Negligence 2

NEGLIGENCE 2
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Phil.Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. Nos. 66102-04. August 30, 1990.*
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL.,** respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; Torts and damages; Doctrine of last clear chance applies in a suit between the
owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles, not where the passenger demands responsibility from the
carrier to enforce contractual obligations.—We reiterate that “[t]he principle about the ‘last clear
chance’ would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles.
It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on
the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.” This was Our ruling in Anuran, et al.
v. Buño, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354, May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 224. Thus, the respondent court
erred in applying said doctrine.
Same; Same; Same; Carrier, presumed at fault or negligent, the moment a passenger dies or is injured.—
In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence
that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New
Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a forfuitous event.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Accident caused either by defects in the automobile or negligence of driver,
not a caso fortuito.—In any event, “[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely
carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through
the negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carrier’s liability for damages.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Driver,not jointly and severally liable with carrier in case of breach of
contract of carriage.—The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune
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* FIRST DIVISION.
** as it appears in the petition.
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Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
and Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune
and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous. The driver cannot be held jointly
and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind
this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger, and
in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefor to the passenger, even
if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (see Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos.
L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the
contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver’s negligence is his. Secondly, if We make the
driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier’s liability personal instead
of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the
driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Santiago & Santiago for petitioner.
Federico R. Vinluan for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court
of Appeals) dated July 29, 1983 in AC-G.R. Nos. CV-65885, CV-65886 and CV-65887 which reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pangasinan dated December 27,
1978; and its resolution dated November 28, 1983 denying the motion for reconsideration.
It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be
reviewed by this Court on appeal. However, this principle is subject to certain exceptions. One of these
is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court (see Sabinosa v. The
Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47981, July 24, 1989) in which case, a re-examination of
the facts and evidence may be undertaken. This is Our task now.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
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About 11:00 o’clock in the morning on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida
Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the
jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at
Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas at their
respective homes. Although they usually ride in buses, they had to ride in a jeepney that day because
the buses were full. Their contract with Manalo was for them to pay P24.00 for the trip. The private
respondents’ testimonial evidence on this contractual relationship was not controverted by Mangune,
Carreon and Manalo, nor by Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc., the insurer of the jeepney,
with contrary evidence. Purportedly riding on the front seat with Manalo was Mercedes Lorenzo. On the
left rear passenger seat were Caridad Pascua, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas. On the right rear
passenger seat were Catalina Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, and Erlinda Meriales. After a brief stopover at
Moncada, Tarlac for refreshment, the jeepney proceeded towards Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney was detached,
so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of which, the
jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and
eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that the jeepney’s front faced the
south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). The jeepney
practically occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of
vehicles coming from the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. (Rabbit) driven by Tomas delos Reyes. Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden U-turn
and encroached on the western lane of the highway as claimed by Rabbit and delos Reyes, or after
stopping for a couple of minutes as claimed by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, the bus bumped from
behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a result of the collision, three passengers of the jeepney
(Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died while the other jeepney passengers
sustained
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physical injuries. What could have been a festive Christmas turned out to be tragic.
The causes of the death of the three jeepney passengers were as follows (p. 101, Record on Appeal):
“The deceased Catalina Pascua suffered the following injuries, to wit: fracture of the left parietal and
temporal regions of the skull; fracture of the left mandible; fracture of the right humenous; compound
fracture of the left radious and ullma, middle third and lower third; fracture of the upper third of the
right tibia and fillnea; avulsion of the head, left internal; and multiple abrasions. The cause of her death
was shock, secondary to fracture and multiple hemorrhage. The fractures were produced as a result of
the hitting of the victim by a strong force. The abrasions could be produced when a person falls from a
moving vehicles (sic) and rubs parts of her body against a cement road pavement. x x x.
“Erlinda Mariles (sic) sustained external lesions such as contusion on the left parietal region of the skull;
hematoma on the right upper lid; and barasions (sic) on the left knee. Her internal lesions were:
hematoma on the left thorax; multiple lacerations of the left lower lobe of the lungs; contusions on the
left lower lobe of the lungs; and simple fractures of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th ribs, left. The
forcible impact of the jeep caused the above injuries which resulted in her death. x x x.
“The cause of death of Erlinda or Florida Estomo (also called Adelaida) as per autopsy of Dr. Panlasiqui
was due to shock due to internal hemorrhage, ruptured spleen and trauma. x x x.”
Caridad Pascua suffered physical injuries as follows (p. 101, Record on Appeal):
“x x x lacerated wound on the forehead and occipital region, hematoma on the forehead, multiple
abrasions on the forearm, right upper arm, back and right leg. x x x.”
The police investigators of Tacpal and policemen of San Manuel, Tarlac, Tarlac, upon arrival at the scene
of the mishap, prepared a sketch (common exhibit “K” for private respondents and “19” for Rabbit)
showing the relative positions of the two vehicles as well as the alleged point of impact (p. 100, Record
on Appeal):
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“x x x. The point of collision was a cement pave-portion of the Highway, about six (6) meters wide, with
narrow shoulders with grasses beyond which are canals on both sides. The road was straight and points
200 meters north and south of the point of collision are visible and unobstructed. Purportedly, the point
of impact or collision (Exh. ‘K-4’-Pascua, on the sketch Exh. ‘K’-Pascua) was on the western lane of the
highway about 3 feet (or one yard) from the center line as shown by the bedris (sic), dirt and soil
(obviously from the undercarriage of both vehicles) as well as paint, marron (sic) from the Rabbit bus
and greenish from the jeepney. The point of impact encircled and marked with the letter ‘X’ in Exh. ‘K’-4,
Pascua, had a diameter of two meters, the center of which was about two meters from the western
edge of cement pavement of the roadway. Pictures taken by witness Bisquera in the course of the
investigation showed the relative positions of the point of impact and center line (Exh. ‘P’-Pascua) the
back of the Rabbit bus (Exh. ‘P-1-Pascua’), the lifeless body of Catalina Pascua (Exh. ‘P-2-Pascua’), and
the damaged front part of the Rabbit bus (Exh. ‘P-3-Pascua’). No skid marks of the Rabbit bus was found
in the vicinity of the collision, before or after the point of impact. On the other hand, there was a skid
mark about 45 meters long purportedly of the jeepney from the eastern shoulder of the road south of,
and extending up to the point of impact.”
At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there were no vehicles following the jeepney, neither
were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather condition of that day was fair.
After conducting the investigation, the police filed with the Municipal Court of San Manuel, Tarlac, a
criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. At the preliminary investigation, a
probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo, thus, his case was elevated to the Court
of First Instance. However, finding no sufficiency of evidence as regards the case of delos Reyes, the
Court dismissed it. Manalo was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment. Not having appealed,
he served his sentence.
Complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. In
Civil Case No. 1136, spouses Casiano Pascua and Juana Valdez sued as heirs of Catalina Pascua while
Caridad Pascua sued in her behalf. In Civil Case No. 1139, spouses Manuel Millares and Fidencia Arcica
sued as heirs of Erlinda Meriales. In Civil Case No. 1140,
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spouses Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento also sued as heirs of Adelaida Estomo.,
In all three cases, spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo, Rabbit and delos Reyes were all impleaded as
defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their
contractual liability. As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for
a quasi-delict. Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. was also impleaded as additional defendant
in Civil Case No. 1136 only.
For the death of Catalina Pascua, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1136 sought to collect the aggregate amount
of P70,060.00 in damages, itemized as follows: P500.00 for burial expenses; P12,000.00 for loss of wages
for 24 years; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; P10,000.00 for moral damages; and P3,000.00 for
attorney’s fees. In the same case, plaintiff Caridad Pascua claimed P550.00 for medical expenses;
P240.00 for loss of wages for two months; P2,000.00 for disfigurement of her face; P3,000.00 for
physical pain and suffering; P2,500.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 for attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation.
In Civil Case No. 1139, plaintiffs demanded P500.00 for burial expenses; P6,000.00 for the death of
Erlinda, P63,000.00 for loss of income; P10,000.00 for moral damages and P3,000.00 for attorney’s fees
or total of P80,000.00.
In Civil Case No. 1140, plaintiffs claimed P500.00 for burial expenses; P6,000.00 for the death of
Adelaida, P56,160.00 for loss of her income or earning capacity; P10,000.00 for moral damages; and
P3,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
Rabbit filed a cross-claim in the amount of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. On
the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim in the amount of P6,168.00 for the
repair of the jeepney and P3,000.00 for its non-use during the period of repairs.
On December 27, 1978, the trial court rendered its decision finding Manalo negligent, the dispositive
portion of which reads (pp. 113-114, Record on Appeal):
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court is of the opinion and so holds:
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SUPREMECOURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
“1) That defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo thru their negligence,
breached contract of carriage with their passengers the plaintiffs’ and/or their heirs, and this Court
renders judgment ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs—
‘a) In Civil Case No. 1136, for the death of Catalina Pascua, to pay her heirs the amounts of P12,000.00
for indemnity for loss of her life; P41,760.00 for loss of earnings; P324.40 for actual expenses and
P2,000.00 for moral damages;
‘b) In the same Civil Case No. 1136 for the injuries of Caridad Pascua, to pay her the amounts of P240.00
for loss of wages, P328.20 for actual expenses and P500.00 for moral damages;
‘c) In Civil Case No. 1139 for the death of Erlinda Meriales, to pay her heirs (the plaintiffs) the amount of
P12,000.00—for indemnity for loss of her life; P622.00 for actual expenses, P60,480.00 for loss of wages
or income and P2,000.00 for moral damages;
‘d) In Civil Case No. 1140, for the death of Erlinda (also called Florida or Adelaida Estomo), to pay her
heirs (the plaintiffs) the amount of P12,000.00 for indemnity for the loss of her life; P580.00 for actual
expenses; P53,160.00 for loss of wages or income and P2,000.00 for moral damages.’
“2) The defendant Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., having contracted to ensure and answer for the
obligations of defendants Mangune and Carreon for damages due their passengers, this Court renders
judgment against the said defendants Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., jointly and severally with said
defendants (Mangune and Carreon) to pay the plaintiffs the amount herein above adjudicated in their
favor in Civil Case No. 1136 only. All the amounts awarded said plaintiffs as set forth in paragraph one
(1) hereinabove;
“3) On the cross claim of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the defendants Isidro Mangune, Guillerma
Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, cross-claimant Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.,
the amounts of P216.27 as actual damages to its Bus No. 753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earning.
“All of the above amounts shall bear legal interest from the filing of the complaints.
“Costs are adjudged against defendants Mangune, Carreon and Manalo and Filriters Guaranty.
“SO ORDERED.”
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the above-quoted decision by finding delos Reyes
negligent, the dis-
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positive portion of which reads (pp. 55-57, Rollo):
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the lower court’s decision is hereby REVERSED as to item No. 3
of the decision which reads:
‘3) On the cross claim of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the defendants Isidro Mangune,
Guillerma Carreon and Tranquilino Manalo, to pay jointly and severally, the amounts of P216.27 as
actual damages to its Bus No. 753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earnings.’
and another judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-appel-lants Casiana Pascua, Juan Valdez
and Caridad Pascua, ordering the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver Tomas delos Reyes to
pay the former jointly and severally damages in amounts awarded as follows:
“For the death of Catalina Pascua, the parents and/or heirs are awarded:
“Civil Case No. 1136—
a)
Indemnity for the loss of life
P12,000.00
b)
Loss of Salaries or earning capacity
14,000.00
c)
Actual damages (burial expenses)
800.00
d)
For moral damages
—
10,000.00
e)
Exemplary damages
3,000.00
f)
For attorney’s fees
3,000.00
Total
P38,200.00 (sic)
“For the physical injuries suffered by Caridad Pascua:
“Civil Case No. 1136
a)
Actual damages (hospitalization expenses)
P 550.00
b)
Moral damages (disfigurement of the face and physical suffering
8,000.00
c)
Exemplary damages
2,000.00
Total
—
P10,550.00
“For the death of Erlinda Arcega Meriales, the parents and/or heirs:
a)
Indemnity for loss of life
P12,000.00
b)
Loss of Salary or Earning Capacity
20,000.00
c)
500.00
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d)
Moral damages
15,000.00
e)
Exemplary damages
15,000.00
f)
Attorney’s fees
3,000.00
Total
P65,500.00
“For the death of Florida Sarmiento Estomo:
a)
Indemnity for loss of life
P12,000.00
b)
Loss of Salary or Earning capacity
20,000.00
c)
500.00
d)
Moral damages
3,000.00
e)
Exemplary damages
—
3,000.00
f)
Attorney’s fees
3,000.00
Total
P41,500.00
“With costs against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
“SO ORDERED.”
The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.
The issue is who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?
The trial court, in declaring that Manalo was negligent, considered the following (p. 106, Record on
Appeal):
“(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger plaintiff Caridad Pascua that a long ways (sic)
before reaching the point of collision, the Mangune jeepney was ‘running fast’ that his passengers
cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning: that the right rear wheel was
detached causing the jeepney to run to the eastern shoulder of the road then back to the concrete
pavement; that driver Manalo applied the brakes after which the jeepney made a U-turn (half-turn) in
such a manner that it inverted its direction making it face South instead of north; that the jeepney
stopped on the western lane of the road on the right of way of the oncoming Phil. Rabbit Bus where it
was bumped by the latter;
“(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police
who, upon responding to the reported collision, found the real evidence thereat indicating in his sketch
(Exh. K, Pascua), the tracks of the jeepney of defendant Mangune and Carreon running on the Eastern
shoulder (outside the concrete
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paved road) until it returned to the concrete road at a sharp angle, crossing the Eastern lane and the
(imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into the western lane where the collision took place as
evidenced by the point of impact;
“(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San Manuel Police that the path of
the jeepney they found on the road and indicated in the sketch (Exh. K-Pascua) was shown by skid marks
which he described as ‘scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep, after its wheel was
removed;’
“(4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries with
Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (Exh. 24-Rabbit)
upon the criminal Information by the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac (Exh. 23-Rabbit), as a result of the
collision, and his commitment to prison and service of his sentence (Exh. 25-Rabbit) upon the finality of
the decision and his failure to appeal therefrom; and
“(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar (sic) attesting to the circumstance that the
collision occured (sic) on the right of way of the Phil. Rabbit Bus.”
The respondent court had a contrary opinion. Applying primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2)
the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident
unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor test, concluded that delos Reyes
was negligent.
The misappreciation of the facts and evidence and the misapplication of the laws by the respondent
court warrant a reversal of its questioned decision and resolution.
We reiterate that “[t]he principle about the ‘last clear chance’ would call for application in a suit
between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other
driver was likewise guilty of negligence.” This was Our ruling in Anuran, et al. v. Buño, et al., G.R. Nos. L-
21353 and L-21354, May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA 224.1 Thus, the
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1 In this case, an improperly parked passenger jeepney was bumped from behind by a speeding truck
with such violence that three of its
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respondent court erred in applying said doctrine.

