PHRONESIS 60 (2015) 40-59

BRILL brill.com/phro

A Fourth Alternative in Interpreting Parmenides

John E. Sisko
Department of Philosophy, Religion and Classical Studies
The College of New Jersey, Ewing, nj 08628. USA
sisko@tcnj.edu

Yale Weiss
Philosophy Program, The Graduate Center, CUNY
365 5th Ave., Rm. 7113, New York, ny 10016. usa
yweiss@gc.cuny.edu

Abstract

According to current interpretations of Parmenides, he either embraces a token-

monism of things, or a type-monism of the nature of each kind of thing, or a generous
monism, accepting a token-monism of things of a specific type, necessary being. These
interpretations share a common flaw: they fail to secure commensurability between
Parmenides’ alëtheia and doxa. We effect this by arguing that Parmenides champions a
metaphysically refined form of material monism, a type-monism of things; that light
and night are allomorphs of what-is (to eon); and that the key features of what-is are
entailed by the theory of material monism.

Keywords

Parmenides - Presocratics - metaphysics - monism

1 Introduction

In the contemporary debate over Parmenides, three core perspectives stand at

issue. Some scholars (the overwhelming majority) contend that Parmenides is
a numerical monist, embracing a token monism of things;1 others claim that

1 E.g. Owen i960; Guthrie 1965; Furth 1974; Gallop 1984; Nehamas iggg; Sedley 1999; Nehamas
2002; Graham 2006; Coxon 2009; McKirahan 2011; Wedin 2011; and Makin 2014. Mourelatos

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2015 | DOI 10.1163/15685284-12341278

A F O U R T H ALTERNATIVE IN IN T E R P R E T IN G PARM ENIDE S 41

he is a predicational monist, promoting a type monism of the nature of each

kind of thing;*2 and yet others posit that he is a generous monist, accepting a
token monism of things of a specific type, necessary being .3 These perspec­
tives on Parmenides differ in significant ways. Nevertheless, they are alike, we
contend, insofar as they share a common flaw. Each approach fails to secure
commensurability between Parmenides’ alëtheia and doxa; and, in our estima­
tion, it is a desideratum of any adequate interpretation of Parmenides that it
set out a plausible rationale for commensurability .4 On the one hand, defend­
ers of numerical monism champion incommensurability as a bona fide corol­
lary of Parmenides’ account of what-is in the alëtheia.5 But in this they are
mistaken for, as we shall show, Parmenides’ assessment of what-is is entailed
by a thesis that is brought to light in the doxa. On the other hand, defend­
ers of predicational monism and generous monism, to their credit, discern the
need to establish commensurability.6 However, as we shall show, neither group
succeeds in cementing a proper bond between Parmenides’ account of what-is
and his cosmology.
In what follows, we offer a new approach: a fourth alternative in inter­
preting Parmenides. On our view, Parmenides champions a metaphysically

1970 and Barnes 1979 presage the development of interpretations that go against the long­
standing orthodoxy. Barnes argues that Parmenides does not explicitly endorse numerical
monism, but he does not advance an alternative positive thesis to replace numerical monism.
Mourelatos contends that Parmenides’formulation of uniqueness, in the alëtheia, is ambigu­
ous. He suggests that either Parmenides thinks that only numerically one individual exists or
he thinks that only one type of attribute can satisfy specific metaphysical criteria for being
(Mourelatos 1970,130-1). Mourelatos’ second option is fleshed out in markedly different ways
in Curd 2004 and Palmer 2009.
2 Curd 2004. Also, while Graham holds that Parmenides is likely to be a numerical monism,
he thinks that it is not implausible to take Parmenides to be a predicational monist (or, in
Graham’s preferred idiom, an ‘Eleatic substantialist’) (Graham 2006,165-8).
3 Palmer 2009.
4 More cautiously, we might affirm that, if an interpretation establishes a plausible case for
commensurability and ceteris paribus other interpretations do not, then that interpretation
should be favored over the others.
5 For instance, Owen claims that the cosmology of the doxa ‘require [s] the existence of at least
two irreducibly different things in a constant process of interaction; and both the plurality
and the process have now, on Parmenides’ view [sc. in the alëtheia], been proven absurd’
(i960,89).
6 For instance, Palmer states: ‘[t]here is no good reason to saddle him [sc. Parmenides] with
the view that the everyday world of distinct and changing objects is a non-existent illusion
and that we are deluded in believing in its existence’ (2009,49).

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refined form of material monism, a type monism of things.7 First, we sketch

Parmenides’ account and assess the prominent contemporary interpretations.
Secondly, we offer suggestions concerning Parmenides’ framing of the discus­
sion in the alëthela and doxa. Thirdly, we explore Parmenides’ diagnosis of
error in the doxa and we show that he champions material monism. Finally,
we use lessons gleaned from the doxa to illuminate Parmenides’ meaning in
the alëtheia.8

2 Aletheia and doxa: Three Prominent Interpretations

In the alëtheia, Parmenides’goddess claims: ‘what-is is ungenerated and imper­

ishable, I a whole, of one kind, unperturbed and complete’ (28 B8.3-4 dk ); she
adds: ‘it is all alike, | nor is there any more here, which might keep it from unit­
ing, I nor any less, but all (itâv) is full of what-is’ (8.22-4); and she declares: ‘it is
complete | from eveiy viewpoint, like the bulk of a well-rounded ball’ (8.42-3).9
The goddess maintains that what-is is uniformly replete with being: it is a ple­
num, hemmed within a spherical bound.

