G.R. No.

103702 December 6, 1994

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN K. UY; COUNCILORS: DEOGRACIAS R.

ARGOSINO III, BENITO T. CAPIO, EMMANUEL R. CORTEZ, NORMANDO MONTILLA, LEONARDO
C. UY, FIDEL C. AURELLANA, PEDRO C. CARABIT, LEONARDO D. AURELLANA, FABIAN M.
MEDENILLA, TRINIDAD F. CORTEZ, SALVADOR M. MEDENILLA, CERELITO B. AUREADA and
FRANCISCA A. BAMBA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, 4th Judicial Region,
Gumaca, Quezon; MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES, QUEZON; MAYOR FRANCISCO DE LEON;
COUNCILORS: FE LUPINAC, TOMAS AVERIA, MANUEL O. OSAS, WILFREDO O. FONTANIL,
ENRICO U. NADRES, RODELITO LUZOIR, LENAC, JOSE L. CARABOT, DOMING AUSA, VIDAL
BANQUELES and CORAZON M. MAXIMO, respondents.

Manuel Laserna, Jr. for petitioners.

Florante Pamfilo for private respondents.

VITUG, J.:

On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San
Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San
Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios.

Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through the
Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24
May 1959.1

By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the
municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class
municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515.2 The executive order
added that "(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864
was approved by the House of Representatives."

On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 62, in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. Docketed
Special Civil Action No. 2014-G, the petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 and
prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain
from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices.3 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez
v. Auditor General,4 the petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act,
was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the Municipality or Municipal
District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that righfully
belonged to the corresponding officials of the Municipality of San Narciso.

1
In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of affirmative and special
defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San Andres was
given life with the issuance of Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be deemed estopped
from questioning the creation of the new municipality;5 that because the Municipality of San Andred had been
in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed; and that, considering the petition
to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative
being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor General.6

On 18 July 1991, after the parties had submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the trial court resolved to defer
action on the motion to dismiss and to deny a judgment on the pleadings.

On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a motion to dismiss alleging that the case
had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 01 January 1991. The movant municipality cited Section
442(d) of the law, reading thusly:

Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office
at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities.

The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending that the above provision of law was
inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing
municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio.7

In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court8 finally dismissed the petition9 for lack of cause of action on
what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State, adding that "whatever defects (were) present in the creation
of municipal districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances and executive orders, (were) cured by
the enactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991." In an order, dated 17
January 1992, the same court denied petitioner municipality's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari." Petitioners 10 argue that in issuing the orders of 02 December
1991 and 17 January 1992, the lower court has "acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction." Petitioners assert that the existence of a municipality created by a null and void
presidential order may be attacked either directly or even collaterally by anyone whose interests or rights are
affected, and that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no office and is inoperative such as though its has
never been passed. 11

Petitioners consider the instant petition to be one for "review on certiorari" under Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules
of Court; at the same time, however, they question the orders of the lower court for having been issued with
"grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to petitioners to correct said Orders, to
protect their rights and to secure a final and definitive interpretation of the legal issues involved." 12 Evidently,
then, the petitioners intend to submit their case in this instance under Rule 65. We shall disregard the procedural
incongruence.

2
The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any
person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise." 13 When the inquiry is
focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
warranto or any other credit proceeding. 14 It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines"
15 and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the
Philippines . . . ." 16 Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and
upon the relation of another person" with the permission of the court. 17 The Rules of Court also allows an
individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he
claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another." 18
While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only the officials of
the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the authority of the
Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.

At any rate, in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of the Municipality of San Andres,
the Court shall delve into the merits of the petition.

While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act

No. 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however,
contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner
municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt
to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive Order
No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after
almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge
the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of San
Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In
the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a
position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, 19 so also, if not indeed with greatest
imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be
timely raised. 20 Public interest
demands it.

Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice
other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own
closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom
cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San
Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General
was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to
the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five
years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class
municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as
municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities
that comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued
by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San

3
Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of
Quezon.

At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the
Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to
the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12)
municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) of
the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances
or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time
of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of
unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is proferred. It is doubtful whether
such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the
legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in
essence are retrospective, 21 and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to
the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. 22

All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be
conceded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 116702 December 28, 1995

THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL, acting through its Sanguniang Bayan and Mayor, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA, BOHOL, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals1 promulgated on June 28,
1994, reversing the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch I) of the City of Tagbilaran, Bohol.

The lower court's decision, among other things, declared "barrio/barangay Pagahat as within the territorial
jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part and parcel of its
territory, therefore, belonging to said plaintiff municipality", and further permanently enjoined defendant
municipality of Alicia "to respect plaintiff's control, possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat
and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the same barrio" (RTC decision, p. 4;
Rollo, p. 86).

On appeal, the respondent Court stated that "(S)crutiny of the conflicting claims and the respective evidence of
the parties lead to the conclusion that the trial court committed an error in declaring that Barrio Pagahat is
within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee (municipality of Candijay)." Said Court rejected the
boundary line being claimed by petitioner based on certain exhibits, since it would in effect place "practically
4
all of Barrio Pagahat . . . , part of Barrio Cagongcagong and portions of Barrio Putlongcam and La Hacienda
and all of Barrio Mahayag and Barrio del Monte within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee
Candijay." Added the respondent Court, "As aptly pointed out by defendant-appellant in its appeal brief, 'the
plaintiff municipality will not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but also of the barrios of Putlongcam,
Mahayag, Del Monte, Cagongcagong, and a part of the Municipality of Mabini. Candijay will eat up a big
chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her. Her claim opens the
floodgate of controversies over boundaries, including with Mabini.'" (Decision p. 4; rollo, p. 35.) The
respondent Court concluded that "the trial court erred in relying on Exh. X-Commissioner [exhibit for
petitioner], because, in effect, it included portions of Barrios Putlongcam and La Hacienda within the
jurisdiction of appellee Candijay when said barrios are undisputedly part of appellant's (Alicia) territory under
Executive Order No. 265 creating the latter" (Decision, p. 6, rollo, p. 37).

The respondent Court also found, after an examination of the respective survey plans of petitioner and
respondent submitted as exhibits, that "both plans are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the
boundary line between [petitioner] and the Municipality of Mabini (which is not a party to this case) as declared
by the Provincial Board of Bohol. Neither plan shows where Looc-Tabasan, Lomislis Island, Tagtang Canlirong,
mentioned in the aforequoted boundary line declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol, are actually located."
(Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 35.) The respondent Court, after weighing and considering the import of certain official
acts, including Executive Order No. 265 dated September 16, 1949 (which created the municipality of Alicia
from out of certain barrios of the municipality of Mabini), and Act No. 968 of the Philippine Commission dated
October 31, 1903 (which set forth the respective component territories of the municipalities of Mabini and
Candijay), concluded that "Barrio Bulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the
barrios constituted as part of defendant-appellant Municipality of Alicia. Neither do they show that Barrio
Pagahat forms part of plaintiff-appellant Municipality of Candijay."

On that basis, the respondent Court held that:

Clearly, from the foregoing, there is equiponderance of evidence. The Supreme Court has ruled:

Equiponderance of evidence rule states:

When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence
which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.

Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and
not on the weakness of defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff
may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence
on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.

(Sapu-an, et al. v. Court of Appeals, Oct. 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 701, 705-706.)

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is reversed and set aside. Another judgment is hereby
entered dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2402. No costs. (Decision, p. 6, rollo, p. 37.)

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been rejected by the respondent Court, petitioner came to this
Court, alleging (i) improper application by the respondent Court of Appeals of the so-called principle of
"equiponderance of evidence", for having based its ruling against petitioner on documentary evidence which,
petitioner claims, are void, (ii) the respondent municipality's purported lack of juridical personality, as a result
of having been created under a void executive order, and (iii) that the challenged Decision "does not solve the
problem of both towns but throws them back again to their controversy." (Petition, p. 6, rollo, p. 21.)
5
After deliberating on the petition, comment and reply, this Court is not persuaded to grant due course to the
petition.

With respect to the first and third grounds, we find that the issues of fact in this case had been adequately passed
upon by respondent Court in its Decision, which is well-supported by the evidence on record. The determination
of equiponderance of evidence by the respondent Court involves the appreciation of evidence by the latter
tribunal, which will not be reviewed by this Court unless shown to be whimsical or capricious; here, there has
been no such showing.

In connection with the foregoing, that the assailed Decision, in dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
2402, may leave the parties where they are or may not resolve their problem one way or the other, is of no
moment. The fact remains that, as correctly evaluated by the respondent Court, neither party was able to make
out a case; neither side could establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no
better off than before they proceeded to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them
as they are. In such cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions.

On the second issue, we noted that petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of
respondent municipality on 19 January 1984 (or some thirty five years after respondent municipality first came
into existence in 1949) during the proceedings in the court a quo. It appears that, after presentation of its
evidence, herein petitioner asked the trial court to bar respondent municipality from presenting its evidence on
the ground that it had no juridical personality. Petitioner contended that Exec. Order No. 265 issued by
President Quirino on September 16, 1949 creating respondent municipality is null and void ab initio, inasmuch
as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order was based, constituted an
undue delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and was therefore declared
unconstitutional, per this Court's ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General.3

In this regard, we call to mind the ruling of this Court in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr.4 ,
which will be found very instructive in the case at bench. Therein we stated:

While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 [Local Government
Code of 1991] may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality,
they, however, contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the
passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification
of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the
petition would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

Petitioner's theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought.
Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August
1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of
San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the
Municipal district, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the
powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure
of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-
year period can abrogate an action belatedly file, so also, if not indeed with greatest
imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political
subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it.

Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case
6
 hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least
attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de
facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in
1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in
existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor General was
promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary,
certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the
Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive
Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having
surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as
municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain
municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No.
33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this
administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal
Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.

At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled.
Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been
considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the
province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code to the
effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders
and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No
pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code is
proffered. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to
create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has
incorporated Section 442 (d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and
aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if
existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the
usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.

All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon
must now be conceded.

Respondent municipality's situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of the municipality of San
Andres. Respondent municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten
years ahead of the municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen years when
Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate
the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under Administrative Order
No. 33 above-mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-
Mabini for the province of Bohol. Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the
Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol.

Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality of San Andres, it should
likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should henceforth be
considered as a regular, de jure municipality.

7
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-7012 March 26, 1913

THE ILOILO ICE AND COLD STORAGE COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Juan de Leon, Quirico Abeto, and Crecenciano Lozano, for appellants.

Bruce, Lawrence, Ross and Block, for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

According to the pleadings, the plaintiff, upon authority granted by the defendant, constructed an ice and cold
storage plant in the city of Iloilo. Some time after the plant had been completed and was in operation, nearby
residents made complaints to the defendant that the smoke from the plant was very injurious to their health and
comfort. Thereupon the defendant appointed a committee to investigate and report upon the matters contained
in said complaints. The committee reported that the complaints were well-founded. The defendant counsel then
passed a resolution which reads in part as follows:

That after the approval by the honorable provincial board of this resolution, a period of one month will
be granted to the said entity. The Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Company, in which to proceed with the
elevation of said smokestacks, and if not done, the municipal president will execute the order requiring
the closing or suspension of operations of said establishment.

Upon receipt of this resolution and order, the plaintiff commenced this action in the Court of First Instance to
enjoin the defendant from carrying into effect the said resolution. The fifth paragraph of the complaint is as
follows:

That the defendants intend and threaten to require compliance with said resolution administratively and
without the intervention of the court, and by force to compel the closing and suspension of operations of
the plaintiff's machinery and consequently of the entire plant, should the plaintiff not proceed with the
elevation of the smokestacks to one hundred feet, which the plaintiff maintains it is not obliged to do and
will not do.

Upon notice and after hearing, a preliminary injunction was issued. Subsequently thereto the defendant
answered, admitting paragraphs 1 and 4 and denying all the other allegations in the complaint, and as a special
defense alleged:

1. xxx xxx xxx.

2. That the factory of the plaintiff company stands in a central and populated district of the municipality;

3. That the quantity of smoke discharged from the smokestacks of said factory is so great and so dense
that it penetrates into the dwelling houses situated near it and causes great annoyance to the residents
and prejudice to their health;

8
 4. That the municipal board of health of the city has reported that the smoke discharged from the
smokestacks of said factory is prejudicial and injurious to the public health;

5. That the plaintiff company has no right to maintain and operate machinery in its factory under the
conditions which it is at present operating the same, without complying with the regulations which were
imposed upon it when the license for its installation was granted, because it thereby violates the
ordinances of the city now in force upon the matter.

Wherefore, the defendant prays that it be absolved from the complaint and the plaintiff be declared to have no
right to the remedy asked, and that the preliminary injunction issued in this case be set aside, with the costs
against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff demurred to this answer upon the following grounds:

1. That the facts alleged in the answer do not constitute a defense; and

2. That the answer is vague and ambiguous and contains arguments and conclusions of law instead of
facts.

This demurrer was sustained, the court saying:

The defendant will amend his answer within five days or the injunction will be permanently granted as
prayed for, with costs to the defendant.

To this order the defendant excepted and, not desiring to amend its answer, appealed to this court.

It is alleged in paragraph 1 that both the plaintiff and the defendants are corporations duly organized under the
laws of the Philippine Islands; and paragraph 4 sets forth the resolution complained of, the dispositive part of
which is inserted above. The allegations in paragraph 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8, which are specifically denied in the
answer, all (except the fifth) relate to the building of the plant under authority granted by the defendant, the cost
of its construction, the legality of the resolution in question, the power of the defendant to pass such resolution,
and the damages which will result if that resolution is carried into effect. As before stated, the allegations in
paragraph 5 to the effect that the defendants intend and are threatening to close by force and without the
intervention of the courts the plaintiff's plant is specifically denied. The issue in this case, according to the
pleadings, relates to the power of the municipal council to declare the plant of the petitioner a nuisance as
operated, and the method of abating it.

The municipal council is, under section 39 (j) of the Municipal Code, specifically empowered "to declare and
abate nuisances." A nuisance is, according to Blackstone, "Any thing that worketh hurt, inconvenience, or
damages." (3 Black. Com., 216.) They arise from pursuing particular trades or industries in populous
neighborhoods; from acts of public indecency, keeping disorderly houses, and houses of ill fame, gambling
houses, etc. (2 Bouv., 248; Miller vs. Burch, 32 Tex., 208.) Nuisances have been divided into two classes:
Nuisances per se, and nuisances per accidens. To the first belong those which are unquestionably and under all
circumstances nuisances, such as gambling houses, houses of ill fame, etc. The number of such nuisances is
necessarily limited, and by far the greater number of nuisances are such because of particular facts and
circumstances surrounding the otherwise harmless cause of the nuisance. For this reason, it will readily be seen
that whether a particular thing is a nuisance is generally a question of fact, to be determined in the first instance
before the term nuisance can be applied to it. This is certainly true of a legitimate calling, trade, or business such
as an ice plant. Does the power delegated to a municipal council under section 39 (j) of the Municipal Code
commit to the unrestrained will of that body the absolute power of declaring anything to be a nuisance? Is the
9
decision of that body final despite the possibility that it may proceed from animosity or prejudice, from partisan
zeal or enmity, from favoritism and other improper influences and motives, easy of concealment and difficult to
be detected and exposed? Upon principle and authority, we think it does not.

In Rutton vs. City of Camden, 39 N.J.L., 122, 129; 23 Am. Rep. 203, 209, the court said:

The authority to decide when a nuisance exists in an authority to find facts, to estimate their force, and
to apply rules of law to the case thus made. This is the judicial function, and it is a function applicable to
a numerous class of important interests. The use of land and buildings, the enjoyment of water rights, the
practice of many trades and occupations, and the business of manufacturing in particular localities, all
fall on some occasions, in important respects, within its sphere. To say to a man that he shall not use his
property as he pleases, under certain conditions, is to deprive him pro tanto of the enjoyment of such
property. To find conclusively against him that a state of facts exists with respect to the use of his
property, or the pursuit of his business, which subjects him to the condemnation of the law, is to affect
his rights in a vital point. The next thing to depriving a man of his property is to circumscribe him in its
use, and the right to use property is as much under the protection of the law as the property itself, in any
other aspect, is, and the one interest can no more be taken out of the hands of the ordinary tribunal than
the other can. If a man's property cannot be taken away from him except upon trial by jury, or by the
exercise of the right of eminent domain upon compensation made, neither can be, in any other mode, be
limited in the use of it. The right to abate public nuisances, whether we regard it as existing in the
municipalities, or in the community, or in the land of the individual, is a common law right, and is
derived, in every instance of its exercise, from the same source — that of necessity. It is akin to the right
of destroying property for the public safety, in case of the prevalence of a devastating fire or other
controlling exigency. But the necessity must be present to justify the exercise of the right, and whether
present or not, must be submitted to a jury under the guidance of a court. The finding of a sanitary
committee, or of a municipal council, or of any other body of a similar kind, can have no effect whatever
for any purpose, upon the ultimate disposition of the matter of this kind. It cannot be used as evidence in
any legal proceeding, for the end of establishing, finally, the fact of nuisance, and if can be made
testimony for any purpose, it would seem that it can be such only to show that the persons acting in
pursuance of it were devoid of that malicious spirit which sometimes aggravates a trespass and swells
the damages. I repeat that the question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the
established courts of law or equity alone, and that the resolutions of officers, or of boards organized by
force of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision.

The leading case upon this point is Yates vs. Milwaukee, (10 Wall., 497; 19 L. ed., 984). The following
quotation from this case has been cited or quoted with approval in a great number of cases. (See Notes to this
case in 19 L. ed., Notes, page 356.)

But the mere declaration by the city council of Milwaukee that a certain structure was an encroachment
or obstruction did not make structure was an encroachment or obstruction did not make it so, nor could
such declaration make it a nuisance unless it in fact had that character. It is a doctrine not to be tolerated
in this country, that a municipal corporation, without any general laws either of the city or of the State,
within which a given structure can be shown to be a nuisance, can, by its mere declaration that it is one,
subject it to removal by any person supposed to be aggrieved, or even by the city itself. This would place
every house, every business, and all the property of the city at the uncontrolled will of the temporary
local authorities. Yet this seems to have been the view taken by counsel who defended this case in the
circuit court; for that single ordinance of the city, declaring the wharf of Yates a nuisance, and ordering
its abatement, is the only evidence in the record that it is a nuisance or an obstruction to navigation, or in
any manner injurious to the public.

10
In Cole vs. Kegler (64 la., 59, 61) the court said:

We do not think the general assembly intended to confer on cities and towns the power of finally and
conclusively determine, without notice or a hearing, and without the right of appeal, that any given thing
constitutes a nuisance, unless, probably, in cases of great emergency, so strong as to justify extraordinary
measures upon the ground of paramount necessity. The law does not contemplate such an exigency, and
therefore does not provide for it. If it did, it would no longer be the undefined law of necessity. (Nelson,
J., in The People vs. The Corporation of Albay, 11 Wend., 539.)

Nuisance may be abated by an individual, but they must in fact exist, The determination of the
individual that a nuisance exists does not make it so, and if he destroys property on the that it is a
nuisance, he is responsible, unless it is established that the property destroyed constituted a nuisance.
This precise power, and no more, is conferred by the statute on cities and towns. In Wood on Nuisances,
section 740, it is said: "If the authorities of a city abate a nuisance under authority of an ordinance of the
city, they are subject to the same perils and liabilities as an individual, if the thing in fact is not
nuisance."

In Grossman vs. City of Oakland (30 Ore., 478, 483) the court said:

In our opinion this ordinance cannot be sustained as a legitimate exercise of municipal power. The
character of the city confers upon it the power to prevent and restrain nuisances, and to "declare what
shall constitute a nuisance;" but this does not authorize it to declare a particular use of property a
nuisance, unless such use comes within the common law or statutory idea of a nuisance. (2 Wood on
Nuisances (3d ed.), 977; Yates vs. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.), 497; Village of Des Plaines vs. Poyer,
123 Ill., 348; 5 Am. St. Rep., 524; 14 N.E., 677; Quintini vs. City Board of Aldermen, 64 Miss., 483; 60
Am. Rep., 62; 1 So., 625; Chicago & Rock Islands R.R. Co. vs. City of Joliet, 79 Ill., 44; Hutton vs. City
of Camden, 39 N.J. Law, 122; 23 Am. Rep., 203.) By this provision of the charter the city is clothed with
authority to declare by general ordinance under what circumstances and conditions certain specified acts
or things injurious to the health or dangerous to the public are to constitute and be deemed nuisances,
leaving the question of fact open for judicial determination as to whether the particular act or thing
complained of comes within the prohibited class; but it cannot by ordinance arbitrarily declare any
particular thing a nuisance which has not heretofore been so declared by law, or judicially determined to
be such. (City of Dener vs. Mullen, 7 Colo., 345).

In Western & Atlantic R. Co. vs. Atlanta (113 Ga., 537, 551), after an extensive review of the authorities, the
court, per Lumpkin, J., said:

It is our opinion that the provisions of our code require, when a municipal corporation is seeking to
abate a nuisance such as it was alleged the floor of the union passenger station was in this case, that the
parties interested be given reasonable notice of the time and place of hearing at which the fact whether
the property complained of is or is not a nuisance shall be inquired into and determined; that, without
such notice and a judgment on the facts by the body invested with power to abate the nuisance, it is
unlawful to enter thereon and remove or destroy it as a nuisance. If the thing, as we said, is declared by
law to be a nuisance, or if it is unquestionably a nuisance, such as a rabid dog, infected clothing, the
carcass of a dead animal on a private lot, the presence of a smallpox patient on the street, it may be
abated by the municipal authorities at once, by order, from the necessity of the case, and to meet an
emergency which exists, to at once protect the health and lives of the people.

In Everett vs. City of Council Bluffs (46 Ia., 66, 67), where the council passed an ordinance declaring trees on
certain streets to be a nuisance and ordering the marshall to abate the same, the court held:
11
 The defendant is incorporated under a special charter, which provides that the city council has power "to
declare what shall be a nuisance, and to prevent, remove, or abate the same." This general grant of
power, however, will not authorize the council to declare anything a nuisance which is not such at
common law, or has been declared such by statute.

In Frostburg vs. Wineland (98 Md., 239, 243) the court said:

The first question, then, in the case revolves itself to this, was the summary proceeding of the appellants
in declaring the two trees in front of the appellee's property to be a nuisance and an obstruction to the
paving and curbing of the street, and directing them to be removed and destroyed, so far final as not to
be reviewable by the Courts?

This question we think was in effect settled by this court in the recent cases of New Windsor vs.
Stocksdale (95 Md., 215) and King vs. Hamil (97 Md., 103). In the latter case it is said that equity will
not lend its aid to enforce by injunction the by-laws or ordinances of a municipal corporation, restraining
an act, unless the act is shown to be a nuisance per se. . . .

It is clear, we think, both upon reason and authority, that when a municipality undertakes to destroy
private property which is not a nuisance per se, it then transcends its powers and its acts are reviewable
by a court of equity.

In C.R.I. & P.R. Co. vs. City of Joilet (79 Ill., 25, 44) the court said:

As to the ordinance of the common council of the city of Joilet, of September, 1872, declaring the
railroad a nuisance, we regard that as without effect upon the case, although the charter of the city
confers upon the common council the power to abate and remove nuisances, and to punish the authors
thereof, and to define and declare what shall be deemed nuisances. We will, in this respect, but refer to
the language of the Supreme Court of the United State in Yates vs. Milwaukee (10 Wall., 505). (See
supra.)

In the leading case of Denver vs. Mullen (7 Colo., 345, 353) where an extended review of the authorities is
made, the court said:

The basis of authority for the action of the city in the premises is made to rest upon certain provisions of
the city charter, and certain ordinances, which are set out as exhibits in the testimony; and the following,
among other of the enumerated powers conferred by the legislature upon the city, in said charter, is
relied upon, viz: "To make regulations to secure the general health of the inhabitants, to declare what
shall be a nuisance, and to prevent and remove the same."

The proper construction of this language is that the city is clothed with authority to declare, by general
ordinance, what shall constitute a nuisance. That is to say, the city may, by such ordinance, define,
classify and enact what things or classes of things, and under what conditions and circumstances, such
specified things are to constitute and be deemed nuisances. For instance, the city might, under such
authority, declare by ordinance that slaughter-houses within the limits of the city, carcasses of dead
animals left lying within the city, goods, boxes, and the like, piled up or remaining for certain length of
time on the sidewalks, or other things injurious to health, or causing obstruction or danger to the public
in the use of the streets and sidewalks, should be deemed nuisances; not that the city council may, by a
mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore been
pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination. (Everett vs. Council Bluffs, 40
Iowa, 66; Yates vs. Milwaukee, 10 Wall., 497.) No law or ordinance, under which the city council
12
 assumed to act in respect to this ditch, has been cited which defines nuisance, or within the meaning of
which such ditch is comprehended.

xxx xxx xxx

It is only certain kinds of nuisances that may be removed or abated summarily by the acts of individuals
or by the public, such as those which affect the health, or interfere with the safety of property or person,
or are tangible obstructions to streets and highways under circumstances presenting an emergency; such
clear cases of nuisances per se, are well understood, and need not to be further noticed here to
distinguish them from the case before us. If it were admitted that this ditch, by reason of its obstruction
to the use of the public streets, at the time of the acts complained of, was a nuisance, it must also be
admitted that it was not a nuisance per se. It was constructed for a necessary, useful and lawful purpose,
was used for such purpose, and therefore in its nature was not a nuisance, as a matter of law. Nor as a
matter of fact was it a nuisance while it was no hurt, detriment, or offense to the public, or to any private
citizen. If, then, it has become a nuisance, it is by reason of a change of circumstances brought about
neither by the ditch itself, nor its use. Indeed, the sole matter complained of, to warrant its being
regarded as a nuisance, is the absence of bridges at street crossings. The town has become populous; its
growth has extended beyond the ditch and along its line for a great distance; streets laid out across its
course have come to be traveled so much, that without bridges, the ditch, as appears by the testimony,
has become inconvenient, detrimental, and an obstruction to the full, safe and lawful use of such streets
as highways by the public. To this extent, and from these causes outside the ditch and its use per se, has
the ditch come to be a public nuisance, if, as a matter of fact, it is such. But whether it is such or not is a
fact which must first be ascertained by judicial determination before it can be lawfully abated, either by
the public or by a private person.

In Joyce vs. Woods (78 Ky., 386, 388) the court said:

There was no judicial determination that there was a nuisance, and no opportunity offered the owner of
the lot to contest that matter. Under the exercise of the police power, it may be conceded that
municipalities can declare and abate nuisances in cases of necessity, without citation and without
adjudication as to whether there is in fact a nuisance. But whenever the action of the municipality in
declaring and abating a nuisance goes so far as to fix a burden upon the owner of the property, he is
entitled to be heard upon the question as to the existence of the nuisance. This right to a hearing upon
this question may come before or after the nuisance is abated, as circumstances may require, but there
must be an opportunity offered him to be heard upon that matter before his property can be loaded with
the cost of the removal of the nuisance. To the extent that property is thus burdened by the action of the
city council, when there is no necessity to precipitate action without adjudication, the owner is deprived
of his property, regardless of "the law of the land." The meaning of that provision of the constitution has
generally been construed to be a law that hears before condemning, and arrives at a judgment for the
divestiture of the rights of property through what is ordinarily understood to be judicial process — the
general rules that govern society in reference, to the rights of property; and it is only in extreme cases,
where the preservation and repose of society or the protection of the property rights of a large class of
the community absolutely require a departure, that the courts recognize any exception. In this case there
is no pretense of a necessity for precipitate action. There is no reason why appellant should not have
been permitted to test the question as to the existence of the nuisance.

In Everett vs. Marquette (53 Mich., 450, 451) the court, per Cooley, J., said:

But it is not necessary in this case to determine whether the permission given by the village council was
in due form for the purposes of a permanent appropriation, or even whether the council had the power to
13
 consent to such an appropriation. It is undoubted that the council had general control of the streets under
the village charter; and it was a part of its duty to prevent the creation of any public nuisance within
them. It is not to be assumed that consent would have been given to such a nuisance, and when, by
formal resolution the council assumed to give permission to complainant to make the openings and build
the stairways complained of, it must have been done in the belief that no public inconvenience would
follow. If the permission was effectual for no other purpose, it at least rebutted any presumption which
might otherwise have existed, that this partial appropriation of the street was per se a nuisance.

If the permission was a mere license, and the subsequent action of the city council is to be regarded as a
revocation of the license, it does not follow that the plaintiff has by the revocation immediately been
converted into a wrongdoer. The question will then be whether the act of the complainant in maintaining
his structures constitutes a public nuisance; and while the city council is entitled, under its supervisory
control of the public streets, to consider and pass upon that question for the purpose of deciding upon the
institution of legal proceedings for abatement, it cannot make itself the judge. Maintaining a nuisance is
a public offense; and the fact, as in other cases of alleged criminality, is to be tried on proper accusation
and in the regular courts. The mere fact that the party makes use of some part of a public street for his
private purposes does not make out the public offense. This was decided in People vs. Carpenter (1
Mich., 273), and has never been doubted in this State.

The city in this case proceeding in an act of destruction on an assumption that the structures were
already condemned as illegal. This was unwarranted, and it was quite right that the action should be
restrained.

The above authorities are collated in Judge Dillon's work on Municipal Corporations, fifth edition, section 684,
with the following comment by the author:

It is to secure and promote the public health, safety, and convenience that municipal corporations are so
generally and so liberally endowed with power to prevent and abate nuisances. This authority and its
summary exercise may be constitutionally conferred on the incorporated place, and it authorizes its
council to act against that which comes within the legal notion of a nuisance; but such power, conferred
in general terms, cannot be taken to authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a
nuisance which, in its nature, situation, or use, is not such.

The questions discussed in this august array of authorities are exactly those of the present case, and the
controlling principles and the reasoning upon which they are founded are so fully and lucidly set forth as to
justify us in refraining from comment of our own. It is clear that municipal councils have, under the code, the
power to declare and abate nuisances, but it is equally clear that they do not have the power to find as a fact that
a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can they authorize the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation, or use is not such. These
things must be determined in the ordinary courts of law.

In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate
industry, beneficial to the people, and conducive to their health and comfort. If it be in fact a nuisance due to the
manner of its operation, that question cannot de determined by a mere resolution of the board. The petitioner is
entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before a judicial tribunal.

The respondent has, we think, joined issued by its answer denying that it was intending to proceed with the
abatement of the alleged nuisance by arbitrary administrative proceedings. This is the issue of the present case,
and upon its determination depends whether the injunction should be made permanent (but limited in its scope
to prohibiting the closing of petitioner's factory by administrative action), or whether the injunction should be
14
dissolved, which will be done in case it be shown that the municipal officials intend to proceed with the
abatement of the alleged nuisance in an orderly and legal manner.

It is said that the plaintiff cannot be compelled to build its smokestack higher if said stack is in fact a nuisance,
for the reason that the stack was built under authority granted by the defendant, and in accordance with the
prescribed requirements. If the charter or license does not expressly subject the business or industry to the
exercise of the police power by the State, it is conceded by the great preponderance of authority that such a
reservation is implied to the extent that may be reasonably necessary for the public welfare. (Freud, Police
Power, § 361 et seq, and § 513 et seq.)

For the foregoing reasons, the order sustaining the plaintiff's demurrer to the defendant's answer is reversed. The
record will be returned to the court whence it came with instructions to proceed with the trial of the cause in
accordance with this opinion. No costs will be allowed in this instance. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Moreland, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., dissents.

G.R. No. 161414 January 17, 2005

SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, petitioner,

vs.
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE), respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon1 —the municipality of
Andong, Lanao del Sur―which like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is
anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical,
ghostly or anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of Andong. The creation of the
putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists
that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence, its legal personality should be given
judicial affirmation. We disagree.

The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General2 in 1965. As
discussed therein, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders3 creating thirty-three
(33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of
Executive Order No. 107.4

These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities involved in that case
had failed to pass Congress.5 President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing
his powers under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a
special civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void,
Section 68 having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370,6 and said orders constituting an undue delegation of
legislative power.7

15
After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null and void. A
majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of
legislative power to the executive branch,8 while three justices opined that the nullity of the issuances was the
consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over
local governments.9 Pelaez was disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.10

Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong.
Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment
of the Municipality of Andong.

Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong,11 suing as a
private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi "is of public and paramount interest especially to the people of
the Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur."12 He alleges that Andong "has metamorphosed into a
full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the
municipality and its constituents,"13 even though he concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed,
elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local government positions of Andong.14 Nonetheless, the
municipality of Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and
Sports office, and at least seventeen (17) "barangay units" with their own respective chairmen.15 From 1964
until 1972, according to Camid, the public officials of Andong "have been serving their constituents through the
minimal means and resources with least (sic) honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former
President Diosdado Macapagal." Since the time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by
despite the absence of public funds, with the "Interim Officials" serving their constituents "in their own little
ways and means."16

In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid presents to this Court a Certification issued by
the Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) certifying the total land area of the Municipality of Andong, "created under
Executive Order No. 107 issued [last] October 1, 1964."17 He also submits a Certification issued by the
Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning the population of Andong, which is pegged at fourteen
thousand fifty nine (14,059) strong. Camid also enumerates a list of governmental agencies and private groups
that allegedly recognize Andong, and notes that other municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the
Regional Legislative Assembly for the immediate implementation of the revival or re-establishment of
Andong.18

The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local Government
Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).19 The Certification enumerates
eighteen (18) municipalities certified as "existing," per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18)
municipalities are among the thirty-three (33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court in
Pelaez. These municipalities are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog in Zamboanga del Sur; Siayan and Pres.
Manuel A. Roxas in Zamboanga del Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New Corella in Davao; Badiangan and
Mina in Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del Sur; Gloria in Oriental Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani; Kalilangan and
Lantapan in Bukidnon; and Maco in Compostela Valley.20

Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not classifying [Andong] as a regular
existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing
16
regular municipality."21 He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of
Andong, especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly
annulled by reason of Pelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification
dated 21 November 2003; direct the DILG to classify Andong as a "regular existing municipality;" all public
respondents, to extend full recognition and support to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department
of Budget and Management, to immediately release the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public
respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the "Interim Local Officials" of Andong.22

Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues that Pelaez has
already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence. Particularly
cited is our Decision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez,23 wherein the Court affirmed the unique
status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a "de facto municipal corporation."24 Similar to Andong,
the municipality of San Andres was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner which the Court in
Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional. Moreover, San Narciso cited, as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the current recognition of the impugned municipality. The
provision reads:

Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as
such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the)
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.25

There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better discerned upon examination
of the proper scope and application of Section 442(d), which does not sanction the recognition of just any
municipality. This point shall be further explained further on.

Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the case is
not a fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo
appreciation of factual questions. There is indeed no way to confirm several of Camid’s astonishing factual
allegations pertaining to the purported continuing operation of Andong in the decades since it was annulled by
this Court. No trial court has had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of these factual claims, the
appreciation of which is beyond the function of this Court since it is not a trier of facts.

The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of the legal principles
governing the recognition of de facto municipal corporations. It has been opined that municipal corporations
may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions,
with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long
enough to afford title by prescription.26 These municipal corporations have exercised their powers for a long
period without objection on the part of the government that although no charter is in existence, it is presumed
that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their charters had been lost.27 They are especially
common in England, which, as well-worth noting, has existed as a state for over a thousand years. The reason
for the development of that rule in England is understandable, since that country was settled long before the
Roman conquest by nomadic Celtic tribes, which could have hardly been expected to obtain a municipal charter
in the absence of a national legal authority.

In the United States, municipal corporations by prescription are less common, but it has been held that when no
charter or act of incorporation of a town can be found, it may be shown to have claimed and exercised the

17
powers of a town with the knowledge and assent of the legislature, and without objection or interruption for so
long a period as to furnish evidence of a prescriptive right.28

What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of
its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state. Camid does
not have the opportunity to make an initial factual demonstration of those circumstances before this Court.
Indeed, the factual deficiencies aside, Camid’s plaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet
and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had
the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Camid’s seeming ignorance of the principles of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the
present petition, cannot be countenanced.

It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camid’s present action. The assailed issuance is the
Certification issued by the DILG. But such Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or
revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of the Certification will really do nothing to serve Camid’s
ultimate cause- the recognition of Andong. Neither does the Certification even expressly refute the claim that
Andong still exists, as there is nothing in the document that comments on the present status of Andong. Perhaps
the Certification is assailed before this Court if only to present an actual issuance, rather than a long-standing
habit or pattern of action that can be annulled through the special civil action of certiorari. Still, the relation of
the Certification to Camid’s central argument is forlornly strained.

These disquisitions aside, the central issue remains whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was
previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute.
Apparently, the question has never been decided before, San Narciso and its kindred cases pertaining as they did
to municipalities whose bases of creation were dubious yet were never judicially nullified. The effect of Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation. Besides, the
residents of Andong who belabor under the impression that their town still exists, much less those who may
comport themselves as the municipality’s "Interim Government," would be well served by a rude awakening.

The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the petition, merely by
pointing out that the Municipality of Andong never existed.29 Executive Order No. 107, which established
Andong, was declared "null and void ab initio" in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with thirty-three (33)
other executive orders. The phrase "ab initio" means "from the beginning,"30 "at first,"31 "from the inception."32
Pelaez was never reversed by this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San
Joaquin v. Siva,33 Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,34 and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.35 No subsequent
ruling by this Court declared Pelaez as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed
since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why
Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.

This ratiocination does not admit to patent legal errors and has the additional virtue of blessed austerity. Still, its
sweeping adoption may not be advisedly appropriate in light of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code
and our ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, both of which admit to the possibility of de facto municipal
corporations.

To understand the applicability of Municipality of San Narciso and Section 442(b) of the Local Government
Code to the situation of Andong, it is necessary again to consider the ramifications of our decision in Pelaez.

The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the President was then, and still is, not empowered to
create municipalities through executive issuances. The Court therein recognized "that the President has, for
many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations, and that the same have been organized and
18
in actual operation . . . ."36 However, the Court ultimately nullified only those thirty-three (33) municipalities,
including Andong, created during the period from 4 September to 29 October 1964 whose existence petitioner
Vice-President Pelaez had specifically assailed before this Court. No pronouncement was made as to the other
municipalities which had been previously created by the President in the exercise of power the Court deemed
unlawful.

Two years after Pelaez was decided, the issue again came to fore in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.37 The
Municipality of Lawigan was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 436 in 1961. Lawigan was not one of
the municipalities ordered annulled in Pelaez. A petition for prohibition was filed contesting the legality of the
executive order, again on the ground that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code was unconstitutional.
The trial court dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and entered a new decision
declaring Executive Order No. 436 void ab initio. The Court reasoned without elaboration that the issue had
already been squarely taken up and settled in Pelaez which agreed with the argument posed by the challengers
to Lawigan’s validity.38

In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,39 what was challenged is the validity of the constitution
of the Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also created by an executive order,40 and which, similar to
Lawigan, was not one of the municipalities annulled in Pelaez. This time, the officials of Balabagan invoked de
facto status as a municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court from nullifying action. They alleged that
its status as a de facto corporation cannot be collaterally attacked but should be inquired into directly in an
action for quo warranto at the instance of the State, and not by a private individual as it was in that case. In
response, the Court conceded that an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in
a proceeding for quo warranto, but only if the municipal corporation is a de facto corporation.41

Ultimately, the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de facto corporation, even though it had been
organized prior to the Court’s decision in Pelaez. The Court declared void the executive order creating
Balabagan and restrained its municipal officials from performing their official duties and functions.42 It cited
conflicting American authorities on whether a de facto corporation can exist where the statute or charter
creating it is unconstitutional.43 But the Court’s final conclusion was unequivocal that Balabagan was not a de
facto corporation.1awphi1.nét

In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute
creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was
some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that
Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de
facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid
statute to give color of authority to its creation.44

The Court did clarify in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the exercise of its
corporate powers were not necessarily a nullity.45 Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing this
point,46 yet the relevance of the citation is unclear considering that Camid does not assert the validity of any
corporate act of Andong prior to its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court in Malabang retained an
emphatic attitude as to the unconstitutionality of the power of the President to create municipal corporations by
way of presidential promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.

This principle was most recently affirmed in 1988, in Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.47 The municipality of
Santo Tomas, created by President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a complaint against another municipality, who
challenged Santo Tomas’s legal personality to institute suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not been expressly
nullified by prior judicial action, yet the Court refused to recognize its legal existence. The blunt but simple

19
ruling: "Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since
[Santo Tomas] has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action…."48

Nevertheless, when the Court decided Municipality of San Narciso49 in 1995, it indicated a shift in the
jurisprudential treatment of municipalities created through presidential issuances. The questioned municipality
of San Andres, Quezon was created on 20 August 1959 by Executive Order No. 353 issued by President Carlos
P. Garcia. Executive Order No. 353 was not one of the thirty-three issuances annulled by Pelaez in 1965. The
legal status of the Municipality of San Andres was first challenged only in 1989, through a petition for quo
warranto filed with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, which did cite Pelaez as authority.50 The RTC
dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action, and the petitioners therein elevated the matter to this Court.

In dismissing the petition, the Court delved in the merits of the petition, if only to resolve further doubt on the
legal status of San Andres. It noted a circumstance which is not present in the case at bar—that San Andres was
in existence for nearly thirty (30) years before its legality was challenged. The Court did not declare the
executive order creating San Andres null and void. Still, acting on the premise that the said executive order was
a complete nullity, the Court noted "peculiar circumstances" that led to the conclusion that San Andres had
attained the unique status of a "de facto municipal corporation."51 It noted that Pelaez limited its nullificatory
effect only to those executive orders specifically challenged therein, despite the fact that the Court then could
have very well extended the decision to invalidate San Andres as well.52 This statement squarely contradicts
Camid’s reading of San Narciso that the creation of San Andres, just like Andong, had been declared a complete
nullity on the same ground of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power found in Pelaez.53

The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d)54 of the Local Government Code of 1991. It
clarified the implication of the provision as follows:

Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts
"organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local
Government Code is preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power
to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated
Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to
acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are
validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.
(Emphasis supplied)55

The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmed in Municipality of Candijay v. Court of Appeals56 and
Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz57 In Candijay, the juridical personality of the Municipality of Alicia, created in a
1949 executive order, was attacked only beginning in 1984. Pelaez was again invoked in support of the
challenge, but the Court refused to invalidate the municipality, citing San Narciso at length. The Court noted
that the situation of the Municipality of Alicia was strikingly similar to that in San Narciso; hence, the town
should likewise "benefit from the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code, and should [be]
considered as a regular, de jure municipality." 58

The valid existence of Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949 executive order, was among the issues
raised in Jimenez. The Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided an expert summation of the evolution of the
rule.

