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 Federal & State Cases,  Combined
marbury AND madison
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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 Page 3
5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137

1 of 1 DOCUMENT 

WILLIAM MARBURY v. JAMES MADISON, SECRETARY OF STATE OF
THE UNITED STATES.  

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

5 U.S. 137; 2 L. Ed. 60; 1803 U.S. LEXIS 352; 1 Cranch
137 

February 24, 1803, Decided 

PRIOR HISTORY: that   request;   and   that  [***2]    their

 [***1]   said   commissions   are   withheld   from
them;   that   the   applicants   have   made
AT   the   last   term,   viz.   December
application   to   Mr.   Madison   as
term,   1801,   William   Marbury,   Dennis
secretary   of   state   of   the   United
Ramsay,   Robert   Townsend   Hooe,   and
States at his office, for information
William   Harper,   by   their   counsel,
whether   the   commissions   were   signed
Charles   Lee,   esq.   late   attorney
and sealed as aforesaid; that explicit
general   of   the   United   States,
and   satisfactory   information   has   not
severally   moved   the   court   for   a   rule
been given to that enquiry, either by
to   James   Madison,   secretary   of   state
the   secretary   of   state   or   by   any
of   the   United   States,   to   show   cause
officer   of   the   department   of   state;
why   a   mandamus   should   not   issue
that application has been made to the
commanding   him   to   cause   to   be
secretary   of   the   Senate   for   a
delivered   to   them   respectively   their
certificate   of   the   nomination   of   the
several commissions as justices of the
applicants,   and   of   the   advice   and
peace   in   the   district   of   Columbia.
consent   of   the   senate,   who   has
This   motion   was   supported   by
declined   giving   such   a   certificate;
affidavits   of   the   following   facts;
whereupon   a   rule   was   laid   to   show
that   notice   of   this   motion   had   been
cause   on   the   4th   day   of   this   term.
given to Mr. Madison; that Mr. Adams,
This rule having been duly served, 
the   late   president   of   the   United
States,   nominated   the   applicants   to
the   senate   for   their   advice   and CASE SUMMARY
consent   to   be   appointed   justices   of  
the peace of the district of Columbia; PROCEDURAL POSTURE: An applicant moved
that the senate advised and consented the Court for a rule to the secretary
to  the  appointments;  that  commissions of state of the United States to show
in   the   due   form   were   signed   by   the cause why a mandamus should not issue
said   president   appointing   them commanding   him   to   deliver   to   the
justices, &c. and that the seal of the applicant his commission as a justice
United States was in due form affixed of the peace. A rule was granted.
to   the   said   commissions   by   the  
secretary   of   state;   that   the OVERVIEW:  The   applicant,   and   two
applicants  have  requested  Mr.  Madison others,   contended   that   the   late
to   deliver   them   their   said president   to   the   United   States   had
commissions, who has not complied with nominated them to the senate and that

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
the   senate   had   advised   and   consented
to   their   appointments   as   justices   of
the peace. The commissions were signed
by the late president and the seal of
the   United   States   was   affixed   to   the
commissions by the secretary of state.
The commissions were withheld from the
applicants   and   they   requested   their
delivery. The Court granted a rule to
show cause, requiring the secretary of
state   to   show   cause   why   a   mandamus
should   not   issue,   directing   him   to
deliver   to   the   applicant   his
commission. No cause was shown and the
applicant   filed   a   motion   for   a
mandamus.   The   Court   determined   that
the applicant had a vested legal right
in   his   appointment,   because   his
commission   had   been   signed   by   the
president, sealed by the secretary of
state,   and   the   appointment   was   not
revocable.   The   Court   found   that
because   the   applicant   had   a   legal
title to the office, the laws afforded
him a remedy. However, the Court held
§   13 of the Act of 1789, giving the
Court   authority   to   issue   writs   of
mandamus   to   an   officer,   was   contrary
to the Constitution and was void.
 
OUTCOME: The rule was discharged.
 
CORE   TERMS:    appointment,   duty,
secretary   of   state,   appointed,
mandamus,   seal,     original
jurisdiction,   removable,   affixed,
peace,   legal   right,   signature,
authorize,  recorded,  act  of  congress,
repugnant,   solemnity,   supposed,
inferior,     enquire,   declare,   vested,
person  appointed,  last  act,  delivery,
transmission,     transmitted,
examinable, secretary, evidenced
 
LexisNexis(TM)   HEADNOTES   ­   Core
Concepts  requiring   a   copy,   are   ascertained   by
Constitutional Law > The Presidency >
Appointment of Officials
[HN1]   U.S.   Const.   art.   II,   §     2
declares,   that   the   president   shall
nominate, and, by and with the advice
and   consent   of   the   senate,   shall
Page 4
appoint   ambassadors,   other   public
ministers   and   consuls,   and   all   other
officers   of   the   United   States,   whose
appointments   are   not   otherwise
provided   for.   U.S.   Const.   art.   II,   §
3   declares,   that   he   shall   commission
all the officers of the United States.
Constitutional Law > The Presidency >
Appointment of Officials
[HN2]   An   act   of   congress   directs   the
secretary of state to keep the seal of
the   United   States,   to   make   out   and
record, and affix the said seal to all
civil   commissions   to   officers   of   the
United States, to be appointed by the
President, by and with the consent of
the senate, or by the President alone;
provided that the said seal shall not
be   affixed   to   any   commission   before
the same shall have been signed by the
President of the United States.
Constitutional   Law   >   Separation   of
Powers
Constitutional Law > The Presidency >
Appointment of Officials
[HN3]   U.S.   Const.   art.   II,   §     2
authorizes   congress   to   vest,   by   law,
the   appointment   of   such   inferior
officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the courts of law,
or in the heads of departments.
Constitutional Law > The Presidency >
Appointment of Officials
[HN4] In the case of commissions, the
law   orders   the   secretary   of   state   to
record   them.   When   therefore   they   are
signed and sealed, the order for their
being   recorded   is   given;   and   whether
inserted in the book or not, they are
in law recorded. A copy of this record
is declared equal to the original, and
the   fees,   to   be   paid   by   a   person
law.
Constitutional Law > The Presidency >
Appointment of Officials
[HN5]   When   a   commission   has   been
signed   by   the   President,   the
appointment   is   made;   and   that   the

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
commission is complete, when the seal
of the United States has been affixed
to it by the secretary of state.
Constitutional Law > The Presidency >
Appointment of Officials
[HN6] Where an officer is removable at
the   will   of   the   executive,   the
circumstance   which   completes   his
appointment is of no concern; because
the act is at any time revocable; and
the   commission   may   be   arrested,   if
still   in   the   office.   But   when   the
officer   is   not   removable   at   the   will
of   the   executive,   the   appointment   is
not revocable, and cannot be annulled.
It   has   conferred   legal   rights   which
cannot be resumed.
Constitutional Law > The Presidency >
Appointment of Officials
[HN7] The discretion of the executive
is   to   be   exercised   until   the
appointment has been made. But having
once   made   the   appointment,   his   power
over   the   office   is   terminated   in   all
cases,   where,   by   law,   the   officer   is
not removable by him. The right to the
office   is   then   in   the   person
appointed,   and   he   has   the   absolute,
unconditional,   power   of   accepting   or
rejecting it.
Governments > Legislation > Statutory
Remedies & Rights
Constitutional   Law   >   Civil   Rights
Enforcement
[HN8]   The   very   essence   of   civil
liberty   certainly   consists   in   the
right of every individual to claim the
protection   of   the   laws,   whenever   he
receives   an   injury.   One   of   the   first
duties of government is to afford that
protection.
Governments > Legislation > Statutory
Remedies & Rights
[HN9]   Where   there   is   a   legal   right,
there  is also  a legal  remedy by  suit
or action at law, whenever that right
is invaded.
Page 5
Constitutional   Law   >   The   Judiciary   >
Case   or   Controversy   >   Political
Questions
[HN10]   The   question,   whether   the
legality   of   an   act   of   the   head   of   a
department be examinable in a court of
justice or not, must always depend on
the nature of that act.
Constitutional Law > The Presidency
Constitutional   Law   >   The   Judiciary   >
Case   or   Controversy   >   Political
Questions
[HN11]   By   the   constitution   of   the
United   States,   the   President   is
invested   with   certain   important
political   powers,   in   the   exercise   of
which he is to use his own discretion,
and is accountable only to his country
in his political character, and to his
own   conscience.   To   aid   him   in   the
performance   of   these   duties,   he   is
authorized   to   appoint   certain
officers, who act by his authority and
in conformity with his orders. In such
cases,   their   acts   are   his   acts;   and
whatever opinion may be entertained of
the   manner   in   which   executive
discretion   may   be   used,   still   there
exists,   and   can   exist,   no   power   to
control  that  discretion.  The  subjects
are   political.   They   respect   the
nation,   not   individual   rights,   and
being entrusted to the executive, the
decision   of   the   executive   is
conclusive.
Constitutional   Law   >   The   Judiciary   >
Case   or   Controversy   >   Political
Questions
Governments > Legislation > Statutory
Remedies & Rights
[HN12] Where the heads of departments
are   the   political   or   confidential
agents   of   the   executive,   merely   to
execute the will of the President, or
rather   to   act   in   cases   in   which   the
executive   possesses   a   constitutional
or   legal   discretion,   nothing   can   be
more   perfectly   clear   than   that   their
acts  are  only  politically  examinable.
But where a specific duty is assigned
by   law,   and   individual   rights   depend

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
upon the performance of that duty, it
seems   equally   clear   that   the
individual   who   considers   himself
injured, has a right to resort to the
laws of his country for a remedy.
Governments > Legislation > Statutory
Remedies & Rights
[HN13]   The   question   whether   a   right
has vested or not, is, in its nature,
judicial,   and   must   be   tried   by   the
judicial authority.
Civil   Procedure   >   Remedies   >
Extraordinary Writs
[HN14]   Whenever   there   is   a   right   to
execute an office, perform a service,
or   exercise   a   franchise   (more
specifically  if it  be in  a matter  of
public   concern,   or   attended   with
profit)   and   a   person   is   kept   out   of
the   possession,   or   dispossessed   of
such right, and has no other specific
legal   remedy,   the   court   ought   to
assist   by   mandamus,   upon   reasons   of
justice,   as   the   writ   expresses,   and
upon   reasons   of   public   policy,   to
preserve   peace,   order   and   good
government. This writ ought to be used
upon   all   occasions   where   the   law   has
established   no   specific   remedy,   and
where   in   justice   and   good   government
there ought to be one.
Civil   Procedure   >   Remedies   >
Extraordinary Writs
[HN15] To render the mandamus a proper
remedy,   the   officer   to   whom   it   is
directed,   must   be   one   to   whom,   on
legal   principles,   such   writ   may   be
directed; and the person applying for
it must be without any other specific
and legal remedy.
Constitutional   Law   >   The   Judiciary   >
Case   or   Controversy   >   Political
Questions
[HN16]   The   province   of   the   court   is,
solely,   to   decide   on   the   rights   of
individuals,   not   to   inquire   how   the
executive,   or   executive   officers,
perform   duties   in   which   they   have   a
discretion. Questions, in their nature
Page 6
political,   or   which   are,   by   the
constitution   and   laws,   submitted   to
the   executive,   can   never   be   made   in
this court.
Constitutional   Law   >   The   Judiciary   >
Jurisdiction
[HN17]   The   constitution   vests   the
whole   judicial   power   of   the   United
States in one supreme court, and such
inferior   courts   as   congress   shall,
from   time   to   time,   ordain   and
establish.   This   power   is   expressly
extended   to   all   cases   arising   under
the   laws   of   the   United   States;   and
consequently,   in   some   form,   may   be
exercised   over   the   present   case;
because the right claimed is given by
a   law   of   the   United   States.   In   the
distribution   of   this   power   it   is
declared that the supreme court shall
have   original   jurisdiction   in   all
cases   affecting   ambassadors,   other
public   ministers   and   consuls,   and
those   in   which   a   state   shall   be   a
party. In all other cases, the supreme
court   shall   have   appellate
jurisdiction.
Constitutional   Law   >   The   Judiciary   >
Jurisdiction
[HN18] If congress remains at liberty
to   give   the   Supreme   Court   appellate
jurisdiction,   where   the   constitution
has  declared  their  jurisdiction  shall
be original; and original jurisdiction
where the constitution has declared it
shall   be   appellate;   the   distribution
of   jurisdiction,   made   in   the
constitution,   is   form   without
substance.
Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause
[HN19]   When   an   instrument   organizing
fundamentally   a   judicial   system,
divides   it   into   one   supreme,   and   so
many   inferior   courts   as   the
legislature  may  ordain  and  establish;
then   enumerates   its   powers,   and
proceeds so far to distribute them, as
to   define   the   jurisdiction   of   the
supreme   court   by   declaring   the   cases
in   which   it   shall   take   original