On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the
accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, the respondent court said (p. 49, Rollo):
“x x x, the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and at the time of impact was already
facing the western side of the road. Thus the jeepney assumed a new frontal position vis a vis, the bus,
and the bus assumed a new role of defensive driving. The spirit behind the presumption of guilt on one
who bumps the rear end of another vehicle is for the driver following a vehicle to be at all times
prepared of a pending accident should the driver in front suddenly come to a full stop, or change its
course either through change of mind of the front driver, mechanical trouble, or to avoid an accident.
The rear vehicle is given the responsibility of avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is the rear
vehicle who has full control of the situation as it is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of it.”
The above discussion would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made
by the jeepney was abrupt (Exhibit “K,” Pascua). The jeepney, which was then travelling on the eastern
shoulder, making a straight skid mark of approximately 35 meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp
angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15 meters from the eastern shoulder to the point of impact
(Exhibit “K,” Pascua). Hence, delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by
Manalo. The respondent court did not realize
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passengers died whereas two other passengers suffered injuries. The representatives of the dead and of
the injured passengers filed suits to recover damages against the driver and the owners of the truck and
also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney. The trial court rendered judgment absolving the
driver and the owners of the jeepney but required the driver and the owners of the truck to compensate
the victims. The plaintiffs appealed insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also
be made liable. The appellate court, relying on the doctrine of last clear chance, affirmed the trial court’s
decision. The plaintiffs then filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court. We modified the
questioned decision by making all the defendants solidarily liable.
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that the presumption was rebutted by this piece of evidence.
With regard to the substantial factor test, it was the opinion of the respondent court that (p. 52, Rollo):
“x x x. It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the
extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable
(Restatement, Torts, 2d). Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast speed when the accident
occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid the accident, x x x. The bus driver’s conduct
is thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney, not only because he
was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap, but also because it was the bus which
was the physical force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney.”
The speed of the bus was calculated by respondent court as follows (pp. 54-55, Rollo):
“According to the record of the case, the bus departed from Laoag, Ilocos Norte, at 4:00 o’clock A.M.
and the accident took place at approximately around 12:30 P.M., after travelling roughly for 8 hours and
30 minutes. Deduct from this the actual stopover time of two Hours (computed from the testimony of
the driver that he made three 40-minute stopovers), We will have an actual travelling time of 6 hours
and 30 minutes.
“Under the circumstances, We calculate that the Laoag-Tarlac route (365 kms.) driving at an average of
56 km. per hour would take 6 hours and 30 minutes. Therefore, the average speed of the bus, give and
take 10 minutes, from the point of impact on the highway with excellent visibility factor would be 80 to
90 kms. per hour, as this is the place where buses would make up for lost time in traversing busy city
streets.”
Still, We are not convinced. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the
accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be
correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. We cannot even fault delos Reyes for not
having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left a skid
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mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached up to the point of
collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous condition of the jeepney from the time its right
rear wheel was detached or some 90 meters away, considering that the road was straight and points
200 meters north and south of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes admitted
that he was running more or less 50 kilometers per hour at the time of the accident. Using this speed,
delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers
per hour, delos Reyes would have covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time
to react to the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. Aside
from the time element involved, there were no options available to him. As the trial court remarked (pp.
107-108, Record on Appeal):
“x x x. They (plaintiffs) tried to impress this Court that defendant de los Reyes, could have taken either
of two options: (1) to swerve to its right (western shoulder) or (2) to swerve to its left (eastern lane), and
thus steer clear of the Mangune jeepney. This Court does not so believe, considering the existing
exigencies of space and time.
As to the first option, Phil. Rabbit’s evidence is convincing and unrebutted that the Western shoulder of
the road was narrow and had tall grasses which would indicate that it was not passable. Even plaintiff’s
own evidence, the pictures (Exhs. P and P-2, Pascua) are mute confirmation of such fact. Indeed, it can
be noticed in the picture (Exh. P-2, Pascua) after the Rabbit bus came to a full stop, it was tilted to right
front side, its front wheels resting most probably on a canal on a much lower elevation that of the
shoulder or paved road. It too shows that all of the wheels of the Rabbit bus were clear of the roadway
except the outer left rear wheel. These observation appearing in said picture (Exh. P-2, Pascua) clearly
shows coupled with the finding the Rabbit bus came to a full stop only five meters from the point of
impact (see sketch, Exh. K-Pascua) clearly show that driver de los Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the
right attempting to avoid hitting the Mangune’s jeepney. That it was not successful in fully clearing the
Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit’s) left front hit said jeepney (see picture Exh. 10-A-Rabbit) must have
been due to limitations of space and time.
“Plaintiffs alternatively claim that defendant delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also have swerved to
its left (eastern lane) to avoid
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bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western lane. Such a claim is premised on the
hypthesis (sic) that the eastern lane was then empty. This claim would appear to be good copy of it were
based alone on the sketch made after the collision. Nonetheless, it loses force it one were to consider
the time element involved, for moments before that, the Mangune jeepney was crossing that very
eastern lane at a sharp angle. Under such a situation then, for driver delos Reyes to swerve to the
eastern lane, he would run the greater risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or
broadside.”
After a minute scrutiny of the factual matters and duly proven evidence, We find that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon. They all failed
to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely prohacvice.
In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence
that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New
Civil Code2 or that the death or injury of the passenger was
_______________
2 Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code, respectively provides:
“ART.1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
“Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735,
and 1746. Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further
set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.”
“ART.1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.”
“ART.1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.”
172
172
due to a fortitous event3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).
The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Caridad Pascua,
Police Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo’s) conviction for the crime of Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Serious Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, supra. The negligence of spouses Mangune and Carreon
was likewise proven during the trial (p. 110, Record on Appeal):
“To escape liability, defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio
Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants,
the last on Dec. 23, the day before the collision, which included the tightening of the bolts. This
notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached while in transit. As to the cause
thereof no evidence was offered. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain, much less establish, it
to be one caused by a casofortuito. x x x.”
In any event, “[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to
his destination, an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its
driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid the carrier’s liability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus
Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104
Phil. 75).
The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon were
negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly and severally liable with
Manalo is erroneous. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of
breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of
carriage is between
____________
3 Article 1174 of the New Civil Code provides:
“ART.1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.”
173
VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990
173
the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively
responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver (see
Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742). In other words,
the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his driver’s
negligence is his.4 Secondly, if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that
would make the carrier’s liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to
recover only the share which corresponds to the driver,5 contradictory to the explicit provision of Article
2181 of the New Civil Code.6 We affirm the amount of damages adjudged by the trial court,
_______________
“ART.1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
or wilful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.”
“This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.”
“ART.1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or more
solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
“He who made the payment may claim from his codebtors only the share which corresponds to each,
with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is due, no
interest for the intervening period may de demanded.
“When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor
paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each.”
“ART.2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from
the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.”
174
174
except with respect to the indemnity for loss of life. Under Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the
New Civil Code, the amount of damages for the death of a passenger is at least three thousand pesos
(P3,000.00). The prevailing jurisprudence has increased the amount of P3,000.00 to P30,000.00 (see
Heirs of Amparo delos Santos, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 51165, June 21, 1990
citing De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas Co., G.R. Nos. L-35697-99, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 70).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated
July 29, 1983 and its resolution dated November 28, 1983 are SET ASIDE. The decision of the Court of
First Instance dated December 27, 1978 is REINSTATED WITH MODIFICATION that only Isidro Mangune,
Guillerma Carreon and Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are liable to the victims or their
heirs and that the amount of indemnity for loss of life is increased to thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Petition granted. Decision and resolution set aside.
Note.—A criminal case based solely on the accused driver’s violation of Art. 365 of the RPC is different
from the complaint for damages based on quasi-delict when both driver and bus owner are defendants.
(Lontoc vs.MD Transit, 160 SCRA 367.)
———o0o——— Phil.Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 189 SCRA 158, G.R. Nos.
66102-04 August 30, 1990
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
517
McKee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 68102. July 16, 1992.*
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME
TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
G.R. No. 68103. July 16, 1992.*
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and
ELIZABETH KOH TURLA, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and
ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Actions; Consolidation of an independent civil action for the recovery of civil liability
authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal action allowed under
Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court subject to the condition that no final judgment has been rendered
in the criminal case.—In the recent case of Cojuangco vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the
present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an independent
civil action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code
with the criminal action subject, however, to the condition that no final judgment has been rendered in
that criminal case.
Civil Law; Negligence; The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.—As We held
in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, the responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. And, as more
concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, “in the case of independent civil
action under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would
be entirely irrelevant to the civil action.
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case
against Galang would have
________________
*THIRD DIVISION.
518
518

been conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private respondents.—What remains
to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should not be
considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. It would have
been entirely different if the petitioners’ cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which
case private respondents’ liability could only be subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against Galang
would have been conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private respondents.
Same; Same; Definition of negligence.—Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Layugan
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, thus: “x x x Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do (Black’s Law
Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley defines it, ‘(T)he failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.’
Same; Same; Same; Under what is known as the emergency rule, “one who suddenly finds himself in a
place of danger and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.—On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence
and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving
the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such
immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane
would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give
way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, “one who suddenly
finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection
519
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
519
may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought
about by his own negligence.”
Same; Same; Definition of proximate cause.—Proximate cause has been defined as: “x x x ‘that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.”
Same; Same; Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.—The truck driver’s negligence is
apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour
along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Same; Same; Doctrine of last clear chance; The doctrine states that the contributory negligence of the
party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the
injured party.—Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck
driver’s negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was in law the proxi-
520
520
mate cause of the collision; Employers directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages.—Applying
the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it was the truck driver’s negligence
in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the
collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent
flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris
et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage.
Remedial Law; Appeal; The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.—The principle is well-established that
this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the
lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on
this Court.
Same; Same; Same; The foregoing rule however is not without exceptions.—The foregoing rule,
however, is not without exceptions. Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be
set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed to consider
the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment.
The same is true where the appellate court’s conclusions are grounded entirely on conjectures,
speculations and surmises or where the conclusions of the lower courts are based on a misapprehension
of facts.
PETITION for review from the resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV
Nos. 69040-41, promulgated on 3 April 1984, which set aside its previous Decision dated 29 November
1983 reversing the Decision of the trial court which dismissed petitioners’ complaints in Civil
521
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
521
Case No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Pampanga entitled “Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee and
Elizabeth Koh Turla vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo,” and “George McKee and Araceli Koh McKee
vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo,” respectively, and granted the private respondents’ counterclaim
for moral damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
The said civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a vehicular accident
which led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc and caused physical injuries to
George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and petitioner Araceli Koh McKee.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the
deceased Kim Koh McKee, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478, while petitioner Carmen Dayrit Koh
and her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 68103, who are the wife and children, respectively, of the late Jose
Koh, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477. Upon the other hand, private respondents are the owners
of the cargo truck which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben Galang was the driver of the truck at the
time of the accident.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Between nine and ten o’clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur
Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between
an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate No. RF912-T Philippines ’76 owned by private
respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga ’76
driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc,
and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all
passengers of the Ford Escort.
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors George, Christopher and
Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the baby sitter of one and a half year old Kim. At
the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front passenger’s
seat of the car while Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the
522
522
car’s back seat.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of
rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando
Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles
City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern
approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of
the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side
or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he
then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his
lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the
truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
The incident was immediately reported to the police station in Angeles City; consequently, a team of
police officers was forthwith dispatched to conduct an on the spot investigation. In the sketch1
prepared by the investigating officers, the bridge is described to be sixty (60) “footsteps” long and
fourteen (14) “footsteps” wide—seven (7) “footsteps” from the center line to the inner edge of the side
walk on both sides.2 Pulong Pulo Bridge, which spans a dry brook, is made of concrete with soft
shoulders and concrete railings on both sides about three (3) feet high.
The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right rear portion of the cargo truck was two (2)
“footsteps” from the edge of the right sidewalk, while its left front portion was touching the center line
of the bridge, with the smashed front side of the car resting on its front bumper. The truck was about
sixteen (16) “footsteps” away from the northern end of the bridge while the car was about thirty-six (36)
“footsteps” from
__________________
1Exhibit “S.”
2In the sketch plan prepared by Geodetic Engr. Benito J. Caraan [Exhibit “Y”], the bridge is estimated to
be 42.15 meters in length and 7.5 meters in width.
523
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
523
the opposite end. Skid marks produced by the right front tire of the truck measured nine (9) “footsteps,”
while skid marks produced by the left front tire measured five (5) “footsteps.” The two (2) rear tires of
the truck, however, produced no skid marks.
In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately after the accident, Galang admitted that
he was traveling at thirty (30) miles (48 kilometers) per hour.
As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31
January 1977 before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and were raffled to Branch III and
Branch V of the said court, respectively. In the first, herein petitioners in G.R. No. 68103 prayed for the
award of P12,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Jose Koh, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P60,000.00
as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for burial expenses, P3,650.00 for
the burial lot and P9,500.00 for the tomb, plus attorney’s fees.3 In the second case, petitioners in G.R.
No. 68102 prayed for the following: (a) in connection with the death of Kim McKee, the sum of
P12,000.00 as death benefit, P3,150.00 for funeral services, P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot, P3,000.00
for the tomb, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 as
miscellaneous damages; (b) in the case of Araceli Koh McKee, in connection with the serious physical
injuries suffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P12,000.00 for loss of earnings, P5,000.00 for the hospitalization expenses up to the date of the filing of
the complaint; and (c) with respect to George McKee, Jr., in connection with the serious physical injuries
suffered, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the following
medical expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical Center, P3,500.00 payable to the St. Francis Medical
Center, P5,175.00 payable to the Clark Air Base Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses amounting to
P5,000.00. They also sought an award of attorney’s fees amounting to 25% of the total award plus
traveling and hotel expenses, with costs.4
________________
3Record on Appeal, 220.
4Id., 16-18.
524
524
On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of “Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property” was filed with the
trial court. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3751 and was raffled to Branch V of the court, the same
Branch where Civil Case No. 4478 was assigned.5
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477, private respondents asserted that it was the
Ford Escort car which “invaded and bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as
counterclaim, prayed for the award of P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees, P20,000.00 as actual and
liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as business losses.6 In Civil Case No.
4478, private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of pendency of another action (Civil
Case No. 4477) and failure to implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they also
filed a motion to consolidate the case with Civil Case No. 4477 pending before Branch III of the same
court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs.7 Both motions were denied by Branch V, then presided over
by Judge Ignacio Capulong. Thereupon, private respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim8
wherein they alleged that Jose Koh was the person “at fault having approached the lane of the truck
driven by Ruben Galang, x x x which was on the right lane going towards Manila and at a moderate
speed observing all traffic rules and regulations applicable under the circumstances then prevailing;” in
their counterclaim, they prayed for an award of damages as may be determined by the court after due
hearing, and the sums of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in both cases.
To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478 filed on 27 March 1978 a motion to
adopt the testimonies
__________________
5Record on Appeal, 121-124.
6Id., 226-227.
7Id., 22-25; 26-28; 28-32; 34-36.
8Id., 39-43.
525
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
525
of witnesses taken during the hearing of Criminal Case No. 3751, which private respondents opposed
and which the court denied.9 Petitioners subsequently moved to reconsider the order denying the
motion for consolidation,10 which Judge Capulong granted in the Order of 5 September 1978; he then
directed that Civil Case No. 4478 be consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch III of the court then
presided over by Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr.
Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case No. 3751.
In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli Koh McKee, Fernando Nuñag, Col. Robert
Fitzgerald, Primitivo Parel, Eugenio Tanhueco, Carmen Koh and Antonio Koh,11 and offered several
documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, private respondents presented as witnesses Ruben Galang,
Zenaida Soliman, Jaime Tayag and Roman Dayrit.12
In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as witnesses Mrs. Araceli McKee, Salud Samia, Pfc.
Fernando Nuñag, Dr. Ramon Panlilio, Dr. Robert Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto Yuson, Dr. Hector Ulanday, Pfc.
Benigno de Leon, Marina Bolos, Primitivo Parel, Rogelio Pineda, Benito Caraan and Eugenio Tanhueco,
and offered several documentary exhibits.13 Upon the other hand, the defense presented the accused
Ruben Galang, Luciano Punzalan, Zenaida Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and offered documentary
exhibits.14
On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the accused Ruben Galang in the
aforesaid criminal case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Ruben Galang
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information and after applying the
provisions of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and indeterminate
________________
9Record on Appeal, 45-48; 49-52; 52-53.
10Id., 53-57.
11Id., 91, 92, 100, 101, 103, 104 and 105.
12Record on Appeal, 107, 109, 111 and 112.
13Id., 124, et seq.
14Id., 138, et seq.
526
526
sentence law, this Court, imposes upon said accused Ruben Galang the penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
maximum; the accused is further sentenced to pay and indemnify the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount
of P12,000.00 as indemnity for her death; to reimburse the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of
P2,000.00 representing the funeral expenses; to pay the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of
P20,000.00 representing her loss of income; to indemnify and pay the heirs of the deceased Jose Koh
the value of the car in the amount of P53,910.95, and to pay the costs.”15
The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17 November 1980; on the same day, counsel for
petitioners filed with Branch III of the court—where the two (2) civil cases were pending—a
manifestation to that effect and attached thereto a copy of the decision.16
Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2) civil cases on 12 November 1980
and awarded the private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.17 The
dispositive portion of the said decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence to be in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiffs, these cases are hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against the plaintiffs. The defendants
had proven their counter-claim, thru evidences (sic) presented and unrebutted. Hence, they are hereby
awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus attorney’s fee of P15,000.00
and litigation expenses for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual damages claimed for (sic) by the defendants is (sic)
hereby dismissed for lack of proof to that effect (sic).”18
A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the petitioners on 28 November 1980 and was
received on 2 December 1980.19
________________
15Id., 160-161.
16Record on Appeal, 120-121.
17Id., 86-120.
18Id., 119-120.
19Id., 6.
527
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
527
Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was
docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR and was assigned to the court’s Third Division. Plaintiffs in Civil
Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise separately appealed the 12 November 1980 decision to the
appellate court. The appeals were docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R,
respectively, and were assigned to the Fourth Civil Cases Division.
On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its decision20 in C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR
affirming the conviction of Galang.21 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ay Aming pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan.
Ang naghahabol pa rin ang pinagbabayad ng gugol ng paghahabol.”
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the respondent Court in its Kapasiyahan
promulgated on 25 November 1982.22 A petition for its review23 was filed with this Court; said petition
was subsequently denied. A motion for its reconsideration was denied with finality in the Resolution of
20 April 1983.24
On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as the Intermediate Appellate Court,
promulgated its consolidated decision in A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and 69041,25 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and another one is
rendered, ordering defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants as follows:
__________________
20Per Associate Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, concurred in by Associate Justices Crisolito Pascual and
Guillermo P. Villasor.
21Annex “C” of Petition; Rollo, 69-77.
22Annex “C-1,” Id.; Id., 78.
23G.R. No. 62713.
24Annex “D,” Petition, op. cit.; Rollo, op. cit., 79.
25Per Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison, concurred in by Associate Justices Abdulwahid A. Bidin,
Marcelino R. Veloso and Desiderio P. Jurado.
528
528
For the death of Jose Koh:
P50,000.00 as moral damages
P12,000.00 as death indemnity
P16,000.00 for the lot and tomb (Exhs. U and U-1)
P 4,000.00 expenses for holding a wake (p. 9, tsn April 19, 1979)
P 950.00 for the casket (Exh. M)
P 375.00 for the vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
For the death of Kim Koh McKee:
P12,000.00 as death indemnity
P 1,000.00 for the purchase of the burial lot (Exh. M)
P 950.00 for funeral services (Exh. M-1)
P 375.00 for vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by George Koh McKee:
P 672.00 for Clark Field Hospital (Exh. E)
P 4,384.00 paid to Angeles Medical Clinic (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2)
P 1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. B and B-1)
For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh McKee:
P 1,055.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G and G-1)
P 75.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G-2 and G-3)
P 428.00 to Carmelite General Hospital (Exh. F)
P114.20 to Muñoz Clinic (Exh. MM)
For the physical injuries suffered by Christopher Koh McKee:
P 1,231.10 to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. L and L-1)