The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling
in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and
20
therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The
ruling in this case has been reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we have since held that
where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded
legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.,
this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which,
like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez
v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never
been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the
validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later
classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a
legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was
held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have
been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), §442(d) of which provides that
"municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities."

Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December
24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40
years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is
desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, §16 of the Rules of Court, a quo
warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from
the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of
Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June
13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by §31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129),
Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an
agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.

Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution,
apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District
of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.,
442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of
Sinacaban….591awphi1.nét

From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its offspring cases
ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the
particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the
Local Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by
executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and
Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative
whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under.

Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminent
differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is
the fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we
were to affirm Andong’s de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we
21
would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court.l^vvphi1.net Court decisions cannot
obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.

It bears noting that based on Camid’s own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by
executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has
never elected its municipal officers at all.60 This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially
annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the
existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections
for the void municipality.

The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four
decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications
relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the
purpose of attesting to Andong’s legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued
upon the request of Camid, "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del
Sur,"61 thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative.1awphi1.nét

We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had also been relied
upon in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the House of Representatives
to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities that are
encompassed by the various legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of
Lanao del Sur, or of any other province for that matter.62 On the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres,
Alicia and Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part of Quezon,63 Bohol,64 and Misamis Occidental65
respectively.

How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in the DILG
Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez,
legislation was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.66 It is thus not surprising that the DILG certified the
existence of these eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities enumerated in
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through statute.
Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation recreating these eighteen (18)
municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as against these eighteen
(18) other municipalities.

We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code—that it does not serve to
affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created
by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those
municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm
legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the
municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent,
unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified
by the DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive
orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which
were enacted to revive them.1a\^/phi1.net

And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has obliterated Andong
into a hole on the ground. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the constituent
barrios of the voided town back into their original municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig
22
and Tubaran.67 These three municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao del Sur,68 and presumably continue
to exercise corporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong.

If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is through the legislature
and not judicial confirmation of void title. If indeed the residents of Andong have, all these years, been
governed not by their proper municipal governments but by a ragtag "Interim Government," then an expedient
political and legislative solution is perhaps necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the retention of Andong’s
legal personality solely on the basis of collective amnesia that may have allowed Andong to somehow pretend
itself into existence despite its judicial dissolution. Maybe those who insist Andong still exists prefer to remain
unperturbed in their blissful ignorance, like the inhabitants of the cave in Plato’s famed allegory. But the time
has come for the light to seep in, and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Metro Manila

Eleventh Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fourth day of July, two thousand.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9009 February 24, 2001

AN ACT AMENDING SECTION 450 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, BY INCREASING THE AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME
REQUIREMENT FOR A MUNICIPALITY OR CLUSTER OF BARANGAYS TO BE CONVERTED INTO A
COMPONENT CITY

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

"Section 450. Requisites for Creation. -

(a)A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a
locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least
One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000
constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i)a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by
the Land Management Bureau; or

23
 (ii)a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.

(b)The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)
or more islands.

(c)The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income."

Section 2. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts
thereof, which are inconsistent with this Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 3. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect on June 30, 2001 following its complete publication in
at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR. (Sgd.) ARNULFO P. FUENTEBELLA

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act which originated in the House of Representatives was finally passed by the House of Representatives
and the Senate on January 22, 2001and January 21, 2001, respectively.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Representatives

Approved: February 24, 2009

(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

President of the Philippines

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Representatives

24
Approved:

(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

President of the Philippines

Lapsed into law on February 24, 2001 without the signature of the President in accordance with Article VI,
Section 27(1) of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P.
TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented
by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer,
petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF
WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF
TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY
OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL
SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN,
CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY
OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,
petitioners-in-intervention.

x-----------------------------x

G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P.
TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented
by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer,
petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE
OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY
OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF
NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY
OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL
SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN,
CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY
OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,
petitioners-in-intervention.

25
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x

G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P.
TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented
by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer,
petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL
NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR,
MISAMIS ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY
OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL
SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN,
CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY
OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM,
petitioners-in-intervention.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog,
and Jerry P. Treñas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood
Laws.

The Facts

During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),5 which took effect on
30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to
convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence.6

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29,8 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities
whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

26
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution
No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint
Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood
bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's
signature.11

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.12 Petitioners also lament
that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities
under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.13

The Issues

The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and

2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petitions.

The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than
five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for
converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
27
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Preliminary Matters

Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the COMELEC,14 like
the Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws.
Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government
Code tasks the League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting
city government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-
in-intervention,16 which are existing cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be
reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treñas has legal standing because as
Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public
funds, like the release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows.

Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law

RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land
Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by
the National Statistics Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at
the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one
(1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million
to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.

28
Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-
three cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress.

During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the
income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon
during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed
between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood
bills containing a common provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100 million
prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed
into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.

Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became
effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood
bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-
retroactivity of laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws,
is not being applied retroactively but prospectively.

Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.18 The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the
creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in
any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law,
not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the
creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found
solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local
Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20
million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment
the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100
29
million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not
contain any exemption from this income requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their
cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after
the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement
in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must
be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement
a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution provides:

Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall
be automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)

If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same
share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area,
population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed
because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government units
in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,

Plain and Unambiguous

There can be no resort to extrinsic aids – like deliberations of Congress – if the language of the law is plain,
clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the
law's four corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law
according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice,
then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law.20

Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills
were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any
municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to
go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009.

The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code

30
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the
various deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended
exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This
is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an
amendment to Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the
conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the
Local Government Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other
law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption
found in the Local Government Code.

Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from
creating private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:

The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by
special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private
corporations in a general law applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private
corporation through a special law or charter.

Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable

Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere
scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during
the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These
hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent
Congresses.

The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become
functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next
Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills
had to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time,
from the filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished Business,
provides:

Sec. 123. x x x

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may
be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:

Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following:

a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its last
adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business
at the end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of the next session as if no

31
 adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are
deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations
during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain
municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by
subsequent Congresses.

Applicability of Equal Protection Clause

If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100
million annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of
the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could
be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood
Laws, which are unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as
mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City
of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one
sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted
municipalities from those that are not exempted.

Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood
bills should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy
the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had
cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification
between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement.

To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a
legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing conditions only, and
applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following
conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.24

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a
32
municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual
income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to
prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they
been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These
municipalities, even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now
convert into cities if their income is less than P100 million.

The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing
at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the
requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is
illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in
business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In
Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:

We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation
and may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed.
Examples are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the
profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which
exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting
existing establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a
regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an
attempt to give an economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as
against all those who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the
classification bears any relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will
discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the
absence of any such showing, we have no right to conjure up possible situations which might justify the
discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal
protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage
based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress - as against all
other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.

Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification
must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption
provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely:
Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436,
and 9491.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198860 July 23, 2012

33
ABRAHAM RIMANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER, INC., represented by its President, ROSEMARIE LLARENAS
and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set
aside Decision2 dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP NO. 112152.

The Facts

The present controversy stemmed from a petition for mandamus and damages filed before Branch 67 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, by Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc., represented by
its President, Rosemarie Llarenas (respondent) against Abraham P. Rimando (petitioner), who, at the time
material to the case, was the sitting mayor of the Municipality of Naguilian, La Union.

The petition prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner to issue a business permit in
favor of the respondent.

In support of its plea, the respondent claimed that its business is being conducted on a parcel of land which
formerly belonged to the national government but later on certified by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The respondent had
operated its business of emission testing on the land from 2005 to 2007. On January 18, 2008, the respondent
filed an application for the renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding fees therefor.

The petitioner, however, refused to issue a business permit unless and until the respondent executes a contract of
lease with the Municipality of Naguilian. The respondent was amenable to signing such contract subject to some
proposed revisions, which, however, were not acceptable to the petitioner. The parties did not reach a common
ground hence, the petition for mandamus.

The Ruling of the RTC

On May 26, 2009, the RTC denied the petition3 for lack of merit based on the ratiocinations that: (a) the
Municipality of Naguilian is the declared owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of Tax Declaration No.
002-01197; (b) under Section 6A.01 of the Revenue Code of the Municipality of Naguilian, the municipality
has the right to require the petitioner to sign a contract of lease because its business operation is being
conducted on a real property owned by the municipality; and (c) a mayor’s duty to issue business permits is
discretionary in nature which may not be enforced by a mandamus writ. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.4

The Ruling of the CA

34
Unwaivering, the respondent appealed to the CA. In its Decision5 dated March 30, 2011, the CA held that the
appeal was dismissible on the ground of mootness considering that the period for which the business period was
being sought had already lapsed. As such, any ruling on the matter would bring no practical relief. Nonetheless,
the CA proceeded to resolve the issues involved in the appeal for academic purposes.

The CA disagreed with the RTC and found that the factual milieu of the case justifies the issuance of a writ of
mandamus. The CA reasoned that the tax declaration in the name of the municipality was insufficient basis to
require the execution of a contract of lease as a condition sine qua non for the renewal of a business permit. The
CA further observed that Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the municipality anchored
its imposition of rental fees, was void because it failed to comply with the requirements of the Local
Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

The CA held that the petitioner may not be held liable for damages since his action or inaction, for that matter,
was done in the performance of official duties that are legally protected by the presumption of good faith. The
CA likewise stressed that the civil action filed against the petitioner had already become moot and academic
upon the expiration of his term as the mayor of Naguilian, La Union.

Despite its incessant declarations on the mootness of the case, the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 26 May 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Bauang, La
Union, Branch 67, in Special Civil Action Case No. 72-BG, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.6

The petitioner moved for reconsideration7 questioning the pronouncement of the CA that Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution No. 2007-81 was void and arguing that a petition for mandamus is not the proper vehicle to
determine the issue on the ownership of the subject land. The motion was denied in the CA Resolution8 dated
September 30, 2011.

The petitioner is now before this Court reiterating the arguments raised in his motion for reconsideration.

Our Ruling

We agree with the CA that the petition for mandamus has already become moot and academic owing to the
expiration of the period intended to be covered by the business permit.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a
determination thereof would be without practical use and value9 or in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.10 In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the applicant would be entitled to and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.11 As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case,
or dismiss it on ground of mootness.12

The objective of the petition for mandamus to compel the petitioner to grant a business permit in favor of
respondent corporation for the period 2008 to 2009 has already been superseded by the passage of time and the
expiration of the petitioner’s term as mayor. Verily then, the issue as to whether or not the petitioner, in his
capacity as mayor, may be compelled by a writ of mandamus to release the respondent’s business permit ceased
to present a justiciable controversy such that any ruling thereon would serve no practical value. Should the writ
be issued, the petitioner can no longer abide thereby; also, the effectivity date of the business permit no longer
subsists.

35
While the CA is not precluded from proceeding to resolve the otherwise moot appeal of the respondent, we find
that the decretal portion of its decision was erroneously couched.

The CA’s conclusions on the issue of ownership over the subject land and the invalidity of Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution No. 2007-81, aside from being unsubstantiated by convincing evidence, can no longer be practically
utilized in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the overriding and decisive factor in the final disposition of the appeal
was its mootness and the CA should have dismissed the same along with the petition for mandamus that
spawned it.

More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of
the same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was the pronouncement of this Court
in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor13 where a determination was made on the nature of the power of a
mayor to grant business permits under the Local Government Code,14 viz:

Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code
of 1991, which provides, thus:

SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:

xxxx

3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the
implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section
18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development
and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

xxxx

(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon
which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.

As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16
of the Local Government Code of 1991, which declares:

SEC. 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local
governments.1âwphi1 Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to issue

36
licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said
licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. x x x

xxxx

Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the respondent mayor to
issue license and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated police power of a municipal
corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the
power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of
mandamus.15 (Citations omitted)

Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for mandamus filed by the respondent is incompetent to
compel the exercise of a mayor’s discretionary duty to issue business permits.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 112152 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang,
La Union is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131512 January 20, 2000

LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE [LTO], represented by Assistant Secretary Manuel F. Bruan, LTO
Regional Office, Region X represented by its Regional Director, Timoteo A. Garcia; and LTO Butuan
represented by Rosita G. Sadiaga, its Registrar, petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF BUTUAN, represented in this case by Democrito D. Plaza II, City Mayor, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The 1987 Constitution enunciates the policy that the territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.1 In obedience to that mandate of the fundamental law, Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code,2 expresses that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall
enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy in order to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals, and that it is a
basic aim of the State to provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources.

While the Constitution seeks to strengthen local units and ensure their viability, clearly, however, it has never
been the intention of that organic law to create an imperuim in imperio and install an infra sovereign political
subdivision independent of a single sovereign state.

The Court is asked in this instance to resolve the issue of whether under the present set up the power of the
Land Registration Office ("LTO") to register, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving
thereof, has likewise devolved to local government units.

The Regional Trial Court (Branch 2) of Butuan City held3 that the authority to register tricycles, the grant of the
corresponding franchise, the issuance of tricycle drivers' license, and the collection of fees therefor had all been
vested in the Local Government Units ("LGUs"). Accordingly, it decreed the issuance of a permanent writ of
37
injunction against LTO, prohibiting and enjoining LTO, as well as its employees and other persons acting in its
behalf, from (a) registering tricycles and (b) issuing licenses to drivers of tricycles. The Court of Appeals, on
appeal to it, sustained the trial court.1âwphi1.nêt

The adverse rulings of both the court a quo and the appellate court prompted the LTO to file the instant petition
for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the decision,4 dated 17 November 1997, of the Court of Appeals
affirming the permanent injunctive writ order of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 2) of Butuan City.

Respondent City of Butuan asserts that one of the salient provisions introduced by the Local Government Code
is in the area of local taxation which allows LGUs to collect registration fees or charges along with, in its view,
the corresponding issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving of tricycles.

The 1987 Constitution provides:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes,
fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.5

Sec. 129 and Section 133 of the Local Government Code read:

Sec. 129. Power to Create Sources or Revenue. — Each local government unit shall exercise its power
to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to the provisions herein,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively
to the local government units.

Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. — Unless otherwise
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
shall not extend to the levy of the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of
licenses or permits for the driving thereof, except tricycles.

Relying on the foregoing provisions of the law, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ("SP") of Butuan, on 16 August
1992, passed SP Ordinance No. 916-92 entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire,
providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and imposing Penalties for
Violations thereof and for other Purposes." The ordinance provided for, among other things, the payment of
franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees
for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof.

Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national government that, indeed, has been transferred
to local government units is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the authority of LTO to register all motor
vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.

In order to settle the variant positions of the parties, the City of Butuan, represented by its City Mayor
Democrito D. Plaza, filed on 28 June 1994 with the trial court a petition for "prohibition, mandamus, injunction
with a prayer for preliminary restraining order ex-parte" seeking the declaration of the validity of SP Ordinance
38
No. 962-93 and the prohibition of the registration of tricycles-for-hire and the issuance of licenses for the
driving thereof by the LTO.

LTO opposed the prayer in the petition.

On 20 March 1995, the trial court rendered a resolution; the dispositive portion read:

In view of the foregoing, let a permanent injunctive writ be issued against the respondent Land
Transportation Office and the other respondents, prohibiting and enjoining them, their employees,
officers, attorney's or other persons acting in their behalf from forcing or compelling Tricycles to be
registered with, and drivers to secure their licenses from respondent LTO or secure franchise from
LTFRB and from collecting fees thereon. It should be understood that the registration, franchise of
tricycles and driver's license/permit granted or issued by the City of Butuan are valid only within the
territorial limits of Butuan City.

No pronouncement as to costs.6

Petitioners timely moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but it was to no avail. Petitioners then
appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its now assailed decision, the appellate court, on 17 November 1997,
sustained the trial court. It ruled:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the questioned permanent injunctive writ issued
by the court a quo dated March 20, 1995 AFFIRMED.7

Coming up to this Court, petitioners raise this sole assignment of error, to wit:

The Court of Appeals [has] erred in sustaining the validity of the writ of injunction issued by the trial
court which enjoined LTO from (1) registering tricycles-for-hire and (2) issuing licenses for the driving
thereof since the Local Government Code devolved only the franchising authority of the LTFRB.
Functions of the LTO were not devolved to the LGU's.8

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Department of Transportation and Communications9 ("DOTC"), through the LTO and the LTFRB, has
since been tasked with implementing laws pertaining to land transportation. The LTO is a line agency under the
DOTC whose powers and functions, pursuant to Article III, Section 4 (d) [1],10 of R.A. No. 4136, otherwise
known as Land Transportation and Traffic Code, as amended, deal primarily with the registration of all motor
vehicles and the licensing of drivers thereof. The LTFRB, upon the other hand, is the governing body tasked by
E.O. No. 202, dated 19 June 1987, to regulate the operation of public utility or "for hire" vehicles and to grant
franchises or certificates of public convenience ("CPC").11 Finely put, registration and licensing functions are
vested in the LTO while franchising and regulatory responsibilities had been vested in the LTFRB.

Under the Local Government Code, certain functions of the DOTC were transferred to the LGUs, thusly:

Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. —

xxx xxx xxx

39
 (3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, enact ordinances granting franchises and
authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses, upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to
promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the city and pursuant to this legislative authority shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(VI) Subject to the guidelines prescribed by the Department of Transportation and Communications,
regulate the operation of tricycles and grant franchises for the operation thereof within the territorial
jurisdiction of the city. (Emphasis supplied).

LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for
the operation thereof. "To regulate" means to fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established
mode; to direct by rule or restriction; or to subject to governing principles or laws.12 A franchise is defined to
be a special privilege to do certain things conferred by government on an individual or corporation, and which
does not belong to citizens generally of common right.13 On the other hand, "to register" means to record
formally and exactly, to enroll, or to enter precisely in a list or the like,14 and a "driver's license" is the
certificate or license issued by the government which authorizes a person to operate a motor vehicle.15 The
devolution of the functions of the DOTC, performed by the LTFRB, to the LGUs, as so aptly observed by the
Solicitor General, is aimed at curbing the alarming increase of accidents in national highways involving
tricycles. It has been the perception that local governments are in good position to achieve the end desired by
the law-making body because of their proximity to the situation that can enable them to address that serious
concern better than the national government.

It may not be amiss to state, nevertheless, that under Article 458 (a)[3-VI] of the Local Government Code, the
power of LGUs to regulate the operation of tricycles and to grant franchises for the operation thereof is still
subject to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC. In compliance therewith, the Department of Transportation
and Communications ("DOTC") issued "Guidelines to Implement the Devolution of LTFRBs Franchising
Authority over Tricycles-For-Hire to Local Government units pursuant to the Local Government Code."
Pertinent provisions of the guidelines state:

In lieu of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) in the DOTC, the
Sangguniang Bayan/Sangguniang Panglungsod (SB/SP) shall perform the following:

(a) Issue, amend, revise, renew, suspend, or cancel MTOP and prescribe the appropriate terms
and conditions therefor;

xxx xxx xxx

Operating Conditions:

1. For safety reasons, no tricycles should operate on national highways utilized by 4 wheel
vehicles greater than 4 tons and where normal speed exceed 40 KPH. However, the SB/SP may
provide exceptions if there is no alternative route.

2. Zones must be within the boundaries of the municipality/city. However, existing zones within
more than one municipality/city shall be maintained, provided that operators serving said zone
shall secure MTOP's from each of the municipalities/cities having jurisdiction over the areas
covered by the zone.

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 3. A common color for tricycles-for-hire operating in the same zone may be imposed. Each unit
shall be assigned and bear an identification number, aside from its LTO license plate number.

4. An operator wishing to stop service completely, or to suspend service for more than one
month, should report in writing such termination or suspension to the SB/SP which originally
granted the MTOP prior thereto. Transfer to another zone may be permitted upon application.

5. The MTOP shall be valid for three (3) years, renewable for the same period. Transfer to
another zone, change of ownership of unit or transfer of MTOP shall be construed as an
amendment to an MTOP and shall require appropriate approval of the SB/SP.

6. Operators shall employ only drivers duly licensed by LTO for tricycles-for-hire.

7. No tricycle-for-hire shall be allowed to carry more passengers and/or goods than it is designed
for.

8. A tricycle-for-hire shall be allowed to operate like a taxi service, i.e., service is rendered upon
demand and without a fixed route within a zone.16

Such as can be gleaned from the explicit language of the statute, as well as the corresponding guidelines issued
by DOTC, the newly delegated powers pertain to the franchising and regulatory powers theretofore exercised by
the LTFRB and not to the functions of the LTO relative to the registration of motor vehicles and issuance of
licenses for the driving thereof. Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code are the powers of LTO under
R.A. No. 4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles "used or operated on or upon any public
highway" in the country. Thus —

Sec. 5. All motor vehicles and other vehicles must be registered. — (a) No motor vehicle shall be used or
operated on or upon any public highway of the Philippines unless the same is properly registered for the
current year in accordance with the provisions of this Act (Article 1, Chapter II, R.A. No. 4136).

The Commissioner of Land Transportation and his deputies are empowered at anytime to examine and
inspect such motor vehicles to determine whether said vehicles are registered, or are unsightly, unsafe,
improperly marked or equipped, or otherwise unfit to be operated on because of possible excessive
damage to highways, bridges and other infrastructures.17 The LTO is additionally charged with being
the central repository and custodian of all records of all motor vehicles.18

The Court shares the apprehension of the Solicitor General if the above functions were to likewise
devolve to local government units; he states:

If the tricycle registration function of respondent LTO is decentralized, the incidence of theft of
tricycles will most certainly go up, and stolen tricycles registered in one local government could
be registered in another with ease. The determination of ownership thereof will also become very
difficult.

Fake driver's licenses will likewise proliferate. This likely scenario unfolds where a tricycle
driver, not qualified by petitioner LTO's testing, could secure a license from one municipality,
and when the same is confiscated, could just go another municipality to secure another license.

Devolution will entail the hiring of additional personnel charged with inspecting tricycles for
road worthiness, testing drivers, and documentation. Revenues raised from tricycle registration
41
 may not be enough to meet salaries of additional personnel and incidental costs for tools and
equipment.19

The reliance made by respondents on the broad taxing power of local government units, specifically under
Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is tangential. Police power and taxation, along with eminent
domain, are inherent powers of sovereignty which the State might share with local government units by
delegation given under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All these inherent powers are for a public purpose and
legislative in nature but the similarities just about end there. The basic aim of police power is public good and
welfare. Taxation, in its case, focuses an the power of government to raise revenue in order to support its
existence and carry out its legitimate objectives. Although correlative to each other in many respects, the grant
of one does not necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The two powers are, by tradition and
jurisprudence, separate and distinct powers, varying in their respective concepts, character, scopes and
limitations. To construe the tax provisions of Section 133(1) indistinctively would result in the repeal to that
extent of LTO's regulatory power which evidently has not been intended. If it were otherwise, the law could
have just said so in Section 447 and 458 of Book III of the Local Government Code in the same manner that the
specific devolution of LTFRB's power on franchising of tricycles has been provided. Repeal by implication is
not favored.20 The power over tricycles granted under Section 458(8)(3)(VI) of the Local Government Code to
LGUs is the power to regulate their operation and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. The exclusionary
clause contained in the tax provisions of Section 133(1) of the Local Government Code must not be held to
have had the effect of withdrawing the express power of LTO to cause the registration of all motor vehicles and
the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature,
exercised pursuant to the police power of the State, whose basic objectives are to achieve road safety by
insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by R.A. 4136.
Not insignificant is the rule that a statute must not be construed in isolation but must be taken in harmony with
the extant body of laws.21

The Court cannot end this decision without expressing its own serious concern over the seeming laxity in the
grant of franchises for the operation of tricycles-for-hire and in allowing the indiscriminate use by such vehicles
on public highways and principal thoroughfares. Senator Aquilino C. Pimentel, Jr., the principal author and
sponsor of the bill that eventually has become to be known as the Local Government Code, has aptly remarked:

Tricycles are a popular means of transportation, specially in the countryside. They are, unfortunately,
being allowed to drive along highways and principal thoroughfares where they pose hazards to their
passengers arising from potential collisions with buses, cars and jeepneys.

The operation of tricycles within a municipality may be regulated by the Sangguniang Bayan. In this
connection, the Sangguniang concerned would do well to consider prohibiting the operation of tricycles
along or across highways invite collisions with faster and bigger vehicles and impede the flow of
traffic.22

The need for ensuring public safety and convenience to commuters and pedestrians alike is paramount.
It might be well, indeed, for public officials concerned to pay heed to a number of provisions in our laws
that can warrant in appropriate cases an incurrence of criminal and civil liabilities. Thus —

The Revised Penal Code —

Art. 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period and suspension shall be imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in
dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the
punishment of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses.
42
 The Civil Code —

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief
against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be
taken.1âwphi1.nêt

Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to
any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages,
and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized
shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to
support such action.

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or supervision.

The Local Government Code —

Sec. 24. Liability for Damages. — Local government units and their officials are not exempt from
liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision which enjoins the Land Transportation Office from requiring the due
registration of tricycles and a license for the driving thereof is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncements on costs.

Let copies of this decision be likewise furnished the Department of Interior and Local Governments, the
Department of Public Works and Highways and the Department of Transportation and Communication.

SO ORDERED.

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