CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set
therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:

“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.”

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of
the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive
officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions
that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their
primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations,
EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

FACTS:

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set
therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:

“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.”

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of
the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive
officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions
that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their
primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations,
EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of
the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS

. THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public
auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC
or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the
bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.”

II. THE ISSUES

1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision
and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;

2. Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;

3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement §10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and

4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a
Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1. YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and
does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-
self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded
from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated
statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly
are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation
of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph
can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it
in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence
of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce
such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance,
and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also
to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its
own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises
the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands.

3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to implement §10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone
makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.” In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered “state action”
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2) when
the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.
It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC
comes under the second and third categories of “state action.” Without doubt therefore the
transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of
power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to
the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable
that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the
State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the
winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be
declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and
secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution
bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents
are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the
highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates
of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders
and other interested parties.

xxx xxx xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest
bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not
to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission
of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the
Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

Facts:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide
management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support
to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC
or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid
security, which GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may
be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.

Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.

Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing
the matching bid of the petitioner.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

It is a self-executing provision.

Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and
the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an
action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation
on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy.
Ubi jus ibi remedium.

The Court agree.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also
to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila
Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since
then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.

Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises
the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

It is not premature.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign
investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to
public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into
business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the
Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.

There was grave abuse of discretion.

To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to
match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary
market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable.
Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do
so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the
basic conditions and parameters for its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to
do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

PAMATONG VS. COMELEC

Prefatory Statement:

Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies (COCs) for the
2010 Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for President. Among the lesser known
presidentiables include someone called "Manok" (because apparently he can mimic a cock's
crow), a six-star general, and a future "emperor of the world." Considering that we would be
having automated elections next year and the list of all candidates are to be written in the
ballots while voters are supposed to shade the circles corresponding to their choices, would all
99 candidates be included? No. Aside from disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants,
the Comelec can also motu propio deny due course to the COCs. Aside from the qualifications
set forth under the Constitution, a candidate should also have the capacity and resources to
launch a national campaign.

Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of disqualifying the so-called
"nuisance" candidates violate this constitutional provision?

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the
COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section
26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to
those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political
parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified
among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal
qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since
he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage
an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform
of government.

ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject
to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the
level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which
suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that
would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as
written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is
difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means
and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed
under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people
an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be
sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.
Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations
apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not
violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are
meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of
candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and
orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in
conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and
resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide
candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious
intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process.
This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-
note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the
electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be
a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The
basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the
reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception
of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is
a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is
thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under
the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-
born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty
years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN

The PCGG cannot vote sequestered shares to elect the ETPI Board of Directors or to amend the
Articles of Incorporation for the purpose of increasing the authorized capital stock unless there
is a prima facie evidence showing that said shares are ill-gotten and there is an imminent
danger of dissipation.

Two sets of board and officers of Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) were
elected, one by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the other by the
registered ETPI stockholders.Victor Africa, a stockholder of ETPI filed a petition for Certiorari
before the Sandiganbayan alleging that the PCGG had been “illegally exercising the rights of
stockholders of ETPI,” in the election of the members of the board of directors. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that only the registered owners, their duly authorized representatives or
their proxies may vote their corresponding shares. The PCGG filed a petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition before the Court which was granted. The Court referred the
PCGG’s petition to hold the special stockholders’ meeting to the Sandiganbayan for reception of
evidence and resolution. The Sandiganbayan granted the PCGG “authority to cause the holding
of a special stockholders’ meeting of ETPI and held that there was an urgent necessity to
increase ETPI’s authorized capital stock; there existed a prima facie factual foundation for the
issuance of the writ of sequestration covering the Class “A” shares of stock; and the PCGG was
entitled to vote the sequestered shares of stock. The PCGG-controlled ETPI board of directors
held a meeting and the increase in ETPI’s authorized capital stock from P250 Million to P2.6
Billion was “unanimously approved”. Africa filed a motion to nullify the stockholders meeting,
contending that only the Court, and not the Sandiganbayan, has the power to authorize the
PCGG to call a stockholders meeting and vote the sequestered shares. The Sandiganbayan
denied the motions for reconsideration of prompting Africa to file before the Court a second
petition, challenging the Sandiganbayan Resolutions authorizing the holding of a stockholders
meeting and the one denying the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering the holding of a
stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of directors without first setting in place, through
the amendment of the articles of incorporation and the by-laws of ETPI 2. Whether the PCGG
can vote the sequestered ETPI Class “A” shares in the stockholders meeting for the election of
the board of directors.