7 As we understand him, Parmenides works within the tradition of Ionian natural philoso­
phy: our interpretation is an ‘Ionian interpretation'. The Ionian tradition is characterized
by material monism, the theory that all things are of the same material type and all that
exists in the universe is matter of this one type. Most scholars agree that the Ionian philoso­
phers Anaximander, Anaximenes and Thales advance material monism (for representative
accounts, see Guthrie 1962,39-145 and Barnes 1982,14-43). Graham challenges the orthodoxy
and suggests that the early Ionians promote generating-substance theory, according to which
different types of matter arise and are generated from a single primordial material type that
perishes in the course of the generation of other types (Graham 2006, 85-8). In the case of
Anaximenes, Graham's arguments are successfully countered in Sisko 2007. We accept that
some Ionians (including, most notably, Anaximenes) are material monists and some are not
(Xenophanes, for example, is a material dualist: see 21B26 and B33 d k ). Wedin rejects previ­
ous Ionian interpretations of Parmenides (specifically Nehamas 1999, Curd 2004 and Palmer
2009) on the grounds that these require unacceptable revisionist readings of B6: see Wedin
2011,2-3 and 42-63. We discuss B6 in n. 31 below.
8 Cosgrove argues that, given the fact that Parmenides’ work is a poem, in the epic meter of
Hesiod and Homer, it is reasonable to expect that multiple complete hearings (or readings)
are required, if one is to grasp its esoteric significance (2011, 28-30). For this reason, it is not
irrational to think that the later parts of the poem may be useful in clarifying the earlier parts.
9 Translations of Parmenides in this article generally follow, but occasionally diverge from,
those in Graham 2010.

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In the doxa, the goddess offers light and night as, in some manner, rudimen­
tary material, filling the cosmos. She states: ‘all ( toxv) is full of light and dark
night together, | both equal, since neither has any share of nothing’ (B9.3-4).
Her cosmos is a plenum: it is replete with light and night, just as the ‘all’ ( t o v ,
B8.24) of the alëtheia is replete with being. The goddess describes a geocentric
world, which, like the ‘all’ of the alëtheia, is hemmed within a spherical bound
(Bio, 12). This cosmos is ringed with hoops or circuits; and in the midst of these
configurations the goddess locates a single female divinity. This second god­
dess, we are told, ‘steers all things’ ( ttòìvtoc x u ß s p v a , B12.3).
In the extant fragments of the doxa, Parmenides’ goddess discusses a
broad range of scientific topics. She expounds on the structure of the heav­
ens; the nature of the sun, the moon, and the earth; the Milky Way and the
stars; and she lectures on reproduction, physiology, and cognition (B11,16,17).
In addition, she offers the earliest known claim to the effect that moonlight
is reflected sunlight (B14,15).10 The range of scientific topics discussed in the
extant fragments is impressive. Yet, we know that significant portions of the
doxa have been lost. Some suggest that the only about one-ninth of the doxa is
extant.*11 On this estimate, at least 350 lines of the doxa have been lost. To put
this into perspective, what may have been lost from the doxa amounts to more
than double the total number of lines that are now extant from the whole of
Parmenides’ poem. So, it is safe to claim that the goddess has a great deal to
say about the natural world; and, through her, Parmenides is revealed to have a
keen and wide-ranging interest in the project of natural science. This explains
why Plutarch notes that, within the doxa, Parmenides ‘left nothing of impor­
tance unsaid’ (adv: CoL 1114B).
Given his deep interest in natural science, it is unlikely that Parmenides
views the doxa as a bankrupt enterprise, one conveying no more than false­
hood or illusion.12 Yet, beyond the evidence concerning scope and depth of
interest in natural science, we note that Parmenides’ goddess insinuates that
the doxa holds truths and she claims that the doxa is given with her own
authority. First, the goddess identifies specific cosmogonical and cosmological
elements as being knowable. She states (B10.1-3 + 5-7):

10 See Graham 2006,179-82.

11 See Cordero 2010,234 and Diels 1897,26. Palmer suggests that the doxa originally made up
about four-fifths of Parmenides’ poem (Palmer 2009,160) and Gallop claims that the doxa
made up about two-thirds of the poem (Gallop 1984,21).
12 Contra Owen i960,89; Long 1963,90; Barnes 1982,156-7; Coxon 2009,343; and Wedin 2011,
53 n. 76.

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You shall know (£107]) the ethereal nature, and all the signs
in aether, and the unseen works of the pure torch
of the blazing s un ...

and you shall know (siSvjcrEiç) surrounding heaven,

whence it grew and how Necessity led it in shackles
to furnish the limits of the stars.

Here the goddess twice uses the verb ‘to know’.13 She asserts that, through her
account, the kouros will come to know what can only be described as truths of
cosmogony and cosmology. Therefore, the goddess proffers truth in the doxa.
Moreover, the goddess indicates that her own account of the natural world is
unsurpassable. She states: T declare to you this ordering [of things], reason­
able and whole (àoixórot 7Tdvxa) | so that no judgment of mortals will ever over­
take (TrapeXacoT)) you’ (B8.60-1). Here the goddess makes it clear that the doxa
comes with her own authority, and, by claiming that her own account cannot
be equaled, the goddess strongly implies that the doxa is legitimate science.14
Of course, the goddess’s truths are situated in context; they do not lie at
the surface of her discourse. She cautions the kouros to ‘listen to the deceptive
order (xócrpov) o f . .. [sc. her] words’ (B8.52), and she notes that mortal opinion
is not entirely trustworthy (B1.30). Thus, there is craft in her presentation. The
key to unlocking the goddess’s meaning is to develop a proper understanding
of her two-fold approach to mortal opinion. Thankfully, she provides signs. The