P 321.95 to F.C.E.A. Hospital (Exhs. G and D-1)
In addition, We award P10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4477 and another P10,000.00 as
counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4478.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”26
________________
26Rollo, 88-89.
529
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
529
The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court’s findings that it was Ruben Galang’s
inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that
the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private respondents), as employers of
Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did
not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting and supervising the said employee.27 This conclusion of reckless imprudence is based on the
following findings of fact:
“In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial positions, the determinative issue in this appeal is
posited in the fourth assigned error as follows:
‘IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE (sic) DRIVER OF THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS TRUCK BLEW HIS
HORN SWITCHED ON HIS HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE TO THE RIGHT.’
Supportive of plaintiffs’ version, principal witness Araceli Koh McKee testified thus:
‘Q
What happened after that, as you approached the bridge?
When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of the
highway going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two (2)
boys who were crossing, heblew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys. We
noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the
right of way to come back to our right lane.
Did the truck slow down?
No, sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.
What happened after that?
After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right lane since the truck is (sic) coming,
my father stepped on the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the
_________________
27Id., 88.
530
530
sound of impact (sic), sir.’ (tsn, pp. 5-6, July 22, 1977); or (Exhibit ‘O’ in these Civil Cases).
xxx
Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce its
speed before the actual impact of collision (sic) as you narrated in this Exhibit ‘1,’ how did you know
(sic)?
It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our right lane on
side (sic) of the highway, sir.’ (tsn. pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit ‘O’ in these Civil Cases)’ (pp. 30-
31, Appellants’ Brief).
Plaintiffs’ version was successfully corroborated to Our satisfaction by the following facts and
circumstances:
1. An impartial eye-witness to the mishap, Eugenio Tanhueco, declared that the truck stopped only
when it had already collided with the car:
x x x
Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the hearing in the criminal case:
x x x
Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation witness because he was one of the first to
arrive at the scene of the accident. As a matter of fact, he brought one of the injured passengers to the
hospital.
We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to defendants’ witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a passenger
of the truck, and Roman Dayrit, who supposedly lived across the street.
Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the ordinary course of events people usually take the
side of the person with whom they are associated at the time of the accident, because, as a general rule,
they do not wish to be identified with the person who was at fault. Thus an imaginary bond is
unconsciously created among the several persons within the same group (People vs. Vivencio, CA-G.R.
No. 00310-CR, Jan. 31, 1962).
With respect to Dayrit, We can not help suspecting (sic) that he is an accommodation witness. He did
not go to the succor of the injured persons. He said he wanted to call the police authorities about the
mishap, but his phone had no dial tone. Be this (sic) as it may, the trial court in the criminal case acted
correctly in refusing to believe Dayrit.
531
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
531
2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include the claim that Galang stopped his truck at a safe
distance from the car, according to plaintiffs (p. 25, Appellants’ Brief). This contention of appellants was
completely passed sub-silencio or was not refuted by appellees in their brief. Exhibit 2 is one of the
exhibits not included in the record. According to the Table of Contents submitted by the court below,
said Exhibit 2 was not submitted by defendants-appellees. In this light, it is not far-fetched to surmise
that Galang’s claim that he stopped was an eleventhhour desperate attempt to exculpate himself from
imprisonment and damages.
3. Galang divulged that he stopped after seeing the car about 10 meters away:
‘ATTY. SOTTO:
Q
Do I understand from your testimony that inspite of the fact that you admitted that the road is straight
and you may be able to (sic) see 500-1000 meters away from you any vehicle, you first saw that car only
about ten (10) meters away from you for the first time?
xxx
I noticed it, sir, that it was about ten (10) meters away.
ATTY. SOTTO:
So, for clarification, you clarify and state under your oath that you have (sic) not noticed it before that
ten (10) meters? (Tsn. 3 to 5, Sept. 18, 1979).’ (p. 16, Appellants’ Brief)’
Galang’s testimony substantiate (sic) Tanhueco’s statement that Galang stopped only because of the
impact. At ten (10) meters away, with the truck running at 30 miles per hour, as revealed in Galang’s
affidavit (Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants’ Brief), it is well-nigh impossible to avoid a collision on a bridge.
5. Galang’s truck stopped because of the collision, and not because he waited for Jose Koh to return to
his proper lane. The police investigator, Pfc. Fernando L. Nunag, stated that he found skid marks under
the truck but there were not (sic) skid marks behind the truck (pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1978). The
presence of skid marks show (sic) that the truck was speeding. Since the skid marks were found under
the truck and none were found at the rear of the truck, the reasonable conclusion is that the skid marks
under the truck were caused by the truck’s front wheels when the trucks (sic) suddenly stopped seconds
before the mishap in an endeavor to avoid the same. But, as aforesaid,
532
532
Galang saw the car at barely 10 meters away, a very short distance to avoid a collision, and in his futile
endeavor to avoid the collision he abruptly stepped on his brakes but the smashup happened just the
same.
For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang, the law presumes negligence on the part of
the defendants in the selection of their driver or in the supervision over him. Appellees did not allege
such defense of having exercised the duties of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employees in their answers. They did not even adduce evidence that they did in fact have
methods of selection and programs of supervision. The inattentiveness or negligence of Galang was the
proximate cause of the mishap. If Galang’s attention was on the highway, he would have sighted the car
earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic) 10 meters. He proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop
when a collision was already inevitable, because at the time that he entered the bridge his attention was
not riveted to the road in front of him.
On the question of damages, the claims of appellants were amply proven, but the items must be
reduced.”28
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the facts was subsequently filed by
private respondents on the basis of which the respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3 April 1984,29
reconsidered and set aside its 29 November 1983 decision and affirmed in toto the trial court’s
judgment of 12 November 1980. A motion to reconsider this Resolution was denied by the respondent
Court on 4 July 1984.30
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners allege that respondent Court:
“I
x x x COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT TOTALLY REVERSED ITS DECISION BY
MERELY BASING IT FROM (sic) A MERE ‘PRESUMPTION,’ TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER’S ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS, WHO EXCLUSIVELY COMMITTED
_________________
28Rollo, 83-88.
29 Rollo, 61-65.
30Id., 67.
533
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
533
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (sic), FURTHER, IT ALSO DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED AND FOUND IN THE RECORDS; THEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT’S RESOLUTIONS (ANNEXES
A and B, PETITION) ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, PURELY BASED ON SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND
WITHOUT SURE FOUNDATION IN THE EVIDENCE.
II
x x x GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN IN EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAID
DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS, ‘IT CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT
THE FINDINGS OF GUILT IN THE CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE DRIVER OF THE TRUCK INVOLVED IN THE
ACCIDENT WAS INDICTED.’
III
x x x PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND MADE A MISLEADING

PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT HELD: ‘IT IS THUS INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
(APPELLEES WRONGLY MENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION) TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER.’
IV
x x x COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) ERROR, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
CITED ANOTHER CASE WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THESE CASES.
x x x COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE FINDINGS
OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN
THE RECORDS, SPECIALLY THEY (sic) ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND JUDICIAL
ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER.
VI
534
534
x x x EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT AWARDED DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHEN SAID AWARD IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY EVIDENCE, IN THE RECORDS, AND SAID AWARD IS NOT ALLOWED BY LAW AND THE CONSISTENT
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
VII
x x x EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS
CLEARLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE
AWARD OF DAMAGES.”31
In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required private respondents to Comment on the

petition.32 After the said Comment33 was filed, petitioners submitted a Reply34 thereto; this Court
then gave due course to the instant petitions and required petitioners to file their Brief,35 which they
accordingly complied with.
There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the main task of dissecting the arguments and counter-
arguments, some observations on the procedural vicissitudes of these cases are in order.
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a quasi-delict
under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of Criminal Case No.
3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 for joint trial in Branch III
of the trial court. The records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties, and it may
therefore be reasonably con-
_________________
31Rollo, 213-214.
32Rollo, 150.
33Id., 157-175.
34Id., 185-198.
35Id., 199.
535
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
535
cluded that none was made, to consolidate Criminal Case No. 3751 with the civil cases, or vice-versa.
The parties may have then believed, and understandably so, since by then no specific provision of law or
ruling of this Court expressly allowed such a consolidation, that an independent civil action, authorized
under Article 33 in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code, such as the civil cases in this case, cannot be
consolidated with the criminal case. Indeed, such consolidation could have been farthest from their
minds as Article 33 itself expressly provides that the “civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.” Be that as it may, there was
then no legal impediment against such consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which
seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear
congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice with the least
expense to the parties litigants,36 would have easily sustained a consolidation, thereby preventing the
unseeming, if not ludicrous, spectacle of two (2) judges appreciating, according to their respective
orientation, perception and perhaps even prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafter rendering
conflicting decisions. Such was what happened in this case. It should not, hopefully, happen anymore. In
the recent case of Cojuangco vs. Court of Appeals,37 this Court held that the present provisions of Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an independent civil action for the recovery of
civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal action
subject, however, to the condition that no final judgment has been rendered in that criminal case.
Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 3751 finding Galang guilty of reckless
imprudence, although already final by virtue of the denial by no less than this Court of his last attempt
to set aside the respondent Court’s affirmance of the verdict of conviction, has no relevance or
________________
36Caños vs. Peralta, 115 SCRA 843 [1982], citing 1 C.J.S. 1342-1343.
37203 SCRA 619 [1991].
536
536
importance to this case.
As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia,38 the responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. And,
as more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, “in the case of independent
civil actions under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction,
would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action.”39 In Salta vs. De Veyra and PNB vs. Purisima,40 this
Court stated:
“x x x It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted
in the same manner to be filed separately from the criminal case, may proceed similarly regardless of
the result of the criminal case.
Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed separately and to
proceed independently even during the pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make the
court’s disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be
so because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not
mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct
separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action x x x.”
What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should
not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. It would
have been entirely different if the petitioners’ cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in
which case private respondents’ liability could only be subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against
Galang would have been conclusive in the
_______________
38102 Phil. 443 [1957].
39At page 447.
40117 SCRA 212, 218-219 [1982]; see also Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 591 [1989]; Andamo
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 195 [1990].
537
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
537
civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private respondents.41
And now to the merits of the petition.
It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not
respondent Court’s findings in its challenged resolution are supported by evidence or are based on mere
speculations, conjectures and presumptions.
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are
received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court.42
The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions. Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court
of Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial
court failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what was
stated in its judgment.43 The same is true where the appellate court’s conclusions are grounded entirely
on conjectures, speculations and surmises44 or where the conclusions of the lower courts are based on
a misapprehension of facts.45
It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case qualifies as one of the aforementioned exceptions
as the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the respondent Court in its challenged resolution
are not supported by the evidence,
_________________
41Martinez vs. Barredo, 81 Phil. 1 [1948]; Miranda vs. Malate Garage and Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670
[1956]; Manalo vs. Robles Transportation Co., Inc., 99 Phil. 729 [1956].
42FNCB Finance vs. Estavillo, 192 SCRA 514 [1990]; Rañeses vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 187 SCRA
397 [1990]; Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138 [1988].
43Capco vs. Macasaet, 189 SCRA 561 [1990].
44Orcino vs. Civil Service Commission, 190 SCRA 815 [1990]; Tupue vs. Urgel, 161 SCRA 417 [1988];
Tolentino vs. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 167 [1974].
45Pajunar vs. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 464 [1989]; Sese vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA
585 [1987].
538
538
are based on a misapprehension of facts and the inferences made therefrom are manifestly mistaken.
The respondent Court’s decision of 29 November 1983 makes the correct findings of fact.
In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the
lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver
of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court
immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh’s negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause
of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows
that the car swerved into the truck’s lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two
(2) boys darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. As testified to by
petitioner Araceli Koh McKee:
What happened after that, as you approached the bridge?
When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of the
highway going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two (2)
boys who were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys. We
noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the
right of way to come back to our right lane.
Did the truck slow down?
No sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.
What happened after that?
After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right lane since the truck is (sic) coming,
my father stepped on the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir.”46
Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during cross examination. Jose Koh’s entry into the
lane of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril—
death or injury to the two (2) boys. Such
________________
46TSN, 22 July 1977, 5-6; Exhibit “O,” Rollo, 83.
539
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
539
act can hardly be classified as negligent.
Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,47
thus:
“x x x Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those

considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do (Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition,
930), or as Judge Cooley defines it, ‘(T)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.’ (Cooley on Torts, Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265)
In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. 809, 813), decided more than seventy years ago but still a sound rule, (W)e
held:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. x x x”
In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company,48 We held:
“x x x ‘Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not
an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care
and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of
care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (citing
Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35 Pac. 549 (1894).’”
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is
manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man
would have tried to avoid running over
________________
47167 SCRA 363 [1988].
4827 SCRA 674 [1969].
540
540
the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the
opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the
vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the
side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency
rule, “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence,
if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method,
unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.”49
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh
adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test,
therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been defined as:
“x x x ‘that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.”50
_________________
49Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 378 [1988], citing Siegl vs. Watson, 195 NW 867 and others.
50Vda. de Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181 [1957], citing 38 Am. Jur. 695-696.
541
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
541
Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was
the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and
deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver,
which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have
resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down
and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to
the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances,
the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver’s negligence becomes more
apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and
the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a
clearance of 3.661 meters to spare.51 Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could have
partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have
tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.
The truck driver’s negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30
miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge52
is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give
credence to private respondents’ claim that there was an error in the translation by the investigating
officer of the truck driver’s response in Pampango as to whether the speed cited was in kilometers per
hour or miles per hour. The law presumes that official duty has been regularly performed;53 unless
there is proof to the contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant case, private respondents’ claim is
based on mere conjecture.
_________________
51Rollo, 148.
52Section 53, Motor Vehicle Law.
53Section 2(m), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court.
542
542
The truck driver’s negligence was likewise duly established through the earlier quoted testimony of
petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which was duly corroborated by the testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an
impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus:
xxx
“Q
Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce its
speed before the actual impact of collision as you narrated in this Exhibit ‘1,’ how did you know?
It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our right lane on
side (sic) of the highway, sir.’ (tsn, pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit ‘O’ in these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31,
Appellants’ Brief)”54
while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus:
“Q
When you saw the truck, how was it moving?
A
It was moving 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, sir.
Immediately after you saw this truck, do you know what happened?
I saw the truck and a car collided (sic), sir, and I went to the place to help the victims.’ (tsn, 28, April 19,
1979)
xxx
From the time you saw the truck to the time of the impact, will you tell us if the said truck ever stopped?
I saw it stopped (sic) when it has (sic) already collided with the car and it was already motionless.’ (tsn.
31, April 19, 1979; Italics supplied). (p. 27, Appellants’ Brief).”55
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver’s subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures
and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting
accident.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear
chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
_________________
54Rollo, 83-84.
55Id., 84.
543
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
543
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.56
In Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals,57 We held:

“The respondent court adopted the doctrine of ‘last clear chance.’ The doctrine, stated broadly, is that
the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. In other words, the doctrine of
last clear chance means that even though a person’s own acts may have placed him in a position of peril,
and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery (sic). As the doctrine is usually stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law
solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. (Sangco, Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p.
165).
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or
even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff’s
peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due
care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am. Jr., 2d, pp.
798-799).”
In Pantranco North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa,58 We ruled:
“The doctrine of last clear chance was defined by this Court in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water
District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this wise:
__________________
56Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 405 [1958]; Del Prado vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil.
900 [1929]; Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 [1918].
57193 SCRA 603 [1991].
58179 SCRA 384 [1989].
544
544
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude
a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence
but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is
made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff
[Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware, et al. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., G.R. No. 70493, May 18, 1989]. The subsequent
negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the
immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the more
remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith
supra].
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a
plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to
defeat claim (sic) for damages.”
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it was the truck driver’s
negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause
of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are
negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum,
not juris et de jure.59 Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows:
“The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom
_________________
59Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 19 SCRA 289 [1967], citing Bahia vs. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624 [1915].
545
VOL. 211,JULY16,1992
545
one is responsible.
x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
x x x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees.60 The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not
interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November 1983 in reversing the decision of
the trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984
finds no sufficient legal and factual moorings.
In the light of recent decisions of this Court,61 the indemnity for death must, however, be increased
from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April
1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED,
subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00
each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. (Chairman), Feliciano and Romero, JJ., concur.
________________
60Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., supra.
61People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643 [1989]; People vs. Narit, 197 SCRA 334 [1991]; People vs. Tiozon, 198
SCRA 368 [1991]; People vs. Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 [1991]; Dangwa Trans., Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
202 SCRA 574 [1991].
546
546
Eudela vs. Court of Appeals
Bidin, J., No part. I participated in the appealed decision.
Petition granted.
Note.—Doctrine of last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding
vehicles, not where the passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce contractual
obligations (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 189 SCRA 158).
——o0o—— McKee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 211 SCRA 517, G.R. No. 68102, G.R. No. 68103
July 16, 1992
624
Syquia vs. Court of Appeals
58
JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA and ANTHONY C. SYQUIA,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY,
INC., respondents.
Civil Law; Torts; Negligence; Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not
preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, Supreme Court finds no reason to disregard the
respondent’s Court finding that there was no negligence.—With respect to herein petitioners’ averment
that private respondent has committed culpa aquiliana, the Court of Appeals found no negligent act on
the part of private respondent to justify an award of damages against it. Although a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find
no reason to disregard the respondent’s Court finding that there was no negligence.
Same; Same; Same; Had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana but for culpa contractual
as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code.—In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and
the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled “Deed of Sale and Certificate
of Perpetual Care” on August 27, 1969. That agreement governed the relations of the parties and
defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of
the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana,
but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Contracts; Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the contract are clear and
leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation
shall control.—There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the
Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be water-
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
625
VOL. 217, JANUARY 27, 1993
625

proof. Private respondent’s witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel, explained that the term “sealed” meant
“closed.” On the other hand, the word “seal” is defined as “x x x any of various closures or fastenings x x
x that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized
opening.” The meaning that has been given by private respondent to the word conforms with the cited
dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite clear that “sealed” cannot be equated with “waterproof’.
Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control. Contracts
should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be interpreted beyond their
obvious intendment.
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence
to be observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a
family.—The law defines negligence as the “omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.” In
the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the
performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Buena, J.
Pacis & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Augusto S. San Pedro & Ari-Ben C. Sebastian for private respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Herein petitioners, Juan J. Syquia and Corazon C. Syquia, Carlota C. Syquia, Carlos C. Syquia, and
Anthony Syquia, were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the deceased Vicente Juan Syquia. On
March 5, 1979, they filed a complaint1 in the
___________________
1 Civil Case No. Q-27112, “Juan J. Syquia, et al. vs. Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.”.
626
626

then Court of First Instance against herein private respondent, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. for
recovery of damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-delict. The trial court dismissed the
complaint.
The antecedent facts, as gathered by the respondent Court, are as follows:
“On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony all surnamed Syquia, plaintiffs-appellants
herein, filed a complaint for damages against defendant-appellee, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.
The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a Deed of Sale (Contract No. 6885) dated August
27, 1969 and Interment Order No. 7106 dated July 21, 1978 executed between plaintiff-appellant Juan J.
Syquia and defendant-appellee, the former, father of deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and
instructed defendant-appellee to inter the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery
in the morning of July 25, 1978 conformably and in accordance with defendant-appellant’s (sic)
interment procedures; that on Sep-tember 4, 1978, preparatory to transferring the said remains to a
newly purchased family plot also at the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing
the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground with the assistance of certain
employees of defendant-appellant (sic); that as the concrete vault was being raised to the surface,
plaintiffs-appellants discovered that the concrete vault had a hole approximately three (3) inches in
diameter near the bottom of one of the walls closing out the width of the vault on one end and that for
a certain length of time (one hour, more or less), water drained out of the hole; that because of the
aforesaid discovery, plaintiffs-appellants became agitated and upset with concern that the water which
had collected inside the vault might have risen as it in fact did rise, to the level of the coffin and flooded
the same as well as the remains of the deceased with ill effects thereto; that pursuant to an authority
granted by the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila on September 14, 1978, plaintiffs-
appellants with the assistance of licensed morticians and certain personnel of defendant-appel-lant (sic)
caused the opening of the concrete vault on September 15, 1978; that upon opening the vault, the
following became apparent to the plaintiffs-appellants: (a) the interior walls of the concrete vault
showed evidence of total flooding; (b) the coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt causing
the wooden parts to warp and separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located directly above the
head and torso of the deceased; (c) the entire lining of the coffin, the clothing
627
VOL. 217, JANUARY 27, 1993
627
of the deceased, and the exposed parts of the deceased’s remains were damaged and soiled by the
action of the water and silt and were also coated with filth.
Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defen-dant-appellee of its obligation to deliver
a defect-free concrete vault designed to protect the remains of the deceased and the coffin against the
elements which resulted in the desecration of deceased’s grave and in the alternative, because of
defendant-appellee’s gross negligence conformably to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code in failing to
seal the concrete vault, the complaint prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-appellee
to pay plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00 for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages, exemplary
damages in the amount determined by the court, 20% of defen-dant-appellee’s total liability as
attorney’s fees, and expenses of litigation and costs of suit.”2
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the contract between the parties did not guarantee
that the cement vault would be waterproof; that there could be no quasi-delict because the defendant
was not guilty of any fault or negligence, and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation
between the Syquias and defendant Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.. The trial court also noted
that the father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be
constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that water would eventually seep through
the vault. The trial court also accepted the explanation given by defendant for boring a hole at the
bottom side of the vault: “The hole had to be bored through the concrete vault because if it has no hole
the vault will (sic) float and the grave would be filled with water and the digging would caved (sic) in the
earth, the earth would caved (sic) in the (sic) fill up the grave.”3
From this judgment, the Syquias appealed. They alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the
contract allowed the flooding of the vault; that there was no desecration; that the boring of the hole
was justifiable; and in not awarding damages.
_________________
2 Rollo, pp. 59-60.
3 Ibid., p. 65.
628
628
The Court of Appeals in the Decision4 dated December 7, 1990 however, affirmed the judgment of
dismissal. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated April 25, 1991.5
Unsatisfied with the respondent Court’s decision, the Syquias filed the instant petition. They allege
herein that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors when it:
1. held that the contract and the Rules and Regulations of private respondent allowed the flooding of
the vault and the entrance thereto of filth and silt;
2. held that the act of boring a hole was justifiable and corollar-ily, when it held that no act of
desecration was committed;
3. overlooked and refused to consider relevant, undisputed facts, such as those which have been
stipulated upon by the parties, testified to by private respondent’s witnesses, and admitted in the
answer, which could have justified a different conclusion;
4. held that there was no tort because of a pre-existing contract and the absence of fault/negligence;
and
5. did not award the P25,000.00 actual damages which was agreed upon by the parties, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the act of boring a hole by private respondent on the vault of
the deceased kin of the bereaved petitioners. The latter allege that such act was either a breach of
private respondent’s contractual obligation to provide a sealed vault, or, in the alternative, a negligent
act which constituted a quasi-delict. Nonetheless, petitioners claim that whatever kind of negligence
private respondent has committed, the latter is liable for desecrating the grave of petition-ers’ dead.
In the instant case, We are called upon to determine whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.
breached its contract with petitioners; or, alternatively, whether private respondent was guilty of a tort.
___________________
4 Penned by Associate Justice Arturo B. Buena, concurred in by Associate Justices Minerva P. Gonzaga-
Reyes and Jainal D. Rasul.
5 Rollo, p. 87-A.
629
VOL. 217, JANUARY 27, 1993
629
We understand the feelings of petitioners and empathize with them. Unfortunately, however, We are
more inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the negative. There is not enough ground, both in
fact and in law, to justify a reversal of the decision of the respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of
the petitioners.
With respect to herein petitioners’ averment that private respondent has committed culpa aquiliana,
the Court of Ap-peals found no negligent act on the part of private respondent to justify an award of
damages against it. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude
the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent’s Court finding that
there was no negligence.
“Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x.” (Italics Ours).
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,
entered into a contract entitled “Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care”6 on August 27, 1969.
That agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and obligations.
Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it
would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by
Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
“Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.”
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the concrete box to be used in the
interment. Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of private respondent provides that:
_______________
6 Exhibit “D”; Records, p. 10.
630
630
“Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer wall of stone,
brick or concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees of the Associa-tion.”7
Pursuant to this above-mentioned Rule, a concrete vault was provided on July 27, 1978, the day before
the interment, and was, on the same day, installed by private respondent’s employees in the grave
which was dug earlier. After the burial, the vault was covered by a cement lid.
Petitioners however claim that private respondent breached its contract with them as the latter held out
in the brochure it distributed that the “x x x lot may hold single or double intern-ment (sic) underground
in sealed concrete vault.”8 Petitioners claim that the vault provided by private respondent was not
sealed, that is, not waterproof. Consequently, water seeped through the cement enclosure and
damaged everything inside it.
We do not agree. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in
the Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be
waterproof. Private respondent’s witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel, explained that the term “sealed”
meant “closed.”9 On the other hand, the word “seal” is defined as “x x x any of various closures or
fastenings x x x that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or
unauthorized opening.”10 The meaning that has been given by private respondent to the word
conforms with the cited dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite clear that “sealed” cannot be
equated with “waterproof”. Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the contract are clear and
leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation
shall control.11 Contracts should be
___________________
7 Annex A of Answer; Records, p. 31.
8 Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 13.
9 TSN, November 4, 1981, p. 7.
10 Webster’s Third International Dictionary 2046 (1970).
11 Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Felipe Ysmael, Jr. and Co., Inc., 169 SCRA 66 (1989); Papa vs. Alonzo,
198 SCRA 564 (1991); Alim
631
VOL. 217, JANUARY 27, 1993
631
interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not be interpreted beyond their obvious
intendment.12 As ruled by the respondent Court:
“When plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia affixed his signature to the Deed of Sale (Exhibit “A”) and the
attached Rules and Regulations (Exhibit “1”), it can be assumed that he has accepted defendant-
appellee’s undertaking to merely provide a concrete vault. He can not now claim that said concrete vault
must in addition, also be water-proofed (sic). It is basic that the parties are bound by the terms of their
contract, which is the law between them (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 178 SCRA 739). Where there is nothing in the contract which is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy, the validity of the contract must be sustained (Phil. American
Insurance Co. vs. Judge Pineda, 175 SCRA 416). Consonant with this ruling, a contracting party cannot
incur a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It cannot be extended by
implication, beyond the terms of the contract (Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). And as a rule of evidence, where the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the
document itself, being constituted by the parties as the expositor of their intentions, is the only
instrument of evidence in respect of that agreement which the law will recognize, so long as its (sic)
exists for the purpose of evidence (Starkie, Ev., pp. 648, 655, Kasheenath vs. Chundy, 5 W.R. 68 cited in
Fran-cisco, Revised Rules of Court in the Phil. p. 153, 1973 Ed.). And if the terms of the contract are clear
and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations
shall control (Santos vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 83664, Nov. 13, 1989; Prudential Bank & Trust Co. vs.
Community Builders Co., Inc., 165 SCRA 285; Balatero vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 530).”13
We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation to the Syquias.
While this may be so, can private respondent be liable for culpa aquiliana for boring
___________________
vs. CA, 200 SCRA 450 (1991); Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 203 SCRA 310 (1991).
12 Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Felipe Ysmael, Jr. and Co., Inc., 169 SCRA 66 (1989).
13 Rollo, pp. 64-65.
632
632
the hole on the vault? It cannot be denied that the hole made possible the entry of more water and soil
than was natural had there been no hole.
The law defines negligence as the “omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.”14 In
the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the
performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.
The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act—boring of the hole—negate the
allegation of negligence. The reason for the act was explained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who
said that:
It has been established in this particular case that a certain Vicente Juan Syquia was interred on July 25,
1978 at the Parañaque Cemetery of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., will you please tell the
Hon. Court what or whether you have participation in connection with said internment (sic)?
A day before Juan (sic) Syquia was buried our personnel dug a grave. After digging the next morning a
vault was taken and placed in the grave and when the vault was placed on the grave a hole was placed
on the vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining heavily then because the
vault has no hole the vault will float and the grave would be filled with water and the digging would
caved (sic) in and the earth, the earth would (sic) caved in and fill up the grave.”15 (Italics ours)
Except for the foreman’s opinion that the concrete vault may float should there be a heavy rainfall, from
the above-men-tioned explanation, private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving
in of earth around the grave filling the same with earth.
__________________
14 CIVIL CODE, Article 1173.
15 TSN, June 28, 1982, p. 2.
633
VOL. 217, JANUARY 27, 1993
633
Santiago vs. Vasquez
Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private respondent, We find no reason to award
damages in favor of petitioners.
In the light of the foregoing facts, and construed in the language of the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, We are constrained to AFFIRM in toto the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
dated December 7, 1990. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Decision affirmed.
Note.—A person is expected to take ordinary care of his affairs (Quality Tobacco Corporation vs.
Intermediate Appel-late Court, 187 SCRA 210).
——o0o—— Syquia vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 624, G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993
Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co.
(CA-G.R. No. 3240-R, September 20, 1949)Reyes, JBL:In the afternoon of May 5, 1946while the plaintiff-
appellee and other companions were loading grass,an electric transmission wire, installed and
maintained by the defendant Philippine Power andDevelopment Co., Inc., alongside the road suddenly
parted, and one of the broken ends hit the head of the plaintiff as he was about to board the truck. As a
result, plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400volts of the wire. The electric charge coursed through his
body and caused extensive and seriousmultiple burns from skull to eyes, leaving the bone exposed in
some parts and causing intense pain andwounds that were not completely healed when the case was
tried on June 18, 1947, over one year afterthe incident. Defendant disclaimed such liability on the
ground that the plaintiff had failed to show anyspecific act of negligence.
The appellate court, in overruling this defense, held: “While it is the rule, as contended by the appellant,
that in case of non-contractual negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
toestablish that the proximate cause of injury was the negligence of the defendant, it is also a
recognized
principle that ‘where the thing that causes injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the
exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does
notoccur as if he having such control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
the
explanation, that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care.’ And the burden of evidence is
shifted to him to establish that he had observed due diligence and care. This rule is known by
the nameof res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself), and is peculiarly applicable to
the case atbar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every night to be on the highway, and the
electricwire was under the sole control of the defendant company. In the ordinary course of events,
electricwires do not part suddenly in fair weather and injure people, unless they are subject to unusual
strainand stress or there are defects in their installation, maintenance and supervision, just as barrels
do notordinarily roll out of the warehouse windows to injure passers-by, unless someone is negligent
(which isadmittedly not present), the fact that the wire snapped suffices to raise a reasonable
presumption of
negligence in its installation, care and maintenance. Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron Pollock “if
there are any facts inconsistent with negl
igence, it is for the defendant to prove.”
596
Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-47851. October 3, 1986.*
JUAN F. NAKPIL & SONS, and JUAN F. NAKPIL, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., JUAN J. CARLOS, and the PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, respondents.
No. L-47863. October 3, 1986.*
THE UNITED CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
No. L-47896. October 3, 1986.*