HELD:

First Issue :

On the PCGG’s imputation of grave abuse of discretion upon the Sandiganbayan for ordering
the holding of a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of directors without first setting in
place, through the amendment of the articles of incorporation and the by-laws of ETPI, the
safeguards prescribed in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Roxas. The Court laid down those safeguards because
of the obvious need to reconcile the rights of the stockholder whose shares have been
sequestered and the duty of the conservator to preserve what could be ill-gotten wealth. There
is nothing in the Cojuangco case that would suggest that the above measures should be
incorporated in the articles and by-laws before a stockholders meeting for the election of the
board of directors is held. The PCGG nonetheless insists that those measures should be written
in the articles and by-laws before such meeting, “otherwise, the {Marcos] cronies will elect
themselves or their representatives, control the corporation, and for an appreciable period of
time, have every opportunity to disburse funds, destroy or alter corporate records, and
dissipate assets.” That could be a possibility, but the peculiar circumstances of the case require
that the election of the board of directors first be held before the articles of incorporation are
amended. Section 16 of the Corporation Code requires the majority vote of the board of
directors to amend the articles of incorporation. At the time Africa filed his motion for the
holding of the annual stockholders meeting, there were two sets of ETPI directors, one
controlled by the PCGG and the other by the registered stockholders. Which of them is the
legitimate board of directors? Which of them may rightfully vote to amend the articles of
incorporation and integrate the safeguards laid down in Cojuangco? It is essential, therefore, to
cure the aberration of two boards of directors sitting in a single corporation before the articles of
incorporation are amended to set in place the Cojuangco safeguards. The danger of the so-called
Marcos cronies taking control of the corporation and dissipating its assets is, of course, a
legitimate concern of the PCGG, charged as it is with the duties of a conservator. Nevertheless,
such danger may be averted by the “substantially contemporaneous” amendment of the articles
after the election of the board.

LAMBINO VS. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had
the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their
petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art
7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form
of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of
enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that
RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to
the Lambino Group’s petition.
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of
the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which
renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and
“revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may
propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a
radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before
complying with RA 6735

IMBONG VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as
candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the
Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional
Convention which shall have two delegates from each representative district. On June 17, 1969,
the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the
convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from each
representative district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted
R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously
implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and
the entire law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A.
6132.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the
parameters of such convention?

2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HELD:

1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly.
The Congress also has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and
4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within the competence of the Congress in exercise of its
legislative power.

2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of
Art. XII of the Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due process or equal protection
of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding
the apportionment of delegates. The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from
running for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.
Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction
contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain substantially intact
and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked
by the petitioners.

OCCENA VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings
against the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing
an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign
country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote
of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a
vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such resolution is
against the constitutions in proposing amendments:

ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?

HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:
1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be
exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested
the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special
call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in
accordance with the Article on Amendments similar with the interim and regular
national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of
the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it
acted by virtue of such impotence.

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a

revision rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that
whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the
Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new
Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment,
because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the
sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The
fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no
argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or
total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment
the same is ratified by the sovereign people."

3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the
standard for proper submission. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to
the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can
propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a
legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which
amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional
convention is concerned. Further, the period required by the constitution was complied
as follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than
three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three
resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the
plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution.

TOLENTINO V. COMELEC

FACTS:

After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the
convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of
September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to
 amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On
September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the Constitutional Convention that it
will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971.
Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.

ISSUE:

1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:

1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a
resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a
justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the
Court is superior to the Convention but they are both subject to the Constitution.