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
jurisdiction,   and   that   in   others   it
shall take appellate jurisdiction; the
plain import of the words seems to be,
that   in   one   class   of   cases   its
jurisdiction   is   original,   and   not
appellate;   in   the   other   it   is
appellate,   and   not   original.   If   any
other   construction   would   render   the
clause   inoperative,   that   is   an
additional   reason   for   rejecting   such
other   construction,   and   for   adhering
to their obvious meaning.
Civil   Procedure   >   Remedies   >
Extraordinary Writs
Civil   Procedure   >   Appeals   >   U.S.
Supreme Court Review
[HN20]   It   is   the   essential   criterion
of   appellate   jurisdiction,   that   it
revises   and   corrects   the   proceedings
in   a   cause   already   instituted,   and
does not create that cause. Although,
therefore, a mandamus may be directed
to courts, yet to issue such a writ to
an   officer   for   the   delivery   of   a
paper,   is   in   effect   the   same   as   to
sustain   an   original   action   for   that
paper,   and   therefore   seems   not   to
belong   to   appellate,   but   to   original
jurisdiction.
Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause
[HN21] The constitution of the United
States  establishes  certain  limits  not
to   be   transcended   by   the   different
departments   of   the   government.   The
powers of the legislature are defined,
and limited; and that those limits may
not   be   mistaken,   or   forgotten,   the
constitution   is   written.   To   what
purpose   are   powers   limited,   and   to
what   purpose   is   that   limitation
committed to writing, if these limits
may,  at any  time, be  passed by  those
intended   to   be   restrained?   The
distinction, between a government with
limited   and   unlimited   powers,   is
abolished,   if   those   limits   do   not
confine   the   persons   on   whom   they   are
imposed,   and   if   acts   prohibited   and
acts allowed, are of equal obligation.
It   is   a   proposition   too   plain   to   be
contested,   that   the   constitution
Page 7
controls any legislative act repugnant
to   it;   or,   that   the   legislature   may
alter the constitution by an ordinary
act.
Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause
[HN22]   Certainly   all   those   who   have
framed   written   constitutions
contemplate   them   as   forming   the
fundamental   and   paramount   law   of   the
nation, and consequently the theory of
every such government must be, that an
act   of   the   legislature,   repugnant   to
the constitution, is void.
Constitutional   Law   >   The   Judiciary   >
Case   or   Controversy   >
Constitutionality of Legislation
[HN23] It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to
say  what the  law is.  Those who  apply
the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity   expound   and   interpret   that
rule.   If   two   laws   conflict   with   each
other,   the   courts   must   decide   on   the
operation of each. So if a law be in
opposition   to   the   constitution;   if
both   the   law   and   the   constitution
apply   to   a   particular   case,   so   that
the court must either decide that case
conformably   to   the   law,   disregarding
the   constitution;   or   conformably   to
the   constitution,   disregarding   the
law; the court must determine which of
these   conflicting   rules   governs   the
case.  This is  of the  very essence  of
judicial duty.
Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause
[HN24]   The   judicial   power   of   the
United States is extended to all cases
arising under the constitution.
Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause
[HN25]   A   law   repugnant   to   the
constitution   is   void;   the   courts,   as
well   as   other   departments,   are   bound
by that instrument. 
LEXIS   HEADNOTES   ­   Classified   to   U.S.
Digest Lawyers' Edition:
The Supreme Court of the United States
has not power to issue a mandamus to a

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
Secretary   of   State   of   the   United
States,   it   being   an   exercise   of
original jurisdiction not warranted by
the constitution.
Congress   has   not   power   to   give
original   jurisdiction   to   the   Supreme
Court   in   other   cases   than   those
described in the constitution.
An   act   of   congress   repugnant   to   the
constitution cannot become a law.
The   courts   of   the   United   States   are
bound   to   take   notice   of   the
constitution.
A   commission   is   not   necessary   to   the
appointment   of   an   officer   by   the
executive; semb.
A   commission   is   only   evidence   of   an
appointment.
Delivery   is   not   necessary   to   the
validity of letters patent.
The   president   cannot   authorize   a
Secretary   of   State   to   omit   the
performance of those duties which are
enjoined by law.
A justice of peace in the District of
Columbia is not removable at the will
of the president.
When   a   commission   for   an   officer   not
holding his office at the will of the
president,   is   by   him   signed   and
transmitted to the Secretary of State,
to   be   sealed   and   recorded,   it   is
irrevocable;   the   appointment   is
complete.
A   mandamus   is   the   proper   remedy   to
compel a Secretary of State to deliver
a   commission   to   which   the   party   is
entitled.  
SYLLABUS:
REPORTER'S NOTES  in obtaining evidence of them.  [***4]
The   supreme   court   of   the   United
States   has   not   power   to   issue   a
mandamus   to   a   secretary   of   state   of
the   United   States,   it   being   an
exercise  of  original  jurisdiction  not
warranted   by   the   constitution.
Congress   have   not   power   to   give
original   jurisdiction   to   the   supreme
court   in   other   case   than   those
Page 8
described in the constitution.  An act
of   congress   repugnant   to   the
constitution   can   not   become   a   law.
The  courts of  U. States  are bound  to
take   notice   of   the   constitution.
[***3]    A commission is not necessary
to   the   appointment   of   an   officer   by
the   executive   ­­   Semb.     A   commission
is only evidence of an appointment. 
Delivery   is   not   necessary   to   the
validity   of   letters   patent.     The
President cannot authorize a secretary
of   state   to   omit   the   performance   of
those   duties   which   are   enjoined   by
law.  
A justice of peace in the district
of   Columbia   is   not   removable   at   the
will   of   the   President.     When   a
commission for an officer not holding
his   office   at   the   will   of   the
President,   is   by   him   signed   and
transmitted to the secretary of state
to   be   sealed   and   recorded,   it   is
irrevocable;   the   appointment   is
complete.     A   mandamus   is   the   proper
remedy to compel a secretary of state
to   deliver   a   commission   to   which   the
party is entitled.  
COUNSEL:
Mr.   Lee,   in   support   of   the   rule,
observed that it was important to know
on  what ground  a justice  of peace  in
the   district   of   Columbia   holds   his
office,   and   what   proceedings   are
necessary to constitute an appointment
to   an   office   no   held   at   the   will   of
the president.   However notorious the
facts   are,   upon   the   suggestion   of
which this rule has been laid, yet the
applicants  have  been  much  embarrassed
Reasonable information has been denied
at   the   office   of   the   department   of
state.  Although a respectful memorial
has   been   made   to   the   senate   praying
them to suffer their secretary to give
extracts from their executive journals
respecting   the   nomination   of   the
applicants to the senate, and of their
advice   and   consent   to   the

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
appointments,   yet   their   request   has
been   denied,   and   their   petition
rejected.     They   have   therefore   been
compelled   to   summon   witnesses   to
attend   in   court,   whose   voluntary
affidavits they could not obtain.  Mr.
Lee here read the affidavit of Dennis
Ramsay,   and   the   printed   journals   of
the   senate   of   31   January,   1803,
respecting   the   refusal   of   the   senate
to suffer their secretary to give the
information requested.  He then called
Jacob Wagner and Daniel Brent, who had
been summoned to attend the court, and
who had, as it is understood, declined
giving   a   voluntary   affidavit.     They
objected to being sworn, alleging that
they were clerks in the department of
state   and   not   bound   to   disclose   any
facts   relating   to   the   business   or
transactions in the office.   affairs as the President of the United
Mr. Lee observed, that to show the
propriety   of   examining   these
witnesses, he would make a few remarks
on the nature [***5]  of the office of
secretary of state.  His duties are of
two   kinds,   and   he   exercises   his
functions  in  two  distinct  capacities;
as a public ministerial officer of the
United   States,   and   as   agent   of   the
President.   In  the first  his duty  is
to the United States or its citizens;
in   the   other   his   duty   is   to   the
President;   in   the   one   he   is   an
independent,   and   an   accountable
officer; in the other he is dependent
upon the President, is his agent, and
accountable   to   him   alone.     In   the
former   capacity   he   is   compellable   by
mandamus to do his duty; in the latter
he   is   not.     This   distinction   is
clearly pointed out by the two acts of
congress upon this subject.  The first
was passed 27th July, 1789, vol. 1. p.
359, entitled "an act for establishing
an   executive   department,   to   be
denominated  the  department  of  foreign
affairs." The first section ascertains
the duties of the secretary so far as
he   is   considered   as   a   mere   executive
agent.   It is in these words, "Be it
enacted,   &c.   that   there   shall   be   an
Page 9
executive   department,   to   be
denominated  the  department  of  foreign
affairs,   and   that   there   shall   be   a
principal   officer   therein,   to   be
called the secretary of the department
of   foreign   affairs,   who   shall  [***6]
perform   and   execute   such   duties   as
shall   from   time   to   time   be   enjoined
on,   or   instructed   to   him   by   the
President   of   the   United   States,
agreeable   to   the   constitution,
relative   to   correspondences,
commissions or instructions to or with
public   ministers   or   consuls   from   the
United States; or to negotiations with
public   ministers   from   foreign   states
or   princes,   or   to   memorials   or   other
applications   from   foreign   public
ministers, or other foreigners, or to
such  other  matters  respecting  foreign
States   shall   assign   to   the   said
department;  and  furthermore,  that  the
said   principal   officer   shall   conduct
the business of the said department in
such   manner   as   the   President   of   the
United States shall from time to time
order or instruct." 
The second section provides for the
appointment   of   a   chief   clerk;   the
third   section   prescribes   the   oath   to
be   taken   which   is   simply,   "well   and
faithfully   to   execute   the   trust
committed to him;" and the fourth and
last section gives him the custody of
the books and papers of the department
of   foreign   affairs   under   the   old
congress.  Respecting the powers given
and the duties imposed by this act, no
mandamus   will   lie.     The   secretary
[***7]    is   responsible   only   to   the
President.  The other acts of congress
respecting  this  department  was  passed
at   the   same   session   of   the   15th
September 1789, vol. 1, p. 41, c. 14,
and is entitled "An act to provide for
the   safe   keeping   of   the   acts   and
records,   and   seal   of   the   United
States,   and   for   other   purposes."   The
first section changes the name of the
department  and  the  secretary,  calling
the   one   the   department   and   the   other

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
the   secretary   of   state.     The   second
section   assigns   new   duties   to   the
secretary, in the performance of which
it   is   evident,   from   their   nature,   he
cannot   be   lawfully   controlled   by   the
president, and for the non­performance
of which he is not more responsible to
the   president   than   to   any   other
citizen   of   the   United   States.     It
provides   that   he   shall   receive   from
the   president   all   bills,   orders,
resolutions   and   votes   of   the   senate
and   house   of   representatives,   which
shall have been approved and signed by
him;   and   shall   cause   them   to   be
published,   and   printed   copies   to   be
delivered   to   the   senators   and
representatives  and  to  the  executives
of   the   several   states;   and   makes   it
his   duty   carefully   to   preserve   the
originals;   and   to   cause   them   to   be
recorded   in   books   to   be  [***8]
provided for that purpose.   The third
section provides a seal of the United
States.   The fourth makes it his duty
to keep the said seal, and to make out
and  record, and  to affix  the seal  of
the   United   States   to   all   civil
commissions,   after   they   shall   have
been   signed   by   the   President.     The
fifth   section   provides   for   a   seal   of
office, and that all copies of records
and   papers   in   his   office,
authenticated   under   that   seal,   shall
be as good evidence as the originals.
The sixth section establishes fees for
copies,   &c.     The   seventh   and   last
section   gives   him   the   custody   of   the
papers of the office of the secretary
of   the   old   congress.     Most   of   the
duties  assigned by  this act  are of  a
public   nature,   and   the   secretary   is
bound   to   perform   them,   without   the
control of any person.   The President
has   no   right   to   prevent   him   from
receiving   the   bills,   orders,
resolutions   and   votes   of   the
legislature,   or   from   publishing   and
distributing  them,  or  from  preserving
or   recording   them.     While   the
secretary   remains   in   office   the
President cannot take from his custody
the   seal   of   the   United   States,   nor
Page 10
prevent   him   from   recording,   and
affixing the seal to civil commissions
of   such   officers   as   hold   not   their
[***9]    offices   at   the   will   of   the
President,   after   he   has   signed   them
and   delivered   them   to   the   secretary
for that purpose.  By other laws he is
to  make out  and record  in his  office
patents   for   useful   discoveries,   and
patents   of   lands   granted   under   the
authority   of   the   United   States.     In
the performance of all these duties he
is a public ministerial officer of the
United   States.     And   the   duties   being
enjoined   upon   him   by   law,   he   is,   in
executing  them,  uncontrollable  by  the
President;   and   if   he   neglects   or
refuses   to   perform   them,   he   may   be
compelled   by   mandamus,   in   the   same
manner   as   other   persons   holding
offices   under   the   authority   of   the
United   States.     The   President   is   no
party to this case.   The secretary is
called   upon   to   perform   a   duty   over
which   the   President   has   no   control,
and   in   regard   to   which   he   has   no
dispensing power, and for the neglect
of   which   he   is   in   no   manner
responsible.     The   secretary   alone   is
the person to whom they are entrusted,
and   he   alone   is   answerable   for   their
due   performance.     The   secretary   of
state,   therefore,   being   in   the   same
situation,   as   to   these   duties,   as
every other ministerial officer of the
United   States,   and   equally   liable   to
be compelled to perform [***10]  them,
is   also   bound   by   the   same   rules   of
evidence.   These  duties are  not of  a
confidential   nature,   but   are   of   a
public   kind,   and   his   clerks   can   have
no   exclusive   privileges.     There   are
undoubtedly   facts,   which   may   come   to
their   knowledge   by   means   of   their
connection   with   the   secretary   of
state, respecting which they cannot be
bound  to answer.   Such  are the  facts
concerning   foreign   correspondences,
and   confidential   communications
between the head of the department and
the President.   This, however, can be
no objection to their being sworn, but
may   be   a   ground   of   objection   to   any