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Obligations and Contracts; Damages; Requisites for exemption from liability due to an “act of God.”—To
exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due
to an “act of God,’ the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner;
and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
Same; Same; Having made substantial deviations from plans and specifications, having failed to observe
requisite workmanship in construction, and the architect made plans that contain defects and
inadequacies, both contractor and architect cannot escape liability for damages sustained by the
building that collapsed in the wake of an earthquake on Aug. 2, 1968.—The negligence of the defendant
and the third-party defendants petitioners was established beyond dispute both in the lower court and
in the Intermediate Appellate Court. Defendant United Construction Co., Inc. was found to have made
substantial deviations from the plans and specifications, and to have failed to observe the requisite
workmanship in the construction as well as to exercise the requisite degree of supervision; while the
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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VOL. 144, OCTOBER 3, 1986
597
third-party defendants were found to have inadequacies or defects in the plans and specifications
prepared by them. As correctly assessed by both courts, the defects in the construction and in the plans
and specifications were the proximate causes that rendered the PBA building unable to withstand the
earthquake of August 2, 1968. For this reason the defendant and third-party defendants cannot claim
exemption from liability.
Same; Same; Fact that all other buildings withstood the earthquake, except the one at bar, cannot be
ignored.—In any event, the relevant and logical observations of the trial court as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals that “while it is not possible to state with certainty that the building would not have
collapsed were those defects not present, the fact remains that several buildings in the same area
withstood the earthquake to which the building of the plaintiff was similarly subjected,” cannot be
ignored.
Same; Same; The lower courts found, among others, that spirals in column A5, ground floor were cut.—
The cutting of the spirals in column A5, ground floor is the subject of great contention between the
parties and deserves special consideration. The proper placing of the main reinforcements and spirals in
column A5, ground floor, is the responsibility of the general contractor which is the UCCI. The burden of
proof, therefore, that this cutting was done by others is upon the defendants. Other than a strong
allegation and assertion that it is the plumber or his men who may have done the cutting (and this was
flatly denied by the plumber) no conclusive proof was presented. The engineering experts for the
defendants asserted that they could have no motivation for cutting the bar because they can simply
replace the spirals by wrapping around a new set of spirals. This is not quite correct. There is evidence to
show that the pouring of concrete for columns was sometimes done through the beam and girder
reinforcements which were already in place as in the case of column A4 second floor. If the
reinforcement for the girder and column is to subsequently wrap around the spirals, this would not do
for the elasticity of steel would prevent the making of tight column spirals and loose or improper spirals
would result. The proper way is to produce correct spirals down from the top of the main column bars, a
procedure which can not be done if either the beam or girder reinforcement is already in place. The
engineering experts for the defendants strongly assert and apparently believe that the cutting of the
spirals did not materially diminish the strength of the column. This belief together with the difficulty of
slipping the spirals on the
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top of the column once the beam reinforcement is in place may be a sufficient motivation for the cutting
of the spirals themselves. The defendants, therefore, should be held responsible for the consequences
arising from the loss of strength or ductility in column A5 which may have contributed to the damages
sustained by the building.
Same; Same; One who creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability although an act of God may
have intervened.—Relative thereto, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Tucker v. Milan (49 O.G. 4379,
4380) which may be in point in this case, reads: “One who negligently creates a dangerous condition
cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof, although the act of a third
person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.” As already
discussed, the destruction was not purely an act of God. Truth to tell hundreds of ancient buildings in
the vicinity were hardly affected by the earthquake. Only one thing spells out the fatal difference; gross
negligence and evident bad faith, without which the damage would not have occurred.
Same: Same; Liability of architect and contractor for collapse of building is solidary.—WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED and considering the special and environmental
circumstances of this case, We deem it reasonable to render a decision imposing, as We do hereby
impose, upon the defendant and the third-party defendants (with the exception of Roman Ozaeta) a
solidary (Art. 1723, Civil Code, Supra, p. 10) indemnity in favor of the Philippine Bar Association of FIVE
MILLION (P5,000,000.00) Pesos to cover all damages (with the exception of attorney’s fees) occasioned
by the loss of the building (including interest charges and lost rentals) and an additional ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) Pesos as and for attorney’s fees, the total sum being payable upon the finality
of this decision. Upon failure to pay on such finality, twelve (12%) per cent interest per annum shall be
imposed upon afore-mentioned amounts from finality until paid. Solidary costs against the defendant
and third-party defendants (except Roman Ozaeta).
PETITIONS for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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PARAS, J.:
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the November28, 1977 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. No.51771-R modifying the decision of the Court of First Instanceof Manila, Branch V, in Civil
Case No. 74958 dated September21, 1971 as modified by the Order of the lower court datedDecember
8, 1971. The Court of Appeals in modifying the decision of the lower court included an award of an
additionalamount of P200,000.00 to the Philippine Bar Association to bepaid jointly and severally by the
defendant United Construction Co. and by the third-party defendants Juan F.Nakpil and Sons and Juan F.
Nakpil.
The dispositive portion of the modified decision of the lower court reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
“(a) Ordering defendant United Construction Co., Inc. and third-party defendants (except Roman
Ozaeta) to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P989,335.68 with interest at the legal rate
from November 29, 1968, the date of the filing of the complaint until full payment;
“(b) Dismissing the complaint with respect to defendant Juan J. Carlos;
“(c) Dismissing the third-party complaint;
“(d) Dismissing the defendant’s and third-party defendants’ counterclaims for lack of merit;
“(e) Ordering defendant United Construction Co., Inc. and third-party defendants (except Roman
Ozaeta) to pay the costs in equal shares.
“SO ORDERED.” (Record on Appeal, p. 521; Rollo, L-47851, p. 169).
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

“WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified to include an award of P200,000.00 in favor of
plaintiff-appellant Philippine Bar Association, with interest at the legal rate from November 29, 1968
until full payment to be paid jointly and severally by defen-
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dant United Construction Co., Inc. and third party defendants (except Roman Ozaeta). In all other
respects, the judgment dated September 21, 1971 as modified in the December 8, 1971 Order of the
lower court is hereby affirmed with COSTS to be paid by the defendant and third party defendant
(except Roman Ozaeta) in equal shares.
“SO ORDERED.”
Petitioners Juan F. Nakpil & Sons in L-47851 and United Construction Co., Inc. and Juan J. Carlos in L-
47863 seek the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, among other things, for exoneration
from liability while petitioner Philippine Bar Association in L-47896 seeks the modification of aforesaid
decision to obtain an award of P1,830,000.00 for the loss of the PBA building plus four (4) times such
amount as damages resulting in increased cost of the building; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
These petitions arising from the same case filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila were
consolidated by this Court in the resolution of May 10, 1978 requiring the respective respondents to
comment. (Rollo, L-47851, p. 172).
The facts as found by the lower court (Decision, CC. No. 74958; Record on Appeal, pp. 269-348; pp. 520-
521; Rollo, L-47851, p. 169) and affirmed by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
The plaintiff, Philippine Bar Association, a civic-non-profit association, incorporated under the
Corporation Law, decided to construct an office building on its 840 square meters lot located at the
comer of Aduana and Arzobispo Streets, Intramuros, Manila. The construction was undertaken by the
United Construction, Inc. on an “administration” basis, on the suggestion of Juan J. Carlos, the president
and general manager of said corporation. The proposal was approved by plaintiff’s board of directors
and signed by its president Roman Ozaeta, a third-party defendant in this case. The plans and
specifications for the building were prepared by the other third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons.
The building was completed in June, 1966.
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In the early morning of August 2, 1968 an unusually strong earthquake hit Manila and its environs and
the building in question sustained major damage. The front columns of the building buckled, causing the
building to tilt forward dangerously. The tenants vacated the building in view of its precarious condition.
As a temporary remedial measure, the building was shored up by United Construction, Inc. at the cost of
P13,661.28.
On November 29, 1968, the plaintiff commenced this action for the recovery of damages arising from
the partial collapse of the building against United Construction, Inc. and its President and General
Manager Juan J. Carlos as defendants. Plaintiff alleges that the collapse of the building was accused by
defects in the construction, the failure of the contractors to follow plans and specifications and
violations by the defendants of the terms of the contract.
Defendants in turn filed a third-party complaint against the architects who prepared the plans and
specifications, alleging in essence that the collapse of the building was due to the defects in the said
plans and specifications. Roman Ozaeta, the then president of the plaintiff Bar Association was included
as a third-party defendant for damages for having included Juan J. Carlos, President of the United
Construction Co., Inc. as party defendant.
On March 3, 1969, the plaintiff and third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons and Juan F. Nakpil
presented a written stipulation which reads:
“1. That in relation to defendants’ answer with counterclaims and third-party complaints and the third-
party defendants Nakpil & Sons’ answer thereto, the plaintiff need not amend its complaint by including
the said Juan F. Nakpil & Sons and Juan F. Nakpil personally as parties defendant.
2. That in the event (unexpected by the undersigned) that the Court should find after the trial that the
above-named defendants Juan J. Carlos and United Construction Co., Inc. are free from any blame and
liability for the collapse of the PBA Building, and should further find that the collapse of said building
was due to defects and/or inadequacy of the plans, designs, and specifications prepared by the third-
party defendants, or in the event that the Court may
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find Juan F. Nakpil and Sons and/or Juan F. Nakpil contributorily negligent or in any way jointly and
solidarity liable with the defendants, judgment may be rendered in whole or in part, as the case may be,
against Juan F. Nakpil & Sons and/or Juan F. Nakpil in favor of the plaintiff to all intents and purposes as
if plaintiff’s complaint has been duly amended by including the said Juan F. Nakpil & Sons and Juan F.
Nakpil as parties defendant and by alleging causes of action against them including, among others, the
defects or inadequacy of the plans, designs, and specifications prepared by them and/or failure in the
performance of their contract with plaintiff.
3. Both parties hereby jointly petition this Honorable Court to approve this stipulation.” (Record on
Appeal, pp. 274-275; Rollo, L-47851, p. 169).
Upon the issues being joined, a pre-trial was conducted on March 7, 1969, during which among others,
the parties agreed to refer the technical issues involved in the case to a Commissioner. Mr. Andres O.
Hizon, who was ultimately appointed by the trial court, assumed his office as Commissioner, charged
with the duty to try the following issues:
“1. Whether the damage sustained by the PBA building during the August 2, 1968 earthquake had been
caused, directly or indirectly, by:
(a) The inadequacies or defects in the plans and specifications prepared by third-party defendants;
(b) The deviations, if any, made by the defendants from said plans and specifications and how said
deviations contributed to the damage sustained;
(c) The alleged failure of defendants to observe the requisite quality of materials and workmanship in
the construction of the building;
(d) The alleged failure to exercise the requisite degree of supervision expected of the architect, the
contractor and/or the owner of the building;
(e) An act of God or a fortuitous event; and
(f) Any other cause not herein above specified.
2. If the cause of the damage suffered by the building arose from a combination of the above-
enumerated factors, the degree or
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proportion in which each individual factor contributed to the damage sustained;
3. Whether the building is now a total loss and should be completely demolished or whether it may still
be repaired and restored to a tenantable condition. In the latter case, the determination of the cost of
such restoration or repair, and the value of any remaining construction, such as the foundation, which
may still be utilized or availed of.” (Record on Appeal, pp. 275-276; Rollo, L-47851, p. 169).
Thus, the issues of this case were divided into technical issues and non-technical issues. As aforestated
the technical issues were referred to the Commissioner. The non-technical issues were tried by the
Court.
Meanwhile, plaintiff moved twice for the demolition of the building on the ground that it may topple
down in case of a strong earthquake. The motions were opposed by the defendants and the matter was
referred to the Commissioner. Finally, on April 30, 1979 the building was authorized to be demolished at
the expense of the plaintiff, but not another earthquake of high intensity on April 7, 1970 followed by
other strong earthquakes on April 9, and 12, 1970, caused further damage to the property. The actual
demolition was undertaken by the buyer of the damaged building. (Record on Appeal, pp. 278-280;
Ibid.)
After the protracted hearings, the Commissioner eventually submitted his report on September 25, 1970
with the findings that while the damage sustained by the PBA building was caused directly by the August
2, 1968 earthquake whose magnitude was estimated at 7.3 they were also caused by the defects in the
plans and specifications prepared by the third-party defendants’ architects, deviations from said plans
and specifications by the defendant contractors and failure of the latter to observe the requisite
workmanship in the construction of the building and of the contractors, architects and even the owners
to exercise the requisite degree of supervision in the construction of subject building.
All the parties registered their objections to aforesaid findings which in turn were answered by the
Commissioner.
The trial court agreed with the findings of the Commissioner
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except as to the holding that the owner is charged with full time supervision of the construction. The
Court sees no legal or contractual basis for such conclusion. (Record on Appeal, pp. 309-328; Ibid.).
Thus, on September 21, 1971, the lower court rendered the assailed decision which was modified by the
Intermediate Appellate Court on November 28, 1977.
All the parties herein appealed from the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court. Hence, these
petitions.
On May 11, 1978, the United Architects of the Philippines, the Association of Civil Engineers, and the
Philippine Institute of Architects filed with the Court a motion to intervene as amicus curiae. They
proposed to present a position paper on the liability of architects when a building collapses and to
submit likewise a critical analysis with computations on the divergent views on the design and plans as
submitted by the experts procured by the parties. The motion having been granted, the amicus curiae
were granted a period of 60 days within which to submit their position.
After the parties had all filed their comments, We gave due course to the petitions in Our Resolution of
July 21, 1978.
The position papers of the amicus curiae (submitted on November 24, 1978) were duly noted.
The amicus curiae gave the opinion that the plans and specifications of the Nakpils were not defective.
But the Commissioner, when asked by Us to comment, reiterated his conclusion that the defects in the
plans and specifications indeed existed.
Using the same authorities availed of by the amicus curiae such as the Manila Code (Ord. No. 4131) and
the 1966 Asep Code, the Commissioner added that even if it can be proved that the defects in the
construction alone (and not in the plans and design) caused the damage to the building, still the
deficiency in the original design and lack of specific provisions against torsion in the original plans and
the overload on the ground floor columns (found by all the experts including the original designer)
certainly contributed to the damage which occurred. (Ibid, p. 174).
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In their respective briefs petitioners, among others, raised the following assignments of errors:
Philippine Bar Association claimed that the measure of damages should not be limited to P1,100,000.00
as estimated cost of repairs or to the period of six (6) months for loss of rentals while United
Construction Co., Inc. and the Nakpils claimed that it was an act of God that caused the failure of the
building which should exempt them from responsibility and not the defective construction, poor
workmanship, deviations from plans and specifications and other imperfections in the case of United
Construction Co., Inc. or the deficiencies in the design, plans and specifications prepared by petitioners
in the case of the Nakpils. Both UCCI and the Nakpils object to the payment of the additional amount of
P200,000.00 imposed by the Court of Appeals. UCCI also claimed that it should be reimbursed the
expenses of shoring the building in the amount of P13,661.28 while the Nakpils opposed the payment of
damages jointly and solidarity with UCCI.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not an act of God,—an unusually strong earthquake—which
caused the failure of the building, exempts from liability, parties who are otherwise liable because of
their negligence.
The applicable law governing the rights and liabilities of the parties herein is Article 1723 of the New
Civil Code, which provides:
“Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for
damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure the same should collapse by reason
of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is
likewise responsible for the damage if the edifice falls within the same period on account of defects in
the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of
the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarity
liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the causes of action by
reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
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The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building.”
On the other hand, the general rule is that no person shall be responsible for events which could not be
foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable (Article 1174, New Civil Code).
An act of God has been defined as an accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without
human intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been expected,
could have been prevented. (1 Corpus Juris 1174).
There is no dispute that the earthquake of August 2, 1968 is a fortuitous event or an act of God.
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation
due to an “act of God,” the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner;
and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
(Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of
Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the Phil. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45
Phil. 657).
Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud,
negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided
for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned
exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or
entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found
to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be
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from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it
were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).
Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a
loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was
the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned. (Fish &
Elective Co. v. Phil. Motors, 55 Phil. 129; Tucker v. Milan, 49 O.G. 4379; Limpangco & Sons v. Yangco
Steamship Co., 34 Phil. 594, 604; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).
The negligence of the defendant and the third-party defendants petitioners was established beyond
dispute both in the lower court and in the Intermediate Appellate Court. Defendant United Construction
Co., Inc. was found to have made substantial deviations from the plans and specifications, and to have
failed to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction as well as to exercise the requisite
degree of supervision; while the third-party defendants were found to have inadequacies or defects in
the plans and specifications prepared by them. As correctly assessed by both courts, the defects in the
construction and in the plans and specifications were the proximate causes that rendered the PBA
building unable to withstand the earthquake of August 2, 1968. For this reason the defendant and third-
party defendants cannot claim exemption from liability. (Decision, Court of Appeals, pp. 30-31).
It is well settled that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on
this court (cases cited in Tolentino vs. de Jesus, 56 SCRA 67; Cesar vs. Sandiganbayan, January 17, 1985,
134 SCRA 105, 121), unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and
conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admis-
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sions of both appellant and appellees (Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., February 8, 1967, 19 SCRA 289,
291-292; Roque vs. Buan, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 648, 651); (7) the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Garcia vs. CA, June 30, 1970, 33
SCRA 622; Alsua-Bett vs. Court of Appeals, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 322, 366); (10) the finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence
on record (Salazar vs. Gutierrez, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 243, 247; Cited in G.R. No. 66497-98, Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, July 10, 1986).
It is evident that the case at bar does not fall under any of the exceptions above-mentioned. On the
contrary, the records show that the lower court spared no effort in arriving at the correct appreciation
of facts by the referral of technical issues to a Commissioner chosen by the parties whose findings and
conclusions remained convincingly unrebutted by the in-tervenors/amicus curiae who were allowed to
intervene in the Supreme Court.
In any event, the relevant and logical observations of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
that “while it is not possible to state with certainty that the building would not have collapsed were
those defects not present, the fact remains that several buildings in the same area withstood the
earthquake to which the building of the plaintiff was similarly subjected,” cannot be ignored.
The next issue to be resolved is the amount of damages to be awarded to the PBA for the partial
collapse (and eventual complete collapse) of its building.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the trial court based on the report of the Commissioner
that the total amount required to repair the PBA building and to restore it to tenantable condition was
P900,000.00 inasmuch as it was not initially a total loss. However, while the trial court awarded the PBA
said amount as damages, plus unrealized rental income for one-half year, the Court of Appeals modified
the amount by
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awarding in favor of PBA an additional sum of P200,000.00 representing the damage suffered by the
PBA building as a result of another earthquake that occurred on April 7, 1970 (L-47896, Vol. I, p. 92).
The PBA in its brief insists that the proper award should be P1,830,000.00 representing the total value of
the building (L-47896, PBA’s No. 1 Assignment of Error, p. 19), while both the NAKPILS and UNITED
question the additional award of P200,000.00 in favor of the PBA (L-47851, NAKPIL’s Brief as Petitioner,
p. 6, UNITED’s Brief as Petitioner, p. 25). The PBA further urges that the unrealized rental income
awarded to it should not be limited to a period of one-half year but should be computed on a continuing
basis at the rate of P178,671.76 a year until the judgment for the principal amount shall have been
satisfied (L-47896, PBA’s No. 11 Assignment of Errors, p. 19).
The collapse of the PBA building as a result of the August 2, 1968 earthquake was only partial and it is
undisputed that the building could then still be repaired and restored to its tenantable condition. The
PBA, however, in view of its lack of needed funding, was unable, thru no fault of its own, to have the
building repaired. UNITED, on the other hand, spent P13,661.28 to shore up the building after the
August 2, 1968 earthquake (L-47896, CA Decision, p. 46). Because of the earthquake on April 7, 1970,
the trial court after the needed consultations, authorized the total demolition of the building (L-47896,
Vol. 1, pp. 53-54).
There should be no question that the NAKPILS and UNITED are liable for the damage resulting from the
partial and eventual collapse of the PBA building as a result of the earthquakes.
We quote with approval the following from the erudite decision penned by Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez
(now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) while still an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals:
“There is no question that an earthquake and other forces of nature such as cyclones, drought, floods,
lightning, and perils of the sea are acts of God. It does not necessarily follow, however, that
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specific losses and suffering resulting from the occurrence of these natural force are also acts of God.
We are not convinced on the basis of the evidence on record that from the thousands of structures in
Manila, God singled out the blameless PBA building in Intramuros and around six or seven other
buildings in various parts of the city for collapse or severe damage and that God alone was responsible
for the damages and losses thus suffered.
The record is replete with evidence of defects and deficiencies in the designs and plans, defective
construction, poor workmanship, deviation from plans and specifications and other imperfections.
These deficiencies are attributable to negligent men and not to a perfect God.
The act-of-God arguments of the defendants-appellants and third party defendants-appellants

presented in their briefs are premised on legal generalizations or speculations and on theological
fatalism both of which ignore the plain facts. The lengthy discussion of United on ordinary earthquakes
and unusually strong earthquakes and on ordinary fortuitous events and extraordinary fortuitous events
leads to its argument that the August 2, 1968 earthquake was of such an overwhelming and destructive
character that by its own force and independent of the particular negligence alleged, the injury would
have been produced. If we follow this line of speculative reasoning, we will be forced to conclude that
under such a situation scores of buildings in the vicinity and in other parts of Manila would have toppled
down. Following the same line of reasoning, Nakpil and Sons alleges that the designs were adequate in
accordance with preAugust 2, 1968 knowledge and appear inadequate only in the light of engineering
information acquired after the earthquake. If this were so, hundreds of ancient buildings which survived
the earthquake better than the two-year old PBA building must have been designed and constructed by
architects and contractors whose knowledge and foresight were unexplainably auspicious and
prophetic. Fortunately, the facts on record allow a more down to earth explanation of the collapse. The
failure of the PBA building, as a unique and distinct construction with no reference or comparison to
other buildings, to weather the severe earthquake forces was traced to design deficiencies and defective
construction, factors which are neither mysterious nor esoteric. The theological allusion of appellant
United that God acts in mysterious ways His wonders to perform impresses us to be inappropriate. The
evidence reveals defects and deficiencies in design and construction. There is no mystery about these
acts of negligence. The collapse of the PBA building was no wonder performed by God. It was a result of
the imperfections in the work of the architects and
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the people in the construction company. More relevant to our mind is the lesson from the parable of the
wise man in the Sermon on the Mount, “which built his house upon a rock; and the rain descended and
the floods came and the winds blew and beat upon that house; and it fell not; for it was founded upon a
rock” and of the “foolish man which built his house upon the sand. And the rain descended and the
floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell and great was the fall of it. (St.
Matthew 7:24-27).” The requirement that a building should withstand rains, floods, winds, earthquakes,
and natural forces is precisely the reason why we have professional experts like architects, and
engineers. Designs and constructions vary under varying circumstances and conditions but the
requirement to design and build well does not change.
The findings of the lower Court on the cause of the collapse are more rational and accurate. Instead of
laying the blame solely on the motions and forces generated by the earthquake, it also examined the
ability of the PBA building, as designed and constructed, to withstand and successfully weather those
forces.
The evidence sufficiently supports a conclusion that the negligence and fault of both United and Nakpil
and Sons, not a mysterious act of an inscrutable God, were responsible for the damages. The Report of
the Commissioner, Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report, Third Party Defendants’ Objections to the Report,
Defendants’ Objections to the Report, Commissioner’s Answer to the various Objections, Plaintiffs’
Reply to the Commissioner’s Answer, Defendants’ Reply to the Commissioner’s Answer, CounterReply to
Defendants’ Reply, and Third-Party Defendants’ Reply to the Commissioner’s Report not to mention the
exhibits and the testimonies show that the main arguments raised on appeal were already raised during
the trial and fully considered by the lower Court. A reiteration of these same arguments on appeal fails
to convince us that we should reverse or disturb the lower Court’s factual findings and its conclusions
drawn from the facts, among them:
“The Commissioner also found merit in the allegations of the defendants as to the physical evidence
before and after the earthquake showing the inadequacy of design, to wit:
“Physical evidence before the earthquake, providing (sic) inadequacy of design;
1. Inadequate design was the cause of the failure of the building.
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2. Sun-baffles on the two sides and in front of the building;
a. Increase the inertia forces that move the building laterally toward the Manila Fire Department.
b. Create another stiffness-imbalance.
3. The embedded 4" diameter cast iron downspout on all exterior columns reduces the cross-sectional
area of each of the columns and the strength thereof.
4. Two front corners, A7 and D7 columns were very much less reinforced.
Physical Evidence After the Earthquake, Proving Inadequacy of design;
1. Column A7 suffered the severest fracture and maximum sagging. Also D7.
2. There are more damages in the front part of the building than towards the rear, not only in columns
but also in slabs.
3. Building leaned and sagged more on the front part of the building.
4. Floors showed maximum sagging on the sides and toward the front corner parts of the building.
5. There was a lateral displacement of the building of about 8", Maximum sagging occurs at the column
A7 where the floor is lower by 80 cm. than the highest slab level.
6. Slab at the corner column D7 sagged by 38 cm.”
The Commissioner concluded that there were deficiencies or defects in the design, plans and
specifications of the PBA building which involved appreciable risks with respect to the accidental forces
which may result from earthquake shocks. He conceded, however, that the fact that those deficiencies
or defects may have arisen from an obsolete or not too conservative code or even a code that does not
require a design for earthquake forces mitigates in a large measure the responsibility or liability of the
architect and engineer designer.
The Third-party defendants, who are the most concerned with this portion of the Commissioner’s
report, voiced opposition to the same on the grounds that (a) the finding is based on a basic erroneous
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conception as to the design concept of the building, to wit, that the design is essentially that of a heavy
rectangular box on stilts with shear wall at one end; (b) the finding that there were defects and a
deficiency in the design of the building would at best be based on an approximation and, therefore,
rightly belonged to the realm of speculation, rather than of certainty and could very possibly be outright
error; (c) the Commissioner has failed to back up or support his finding with extensive, complex and
highly specialized computations and analyzes which he himself emphasizes are necessary in the
determination of such a highly technical question; and (d) the Commissioner has analyzed the design of
the PBA building not in the light of existing and available earthquake engineering knowledge at the time
of the preparation of the design, but in the light of recent and current standards.
The Commissioner answered the said objections alleging that third-party defendants’ objections were
based on estimates or exhibits not presented during the hearing; that the resort to engineering
references posterior to the date of the preparation of the plans was induced by the third-party
defendants themselves who submitted computations of the third-party defendants are erroneous.
The issue presently considered is admittedly a technical one of the highest degree. It involves questions
not within the ordinary competence of the bench and the bar to resolve by themselves. Counsel for the
third-party defendants has aptly remarked that “engineering, although dealing in mathematics, is not an
exact science and that the present knowledge as to the nature of earthquakes and the behaviour of
forces generated by them still leaves much to be desired; so much so “that the experts of the different
parties, who are all engineers, cannot agree on what equation to use, as to what earthquake co-
efficients are, on the codes to be used and even as to the type of structure that the PBA building (is)
was” (p. 29, Memo, of third-party defendants before the Commissioner).
The difficulty expected by the Court if this technical matter were to be tried and inquired into by the
Court itself, coupled with the intrinsic nature of the questions involved therein, constituted the reason
for the reference of the said issues to a Commissioner whose qualifications and experience have
eminently qualified him for the task, and whose competence had not been questioned by the parties
until he submitted his report. Within the pardonable limit of the Court’s ability to comprehend the
meaning of the Commissioner’s report on this issue, and the objections voiced to the same, the Court
sees no compelling reasons to disturb the findings of the Commissioner that there were defects and
deficiencies in the design, plans
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and specifications prepared by third-party defendants, and that said defects and deficiencies involved
appreciable risks with respect to the accidental forces which may result from earthquake shocks.
(2) (a) The deviations, if any, made by the defendants from the plans and specifications, and how said
deviations contributed to the damage sustained by the building.
(b) The alleged failure of defendants to observe the requisite quality of materials and workmanship in
the construction of the building.
These two issues, being interrelated with each other, will be discussed together.
The findings of the Commissioner on these issues were as follows:

“We now turn to the construction of the PBA Building and the alleged deficiencies or defects in the
construction and violations or deviations from the plans and specifications. All these may be
summarized as follows:
a. Summary of alleged defects as reported by Engineer Mario M. Bundalian.
(1) Wrongful and defective placing of reinforcing bars.
(2) Absence of effective and desirable integration of the 3 bars in the cluster.
(3) Oversize coarse aggregates: 1-1/4 to 2" were used. Specification requires no larger than 1 inch.
(4) Reinforcement assembly is not concentric with the column, eccentricity being 3" off when on one
face the main bars are only 1½" from the surface.
(5) Prevalence of honeycombs,
(6) Contraband construction joints,
(7) Absence, or omission, or over spacing of spiral hoops,
(8) Deliberate severance of spirals into semi-circles in noted on Col. A5, ground floor,
(9) Defective construction joints in Columns A3, C7, D7 and D4, ground floor.
(10) Undergraduate concrete is evident,
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(11) Big cavity in core of Column 2A-4, second floor,
(12) Columns buckled at different planes. Columns buckled worst where there are no spirals or where
spirals are cut. Columns suffered worst displacement where the eccentricity of the columnar
reinforcement assembly is more acute.
b. Summary of alleged defects as reported by Engr. An-tonio Avecilla.Columns are first (or ground) floor,
unless otherwise stated.
(1) Column D4—Spacing of spiral is changed from 2" to 5" on centers,
(2) Column D5—No spiral up to a height of 22" from the ground floor,
(3) Column D6—Spacing of spiral over 4½,
(4) Column D7—Lack of lateral ties,

(5) Column C7—Absence of spiral to a height of 20" from the ground level, Spirals are at 2" from the
exterior column face and 6" from the inner column face,
(6) Column B6—Lack of spiral on 2 feet below the floor beams,
(7) Column B5—Lack of spirals at a distance of 26" below the beam,
(8) Column B7—Spirals not tied to vertical reinforcing bars, Spirals are uneven 2" to 4",
(9) Column A3—Lack of lateral ties,
(10) Column A4—Spirals cut off and welded to two separate clustered vertical bars,
(11) Column A4—(second floor) Column is completely hollow to a height of 30"
(12) Column A5—Spirals were cut from the floor level to the bottom of the spandrel beam to a height of
6 feet,
(13) Column A6—No spirals up to a height of 30" above the ground floor level,
(14) Column A7—Lack of lateral ties or spirals,
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c. Summary of alleged defects as reported by the experts of the Third-Party defendants.
Ground floor columns.
(1) Column A4—Spirals are cut,
(2) Column A5—Spirals are cut,
(3) Column A6—At lower 18” spirals are absent,
(4) Column A7—Ties are too far apart,
(5) Column B5—At upper fourth of column spirals are either absent or improperly spliced,
(6) Column B6—At upper 2 feet spirals are absent,
(7) Column B7—At upper fourth of column spirals missing or improperly spliced.
(8) Column C7—Spirals are absent at lowest 18 “
(9) Column D5—At lowest 2 feet spirals are absent,
(10) Column D6—Spirals are too far apart and apparently improperly spliced,
(11) Column D7—Lateral ties are too far apart, spaced 16” on centers.
There is merit in many of these allegations. The explanations given by the engineering experts for the
defendants are either contrary to general principles of engineering design for reinforced concrete or not
applicable to the requirements for ductility and strength of reinforced concrete in earthquake-resistant
design and construction.
We shall first classify and consider defects which may have appreciable bearing or relation to the
earthquake-resistant property of the building.
As heretofore mentioned, details which insure ductility at or near the connections between columns and
girders are desirable in earthquake-resistant design and construction. The omission of spirals and ties or
hoops at the bottom and/or tops of columns contributed greatly to the loss of earthquake-resistant
strength. The plans and specifications required that these spirals and ties be carried from the floor level
to the bottom reinforcement of the deeper beam (p. 1, Specifications, p. 970, Reference 11). There were
several clear evidences where this was not done especially in some of the ground floor col-
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umns which failed.
There were also unmistakable evidences that the spacings of the spirals and ties in the columns were in
many cases greater than those called for in the plans and specifications resulting again in loss of
earthquake-resistant strength. The assertion of the engineering experts for the defendants that the
improper spacings and the cutting of the spirals did not result in loss of strength in the column cannot
be maintained and is certainly contrary to the general principles of column design and construction. And
even granting that there be no loss in strength at the yield point (an assumption which is very doubtful)
the cutting or improper spacings of spirals will certainly result in the loss of the plastic range or ductility
in the column and it is precisely this plastic range or ductility which is desirable and needed for
earthquake-resistant strength.
There is no excuse for the cavity or hollow portion in the column A4, second floor, and although this
column did not fail, this is certainly an evidence on the part of the contractor of poor construction.
The effect of eccentricities in the columns which were measured at about 2½ inches maximum may be
approximated in relation to column loads and column and beam moments. The main effect of
eccentricity is to change the beam or girder span. The effect on the measured eccentricity of 2½ inches,
therefore, is to increase or diminish the column load by a maximum of about 1% and to increase or
diminish the column or beam movements by about a maximum of 2%. While these can certainly be
absorbed within the factor of safety, they nevertheless diminish said factor of safety.
The cutting of the spirals in column A5, ground floor is the subject of great contention between the
parties and deserves special consideration.
The proper placing of the main reinforcements and spirals in column A5, ground floor, is the
responsibility of the general contractor which is the UCCI. The burden of proof, therefore, that this
cutting was done by others is upon the defendants. Other than a strong allegation and assertion that it is
the plumber or his men who may have done the cutting (and this was flatly denied by the plumber) no
conclusive proof was presented. The engineering experts for the defendants asserted that they could
have no motivation for cutting the bar because they can simply replace the spirals by wrapping around a
new
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set of spirals. This is not quite correct. There is evidence to show that the pouring of concrete for
columns was sometimes done through the beam and girder reinforcements which were already in place
as in the case of column A4 second floor. If the reinforcement for the girder and column is to
subsequently wrap around the spirals, this would not do for the elasticity of steel would prevent the
making of tight column spirals and loose or improper spirals would result. The proper way is to produce
correct spirals down from the top of the main column bars, a procedure which can not be done if either
the beam or girder reinforcement is already in place. The engineering experts for the defendants
strongly assert and apparently believe that the cutting of the spirals did not materially diminish the
strength of the column. This belief together with the difficulty of slipping the spirals on the top of the
column once the beam reinforcement is in place may be a sufficient motivation for the cutting of the
spirals themselves. The defendants, therefore, should be held responsible for the consequences arising
from the loss of strength or ductility in column A5 which may have contributed to the damages
sustained by the building.
The lack of proper length of splicing of spirals was also proven in the visible spirals of the columns where
spalling of the concrete cover had taken place. This lack of proper splicing contributed in a small
measure to the loss of strength.
The effects of all the other proven and visible defects although minor can certainly be accumulated so
that they can contribute to an appreciable loss in earthquake-resistant strength. The engineering
experts for the defendants submitted an estimate on some of these defects in the amount of a few
percent. If accumulated, therefore, including the effect of eccentricity in the column the loss in strength
due to these minor defects may run to as much as ten percent.
To recapitulate: the omission or lack of spirals and ties at the bottom and/or at the top of some of the
ground floor columns contributed greatly to the collapse of the PBA building since it is at these points
where the greater part of the failure occurred. The liability for the cutting of the spirals in column A5,
ground floor, in the considered opinion of the Commissioner rests on the shoulders of the defendants
and the loss of strength in this column contributed to the damage which occurred.
It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the proven defects, deficiencies and violations of the plans
and specifica-
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tions of the PBA building contributed to the damages which resulted during the earthquake of August 2,
1968 and the vice of these defects and deficiencies is that they not only increase but also aggravate the
weakness mentioned in the design of the structure. In other words, these defects and deficiencies not
only tend to add but also to multiply the effects of the shortcomings in the design of the building. We
may say, therefore, that the defects and deficiencies in the construction contributed greatly to the
damage which occurred.
Since the execution and supervision of the construction work in the hands of the contractor is direct and
positive, the presence of existence of all the major defects and deficiencies noted and proven manifests
an element of negligence which may amount to imprudence in the construction work.” (pp. 42-49,
Commissioner’s Report).
As the parties most directly concerned with this portion of the Commissioner’s report, the defendants
voiced their objections to the same on the grounds that the Commissioner should have specified the
defects found by him to be “meritorious”; that the Commissioner failed to indicate the number of cases
where the spirals and ties were not carried from the floor level to the bottom reinforcement of the
deeper beam, or where the spacing of the spirals and ties in the columns were greater than that called
for in the specifications; that the hollow in column A-4, second floor, the eccentricities in the columns,
the lack of proper length of splicing of spirals, and the cut in the spirals in column A-5, ground floor, did
not aggravate or contribute to the damage suffered by the building; that the defects in the construction
were within the tolerable margin of safety; and that the cutting of the spirals in column A-5, ground
floor, was done by the plumber or his men, and not by the defendants.
Answering the said objections, the Commissioner stated that, since many of the defects were minor only
the totality of the defects was considered. As regards the objection as to failure to state the number of
cases where the spirals and ties were not carried from the floor level to the bottom reinforcement, the
Commissioner specified groundfloor columns B-6 and C-5, the first one without spirals for 03 inches at
the top, and in the latter, there were no spirals for 10 inches at the bottom. The Commissioner likewise
specified the first storey columns where the spacings were greater than that called for in the
specifications to be columns B-5, B-6, C-7, C-6, C-5, D-5 and B-7. The objection to the failure of the
Commissioner to specify the number of columns where there was lack of proper length of splicing of
spirals,
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the Commissioner mentioned groundfloor columns B-6 and B-5 where all the splices were less than 1-½
turns and were not welded, resulting in some loss of strength which could be critical near the ends of
the columns. He answered the supposition of the defendants that the spirals and the ties must have
been looted, by calling attention to the fact that the missing spirals and ties were only in two out of the
25 columns, which rendered said supposition to be improbable.
The Commissioner conceded that the hollow in column A-4, second floor, did not aggravate or
contribute to the damage, but aver-red that it is “evidence of poor construction.” On the claim that the
eccentricity could be absorbed within the factor of safety, the Commissioner answered that, while the
same may be true, it also contributed to or aggravated the damage suffered by the building.
The objection regarding the cutting of the spirals in Column A-5, groundfloor, was answered by the
Commissioner by reiterating the observation in his report that irrespective of who did the cutting of the
spirals, the defendants should be held liable for the same as the general contractor of the building. The
Commissioner further stated that the loss of strength of the cut spirals and inelastic deflections of the
supposed lattice work defeated the purpose of the spiral containment in the column and resulted in the
loss of strength, as evidenced by the actual failure of this column.
Again, the Court concurs in the findings of the Commissioner on these issues and fails to find any
sufficient cause to disregard or modify the same. As found by the Commissioner, the “deviations made
by the defendants from the plans and specifications caused indirectly the damage sustained and that
those deviations not only added but also aggravated the damage caused by the defects in the plans and
specifications prepared by third-party defendants.” (Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 128-142)
The afore-mentioned facts clearly indicate the wanton negligence of both the defendant and the third-
party defendants in effecting the plans, designs, specifications, and construction of the PBA building and
We hold such negligence as equivalent to bad faith in the performance of their respective tasks.
Relative thereto, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Tucker v. Milan (49 O.G. 4379, 4380) which may be
in point in this case, reads:
“One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot
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escape liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or
an act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.”
As already discussed, the destruction was not purely an act of God. Truth to tell hundreds of ancient
buildings in the vicinity were hardly affected by the earthquake. Only one thing spells out the fatal
difference; gross negligence and evident bad faith, without which the damage would not have occurred.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED and considering the special and
environmental circumstances of this case, We deem it reasonable to render a decision imposing, as We
do hereby impose, upon the defendant and the third-party defendants (with the exception of Roman
Ozaeta) a solidary (Art. 1723, Civil Code, Supra, p. 10) indemnity in favor of the Philippine Bar
Association of FIVE MILLION (P5,000,000.00) Pesos to cover all damages (with the exception of
attorney’s fees) occasioned by the loss of the building (including interest charges and lost rantals) and
an additional ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) Pesos as and for attorney’s fees, the total sum
being payable upon the finality of this decision. Upon failure to pay on such finality, twelve (12%) per
cent interest per annum shall be imposed upon afore-mentioned amounts from finality until paid.
Solidary costs against the defendant and third-party defendants (except Roman Ozaeta).
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Cruz, JJ., concur.
Decision modified.
——o0o—— Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 596, No. L-47851, No. L-47863, No. L-
47896 October 3, 1986
[No. L-6648. 25 July 1955]
VICTORIAS PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., NORTH NEGROS PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., FERNANDO
GONZAGA, JOSE GASTON and CESAR L. LOPEZ, on their own behalf and on behalf of other sugar cane
planters in Manapla, Cadiz and Victorias Districts, petitioners and appellees, vs. VICTORIAS MILLING Co.,
INC., respondent and appellant.
CONTRACTS, INTERPRETATION OF; EFFECT OF FAILURE OF OBLIGOR TO FlLL THE CONTRACTUAL

OBLIGATION DUE TO "FORCE MAJEURE".—The petitioners (sugar planters) and the respondent central
company entered into milling contract whereby they stipulated a 30-year period within which the sugar
cane produced by the petitioners would be milled by the respondent central. The parties also stipulated
that in the event of force majeure, the contract shall be deemed suspended during said period. The
petitioners failed to deliver sugar cane during the four years of the Japanese occupation and the two
years after liberation when the mill was being rebuilt or a total of six years. Question: Could the
petitioners be compelled to deliver sugar cane to the respondent central for six more years after the
expiration of the 30-year period, to make up for what they failed to deliver during the six years? Held:
Fortuitous event relieves the obligor from fulfilling a contractual obligation (Article 1105, old Civil Code;
Article 1174, new Civil Code). The stipulation in the contract that in the event of force majeure the
contract shall be deemed suspended during said period does not mean that the happening of any of
those events stops the running of the period agreed upon. It only relieves the parties from the
fulfillment of their
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VOL. 97, JULY 25, 1955
319
Victorias Planters Assn., Inc., et al. vs. Victorias Milling Co., Inc.
respective obligations during that time—the petitioners from delivering sugar cane and the respondent
central from milling it. In order that the respondent central may be entitled to demand from the
petitioners the fulfillment of their part in the contracts, the latter must have been able to perform it but
failed or refused to do so and not when they were prevented by force majeure such as war. To require
the petitioners to deliver the sugar cane which they failed to deliver during the six years is to demand
from them the fulfillment of an obligation which was impossible of performance at the time it became
due. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. The respondent central not being entitled to demand from the
petitioners the performance of the latter's part of the contracts under those circumstances cannot later
on demand its fulfillment. The performance of what the law has written off cannot be demanded and
required. The prayer that the petitioners be compelled to deliver sugar cane for six more years to make
up for what they failed to deliver, the fulfillment of which was impossible, if granted, would in effect be
an extension of the terms of the contracts entered into by and between the parties.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Encarnacion, J.:
Ross, Selph, Carrascoso & Janda for appellant.
Tañada, Pelaez & Teehankee for appellees.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an action for declaratory judgment under Rule 66. The relief prayed for calls for an interpretation
of contracts entered into by and between the sugar cane planters in the districts of Manapla, Cadiz and
Victorias, Occidental Negros, and the Victorias Milling Company, Inc. After issues had been joined the
parties submitted the case for judgment upon the testimony of Jesus Jose Ossorio and the following
stipulation of facts:
1. That petitioners Victorias Planters Association, Inc. and North Negros Planters Association, Inc. are
non-stock corporations duly
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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
established and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with main offices at Victorias,
Negros Occidental, and Manapla, Negros Occidental, respectively, and were organized by, and are
composed of, sugar cane planters in the districts of Victorias, Manapla and Cadiz, respectively, having
been established principally as the representative entities of the numerous sugar cane planters in said
districts whose sugar cane productions are milled by the respondent corporation, with the main object
of safeguarding their interests and of taking up with the latter problems and questions which from time
to time, may come up between the said respondent corporation the said sugar cane planters; the other
petitioners are Filipinos, of legal age, and together with numerous other sugar cane planters who own
sugar cane producing properties at Victorias, Manapla, and Cadiz Districts, Negros Occidental, are bona
fide officials and members of either one of the two petitioner associations; that petitioner Fernando
Gonzaga is a resident of Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioner Jose Gaston is a resident of Victorias,
Negros Occidental, and petitioner Cesar L. Lopez is a resident of Bacolod City, Negros Occidental; and
that said petitioners bring this action for the benefit and on behalf of all their fellow sugar cane planters,
owners of sugar cane producing lands in the said districts of Victorias, Manapla, and Cadiz, whose sugar
cane productions are milled by respondent corporation, and who are so numerous that it would be
impractical to include them all as parties herein;
2. That respondent Victorias Milling Co., Inc. is a corporation likewise duly organized and established
under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with main offices at Ayala Building Manila, where it
may be served with summons;
3. That at various dates, from the year 1917 to 1934, the sugar cane planters pertaining to the districts
of Manapla and Cadiz, Negros Occidental, executed identical miling contracts, setting forth the terms
and conditions under which the sugar central "North Negros Sugar Co. Inc." would mill the sugar
produced by the sugar cane planters of the Manapla and Cadiz districts;
A copy of the standard f orm of said milling contracts with "North Negros Sugar Co., Inc, is hereto
attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex "A."
As may be seen from the said standard form of milling contract, Annex "A," the sugar cane planters of
Manapla and Cadiz, Negros Occidental had executed on November 17, 1916 with Miguel J. Ossorio, a
contract entitled "Contrato de la Central Azucarrera de 300 Toneladas," whereby said Miguel J. Ossorio
was given a period up to December 31, 1916 within which to make
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VOL. 97, JULY 25, 1955
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Victorias Planters Assn., Inc., et al vs. Victorias Milling Co., Inc.

a study of and decide whether he would construct a sugar central or mill with a capacity of milling 300
tons of sugar cane every 24 hours and setting forth the mutual obligations and undertakings of such
central and the planters and the terms and conditions under which the sugar cane produced by said
sugar can planters would be milled in the event of the construction of such sugar central by said Miguel
J. Ossorio. Such central was in fact constructed by said Miguel J. Ossorio in Manapla, Negros Occidental,
through the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc., where after the standard form of milling contracts (Annex "A")
were executed, as above stated,
The parties cannot stipulate as to the milling contracts executed by the planters by Victorias, Negros
Occidental, other than as follows; a number of them executed such milling contracts with the North
Negros Sugar Co., Inc., as per the standard forms hereto attached and made an integral part as Annexes
"B" and "B—1," while a number of them executed milling contracts with the Victorias Milling Co., Inc.,
which was likewise organized by Miguel J. Ossorio and which had constructed another Central at
Victorias, Negros Occidental, as per the standard form hereto attached and made an integral part hereof
as Annex "C".
4. The North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. had its first molienda or milling during the 1918-1919 crop year, and
the Victorias Milling Co., had its first molienda or milling during the 1921-1922 crop year.
Subsequent moliendas or millings took place every successive crop year thereafter, except the 6-year
period, comprising 4 years of the last World War II and 2 years- of post-war reconstruction of
respondent's central at Victorias, Negros Occidental.
5. That after the liberation, the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. did not reconstruct its destroyed central at
Manapla, Negros Occidental, and in 1946, it advised the North Negros Planters Association, Inc. that it
had made arrangements with the respondent Victorias Milling Co., Inc. for said respondent corporation
to mill the sugar cane produced by the planters of Manapla and Cadiz holding milling contracts with it,
Thus, after the war, all the sugar cane produced by the planters of petitioner associations, in Manapla,
Cadiz, as well as in Victorias, who held milling contracts, were milled in only one central, that of the
respondent corporation at Victorias;
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6. Beginning with the year 1948, and in the following years, when the planters-members of the North
Negros Planters Association, Inc. considered that the stipulated 30-year period of their milling contracts
executed in the year 1918 had already expired and terminated in the crop year 1947-1948, and the
planters-members of the Victorias Planters Association, Inc. likewise considered the stipulated 30—year
period of their milling contracts, as having likewise expired and terminated in the crop year 1948—1949,
under the pertinent provisions of the standard milling contract (Annex
"A") 01 the duration thereof, which provided in Par. 21 thereof as follows:

"(a) Que entregaran a la Central de la 'North Negros Sugar Co., Inc/ o a la que se construya en Victorias
por Don Miguel J. Ossorio o sus cesionarios por espacio de treinta (30) años desde la primera molienda,
la caña que produzcan sus respectivas haciendas, obligandose además a sembrar anualmente con
cañadulce por lo menos en tres quintas partes de su extension total apropiado para caña, incluyendo en
esta denominación tanto la siembra con puntas nuevas como el cultivo del retoño o cala-anan y
sujetando la siembra a las épocas convenientes designadas por el comité de hacenderos a fin de poder
proporcionar caña a la Central de conformidad con las claúsulas 17 y 18 de esta escritura.
* * * * * * *
"(i) 'Los hacenderos' imponen sobre sus haciendas mencionadas y citadas en esta escritura
servidumbres voluntarias a favor de Don Miguel J. Ossorio de sembrar caña por lo menos en tres quintas
partes (3/5) de su extension superficial y entregar la caña que produzcan a Don Miguel J. Ossorio, de
acuerdo con este contrato, por espacio de treinta (30) años, a contar un (1) año desde la fecha de la
primera molienda."
repeated representation were made with respondent corporation for negotiations regarding the
execution of new milling contracts which would take into consideration the changed circumstances
presently prevailing in the sugar industry as compared with those prevailing over 30 years ago and
would provide for an increased participation in the milled sugar for the benefit of the planters and their
workers.
7. That notwithstanding these repeated representations made by the herein petitioners with the
respondent corporation for the negotiation and execution of new milling contracts, the herein
respondent has refused and still refuses to accede to the same, contending that under the provisions of
the mining contract (Annex "A".) "It is the view of the majority of the stockholder-investors,
323
VOL. 97, JULY 25, 1955
323
that our contracts with the planters call for 30 years of milling—not 30 years in time" and that "as there
was no milling during 4 years of the recent war and two years of reconstruction, when these six years
are added on to the earliest of our contracts in Manapla, the contracts by this view terminate in the
autumn of 1952," and the "the contracts for the Victorias Planters would terminate in 1957, and still
later for those in the Cadiz districts," and that "apart from the contractual agreements, the Company
believes these war and reconstruction years acrue to it in equity."
The trial court rendered judgment the dispositive part of which is—
Wherefore, the Court renders judgment in favor of the petitioners and against the respondent and
declares that the milling contracts executed between the sugar cane planters of Victorias, Manapla and
Cadiz, Negros Occidental, and the respondent corporation or its predecessors in interest, the North
Negros Sugar Co., Inc., expired and terminated upon the lapse of the therein stipulated 30-year period,
and that respondent corporation is not entitled to claim any extension of or addition to the said 30-year
term or period of said milling contracts by virtue of an equivalent to 6 years of the last war and
reconstruction of its central, during which there was no planting and/or milling.
From this judgment the respondent corporation has appealed.
The appellant contends that the term stipulated in the contracts is thirty milling years and not thirty
calendar years and postulates that the planters fulfill their obligation—the six installments of their
indebtedness—which they failed to perform during the six milling years from 1941-42 to 1946-47. The
reason the planters failed to deliver the sugar cane was the war or a fortuitous event. The appellant
ceased to run its mill due to the same cause.
Fortuitous event relieves the obligor from fulfilling a contractual obligation. 1 The fact that the contracts
make reference to "first milling" does not make the period of thirty years one of thirty milling years. The
term "first milling" used in the contracts under consideration was for
______________
1 Article 1105. old Civil Code; article 1174, new Civil Code.
324
324
the purpose of reckoning the thirty-year period stipulated therein. Even if the thirty-year period
provided for in the contracts be construed as milling years, the deduction or extension of six years
would not be justified. At most on the last year of the thirty-year period stipulated in the contracts the
delivery of sugar cane could be extended up to a time when all the amount of sugar cane raised and
harvested should have been delivered to the appellant's mill as agreed upon. The seventh paragraph of
Annex "C", not found in the earlier contracts (Annexes "A", "B", and "B—1"), quoted by the appellant in
its brief, where the parties stipulated that in the event of flood, typhoon, earthquake, or other force
majeure, war, insurrection, civil commotion, organized strike, etc., the contract shall be deemed
suspended during said period, does not mean that the happening of any of those events stops the
running of the period agreed upon. It only relieves the parties from the fulfillment of their respective
obligations during that time—the planters from delivering sugar cane and the central from milling it. In
order that the central, the herein appellant, may be entitled to demand from the other parties the
fulfillment of their part in the contracts, the latter must have been able to perform it but failed or
refused to do so and not when they were prevented by force majeure such as war. To require the
planters to deliver the sugar cane which they failed to deliver during the four years of the Japanese
occupation and the two years after liberation when the mill was being rebuilt is to demand from the
obligors the fulfillment of an obligation which was impossible of performance at the time it became due.
Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. The obligee not being entitled to demand from the obligors the
performance of the latters' part of the contracts under those circumstances cannot later on demand its
fulfillment. The performance of what the law has written off cannot be demanded and required. The
prayer that the plaintiffs be compelled to deliver sugar cane to the appellant for six
325
VOL. 97, JULY 25, 1955
325
Cueto vs. Collantes, et al.
more years to make up for what they failed to deliver during those trying years, the fulfillment of which
was impossible, if granted, would in effect be an extension of the term of the contracts entered into by
and between the parties.
In accord with the rule laid down in the case of Lacson vs. Diaz, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 12, p. 337, where
despite the fact that the lease contract stipulated seven sugar crops and not seven crop years as the
term thereof, we held that such stipulation contemplated seven consecutive agricultural years and
affirmed the judgment which declared that the leasee was not entitled to an extension of the term of
the lease for the number of years the country was occupied by the Japanese Army during which no
sugar cane was planted 1 we are of the opinion and so hold that the thirty-year period stipulated in the
contracts expired on the thirtieth agricultural year. The period of six years—four during the Japanese
occupation when the appellant did not operate its mill and the last two during which the appellant
reconstructed its mill—cannot be deducted from the thirty-year period stipulated in the contracts.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Bengzon, Acting C. J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.
B. L., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
________________ Victorias Planters Assn., Inc., et al. vs. Victorias Milling Co., Inc., 97 Phil., 318, No. L-
6648 July 25, 1955

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NEGLIGENCE 2

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Phil.Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. Nos. 66102-04. August 30, 1990.*

** as it appears in the petition.

VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Santiago & Santiago for petitioner.

Federico R. Vinluan for private respondents.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

VOL. 189,AUGUST 30, 1990

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

SUPREMECOURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

positive portion of which reads (pp. 55-57, Rollo):

“Civil Case No. 1136—

Indemnity for the loss of life

Loss of Salaries or earning capacity

Actual damages (burial expenses)

For moral damages

For attorney’s fees

“For the physical injuries suffered by Caridad Pascua:

“Civil Case No. 1136

Actual damages (hospitalization expenses)

Moral damages (disfigurement of the face and physical suffering

“Civil Case No. 1139

Indemnity for loss of life

Loss of Salary or Earning Capacity

Actual damages (burial expenses)

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

“For the death of Florida Sarmiento Estomo:

“Civil Case No. 1140

Indemnity for loss of life

Loss of Salary or Earning capacity

Actual damages (burial expenses)

“With costs against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.

VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

respondent court erred in applying said doctrine.

VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

that the presumption was rebutted by this piece of evidence.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

due to a fortitous event3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).

3 Article 1174 of the New Civil Code provides:

VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990

Phil. Rabbit Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

4 Article 1759 of the New Civil Code provides:

5 Article 1217 of the New Civil Code provides: