VILLAROSA V.

BENITO

Facts: Petitioner is a limited partnership with principal office GALURA vs. MATH ARGO
address at Davao City and with branch offices at Parañaque,
MM and Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and private FACTS: Spouses Galura purchased broiler starters and finishers
respondent executed a Deed of Sale with from Math-Agro Corporation (MAC). The Spouses Galura paid
Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop MAC P72,500. Despite several demands, they failed to pay the
certain parcels of land located at Cagayan de Oro belonging P353,500 unpaid balance. MAC engaged the services of a
to the latter into a housing subdivision for the construction of low certain Atty. Pasamba for the purpose of collecting the unpaid
cost housing units. They further agreed that in case balance from the Spouses Galura. A demand letter was sent to
of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue spouses Galura wherein it stated that they were giving them 5
shall be in the proper courts of Makati. private respondent, as days upon receipt of the letter, to pay the unpaid balance plus
plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages interest; that failure to pay would result in an action in court.
against petitioner, as defendant, before the RTC Makati for
failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in
that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no
substantial developments therein. Summons, together with Because of non-payment after demand was made, MAC filed a
the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its complaint with the RTC praying that the court would order
Branch Manager at the stated address at Cagayan de Oro City spouses Galura to settle the balance plus attorney’s fee and
but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons was litigation expenses. In their complaint, MAC provided for their
duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. address where summons may be served to them. Clerk of Court
thru its Branch Manager Engr. at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Ortega issued the summons.
Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the
signature on the face of the original copy of the summons.
Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of improper service of summons and for lack of 1st SERVICE: went to 230 Apo St., Sta. Mesa Heights , Quezon City
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It contends that where he was informed that the Spouses Galura were presently
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the residing at Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City .
summons was improperly served upon its employee in its branch
office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons
named inSection 11, Rule 14 RoC upon whom service of
2nd SERVICE: went to G.L. Calayan Agro System, Inc. in Barrio
summons may be made. plaintiff filed an Opposition to
Kalayaan, Gerona , Tarlac to serve the summons, however he
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare
learned that the property had been foreclosed and that the
Defendant in Default. the trial court issued an Order denying
Spouses Galura no longer resided there.
defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiffs Motion to
Declare Defendant in Default. defendant, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that Sec.11, Rule 14 of the new Rules
did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of 3rd SERVICE: went to Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora,
summons on persons enumerated therein; and that the new Quezon City , to serve the summons. Sildo served the summons
provision is very specific and clear in that the word "manager" on Teresa L. Galura’s sister, Victoria Lapuz.
was changed to "general manager", "secretary" to "corporate
secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director.
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition. The Spouses Galura failed to file their answer. RTC declared
them in default and allowed MAC to present its evidence ex
Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the parte.
person of petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch
Manager