2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic
Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all
amendments must be submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite.
Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess the
amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately but together.

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC

Facts:

On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued

Presidential Decree 991

calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays")
toresolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its
replacement, thepowers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the
period for the exercise bythe President of his present powers.20 days after or on 22
September 1976, the President issued another related decree,

Presidential Decree 1031

, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential
Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
"barangays"(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16
October 1976. Quiterelevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of
Presidential Decree 991.On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued

Presidential Decree 1033,

stating thequestions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October
1976. TheDecree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to
the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru aconstitutional amendment, providing for a new interim
legislative body, which will be submitteddirectly to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite of October 16.The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive
supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27
September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-
44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking toenjoin the Commission on
Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite onOctober 16; to
declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar asthey
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as
itdirects the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutionsthere is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to proposeamendments to the new Constitution.As a consequence,
the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.On 30
September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as
L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention,asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the
Constitution during thetransition period is expressly conferred on the interim National
Assembly under action 16, ArticleXVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5October 1976 by Raul M.
Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, o restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-
Plebiscite of October 16.

Issue:

Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held:

Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1)
Anyamendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National
Assembly upon avote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional
convention. (2) The National Assemblymay, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members,
call a constitutional convention or, by a majority voteof all its Members, submit the
question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election."Section 2 thereof
provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be validwhen
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than
threemonths a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period
of transition, theinterim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is
conferred with that amendingpower. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The
interim National Assembly, upon specialcall by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a
majority vote of all its Members, propose amendmentsto this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with ArticleSixteen hereof."
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of thenation, i.e.,
period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending
processmay be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a
 vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a
vote of two-thirds of all theMembers of the National Assembly. However the calling of a
Constitutional Convention may besubmitted to the electorate in an election voted upon
by a majority vote of all the members of theNational Assembly. In times of transition,
amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all theMembers of the interim
National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Courtin Aquino
v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with
thatprerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly. TheConstitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the
determination of the time when heshall initially convene the interim National Assembly,
consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on theTransitory Provisions, they
were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President wasgiven the
discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The
President'sdecision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the peoplethemselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the
ratification of the 1973Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the
convening of the interim NationalAssembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the
Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the
convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendumof 27 February
1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall beinitially
convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of
theConstitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim
National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973
the people hadalready resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of
the state undertakes theproposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in
the usual function of lawmaking. It isnot legislating when engaged in the amending
process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental
charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for inArticle XVI of the 1973
Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of theTransitory
Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of
thelegislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment,
amending of theConstitution is not legislative in character. In political science a
distinction is made betweenconstitutional content of an organic character and that of a
legislative character. The distinction,however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the
case, approval of the President of any proposedamendment is a misnomer. The
prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies onlyto the ordinary cases
of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of
amendments to the Constitution.

JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:

The Plebiscite Case

On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, as amended
byResolution No. 4, calling for a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments to
thePhilippine Constitution. Said Resolution was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132,
for theelection of delegates of the said Convention. Hence, the 1971 Constitutional
 Convention beganto perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in
session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the
entire Philippines under Martial Law.On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved
its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30,
1972, the President of the Philippines issuedPresidential Decree No. 73, which is an
order for setting and appropriating of funds for aplebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the proposed Constitution as drafted by the 1971Constitutional
Convention.On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on
Elections, theTreasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said
respondents or their agentsfrom implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, on the
grounds that the President does not havethe legislative authority to call a plebiscite and
the appropriation of public funds for the purposeare lodged exclusively by the
Constitution in Congress and there is no proper submission to thepeople of said
Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press
and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of thecontents
thereof.On December 23, 1972, the President announced the postponement of the
plebiscite for theratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. The Court deemed
it fit to refrain, for thetime being, from deciding the aforementioned case.In the
afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an
"urgentmotion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not
later thanJanuary 15, 1973." The next day, January 13, 1973, the Court issued a resolution
requiring therespondents to comment and file an answer to the said "urgent motion" not
later than Tuesdaynoon, January 16, 1973." When the case was being heard, the Secretary
of Justice called onand said that, “upon instructions of the President, he is delivering a
copy of Proclamation No.1102, which had just been signed by the President earlier that
morning.”Proclamation No. 1102, declares that Citizen Assemblies referendum was
conducted, and thatthe result shows that more than 95% of the members of the Citizens
Assemblies are in favor of the new Constitution and majority also answered that there
was no need for a plebiscite andthat the vote of the Citizens Assemblies should be
considered as a vote in a plebiscite. The thenPresident of the Philippines, Marcos, hereby
certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposedby the 1971 Constitutional
Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the
members of the Citizens Assemblies throughout the Philippines, and hasthereby come
into effect.

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed case against the Executive Secretary and
theSecretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents
"and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the
propose Constitution notfound in the present Constitution" referring to that of
1935.Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation
of the NewConstitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter
"are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
Constitution" upon the ground: "thatthe President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, is withoutauthority to create the Citizens Assemblies";
that the same "are without power to approve theproposed Constitution ..."; "that the
President is without power to proclaim the ratification by theFilipino people of the
 proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposedConstitution
was not a free election, hence null and void."

Issue:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 involves a justiciable or
political question.2. Whether or not the proposed new or revised Constitution been
ratified to said Art. XV of the1935 Constitution. 3. Whether or not the proposed
Constitution aforementioned been approved by a majority of thepeople in Citizens'
Assemblies allegedly held throughout the Philippines.4. Whether or not the people
acquiesced in the proposed Constitution.5. Whether or not the parties are entitled to any
relief.

Ruling:

The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when
thecrucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the
court(Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to
dismiss thepetition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee,
voted to grant therelief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.

First Issue

On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro,Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the
issue of thevalidity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political
question. JusticesMakalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only
inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his
vote, stating that "inasmuch asit is claimed there has been approval by the people, the
Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an
approval, and, in the affirmative, the Courtshould keep hands-off out of respect to the
people's will, but, in negative, the Court maydetermine from both factual and legal
angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitutionbeen complied with." Justices
Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Courthold that the issue is
political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."

Second Issue

On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar,

Castro,Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that
theConstitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified
inaccordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only
one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and
participated in onlyby qualified and duly registered voters. ustice Barredo qualified his
vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution hasbeen validly ratified
pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional conceptsregarding
the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens'
Assemblies,specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed,
falls short of therequirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means
of refusing to recognizeas a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of
the votes were for consideringas approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity
 of the usual form of plebiscite followedin past ratifications, I am constrained to hold
that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodoxlegal sense, the people may be deemed
to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that indoing so they did the part required
of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in itspolitical aspect, which is what
counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially compliedwith, and, in effect,
the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."Justices Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in
effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirementsfor valid ratification.

Third Issue

On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned

proposedConstitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.Four (4) of its
members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that"the
people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."Two (2) members of the Court,
namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be nofree expression, and there
has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of
their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under MartialLaw.Justice
Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some
Americandecisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a
new Constitutiononce accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded
recognition by the Court, I am notat this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls
for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of
ascertaining what is the mind of the people in theabsence of the freedom of debate that
is a concomitant feature of martial law." Three (3) members of the Court express their
lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule onthe question. Justices Makalintal and
Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statementthat "Under a regime of martial
law, with the free expression of opinions through the usualmedia vehicle restricted,
(they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty,whether the people
have accepted the Constitution."

Fourth Issue

On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices
Makalintal,Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS

the petition

. JusticeMakalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the
saidConstitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these
cases toresolve which considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond the
competence of thisCourt, are relevant and unavoidable."Four (4) members of the Court,
namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to

deny respondents'

motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.

Fifth Issue

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
holdthat it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;Four (4) members of
 the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankeecast no vote
thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they couldnot
state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted
theConstitution; andTwo (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself
voted that the Constitutionproposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in
force; with the result that there are notenough votes to declare that the new Constitution
is not in force. ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices
Makalintal, Castro,Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting
votes of the Chief Justiceand Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee,

all the aforementioned cases are herebydismissed.

This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the newConstitution
being considered in force and effect.

It is so ordered