ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYEES (ACEA) VS.

CALLEJA

G.R NO. 94716 November 15, 1991

FACTS:

The registered respondent Union of concerned employees of the Court of Appeals (UCECA) filed a petition for Certification Election with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) alleging that the Association of Court of Appeals
Employees (ACAE) which the incumbent bargaining representative no longer enjoys the support of the majority of the rank-and-file employees. It was alleged by the respondent union that there was a mass resignation of
ACAE members, ACAE opposed the allegation. ACAE countered UCECA with misrepresentation, forgery, and perjury. Petitioner then filed a petition for cancellation of certificate of registration of the UCECA on the ground
of fraud and misinterpretation in obtaining registration certificate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petition for cancellation of registration of union requesting for a certification election is a bar to the resolution of a prior petition for Certification Election?

RULING:

The Court after careful perusal ruled in favor of UCECA by applying the established rule correctly followed by the public respondent BLR that an order hold certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition
for cancellation of the registration certification of the respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order
directing a cancellation.

As to the question of the legality of labor union in government sector is well settled in accordance with the pertinent provisions of executive order 180.

Bautista vs CA
GR No. 123375; February 28, 2005

FACTS:

(presented in chronological order of petitions and motions filed before several fora)

Kaisahan at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (KKMK-MWSS) is a union in the said public sector (MWSS) created and registered pursuant to Executive
Order No. 180.

➢ On May 7, 1993, a petition for election of officers was filed by Bonifacio de Guzman, former auditor of KKMK-MWSS before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR);
➢ The BLR granted the petition and the Labor Organization Division of the Bureau shall supervise the conduct of said elections;
 ➢ A motion for reconsideration was filed by the incumbent officers of KKMK-MWSS, led by its president, Genaro Bautista, but was denied by BLR;
➢ An appeal was filed with the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment where the order of the BLR was assailed as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction,
and so dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction;
➢ The then incumbent officers filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, Quezon City, with the issuance of temporary restraining order, but the petition was dismissed for being insufficient in form
and substance, and for want of genuine justiciable issue. The resolution became final;
➢ However, on November 25, 1993, a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer of Temporary Restraining/Injunction was filed by Bautista, et al., before RTC Quezon City (Branch 87) to enjoin the
respondents (present officers, BLR, etc.) from proceeding with the election of officers scheduled on December 2, 1993. The petition was granted;
➢ On December 2, 1993, the election proceeded in defiance to the order of the court. Hence, an order was issued by the court to refrain from giving effect of the election and recognizing the persons
supposedly elected, and hereby ordering the latter to refrain from assuming office and acting as officers of the KKMK-MWSS. The court subsequently issued a writ of preliminary injunction;
➢ The case was re-raffled to Branch 220 of RTC Quezon. The respondents filed a Reiteration of Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Lift Writ Preliminary Injunction on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
and that the injunction does not anymore served its purpose. The instant case was dismissed;
➢ A motion for reconsideration was filed by Bautista, et al alleging that the RTC has jurisdiction considering that the case before it is an action for prohibition, as a result of which, the said writ was
reinstated;
➢ A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondents but was denied. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order, before the Court of Appeals;
➢ On October 9, 1995, a decision was rendered by the CA finding for the private respondents, upholding that the BLR had jurisdiction over an intra-union dispute.
➢ A motion for reconsideration was filed by Bautista, et al but the same was denied. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari was now filed before the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BLR has jurisdiction over the conduct of election of officers (intra-union conflict) of an employee’s association in the public sector.

RULING:
The court ruled in the affirmative. It is quite clear from the provision of Article 226 of the Labor Code that BLR has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. An
intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, and an inter-union controversy or dispute, one occurring or carried on between or among unions.
The subject of the case at bar, which is the election of the officers and members of the board of KMKK-MWSS, is, clearly, an intra-union conflict, being within or inside a labor union. It is well within
the powers of the BLR to act upon.
Executive Order No. 180 (1987), particularly Section 16 thereof, is completely lucid as to the settlement of disputes involving government employees, viz:
SEC. 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving government employees.