Held: No. the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be RTC ruled in favor of MAC and ordered the Spouses Galura to
served is "restricted, limited and exclusive" following the rule on pay the unpaid balance, attorney’s fees, and expenses of
statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius and litigation. Subsequently, RTC issued a writ of execution to
argues that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to implement its Decision.
liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily
done so by clear and concise language. under the new Rules,
service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no
Thereafter, Spouses Galura received “from their parents-in-law”
longer authorized. The designation of persons or officers who are
a copy of the 10 November 2004 Order. Spouses Galura filed
authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation
with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment and final order
or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance
in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager";
claiming that the RTC’s Decision and Order were void beacuse
"corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer"
the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over their persons because
instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is
the substituted service of summons was invalid, and there was
conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
extrinsic fraud because MAC made them believe that it would
not file a case against them - MAC, despite the commitment of
its owner not to file the complaint, did so. Such an act on the
part of Math-Agro and its owner constitutes extrinsic fraud, as it
prevented petitioners from defending themselves in the action
lodged with the RTC.
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals
held that there was a valid substituted service of summons, that
the allegation of extrinsic fraud was unbelievable, and that the
Spouses Galura should have first availed of the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief. The Spouses
Galura filed a MR but was denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES:
1. Was there a valid substituted service of summons? NONE.
2. Should have they availed first of the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, or petition for relief? NO.
HELD:
1. Sildo, in his Rertun, did not state that his attempts to serve
the summons by personal service at the Tierra Pura Subdivision
address failed, and that the same could not be made within a
reasonable time. He likewise failed to state facts and
circumstances showing why personal service of the summons
upon the petitioners at the said address was impossible. Finally,
he also failed to state that Ms. Victoria Lapuz, the person with
whom he left the summons, was a person of sufficient age and
discretion, and residing in the said Tierra Pura address.
The requisites of a valid substituted service: (1) service of
summons within a reasonable time is impossible; (2) the person
serving the summons exerted efforts to locate the defendant; (3)
the person to whom the summons is served is of sufficient age
and discretion; (4) the person to whom the summons is served
resides at the defendant’s place of residence; and (5) pertinent
facts showing the enumerated circumstances are stated in the
return of service. In Sandoval, the Court held that “statutory
restrictions for substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and
fully observed.”
The summons must be served to the defendant in person. It is
only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time that a substituted service may be made.
Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the
efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that
such efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof
of service – in the Return. This is necessary because substituted
service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has
been held that this method of service is “in derogation of the
common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and
hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances
authorized by statute.”
In the present case, there was no showing in the return of service
(1) of the impossibility of personal service within a reasonable
time; (2) that Lapuz, the person on whom summons was served,
was of suitable age and discretion; and (3) that Lapuz resided in
the residence of the Spouses Galura. Consequently, the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Galura,
and thus the Spouses Galura are not bound by the RTC’s
Decision and Order.
2. When a petition for annulment of judgment or final order
under Rule 47 is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant, the petitioner does not need to allege that
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief
are no longer available through no fault of his or her own.
In a case where a petition for annulment of a judgment or final
order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the
action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the
ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order
or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available
through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment
rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is
null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or
in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order an
any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred
by laches
TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY
FACTS: Spouses Tijam filed a civil case for recovery of a sum of
money and corresponding interests against Sopuses
Sibonghanoy in the CFI of Cebu. As prayed for in the complaint,
a writ of attachment was issued by the court against
defendants' properties, but the same was dissolved upon the
filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co., Inc. Defendants after being duly served with
summons filed an answer with a counterclaim.
CFI rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. A writ of
execution was issued against defendants, however it was
unsatisfied. Spouses Tijam then moved for a writ of execution
against the Surety, but the Surety opposed on the ground that
no prior demand was made and that there was failure to
prosecute. CFI denied this motion on the ground that no
previous demand had been made on the Surety.
Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure
of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second
motion for execution against the counterbond. Surety motioned
for extension to filed an answer, which was granted. However,
upon its failure to file such answer, CFI granted the motion for
execution and the corresponding writ was issued.
Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was
issued without the required summary hearing, but CFI denied the
motion. Surety appealed to the CA, which affirmed the orders
appealed from. It then filed a motion asking for extension to file
a MR, which was granted, but instead of filing a MR it filed a
Motion To Dismiss on the ground that the CFI had no jurisdiction
to try and decide the case as in false under the jurisdiction of the
Inferior Courts as per RA 296. CA required Spouses Tijan to answer
the motion to dismiss but failed to do so. CA then resolved to set
aside its decision and certified the case to SC.
ISSUE: Does failure to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction for a
considerable length of time bar a motion to dismiss the case?
YES.
HELD: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a
question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we
speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and
of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society,
the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on
the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
power of the court. It is not right for a party who has affirmed
and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became
a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question
of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI. It failed to do so. Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in
the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to
obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to
raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such
conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless
all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment
creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs'
motion for execution and of the date when the same would be
submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was
present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his
request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days
within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to
lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot
now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
PPA vs. GOTHONG
FACTS: Veterans Shipping Corporation’s lease over the Marine
Slip Way in the North Harbor expired on December 31, 2000,
because of this WG&A requested PPA for it to be allowed to
lease and operate the facility. President Estrada issued a
memorandum approving the request. A contract of lease was
executed with the following terms: (1) duration is from January 1
to June 30, 2001 or until such time that PPA turns over its
operation to the winning bidder for the North Harbor
modernization; (2) payment of monthly rentals of P12.15 per
square meter or an aggregate monthly rental amount
of P886,950.00; (3) all structures/improvements introduced in the
leased premises shall be turned over to PPA; (4) Water,
electricity, telephone and other utility expenses shall be for the
account of WG&A; (5) Real Estate tax/insurance and other
government dues and charges shall be borne by WG&A. On
November 12, 2001 PPA sent a letter to WG&A directing it to
vacate the premises and to turnover the improvements made
therein. WG&A requested for reconsideration, but it was denied.
FIRST COMPLAINT: Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of TRO.
1ST AMENDMENT: Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of TRO plus
second cause of action - estopped from denying that the
correct period of lease and additional relief if they should be
forced to vacate the facility they are entitled to be refunded of
the value of the improvements it introduced in the leased
property.
PPA submitted its answer. Meanwhile, the TRO sought was
denied. WG&A moved for the reconsideration, subsequently
filed a Motion to Admit Attached Second Amended Complaint
2nd AMENDMENT: Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and damages and/or
for Reformation of Contract plus additional relief of reformation
of the contract as it failed to express or embody the true intent
of the contracting parties.
PPA opposed this second amendment - reformation sought for
constituted substantial amendment, which if granted, will
substantially alter the cause of action and theory of the case.
RTC denied admission of second amendment. WG&A filed a
motion MR but was denied. WG&A then filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA which was granted. CA directed RTC to
admit second amended complaint. PPA file a MR but it was
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Should the second amended complaint be admitted?
YES.
HELD: RTC committed grave abuse of discretion denying the
admission of second amended complaint. By applying the old
Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court almost five years after its
amendment patently constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
OLD SECTION 3, RULE 10:
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. – After the case is set
for hearing, substantial amendments may be made only upon
leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the
court that the motion was made with intent to delay the action
or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered.
Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall
be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the
adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
NEW SECTION 3, RULE 10:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided
in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be
made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if
it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to
delay.Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this
section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after
notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that
under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially
alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true,
however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the
cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be
made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and
prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of
the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
SWAGMAN HOTELS vs. CA
FACTS: Sometime in 1996 and 1997, Swagman Hotels and Travel,
Inc., through Atty. Infante and ] Hegerty, its president and vice-
president, obtained from Christian loans evidenced by three
promissory notes dated 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14
July 1997. Each of the promissory notes is in the amount of
US$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an interest
of 15% per annum payable every three months. In 1998, Christian
informed the Swagman Hotels that he was terminating the loans
and demanded from the latter payment in the total amount of
US$150,000 plus unpaid interests.
In 1999, Christian filed with the RTC of Baguio a complaint for a
sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation,
Hegerty, and Atty. Infante. Alleging that:Petitioner obtained
loans from him, total amount of US$150,000 payable after three
years, with an interest of 15% per annum payable quarterly or
every three months. However, starting January 1998 until
December 1998, they paid him only an interest of 6% per
annum. Thus, Christian prayed that the trial court order them to
pay him jointly and solidarily the total amount, the unpaid
interests, moral damages; attorney’s fees; and the cost of the
suit.
The petitioners filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of cause
of action and novation of the principal obligations. The
petitioner and its co-defendants then prayed that the complaint
be dismissed and that Christian be ordered to pay moral
damages; exemplary damages; and attorney’s fees.
RTC declared the first two promissory notes dated 7 August 1996
and 14 March 1997 as already due and demandable and that
the interest on the loans had been reduced by the parties from
15% to 6% per annum. It then ordered the petitioner corporation
to pay Christian the amount of $100,000 representing the
principal obligation covered by the promissory notes dated 7
August 1996 and 14 March 1997, “plus interest of 6% per month
thereon until fully paid, with all interest payments already paid by
the defendant to the plaintiff to be deducted therefrom.”
RTC held that when the instant case was filed on February 2,
1999, none of the promissory notes was due and demandable.
As of this date however, the first and the second promissory
notes have already matured. Hence, payment is already due. It
held that under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a complaint which states no cause of action may be
cured by evidence presented without objection. Thus, even if
the plaintiff had no cause of action at the time he filed the
instant complaint, as defendants’ obligation are not yet due
and demandable then, he may nevertheless recover on the first
two promissory notes in view of the introduction of evidence
showing that the obligations covered by the two promissory
notes are now due and demandable.
Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s appeal and
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, holding that in the case
at bench, while it is true that appellant Swagman raised in its
Answer the issue of prematurity in the filing of the complaint,
appellant Swagman nonetheless failed to object to appellee
Christian’s presentation of evidence to the effect that the
promissory notes have become due and demandable. The
afore-quoted rule allows a complaint which states no cause of
action to be cured either by evidence presented without
objection or, in the event of an objection sustained by the court,
by an amendment of the complaint with leave of court
A motion for consideration filed by petitioner was likewise
denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Does Section 5, Rule 10 allows a complaint that does not
state a cause of action to be cured by evidence presented
without objection during the trial? NO.
HELD: Such interpretation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure is erroneous.
Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the actual merits of a case
may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive
manner without regard to technicalities, and that all other
matters included in the case may be determined in a single
proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits. Section 5
thereof applies to situations wherein evidence not within the
issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties during
the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are
subsequently amended on motion of a party. Thus, a complaint
which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence
presented during the trial.
However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a
cause of action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed,
but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential
facts. It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has
not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended
or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a
cause of action while the case is pending. Such an action is
prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which
should be dismissed by the court upon proper motion
seasonably filed by the defendant.
Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at
the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured
or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the
action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an
amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not
permissible. Contrary to the holding of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, the defect of lack of cause of action at the
commencement of this suit cannot be cured by the accrual of a
cause of action during the pendency of this case arising from
the alleged maturity of two of the promissory notes on 7 August
1999 and 14 March 2000.
VILLAROSA vs. BENITO
FACTS: Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with
principal office address at 102 Juan Luna St. , Davao City and
with branch offices at 2492 Bay View Drive , Tambo, Parañaque,
Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.
Villarosa and Imperial Development Corp. executed a Deed of
Sale with Development Agreement wherein the Villarosa agreed
to develop certain parcels of land located at Barrio Carmen,
Cagayan de Oro belonging to the Imperial Development Corp.
into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing
units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any
dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts
of Makati .
In 1998, Imperial Development Corp. filed a Complaint for
Breach of Contract and Damages against Villarosa before the
RTC of Makati allegedly for failure to comply with its contractual
obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses,
there were no substantial developments therein.
Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the
Villarosa, through its Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero
at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons
was duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL SALBULBERO on May
5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de
Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the
original copy of the summons.
Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Imperial filed a
Motion to Declare Defendant in Default for failure to file an
Answer despite its receipt of the summons and the complaint.
Villarosa filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
RTC issued an Order denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss as
well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default.
Defendant was given ten (10) days within which to file a
responsive pleading. RTC stated that since the summons and
copy of the complaint were in fact received by the corporation
through its branch manager, there was substantial compliance
with the rule on service of summons and consequently, it validly
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Villarosa filed a MR alleging that Section 11, Rule 14 of the new
Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service
of summons on persons enumerated therein; and that the new
provision is very specific and clear in that the word "manager"
was changed to "general manager", "secretary" to "corporate
secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director. This was
however denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Did RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
upon service of summons on its Branch Manager? NO.
HELD:
NEW Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that:
When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, service may be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel.
OLD Sec. 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which provided that:
Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or
partnership. — If the defendant is a corporation organized under
the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered,
service may be made on the president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent, or any of its directors. (emphasis supplied).
The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained
by retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz Regalado, thus:
. . . the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a
defendant corporation to "be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors." The aforesaid
terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and
sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word "agent" of
the corporation.
It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has
been enjoined. In the case of Delta Motor Sales Corporation
vs. Mangosing,25 the Court held:
A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to
confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer
upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the
statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. . . .
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the
corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action
against it or to insure that the summons be served on a
representative so integrated with the corporation that such
person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him.
In other words, "to bring home to the corporation notice of the
filing of the action." . . . .
The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a
substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in
which summons should be served on a domestic corporation.
Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in
Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has been held as improper. Even
under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a firm's
branch office has been held as improper as summons should
have been served at the firm's principal office. Accordingly, we
rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of
petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of
upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City is
improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not
operate to confer jurisdiction upon its person. There is no
question that the defendant's voluntary appearance in the
action is equivalent to service of summons. Before, the rule was
that a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his
person by making a special appearance through a motion to
dismiss and if in the same motion, the movant raised other
grounds or invoked affirmative relief which necessarily involves
the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court. This doctrine has
been abandoned.
The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to
enforce strict enforcement of the rules on summons.
Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not
belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or
attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper
service of summons, the trial court cannot take cognizance of a
case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court will consequently
be null and void.
SANTOS vs. PNOC
FACTS: On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration
Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money against
petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the RTC of Pasig City. The
complaint sought to collect the amount of P698,502.10
representing petitioner’s unpaid balance of the car
loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a
member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons to Santos failed because he could
not be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts
to do so. Subsequently, on PNOCs motion, the trial court allowed
service of summons by publication. PNOC caused the
publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines , on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, PNOC
submitted the affidavit of publication and an affidavit to the
effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to
Santos ’ last known address.
When Santos failed to file his answer within the prescribed
period, PNOC moved that the case be set for the reception of its
evidence ex partewhich was granted.
On October 28, 2003, Santos filed an “Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer.” He sought
reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that
the affidavit of service submitted by PNOC failed to comply with
Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed
by the clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due
process as he was not notified of the September 11, 2003 order.
However, RTC denied his motion and held that the rules did not
require the affidavit of complementary service by registered mail
to be executed by the clerk of court. It also ruled that due
process was observed as a copy of the September 11, 2003
order was actually mailed to petitioner at his last known address.
Santos filed a petition for certiorari in the CA contending that the
orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion. During the
pendency of the petition in the CA, the RTC rendered its
decision in the civil case ordering Santos to pay P698,502.10 plus
legal interest and costs of suit. CA on the other hand sustained
the decision of the RTC. It also denied Santos ’ MR. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
1. Was there proper service of summons? YES.
2. Does the rules on service of summon by publication apply
only to actions in rem? NO.
3. Was there a defect in the affidavit of complementary
service having been executed by PNOCs messenger and not
the Clerk of Court? NONE.
HELD:
1. Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts
are unknown. – In any action where the defendant is designated
as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts
are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry,
service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such
places and for such times as the court may order.
Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons
despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent
sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of
summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by
publication.
2. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under
the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to
which the rule was applicable. Because of this silence, the Court
limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only.
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it
applies “[i]n any action where the defendant is designated as
an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.” Thus, it
now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi
in rem.
3. The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of
complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While
the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders
and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by
registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by
publication.
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was
defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the
action against him. In this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court states:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the
“Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Adm
SOLIVEN vs. FAST FORMS
FACTS: Marie Antoinette R. Soliven, petitioner, filed with the RTC
of Makati a complaint for sum of money with damages against
Fastforms Philippines, Inc. Soliven alleges that Fastforms through
its president Dr. Escobar, obtained a loan from her amounting to
P170,000.00 payable in a period of 21 days, with a 3% interest.
This loan was evidence by a promissory note executed by Dr.
Escobar. Respondent issued a postdated check but advised
petitioner not to deposit the check as the account from where it
was drawn has insufficient funds. Respondent proposed to
petitioner that the P175,000.00 be "rolled-over," with a monthly
interest of 5% (or P8,755.00). Petitioner agreed to the proposal.
Respondent then issued several checks as payment for interests
but, despite petitioner’s repeated demands, respondent refused
to pay its principal obligation and interests due.
Respondent, in its answer with counterclaim, denied that it
obtained a loan from petitioner; and that it did not authorize its
then president, Dr. Escobar, to secure any loan from petitioner or
issue various checks as payment for interests.
RTC rendered its decision in favor or Soliveb and ordered
Fastforms to pay their obligation. Respondent then filed a MR
questioning for the first time the trial court’s jurisdiction. It alleged
that since the amount of petitioner’s principal demand
(P195,155.00) does not exceed P200,000.00, the complaint
should have been filed with the MTC.
Soliven opposed the MR, stressing that respondent is barred from
assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court since it has invoked the
latter’s jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief in its answer to the
complaint and actively participated in all stages of the trial. RTC
denied the MR, ruling the totality of the claim therein
exceeds P200,000.00 and that under the principle of estoppel,
respondent has lost its right to question its jurisdiction.
On appeal, CA reversed the trial court’s Decision on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a MR but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Should the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the
RTC? NO.
HELD: While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time,
"this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened."
In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages
of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its
authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is
estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially
when an adverse judgment has been rendered.
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while
jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigant’s
participation in all stages of the case before the trial court,
including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative
relief, bars such party from challenging the court’s jurisdiction. A
party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a
party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case
for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse
it Attached Answer.” This was equivalent to service of summons
and vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner
RTC
RAPID CITY VS. VILLA
FACTS:
Sometime in 2004, Rapid City Realty and
DevelopmentCorporation (petitioner) filed a complaint
fordeclaration of nullity of subdivision plans . . . mandamusand
damages against several defendants includingSpouses Orlando
and Lourdes Villa (respondents).After one failed attempt at
personal service of summons, court process server resorted to
substitutedservice by serving summons upon
respondents househelp who did not acknowledge receipt
thereof and refused to divulge their names.Despite substituted
service, respondents failed to filetheir Answer, prompting
petitioner to file a "Motion toDeclare Defendants[-herein
respondents] in Default"which the trial court granted by Order of
May 3, 2005.More than eight months thereafter respondents filed
aMotion to Lift Order of Default,claiming that onJanuary 27, 2006
they "officially receivedall pertinentpapers such as Complaint
and Annexes. And they denied the existence of two women
helpers whoallegedly refused to sign and acknowledge receipt
of the summons. In any event, they contended thatassuming
that the allegation were true, the helpers hadno authority to
receive the documents.
By Order the trial court set aside the Order of Defaultand gave
herein respondents five days to file theirAnswer. Respondents just
the same did not file anAnswer, drawing petitioner to again file a
Motion todeclare them in default, which the trial court
againgranted..So, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion
forreconsideration of the second order declaring them indefault
and to vacate proceedings, this time claimingthat the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over theirpersons due to invalid
service of summons.The trial court denied respondents
Omnibus Motion byOrder and proceeded to receiveex-parte
evidence forpetitioner.Petitioner s motion for reconsideration
having beendenied by the appellate court by Resolution of
August12, 2008, it comes to the Court via petition for reviewon
certiorari, arguing in the main that respondents, infiling the first
Motion to Lift the Order of Default,voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: W/n the court acquires jurisdiction over thepersons of
the defendants [respondents].RULING: YES
The petition is impressed with merit.It is settled that if there is no
valid service of summons,the court can still acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter s
voluntaryappearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court provides: Sec. 20.V oluntary appearance
. The defendant svoluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalentto service of summons. The inclusion in a motion
todismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdictionover the
person shall not be deemed a voluntaryappearance.And
Phili ppine Commercial International Bank v.Spouses Wilson Dy
Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, et al. enlightens:Preliminarily, jurisdiction
over the defendant in a civilcase is acquired either by the
coercive power of legalprocesses exerted over his person, or his
voluntaryappearance in court. As a general proposition, one
whoseeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submittedto
the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of thisrule that we have
had occasion to declare that the filingof motions to admit
answer, for additional time to fileanswer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, andto lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration,is considered voluntary submission to the
court s jurisdiction.
This, however, is tempered by the conceptof conditional
appearance, such that a party who makesa special
appearance to challenge, among others, thecourt s jurisdiction
over his person cannot beconsidered to have submitted to its
authority.Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:(1)
Special appearance operates as an exceptionto the general
rule on voluntary appearance;(2) Accordingly, objections to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendantmust be
explicitly made, i.e., set forth in anunequivocal manner; and(3)
Failure to do so constitutes voluntarysubmission to the jurisdiction
of the court,especially in instances where a pleading ormotion
seeking affirmative relief is filed andsubmitted to the court for
resolution.
Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that theirfiling thereof
was a special appearance for the purposeonly to question the
jurisdiction over their persons.Clearly, they had acquiesced to
the jurisdiction of thecourt.
FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESJULY 14, 2008NACHURA, J.SUBJECT why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single
AREA: piece of pleading to thateffect could not be considered as an
active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to takethe
Estoppel by laches case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural
fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire
NATURE: consequences that impelled her to comply.

Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS: The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the

jurisdiction of the RTC, consideringt h a t h e r a i s e d
Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence the lack thereof in his appeal before the
resulting in homicide. TheRTC found hi m guil ty. I n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t . A t t h a t t i m e , n o considerable
hi s appeal before the CA, the peti ti oner, for the fi rst period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.
ti me, questi oned RTCs jurisdiction on the case.The CA i n DISPOSITIVE:
Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case
affi rming the deci sion of the RT C, rul ed that the
is dismissed.
pri nciple of estoppel by l aches has already precluded the
petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial
went
on for 4 y e a r s w i t h t h e p e t i t i o n e r a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i
pati ng therei n and wi thout hi m ever rai si ng the
jurisdictional infirmity.The petitioner, for his part, counters that the
lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be
rai sed at any ti me even for the fi rst ti me on appeal . As
undue del ay i s further absent herein, the principle of laches
will not be applicable.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON peti ti oner’s failure to rai se the i ssue of

juri sdi cti on duri ng the trial of thi s case, constitute laches
in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
notwithstanding thefact that said issue was immediately raised in
petitioner’s appeal to the CA

HELD:

No.

RATIO:

Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a
general rule, the issueof jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost bywaiver or
by estoppel.

Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of

jurisdiction only in cases inwhich the factual milieu is analogous to that of
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Laches should be clearly present for the
Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable,

that i s,l ack of juri sdi cti on must have been rai sed so
bel atedl y as to w arrant th e presumpti on that the party
entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.In
Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only
after fifteen years and at a stagewhen the proceedings had
already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional casebecause of the presence of laches.In the case
at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not
present. Petitioner Atty.Regalado, after the recei pt of the
Court of Appeal s resoluti on fi ndi ng her guil ty of
contempt,promptl y filed a M otion for
Reconsi derati on assailing the sai d court’s juri sdi cti on
based onprocedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her
compliance with the appellate court’s directive toshow cause