13 Cordero argues that the claims to knowledge in Bio show that Parmenides advances a
physical theory that he believes is true and accurate (Cordero 2010,240-2). With Cordero,
we hold that Parmenides is advancing a legitimate cosmology in Bio and elsewhere.
Against Cordero, we do not believe that the discussion of mortal opinion in B8-9,12 and
19 introduces a second and illegitimate cosmology. On our view, a single cosmological
theory is advanced in Parmenides’ poem and this theory is Parmenides’ own.
14 We agree with Palmer when, in reference to B8.60-1, he states: 'these words mark out the
goddess’s cosmology as superior to any Parmenides might encounter and lend it her own
authority’ (2009, 162). Gregory insists that other cosmological theories might prove to
equal the goddess’s, by both meeting sufficiency conditions for an adequate cosmology
and covering the full range of phenomena that are dealt with by the goddess (Gregory
2014,21 n. 16, and 22-9). We understand the goddess’s claim, ‘no judgment of mortals will
ever overtake (TrapcXâacrj]) you,’to suggest a competition analogous to traditional athletic
contests, such as the Stadion or the pentathlon. In these games, ties for first-place were
not permitted. If officials declared a tie, the contest would be re-run (potentially multiple
times) until a clear victor emerged. On our view, the goddess provides the kouros with
what is needed to always 'stay ahead’ of the competition.

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goddess both identifies and diagnoses the error of mortal opinion and thereby
places us in a position to discern what is true and what is potentially decep­
tive in the doxa. A core truth of the doxa, as we will show, is that the goddess
promotes a version of material monism. Before we assess the goddess’s stand
on mortal error, we must first assess the prominent contemporary interpreta­
tions of Parmenides.

2.1 Numerical Monism 15

Defenders of numerical monism hold that, in the alètheia, Parmenides argues
that only a single thing— a single token item— exists in all of reality. This unity
is ungenerated and deathless. Further, it is static and homogeneous. Finally,
the unity is wholly unchanging and spherical in shape .16
The central difficulty with this interpretation should be obvious: if
Parmenides were a numerical monist, then the very presence of the doxa
would be deeply problematic. Change, motion and difference characterize his
physics, and these are anathema to numerical monism. So, if Parmenides were
a numerical monist, then his alètheia and doxa would be incommensurable
and the cosmology would be an utter falsehood .17 We affirm, however, that

15 Some material in Sections 2.1-3 parallels elements in Sisko 2012,409-11 and 2014,50-4.
16 See, for example, Sedley 1999, 17. Some scholars argue that the monad is infinitely
extended and thus not spherical (see, for example, Gallop 1984,19-21). Others interpret
Parmenides’ spatial terminology as metaphorical (see, for example, McKirahan 2on, 163).
17 Most defenders of numerical monism claim both that the alètheia and doxa are incom­
mensurable and that the cosmology of the doxa is advanced with the understanding
that it is abject falsehood. See Long 1963,106; Guthrie 1965, 2; and Wedin 2011, 53 n. 76.
Nehamas sets out a slightly more nuanced, but ultimately Platonizing, interpretation. To
his credit, Nehamas (together with the defenders of predicational monism and generous
monism) affirms that the cosmology of the doxa is offered as a legitimate description
of a changeable realm. He states: ‘[t]he idea that we should learn his [sc. Parmenides’]
complex cosmology and not believe it is bizarre, if not outright incoherent! Parmenides
expects us to learn, in the most straightforward sense, a large number of truths in the
Doxa’ (Nehamas 2002,60). Accordingly, Nehamas claims, ‘Parmenides accepts the doxa as
an accurate description of appearance’ (63). Here Nehamas looks to champion the Ionian
interpretation. Nevertheless, he goes on to add, ‘though accurate... it is a description of a
false world’ (63; cf. Nehamas 1999,135). So Nehamas maintains that the alètheia provides
an accurate description of reality, whereas the doxa provides an accurate description of
what is not real, merely a 'realm of appearance’.
When faced with the question of why Parmenides should offer a cosmology that he
believes is an abject falsehood or, at best, an accurate account of a false world, defenders
of numerical monism respond with little more than hand-waving. Guthrie insists that
such a question ‘is not likely to have occurred’ to Parmenides (1965, 52), and Nehamas

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the cosmology is not bankrupt; for, as we have shown, the goddess claims
that the doxa holds truths and she indicates that the cosmology comes with
her own authority. As the thesis of numerical monism fails to meet the desid­
eratum that the two parts of Parmenides’ poem be reconcilable, it must be
rejected.

2.2 Predicational Monism

Defenders of predicational monism suggest that, in the alëtheia, Parmenides
assesses the meta-theoretical requirements for the existence of any fundamen­
tal object. He contends that fundamental objects (whatever the number) must
be ungenerated, deathless, homogenous and unchanging: each must possess
one essential nature uniformly throughout itself. Further, on this view, these
requirements are at play in the doxa insofar as tokens of light or night are pre­
sumed to be predicational monads .18
This interpretation faces several problems. Here we will mention just two.
First, the evidence in the doxa does not support the contention that light and
night are predicational monads. The goddess never directly claims that light
and night are substances nor does she claim that tokens of light or night are
either ungenerated or deathless .19 In fact, as we will show, the goddess sug­
gests that light and night, far from being substances, are actually different
phase-states of some one underlying substance. The second difficulty with
the interpretation is that, if Parmenides were to hold that the account in
the doxa satisfies the meta-theoretical requirements that are set out in the
alëtheia (insofar as tokens of light and night are predicational monads), then it
would seem that there is no adequate way for us to explain the goddess’s sug­
gestion that there is error in the doxa.20 Therefore, we must reject predica­
tional monism.