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
particular question.   Suppose I claim
title to land under a patent from the
United States.  I demand a copy of it
from   the   secretary   of   state.     He
refuses.     Surely   he   may   be   compelled
by mandamus to give it.   But in order
to obtain a mandamus, I must show that
the patent is recorded in his office.
My   case   would   be   hard   indeed   if   I
could not call upon the clerks in the
office to give evidence of that fact.
Again,   suppose   a   private   act   of
congress   had   passed   for   my   benefit.
It   becomes   necessary   for   me   to   have
the use of that act in a court of law.
I   apply   for   a   copy.     I   am   refused.
Shall I not be permitted,  [***11]  on
a motion for a mandamus, to call upon
the clerks in the office to prove that
such an act is among the rolls of the
office,   or   that   it   is   duly   recorded?
Surely   it   cannot   be   contended   that
although the laws are to be recorded,
yet   no   access   is   to   be   had   to   the
records,   and   no   benefit   to   result
therefrom.  
The court ordered the witnesses to
be   sworn   and   their   answers   taken   in
writing,   but   informed   them   that   when
the   questions   were   asked   they   might
state   their   objections   to   answering
each particular question, if they had
any.   office,   where   the   seal   of   the   United
Mr.   Wagner   being   examined   under
interrogatories,   testified,   that   at
this   distance   of   time   he   could   not
recollect   whether   he   had   seen   any
commission in the office, constituting
the   applicants,   or   either   of   them
justices   of   the   peace.     That   Mr
Marbury   and   Mr.   Ramsey   called   on   the
secretary   of   state   respecting   their
commissions.     That   the   secretary
referred   them   to   him;   he   took   them
into   another   room   and   mentioned   to
them, that two of the commissions had
been   signed,   but   the   other   had   not.
That he did not know that fact of his
own knowledge, but by the information
of   others.     Mr.   Wagner   declined
answering   the   question   "who   gave   him
that   information;"   and   the  [***12]
Page 11
court decided that he was not bound to
answer   it,   because   it   was   not
pertinent   to   this   cause.     He   further
testified that some of the commissions
of   the   justices,   but   he   believed   not
all,  were recorded.   He  did not  know
whether   the   commissions   of   the
applicants   were   recorded,   as   he   had
not had recourse to the book for more
than twelve months past.  
Mr. Daniel Brent testified, that he
did   not   remember   certainly   the   names
of   any   of   the   persons   in   the
commissions   of   justices   of   the   peace
signed by Mr. Adams; but believed, and
was almost certain, that Mr. Marbury's
and Col. Hooe's commissions were made
out,,   and   that   Mr.   Ramsay's   was   not;
that he made out the list of names by
which   the   clerk   who   filled   up   the
commissions   was   guided;   he   believed
that   the   name   of   Mr.   Ramsey   was
pretermitted   by   mistake,   but   to   the
best of his knowledge it contained the
names   of   the   other   two;   he   believed
none   of   the   commissions   for   justices
of the peace signed by Mr. Adams, were
recorded.     After   the   commissions   of
justices   of   peace   were   made   out,   he
carried   them   to   Mr.   Adams   for   his
signature.     After   being   signed   he
carried   them   back   to   the   secretary's
States   was   affixed  [***13]    to   them.
That   commissions   are   not   usually
delivered   out   of   the   office   before
they are recorded; but sometimes they
are, and a note of them only is taken,
and they are recorded afterwards.   He
believed none of those commissions of
justices   were   ever   sent   out,   or
delivered to the persons for whom they
were   intended;   he   did   not   know   what
became  of them,  nor did  he know  that
they   are   now   in   the   office   of   the
secretary of state.  
Mr.   Lincoln,   attorney   general,
having been summoned, and now called,
objected   to   answering.     He   requested
that   the   questions   might   be   put   in
writing, and that he might afterwards
have   time   to   determine   whether   he
 Page 12
5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137

would   answer.     On   the   one   hand   he
respected   the   jurisdiction   of   this
court,   and   on   the   other   he   felt
himself   bound   to   maintain   the   rights
of   the   executive.     He   was   acting   as
secretary   of   state   at   the   time   when
this transaction happened.   He was of
opinion, and his opinion was supported
by   that   of   others   whom   he   highly
respected, that he was not bound, and
ought  not to  answer, as  to any  facts
which came officially to his knowledge
while acting as secretary of state.  
The   questions   being   written   were
then   read   and   handed   to   him.     He
repeated   the   ideas  [***14]    he   had
before   suggested,   and   said   his
objections were of two kinds.
1st.     He   did   not   think   himself
bound   to   disclose   his   official
transactions while acting as secretary
of state; and  If  there had  been he  was not  obliged
2d.   He  ought not  to be  compelled
to   answer   any   thing   which   might   tend
to criminate himself.  
Mr.   Lee,   in   reply,   repeated   the
substance   of   the   observations   he   had
before   made   in   answer   to   the
objections   of   Mr.   Wagner   and   Mr.
Brent.  He stated that the duties of a
secretary   of   state   were   two­fold.   In
discharging   one   part   of   those   duties
he   acted   as   a   public   ministerial
officer of the United States, totally
independent of the President, and that
as to any facts which came officially
to his knowledge, while acting in that
capacity,   he   was   as   much   bound   to
answer   as   a   marshal,   a   collector,   or
any   other   ministerial   officer.     But
that   in   the   discharge   of   the   other
part of his duties, he did not act as
public ministerial officer, but in the
capacity of an agent of the President,
bound   to   obey   his   orders,   and
accountable   to   him   for   his   conduct.
And   that   as   to   any   facts   which   came
officially   to   his   knowledge   in   the
discharge of this part of his duties,
he was not bound to answer.  He agreed
that   Mr.   Lincoln  [***15]    was   not
bound   to   disclose   any   thing   which
might tend to criminate himself.  
Mr. Lincoln thought it was going a
great way to say that every secretary
of state should at all times be liable
to   be   called   upon   to   appear   as   a
witness   in   a   court   of   justice,   and
testify   to   facts   which   came   to   his
knowledge officially.  He felt himself
delicately   situated   between   his   duty
to   this   court,   and   the   duty   he
conceived   he   owed   to   an   executive
department; and hoped the court would
give   him   time   to   consider   of   the
subject.  
The court said, that if Mr. Lincoln
wished   time   to   consider   what   answers
he   should   make,   they   would   give   him
time;  but they  had no  doubt he  ought
to   answer.     There   was   nothing
confidential required to be disclosed.
to  answer it;  and if  he thought  that
any   thing   was   communicated   to   him   in
confidence   he   was   not   bound   to
disclose   it;   nor   was   he   obliged   to
state any thing which would criminate
himself;   but   that   the   fact   whether
such   commissions   had   been   in   the
office   or   not,   could   not   be   a
confidential fact; it is a fact which
all   the   world   have   a   right   to   know.
If   he   thought   any   of   the   questions
improper,   he   might   state   his
objections.   [***16]  
Mr.   Lincoln   then   prayed   time   till
the   next   day   to   consider   of   his
answers   under   this   opinion   of   the
court.  
The court granted it and postponed
further   consideration   of   the   cause
till the next day.  
At the opening of the court on the
next morning, Mr. Lincoln said he had
no   objection   to   answering   the
questions proposed, excepting the last
which he did not think himself obliged
to   answer   fully.     The   question   was,
what   had   been   done   with   the
commissions.   He had no hesitation in
 Page 13
5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137

saying that he did not know that they justices   for   that   county   were

ever   came   to   the   possession   of   Mr. delivered  to him  for which  he gave  a
Madison,   nor   did   he   know   that   they receipt, which he left in the office.
were   in   the   office   when   Mr.   Madison That  [***18]    finding   he   could   not
took possession of it.   He prayed the conveniently   carry   the   whole,   he
opinion   of   the   court   whether   he   was returned several of them, and struck a
obliged to disclose what had been done pen through the names of those, in the
with the commissions.   receipt, which he returned.  Among the
commissions  so  returned,  according  to
The   court   were   of   opinion   that   he
the best of his knowledge and belief,
was  not bound  to say  what had  become
was one for colonel Hooe, and one for
of   them;   if   they   never   came   to   the
William Harper.  
possession   of   Mr.   Madison,   it   was
immaterial to the present cause, what Mr. Lee then observed, that having
had been done with them by others.   proved   the   existence   of   the
commissions,   he   should   confine   such
To the other questions he answered
further  remarks as  he had  to make  in
that   he   had   seen   commissions   of
support   of   the   rule   to   three
justices of the peace of the district
questions: 
of Columbia, signed by Mr. Adams, and
sealed   with   the   seal   of   the   United 1st.Whether   the   supreme   court   can
States.   He did not recollect whether award   the   writ   of   mandamus   in   any
[***17]    any   of   them   constituted   Mr. case.  
Marbury,   Col.   Hooe,   or   Col.   Ramsay,
2d.     Whether   it   will   lie   to   a
justices of the peace; there were when
secretary   of   state   in   any   case
he   went   into   the   office   several
whatever.  
commissions   for   justices   of   peace   of
the   district   made   out;   but   he   was 3d.     Whether   in   the   present   case
furnished  with a  list of  names to  be the   court   may   award   a   mandamus   to
put   into   a   general   commission,   which James Madison, secretary of state.  
was   done,   and   was   considered   as
The argument upon the 1st question
superseding   the   particular
is   derived   not   only   from   the
commissions; and the individuals whose
principles   and   practice   of   that
names   were   contained   in   this   general
country, from whence we derive many of
commission   were   informed   of   their
the   principles   of   our   political
being thus appointed.  He did not know
institutions,   but   from   the
that   any   one   of   the   commissions   was
constitution   and   laws   of   the   United
ever   sent   to   the   person   for   whom   it
States.  
was made out, and did not believe that
any one had been sent.   This   is   the   supreme   court,   and   by
reason of its supremacy must have the
Mr. Lee then read the affidavit of
superintendence   of   the   inferior
James   Marshall,   who   had   been   also
tribunals   and   officers,   whether
summoned as a witness.  It stated that
judicial   or   ministerial.     In   this
on the 4th of March 1801, having been
respect there is no difference between
informed   by   some   person   from
a   judicial   and  [***19]    ministerial
Alexandria   that   there   was   reason   to
officer.     From   this   principle   alone
apprehend  riotous  proceedings  in  that
the   court   of   King's   Bench   in   England
town on that night, he was induced to
derives the power of issuing the writs
return   immediately   home,   and   to   call
of mandamus and prohibition.   3 Inst.
at   the   office   of   the   secretary   of
70,   71.     Shall   it   be   said   that   the
state,   for   the   commissions   of   the
court   of   King's   Bench   has   this   power
justices of the peace; that as many as
in   consequence   to   its   being   the
2,   as   he   believed,   commissions   of
supreme court of judicature, and shall
 Page 14
5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137

we   deny   it   to   this   court   which   the In the Federalist, vol. 2, p. 239,

constitution  makes  the  supreme  court? it is said, that the word "appellate"
It   is   beneficial,   and   a   necessary is   not   to   be   taken   in   its   technical
power;   and   it   can   never   be   applied sense, as used in reference to appeals
where   there   is   another   adequate, in the course of the civil law, but in
specific, legal remedy.  its   broadest   sense,   in   which   it
[***21]  denotes nothing more than the
The   second   section   of   the   third
power   of   one   tribunal   to   review   the
article of the constitution gives this
proceedings   of   another,   either   as   to
court   appellate   jurisdiction   in   all
law   or   facts,   or   both.     The   writ   of
cases in law and equity arising under
mandamus is in the nature of an appeal
the   constitution   and   laws   of   the
as   to   facts   as   well   as   law.     It   is
United   States   (except   the   cases   in
competent   for   congress   to   prescribe
which   it   has   original   jurisdiction)
the   forms   of   process   by   which   the
with   such   exceptions,   and   under   such
supreme   court   shall   exercise   its
regulations   as   congress   shall   make.
appellate   jurisdiction,   and   they   may
The   term   "appellate   jurisdiction"   is
well   declare   a   mandamus   to   be   one.
to be taken in its largest sense, and
But   the   power   does   not   depend   upon
implies   in   its   nature   the   right   of
implication   alone.     It   has   been
superintending the inferior tribunals.
recognized by legislative provision as
Proceedings   in   nature   of   appeals well as in judicial decisions in this
are of various kinds, according to the court.  
subject matter.   3 Bl. Com. 402.   It
Congress,   by   a   law   passed   at   the
is a settled and invariable principle,
very first session after the adoption
that every right, when withheld, must
of the constitution, vol. 1. p. 58, §
have   a   remedy,   and   every   injury
13,   have   expressly   given   the   supreme
[***20]    its   proper   redress.     3   Bl.
court   the   power   of   issuing   writs   of
Com.   109.     There   are   some   injuries
mandamus.  The words are, "The supreme
which can only be redressed by a writ
court   shall   also   have   appellate
of  mandamus, and  others by  a writ  of
jurisdiction  from  the  circuit  courts,
prohibition.     There   must   then   be   a
and the courts of the several states,
jurisdiction   some   where   competent   to
in   the   cases   herein   after   specially
issue that kind of process.  Where are
provided for; and shall have power to
we   to   look   for   it   but   in   that   court
issue   writs   of   prohibition   to   the
which   the   constitution   and   laws   have
district   courts,   when   proceeding   as
made   supreme,   and   to   which   they   have
courts   of   admiralty   and   maritime
given   appellate   jurisdiction?
jurisdiction;   and   writs   of   mandamus,
Blakstone, vol. 3, p. 110. says that a
in   cases   warranted   by   the   principles
writ of mandamus is "a command issuing
and   usages   of   law,   to   any   courts
in  the King's  name from  the court  of
appointed,  or  persons  holding  office,
King's   Bench,   and   directed   to   any
under  [***22]    the   authority   of   the
person, corporation or inferior court,
United States." 
requiring   them   to   do   some   particular
thing   therein   specified,   which Congress   is   not   restrained   from
appertains   to   their   office   and   duty, conferring   original   jurisdiction   in
and   which   the   court   has   previously other   cases   than   those   mentioned   in
determined,   or   at   least   supposes,   to the constitution.  2 Dal. Rep. 298.  
be consonant to right and justice.  It
This   court   has   entertained
is a writ of most extensively remedial
jurisdiction   on   a   mandamus   in   one
nature, and issues in all cases where
case, and on a prohibition in another.
the   party   has   a   right   to   have   any
In   the   case   of   the   United   States   v.
thing done, and has no other specific
judge   Lawrence,   3   Dal.   Rep.   42,   a
means of compelling its performance." 

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
mandamus was moved for by the attorney
general at the instance of the French
minister, to compel judge Lawrence to
issue a warrant against captain Barre,
commander of the French ship of war Le
Perdrix, grounded on an article of the
consular   convention   with   France.   In
this   case   the   power   of   the   court   to
issue writs of mandamus, was taken for
granted in the arguments of counsel on
both sides, and seems to have been so
considered by the court.  The mandamus
was refused, because the case in which
it was required, was not a proper one
to support the motion.  In the case of
the   United   States   v.   judge   Peters   a
writ   of   prohibition   was   granted,   3
Dal.   Rep.   121,   129.This   was   the
celebrated case of the French corvette
the Cassius, which afterwards became a
subject   of   diplomatic   controversy
between  the two  nations.    On the  5th
Feb. 1794, a motion  [***23]    was made
to the supreme court in behalf of one
John   Chandler,   a   citizen   of
Connecticut,   for   a   mandamus   to   the
secretary   of   war,   commanding   him   to
place Chandler on the invalid pension
list.     After   argument,   the   court
refused the mandamus, because the two
acts  of  congress  respecting  invalids,
did not support the case on which the
applicant   grounded   his   motion.     The
case of the United States v. Hopkins,
at   February   term,   1794,   was   a   motion
for   a   mandamus   to   Hopkins,   loan
officer for the district of Virginia,
to   command   him   to   admit   a   person   to
subscribe   to   the   United   States   loan.
Upon argument the mandamus was refused
because   the   applicant   had   not
sufficiently   established   his   title.
In   none   of   these   cases,   nor   in   any
other, was the power of this court to
issue   a   mandamus   ever   denied.     Hence
it   appears   there   has   been   a
legislative   construction   of   the
constitution   upon   this   point,   and   a
judicial   practice   under   it,   for   the
whole time since the formation of that
government.   the   act   of   congress   expressly   gives
Page 15
2d.     The   second   point   is,   can   a
mandamus go to a secretary of state in
any case?   It certainly cannot in all
cases;   nor   to   the   President   in   any
case.  It may not be proper to mention
this   position;   but   I   am   compelled
[***24]    to do it.   An idea has gone
forth, that a mandamus to a secretary
of   state   is   equivalent   to   a   mandamus
to the President of the United States.
I   declare   it   to   be   my   opinion,
grounded   on   a   comprehensive   view   of
the subject, that the President is not
amenable   to   any   court   of   judicature
for   the   exercise   of   his   high
functions, but is responsible only in
the   mode   pointed   out   in   the
constitution.   The secretary of state
acts,   as   before   observed,   in   two
capacities.     As   the   agent   of   the
President,   he   is   not   liable   to   a
mandamus;   but   as   a   recorder   of   the
laws   of   the   United   States;   as   keeper
of   the   great   seal,   as   recorder   of
deeds of land, of letters patent, and
of   commissions,   &c.   he   is   a
ministerial   officer   of   the   people   of
the   United   States.     As   such   he   has
duties   assigned   him   by   law,   in   the
execution   of   which   he   is   independent
of all control, but that of the laws.
It is true he is a high officer, but
is   not   above   law.     It   is   not
consistent   with   the   policy   of   our
political institutions, or the manners
of the citizens of the United States,
that   any   ministerial   officer   having
public   duties   to   perform,   should   be
above   the   compulsion   of   law   in   the
exercise   of   those   duties.     As   a
ministerial  [***25]    officer   he   is
compellable to do his duty, and if he
refuses,   is   liable   to   indictment.     A
prosecution of this kind might be the
means of punishing the officer, but a
specific   civil   remedy   to   the   injured
party  can only  be obtained  by a  writ
of   mandamus.     If   a   mandamus   can   be
awarded by this court in any case, it
may issue to a secretary of state; for
the   power   to   award   it,   "in   cases
warranted by the principles and usages
 Page 16
5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137

of law, to any persons holding offices signing and sealing; and the secretary
under   the   authority   of   the   United does   wrong   if   he   withholds   the
States."  commission.  
Many   cases   may   be   supported,   in 3d.  The third point is, whether in
which a secretary of state ought to be the   present   case   a   writ   of   mandamus
compelled   to   perform   his   duty ought   to   be   awarded   to   James  [***27]
specifically.     By   the   5th   and   6th Madison, secretary of state.  
sections of the act of congress, vol.
The   justices   of   the   peace   in   the
1.   p.   43,   copies   under   seal   of   the
district   of   Columbia   are   judicial
office of the department of state are
officers,   and   hold   their   office   for
made   evidence   in   courts   of   law,   and
five years.  The office is established
fees   are   given   for   making   them   out.
by the act of Congress passed the 27th
The   intention   of   the   law   must   have
of   Feb.   1803,   entitled   "An   act
been, that every person needing a copy
concerning  the  district  of  Columbia,"
should be entitled to it.  Suppose the
ch.   86,   §     11   and   4;   page   271,   273.
secretary   refuses   to   give   a   copy,
They are authorized to hold courts and
ought he not to be compelled?  Suppose
have cognizance of personal demands of
I   am   entitled   to   a   patent   for   lands
the value of 20 dollars.   The act of
purchased of the United States; it is
May 3d, 1802, ch. 52, §  4, considers
made   out   and   signed   by   the   President
them   as   judicial   officers,   and
who   gives   a   warrant   to   the   secretary
provides   the   mode   in   which   execution
to   affix  [***26]    the   great   seal   to
shall   issue   upon   their   judgments.
the patent; he refuses to do it; shall
They hold their offices independent of
I  not have  a mandamus  to compel  him?
the   will   of   the   President.     The
Suppose   the   seal   is   affixed,   but   the
appointment   of   such   an   officer   is
secretary refuses to record it; shall
complete   when   the   President   has
he   not   be   compelled?     Suppose   it
nominated   him   to   the   senate,   and   the
recorded,   and   he   refuses   to   deliver
senate have advised and consented, and
it; shall I have no remedy?  
the   President   has   signed   the
In   this   respect   there   is   no commission   and   delivered   it   to   the
difference   between   the   patent   for secretary to be sealed.  The President
lands,   and   the   commission   of   a has   then   done   with   it;   it   become
judicial   officer.     The   duty   of   the irrevocable.     An   appointment   of   a
secretary is precisely the same.   judge once completed, is made forever.
He holds under the constitution.   The
Judge Patterson enquired of Mr. Lee
requisites   to   be   performed   by   the
whether   he   understood   it   to   be   the
secretary are ministerial, ascertained
duty   of   the   secretary   to   deliver   a
by law, and he has no discretion, but
commission, unless ordered so to do by
must   perform   them;   there   is   no
the President.  
dispensing   power.     In  [***28]
Mr.   Lee   replied,   that   after   the contemplation   of   law   they   are   as   if
President has signed a commission for done.  
an office not held at his will, and it
These justices exercise part of the
comes   to   the   secretary   to   be   sealed,
judicial   power   of   the   United   States.
the   President   has   done   with   it,   and
They   ought   therefore   to   be
nothing   remains,   but   that   the
independent.     Mr.   Lee   begged   leave
secretary   perform   those   ministerial
again to refer to the Federalist, vol.
acts   which   the   law   imposes   upon   him.
2,   Nos.   78   and   79,   as   containing   a
It   immediately   becomes   his   duty   to
correct   view   of   this   subject.   They
seal,   record,   and   deliver   it   on
contained observations and ideas which
demand.     In   such   a   case   the
he wished might be generally read and
appointment   becomes   complete   by   the
 Page 17
5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137

understood.     They   contained   the A mandamus gives no right, but only

principles   upon   which   this   branch   of puts   the   party   in   a   way   to   try   his
our constitution was constructed.   It right.  Sid. 286.  
is   important   to   the   citizens   of   this
It lies to compel a ministerial act
district   that   the   justices   should   be
which concerns the public.   1 Wilson,
independent;  almost  all  the  authority
283.  1 Bl. Rep. 640 ­­ although there
immediately   exercised   over   them   is
be   a   more   tedious   remedy,   Str.   1082.
that   of   the   justices.     They   wish   to
4 Bur. 2188.  2 Bur. 1045; So if there
know   whether   the   justices   of   this
be   a   legal   right,   and   a   remedy   in
district are to hold their commissions
equity,   [***30]    3.  Term. Rep.  652.
at  the will  of a  secretary of  state.
A   mandamus   lies   to   obtain   admission
This   cause   may   seem   trivial   at   first
into a trading company.  Rex v. Turkey
view,   but   it   is   important   in
Company, 2 Bur. 1000. Carthew 448.   5
principle.  It is for this reason that
Mod.   402;  So   it   lies   to   put   the
this   court   is   now   troubled   with   it.
corporate   seal   to   an   instrument.    4
The   emoluments   or   the   dignity   of   the
Term.   Rep.   699;  to   commissioners   of
office,   are   no   objects   with   the
the excise to grant a permit,  2 Term
applicants.    They  conceive  themselves
Rep.   381;  to   admit   to   an   office,  3
to   be   duly   appointed   justices   of   the
Term.   Rep.   575;  to   deliver   papers
peace, and they believe it to be their
which concern the public, 2 Sid. 31. A
duty   to   maintain   the   rights   of   their
mandamus   will   sometimes   lie   in   a
office,  and not  to suffer  them to  be
doubtful   case,  1   Levinz   123,  to   be
violated   by   the   hand   of   power.     The
further   considered   on   the   return,  2
[***29]    citizens   of   this   district
Levinz, 14. 1 Siderfin, 169.  
have   their   fears   excited   by   every
stretch  of power  by a  person so  high It lies to be admitted a member of
in office as the secretary of state.   a church, 3 Bur. 1265, 1043. 
It   only   remains   now   to   consider The   process   is   as   ancient   as   the
whether   a   mandamus   to   compel   the time of Ed. 2d.  1 Levinz 23. 
delivery   of   a   commission   by   a   public
The   first   writ   of   mandamus   is   not
ministerial   officer,   is   one   of   "the
peremptory,   it   only   commands   the
cases warranted by the principles and
officer to do the thing or show cause
usages of law." 
why he should not do it.  If the cause
It is the general principle of law returned   be   sufficient,   there   is   an
that  a mandamus  lies, if  there be  no end   of   the   proceeding,   if   not,   a
other   adequate,   specific,   legal peremptory mandamus is then awarded.  
remedy;  3   Burrow,   1067,  King   v.
It   is   said   to   be   a   writ   of
Barker,   et   al.   This   seems   to   be   the
discretion.     But   the   discretion   of   a
result of a view of all the cases on
court   always   means   a   sound,   legal
the subject.  
discretion, not an arbitrary will.  If
The   case   of   Rex   v.   Borough   of the applicant makes out a proper case,
Midhurst, 1 Wils. 283, was a mandamus the court are bound to grant it.  They
to   compel   the   presentment   of   certain can refuse justice to no man.  
conveyances   to   purchasers   of   burgage
On a subsequent day, and before the
tenements,   whereby   they   would   be
court   had   given  [***31]    an   opinion,
entitled   to   vote   for   members   of
Mr.   Lee   read   the   affidavit   of   Hazen
parliament.  In the case of Rex v. Dr.
Kimball,  who had  been a  clerk in  the
Hay,   1   W.   Bl.   Rep.   640,   a   mandamus
office of the Secretary of State, and
issued   to   admit   one   to   administer   an
has   been   to   a   distant   part   of   the
estate.  
United   States,   but   whose   return   was
 Page 18
5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137

not known to the applicant till after In the order in which the court has
the argument of the case.   viewed   this   subject,   the   following
questions   have   been   considered   and
It   stated   that   on   the   third   of
decided.  
March,   1801,   he   was   a   clerk   in   the
department of state.   That there were 1st.   Has the applicant a right to
in   the   office,   on   that   day, the commission he demands?  
commissions made out and signed by the
2dly.   If he has a right, and that
president,   appointing   William   Marbury
right   has   been   violated,   do   the   laws
a  justice of  peace for  the county  of
of his country afford him a remedy?  
Washington;   and   Robert   T.   Hooe   a
justice of the peace for the county of 3dly.     If   they   do   afford   him   a
Alexandria,   in   the   district   of remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from
Columbia.   this court?  
The first object of enquiry is, 
OPINIONBY:
1st.   Has the applicant a right to
MARSHALL 
the commission he demands?  
OPINION: His   right   originates   in   an   act   of
congress   passed   in   February,   1801,
  [*153]     [**66]    Afterwards,   on concerning the district of Columbia.  
the   24th   of   February   the   following
After   dividing   the   district   into
opinion of the court was delivered by
two counties, the 11th section of this
the chief justice.  
law,   enacts,   "that   there   shall   be
Opinion of the court.  appointed in and for  [***33]    each of
the   said   counties,   such   number   of
At the last term on the affidavits
discreet persons to be justices of the
then read and filed with the clerk, a
peace   as   the   president   of   the   United
rule   was   granted   in   this   case,
States shall, from time to time, think
requiring   the   secretary   of   state   to
expedient,   to   continue   in   office   for
show   cause   why   a   mandamus    [*154]
five years.  
should   not   issue,   directing   him   to
deliver   to   William   Marbury   his   [*155]    It   appears,   from   the
commission   as   a   justice   of   the   peace affidavits,   that   in   compliance   with
of   the   county   of   Washington,   in   the this   law,   a   commission   for   William
district of Columbia.   Marbury as a justice of peace for the
county   of   Washington,   was   signed   by
No   cause   has   been   shown,   and   the
John   Adams,   then   president   of   the
present   motion   is   for   a   mandamus.
United States; after which the seal of
[***32]  The peculiar delicacy of this
the   United   States   was   affixed   to   it;
case,   the   novelty   of   some   of   its
but   the   commission   has   never   reached
circumstances, and the real difficulty
the person for whom it was made out. 
attending   the   points   which   occur   in
it,   require   a   complete   exposition   of In order to determine whether he is
the   principles,   on   which   the   opinion entitled   to   this   commission,   it
to be given by the court, is founded. becomes   necessary   to   enquire   whether
he   has   been   appointed   to   the   office.
These principles have been, on the
For if he has been appointed, the law
side   of   the   applicant,   very   ably
continues   him   in   office   for   five
argued   at   the   bar.   In   rendering   the
years,   and   he   is   entitled   to   the
opinion   of   the   court,   there   will   be
possession   of   those   evidences   of
some departure in form, though not in
office, which, being completed, became
substance,   from   the   points   stated   in
his property. 
that argument.  

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
[HN1]   The   2d   section   of   the   2d
article of the constitution, declares,
that   "the   president   shall   nominate,
and,   by   and   with   the   advice   and
consent   of   the   senate,   shall   appoint
ambassadors,   other   public   ministers
and consuls, and all other officers of
the  United  States,  whose  appointments
are   not  [***34]    otherwise   provided
for."  authorizes congress "to vest, by law,
The   third   section   declares,   that
"he shall commission all the officers
of the United States." 
[HN2]   An   act   of   congress   directs
the   secretary   of   state   to   keep   the
seal   of   the   United   States,   "to   make
out   and   record,   and   affix   the   said
seal   to   all   civil   commissions   to
officers   of   the   United   States,   to   be
appointed   by   the   President,   by   and
with the consent of the senate, or by
the President alone; provided that the
said seal shall not be affixed to any
commission before the same shall have
been   signed   by   the   President   of   the
United States." 
These   are   the   clauses   of   the
constitution   and   laws   of   the   United
States, which affect this part of the
case.   They seem to contemplate three
distinct operations:  constitutional distinction between the
1st,   The   nomination.     This   is   the
sole   act   of   the   President,   and   is
completely voluntary.
2d.   The appointment. This is also
the act of the President, and is also
a voluntary act, though it can only be
performed   by   and   with   the   advice   and
consent of the senate.  
  [*156]    3d.   The commission.   To
grant   a   commission   to   a   person
appointed,   might   perhaps   be   deemed   a
duty   enjoined   by   the   constitution.
"He   shall,"   says   that   instrument,
"commission   all   the   officers  [***35]
of the United States."  to perform the duties without it.
The   acts   of   appointing   to   office,
and   commissioning   the   person
appointed,  can  scarcely  be  considered
Page 19
as  one and  the same;  since the  power
to   perform   them   is   given   in   two
separate and distinct sections of the
constitution.  The distinction between
the   appointment   and   the   commission
will   be   rendered   more   apparent,   by
[**67]  adverting to that provision in
[HN3] the second section of the second
article   of   the   constitution,   which
the   appointment   of   such   inferior
officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the courts of law,
or in the heads of departments;" thus
contemplating cases where the law may
direct the President to commission an
officer appointed by the courts, or by
the  heads of  departments.    In such  a
case,   to   issue   a   commission   would   be
apparently   a   duty   distinct   from   the
appointment, the performance of which,
perhaps, could not legally be refused.
Although   that   clause   of   the
constitution   which   requires   the
President   to   commission   all   the
officers   of   the   United   States,   may
never   have   been   applied   to   officers
appointed   otherwise   than   by   himself,
yet it would be difficult to deny the
legislative power [***36]  to apply it
to   such   cases.     Of   consequence   the
appointment   to   an   office   and   the
commission of an officer, who has been
appointed,   remains   the   same   as   if   in
practice   the   President   had
commissioned  officers  appointed  by  an
authority other than his will.  
It follows too, from the existence
of   this   distinction,   that,   if   an
appointment was to be evidenced by any
public act, other than the commission,
the   performance   of   such   public   act
would   create   the   officer;   and   if   he
was  not removable  at the  will of  the
President,   would   either   give   him   a
right to his commission, or enable him
  
These   observations   are   premised
solely   for   the   purpose   of   rendering
more   intelligible   those   which   apply
 Page 20
5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137

more   directly   to   the   particular   case over an officer, not removable at his

under consideration.   will, must cease.   That point of time
must be when the constitutional power
  [*157]    This is an appointment by
of   appointment   has   been   exercised.
the President, by and with the advice
And this power has been exercised when
and   consent   of   the   senate,   and   is
the last act, required from the person
evidenced by no act but the commission
possessing   the   power,   has   been
itself.   In such a case therefore the
performed.     This   last   act   is   the
commission   and   the   appointment   seem
signature   of   the   commission.     This
inseparable;   it   being   almost
idea seems to have prevailed with the
impossible   to   show   an   appointment
legislature,   when   the   act   passed,
otherwise   than   by   proving   the
converting the department   [*158]    of
existence   of   a   commission;   still   the
foreign affairs into the department of
commission  is  not  necessarily  [***37]
state.     By   that   act   it   is   enacted,
the   appointment;   though   conclusive
that the secretary of state shall keep
evidence of it.  
the   seal   of   the   United   States,   "and
But at what state does it amount to shall   make   out   and   record,   and   shall
this conclusive evidence?   affix   the   said   seal   to   all   civil
commissions to officers of the United
The   answer   to   this   question   seems
States,   to   be   appointed   by   the
an obvious one.  The appointment being
President:"   "Provided   that   the   said
the sole act of the President, must be
seal   shall   not   be   affixed   to   any
completely evidenced, when it is shown
commission, before the same shall have
that   he   has   done   every   thing   to   be
been   signed   by   the   President   of   the
performed by him.  
United   States;   nor   to   any   other
Should   the   commission,   instead   of instrument or act, without the special
being evidence of an appointment, even warrant of the President therefor." 
be   considered   as   constituting   the
The   signature   is   a   warrant   for
appointment itself; still it would be
affixing   the   great   seal   to   the
made when the last act to be done by
commission; and the great seal is only
the   President   was   performed,   or,   at
to   be   affixed   to   an   instrument   which
furthest,   when   the   commission   was
is   complete.     It   asserts,   by   an
complete.  
[***39]    act supposed to be of public
The   last   act   to   be   done   by   the notoriety,   the   verity   of   the
President,   is   the   signature   of   the Presidential signature. 
commission.   He has then acted on the
It is never to be affixed till the
advice   and   consent   of   the   senate   to
commission   is   signed,   because   the
his   own   nomination.     The   time   for
signature,   which   gives   force   and
deliberations has then passed.  He has
effect   to   the   commission,   is
decided.   His judgment, on the advice
conclusive   evidence   that   the
and   consent   of   the   senate   concurring
appointment is made. 
with   his   nomination,   has   been   made,
and   the   officer   is   appointed.   This The   commission   being   signed,   the
appointment   is   evidenced   by   an   open, subsequent   duty   of   the   secretary   of
unequivocal   act;   and   being   the   last state is prescribed by law, and not to
act   required   from   the   person   making be   guided   by   the   will   of   the
it,   necessarily   excludes   the   idea   of President.  He is to affix the seal of
its   being,   so   far   as   respects   the the   United   States   to   the   commission,
appointment,   an   inchoate   and and is to record it.  
incomplete transaction.  
This is not a proceeding which may
Some point of [***38]  time must be be   varied,   if   the   judgment   of   the
taken when the power of the executive executive   shall   suggest   one   more

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
eligible;   but   is   a   precise   course
accurately   marked   out   by   law,   and   is
to   be   strictly   pursued.     It   is   the
duty   of   the   secretary   of   state   to
conform to the law, and in this he is
an officer of the United States, bound
to   obey   the   laws.     He   acts,   in   this
regard,   as   has   been   very   properly
stated at the bar, under the authority
of law, and not by the instructions of
the   President.     It   is   a   ministerial
act   which   the   law   enjoins   on   a
particular   officer   for   a   particular
purpose.  
If it should be supposed, that the
solemnity   of   affixing   the   seal,   is
necessary not only to the validity of
the  [***40]    commission,   but   even   to
the   completion   of   an   appointment,
still   when   the   seal   is   affixed   the
appointment is made, and   [*159]    the
commission   is   valid.     No   other
solemnity is required by law; no other
act is to be performed on the part of
government.     All   that   the   executive
can  do to  invest the  person with  his
office,   is   done;   and   unless   the
appointment   be   then   made,   the
executive cannot make one without the
co­operation of others.  
After   searching   anxiously   for   the
principles on which a contrary opinion
may be supported, none have been found
which   appear   of   sufficient   force   to
maintain the opposite doctrine.   cases of commissions, the sign manual
Such   as   the   imagination   of   the
court   could   suggest,   have   been   very
deliberately   examined,   and   after
allowing them all the weight which it
appears possible to give them, they do
not   shake   the   opinion   which   has   been
formed.   transmission   of   the   commission,   and
In   considering   this   question,   it
has been conjectured  [**68]  that the
commission   may   have   been   assimilated
to  a deed,  to the  validity of  which,
delivery is essential.   is a practice directed by convenience,
This   idea   is   founded   on   the
supposition that the commission is not
merely evidence of an appointment, but
Page 21
is   itself   the   actual   appointment;   a
supposition   by   no   means
unquestionable.   [***41]    But for the
purpose   of   examining   this   objection
fairly,   let   it   be   conceded,   that   the
principle, claimed for its support, is
established.  
The   appointment   being,   under   the
constitution,   to   be   made   by   the
President  personally,  the  delivery  of
the deed of appointment, if necessary
to its completion, must be made by the
President   also.   It   is   not   necessary
that   the   livery   should   be   made
personally   to   the   grantee   of   the
office: It never is so made.  The law
would   seem   to   contemplate   that   it
should   be   made   to   the   secretary   of
state, since it directs the secretary
to   affix   the   seal   to   the   commission
after it shall have been signed by the
President.   If then the act of livery
be   necessary   to   give   validity   to   the
commission, it has been delivered when
executed   and   given   to   the   secretary
for   the   purpose   of   being   sealed,
recorded,   and   transmitted   to   the
party.  
But in all cases of letters patent,
certain   solemnities   are   required   by
law,   which   solemnities   are   the
evidences   [*160]    of the validity of
the instrument.   A formal delivery to
the   person   is   not   among   them.     In
of the President, and the seal of the
United  States,  are  those  solemnities.
This [***42]  objection therefore does
not touch the case.  
It   has   also   occurred   as   possible,
and   barely   possible,   that   the
the   acceptance   thereof,   might   be
deemed necessary to complete the right
of the plaintiff.  
The transmission of the commission,
but  not by  law.    It cannot  therefore
be   necessary   to   constitute   the
appointment which must precede it, and
which   is   the   mere   act   of   the
 Page 22
5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137

President.   If the executive required instrument whatever, and the order for

that   every   person   appointed   to   an that   purpose   has   been   given,   the
office,   should   himself   take   means   to instrument   is,   in   law,   considered   as
procure   his   commission,   the recorded,    [***44]    although   the
appointment   would   not   be   the   less manual labor of inserting it in a book
valid   on   that   account.     The kept   for   that   purpose   may   not   have
appointment   is   the   sole   act   of   the been performed.  
President;   the   transmission   of   the
[HN4]   In   the   case   of   commissions,
commission   is   the   sole   act   of   the
the law orders the secretary of state
officer to whom that duty is assigned,
to   record   them.     When   therefore   they
and may be accelerated or retarded by
are   signed   and   sealed,   the   order   for
circumstances   which   can   have   no
their   being   recorded   is   given;   and
influence   on   the   appointment.   A
whether   inserted   in   the   book   or   not,
commission is transmitted to a person
they are in law recorded. 
already appointed; not to a person to
be   appointed   or   not,   as   the   letter A   copy   of   this   record   is   declared
enclosing the commission should happen equal   to   the   original,   and   the   fees,
to get into the post­office and reach to   be   paid   by   a   person   requiring   a
him in safety, or to miscarry.   copy,  are ascertained  by law.   Can  a
keeper   of   a   public   record,   erase
It   may   have   some   tendency   to
therefrom a commission which has been
elucidate   this   point,   to   enquire,
recorded?   Or   can   he   refuse   a   copy
whether the possession [***43]  of the
thereof   to   a   person   demanding   it   on
original   commission   be   indispensably
the terms prescribed by law?  
necessary   to   authorize   a   person,
appointed   to   any   office,   to   perform Such a copy would, equally with the
the duties of that office.   If it was original,   authorize   the   justice   of
necessary,   then   a   loss   of   the peace to proceed in the performance of
commission would lose the office.  Not his   duty,   because   it   would,   equally
only   negligence,   but   accident   or with   the   original,   attest   his
fraud, fire or theft, might deprive an appointment. 
individual  of his  office.    In such  a
If the transmission of a commission
case,   I   presume   it   could   not   be
be not considered as necessary to give
doubted,   but   that   a   copy   from   the
validity to an appointment; still less
record of the office of the secretary
is its acceptance.  The appointment is
of   state,   would   be,   to   every   intent
the   sole   act   of   the   President;   the
and   purpose,   equal   to   the   original.
acceptance   is   the   sole   act   of   the
The act of congress has expressly made
officer,   and   is,   in   plain   common
it so.  To give that copy validity, it
sense,   posterior   to   the   appointment.
would   not   be   necessary   to   prove   that
As he may resign, so may he refuse to
the original had been transmitted and
accept: but neither  [***45]    the one,
afterwards   lost.     The   copy   would   be
nor the other, is capable of rendering
complete   evidence   that   the   original
the appointment a non­entity.  
had existed, and that the appointment
had   been   made,   but,   not   that   the That   this   is   the   understanding   of
original   had   been   transmitted.   If the   government,   is   apparent   from   the
indeed   it   should   appear   that    [*161] whole tenor of its conduct.  
the   original   had   been   mislaid   in   the
A   commission   bears   date,   and   the
office   of   state,   that   circumstance
salary   of   the   officer   commences   from
would not affect the operation of the
his   appointment;   not   from   the
copy.     When   all   the   requisites   have
transmission   or   acceptance   of   his
been   performed   which   authorize   a
commission.   When a person, appointed
recording   officer   to   record   any
to   any   office,   refuses   to   accept   the

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
office, the successor is nominated in
the   place   of   the   person   who    [*162]
has declined to accept, and not in the
place   of   the   person   who   had   been
previously in office, and had created
the original vacancy.   2dly.   If he has a right, and that
It   is   therefore   decidedly   the
opinion of the court, that [HN5] when
a   commission   has   been   signed   by   the
President,   the   appointment   is   made;
and   that   the   commission   is   complete,
when the seal of the United States has
been affixed to it by the secretary of
state.  of   the   first   duties   of   government   is
[HN6] Where an officer is removable
at   the   will   of   the   executive,   the
circumstance   which   completes   his
appointment is of no concern; because
the act is at any time revocable; and
the   commission   may   be   arrested,   if
still   in   the   office.     But   when   the
officer   is   not   removable   at   the   will
of   the   executive,   the   appointment   is
not revocable, and  [***46]    cannot be
annulled.     It   has   conferred   legal
rights which cannot be resumed. 
[HN7]   The   discretion   of   the
executive is to be exercised until the
appointment   has   been   made.      [**69]
But having once made the appointment,
his   power   over   the   office   is
terminated   in   all   cases,   where,   by
law,   the   officer   is   not   removable   by
him.   The right to the office is then
in   the   person   appointed,   and   he   has
the  absolute,  unconditional,  power  of
accepting or rejecting it.  
Mr.   Marbury,   then,   since   his
commission   was   signed   by   the
President, and sealed by the secretary
of   state,   was   appointed;   and   as   the
law   creating   the   office,   gave   the
officer   a   right   to   hold   for   five
years,   independent   of   the   executive,
the appointment was not revocable; but
vested   in   the   officer   legal   rights,
which are protected by the laws of his
country.  
To   withhold   his   commission,
therefore,   is   an   act   deemed   by   the
Page 23
court   not   warranted   by   law,   but
violative of a vested legal right. 
This   brings   us   to   the   second
enquiry; which is, 
right   has   been   violated,   do   the   laws
of his country afford him a remedy?  
  [*163]    [HN8] The very essence of
civil   liberty   certainly   consists   in
the right of every [***47]  individual
to   claim   the   protection   of   the   laws,
whenever   he   receives   an   injury.     One
to   afford   that   protection.     In   Great
Britain   the   king   himself   is   sued   in
the respectful form of a petition, and
he   never   fails   to   comply   with   the
judgment of his court.  
In the 3d vol. of his commentaries,
p. 23, Blackstone states two cases in
which   a   remedy   is   afforded   by   mere
operation of law.  
"In all other cases," he says, "it
is   a   general   and   indisputable   rule,
that   [HN9]   where   there   is   a   legal
right, there is also a legal remedy by
suit   or   action   at   law,   whenever   that
right is invaded." 
And afterwards, p. 109, of the same
vol.  he says,  "I am  next to  consider
such injuries as are cognizable by the
courts of the common law.   And herein
I   shall   for   the   present   only   remark,
that all possible injuries whatsoever,
that did not fall within the exclusive
cognizance   of   either   the
ecclesiastical,   military,   or   maritime
tribunals,   are   for   that   very   reason,
within   the   cognizance   of   the   common
law   courts   of   justice;   for   it   is   a
settled   and   invariable   principle   in
the laws of England, that every right,
when withheld, must have a remedy, and
every   injury   its   proper   redress."
[***48]  
The government of the United States
has   been   emphatically   termed   a
government   of   laws,   and   not   of   men.
It   will   certainly   cease   to   deserve
 Page 24
5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137

this   high   appellation,   if   the   laws of duty, to be performed in any of the

furnish no remedy for the violation of great   departments   of   government,
a vested legal right.  constitutes  such a  case is  not to  be
admitted.  
If   this   obloquy   is   to   be   cast   on
the   jurisprudence   of   our   country,   it By   the   act   concerning   invalids,
must arise from the peculiar character passed in June, 1794, vol. 3. p. 112,
of the case.   the   secretary   of   war   is   ordered   to
place on the pension list, all persons
It   behooves   us   then   to   enquire
whose names are contained in a report
whether   there   be   in   its   composition
previously   made   by   him   to   congress.
any   ingredient   which   shall   exempt   it
If   he   should   refuse   to   do   so,   would
from   legal   investigation,   or   exclude
the wounded veteran be without remedy?
the injured party from legal redress.
Is  it to  be contended  that where  the
In   pursuing   this   enquiry   the   first
law   in   precise   terms,   directs   the
question   which   presents   itself   is,
performance   of   an   act,   in   which   an
whether   this   can   be   arranged    [*164]
individual   is   interested,    [***50]
with   that   class   of   cases   which   comes
the   law   is   incapable   of   securing
under the description of damnum absque
obedience   to   its   mandate?     Is   it   on
injuria ­­ a loss without an injury.  
account of the character of the person
This description of cases never has against   whom   the   complaint   is   made?
been   considered,   and   it   is   believed Is  it to  be contended  that the  heads
never   can   be   considered,   as of departments are not amenable to the
comprehending   offices   of   trust,   of laws of their country?  
honor   or   of   profit.     The   office   of
Whatever the practice on particular
justice   of   peace   in   the   district   of
occasions   may   be,   the   theory   of   this
Columbia   is   such   an   office;   it   is
principle   will   certainly   never   be
therefore worthy of the attention and
maintained.      [*165]    No   act   of   the
guardianship   of   the   laws.     It   has
legislature confers so extraordinary a
received   that   attention   and
privilege,   nor   can   it   derive
guardianship.   It   has   been   created   by
countenance from the doctrines of the
special act of congress, and has been
common   law.     After   stating   that
secured,  so far  [***49]    as the  laws
personal   injury   from   the   king   to   a
can   give   security   to   the   person
subject is presumed to be impossible,
appointed to fill it, for five years.
Blackstone, vol. 3. p. 255, says, "but
It   is   not   then   on   account   of   the
injuries to the rights of property can
worthlessness   of   the   thing   pursued,
scarcely   be   committed   by   the   crown
that the injured party can be alleged
without   the   intervention   of   its
to be without remedy.  
officers;   for   whom,   the   law,   in
Is   it   in   the   nature   of   the matters   of   right,   entertains   no
transaction?  Is the act of delivering respect   or   delicacy;   but   furnishes
or   withholding   a   commission   to   be various   methods   of   detecting   the
considered   as   a   mere   political   act, errors and misconduct of those agents,
belonging  to  the  executive  department by whom the king has been deceived and
alone,   for   the   performance   of   which, induced to do a temporary injustice." 
entire   confidence   is   placed   by   our
By   the   act   passed   in   1796,
constitution in the supreme executive;
authorizing   the   sale   of   the   lands
and   for   any   misconduct   respecting
above   the   mouth   of   Kentucky   river
which,   the   injured   individual   has   no
(vol.   3d.   p.   299)   the   purchaser,   on
remedy.  
paying   his   purchase   money,   becomes
That there may be such cases is not completely   entitled   to   the   property
to   be   questioned;   but   that   every   act [***51]    purchased;   and   on   producing

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
to the secretary of state, the receipt
of   the   treasurer   upon   a   certificate
required by the law, the president of
the   United   States   is   authorized   to
grant   him   a   patent.     It   is   further
enacted   that   all   patents   shall   be
countersigned   by   the   secretary   of
state, and recorded in his office.  If
the   secretary   of   state   should   choose
to withhold this patent; or the patent
being   lost,   should   refuse   a   copy   of
it;   can   it   be   imagined   that   the   law
furnishes   to   the   injured   person   no
remedy?   whom   that   will   is   communicated.   The
It is not believed that any person
whatever   would   attempt   to   maintain
such a proposition.  
  [**70]    It   follows   then   that
[HN10]   the   question,   whether   the
legality   of   an   act   of   the   head   of   a
department be examinable in a court of
justice or not, must always depend on
the nature of that act.  
If   some   acts   be   examinable,   and
others not, there must be some rule of
law to guide the court in the exercise
of its jurisdiction.   away the vested rights of others.
In   some   instances   there   may   be
difficulty   in   applying   the   rule   to
particular cases; but there cannot, it
is   believed,   be   much   difficulty   in
laying down the rule.   merely   to   execute   the   will   of   the
[HN11]   By   the   constitution   of   the
United   States,   the   President   is
invested   with   certain   important
political  [***52]    powers,   in   the
[*166]  exercise of which he is to use
his own discretion, and is accountable
only   to   his   country   in   his   political
character, and to his own conscience.
To aid him in the performance of these
duties,   he   is   authorized   to   appoint
certain   officers,   who   act   by   his
authority   and   in   conformity   with   his
orders.  
In   such   cases,   their   acts   are   his
acts;   and   whatever   opinion   may   be
entertained   of   the   manner   in   which
executive   discretion   may   be   used,
still there exists, and can exist, no
Page 25
power to control that discretion.  The
subjects are political.   They respect
the nation, not individual rights, and
being entrusted to the executive, the
decision   of   the   executive   is
conclusive.     The   application   of   this
remark will be perceived by adverting
to   the   act   of   congress   for
establishing the department of foreign
affairs.     This   office,   as   his   duties
were   prescribed   by   that   act,   is   to
conform   precisely   to   the   will   of   the
President.     He   is   the   mere   organ   by
acts   of   such   an   officer,   as   an
officer,   can   never   be   examinable   by
the courts.  
But   when   the   legislature   proceeds
to   impose   on   that   officer   other
duties;   when   he   is   directed
peremptorily   to  [***53]    perform
certain   acts;   when   the   rights   of
individuals   are   dependent   on   the
performance   of   those   acts;   he   is   so
far   the   officer   of   the   law;   is
amenable to the laws for his conduct;
and   cannot   at   his   discretion   sport
  
The  conclusion  from  this  reasoning
is,   that   [HN12]   where   the   heads   of
departments   are   the   political   or
confidential  agents  of  the  executive,
President,   or   rather   to   act   in   cases
in   which   the   executive   possesses   a
constitutional   or   legal   discretion,
nothing   can   be   more   perfectly   clear
than   that   their   acts   are   only
politically   examinable.   But   where   a
specific duty is assigned by law, and
individual   rights   depend   upon   the
performance   of   that   duty,   it   seems
equally clear that the individual who
considers himself injured, has a right
to  resort to  the laws  of his  country
for a remedy.  
If this be the rule, let us enquire
how  it applies  to the  case under  the
consideration of the court.  
 [*167]  The power of nominating to
the   senate,   and   the   power   of

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
appointing   the   person   nominated,   are
political   powers,   to   be   exercised   by
the   President   according   to   his   own
discretion.     When   he   has   made   an
appointment, he has [***54]  exercised
his   whole   power,   and   his   discretion
has   been   completely   applied   to   the
case.     If,   by   law,   the   officer   be
removable   at   the   will   of   the
President, then a new appointment may
be immediately made, and the rights of
the officer are terminated.   But as a
fact which has existed cannot be made
never to have existed, the appointment
cannot   be   annihilated;   and
consequently if the officer is by law
not   removable   at   the   will   of   the
President; the rights he has acquired
are protected by the law, and are not
resumeable   by   the   President.     They
cannot   be   extinguished   by   executive
authority, and he has the privilege of
asserting   them   in   like   manner   as   if
they   had   been   derived   from   any   other
source. 
[HN13] The question whether a right
has vested or not, is, in its nature,
judicial,   and   must   be   tried   by   the
judicial authority.   If, for example,
Mr.  Marbury had  taken the  oaths of  a
magistrate,   and   proceeded   to   act   as
one;   in   consequence   of   which   a   suit
had   been   instituted   against   him,   in
which his defence had depended on his
being   a   magistrate;   the   validity   of
his   appointment   must   have   been
determined by judicial authority.  
So, if he conceives that, by virtue
of   his   appointment,   he   has   a   legal
[***55]    right,   either   to   the
commission which has been made out for
him, or to a copy of that commission,
it is equally a question examinable in
a court, and the decision of the court
upon   it   must   depend   on   the   opinion
entertained of his appointment. 
That   question   has   been   discussed,
and   the   opinion   is,   that   the   latest
point   of   time   which   can   be   taken   as
that   at   which   the   appointment   was
complete,   and   evidenced,   was   when,
Page 26
after the signature of the president,
the   seal   of   the   United   States   was
affixed to the commission.  
It   is   then   the   opinion   of   the
court, 
1st.     That   by   signing   the
commission   of   Mr.   Marbury,   the
president   of   the   United   States
appointed   him   a   justice    [*168]    of
peace, for the county of Washington in
the district of Columbia; and that the
seal   of   the   United   States,   affixed
thereto by the secretary of state, is
conclusive testimony of the verity of
the   signature,   and   of   the   completion
of   the   appointment;   and   that   the
appointment   conferred   on   him   a   legal
right  to the  office for  the space  of
five years.  
2dly.     That,   having   this   legal
title   to   the   office,   he   has   a
consequent right to the commission; a
refusal   to   deliver   which,   is   a   plain
violation   of   that   right,   for  [***56]
which   the   laws   of   his   country   afford
him a remedy.  
It remains to be enquired whether, 
3dly.  He is entitled to the remedy
for   which   he   applies.     This   depends
on, 
1st.     The   nature   of   the   writ
applied for, and, 
2dly.  The power of this court.  
1st.  The nature of the writ.  
Blackstone, in the 3d volume of his
commentaries,   page   110,   defines   a
mandamus   to   be,   "a   command   issued   in
the   King's   name   from   the   court   of
King's   Bench,   and   directed   to   any
person, corporation, or inferior court
of   judicature   within   the   King's
dominions,   requiring   them   to   do   some
particular   thing   therein   specified,
which   appertains   to   their   office   and
duty,   and   which   the   court   of   King's
Bench has previously determined, or at
least   supposed,   to   be   consonant   to
right and justice." 

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
Lord Mansfield, in 3d Burrows 1266,
in the case of the King v. Baker, et
al.   states   with   much   precision   and
explicitness   the   cases   in   which   this
writ may be used.  
[HN14]   "Whenever,"   says   that   very
able judge, "there  [**71]  is a right
to   execute   an   office,   perform   a
service, or exercise a franchise (more
specifically  if it  be in  a matter  of
public   concern,   or   attended   with
profit)   and   a   person   is   kept   out   of
the   possession,    [***57]    or
dispossessed   of   such   right,   and
[*169]    has   no   other   specific   legal
remedy, this court ought to assist by
mandamus, upon reasons of justice, as
the   writ   expresses,   and   upon   reasons
of   public   policy,   to   preserve   peace,
order   and   good   government."   In   the
same case he says, "this writ ought to
be   used   upon   all   occasions   where   the
law   has   established   no   specific
remedy, and where in justice and good
government there ought to be one."  attempt   to   intrude   into   the   cabinet,
In addition to the authorities now
particularly   cited,   many   others   were
relied  on at  the bar,  which show  how
far the practice has conformed to the
general doctrines that have been just
quoted.   so   absurd   and   excessive,   could   not
This   writ,   if   awarded,   would   be
directed to an officer of government,
and   its   mandate   to   him   would   be,   to
use the words of Blackstone, "to do a
particular   thing   therein   specified,
which   appertains   to   his   office   and
duty   and   which   the   court   has
previously   determined,   or   at   least
supposes, to be consonant to right and
justice."   Or,   in   the   words   of   Lord
Mansfield,   the   applicant,   in   this
case, has a right to execute an office
of public concern, and is kept out of
possession of that right.   intrusion   into   the   secrets   of   the
These   circumstances   certainly
concur in this case.  
Still,   [HN15]   to   render  [***58]
the   mandamus   a   proper   remedy,   the
officer   to   whom   it   is   directed,   must
Page 27
be   one   to   whom,   on   legal   principles,
such   writ   may   be   directed;   and   the
person applying for it must be without
any other specific and legal remedy.  
1st.     With   respect   to   the   officer
to   whom   it   would   be   directed.     The
intimate   political   relation,
subsisting   between   the   president   of
the   United   States   and   the   heads   of
departments,   necessarily   renders   any
legal investigation of the acts of one
of   those   high   officers   peculiarly
irksome,   as   well   as   delicate;   and
excites   some   hesitation   with   respect
to the propriety of entering into such
investigation.    Impressions  are  often
received   without   much   reflection   or
examination,   and   it   is   not   wonderful
that   in   such   a   case   as   this,   the
assertion,   by   an   individual,   of   his
legal claims in a court of justice; to
which   claims   it   is   the   duty   of   that
court to attend; should at first view
be considered   [*170]   by some, as an
and   to   intermeddle   with   the
prerogatives of the executive.  
It   is   scarcely   necessary   for   the
court   to   disclaim   all   pretensions   to
such a jurisdiction.  An extravagance,
have   been   entertained  [***59]    for   a
moment.     [HN16]   The   province   of   the
court   is,   solely,   to   decide   on   the
rights of individuals, not to enquire
how   the   executive,   or   executive
officers, perform duties in which they
have   a   discretion.     Questions,   in
their nature political, or which are,
by   the   constitution   and   laws,
submitted to the executive, can never
be made in this court.  
But,   if   this   be   not   such   a
question;   if   so   far   from   being   an
cabinet,   it   respects   a   paper,   which,
according to law, is upon record, and
to   a   copy   of   which   the   law   gives   a
right, on the payment of ten cents; if
it be no intermeddling with a subject,
over   which   the   executive   can   be
 Page 28
5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137

considered   as   having   exercised   any has   received   all   the   legal

control; what is there in the exalted solemnities; or to give a copy of such
station   of   the   officer,   which   shall record;   in   such   cases,   it   is   not
bar   a   citizen   from   asserting,   in   a perceived on what ground the courts of
court of justice, his legal rights, or the   country   are   further   excused   from
shall forbid a court to listen to the the   duty   of   giving   judgment,   that
claim;   or   to   issue   a   mandamus, right   be   done   to   an   injured
directing   the   performance   of   a   duty, individual, than if the same services
not depending on executive discretion, were  to be  performed by  a person  not
but on particular acts of congress and the head of a department.  
the general principles of law?  
This opinion seems not now, for the
If one of the heads of departments first  time, to  be taken  upon in  this
commits   any   illegal   act,   under   the country.  
color   of   his   office,   by   which   an
It must be well recollected that in
individual   sustains   an   injury,   it
1792,   an   act   passed,   directing   the
cannot  [***60]    be pretended that his
secretary   at   war   to   place   on   the
office   alone   exempts   him   from   being
pension   list   such   disabled   officers
sued   in   the   ordinary   mode   of
and soldiers as should be reported to
proceeding,   and   being   compelled   to
him, by the circuit courts, which act,
obey   the   judgment   of   the   law.     How
so far as the duty was imposed on the
then   can   his   office   exempt   him   from
courts,   was   deemed   unconstitutional;
this   particular   mode   of   deciding   on
but some of the judges, thinking that
the   legality   of   his   conduct,   if   the
the  law might  be executed  by them  in
case be such a case as would, were any
the   character   of   commissioners,
other  individual  the  party  complained
proceeded to act and to report in that
of, authorize the process? 
character.  
It   is   not   by   the   office   of   the
This   law   being   deemed
person   to   whom   the   writ   is   directed,
unconstitutional  at  the  circuits,  was
but the nature of the thing to be done
repealed,   and   a   different   system   was
that   the   propriety   or   impropriety   of
established; but this question whether
issuing   a   mandamus,   is   to   be
those   persons,   who   had   been   reported
determined.     Where   the   head   of   a
by the judges, as commissioners, were
department   acts   in   a   case,   in   which
entitled,   in   consequence   of   that
executive   discretion   is   to   be
report,   to   be   placed   on   the   pension
exercised;   in   which   he   is   the   mere
list,   was   a   legal  [***62]    question,
organ of executive will; it is  [*171]
properly   determinable   in   the   courts,
again   repeated,   that   any   application
although   the   act   of   placing   such
to a court to control, in any respect,
persons   on   the   list   was   to   be
his conduct, would be rejected without
preformed by the head of a department.
hesitation.  
That   this   question   might   be
But where he is directed by law to
properly   settled,   congress   passed   an
do   a   certain   act   affecting   the
act in February, 1793, making   [**72]
absolute rights of individuals, in the
it  the duty  of the  secretary of  war,
performance of which he is not placed
in   conjunction   with   the   attorney
under the particular direction of the
general,   to   take   such   measures,   as
President,   and   the   performance   of
might   be   necessary   to   obtain   an
which,   the   President   cannot   lawfully
adjudication   of   the   supreme   court   of
forbid,   and   therefore   is   never
the   United    [*172]    States   on   the
presumed   to   have   forbidden;   as   for
validity   of   any   such   rights,   claimed
example,   to   record   a   commission,
under the act aforesaid.  
[***61]    or  a patent  for land,  which
 Page 29
5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137

After   the   passage   of   this   act,   a of the executive; and being so  [*173]

mandamus was moved for, to be directed appointed,   he   has   a   right   to   the
to   the   secretary   at   war,   commanding commission   which   the   secretary   has
him   to   place   on   the   pension   list,   a received  [***64]    from   the   president
person   stating   himself   to   be   on   the for his use.  The act of congress does
report of the judges.   not   indeed   order   the   secretary   of
state   to   send   it   to   him,   but   it   is
There is, therefore, much reason to
placed   in   his   hands   for   the   person
believe, that this mode of trying the
entitled   to   it;   and   cannot   be   more
legal   right   of   the   complainant,   was
lawfully withheld by him, than by any
deemed   by   the   head   of   a   department,
other person.  
and by the highest law officer of the
United   States,   the   most   proper   which It was at first doubted whether the
could be selected for the purpose.   action of detinue was not a specified
legal remedy for the commission which
When the subject was brought before
has been withheld from Mr. Marbury; in
the court the decision was, not that a
which   case   a   mandamus   would   be
mandamus would not lie to the head of
improper.   But this doubt has yielded
a department, directing him to perform
to the consideration that the judgment
an   act,   enjoined   by   law,   in   the
in detinue is for the thing itself, or
performance   of   which  [***63]    an
its   value.     The   value   of   a   public
individual had a vested interest; but
office not to be sold, is incapable of
that a mandamus ought not to issue in
being   ascertained;   and   the   applicant
that case ­­ the decision necessarily
has  a right  to the  office itself,  or
to   be   made   if   the   report   of   the
to nothing.  He will obtain the office
commissioners   did   not   confer   on   the
by obtaining the commission, or a copy
applicant a legal right. 
of it from the record.  
The   judgment   in   that   case,   is
This,  then, is  a plain  case for  a
understood to have decided the merits
mandamus,   either   to   deliver   the
of all claims of that description; and
commission,  or a  copy of  it from  the
the   persons   on   the   report   of   the
record;   and   it   only   remains   to   be
commissioners   found   it   necessary   to
enquired, 
pursue the mode prescribed by the law
subsequent   to   that   which   had   been Whether   it   can   issue   from   this
deemed   unconstitutional,   in   order   to court. 
place themselves on the pension list.
The   act   to   establish   the   judicial
The   doctrine,   therefore,   now courts of the United States authorizes
advanced, is by no means a novel one. the   supreme   court   "to   issue   writs   of
mandamus,   in   cases   warranted   by   the
It   is   true   that   the   mandamus,   now
principles   and   usages   of   law,   to   any
moved for, is not for the performance
courts   appointed,   or   persons  [***65]
of   an   act   expressly   enjoined   by
holding office, under the authority of
statute.  
the United States." 
It   is   to   deliver   a   commission;   on
The   secretary   of   state,   being   a
which subject the acts of Congress are
person   holding   an   office   under   the
silent.     This   difference   is   not
authority   of   the   United   States,   is
considered as affecting the case.   It
precisely   within   the   letter   of   the
has   already   been   stated   that   the
description; and if this court is not
applicant   has,   to   that   commission,   a
authorized to issue a writ of mandamus
vested   legal   right,   of   which   the
to such an officer, it must be because
executive cannot deprive him.   He has
the   law   is   unconstitutional,   and
been   appointed   to   an   office,   from
therefore   absolutely   incapable   of
which he is not removable at the will

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
conferring   the   authority,   and
assigning   the   duties   which   its   words
purport to confer and assign.   where   the   constitution   has   declared
[HN17]   The   constitution   vests   the
whole   judicial   power   of   the   United
States in one supreme court, and such
inferior   courts   as   congress   shall,
from   time   to   time,   ordain   and
establish.     This   power   is   expressly
extended   to   all   cases   arising   under
the   laws   of   the   United   States;   and
consequently,   in   some   form,   may   be
exercised   over   the   present    [*174]
case;   because   the   right   claimed   is
given by a law of the United States.   sense   must   be   given   to   them   or   they
In   the   distribution   of   this   power
it is declared that "the supreme court
shall   have   original   jurisdiction   in
all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public   ministers   and   consuls,   and
those   in   which   a   state   shall   be   a
party.     In   all   other   cases,   the
supreme   court   shall   have   appellate
jurisdiction."  [***66]  
It   has   been   insisted,   at   the   bar,
that   as   the   original   grant   of
jurisdiction,   to   the   supreme   and
inferior   courts,   is   general,   and   the
clause,   assigning   original
jurisdiction   to   the   supreme   court,
contains   no   negative   or   restrictive
words;   the   power   remains   to   the
legislature,   to   assign   original
jurisdiction   to   that   court   in   other
cases   than   those   specified   in   the
article   which   has   been   recited;
provided   those   cases   belong   to   the
judicial power of the United States.   jurisdiction.
If it had been intended to leave it
to   the   discretion   of   the   legislature
to   apportion   the   judicial   power
between   the   supreme   and   inferior
courts   according   to   the   will   of   that
body,   it   would   certainly   have   been
useless to have proceeded further than
to   have   defined   the   judicial   powers,
and   the   tribunals   in   which   it   should
be vested. The subsequent part of the
section   is   mere   surplusage,   is
entirely   without   meaning,   if   such   is
to   be   the   construction.     [HN18]   If
Page 30
congress   remains   at   liberty   to   give
this   court   appellate   jurisdiction,
their  jurisdiction  shall  be  original;
and   original   jurisdiction   where   the
constitution has declared it shall be
appellate;   the   distribution   of
jurisdiction,   made  [***67]    in   the
constitution,   is   form   without
substance.  
Affirmative   words   are   often,   in
their   operation,   negative   of   other
objects   than   those   affirmed;   and   in
this   case,   a   negative   or   exclusive
have no operation at all. 
It   cannot   be   presumed   that   any
clause in the constitution is intended
to   be   without   effect;   and   therefore
such   a   construction   is   inadmissible,
unless the words require it.  
  [*175]    If the  solicitude of  the
convention,  respecting  our  peace  with
foreign   powers,   induced   a   provision
that   the   supreme   court   should   take
original   jurisdiction   in   cases   which
[**73]    might   be   supposed   to   affect
them;   yet   the   clause   would   have
proceeded   no   further   than   to   provide
for   such   cases,   if   no   further
restriction on the powers of congress
had   been   intended.     That   they   should
have   appellate   jurisdiction   in   all
other   cases,   with   such   exceptions   as
congress   might   make,   is   no
restriction;   unless   the   words   be
deemed   exclusive   of   original
 
[HN19]   When   an   instrument
organizing   fundamentally   a   judicial
system,   divides   it   into   one   supreme,
and   so   many   inferior   courts   as   the
legislature  may  ordain  and  establish;
then   enumerates   its   powers,   and
[***68]  proceeds so far to distribute
them, as to define the jurisdiction of
the   supreme   court   by   declaring   the
cases in which it shall take original
jurisdiction,   and   that   in   others   it
shall take appellate jurisdiction; the
plain import of the words seems to be,

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
that   in   one   class   of   cases   its
jurisdiction   is   original,   and   not
appellate;   in   the   other   it   is
appellate,   and   not   original.   If   any
other   construction   would   render   the
clause   inoperative,   that   is   an
additional   reason   for   rejecting   such
other   construction,   and   for   adhering
to their obvious meaning.  to   have   been   long   and   well
To enable this court then to issue
a mandamus, it must be shown to be an
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or
to   be   necessary   to   enable   them   to
exercise appellate jurisdiction.   their   opinion,   shall   most   conduce   to
It has been stated at the bar that
the   appellate   jurisdiction   may   be
exercised   in   a   variety   of   forms,   and
that   if   it   be   the   will   of   the
legislature that a mandamus should be
used for that purpose, that will must
be   obeyed.     This   is   true,   yet   the
jurisdiction   must   be   appellate,   not
original. 
[HN20]   It   is   the   essential
criterion   of   appellate   jurisdiction,
that   it   revises   and   corrects   the
proceedings   in   a   cause   already
instituted,   and   does   not   create   that
cause.  Although,  [***69]  therefore,
a mandamus may be directed to courts,
yet to issue such a writ to an officer
for   the   delivery   of   a   paper,   is   in
effect   the   same   as   to   sustain   an
original   action   for   that   paper,   and
therefore   seems   not   to   belong   to
[*176]    appellate,   but   to   original
jurisdiction.  Neither  is  it  necessary
in such a case as this, to enable the
court   to   exercise   its   appellate
jurisdiction.  limited,   and   to   what   purpose   is   that
The  authority,  therefore,  given  to
the   supreme   court,   by   the   act
establishing   the   judicial   courts   of
the   United   States,   to   issue   writs   of
mandamus   to   public   officers,   appears
not   to   be   warranted   by   the
constitution; and it becomes necessary
to enquire whether a jurisdiction, so
conferred, can be exercised.  
Page 31
The   question,   whether   an   act,
repugnant   to   the   constitution,   can
become   the   law   of   the   land,   is   a
question   deeply   interesting   to   the
United States; but, happily, not of an
intricacy   proportioned   to   its
interest.   It seems only necessary to
recognize certain principles, supposed
established, to decide it.  
That   the   people   have   an   original
right   to   establish,   for   their   future
government,   such   principles   as,   in
their own happiness,   [***70]    is the
basis,   on   which   the   whole   American
fabric has been erected.  The exercise
of this original right is a very great
exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to
be   frequently   repeated.     The
principles, therefore, so established,
are   deemed   fundamental.     And   as   the
authority, from which they proceed, is
supreme, and can seldom act, they are
designed to be permanent.  
This   original   and   supreme   will
organizes the government, and assigns,
to   different   departments,   their
respective powers. It may either stop
here; or establish certain limits not
to   be   transcended   by   those
departments.  
[HN21] The government of the United
States   is   of   the   latter   description.
The   powers   of   the   legislature   are
defined,   and   limited;   and   that   those
limits   may   not   be   mistaken,   or
forgotten,   the   constitution   is
written.     To   what   purpose   are   powers
limitation   committed   to   writing,   if
these   limits   may,   at   any   time,   be
passed   by   those   intended   to   be
restrained?    The  distinction,  between
a   government   with   limited   and
unlimited   powers,   is   abolished,   if
those   limits   do   not   confine   the
persons on whom they are imposed, and
if  acts prohibited   [*177]    and acts
allowed,   are   of   equal   obligation.
[***71]  It is a proposition too plain

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
to be contested, that the constitution
controls any legislative act repugnant
to   it;   or,   that   the   legislature   may
alter the constitution by an ordinary
act.   oblige them to give it effect?  Or, in
Between these alternatives there is
no middle ground.  The constitution is
either   a   superior,   paramount   law,
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it
is   on   a   level   with   ordinary
legislative acts, and like other acts,
is   alterable   when   the   legislature
shall please to alter it.  
If   the   former   part   of   the
alternative   be   true,   then   a
legislative   act   contrary   to   the
constitution is not law: if the latter
part   be   true,   then   written
constitutions  are  absurd  attempts,  on
the   part   of   the   people,   to   limit   a
power, in its own nature illimitable.
[HN22] Certainly all those who have
framed   written   constitutions
contemplate   them   as   forming   the
fundamental   and   paramount   law   of   the
nation, and consequently the theory of
every such government must be, that an
act   of   the   legislature,   repugnant   to
the constitution, is void.  
This theory is essentially attached
to   a   written   constitution,   and   is
consequently to be considered, by this
court,   as   one   of   the   fundamental
principles of our society.   It is not
therefore to be [***72]  lost sight of
in   the   further   consideration   of   this
subject.  
Page 32
If   an   act   of   the   legislature,
repugnant   to   the   constitution,   is
void,   does   it,   notwithstanding   its
invalidity,   bind   the   courts,   and
other   words,   though   it   be   not   law,
does it constitute a rule as operative
as if it was a law?  This would be to
overthrow in fact what was established
in   theory;   and   would   seem,   at   first
view,   an   absurdity   too   gross   to   be
insisted   on.     It   shall,   however,
receive   a   more   attentive
consideration. 
[HN23]   It   is   emphatically   the
province   and   duty   of   the   judicial
department   to   say   what   the   law   is.
Those who apply the rule to particular
cases,   must   of   necessity   expound   and
interpret   that   rule.     If   two   laws
conflict   with   each   other,   the   courts
must decide on the operation of each.
  [*178]    So   if   a   law   be   in
opposition   to   the   constitution;   if
both   the   law   and   the   constitution
apply   to   a   particular   case,   so   that
the court must either decide that case
conformably   to   the   law,   disregarding
the   constitution;   or   conformably   to
the   constitution,   disregarding   the
law; the court must determine which of
[**74]    these   conflicting   rules
governs   the   case.     This   is   of   the
[***73]    very   essence   of   judicial
duty. 
If   then   the   courts   are   to   regard
the constitution; and the constitution
is superior to any ordinary act of the
legislature; the constitution, and not
such   ordinary   act,   must   govern   the
case to which they both apply.  
Those   then   who   controvert   the
principle that the constitution is to
be   considered,   in   court,   as   a
paramount   law,   are   reduced   to   the
necessity   of   maintaining   that   courts
must   close   their   eyes   on   the
constitution, and see only the law.  
This   doctrine   would   subvert   the
very   foundation   of   all   written

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
constitutions.   It would declare that
an   act,   which,   according   to   the
principles   and   theory   of   our
government, is entirely void; is yet,
in   practice,   completely   obligatory.
It   would   declare,   that   if   the
legislature shall do what is expressly
forbidden,   such   act,   notwithstanding
the express prohibition, is in reality
effectual.   It would be giving to the
legislature   a   practical   and   real
omnipotence,   with   the   same   breath
which   professes   to   restrict   their
powers   within   narrow   limits.     It   is
prescribing limits, and declaring that
those   limits   may   be   passed   at
pleasure.   prosecuted   under   it;   must   the   court
That   it   thus   reduces   to   nothing
what   we   have   deemed   the   greatest
improvement  [***74]    on   political
institutions ­­ a written constitution
­­   would   of   itself   be   sufficient,   in
America,   where   written   constitutions
have   been   viewed   with   so   much
reverence,   for   rejecting   the
construction.     But   the   peculiar
expressions of the constitution of the
United   States   furnish   additional
arguments in favor of its rejection. 
[HN24]   The   judicial   power   of   the
United States is extended to all cases
arising under the constitution.   and   declare   one   witness,   or   a
  [*179]    Could it be the intention
of  those who  gave this  power, to  say
that,   in   using   it,   the   constitution
should   not   be   looked   into?     That   a
case   arising   under   the   constitution
should   be   decided   without   examining
the instrument under which it arises?
This   is   too   extravagant   to   be
maintained.  
In   some   cases   then,   the
constitution   must   be   looked   into   by
the judges.   And if they can open it
at   all,   what   part   of   it   are   they
forbidden to read, or to obey?
There   are   many   other   parts   of   the
constitution which serve to illustrate
this subject.   they   were   to   be   used   as   the
Page 33
It is declared that "no tax or duty
shall   be   laid   on   articles   exported
from any state." Suppose a duty on the
export   of   cotton,   of   tobacco,   or   of
flour;   and   a   suit   instituted   to
recover   it.     Ought   judgment   to   be
rendered  [***75]    in   such   a   case?
ought   the   judges   to   close   their   eyes
on the constitution, and only see the
law.  
The  constitution  declares  that  "no
bill of attainder or ex post facto law
shall be passed." 
If, however, such a bill should be
passed   and   a   person   should   be
condemn   to   death   those   victims   whom
the   constitution   endeavors   to
preserve?  
"No person," says the constitution,
"shall be convicted of treason unless
on   the   testimony   of   two   witnesses   to
the   fame   overt   act,   or   on   confession
in open court." 
Here   the   language   of   the
constitution   is   addressed   especially
to   the   courts.     It   prescribes,
directly for them, a rule of evidence
not   to   be   departed   from.     If   the
legislature   should   change   that   rule,
confession   out   of   court,   sufficient
for   conviction,   must   the
constitutional  principle  yield  to  the
legislative act?  
From   these,   and   many   other
selections which might be made, it is
apparent,   that   the   framers   of   the
constitution    [*180]    contemplated
that   instrument,   as   a   rule   for   the
government   of   courts,   as   well   as   of
the legislature.  
Why   otherwise   does   it   direct   the
judges to take an oath to support it?
This oath certainly  [***76]    applies,
in   an   especial   manner,   to   their
conduct   in   their   official   character.
How  immoral to  impose it  on them,  if
instruments,   and   the   knowing

5 U.S. 137, *; 2 L. Ed. 60, **;
1803 U.S. LEXIS 352, ***; 1 Cranch 137
instruments,   for   violating   what   they
swear to support!  things,   this   is   worse   than   solemn
The oath of office, too, imposed by
the   legislature,   is   completely
demonstrative   of   the   legislative
opinion   on   the   subject.     It   is   in
these words, "I do solemnly swear that
I   will   administer   justice   without
respect to persons, and do equal right
to the poor and to the rich; and that
I   will   faithfully   and   impartially
discharge all the duties incumbent on
me  as     according  to the  best of  my
abilities and understanding, agreeably
to   the   constitution,   and   laws   of   the
United States." 
Why does a judge swear to discharge
his   duties   agreeably   to   the
constitution of the United States, if
that   constitution   forms   no   rule   for
his   government?   if   it   is   closed   upon
him, and cannot be inspected by him?  
Page 34
If   such   be   the   real   state   of
mockery.     To   prescribe,   or   to   take
this oath, becomes equally a crime.  
It is also not entirely unworthy of
observation,   that   in   declaring   what
shall be the supreme law of the land,
the   constitution  [***77]    itself   is
first   mentioned;   and   not   the   laws   of
the United States generally, but those
only which shall be made in pursuance
of the constitution, have that rank.  
Thus, the particular phraseology of
the constitution of the United States
confirms   and   strengthens   the
principle, supposed to be essential to
all written constitutions, that [HN25]
a law repugnant to the constitution is
void;   and   that   courts,   as   well   as
other   departments,   are   bound   by   that
instrument.  
The rule must be discharged.  
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