G.R. No. 142347 August 25, 2005

DULCE M. ABANILLA, in her capacity as General Manager of the Metropolitan Cebu Water District, Cebu City, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
FACTS:
Pursuant to Presidential Decree 198 or the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD), a local water district was organized as a government-owned corporation with
original charter.
Subsequently, MCWD, through its Board of Directors, issued the following Resolutions giving benefits and privileges to its personnel, one of whom is Dulce M. Abanilla, MCWD’s General
Manager, petitioner herein: (1) Board Resolution No. 054-83 dated May 23, 1983 granting hospitalization privileges; (2) Board Resolution Nos. 091-83 and 0203-85 dated October 21, 1983 and
November 20, 1985, respectively, allowing the monetization of leave credits; (3) Board Resolution No. 0161-86 dated November 29, 1986 granting Christmas bonus; and (4) Board Resolution No. 083-88
granting longevity allowance.
On January 1, 1989, MCWD and Metropolitan Cebu Water District Employees Union, petitioner-in-intervention, executed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) providing for the continuous grant to all
its regular rank and file employees of existing benefits, such as cash advances, thirteenth month pay, mid-year bonus, Christmas bonus, vacation and sick leave credits, hospitalization, medicare,
uniform privileges, and water allowance.
On January 1, 1992, the parties renewed their CBA.
On November 13, 1995, an audit team headed by Bernardita T. Jabines of the COA Regional Office No. VII at Cebu City, one of the herein respondents, conducted an audit of the accounts and
transactions of MCWD.
Thereafter, the Regional Director of COA Regional Office No. VII, also a respondent, sent MCWD several notices disallowing the amount of ₱12,221,120.86 representing hospitalization benefits, mid-
year bonus, 13th month pay, Christmas bonus and longevity pay. 3
Aggrieved, petitioner interposed an appeal to respondent COA at Quezon City. She cited COA Memorandum Circular No. 002-94 providing that "all benefits provided under the duly existing CBAs
entered into prior to March 12, 1992, the date of official entry of judgment of the Supreme Court ruling in Davao City Water District, et al. vs. CSC and COA, shall continue up to the respective expiry
dates of the benefits or CBA whichever comes earlier."
On December 3, 1998, respondent COA rendered its Decision No. 98-4654 denying petitioner’s appeal. In sustaining the disallowance in the amount of ₱12,221,120.86, respondent COA cited this
Court’s ruling in Davao City Water District vs. Civil Service Commission5 that "a water district is a corporation created pursuant to a special law – P.D. No. 198, as amended, and as such, its officers and
employees are covered by the Civil Service Law."
Respondent COA then held that:
"There is no question that the CBA was concluded after the decision in the Davao case was promulgated. As far as the CBA is concerned the critical moment is the date of the promulgation itself. Any
transaction (CBA) concluded after this date in violation of existing laws and regulations applicable to government entities is void and of no effect. It conferred no demandable right, it created no
enforceable obligation.
xxx
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant appeal has to be, as it is hereby, denied. The disallowance in the total amount of ₱12,221,120.86 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent COA in a Resolution No. 2000-0626dated February 15, 2000. In denying petitioner’s motion, respondent COA ruled that the
compensation package of MCWD personnel may no longer be the subject of a CBA. For the terms of employment of those personnel are covered, not by the Labor Code, but by the Civil Service Law.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner contends that respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the above benefits and privileges and contravened the Labor Code provision on non-diminution of benefits.
The Solicitor General, in his comment, maintains that the COA did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s appeal considering that the terms and conditions of employment, such as the
entitlement of government personnel, like the affected MCWD employees, to privileges and benefits are governed by the Civil Service Law, the General Appropriations Act and applicable issuances of
the Department of Budget and Management, not by the Labor Code.
The petition is bereft of merit.
In light of this Court’s ruling in Davao City Water District7 that the officers and employees of a water district are covered by the Civil Service Law,8 petitioner’s invocation of the CBA, in justifying the receipt
by the MCWD personnel of benefits and privileges, is utterly misplaced. Thus, we sustain the disallowance by respondent COA.
In Alliance of Government Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment,9 this Court held:
"Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of
collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements."
While we sustain the disallowance of the above benefits by respondent COA, however, we find that the MCWDaffected personnel who received the above mentioned benefits and privileges acted
in good faith under the honest belief that the CBA authorized such payment. Consequently, they need not refund them.
In Querubin vs. Regional Cluster Director, Legal and Adjudication Office, COA Regional Office VI, Pavia, Iloilo City,10 citing De Jesus vs. Commission on Audit,11 this Court held:
"Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already
received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief
that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accept the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.
x x x. Petitioners here received the additional allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time petitioners
received the additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had not yet decided Baybay Water District. Petitioners had no knowledge that such payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in good
faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed by the COA."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision No. 98-465 dated December 3, 1998 and Resolution No. 2000-062 dated February 15, 2000 of respondent COA are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in the sense that the amount of ₱12,221,120.86 representing disallowed benefits and privileges should not be refunded by the MCWD personnel.
G.R. No. 194710 : February 14, 2012

