the said
meeting thus they were not present and were not able to exercise their
right. RTC agreed with the Ricaforts.
Four separate Petition for Certiorari were filed by the members of the board
with the CA, all with application for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction.
The CA denied such applications, but on the same day nevertheless, the
11th division issued a TRO. During the effectivity of the TRO, the old Board
of Directors assumed the functions of the new one in order to prevent any
hiatus and not to prejudice the corporation. All the CA petitions were
consolidated as well as the other cases.
On February 17, 2012, the respondents Ricafort filed their Comment Ad
Cautelam to the petition in CA-G.R. No. 122784. The petitioners therein
thereafter filed (3) urgent motions to resolve their application for writ of
preliminary injunction, on March 8, on May 22, and again on June 6, 2012.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction was granted by the CA 14th Division,
which not for long was questioned.
Complainants filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition, seeking to annul the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
CA’s Special 14th Division. Complainants also filed an Administrative case
against the Justices of the 14th Division of the CA. Alleged in this
administrative complaint that the respondent Justices are guilty of grave
misconduct, conduct detrimental to the service, gross ignorance of the law,
gross incompetence, and manifest partiality.
ISSUE: Whether the Ricaforts have a legal personality to assail the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the CA 14th Division.
RULING: NO. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is
so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.—Section 1 of Rule 19
of the Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main suit cannot be bound
by an ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction. Indeed, he cannot be
affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.
Moreover, a person not an aggrieved party in the original proceedings that
gave rise to the petition for certiorari, will not be permitted to bring the said
action to annul or stay the injurious writ. Such is the clear import of Sections
1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, a person not a party to the
proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an action for
certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed. Stated
differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was
not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed
order.
The complainants, who at various times served as elected members of the
Board of NADECOR, did not bother to intervene in the CA petitions, hence,
they are not entitled to the service of pleadings and motions therein.
Complainant Fernandez was himself a defendant in SEC Case No. 11-164
in the RTC, but he chose not to join any of the four CA petitions.
Having established that the herein complainants have no personality to
assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA’s former Special
14th Division, we cannot now permit them to harass the CA Justices who
issued the same. For even granting that the issuance of the writ was
erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate cannot be held
administratively liable for every discretionary but erroneous order he
issues. The settled rule is that “a Judge cannot be held to account civilly,
criminally or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by him in
good faith.
 43. G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013 statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle
JESUS C. GARCIA a litigant to have the same enjoined.
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court of the
Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, United States declared, thus: Federal injunctions against state criminal
for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct
JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such
statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is
FACTS: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The
Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized
pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its
psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who
custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital seeks its aid.
infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their
modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders
on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it
would be an “exercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of
the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied
the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings
before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this
petition is filed.

ISSUE: WON the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case
against the enforcement of the TPO is proper.

RULING: No. It bears stressing that protection orders are granted ex parte
so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue
an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law
against Violence Against Women and Children.—As the rules stand, a
review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall
not stay its enforcement, with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only
for thirty (30) days at a time, should not be enjoined. The mere fact that a