states: ‘Parmenides does not explain the relationship between these two worlds. He prob­
ably saw it as an unbridgeable gap’ (2002, 63). As we see it, such hand-waving might be
permissible, but only if no alternative interpretation, establishing aletheia-doxa com-
mensurability, were otherwise available.
18 See Curd 2004,64-97.
19 See Palmer 2009,30.
20 See Palmer 2009,30-1 and Nehamas 2002,61. In an attempt to address this problem, Curd
(2004,107-10) posits that Parmenides intentionally violates the principles of predicational
monism by defining light and night as incongruent counterparts: enantiomorphic oppo­
sites. On this approach, Parmenides defines both light and night in terms of what the
other is not and, purposively scuttling the doxa on the reef of the alëtheia, he challenges
his contemporaries to construct cosmologies that rely on truly independent substances.
We, however, do not see this as a solution to the problem. Curd’s proposal flies in the face

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2.3 Generous Monism

Defenders of generous monism contend that, in the alëtheia, Parmenides
argues that there is just one necessary being. The characteristics of the pur­
ported necessary being are essentially the same as those that are attributed to
what-is under numerical monism. The necessary being is ungenerated, death­
less, static and homogenous. Finally, it is hemmed within a spherical bound.
This interpretation is ‘generous’ insofar as it is alleged that the existence of the
necessary monad is compatible with the existence of contingent and change­
able substances: it is suggested that the lone necessary being and the mutable
cosmos co-exist and are spatially co-terminous.21
Among the three prominent interpretations, this approach alone seems to
fully appreciate the legitimacy the goddess imputes to her cosmology, for it
respects the cosmological enterprise in full. Nonetheless, it faces a serious dif­
ficulty: the problem of co-presence. In bare conceptual terms the existence of
a necessary being might be compatible with the existence of a mutable cosmos
(consider the possible co-existence of Anselm’s God and world). Nevertheless,
Parmenides’ description of what-is makes such a symbiosis problematic. The
purported necessary being of the alëtheia occupies all space within a spheri­
cal bound. It is replete with being: it is a plenum. Yet the goddess’s cosmos of
light and night is also a plenum, existing within the same spherical bound. So,
given that no two plena may exist in the same place, it turns out that generous

of the goddess’s claim that her own account; is unsurpassable, for, under the proposal, any
mere mortal might develop a cosmology that is superior to the goddess’s.
The most significant problem facing predicational monism is that it generates incon­
sistency whenever more than one material type is posited. Even if some two material
types are not enantiomorphic opposites, any token of one type will not be a token of the
other type: if tokens of type A are purely A internally, and tokens of type B are purely B
internally, it remains that each token of A will not be B (and each token of B will not be
A). This 'external negation' violates the goddess’s account of what-is not in the alëtheia, as
the account is understood by defenders of predicational monism (see Nehamas 2002, 61
and Sisko 2012,410). Predicational monism collapses in on itself and, insofar as the theory
ultimately limits what-is to only one type of stuff, it entails either numerical monism
or material monism. Thus, predicational monism is untenable. Curd, acknowledges the
problem of external negation, but replies with hand-waving. She states that Parmenides
‘did not recognize the difficulty in his theory’ (2004, p. xxii). As we see it, Curd's hand-
waving, like that of Guthrie and Nehamas (see n. 17 above), might be permissible, but
only if no alternative interpretation, establishing alêtheia-doxa commensurability, were
otherwise available.
21 Palmer 2009,51-105.

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monism brokers incommensurability and contradiction.22 Thus, we must also

reject generous monism.

3 The Heart of Reality and the Steering Goddess

On our view, the subject matter of the aiëtheia, viz. what-is, is consubstantial
with the cosmos of light and night: we affirm that what-is is a cosmic archë and
Parmenides is a material monist. As we understand him, Parmenides works
within the Ionian tradition. To start with, Ionianism is suggested by a pair of
framing passages. The first is in the proem. The goddess states (B1.28-30):

It is necessary that you learn all things,

both the unshaken heart of well-rounded reality (àXrjSsfyç sùxuxXéoç23
àTpspèç ^xop),
and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true trust.

Here the goddess indicates that the subject matter of the aiëtheia will be
that of the heart of reality. Heart, Y j r o p , may be taken to signify vital core, cen­
tral nucleus or original basis: it may be taken to signify archë. Aristotle, for
example, marks the conceptual link between heart and archë, in Metaphysics
A.i. Albeit using xapSla, not vjxop, he states: ‘We call an origin (apyr))... that

22 Palmer insists that the necessary being is ‘uniformly present... without occupying every
point of space’, and this allows for co-presence (Palmer 2009,186-7). Nevertheless, the
goddess’s claims that ‘you will not cut off what-is from clinging to what is' (B4.2)
and that ‘it is full of what-is | ... [I] t is all continuous, for what-is cleaves to (raXdÇei) what-
is’ (B8.24-5) show that what-is is a continuous plenum, occupying all space to the exclu­
sion of all else. (For supporting arguments, see Barnes 1982, 210-13.) Further, Palmer does
not rule out the possibility that the goddess’s cosmos of light and night is a plenum. So
even if he were correct about what-is (and it proves to be, let us say, ‘gappy’), the problem
of co-presence would persist. Palmer, in explaining the physics of co-presence, notes that
Anaxagoras’principle of universal mixture (see 59B1,4 and 6 d k ) entails the co-presence
of all types of material stuff in every spatial region of the universe, and he adds that 'the
problem of co-presence... would not have presented itself to Parmenides in the same
way as it did to Anaxagoras’ (Palmer 2009,187). We find this to be a sophisticated form of
hand-waving. There is no evidence showing that Parmenides tries to explain co-presence
and this, we maintain, is due to the fact that he does not proffer a theory that requires
co-presence. Palmer’s hand-waving, together with kindred waving by Curd, Guthrie and
Nehamas (see nn. 17 and 20 above) might be permissible, but only if no alternative inter­
pretation, establishing alëtheia-doxa commensurability, were otherwise available.
23 Following Simplicius, On the Physics vii. 557.26 Heiberg. Palmer’s argument for favoring
this textual variant over others is decisive (see Palmer 2009,378-80).

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from which a thing first arises... some suppose the heart (xapSlav)... to be of
this nature’ (ioi2b3i-ioi3a6). Given the connotation of fyrop, it is not unreason­
able to view our first framing passage as heralding a discussion, soon to come
in the alëtheia, that will focus on the nature of a cosmic arche. Such a focus on
arche would place Parmenides squarely within the Ionian tradition.
The Ionians share not only the belief that there is a material source of the
structured world but also the belief that there is an efficient cause which
brings about change within the world. Many of the Ionians identify this cause
as a ‘steering cause’. As examples, we note that Anaximander asserts that the
apeiron ‘steers all things (rravra xußspväv)’ (12 A15 dk ); Heraclitus claims that
‘thunderbolt steers (olotxlÇei) all things’ (22 B34 dk ). For some of the Ionians,
including Anaximander, the ‘steering cause’is identical with the material arche.
For others, it is not. Xenophanes, for example, posits two material sources:
earth and water (see 21 B29 and B33 dk ). Yet his efficient cause— the one
god who, ‘aloof from toil, shakes (xpaSodvsi) all things by the will of his
mind' (B25)— appears to exist independently from matter. Our second
framing passage, Parmenides B12.3 (to which we have already referred), gains
resonance with the Ionian tradition of marking out a ‘steering cause’; for in it
we learn of a goddess who ‘steers all things (7rctvT0t xußspvä)’. This goddess is
responsible for change within the cosmos (see B12.4-6 and B13). While it is not
our interest here to determine whether Parmenides' ‘steering goddess’ is inde­
pendent from matter or is, ultimately, material stuff, we do think that, by posit­
ing a ‘steering cause’, Parmenides situates himself squarely within the Ionian
tradition.

4 Mortal Error and Divine Knowledge

In order to strengthen the claim that Parmenides is concerned with a material

arche, we must turn to the goddess’s comments on the doxa and the ‘error’
with which it is polluted. In the proem, the goddess tells the kouros that he
will learn the opinions of mortals ‘in which there is no true trust’ (B1.30). Here
it bears emphasis that the opinions of mortals are not said to be false but,
instead, somehow lacking in trust.24 Regarding mortal opinion, the goddess
states (B1.31-2):

Even these things you will learn, how what they resolved (ûç m Soxoûvxa)
would have had to be trustworthy, through a whole, all things are comple­
tely (Sià 7tavxàç raivxa Ttsp 8vxa).

24 This point is made by both Graham and Matson (Graham 2006,174 and Matson 1980,347).

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The goddess’s approach to mortal opinion is two-fold. On the one hand, she
indicates that there is something untrustworthy about the opinions of mortals.
On the other hand, she claims that the beliefs of mortals would have been true,
or acceptable, on account of some condition: a condition to which she alludes,
w hen she states, ‘through a whole, all things being completely’ (B1.32). We may
infer that, if this error were diagnosed and no longer neglected, then some
account of mortal opinion, which respects the condition ‘through a whole, all
things being completely’, would be acceptable to the goddess. Further, given
Parmenides’ interest in natural science, it is no surprise that, in the doxa, the
goddess both diagnoses the error, which makes the beliefs of mortals untrust­
worthy, and develops a cosmology th at respects the condition to which she
alludes in the proem.
At the com m encem ent of the doxa the goddess warns the kouros to ‘heed
the deceptive order (xóapov) of [sc. her] words’ (B8.52). W hat is deceptive
about her verse, the views of mortals, is identified immediately thereafter. The
goddess states: ‘for they [mortals] undertook to nam e two forms (popçdç); | of
these it is not right to nam e one, in which they have gone astray (rwv plav où
Xpecóv ècTTiv— sv w 7ts7rXavv]pévoi stalv)’ (B8.53-4). The two forms nam ed are light
and night (see B8.57-9 and Bg). Here, then, we find the diagnosis of the singular
m ortal error th at had been alluded to in the proem.25 So, if we can come to
grips with the diagnosis, then we should be able to discern w hat the goddess
finds acceptable in the doxa.
The question of how best to understand the goddess’s meaning at B8.54 is a
longstanding crux.26 We note th at there are three substantially different ways
in which the first half of this line can be interpreted.27 The goddess might be
indicating:

(x) ju st one of the two forms should not be named; or

(2) so m uch as one of the two forms should not be named;28 or
(3) a unity of the two forms should not be named.

We can dismiss the third interpretation on the basis of internal consistency.

The approach implies that there cannot be a unity of the two forms named, but
this directly conflicts w ith the pronouncem ents of the goddess shortly there-

25 Note the singular relative pronoun, u, in B8.54.

26 See Mourelatos 1970,80-5; Curd 2004,109-10; Graham 2006,172-3; and Palmer 2009,167-75.
27 Following Graham 2006,172.
28 As Furley has shown piav où can mean oùSejiicìv, so there is no reason to deny that it can
also mean oùSrrépav (Furley 1989,31).

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A F O U R T H ALTERNATIVE IN IN T E R P R E T IN G PARM ENIDE S 51

after, viz. ‘all is fall of light and dark night together’ (B9.4). If everything in the
cosmos, or the whole cosmos itself, is a union of the two forms, then it is obvi­
ously false that there cannot be a unity of two forms. So this reading would
have the goddess correcting mortals, who believe that there are unities of two
forms, by saying there are not, and then herself saying that there are. Thus, the
third interpretation cannot be accepted.
If denotation is the core issue in B8.54, as it appears to be, then the question
before us is whether the goddess holds that just one of the names fails to refer
or that both of the names fail to refer. We find that there is a clear rationale for
favoring the latter interpretation. Several lines earlier, at B8.38-41, the goddess
offers an analysis of mortal names, and this analysis places constraints upon
the interpretation of B8.54. In this earlier passage, the goddess states:

It [sc. what-is, TÒ èóv: see B8.32] has been named all things
that mortals, believing them to be real,
suppose to be coming to be and perishing, to be and not to be,
and to change their place and alter their bright color.

Here the goddess describes a broad failure of reference. She asserts that all
mortal names fail to refer. Now, reference can fail either when a name does
not denote anything or when a name does not denote the intended object.
In this passage, the goddess is concerned with the latter type of failure. She
asserts that, whenever mortals assign a name to a purported object (believing
the object to be real), there is a failure of reference in regard to that object as
named, for each mortal name in actuality denotes, not its purported object,
but what-is ( tò èó v ). Thus, the goddess contends that all mortal names fail to
refer. Her stance on reference in this passage provides us with a deduction that
cements the interpretation of B8.53-4. If all mortal names fail to refer and the
two form-names to which the goddess alludes at B.8.53-4— ‘light’and ‘night’—
are mortal names, then each of these names fails to refer. That is, so much as
one of the two forms should not be named: so the second interpretation of
B8.53-4 is entailed by the goddess’s earlier account of reference. The goddess’s
position is that neither ‘light’ nor ‘night’, qua names of substances, refer, since
neither light nor night are substances.
Considering the diagnosis, we suggest that the two names— ‘light’ and
‘night’— in fact refer to the same thing which is neither light nor night
perse: the names refer to what-is ( tò èó v ) and this is a material substrate. It is the
archë. Light and night are forms of this material, but have no independent exis­
tence from it. So every statement about the two forms in the doxa can be read
as a statement that is, in fact, about a material substrate. The interpretation

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52 SISKO AND WEISS

gains credence when we consider the goddess’s use of language in the diagno­
sis of mortal error. She calls light and night ‘opposites in frame’ (Sépaç, B8.55)
and she refers to the two as ‘forms’ (popçâç, B8.53). The goddess indicates, not
that light and night are substances, but that they are forms, frames or phase-
states: light and night are a pair of allomorphs of the same substance.29 So,
the following picture of the error emerges: the uninitiated, who are ignorant
of the goddess’s diagnosis, name two (or more) forms, thinking, erroneously,
that these are substances. Yet initiates, who comprehend the goddess’s diag­
nosis, name two forms, thinking, without error, that these are different phase-
states of some one underlying type of matter. As such, once this singular error
is diagnosed, statements like ‘all is full of light and dark night together’ (B9.3)
are revealed to be true: all things are structured out of what-is in its two forms:
light and night. The doxa, properly understood, becomes true and acceptable.
It is revealed to contain legitimate cosmological speculation grounded upon
the supposition that there are two basic forms of one underlying substance.
Finally, this account respects the goddess’s assertion that ‘through a whole, all
things are completely’ (B1.32). That is, all things of the world, made up of the
forms light and night, exist through a single, whole substance: tò éóv. Since this
account is acceptable, we may use it to inform our reading of the alëtheia.

5 Material Monism in the Aletheia

To begin with, it is necessary to note that the goddess does not advance exis­
tence arguments in the alëtheia. She does not attempt to show that what-is is or
must be; rather, her arguments focus on what must hold of what-is, insofar as it
is. The lack of existence arguments, we infer, is due to Parmenides’ taking it as
given, from the start, that there is a single substance which furnishes the mate­
rial of the world. In light of this, we should expect him to study the attributes of
what-is from the perspective of one who already accepts material monism—
and this appears to be precisely what he does in the alëtheia.30 We contend

29 This use of form-words clearly indicates that Parmenides is embracing some sort of mate­
rial monism. Generating substance theory (a view that Graham attributes to the early
Ionians: see n. 7 above) cannot coherently be attributed to Parmenides if he holds that
light and night are merely two forms of some one type of matter. Parmenides’ version of
material monism is superior to that which is offered by Anaximenes. Anaximenes con­
flates substance and phase-state by naming both his underlying material type and one of
its (many) phase-states a ë r (see 13 A5 d k ). But Parmenides is aware that a phase-state of
substance may reveal accidents and not the nature, or essence, of substance.
30 No independent arguments for material monism are given by any of the pre-Parmenide-
ans and such arguments are not found until Diogenes of Apollonia (see especially 64 Ai

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A F O U R T H ALTERNAT IVE IN IN T E R P R E T I N G PARM ENIDE S 53

that most of the attributes which are ascribed to what-is (tè èóv) in the alëtheia
are entailed by the theory of material monism. In B8.1-4, the goddess identifies
four chief attributes. She states:

Only one tale is left of the way;31

that it is, and on this are posted

and B2 d k ). Diogenes continued the Ionian tradition, while utilizing the rigorous tools
developed by Parmenides for his own Ionian project.
31 This proposition alludes to the conclusion of a series of arguments that are advanced in
B2-4 and B6-7. The meaning and import of these arguments are topics of much debate
and a second paper would be required if we were to provide an adequate study of the
arguments. However, in brief, we hold that, in B2-3, Parmenides initiates an a priori inves­
tigation into the metaphysical attributes of whatever exists in reality. He identifies two
possible objects of study: what-is and what-is-not. He argues that what-is, which he takes
to be a necessarily existing substance (owing, we would say, to the supposition of material
monism), is a suitable object of study and he rules out any investigation into what-is-
not, on the grounds that what-is-not, which he conceives to be not-being, nothingness,
or void, does not and cannot exist. This brings us near to the starting point of B8: the
proposition that only one route of study, one that focuses the attributes of the necessarily
existing substance, will prove to be a fruitful a priori investigation. However, B2-3 leaves
open the question of whether changeable and corruptible stuffs might be suitable objects
of a priori investigation. The goddess takes up this issue in B6-7. In B6, she states; ‘from
this first way [sc. the way of what-is-not] I withhold (sïpyw) you, | but then from this one,
which mortals knowing nothing | wander two-headed | ... and by whom to be and not to
be are thought to be the same | and not the same’ (B6.3-9). Here the goddess reiterates
that what-is-not is not a suitable object of study, and she affirms that what mortals proffer
as existing is also unsuitable as an object of study, because mortals have a mistaken view
about what exists. (The nature of mortal error is, as we have argued, explained at B8.38-
41 and 53- 4- ) In B7, the goddess reaffirms that the kouros is to withhold (à'pyw, B7.3) his
thoughts from this third route of inquiry. Having determined that the objects that mortals
proffer as existing are not suitable objects for a priori investigation, the goddess, in B8,
advances an investigation into the metaphysical nature of what-is.
We note that, while the goddess withholds the kouros from an a priori investigation
into changeable and corruptible stuffs, she does not bar him from studying the natural
world in the context of a posteriori investigation. In fact, the doxa constitutes such an a
posteriori investigation. In B.6-7, the goddess merely delays the discussion of physics so
that she can provide the kouros with an adequate understanding of metaphysical truth.
As she sees it, her student needs to grasp the truth that there is just one type of substance
(one substance that invariable possesses the characteristics outlined in B8) if he is to fully
comprehend how mere mortals err, thinking both that there are two (or more) types of
substance and that these are subject to generation and destruction. Put simply, the god­
dess holds that an understanding of phase-state physics requires an understanding of
the nature of substance. We, together with Wedin, agree that, in B.6, the goddess bars the
kouros from the study of physics (see Wedin 2011,2-3 and 42-63). However, against Wedin,

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54 SISKO AND W EISS

very many signs, that what-is is ungenerated (àyévvjxov) and imperishable

(àvéXeGpóv),
a whole of one kind (oSXov pouvoysvéç), unperturbed (àxpsuÉç) and com­
plete (xéXeiov).

The goddess affirms that what-is is (i) ungenerated and deathless, (ii) a whole
of one kind, (iii) unshaken, and (iv) complete. Let us consider her arguments
for each of these points, as they are laid out.
Regarding what-is being ungenerated, the goddess states (B8.5-9, u ):

Never was it, nor shall it be, since it now is, all together,
one (ëv) continuous (cuvexéç). For what birth would we seek of it?
Where, whence did it grow? From ‘what-is-not’ I will not let you
say or think; for it is not sayable or thinkable
that it is n o t...

Thus, it must be completely or not at all.

The goddess argues that, if a single substance is taken to be the totality of what-
is, as must be the case under material monism, then that substance cannot be
generated; for if it were it would have to be generated out of nothing, as there
is nothing else besides it. But that is impossible, for nothing comes from noth­
ing. Further, she contends by parity of reason that what-is cannot be destroyed,
and she contends that it cannot become a substance other than itself, since
material monism requires that there is no other type of matter. There is just
what-is. Thus, the claim that what-is is ungenerated and deathless is directly
entailed by the theory of material monism.
Regarding the characteristic of being a whole of one kind,32 the goddess
states (B8.22-5):

Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike (îtâv èaxiv ôpoîov),

nor is there any more here, which would keep it from holding together,
nor any less, but all is full of what-is (nâv S’ ëputXeôv ècxtv èôvxoç).
Thus, it is all continuous (IjuvEX^ç), for what-is cleaves (tteXc^ ei) to what-is.

we affirm that the ban only applies to a priori, not a posteriori, investigation. Thus, B.6 is
no obstacle to an Ionian interpretation of Parmenides.
32 We note that pouvoyevéç ‘of one kind’ (B8.4), which is derived from yévoç, not ylyveaSai
(see Barnes 1979,8-9; Mourelatos 1970,113-14; and Curd 2004,71), signals material monism
in no uncertain terms.

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A F O U R T H ALTERNATIVE IN IN T E R P R E T I N G PARM ENIDES 55

The goddess begins with the assumption that there is only one type of mat­
ter and she argues that the complete aggregate of this matter must have spa­
tial uniformity.33 But we note that uniformity follows from material monism.
Under material monism, what-is collectively is a whole of one kind. Now, if
there is only one type of thing, then the only thing that could separate the type
from itself is nothing. But nothing is not, and so it cannot separate what-is.
Thus what-is must cleave to itself. Accordingly, the goddess concludes that it is
a continuous whole: a plenum. So, the spatial uniformity of what-is is directly
entailed by the theory of material monism.
Regarding the characteristic of being unmoved, the goddess states (B8.26-7,
2 9 -31 ):

Further, motionless (àxlvvjxov) in the limits of great bonds

it is without starting and stopping...

Remaining the same in the same by itself it lies

and thus it remains steadfast there; for mighty Necessity
holds it in the bonds of a limit, which confines it round about.

The goddess’s argument does not concern motion under the modern para­
digm: it does not concern transitions between different Cartesian coordinates.
Rather, the goddess is working under a Homeric paradigm, according to which
kinesis is egress.34 Under this paradigm, motion is absolute with reference
to one’s own territory, place, or home. It is spatial self-estrangement. So, the
goddess contends that what-is cannot leave its native place: the aggregate of
what-is is hemmed within a limit.35 She also notes that the presence of a limit
follows from the spatial uniformity of what-is, which is entailed by the thesis
of material monism; that is, if what-is cleaves to itself, the boundary between

33 That this is her point is strongly implied by a related discussion in B4. There she claims
that ‘you will not cut off what-is from clinging to ( ^ s<t6«i) what-is, since it is neither com­
pletely scattered everywhere in order nor combined’ (B4.2-4). If what-is were ‘scattered’, it
would be separated from itself, something impossible under material monism. Likewise,
what-is cannot be combined with anything else, since there is nothing else to combine it
with (given the assumption of material monism). Therefore, what-is must cling to itself.
34 See Mourelatos 1970, U7-i9.
35 Importantly, the goddess’s stance on motion does not preclude relative change of loca­
tion within the spatial limit. Antiperistasis, the motion of cyclical replacement within
a voidless plenum, is likely to be a feature of Parmenides’ physics. Parmenides’ immedi­
ate successors in natural science, Anaxagoras and Empedocles, posit antiperistasis. See
Barnes 1982,397-402 and Sisko 2003,104-6.

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56 SISKO AN D WEIS S

what-is and nothingness is absolute. So the goddess’s claim that what-is is

unmoved, remaining in its own place or domain, is also entailed by the thesis
of material monism: as the limit between nothingness and what-is is absolute,
what-is cannot cross its own boundary.
Finally, the goddess argues that what-is is complete. She states (B8.42-9):

Yet since there is a final limit, it is in a state of perfection (rsTeÀcapévov)

from every viewpoint, like the bulk of a well-rounded ball (eoxuicXoo
crçc«pv)ç èvaXfyxiov öyxcp),
equally [sc. distant] from the center in all directions. For it is not right
for it to be any greater nor any smaller here or there.
For neither is there what-is-not, which might stop it from reaching
its like, nor what-is in such a way that there would be of what-is
here more but there less, since it is all inviolate.
For being equal to itself in every direction, it equally meets its limits.

The goddess argues that what-is is spatially complete: it is uniformly present

everywhere. Her conclusion rests on two supporting considerations: first, there
is not what-is-not to prevent the cleaving of what-is to itself (B8.46-7) and, sec­
ondly, what-is does not differ in such a way to stop the coming together of
substance (B8.47-8). These considerations are drawn directly from her earlier
account of the spatial uniformity of what-is (at B8.22-5). Here the goddess indi­
cates that spatial uniformity, unhindered by what-is-not, entails uniform pres­
ence everywhere. But, now, since the spatial uniformity of what-is is directly
entailed by the theory of material monism, so too is spatial completeness. So
to this point each of the attributes which are ascribed to what-is (tò èóv) in B.8
are entailed by the theory of material monism.36
The goddess also advances the claim that what-is is spherical and she pres­
ents this claim as if it were entailed by spatial completeness. In this she is
mistaken. Spatial completeness requires that what-is be everywhere, but com­
pleteness does not entail that ‘everywhere’ amounts the interior of a sphere.37
Here we find that certain a posteriori considerations are likely to shape
Parmenides' thinking. In the doxa, the goddess insinuates that the cosmos of
light and night is spherical (see B12 and A37), and she shows that light and
night are phase-states of what-is. Together these claims entail the sphericity

36 We note that, as a single type of substance, what-is is sufficient for everything in the cos­
mos: it is ‘complete’ insofar as it is the material basis of all that is, was or shall be.
37 It is reasonable to suppose that spatial completeness entails infinite extension (see Sisko
2003,92-3).

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A F O U R T H ALTERNAT IVE IN IN T E R P R E T IN G PARM ENIDE S 57

of what-is. Nevertheless, the explicit argument for sphericity in the alêtheia

rests on an aesthetic / evaluative consideration: the notion that the sphere is
the only (or, perhaps, the most) perfect solid. The goddess infers that, since
the aggregate of what-is is spatially complete, or perfect (xETeXecrpévov, B8.42),
it must be realized in the shape of a perfect solid; and, since the sphere is the
only perfect solid, the aggregate must fill the interior of a sphere.38 Sphericity
alone, among the attributes which are ascribed to what-is in B.8, is not entailed
by the theory of material monism. Nevertheless, Parmenides, harboring cer­
tain geometric prejudices, believes that what-is is spherical.
So, the four chief characteristics that are attributed to what-is in the alêtheia
(the fifth—sphericity— not withstanding) are entailed by the thesis of mate­
rial monism. The alêtheia of Parmenides thus emerges as an exercise in deduc­
tive cosmology, a milestone both in the development of Greek axiomatics and
cosmological speculation. It is in this that Parmenides’ main innovativeness
as a philosopher lies: he takes the thesis of the Ionians and unpacks it criti­
cally, seeing what must follow from the supposition of material monism in his
alêtheia and assessing the cosmos’ contingent features in his doxa.

6 Conclusion

In conclusion, we have shown that the goddess’s diagnosis of mortal error

suggests that light and night are different phase-states of some one underly­
ing type of matter, what-is. Further, we have shown that the chief attributes
of what-is, which are discussed in the alêtheia, are logically entailed by the
thesis of material monism. On our view, Parmenides’ comments suggest that
the alêtheia and doxa are commensurable. So our approach appears to surpass
each of the three prominent interpretations. As we see it, Parmenides believes
that our changeable cosmos is consubstantial with what-is. Further, he warns
against the error of taking mere frames or forms of substance to be substance;
for, as he suggests in a now pregnant comment from the proem, ‘through a
whole all things are completely’ (B1.32).39

38 We note that Plato and Aristotle rely on similar aesthetic / evaluative judgments in argu­
ments for the sphericity of the cosmos. See Plato Timaeus 33bi-ci, with a clear allusion to
B8.44 at 33t>4-5, and Aristotle, de caelo 2.4.
39 This research was supported by a m u s e (Mentored Undergraduate Summer Experience)
Grant from The College of New Jersey. We are pleased to acknowledge this valuable assis­
tance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on
Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Fordham University, New York, ny , 13th October, 2013.

PHRONESIS 60 (2015) 40 -5 9
58 SISKO AN D WEISS

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