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

REYES, J.:

FACTS:

On July 30, 2003, the Board of Directors of MIAA issued Resolution No. 2003-067, which approved the Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) between MIAA and Samahang Manggagawa sa
Paliparan ng Pilipinas (SMPP) and authorized the grant of P30,000.00 to all MIAA officials and employees as "contract signing bonus".

On post-audit, Mr. Ireneo B. Manalo, the then Corporate Auditor, issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. JPA 03-35 stating that the payment of the said contract-signing bonus had been
previously declared improper by this Court in Social Security System v. Commission on Audit. The payment of signing bonus made by MIAA, therefore, was improper and has no legal basis.

In a Notice of Disallowance dated August 31, 2006, Director IV Janet D. Nacion disallowed the subject disbursement in the total amount of P44,790,000.00 for being contrary to Section 1 of Public Sector
Labor Management Council (PSLMC) Resolution No. 2, Series of 2003 and the May 2, 2002 letter of Emilia T. Boncodin (Boncodin), the former Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM), to Guillermo N. Carague (Carague), the former Chairman of the COA.

MIAA, through its Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration, Herminia D. Castillo appealed N.D. No. MIAA-2006-01 stating that: (a) the CNA Incentive was granted to all officers and
employees of MIAA, including those who do not occupy rank-and-file positions, since the achievement of MIAA performance targets and the success of its fiscal reforms is a collaborative effort; and (b)
MIAA performance in 2003 justified the grant of the CNA Incentive.

In its Decision dated February 18, 2008, the LAO-Corporate, thru Director Nacion, denied MIAA appeal.

According to Director Nacion, the President decision to disallow the grant of signing bonus is clear from former DBM Secretary Boncodin May 15, 2002 letter to former COA Chairman Carague. Contrary
to MIAA claim, the grant is actually a signing bonus and cannot be considered a CNA Incentive since it was released on August and October, or immediately after the approval of the CNA between MIAA
and SMPP and before MIAA had determined its savings from Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE). Under DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-01 dated February 1, 2006, the CNA Incentive
is a one-time benefit, the payment of which is subject to the successful implementation of projects and achievement of performance targets, and should be exclusively sourced from the MOOE based on
the cost-cutting measures specified in the CNA.

Consequently, the MIAA filed with the COA a petition for review, which was denied on the following grounds: (a) the subject grant is not a CNA Incentive but a signing bonus as it was paid on August 1,
2003 or immediately after the CNA between MIAA and SMPP was approved on July 30, 2003 and it was paid before any savings from MOOE could be generated from the programs, projects and
activities under the CNA; (b) the signing bonus is prohibited under Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 135 and Section 5.6.2 of DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-1; (c) assuming that the grant is a CNA
Incentive, still, it is invalid as it was paid upon renewal of the CNA, which is contrary to the provisions of Section 1 of PSLMC Resolution No. 2; (d) payment of the CNA Incentive to MIAA officers, Board
of Directors, Board Secretariat and Executive Committee (ExeCom) violated PSLMC Resolution No. 2, Section 2 of A.O. No. 135 and DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-01; and (e) the grant was without the
prior approval of the OP and/or the DBM.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA was correct in holding the beneficiaries of this disallowed benefit liable for a refund and for attributing bad faith on the part of the members of MIAA Board of Director who
authorized the same?

HELD:

There is no dispute that the grant of a signing bonus had been previously disallowed by the express mandate of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Shortly thereafter, on July 22, 2002, this Court declared in SSS v. COA that Social Services Commission authority to fix the compensation of its employees under its charter, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161
as amended, is subject to the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, which provides for the consolidation of allowances and compensation in the prescribed standardized salary rates. While there are exceptions
provided under Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. No. 6758 in observance of the policy on non-diminution of pay, the signing bonus is not one of the benefits contemplated. This Court also ruled that the signing
bonus is "not a truly reasonable compensation" since conduct of peaceful collective negotiations "should not come with a price tag".

We have no doubt that RA 6758 modified, if not repealed, Sec. 3, par. (c), of RA 1161 as amended, at least insofar as it concerned the authority of SSC to fix the compensation of SSS employees and
officers. This means that whatever salaries and other financial and non-financial inducements that the SSC was minded to fix for them, the compensation must comply with the terms of RA 6758.
Consequently, only the remuneration which was being offered as of 1 July 1989, and which was then being enjoyed by incumbent SSS employees and officers, could be availed of exclusively by the
same employees and officers separate from and independent of the prescribed standardized salary rates. Unfortunately, however, the signing bonus in question did not qualify under Secs. 12 and 17 of
RA 6758. It was non-existent as of 1 July 1989 as it accrued only in 1996 when the CNA was entered into by and between SSC and ACCESS. The signing bonus could not have been included in the
salutary provisions of the statute nor would it be legal to disburse to the intended recipients.

xxxx

On the basis of the foregoing pronouncement, the signing bonus is found to be a truly reasonable compensation. The gratuity was of course the SSC gesture of good will and benevolence for the
conclusion of collective negotiations between SSC and ACCESS, as the CNA would itself state, but for what objective? Agitation and propaganda which are so commonly practiced in private sector
labor-management relations have no place in the bureaucracy and that only a peaceful collective negotiation which is concluded within a reasonable time must be the standard for interaction in the public
sector. This desired conduct among civil servants should not come, we must stress, with a price tag which is what the signing bonus appears to be.

With the abolition of the signing bonus, the PSLMC issued Resolution No. 2, Series of 2003, authorizing the grant of the CNA Incentive, the primary purpose of which is to recognize the joint efforts of
labor and management in the achievement of planned targets, programs and services approved in the budgets of government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government financial
institutions (GFIs) at lesser cost. The clear objective is to encourage, promote and reward productivity, efficiency and use of austerity measures as specified in the CNA.

Subsequently, on December 27, 2005, former President Arroyo issued A.O. No. 135, which confirmed the grant of the CNA to rank-and-file employees under PSLMC Resolution No. 2, Series of
2003.Grants of the CNA Incentive authorized after PSLMC Resolution No. 2 took effect and in strict compliance with its provisions prior to the effectivity of A.O. No. 135 were likewise confirmed. A.O. No.
135 also required that the frugality schemes be identified in the CNA and that the CNA Incentive be exclusively sourced from the savings that may be generated during the term of the CNA.

Essentially, the conclusion reached by this Court is anchored on the following: (a) the benefit in question is, in fact, a signing bonus, which is an illegal disbursement; (b) even assuming that the subject
benefit is a CNA Incentive, MIAA non-compliance with the requirements under PSLMC Resolution No. 2 and DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-1 rendered the same illegal; and (c) MIAA Board of
Directorsdecision to authorize the grant of a signing bonus and its officersact of approving the release thereof and certifying its validity notwithstanding former President Arroyo mandate, PSLMC
Resolution No. 2, and this Court ruling in SSS v. COA is an error so gross that is tantamount to bad faith, thus, rendering them personally liable.

Facts indubitably demonstrate that the grant in question is a signing bonus.

MIAA claim that the amount of P30,000.00 given to each employee, rank-and-file or otherwise, and member of the Board of Directors, Board Secretariat and ExeCom is a CNA Incentive and not a
signing bonus, deserves scant consideration. MIAA claim that its Board of Directors labelled the subject benefit as a signing bonus by mistake or inadvertence in good faith fails to convince. Indeed,
claims of well-meaning negligence, blunder or oversight can be self-serving and easily contrived.

That MIAA Board of Directors did not make a mistake and their real intention was to reward the successful conclusion of collective negotiations by some pecuniary means is belied by simultaneous
approval of the grant and the CNA between SMPP and MIAA betrays their real intention. Moreover, prior to the issuance of AOM No. JPA 03-35 declaring the subject benefit illegal, there was no effort on
the part of its Board of Directors to rectify the alleged mistake in nomenclature. It was only after then Corporate Auditor Manalo and Director Nacion called MIAA attention as to the illegality of a signing
bonus that MIAA alleged that the subject benefit is a CNA Incentive. Easily, such is a mere afterthought.

The grant of a signing bonus, of course, is contrary to this Court ruling in SSS v. COA, which effectively illegalized the signing bonus for being inconsistent with the objectives of R.A. No. 6758 of
standardizing the salaries and compensation of civil servants. Moreover, the signing bonus is inherently unnecessary since orderly behavior and conciliatory approach to collective negotiations are
expected of members of the public sector, the performance of which is not subject to their whims or conditioned on their receipt of a monetary award. Similarly, this contravened then President Arroyo
order to discontinue the grant of signing bonus and PSLMC Resolution No. 2, which was issued to provide a reasonable substitute for the signing bonus.

Apparently, the members of MIAA Board of Directors were either oblivious of the foregoing or they simply had the temerity to believe that their authority to approve the salaries and compensation of MIAA
officers and employees under MIAA charter is plenary to the point of being unbridled. However, as will be discussed below, departure from prevailing rules and regulations, whether by reason of
ignorance or audacity, is inexcusable.

This Court finds no reason to deviate from prevailing jurisprudence, stating that disallowed benefits received in good faith need not be refunded. As stated in Lumayna v. Commission on Audit:

While we sustain the disallowance of the above benefits by respondent COA, however, we find that the MCWDaffected personnel who received the above mentioned benefits and privileges acted in
good faith under the honest belief that the CBA authorized such payment. Consequently, they need not refund them.

In Querubin vs. Regional Cluster Director, Legal and Adjudication Office, COA Regional Office VI, Pavia, Iloilo City, citing, De Jesus vs. Commission on Audit, this Court held:

"Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already
received. Indeed, noindicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief
that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accept the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.

Petitioners here received the additional allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that the LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time petitioners received
the additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had not yet decided Baybay Water District. Petitioners had no knowledge that such payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in good faith,
petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed by the COA."

Clearly, good faith is anchored on an honest belief that one is legally entitled to the benefit. In this case, the MIAA employees who had no participation in the approval and release of the disallowed
benefit accepted the same on the assumption that Resolution No. 2003-067 was issued in the valid exercise of the power vested in the Board of Directors under the MIAA charter. As they were not privy
as to reason and motivation of the Board of Directors, they can properly rely on the presumption that the former acted regularly in the performance of their official duties in accepting the subject benefit.
Furthermore, their acceptance of the disallowed grant, in the absence of any competent proof of bad faith on their part, will not suffice to render liable for a refund.

The same is not true as far as the Board of Directors. Their authority under Section 8 of the MIAA charter is not absolute as their exercise thereof is "subject to existing laws, rules and regulations" and
they cannot deny knowledge of SSS v. COA and the various issuances of the Executive Department prohibiting the grant of the signing bonus. In fact, they are duty-bound to understand and know the
law that they are tasked to implement and their unexplained failure to do so barred them from claiming that they were acting in good faith in the performance of their duty. The presumptions of "good
faith" or "regular performance of official duty" are disputable and may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.
Granting that the benefit in question is a CNA Incentive, MIAA Board of Directors has no authority to include its members, the members of the Board Secretariat, ExeCom and other employees not
occupying rank-and-file positions in the grant. Indeed, this is an open and contumacious violation of PSLMC Resolution No. 2 and A.O. No. 135, which were unequivocal in stating that only rank-and-file
employees are entitled to the CNA Incentive. Given their repeated invocation of these rules to justify the disallowed benefit, they cannot feign ignorance of these rules. That they deliberately ignored
provisions of PSLMC Resolution No. 2 and A.O. No. 135 that they failed to observe bolsters the finding of bad faith against them.

The same is true as far as the concerned officers of MIAA are concerned. They cannot approve the release of funds and certify as to the legality of the subject disbursement knowing that it is a signing
bonus. Alternatively, if they acted on the belief that the benefit is a CNA Incentive, they were in no position to approve its funding without assuring themselves that the conditions imposed by PSLMC
Resolution No. 2 are complied with. They were also not in the position to release payment to the members of the Board of Directors, ExeCom and employees who do not occupy rank-and-file positions
considering the express language of PSLMC Resolution No. 2.

Simply put, these individuals cannot honestly claim that they have no knowledge of the illegality of their acts. Thus, this Court finds that a refund of the amount of P30,000.00 received by each of the
responsible officers and members of MIAA Board of Directors is in order.

PARTIALLY GRANTED.

SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ
of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the
jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws,
rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes.
On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-
outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited
from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government
employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered
by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor
disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate
 Manila Public School Teachers Association vs. Laguio

200 SCRA 232 (1991)

Facts:

The series of events that touched off these cases started with the so-called "mass action" undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the petitioning associations in both cases, on
September 17, 1990 to "dramatize and highlight" 1 the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention.

Issue:

Are employees in the public service prohibited from forming unions and holding strikes?

Held:

“These ‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers’ duty to perform, undertaken for
essentially economic reasons,” should not principally resolve the present case, as the underlying facts are allegedly not identical.

G.R. No. 124540. November 14, 1997

MERLINDA JACINTO, ET.AL. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS; THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; and THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.
By:Wea Matriz

FACTS: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila. They incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions then staged. DECS Sec. Cariño
immediately issued a return-to-work order, but it was ignored by petitioners. Sec. Cariño issued formal charges and preventive suspension orders against them. They were administratively charged with
gross misconduct; gross neglect of duty, etc. for joining unauthorized mass actions; ignoring report-to-work directives; etc. During the investigation, petitioners did not file their answers or controvert the
charges against them. As a consequence, Sec. Cariño, in his decisions found them guilty as charged and imposed the penalty of dismissal except Jacinto which is and Agustin who were meted only six
(6) months suspension.
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB): dismissed the appeals for lack of merit
CSC: set aside the Orders of the MSPB; found the petitioners (except Merlinda Jacinto) guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; imposed upon them the penalty of six (6) months
suspension without pay; and automatically reinstated them to the service without payment of back salaries; the CSC found her guilty of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations; imposed
upon her the penalty of reprimand; and automatically reinstated her in the service without payment of back salaries
CA: Affirmed decision of CSC
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether civil servants are guilty of grave misconduct in participating in mass actions.
HELD: Yes. The terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes. Workers in the public sector do not enjoy the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its
exercise with the proviso “in accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. The Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed.
The teachers have given cause for their suspension, for being absent in their classes and joining in the mass actions. They were not fully innocent of the charges against them although they were
eventually found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and not grave misconduct or other offense warranting their dismissal from the service; “being found liable for a lesser
offense is not equivalent to exoneration.” In the case of Merlinda Jacinto, there was a finding that there was no proof that she joined the unlawful mass actions.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification.