G.R. No.
L-22320 July 29, 1968
MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.
Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically
directed against the following observation therein made:
We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners resorted to
a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole
purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and
executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and
their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use
them to subvert the very ends of justice.
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their counsel.".
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, while
submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as it reflects
adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble costs adjudged
against their clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature
deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer
conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision, was
designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this adventure is
patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso Perez'
position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed alternatingly
by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the
courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were
conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CA-
G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to end
the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a piecemeal
fashion, causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More than eight years
after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied.
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their counsels,
sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final judgment in civil
case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as expected, initially or
ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the
scene following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez,
Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed
with the said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was
the proper forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that
courts of first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on
October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from
carrying out the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants,
knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have
jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ
improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in
the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961,
alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of
Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then
still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any
evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared
during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order:
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for hearing,
counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly notified of the motion
for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving his right to present evidence in
support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore
deemed submitted for resolution.
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of
jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs. Perez,
now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of another
injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch
which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the Perez
spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963
denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to
interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal
from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November
8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of
October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ
of execution.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19,
1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to the
denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an offer to
replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in
the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21,
1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five days,
but the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964,
denied the said motion for reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates the
avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any particular
counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of the judgment
in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable
that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies"
projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they
foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before,
one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court for the
second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are
persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and 55292 as
the "proper remedy" when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of which are
unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the
recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the
projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a
basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim.
Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this
remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often
simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as having
been instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not be
considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the
suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292 were apparently instituted
to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in question. We used the word
incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted
execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were
definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch
XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have
jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance
of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts
outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of
preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal
of the principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the
said cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case
7532 when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic
civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the
said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case
55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition for
certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in the said
civil case — until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties
because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel happened
to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's
insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of
the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless,
then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's
propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable.
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the participation
of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering that "treble costs
are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is not clear. The word
"counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant
the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the
execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had
rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants
are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar
about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in
Civil Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision
above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963
when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of
Manila presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to
recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was
over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for
Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above,
which, curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued in civil case 7532.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is
hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and
severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,
vs.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.
Roger Castuciano for complainant.
Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso B. Obusan,
Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she was a
widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He
was named John Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony Garcia
was subsisting or undissolved.
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in
a civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh.
C and C-1)
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila for more than one
year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked
permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in his hometown, Daet,
Camarines Norte. Since then, he has never returned to the conjugal abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient investigation and
surveillance, she discovered that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment
located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to that place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by Linda Delfin,
their housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their
neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F,
which were confirmed by their testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the head of the
family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and H).
Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified
five photographs, Exhibits I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing
eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he married
Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the
purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-
Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that they were
paid witnesses. He declared that he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress
Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home because he
could not endure the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal
home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her interference with his
professional obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint for disbarment
against the respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation of
additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum.
After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained the burden of proof.
She has proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous relations with a married woman
separated from her own husband.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral
conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a married
woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959;
Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).
Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another
woman who had borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).
WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.
FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.
Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.
REGALA, J.:
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando
Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent
denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the
allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule
127 of the former Rules of Court.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the
complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The
respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent
likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on
June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and
disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with
immorality. The complaint recites:
That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno
were engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on
their way the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric
Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the
restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that
they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married; that with
reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise
of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent
registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel,
respondent shoved complainant inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room,
someone locked the door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed
himself; that complainant begged respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her:
'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant
to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that
I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and
then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when
respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to
respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock
that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after
the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some
more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait until they were married; that after
their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the family way,
complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but
respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child.
That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise
of marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct
which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all
times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar.
The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.
A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the
complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and
that on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He,
however, admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until
November, 1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958,
to practice law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional
evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor
Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral
argument. There was no appearance for the respondents.
Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional
evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo,
Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine
the witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of
Court.
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.
Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She
testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel
register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the
promise of marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that
"Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.
Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to
Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a
telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a
letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant
and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City
in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to
marry her.1äwphï1.ñët
Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant
met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and
letters was likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958
(Exh. E), which was duly identified by the respondent to be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's
Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local
Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and
Children's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.
To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter
testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was
corroborated by the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter
dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.
The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed
to discredit complainant's testimony.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and
complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were
sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant
(pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and
respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise
of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual
passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule
127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent
to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of
the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963,
citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that
he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the
relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied
that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1,
1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United
States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that
duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation
which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he
demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those
who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines
to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the
complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the
(old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to
suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted.
Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In
re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104,
January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G.
627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or
disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral
act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is
important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in
accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics:
... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates
unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all
times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the
law but the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is
ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
A.M. No. 145 December 28, 1956
JOSEFINA MORTEL, petitioner,
vs.
ANACLETO F. ASPIRAS, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres
and Solicitor Juan T. Alano for petitioner.
Anacleto F. Aspiras, in his own behalf.
BENGZON, J.:
On March 17, 1953, Josefina Mortel complained before this Court against Attorney Anacleto F.
Aspiras, alleging substantially that:
1. Sometime in August, 1952, the respondent, representing as single, courted her and
eventually won her affection; 2. on December 22, 1952, following his instructions, she came to
Manila so they could get married, and she stayed with her sister at No. 10 Espiritu, Pasay City; 3. on
and after December 31, 1952 upon being assured of marriage she allowed him to live with her as her
husband; 4. on January 3, 1953, a marriage license was applied for, with the son of the respondent,
Cesar Aspiras, as one of the applicants; 5. upon suggestion of respondent, she was married to said
Cesar Aspiras, although she was not in love with the latter; 6. after the marriage, she and
respondent continued cohabiting together, the ceremony being a mere formality performed at the
indication of respondent, who was a married man and who used his knowledge and education to
abuse and destroy her.
On April 9, 1953 the petitioner filed a motion to "withdraw and/or dismiss" alleging the contents of
her complaint did not "represent her true sentiments", the respondent acted in good faith, and her
marriage to respondent's son, Cesar Aspiras, was "without any fraud or deceit whatsoever".
Believing that the matter was not a mere private affair of petitioner, but that it affected the legal
profession 1, this Court denied the motion to dismiss, and required the respondent to answer.
On May 6, 1953, the respondent made his answer, asserting that petitioner had really married his
son Cesar Aspiras, and denying having had any amorous or sexual relations with her. He also said
she knew all the time he was a married man.
On May 13, 9153, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On November 2, 1953, the Solicitor General reported that in view of the motion to withdraw filed by
the petitioner, he found no other alternative but to recommend the dismissal of the case.
Of course, for lack of evidence, the complaint was dismissed on November 5, 1953.
However, on December 17, 1953, the petitioner filed a motion to re-open the matter, alleging that
she had asked for dismissal before the office of the Solicitor General pursuant to an amicable
settlement with the respondent; but that the truth was, petitioner and respondent lived together as
husband and wife, from April to November, 1953 at No. 383 Int. 5 Tajeron, Sta. Ana, Manila and that
as a result she was on the family way. She also charged the respondent with having ordered his son,
Cesar, to live with them for purpose of "camouflaging their living together".
On January 5, 1954, this Court granted the above petition to re-open and referred the papers to the
Solicitor General for re-investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting the proper inquiry, and based on the evidence adduced before him, the Solicitor
General filed in accordance with the Rules a complaint against the respondent, praying for his
disbarment, on the ground that he seduced Josefina Mortel by a promise of marriage, and to cover
up his illicit relations, he made his son, Cesar, a minor to marry the said Josefina Mortel on January
14, 1953; and, what it worse, after the marriage, the respondent continued having sexual relations
with the spouse of his own son.
On May 6, 1955, this Court ordered the respondent to reply to the official charges of the
Government prosecutor.
He replied in due time repeating the same denials he had previously made in this Court. Then he
asked for, and was granted, a chance to introduce evidence in addition to the proofs submitted to,
and forwarded by, the Solicitor General. Yet he failed to produce any.
At the oral argument he did not appear to defend himself, but asked for permission to file a
memorandum--which he afterwards presented. Therein he maintains that the complaint's allegation
were not supported by the evidence, that the petitioner is in pari delicto and deserves no remedy,
and that the alleged misconduct is not sufficient ground for disbarment.
In regard to the first point, the oral and documentary evidence at hand establish beyond reasonable
doubt the following facts:
In the year 1952 Josefina Mortel, 21 years of age, single, was a teacher residing with her widowed
mother in Sawang Barrio School, Romblon, Romblon. Sometime in August, of that year she met the
respondent. Atty. Anacleto P. Aspiras, an employee of the Cebu Portland Cement Co., who
represented himself as single, although he was already married to Carolina Bautista Aspiras with
whom he had seven children.
A reckless Lothario, he wooed her personally and by correspondence until he finally conquered her
trusting heart. He visited her at her house and must have charmed even the mother, because
without much ado she approved of him. The climax came when on a certain night of November,
1952, he was invited to stay and spend the night at her house, due to a typhoon which was raging.
About 3 or 4 a.m., while the mother was in the kitchen, he crept into Josefina's room and after glibly
promising marriage, succeeded in seducing her. From that time on, and without the benefit of
marriage she gave him the privileges of a husband. Thereafter yielding to his invitation, Josefina
came to Manila in December, 1952, for the purpose of marrying him, despite her mother's desire to
have the marriage celebrated the following month of April, so as to enable he to continue teaching
until the end of the school term. She stayed with her sister at 10 Espiritu Street, Pasay City.
Accompanied by the respondent, she went on January 3, 1953 to the Manila City Hall, where for the
first time, she met his son Cesar, who was introduced (by respondent) as his nephew, and her
bridegroom-to-be. She says respondent again told her to follow his "instructions", and left the two
of them (with Atty. Espino) at the City Hall. He then departed for Cebu. She filled up the application
for marriage (Exhibit 7,8 Respondent) and wrote the name of Cesar as her husband-to-be.
In connection with the above "instructions", it is probable that before filing the application Josefina
discovered or was told that respondent was a married man. But she was persuaded by respondent
to enter into a sham marriage with his "nephew" Cesar, so that she may rightfully claim to be Mrs.
Josefina Aspiras and save her face before the relatives and acquaintances who had known her
amorous relations with Attorney Aspiras.
Accordingly on January 14, 1953, Josefina and Cesar were married 2 at the Manila City Hall before
Judge Aragon, with the respondent and Rosario R. Veloso (Cesar's Aunt) as witnesses. After the
ceremony, the two contracting parties separated, never to live together as husband and wife.
However, the respondent continued up to November, 1953 his adulterous relations with Josefina, as
a result of which she gave birth to a baby boy on January 24, 1954.
Josefina's sworn testimony that herein respondent pretended to be single and promised marriage, is
confirmed by his love letters, portions of which say:lawphil.net
. . . You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world . . . I will bring you along with me
before the altar of matrimony . (Exhibit A-6, September 22, 1952.)
Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be
the first, middle and the last in my life. In short, you will be the only woman to me as I used to say to
you. (Exhibit A, November 2, 1952.)
And her testimony that after her marriage to Cesar she continued living, as wife, with herein
respondent is borne out by his letters to Josefina's mother dated February 9, 1953 and March 6,
1953 — Exhibits A-19 and A-21.
Obviously the courtship and seduction by respondent was morally wrong, and this obliquity became
worse when he made use of his minor son Cesar to "redeem" his promise of marriage and/or to
cover up his illicit relations, as the Solicitor General alleged. He corrupted his own descendant by
turning him into an accomplice of his marital infidelities.
But he says, the marriage was a true marriage, the contracting parties being actually in love with
each other. Granted. Then his moral deliquency becomes all the more unpardonable: the cohabited
with the wife of his own son after the marriage which he himself arranged and witnessed.
It is immaterial that Josefina Mortel the complainant was also at fault — in pari delicto, respondent
suggests -- because this is not a proceeding to grant her relief, but one to purge the profession of
unworthy members, to protect the public and courts 3. So much so that even if she should presently
ask for dismissal, the matter may not dropped, the evidence at hand being sufficient to warrant
disciplinary action. Anyway, pari delicto is not always a complete defense 4
Supposing that respondent's conduct is not one of those mentioned in the Rules for which an
attorney may be disbarred 5, still, in this jurisdiction, lawyers may be removed from office on
grounds other than those enumerated by the statutes. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567.) And we recently
applied that principle in Balinon vs. De Leon, 50 Off. Gaz., 583.
In the United States wherefrom our system of legal ethics derives, "the continued possession . . . of
a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law
. . . and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a
ground for disbarment. (5 Am. Jur. 417.)
As stated by Mr. Justice Owen of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
One of the requisite qualifications for one who holds the office of an attorney at law is that he or she
shall be good moral character, in so far as it relates to the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney at law. This is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to
admission to the bar, and the loss of such qualification requires his suspension. The respondent is a
member of the bar of this court. The charges preferred against him challenge his moral integrity.
Just as it was the duty of this court to refuse him admission in the first instance upon a showing that
he lacked the necessary qualification, so is its duty now to remove him upon like proof." (Re Stolen,
193 Wis. 602; 55 A. L. R. 1361.)
Perhaps mere moral transgression not amounting to crime will not disbar, as some cases hold 6 and
on this we do not decide. But respondent's moral deliquency having been aggravated by a mockery
of the inviolable social institution of marriage, and by corrupting of his minor son or destruction of
the latter's honor, the undersigned all agree he is unfit to continue exercising the privileges and
responsibilities of members of the bar. 7
Wherefore it becomes the duty of this Court to strike, as it does hereby strike his name from the Roll
of Attorneys. So ordered.
A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre
charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct,"
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant,
while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully
evaded five (5) attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving
from one place to another, such that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of
employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no
answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the
complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan
Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against
him" in the instant
case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift
Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was single; that he
subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968;
that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal
residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla
and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in
good faith that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with
Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and
insisted that Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth
Certificate and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had
given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had
done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to
be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by
respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and
hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead
referred; by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He
set the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant
Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The
Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put
clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to
do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another
hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should
he fail once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did
not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to
have waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The
parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8
December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and
Recommendation" to this Court. The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the
following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and
respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High
School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was
single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent
started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and
respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law
student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting
her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she
was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she
and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having
secured favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite
her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they
were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A;
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July
7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981,
complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his
parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out
later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22);
she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which
was subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159
(Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent and
Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was
found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrative case
against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however
was considered closed for being moot and academic when respondent was considered
automatically separated from the service for having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit
F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre
contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over
the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol,
Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with
complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration
obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith
that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action
for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the
first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which
underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the
same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to
Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first
cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent
Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the
prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his
own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the
result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in
character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other
circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was
null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and
respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being
supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had
finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant
without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently
displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to
uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a
member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as
claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made
a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Article
216, Civil Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct"
because he made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his
schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage,
marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while
continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a
character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant
Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre
after she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without means for
the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his
first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral
conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for
disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place.
The Court will correct this error forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of
respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the
land.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989
ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
Federico A. Blay for complainant.
Luciano Babiera for respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality.
Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her
verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal
knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she
would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she
became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer
denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the
complaint and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University, the Chairman of the
Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);
2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to approach respondent in
the latter's house who assured her that she would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June
6, 1975);
3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with him to Manila,
otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;
5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the same plane (Exh. "A")
for Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the
Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1
975);
6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant at San Marcelino,
Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where respondent had carnal
knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 &
157, tsn, July 18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for her, she would
sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;
9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was suspecting pregnancy
because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;
10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of medicine) that
respondent wanted that an abortion be performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched her at her
boarding house on the pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17,
1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and an inhalation mask was
placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1 975);
13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion had already been
performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July
17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom complainant introduced
as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that abdominal
examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no signs of
abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and
children; respondent never came to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24,
1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent; the latter had male
companions at the hotel but he did not see any woman companion of respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside the
hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General,
respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in
the complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is
in furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the
latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from
enrollment for the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise
contended that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by
the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had
carnal knowledge of the complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect
that respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with respondent
upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she
would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman of
the College of Medicine, complainant had every reason to believe him.
It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to Ambassador Hotel in
Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that if she
would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1"
to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is true that he
presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent usually slept with
them every time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of
them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to
February 14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent
stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in question,
however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to
the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has
been substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding
insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then
recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than
three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to determine
whether any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p.
69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at bar
be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously
submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General
that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the
case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the
Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the
offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses
presented on respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of
the act complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant
herself.
While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual
intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date.
While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if
he really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is
a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor
downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439
[1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against
him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by
Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity,
which at all times is expected of him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice
Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that
duty, he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation
which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he
demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those
who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines
to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him
(Quingwa SCRA 439 [1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone
with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children,
respondent should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years
(Rollo, p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that
since a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made
his recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession
as a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended during the said
period and the case dismissed for being moot and academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise to
marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's
marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation
for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's
moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As
chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to
believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would
deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a
very rich man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p.
70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The
fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render
respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission
to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission
thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in
the practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest
standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v.
Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral
conduct, as follows:
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral
conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community' (7
C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of
intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on
the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken
advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in
said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that
she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off
from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong
charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly
committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the
respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not
disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation
that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from
the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left
her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while
she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered
and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the
other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the
floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next
undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties
and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual
intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and
all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that
afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual
intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27,
t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she
did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still
frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran
errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958,
when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt
Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil
Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati,
Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34,
t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January,
1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster
parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing
and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had
their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one
week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all,
they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house
whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally contract
marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we
cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife,
will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he
confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia)
could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
xxx xxx xxx
FINDINGS AND COMMENT
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The
complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but
the undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly
and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have
been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend
respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not
long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled
because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of
adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not
bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and
the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of
confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without
grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of
her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis,
treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a
sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see
why she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May
22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the
Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August,
1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to
the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still
alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact
permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the
Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year
or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from
admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is
submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment,
unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and
another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
xxx xxx xxx
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J.
Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll
of attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit
the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated
another complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and
deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral
character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations
with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public
confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court
render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer
and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint
does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign
from the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities
called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and
hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional
evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On
September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on
October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been
proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or
fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission
to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles,
who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16,
1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to
Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n.
24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores
registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him
she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house,
respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we
will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she
and respondent were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent
asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left
Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and respondent
'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to
her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to live with her
and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her
legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-
29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29).
Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living
with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request
was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among
others, the following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the
latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11,
1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-law
wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no
intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he
courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February
21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to
Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia
had been living together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked
Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines)
was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the
place, nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943
she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again;
that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia
strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as
he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to
molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice
but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in
1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open
cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition,
because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated;
and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was
only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit
perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954."
(Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his
knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he
did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2)
Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even
after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his
moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally
(adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The
investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel
of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave
to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding
memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the
complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he
likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the
present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and
the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the
respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations
with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not
been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the
disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the
Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this
enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy
members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of
justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless
positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the
party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958
ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the
Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall
require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to
disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of
the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than
statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is
derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has
been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not
specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be
disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am.
Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member
of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds.
Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer
(In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most
apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained
from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared
— and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates
a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid
purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his
common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her
uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her.
From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17
or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see
why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the
complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his
acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself
to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for
disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where
this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of
Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a
condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to
be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is
held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but
also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit
for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
(Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his
profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We
cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor General puts it —
recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another
for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations
and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from
continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an
essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the
moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly
committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to
shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the
prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he
continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his
law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her
after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his
moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the
predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with
her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The
noblest means he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to
do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously
maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be
condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the
legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the
present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or
offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and
cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the
Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a
report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the
respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. — If the Solicitor General finds
sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the
respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with
direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the
Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally
filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General
find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at
liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during
the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in
1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of
good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is
not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which
corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other
people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law
is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the
public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and
professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by
such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing
In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52
Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good
moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with
Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did
not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was
discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena,
from the roll of attorneys.
A.M. No. 3049 December 4, 1989
PERLA Y. LAGUITAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR F. TINIO, respondent.
Joanes G. Caacbay for respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the instant Petition for Disbarment dated 21 May 1987, petitioner Perla Y. Laguitan charged Atty.
Salvador F. Tinio with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
After answer was filed on 27 October 1987, the Court, in its Resolution dated 16 November 1987,
referred the Petition to the Solicitor General for Investigation, Report and Recommendation.
During the initial hearing of this case by the Solicitor General on 17 February 1988, only respondent
and his counsel appeared; it turned out that complainant had not been duly served with notice of
the hearing. The hearing scheduled for 24 March 1988 was likewise reset to 27 April 1988 upon
motion of respondent and upon failure of complainant to appear before the Office of the Solicitor
General.
This case was eventually transmitted by the Solicitor General to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) for investigation and proper action. Thus, in
an order dated 18 August 1988, the Commission set the case for hearing on 9 September 1988 and
required both complainant and respondent to submit additional copies of their pleadings within ten
(10) days from notice.
The initial hearing set by the Commission for 9 September 1988 was reset to 20 September 1988
because only complainant appeared, respondent having failed to present himself despite due notice
to him. The hearing of 20 September 1988 was again reset to 20 October 1988 because neither
complainant nor her counsel appeared. The hearing for 20 October 1988 was once again reset to 14
November 1988 as only complainant appeared, Finally, the hearing for 14 November 1988 was
rescheduled two (2) more times, first to 15 December 1988 and second to 17 January 1989.
In its Order dated 27 January 1989, the Commission, upon the unexplained failure of respondent to
appear at the hearing on 17 January 1989, required petitioner to make a formal offer of evidence ex
parte, and thereafter submit the case for resolution. The Order was duly received by respondent's
counsel on 31 January 1989.
On 9 February 1989, petitioner formally offered her exhibits as follows:
1. Exh. 'A' — Certificate of Live Birth of Sheila Laguitan Tinio.
Purpose: To show and prove the filiation of the child as shown on the document;
2. Exh. 'B' —Certificate of Live Birth of Benedict Laguitan.
Purpose: To show and prove likewise the filiation of the child as shown on the document:
3. Exh. 'C' to 'C-6' — Receipts issued by the Mt. Carmel Maternity and Children's Hospital.
Purpose: To prove that petitioner herein gave birth to a baby girl at the Mt. Carmel Maternity and
Children's Hospital and for which respondent paid the bills for the hospitalization, medicines and
professional fees of doctors;
4. Exh. 'D' to 'D-2' — Receipts issued by the Paulino Medical Clinic.
Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner again gave birth to a baby boy at said clinic and for
which respondent paid the bill for hospitalization, medicines and professional fees of doctors;
5. Exh. 'E' to 'E-l' — Baptismal certificates of Sheila L. Tinio and Benedict L. Tinio, respectively
Purpose: To show and prove that respondent admits his paternity of the children:
6. Exh. 'F' to 'F-4' — The family pictures showing respondent either singly or with the rest of
the family during happier times.
Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner and respondent really lived together as husband and
wife and begot two children and the respondent admits these through the pictures:
7. Exh. 'G' to 'G-3' — The school records of Sheila L. Tinio at the St. Mary's Academy.
Purpose: To show and prove that respondent was supporting the schooling of the children as he
himself signed the correspondence and was marked as Exh. 'G-2-A'. 1
Based on the aforequoted exhibits, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
submitted to us its findings and recommendation, which may be summed up as follows:
Sometime in June 1974, complainant and respondent Tinio met each other and in time became
lovers. Beginning in 1976, the parties lived together as husband and wife. As a result, complainant
bore respondent two (2) children: Sheila, now about ten (10) years old and Benedict, now
approximately nine (9) years old. In the course of this relationship, petitioner discovered that
respondent Tinio, before meeting her, had contracted marriage with someone else and that the
prior marriage was subsisting. Nonetheless, complainant continued living in with respondent until
eventually, ten (10) years later, she and her children by respondent Tinio were abandoned by the
latter in November 1986. Feeling helpless and aggrieved, she sought the help of respondent's
parents in supporting her children who were then already in school. Respondent's parents gave her
P400.00 and advised her not to see them again.
After examination of the record of this case and noting that respondent Tinio appeared before the
IBP Investigating Commissioner and candidly admitted his illicit relationship with complainant and
his having begotten two (2) children by her, and promised the Commissioner that he would support
his illegitimate children but had not lived to his promise, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP
Board. The IBP Board recommends that respondent Tinio be suspended from the practice of law
"not for having cohabited with the complainant, but for refusal to support his illegitimate children,"
the suspension to remain in effect until respondent Tinio complies with his obligation of support.
The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be suspended from the practice of law but not
merely because he has failed in his obligation to support the children complainant bore him but also
because for a prolonged period of time, he lived in concubinage with complainant, a course of
conduct inconsistent with the requirement of good moral character that is required for the
continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar, 2 Concubinage imports moral
turpitude and entails a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Salvador F. Tinio from the practice of
law until further orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting the suspension upon evidence
satisfactory to the Commission and to this Court that respondent is supporting or has made
provision for the support of his illegitimate children and that he has given up his immoral course of
conduct.
A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with
immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the
Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a verified
complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the
Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and verified version of her long and detailed complaint
against her husband charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in default for
failure to file an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order
required complainant to submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December
1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant for the resetting of the 16 December 1988
hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled for
25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10
and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant failed to appear. Respondent
Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices of the hearings
scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that she and her
husband had already "reconciled". In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the
parties (respondent and complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and explanation of the
telegraphic message and required them to file a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within
fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded and nothing was heard from either party
since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission, the IBP Board of
Governors submitted to this Court its report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him
that any further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him
to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two
(2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year,
respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G.
Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with
respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife,
with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the name
Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store
in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation.
Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family
to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or
cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987,
complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her
daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant's) children in
their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita
Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new
mistress hid Melanie from the complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back
her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita Magallanes as
her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant, stating that
complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree that
the most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real,
does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out
in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the
Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he
is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon
admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing
condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the continued
possession ... of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the
practice of the law ... and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do
not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " 2 It is important to note that the lack of moral
character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the
discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects
the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a mockery of the
inviolable social institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the respondent being already married, wooed
and won the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited with him and bore
him a son. Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive, involving the
marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son after
the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of the bar by
reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual
relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained for a
number of years an adulterous relationship with another woman.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous
relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the humiliation
and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to
support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took up again with another woman not his
wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly,
respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary
obligations before his own daughter and the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and
until farther orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent
Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to
provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of
conduct that he has clung to.
[A.C. No. 5252. May 20, 2004]
PRISCILLA Z. ORBE, complainant, vs. ATTY. HENRY ADAZA, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 27 March 2000, Mrs. Priscilla Z. Orbe charged respondent Atty. Henry Adaza with gross
misconduct and as being unfit to continue his membership in the Bar. In a three-page complaint-
affidavit complainant averred that respondent obtained a loan from the former and, to secure the
repayment thereof, drew and issued two BPI Family Bank checks. When the first check (No.
0350973) was presented for payment upon maturity, the same was dishonored for insufficient
funds. According to complainant, respondent, acting with malice and deceit, dated the second check
January 24, 1996, so that, once presented for payment, it would be, considering, in passing, that the
loan was incurred on 23 November 1996, a stale check. She alleged that, despite repeated verbal
and written demands, respondent had failed to make good his obligation.
Acting on the complaint, the Court required respondent to comment thereon within ten (10) days
from notice. In a letter, dated 26 September 2000, complainant asked that the complaint be now
considered submitted for resolution in view of the failure of Atty. Adaza to comply with the order of
the Court requiring him to file his comment. In a resolution, dated 06 December 2000, the Court
noted the letter of complainant, and it directed that the complaint be thereby referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
Despite proper notice to respondent requiring him to file his answer to the complaint, respondent
continued to ignore the matter. Finally, on 20 February 2002, the case was set for hearing by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline. The complainant appeared. Respondent did not show up despite his
having been duly notified of the hearing by personal service effected on 12 February 2002.
Respondents failure to appear prompted the Commission on Bar Discipline to grant the request of
complainant to allow her to adduce evidence ex-parte. An order was issued setting the proceedings
on 18 March 2002 for such reception of evidence. A copy of the order was served on respondent on
28 February 2002 at his given address.
On 21 February 2002, the Commission received a letter from Atty. Adaza, sent via the facilities of
PTT, requesting for a resetting of the hearing from 18 March to 18 April 2002, claiming that he was
already committed to attend a hearing at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, of Dipolog City on 20
March 2002.
The proceedings set for 18 March 2002 for the reception of complainants evidence ex-parte was
held, but the same was without loss of right on the part of respondent to conduct, if desired, a
cross-examination of the witness. The evidence of complainant showed that complainant used to
avail of the notarial services of Atty. Adaza at his law office at Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila. In 1995,
respondent requested complainant, and the latter agreed, to be the primary sponsor in the
baptismal of his daughter. In November 1996, respondent accompanied by a certain Arlene went to
the residence of complainant to seek a loan. The latter lent respondent the sum of P60,000.00
payable with interest at 5% a month. Respondent issued two (2) BPI Family Bank Checks No. 35073
and No. 35076, each for P31,800.00, dated 23 December 1996 and 24 January 1996, respectively.
When presented for collection Check No. 035073 was dishonored by the drawee bank for having
been drawn against insufficient funds. The other check, Check No. 035076, bearing the date 24
January 1996, was not accepted for being a stale check.
Efforts were exerted by complainant to see respondent but her efforts proved to be futile. Several
demand letters were sent to the respondent by Atty. Ernesto Jacinto, complainants lawyer, but
these letters also failed to elicit any response. A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City for Check No. 035073. Finding
probable cause, the complaint was subsequently elevated to the Metropolitan Trial Court. A warrant
of arrest was issued by the court, but respondent somehow succeeded in evading apprehension.
Sometime in November 2000, respondent went to the house of complainant and promised to pay
the checks within a months time. Complainant agreed to have the service of the warrant of arrest
withheld but, again, respondent failed to make good his promise.
The cross-examination of complainant Priscilla Orbe was set on 22 May 2002. The stenographer was
directed to transcribe the stenographic notes as soon as possible for the benefit of Atty. Adaza. An
order was issued to this effect, and a copy thereof was served upon respondent on 09 April 2002.
On 22 May 2002, the complainant appeared for cross-examination but Atty. Adaza did not appear
despite due notice. In light of the manifestation of complainant that she had no other witness to
present and was ready to close her evidence, she was given a period of fifteen (15) days within
which to file a formal offer and respondent was given a like period to thereupon submit his
comment and/or opposition thereto. The order, dated 22 May 2002, was served on Atty. Adaza on
28 May 2002. The formal offer of complainants evidence was deemed submitted for resolution on
25 June 2002 pending proof of service of a copy thereof upon respondent and the filing of the
necessary comment or opposition thereto by the latter.
In an order, dated 16 October 2002, the Commission set the reception of evidence for respondent
on 13 November 2002 in order to give him another opportunity to rebut the evidence of
complainant. Respondent again failed to appear on the date set therefor, prompting the
Commission to rule on the admissibility of Exhibits A to D with their submarkings. There being no
appearance on the part of respondent despite due notice, the case was considered submitted for
resolution by the Commission in its order of 26 February 2003.
The Commission submitted its report and recommendation, dated 28 May 2003, recommending the
suspension of respondent Atty. Henry Adaza from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
and that he be ordered to pay to complainant the value of the two unpaid checks he issued to
complainant.
The Court adopts the recommendation.
A member of the bar may be so removed or suspended from office as an attorney for any deceit,
malpractice, or misconduct in office.[1] The word conduct used in the rules is not limited to conduct
exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyers professional duties but it also refers to
any misconduct, although not connected with his professional duties, that would show him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
The grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court are not limitative[2] and are
broad enough to cover any misconduct, including dishonesty, of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity.[3] Such misdeed puts his moral fiber, as well as his fitness to continue in the
advocacy of law,[4] in serious doubt.
Respondents issuance of worthless checks and his contumacious refusal to comply with his just
obligation for nearly eight years is appalling[5] and hardly deserves compassion from the Court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Henry M. Adaza is found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is hereby
ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt
hereof. This decision is without prejudice to the outcome of the Criminal Case for Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 filed against him. Let copies of this decision be spread on his record in the Bar
Confidants Office and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
ROSARIO T. MECARAL,
Complainant,
- versus -
ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 8392 [ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175]
Promulgated:
June 29, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez (respondent) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD)[1] with Gross Misconduct
and Gross Immoral Conduct which she detailed in her Position Paper[2] as follows:
After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover and common-law wife. In
October 2007, respondent brought her to the mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran
where he left her with a religious group known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, of
which he was the leader. Although he visited her daily, his visits became scarce in November to
December 2007, prompting her to return home to Naval, Biliran. Furious, respondent brought her
back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her
with drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007, the members of the group tied her
spread-eagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale food, she was guarded
24 hours a day by the women members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.
Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received information that she was weak,
pale and walking barefoot along the streets in the mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of
the Provincial Social Welfare Department which immediately dispatched two women volunteers to
rescue her. The religious group refused to release her, however, without the instruction of
respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1 Robedillo) to rescue
and reunite her with her mother.
Hence, the present disbarment complaint against respondent. Additionally, complainant charges
respondent with bigamy for contracting a second marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996,
despite the subsistence of his marriage to his first wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.
In support of her charges, complainant submitted documents including the following: Affidavit[3] of
Delia dated February 5, 2008; Affidavit of PO3 Lee and PO1 Robedillo[4] dated February 14, 2008;
photocopy of the Certificate of Marriage[5] between respondent and Leny H. Azur; photocopy of the
Marriage Contract[6] between respondent and Shirley G. Yunzal; National Statistics Office
Certification[7] dated April 23, 2008 showing the marriage of Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal to respondent on
April 27, 1990 in Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H. Azur to respondent on August 2, 1996 in
Mandaue City, Cebu; and certified machine copy of the Resolution[8] of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Naval, Biliran and the Information[9] lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-Caibiran, Naval,
Biliran, for Serious Illegal Detention against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on complaint of
herein complainant.
Despite respondents receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order[10] of the Director for Bar Discipline for
him to submit his Answer within 15 days from receipt thereof, and his expressed intent to properly
make [his] defense in a verified pleading,[11] he did not file any Answer.
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008 of which the parties were duly
notified, only complainants counsel was present. Respondent and his counsel failed to appear.
Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his Report and Recommendation[12]
dated September 29, 2008, found that:
[respondents] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting two marriages with Shirley
and Leny, are grossly immoral which no civilized society in the world can countenance. The
subsequent detention and torture of the complainant is gross misconduct [which] only a beast may
be able to do. Certainly, the respondent had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
xxxx
In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently imposed severe penalty for grossly
immoral conduct of a lawyer like the case at bar. In the celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Manuel Eala, the [Court] ordered the disbarment of the respondent for maintaining extra-
marital relations with a married woman, and having a child with her. In the instant case, not only did
the respondent commit bigamy for contracting marriages with Shirley Yunzal in 1990 and Leny Azur
in 1996, but the respondent also made his secretary (complainant) his mistress and subsequently,
tortured her to the point of death. All these circumstances showed the moral fiber respondent is
made of, which [leave] the undersigned with no choice but to recommend the disbarment of Atty.
Danilo S. Velasquez.[13] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by Resolution[14] dated December 11, 2008, ADOPTED the
Investigating Commissioners findings and APPROVED the recommendation for the disbarment of
respondent.
As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP Commissioners evaluation and
recommendation well taken.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.[15] When a lawyers moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing
his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet the charges squarely and present
evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep
his name in the Roll of Attorneys.[16]
Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the hearings before the IBP to rebut
the charges brought against him, suggesting that they are true.[17] Despite his letter dated March
28, 2008 manifesting that he would come up with his defense in a verified pleading, he never did.
Aside then from the IBPs finding that respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he also violated the Lawyers Oath reading:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do
solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent
to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according
to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God, (underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
The April 30, 2008 Resolution[18] of the Provincial Prosecutor on complainants charge against
respondent and Bernardita Tadeo for Serious Illegal Detention bears special noting, viz:
[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused in the complaint) has the effect of
strengthening the allegations against Atty. Danilo Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that there was
really physical restraint employed by Atty. Velasquez upon the person of Rosario Mecaral. Even as
he claimed that on the day private complainant was fetched by the two women and police officers,
complainant was already freely roaming around the place and thus, could not have been physically
detained. However, it is not really necessary that Rosario be physically kept within an enclosure to
restrict her freedom of locomotion. In fact, she was always accompanied wherever she would
wander, that it could be impossible for her to escape especially considering the remoteness and the
distance between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval, Biliran where she is a resident. The
people from the Faith Healers Association had the express and implied orders coming from
respondent Atty. Danilo Velasquez to keep guarding Rosario Mecaral and not to let her go freely.
That can be gleaned from the affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita Tadeo. The latter being
reprimanded whenever Atty. Velasquez would learn that complainant had untangled the cloth tied
on her wrists and feet.[19] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution in the criminal complaint against
respondent, his therein co-respondent corroborated the testimonies of complainants witnesses, and
that the allegations against him remain unrebutted, sufficiently prove the charges against him by
clearly preponderant evidence, the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a
lawyer.[20]
In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts which constitute gross
misconduct, respondent has ceased to possess the qualifications of a lawyer.[21]
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, is DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory and ordered to be part
of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly
carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in
Quezon City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani,
Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant
found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty.
Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living
together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a
graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine
Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited
respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of
Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged,
however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the
representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the
illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos
Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and
pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The
illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been
employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by
the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more
particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her
Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all
along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese
woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their
trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii,
USA in 1985[3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter
continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui
wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they
would live together.[4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return
occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her
trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a
woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery
of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988
and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she
reported to work with the law firm[5] she was connected with, the woman who represented herself
to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been
communicating with her.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were
married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status,
she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang,
and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent
who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the
said house was built exclusively from her parents funds.[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent
sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant
for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew
perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start
of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to
her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her
husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the
criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between
the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence
however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of
1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and
was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living
at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they, admittedly,
continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when
respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as
complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainants evidence, this same evidence
had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the concept of
husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and
indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of
complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not
make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20
Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective
positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want
of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice,
but the same was dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation
that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite
Respondent in Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false
allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered and
intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar,
respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and
attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of
Marriage [11] duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii
State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty.
Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her
Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent
wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock.[12] It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles
183[13] and 184[14] of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the
act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated
document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be
a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),[15] respondent averred that she did
not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of
Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the
copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether
or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from
the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds,
namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral
character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral
manner.[17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case
and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon
learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there
was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor
because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship.[18]
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for
her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the
same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it
appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains
that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed
the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was
Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of
the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the
testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child,
pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car
with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another
picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,[19]
does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to
her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not
presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent
for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged [20] and the dismissal of the
appeal by the Department of Justice [21] to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any
immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she
entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as
willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui
whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways
with him.
In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having
intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant
testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her
husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the
Branch Manager.[23] It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her
parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married
man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission
for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated that complainant miserably
failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the
allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of
marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married
man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and
Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter
represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in
the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single,
separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui,
she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she
returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr.
Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed to
visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent
that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be
sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than
condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy
family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
x..........................x..........................x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of
Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against
Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and
willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the
legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject
to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The
requisites for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held -
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of
good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she
knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a
result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil
status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only
far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners
should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be
before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with
a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater
caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found
herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in
finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents suspicion that
something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For
instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy,
China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this
woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with
respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering
respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered
immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society
and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.[27] Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.[28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."[29] Respondents act of immediately
distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral
indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard
of the legal profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only
if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein
complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find
improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the
Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage
ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to
fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got
married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her
pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained
therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith
of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The
legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions
as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her
Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a
more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356 November 21, 1979
HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, complainant,
vs.
DIOSDADO S. FLORES, respondent.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
In a letter dated July 15, 1976 addressed to the Supreme Court, Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge
of Branch VI. City Court of Quezon City, recommended the dismissal from the service of Mr.
Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court, on the following grounds:
1. Conviction for libel on April 28, 1967, (Criminal Case No. Q- 7171), Branch IV, Court of First
Instance, Quezon City), a crime involving moral turpitude. He was sentenced to pay a fine of
P500.00, which he paid on July 18, 1974, under Receipt No. 4736418.
2. Presistent attempts to unduly influence the undersigned amounting to undue interest in
cases pending before Branch VI as shown by his handwritten notes to the undersigned and to my
present deputy clerk of Court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano.
On March 8, 1976, Mr. Flores was relieved from his position as Deputy Clerk of Court upon request
of the undersigned primarily to dissociate myself from these actuations of Mr. Flores, which I
strongly disapproved of, and to avail my Court of the services of a full-fledged lawyer with
unquestionable integrity. After his transfer, as can be seen from his handwritten notes, he persisted
in taking this unwarranted course of action in at least three (3) cases of Branch VI.
3. Gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use
of strong and contemptuous language in addressing the City Judges, when he wrote a letter, dated
March 11, 1976. 1
In a resolution of this Court dated July 29, 1976, Deputy Clerk of Court Diosdado S. Flores was
required to file his answer to the letter of Judge Remigio E. Zari and this case was transferred to the
First Division. 2
The respondent filed his answers 3 on August 12, 1976 wherein he alleged, among others, that his
conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude; that the then Commissioner Abelardo Subido,
who was also convicted of the crime of libel and was fined P5,000.00, had approved his appointment
as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City; that the respondent never
tried to unduly influence the complainant in the discharge of the latter's duties and responsibilities;
that while respondent's language in his letter dated March 11, 1976 is strong, the same could not be
considered contemptuous either directly or indirectly, in as much as he was merely expressing the
sentiments of an aggrieved employee who deserves a better treatment from his superior after more
than six years and nine months of highly dedicated and very efficient service in the City Court of
Quezon City; that if ever respondent requested favors from his superior, these were all done in the
spirit of friendship which the complainant professed to him before he left Branch VI of the City Court
of Quezon City on March 9, 1976; that from October 15, 1975 up to his illegal transfer on March 8,
1976, the respondent was practically doing the work of the complainant; that the respondent has
tutored the complainant on the fine interpretation and application of the law; that it was Judge Zari
who tried to corrupt him as may be gathered from the following instances: On January 8, 1976, after
the trial in Criminal Case No VI-5783 vs. Juanito Chua and two criminal cases against Emerito Lim,
Judge Zari instructed the respondent to conduct an ocular inspection on the illegal constructions,
subject of the cases; that Judge Zari, likewise, told the respondent to join him for lunch at Alfredo's
Steakhouse in Quezon City; that after conducting the ocular inspection, the respondent proceeded
to Alfredo's Steakhouse where he joined Judge Zari, Fiscal Loja and the defense counsel of Chua and
Lim; that thereafter, Judge Zari directed the respondent not to prepare anymore his report on the
ocular inspection to the site; that up to the time of his illegal transfer, the respondent did not see
the records of said cases anymore; that in Criminal Case No. VI-166624 vs. Corazon and Macaria
Tolentino, for the crime of estafa, the respondent was instructed to convict both the accused
because the complainant was a relative of a certain Judge Erochi; and that in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-
170682 and VI-170689 versus Gerundio Villanueva y Elazo, Dominador Garcia y Orteza and Balbino
Domingo y Ramos, for the crime of theft, he was instructed by Judge Zari to convict the accused
Dominador Garcia y Orteza because according to said judge, the complainant is AVESCO.
In a resolution dated September 1, 1976, 4 this Court required Judge Zari to file a reply to the
answer of the respondent within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
The complainant alleged in his reply to the answer of the respondent that he had not allowed the
respondent to interfere in the preparation of orders and decisions; that while the complainant is
aware of his limitations, he is certainly not so naive as to allow someone not a member of the
Philippine Bar to "tutor" and give him finer interpretation of the law; that he admits that Criminal
Cases Nos. VI-5783 against Juanito Chua and
VI-5788-5789 against Emerito Lim are pending before this court; that he did not call the respondent
to his chamber and instruct him to conduct an ocular inspection on the illegal constructions; that he
did not invite the respondent for lunch that day; that the truth was that after the trial, he went to
Alfredo's Steakhouse in the company of his fiscal, Fiscal Guillermo Loja; that while in the said place,
the complainant was surprised to see the respondent in the company of the accused; that he
counseled the respondent to be more circumspect as these people had cases before his sala; that it
is true that from then on up to the relief of the respondent on March 8, 1976, the records of the
aforesaid case could not be found by the respondent because the complainant had the records
brought inside his chamber in order to forestall any attempt on the part of the respondent to
manipulate the records; that he did not instruct the respondent to convict the accused in Criminal
Case No. VI-166624 and in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-170682 and VI-170689 just because the
complainant is a relative of a certain Judge Erochi and AVESCO, respectively; and that he requested
Atty. Reynaldo Elcano to affix his initial in all orders, decisions and sentences in order to pinpoint
responsibility. 5
In his reply, the complainant additionally charged that when the respondent applied for the position
of Deputy Clerk of Court, Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City, he submitted, among others, an
affidavit dated June 10, 1969 that contains the following statement "That I am a person of good
moral character and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police record;" that the
respondent also accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212 (1965) which was subscribed and sworn to
before then Judge Oscar A. Inocentes; that in the aforesaid data sheet, the respondent admits
having acted as counsel for three companies; and that the giving of legal advice by notaries and
others who are not admitted to the practice of law is dangerous to the welfare of the community,
because such persons have not demonstrated their capacity by submitting to examinations lawfully
established in the practice of law.
This administrative case was referred to the Executive Judge of Rizal, Quezon City, for investigation,
report and recommendation after City Judge Minerva Genovea and City Judge Aloysius Alday had
been allowed to inhibit themselves from investigating this
case. 6
District Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol who conducted the investigation of this administrative case
recommended that the respondent be separated from the service on the following findings:
The first charge is "conviction for libel which is a crime allegedly involving moral turpitude."
Presidential Decree No. 807, Sec. 36(b) No. 10 provides that one of the grounds for disciplinary
action is "conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude."
Evidence adduced by the complainant which was admitted by the respondent was that on April 28,
1967 respondent was convicted of the crime of Libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of Branch IV of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City. Respondent was sentenced to pay a fine of P5,000.00 which
he paid on July 18, 1974 under Official Receipt No. 276418.
Moral turpitude has been defined as including any act done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals. 7
Some of the particular crimes which have been held to involve moral turpitude are adultery,
concubinage, 8 rape, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery, 9 criminal
conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent
proof of loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of public records, fabrication of evidence,
offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction under promise of marriage, 10 estafa, 11
falsification of public document, 12 estafa thru falsification of public document. 13
"Moral turpitude" has been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellow men, to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals. 14 It implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
punishable by law or not. It must not merely be mala prohibita but, the act itself must be inherently
immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. 15
Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in the fact of their being positively prohibited. 16 Hence, the crime of illegal possession
of firearm or ammunition does not involve moral turpitude for under our laws, what is punishable is
the possession of a firearm or ammunition without a license or authority. 17
Bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude. 18
However in another, the Supreme Court seems to imply that libel is not a crime involving moral
turpitude.
The mere filing of an information for libel, or serious slander, against a municipal officer is not a
ground for suspending him from office, as such offenses do not necessarily involve moral turpitude.
19
When respondent submitted his application for the position of Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI,
City Court of Quezon City, he submitted among others an affidavit dated June 10, 1969, which reads
as follows:
That I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or
police record.
On blank space of a personal data sheet opposite question No. 10, which asked if applicant has
previously been convicted of a criminal offense, accused placed no. It was later discovered that
accused was previously convicted of theft. Accused was acquitted of falsification of public document
under Art. 171, par. 4, because there is no legal obligation to reveal previous conviction. 20 However
he maybe guilty of perjury under Art. 183. 21
One of the grounds for disciplinary action under PD 807, Sec. 36(b) under No. 13 is "falsification of
public documents."
The second charge is "persistent attempts to unduly influence the complainant amounting to undue
interest in cases pending before Branch VI as shown by his handwritten notes to the complainant
and to his present Deputy Clerk of Court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano."
Respondent admitted that in writing the four (4) notes (Exhibits "F", "F-1", "F-2", & "F-3"), he
intervened for and in behalf of Gaw Chin in Criminal Case No. VI-6196 pending before the sala of the
complainant because the accused was a compadre of his friend, Salvador Estrada.
On the other hand, the defense of the respondent is that he was practically doing the work of the
complainant and tutoring him in the finer interpretation and application of the law, and he was
preparing the decisions in both criminal and civil cases. Thus he was not trying to influence the
complainant.
The notes marked as Exhibits "F", "F-1, "F-2", & "F-3" speak for themselves. There is no need for the
undersigned to quote the same.
A proposition by an attorney to his client to visit with his wife the family of the judge before whom
the client's cause is to be heard, and to endeavor, in conversation thus to be had in advance of the
hearing, to commit the judge to an expression of opinion favorable to the client's case warrants his
dismissal from the bar. 22
The acts of the respondent amounts to conducts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. 23
The Third charge is "discourtesy to superior Officers as manifested by respondent in calling for and
unjust use of strong and contemptuous language in addressing the city judges when he wrote the
letter, dated March 11, 1976."
To quote the pertinent provisions of Exhibit "D":
'By the tenor of your reply, you have made the change of heart and have developed cold feet. You
have badly shaken my belief in your credibility. Indeed, you are truly a woman, very fickle and
unpredictable, but very impulsive.
I take this as a clear indication of your desire to enlist the sympathies and, if possible, like the other
five (5) judges, involved them in the mess originally of your own making and design and align them
with you against me, hoping to impress upon me that by the tyranny of numbers, I will be convinced
that mine is a lost cause.
However, I regret to inform the six of you that by your conduct, you have dismally failed to live up to
your oaths, ...
Kindly pardon me if I say that, the six of you must be out of your wits when you all decided to lay the
blame on me and condemned without trial for the alleged inefficiency.
Yes, when you all decided to sacrifice me you are all laboring under deep and nagging hallucinations,
induced and prompted by your serious concern to save the face of a colleague.
By the way, could any of the Honorable Judges of Branches I, III, V & IX honestly and truthfully say
the public service in their respective branches is efficient, so that they could now come to the succor
of a colleague and are also competent to promote the efficiency in Branch VI. My God, if that is true,
promotions of Judges in the City Court would be fast, the Purge in the Judiciary would not have
affected Quezon City and the unprepared and the inexperienced would not have come to the
Bench.'
Respondent reasoned out that the use of strong language by him in his letter was justified and very
much called for it being the indubitable manifestation of the indignation and disgust of the
respondent, urged upon him by the complainant who engineered the respondent's illegal transfer
from Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City which he holds a valid and subsisting appointment
to the Appeal and Docket Division, by virtue of a letter of the Executive Judge (Exhibit "43"), to
quote the pertinent provision of which:
'as a measure to promote more efficient public service, after due and circumspect deliberation by
and among the judges. '
pursuant to the authority granted to the executive judge under Administrative Order No. 6 of the
Supreme Court which provides as follows:
To re-assign temporarily the personnel of one branch (sala) to another branch (sala) or to the Office
of the Clerk of Court, in case of vacancy in the position of Presiding Judge of a branch (sala), or when
the interest of the service requires. In the latter case, the assignment shall be made in consultation
with the Presiding Judge of the branch (sala) concerned; and in case of disagreement, the
assignment of the Executive Judge shall be effective immediately, unless revoked by the Supreme
Court.
The transfer was made in consultation with the presiding judge of the branch concerned who is the
complainant in this case.
A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an
appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying
professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification
for the detail, he may appeal his case to the commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the
employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the commission. 24
An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency.
Provided: That such reassignment shall not involve reduction in rank, status or salary. 25
In the instant case there was actually a reassignment of employee from one branch to the Office of
the Clerk of Court in accordance with Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court and in
consonance with PD 807.
The language of attorney in his motion for reconsideration referring to the Supreme Court as a
"Civilized, democratic tribunal," but by innuendo would suggest that it is not; in his motion to
inhibit, categorizing the Court's decision as "false, erroneous and illegal" and accusing two justices
for being interested in the decision of the case without any basis in fact; asking the other members
of the Court to inhibit themselves for favors or benefits received from any of the petitioners
including the President — constitute disrespectful language to the Court. It undermines and
degrades the administration of justice.
The language is necessary for the defense of client is no justification. It ill behooves an attorney to
justify his disrespectful language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his
client. A client's cause does not permanent an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license.
Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "since lawyers are administrators of
justice, oathbound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to
the administration of justice; to this their client's success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct
ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. 26
Thru the use of uncalled language, respondent had committed insubordination, a ground for
disciplinary action. 27
The evidence of record supports the findings of the investigating judge.
It is a fact that the respondent was convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, at Quezon City. 7 While this fact alone is not sufficient to warrant
disciplinary action, the respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others.
His letter dated March 11, 1976 to Judge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City
Court of Quezon City 8 contains defamatory and uncalled for language.
The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI of the City
Court of Quezon City, presided by the complainant, Judge Remigio E. Zari, show that the respondent
had exerted undue influence in the disposition of the cases mentioned therein. 9
It is true that conviction for libel does not automatically justify removal of a public officer. 10
However, the fact of conviction for libel of the respondent, taken together with the letter he wrote
to then Executive City Judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Judge Minerva C. Genovea, shows the
tendency of the respondent to malign people.
Respondent's act of interfering in the cases pending before Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon
City presided by the complainant is inimical to the service. This alone warrants severe disciplinary
measures.
In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969,
the respondent stated "That I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no
administrative, criminal or police record. " This averment is not true because the respondent had
been convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV,
in a sentence dated April 28, 1967. This prevarication in a sworn statement is another ground for
serious disciplinary action.
The removal from the service of the respondent is warranted by the evidence adduced during the
investigation conducted by Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XVI, Quezon City.
WHEREFORE, the respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is hereby DISMISSED as Deputy Clerk of Court of
Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with
prejudice to reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as, in any government
instrumentality or agency including government owned or controlled corporations effective upon
the finality of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal record.
SO ORDERED.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993 Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs. THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC,
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent. INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore
quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

SECRET MARRIAGE? Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required
P560.00 for a valid marriage. the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
ANNULMENT. VISA. Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla. which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

Annex B The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
GUAM DIVORCE. whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

DON PARKINSON Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. this bar matter.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non- 1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
 xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish
the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense
would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction.
For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman
in need of basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act
of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities
in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public,
the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all,
to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name,
it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal
problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical
clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of
the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces
the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers
legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and
name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically
removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services
being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have
it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question
are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought
to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign
divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a
man and woman entered into accordance with law for the
 establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message
being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is
not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law.
At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle
with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the
Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded
that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged
or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent
offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements
in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic
data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such
business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can
be no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of
their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the
exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar
but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad
of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law.
While respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may
be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a
legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of
action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should
be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means
of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to
the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself
to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions,
and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask
the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984
ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and
such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to
practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal
services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot
ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of
the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the
discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the
persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of
law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to
another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have
qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all
the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law
practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein,
are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it
merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public
as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See
pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages,
secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa
related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines
and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities
of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally
term as "the practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration
should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of
law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with
the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not
by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give
the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment
of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and
foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if
they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not
help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely
by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved
in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President
and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek"
article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for
the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal
and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal
but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency
and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages
in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the
use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one
(cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The
law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so,
are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and
seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by
our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses
of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute
the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know
the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of
the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only
when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar
with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower,
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is
charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to
engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a
lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not
the case. The most important body of the industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and
few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it
has been the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen
for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without
regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like
the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get
from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring
[that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who
customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or
that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by
the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider
his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's
obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning
code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his
work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as
part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion,
and the person appointed is free to accept the employment
whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there
may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law.
Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not
lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-
way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the
probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party
to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept
the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his
men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a
statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I
need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not
presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An
agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties
before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to
interfere with such determination or to forbid representation
before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the
National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in
person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means
a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In
this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the
Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal.
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-
Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of
a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on
the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client,
and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation
with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the
public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence
and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS
THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION.
At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common
problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person in a particular situation — in their
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an
office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed
material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in
the memorandum of modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact
with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit,
the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems which might arise in the preparation
and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of
action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore
sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by
the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals
in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation
agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348,
NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It
is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
judicious disposition of this case.
 xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq.,
Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to
assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16
Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct
with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
 incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree
of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments
in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and
skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices
[Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations
of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute
"practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services
it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information
about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce,
marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the
foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in
court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the
efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other
entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the
law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of
the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by
said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely
giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was
given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
 This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-
Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has
specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and
family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the
big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for
the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of
these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient,
hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly.
"If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to
inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation.
There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order,
and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property,
and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem.
Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would
need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court,
and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.
22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar
who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of
their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there
are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the
United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major
standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one
of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance
only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give
something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity
to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments,
or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been
or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services
or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law
is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that
"the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-
product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a
normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in
legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of
the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in
a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not
and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees
for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso
that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented
by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as
that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly
provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has
consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time,
it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt
and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to
regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major
stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained
to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum,
since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for
or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province
of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter,
in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the
Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor
General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY.
ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000
issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.1[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court,
called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to
Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling
annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will
not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband
charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other
half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed
that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin
and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court.3[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the
absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and
that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he
be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public
order as long as it is dignified.4[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.5[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution
No. XV-2002-306,6[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from
the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt
with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7[7]
.
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8[8] which was denied by
the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst.
Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was
consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they
were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10[10] Complainant filed
his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or
evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11[11] Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20,
2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12[12] It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits.13[13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.14[14] The duty to
public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers,
who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.15[15] The following
elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving
thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.16[16]
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he
caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the
Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate
the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14,
2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17[17] Ten months later, he caused the same
advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.18[18] Such acts of
respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment
of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but
also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be
obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,19[19] he in fact encourages
people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their
marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation
to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest
and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.20[20] Thus, the use of
simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of
practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.21[21] Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and
informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of
law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the
profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in
a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
 JUAN DULALIA, JR., A.C. No. 6854 [Formerly CBD Case No. 04- 13, 2004 letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and concurrent Building Official of
1380]
Meycauayan, reading as follows, quoted verbatim:
Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ, xxxx

Respondent. This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F.
Soriano, Spouses David Perez and Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and
x--------------------------------------------------x Mrs. Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and neighbors.

DECISION It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the
building of the abovenamed person has started and that the undersigned and his
family, and those other families mentioned above are respective owners of the
residential houses adjoining that of the high-rise building under construction of
CARPIO MORALES, J.: the said Mrs. Soriano-Dulalia. There is no need to mention the unbearable
nuisances that it creates and its adverse effects to the undersigned and his above
referred to clients particularly the imminent danger and damage to their
Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is charged properties, health and safety.

by Juan Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation Rules 1.01,23[1] 6.02,24[2] and 7.0325[3] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as follows:
It was represented that the intended construction of the building would
only be a regular and with standard height building and not a high rise one but an
inspection of the same would show otherwise. Note that its accessory foundation
already occupies portion of the vacant airspace of the undersigneds residential
house in particular, which readily poses danger to their residential house and life.

Complainants wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building permit for the To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property, loss
of life and for the protection of the safety of all the people concerned, they are
construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance with all the requirements for the purpose, she failed immediately requesting for your appropriate action on the matter please at your
to secure a permit, she attributing the same to the opposition of respondents who wrote a September earliest opportune time.

23[1] Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful 25[3] Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
conduct. practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
24[2] Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.
 Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of
Meycauayan who is the Chief Legal Counsel of its Legal Department, and by virtue
of Sub par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
he is inquiring if there was already full compliance on the part of the owner of
the Building under construction with the requirements provided for in Sections
301, 302 and 308 of the National Building Code and on the part of your good office,
your compliance with the provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same foregoing
cited Building Code.
Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the non-
compliance with said Sections 301, 302, 303 and 304 of the National Building Code
by all the parties concerned. (Which are not confined only to penalties provided in
Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)
x x x x26[4] (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly
supplied)
26[4] Rollo, pp. 60-61.
27[5] Annex E of the Complaint, rollo, p. 36.
28[6] Rollo, pp. 7-10.
29[7] SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
By complainants claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit because of a
personal grudge against his wife Susan who objected to respondents marrying her first cousin Imelda
Soriano, respondents marriage with Carolina Agaton being still subsisting.27[5]
To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint Affidavit28[6] he filed against
respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e)29[7] of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c)30[8] of
30[8] SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. (A) Every public
official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the
discharge and execution of official duties:
(a) Commitment to public interest. Public officials and employees shall always uphold
the public interest over and above personal interest. All government resources and powers
of their respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and
economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.
xxxx
(c) Justness and sincerity. Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people
at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against
anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the
rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not
dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to their relatives whether by
consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of such relatives to positions
considered strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are
coterminous with theirs.
Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees).31[9]
By Resolution of June 25, 2005,34[12] the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.

By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005,32[10] the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the
Hence, the present Petition for Review35[13] filed by complainant.
complaint in light of the following findings:

The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent allegedly
opposes the application of his wife for a building permit for the construction of their Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he contracted a second
commercial building. One of the reason[s] stated by the complainant was that his wife marriage with Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 while his marriage with Carolina Agaton, which
was not in favor of Imeldas relationship with respondent who is a married man. And
was solemnized on December 17, 1967, is still subsisting.
the other reason is that respondent was not authorized to represent his neighbors in
opposing the construction of his building.

From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have

satisfactorily answered all the charges and accusations of complainant. We find no
clear, convincing and strong evidence to warrant the disbarment or suspension of Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the Municipal Legal
respondent. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof rests Officer of Meycauayan to oppose his wifes application for building permit, in violation of Rule 6.02 of
upon the complainant to overcome the presumption and establish his charges by a the Code of Professional Responsibility.
clear preponderance of evidence. In the absence of the required evidence, the
presumption of innocence on the part of the lawyer continues and the complaint
against him should be dismissed (In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239; Balduman vs.
Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).

x x x x.33[11] (Underscoring supplied)

31[9] In the Complaint Affidavit it was erroneously referred to as RA 7160 (The Local 33[11] Id. at 373-374.
Government Code of 1991).
34[12] Id. at 366.
32[10] Rollo, pp. 367- 374.
35[13] Id. at 419-433.
 And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal Legal Officer of After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of the charges of
Meycauayan, complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 7.03. violating Rules 6.02 and 7.03 in order.

To his Comment,36[14] respondent attached the July 29, 200537[15]Joint Resolution of the
Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as Municipal Legal Officer
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing complainants complaint for violation of Sec. 3
to advance his own personal interest against complainant and his wife.
(e) of RA 3019 and Section 4 (a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of which joint resolution
reads:

x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of herein As for respondents September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show that he opposed the
respondent Atty. Pablo Cruz addressed to the Building official appears to be not an
opposition for the issuance of complainants building permit, but rather to redress a application for building permit. He just inquired whether complainants wife fully complied with the
wrong and an inquiry as to whether compliance with the requirements for the requirements provided for by the National Building Code, on top of expressing his concerns about the
construction of an edifice has been met. In fact, the Office of the Building Official after
danger and damages to their properties, health and safety occasioned by the construction of the
conducting an investigation found out that there was [a] violation of the Building Code
for constructing without a building permit committed by herein complainants wife building.
Susan Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage Order was issued. Records disclose fu[r]ther
[that] it was only after the said violation had been committed that Susan Dulalia
applied for a building permit. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the same is
being processed pending approval by the Building Official and not of the Municipal
Zoning Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent the allegation that Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed on September 28,
respondent was engaged in the private practice of his law profession despite being
employed in the government as Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the 2004,39[17] whereas the questioned letter of respondent was priorly written and received on
undersigned has taken into consideration the explanation and clarification made by September 13, 2004 by the Municipal Engineer/ Building Official, who on the same day, ordered an
the respondent to be justifiable and meritorious. Aside from the bare allegations of
herein complainant, there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate the complaints
against the respondent.38[16] (Underscoring supplied)

36[14] Id. at 456-490. 38[16] Rollo, pp. 609-610.

37[15] Annex 11, rollo, pp.608-610. 39[17] As shown by Annex A of the Complaint, rollo, p.12.
inspection and issued a Cease and Desist Order/Notice stating that [f]ailure to comply with th[e] notice
shall cause this office to instate proper legal action against you.40[18]
Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 200541[19] from the Office of the Municipal
Engineer showed, complainants wife eventually withdrew the application as she had not yet secured
clearances from the Municipal Zoning Administrator and from the barangay where the building was
to be constructed.
Respecting complainants charge that respondent engaged in an unauthorized private practice
of law while he was the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, a position coterminous to that of the
40[18] Rollo, p. 74.
41[19] Id. at 199.
42[20] Id. at 79. Attached as Annex 5 of respondents Answer is the Memorandum dated July
2, 1998 of Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor Eduardo A. Alarilla, which states:
xxxx
In accordance with MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR No. 17 dated September 4, 1986
of the Office of the President, Malacaang, you are hereby given permission to engage in
the private practice of your legal profession provided that it shall not be in conflict with
your powers, duties and responsibilities defined and provided for by the Local Government
Code of 1991, thus, always giving priority to the interest of the municipality.
xxxx
appointing authority, suffice it to state that respondent proffered proof that his private practice is not
prohibited.42[20]
It is, however, with respect to respondents admitted contracting of a second marriage while
his first marriage is still subsisting that this Court finds respondent liable, for violation of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County, Nevada,
USA,43[21] when the Family Code of the Philippines had already taken effect.44[22] He invokes good
faith, however, he claiming to have had the impression that the applicable provision at the time was
Article 83 of the Civil Code.45[23] For while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall
43[21] Annex 10, rollo, p. 261.
44[22] The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
45[23] Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if
the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered
as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
have retroactive application, there is a qualification thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members
of the community.46[24] Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.47[25]
In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la Cruz,48[26] this Court declared that the
therein respondents act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting
constituted immoral conduct, for which he was suspended for two years after the mitigating following
circumstances were considered:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for
a period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with
any woman;
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
and void by a competent court.
46[24] St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Dela
Cruz, A.C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 614, 624; Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio, 388
Phil. 691, 707 (2000); Narag v. Narag, 353 Phil. 643, 655 (1998).
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total
love for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and
child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic)
with relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways
when the mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.49[27]
In respondents case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the benefit of
the doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable provision when he
contracted the second marriage abroad. From 1985 when allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an
allegation which was not refuted, until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no showing
that he was romantically involved with any woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has
remained an absentee even during the pendency of this case.
As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with Imelda Soriano. The
community in which they have been living in fact elected him and served as President of the IBP-
Bulacan Chapter from 1997-1999 and has been handling free legal aid cases.
47[25] St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Dela
Cruz, supra at 624; Ui v. Bonifacio, supra.
48[26] Supra.
49[27] Id. at 625.
 Respondents misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at the time he
contracted his second marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude of his residential community
towards his second marriage notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.
As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a second marriage while
the first marriage was still in place as being contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.50[28]
Apropos is this Courts pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:51[29]
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to
be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty
carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep
abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and
diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become
susceptible to committing mistakes.52[30] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the
provides:
Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. He is
WARNED that a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in
continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law
schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating
information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.
Respondents claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August
3, 1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the
Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as ignorance of the law
SO ORDERED.
excuses no one from compliance therewith.

50[28] Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313, 314 (1957). 52[30] Id. at 100-101.

51[29] A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004, 440 SCRA 91.

A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26, 1991
PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER.
CABANTING, respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Antiniw, Arsenio Fer.
Cabanting and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice and
misconduct in the exercise of their legal profession committed in the following manner:
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.
In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana allegedly bought a
parcel of land, where they built their residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of
Pedro Raymundo the original owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer
certificate of title in their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to
settle the land dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short) another heir of Pedro
Raymundo, and the Valencia spouses since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos.
Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if the Valencias could show documents evidencing
ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed
that the deed covered a different property. Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle their
differences. (Report of Investigating Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a complaint against
Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. V-
2170, entitled "Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11).
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio
Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private
document written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to
pay the person who would falsify the signature of the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A
"Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed purporting to be a sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in
favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed the belief that the said document is
not authentic. (Report, p. 14)
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction before
the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his
house. While the petition was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of
execution stating that "the decision in this case has already become final and executory" (Exhibits 3
and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of execution was issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the
remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex
"A" of Administrative Case No. 1302).
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No.
1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code as well as Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of
property under litigation by a counsel.
On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment proceeding
(docketed as Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the
forgery of "Compraventa Definitiva" and its subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and
also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property
allegedly in violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for
allegedly rigging Civil Case No. V-2170 against her parents. On August 17, 1975, Constancia Valencia
filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:
 1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:
In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with one Lydia
Bernal had a deed of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before him as Notary Public by
one Santiago Bernal in favor of Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal
had died already about eight years before in the year 1965.
2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:
In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in confabulation
with Rosa de los Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, executed and ratified before him,
two (2) deeds of sale in favor of said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact the said
deeds were not in fact executed by the supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so Rufino
Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul and declare void the said sales (p. 7,
Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by the grandparents of
Lydia Bernal (complainant,) in favor of her parents, was lost during the last world war. For this
reason, her grandmother (the living donor) executed a deed of confirmation of the donation propter
nuptias with renunciation of her rights over the property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the
deed, her grandmother still offered to sell the same property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly
to strengthen the deed of donation (to prevent others from claim-ing the property).
On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw allegedly
prepared and notarized the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather (deceased at the time of
signing) with her grandmother's approval.
Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a complaint against her
(Lydia Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public document. (Complaint, pp.
1-2) The fiscal exonerated the counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed in court against
Lydia Bernal.
On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case
No.1543) against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.
Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974, the resolution
of the Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two resolutions of the Second Division both
dated December 3, 1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 were referred to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all of these
cases were ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza per his handwritten
directive of March 9, 1976.
On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.1âwphi1 When Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of
Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the investigation of these cases to Acting Presiding Judge
Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Villasis, Pangasinan, for further investigation.
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged threats against the
person of complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the transfer of investigation to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
under the sala of Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.
After investigation, Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of cases against Atty.
Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting; dismissal of Administrative Case No. 1543 and the
additional charges in Administrative Case No. 1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos; however,
he recommended the suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for six months finding
him guilty of malpractice in falsifying the "Compraventa Definitiva."
The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of
the New Civil Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying
notarial documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.
I
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
 The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction, either
in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they make take part by virtue of their profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to
curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the
sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute
malpractice (In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran
vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending.
(Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of
judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if
there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject
to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates, in certiorari
proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe
to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the judgment of
the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase
of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and
the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client
relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take part as
counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons
adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in
consideration of his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would show that
Paulino bought the property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence
that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Bayasen vs. CA, L-25785,
Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos vs. CA, et al., L40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individual's integrity is
challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los Reyes vs. Aznar, Adm.
Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not
corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt
on a subject which was so delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he
fabricated his evidence.
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale,
and its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as
an officer of the court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not
at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty
of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA
459) To that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost
earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means
for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 93
SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them is
mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court
may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
(Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of
a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that courts
and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty.
Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be dismissed for
lack of evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full on direct
examination, but she never submitted herself for cross-examination. Several subpoenas for cross-
examination were unheeded. She eventually requested the withdrawal of her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses against him.1âwphi1 He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of
the charges against him until the contrary is proved. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case
must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm. Case No.
1616, February 9, 1989), Since Atty. Antiniw was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but
proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative Case No.
1543 should be dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of
interest does not ipso facto result in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of an
erring lawyer (Munar vs. Flores, 122 SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the
same because there was no evidence to substantiate the charges.
The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the
information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the personal knowledge of Constancia L.
Valencia: hence, hearsay. "Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative
value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other
person not on the witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p.
486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is inadmissible.
The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in Administrative Case
No. 1391 was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her additional charges.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative cases
conspired in executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the Valencias are
neighbors and only two meters separate their houses. It would not be believable that Atty.
Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer, would hold a meeting with the heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house
with the intention of inducing them to sue the Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the
53[1] Rollo, pp. 3-11.
differences between the parties in a meeting held in his house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170
as an involuntary witness to attest to the holding of the conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood
among them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat the
opposing counsel, and his brethren in the law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility. They
may "do as adversaries do in law: strive mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship
does not connote conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the
practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer.
Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3.
Administrative Case No. 1391 against Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein,
and Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003]
IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL GROUNDS,
FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ, petitioners, vs. ATTY.
LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS, respondents.
DECISION
TlNGA, J.:
This is a Petition53[1] filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez,
mainly seeking the disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera from being elected
Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Regional
Governors elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while
petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past President and the incumbent President, respectively, of
the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) was set on April 26, 2003, a month
prior to the IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so set in
compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws, which reads:
SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At least one month before the national
convention, the delegates from each region shall elect the governor of their region, the choice of
which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution54[2] No. XV-2003-99 dated April 16, 2003, reset
the elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in
Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a
letter55[3] dated 28 March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to reconsider its Resolution of April 6,
2003. Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) adhering to the mandate of Section 39 of
the IBP By Laws to hold the election of Regional Governors at least one month prior to the national
convention of the IBP will prevent it from being politicized since post-convention elections may
otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable political practices, and; (2) holding the
election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board from resolving
protests in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the
IBP By Laws, to wit:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days
after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar
a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition, the President
shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the
54[2] Id. at 104.
55[3] Id. at 105-108.
56[4] Id. at 109-111.
protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not
later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.
On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in its Resolution No. XV-
2003-162.56[4]
On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon of May 24,
2003, the petitioners filed a Petition57[5] dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board seeking (1) the
postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or third week of June 2003; and
(2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern
Mindanao Region.
The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003. The pertinent portions of
the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the postponement of the elections for
regional governors and, second, the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de Vera.
WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no compelling justification for the
postponement of the elections especially considering that preparations and notices had already
been completed.
WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board finds the
petition to be premature considering that no nomination has yet been made for the election of IBP
regional governor.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny the petition.58[6]
Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition, on the same date, May 29,
2003, the petitioners filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as those
sought in their Petition before the IBP.
57[5] Id. at 112-121.
58[6] Id. at 122.
On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners application, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), directing the IBP Board, its agents, representatives or persons
acting in their place and stead to cease and desist from proceeding with the election for the IBP
Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao.59[7]
Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for the selection of the IBP
officers from the Chapter Officers up to the Regional Governors constituting the IBP Board which is
its highest policy-making body, as well as the underlying dynamics, to wit:
IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a term of two years. The IBP Chapter
Presidents in turn, elect their respective Regional Governors following the rotation rule. The IBP has
nine (9) regions, viz: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Greater Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia,
Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and Western Mindanao. The governors serve
for a term of two (2) years beginning on the 1st of July of the first year and ending on the 30th of
June of the second year.
From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive Vice President (EVP) shall be
chosen, also on rotation basis. The rationale for the rotation rule in the election of both the Regional
Governors and the Vice President is to give everybody a chance to serve the IBP, to avoid politicking
and to democratize the selection process.
Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws, whoever is the incumbent EVP will
automatically be the National President for the following term.
Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao, have had two (2)
National Presidents each. Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for
Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will automatically become the
EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. For the next term in turn, i.e., from July 1, 2005 to
June 20, 2007, the EVP immediately before then will automatically assume the post of IBP National
President.
59[7] Id. at 1-2.
60[8] Id. at 7.
61[9] Ibid.
Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP
membership from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del
Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the IBP presidency.60[8] The transfer of IBP
membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of the
rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao
for it implies that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve the IBP.61[9]
Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional governor, executive
vice-president and national president, the petitioners submit that respondent De Vera lacks the
requisite moral aptitude. According to them, respondent De Vera was sanctioned by the Supreme
Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations on the
constitutionality of the plunder law. They add that he could have been disbarred in the United
States for misappropriating his clients funds had he not surrendered his California license to practice
law. Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned for the position of Eastern Mindanao
Governor during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under the
IBP By-Laws.62[10]
After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003 a Respectful Comment 63[11]
on the Petition.
In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has no jurisdiction
over the present controversy, contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the
determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal
matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP.
Respondent De Vera also assails the petitioners legal standing, pointing out that the IBP By-Laws
does not have a provision for the disqualification of IBP members aspiring for the position of
Regional governors, for instead all that it provides for is only an election protest under Article IV,
Section 40, pursuant to which only a qualified nominee can validly lodge an election protest which is
to be made after, not before, the election. He posits further that following the rotation rule, only
members from the Surigao del Norte and Agusan del Sur IBP chapters are qualified to run for
Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region for the term 2003-2005, and the petitioners who are from
Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental are not thus qualified to be nominees.64[12]
62[10] Rollo, p. 9.
63[11] Id. at 46-93.
64[12] Id. at 60.
Meeting the petitioners contention head on, respondent De Vera avers that an IBP member is
entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter membership.65[13] He cites the last paragraph of
Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular
Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political
subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case
shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all members registered in its
membership roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any
of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to
another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made not
less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also recognized in Section 4, Rule
139-A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the same as the first of the above-quoted provisions of
the IBP By-Laws, thus:
Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a
lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or
area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer
be a member of more than one Chapter.
Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan del Sur IBP
Chapter that he transferred his IBP membership, respondent De Vera submits that it is unfair and
unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer was done for convenience and as a
mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao governorship.66[14]
65[13] Id. at 61-62.
66[14] Id. at 66.
67[15] Id. at 87.
68[16] Id. at 150-169.
On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to the
Court or to any of its members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. As
for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in
California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he
maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for
the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of
the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary
findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory in character similar to the
recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review
of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the
California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the
complainants money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating
officer. Finally, on the alleged politicking he committed during the IBP National Convention held on
May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is baseless to assume that he was campaigning simply because he
declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for governorship in the Eastern Mindanao
Region and that the petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their claim that he or
his handlers had billeted the delegates from his region at the Century Park Hotel.67[15]
On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply68[16] to the Respectful Comment of respondent De
Vera who, on July 15, 2003, filed an Answer and Rejoinder.69[17]
In a Resolution70[18] dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other respondent in this case, the
IBP Board, to file its comment on the Petition. The IBP Board, through its General Counsel, filed a
Manifestation71[19] dated 29 August 2003, reiterating the position stated in its Resolution dated 29
May 2003 that it finds the petition to be premature considering that no nomination has as yet been
made for the election of IBP Regional Governors.72[20]
Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main issues, to wit:
(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;
69[17] Id. at 175-196.
70[18] Id. at 173-174.
71[19] Id. at 237-242.
72[20] Id. at 238.
 (2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the
determination of which in turn requires the resolution of two sub-issues, namely:
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper remedy under
the IBP By-Laws; and
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;
(3) whether the present Petition is premature;
(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is not
premature, whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP
Eastern Mindanao Region;
Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De Vera submits
that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those
who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal matter and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
IBP.
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Supreme
Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
Sec. 5(5) Art. X, 1973 Constitution: Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
73[21]
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar,
which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights.
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the
election of its officers.
The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitution. Section 13,
Art. VIII thereof granted the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law. It reads:
SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and
are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly worded
provision in the intervening 1973 Constitution73[21] through all the years have been the sources of
this Courts authority to supervise individual members of the Bar. The term Bar refers to the
collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys.74[22] Pursuant to this power
of supervision, the Court initiated the integration of the Philippine Bar by creating on October 5,
1970 the Commission on Bar Integration, which was tasked to ascertain the advisability of unifying
the Philippine Bar.75[23] Not long after, Republic Act No. 639776[24] was enacted and it confirmed
the power of the Supreme Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Finally, on January 1,
1973, in the per curiam Resolution of this Court captioned In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar
to the Philippines, we ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule 139-A,
of the Rules of Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our rule-making power under the 1935
Constitution.
74[22] In the matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 151 Phil. 132 (1973).
75[23] Supreme Court Resolution dated October 5, 1970.
An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and Appropriating Funds
76[24]
Therefor.
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP independence from
the Supreme Court, ironically recognizes the full range of the power of supervision of the Supreme
Court over the IBP. For one, Section 7777[25] of the IBP By-Laws vests on the Court the power to
amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu propio or upon recommendation of the Board
of Governors of the IBP. Also in Section 15,78[26] the Court is authorized to send observers in IBP
elections, whether local or national. Section 4479[27] empowers the Court to have the final decision
on the removal of the members of the Board of Governors.
On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into the
irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter No. 491
entitled In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into the 1989 elections. The results of the
investigation showed that the elections were marred by irregularities, with the principal candidates
for election committing acts in violation of Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws.28 The Court invalidated
the elections and directed the conduct of special elections, as well as explicitly disqualified from
SEC. 77. Amendments. - These By-Laws may be amended, modified or repealed by the
77[25]
Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.
SEC. 15. Supreme Court observer. The Supreme Court may designate an official
78[26]
observer at any election of the Integrated Bar, whether national or local.
SEC. 44. Removal of Members. If the Board of Governors should determine after proper
79[27]
inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to
perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the majority of the remaining members, may
declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause,
including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by
resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court.
In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the remaining
members of the Board shall, by majority vote, elect a successor from among the Delegates
coming from the Region concerned to serve as Governor for the unexpired portion of the
term.
28SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to election. - The following acts and
practices relative to elections are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any
running thereat the IBP members who were found involved in the irregularities in the elections, in
order to impress upon the participants, in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct
which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the
non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering.
The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed direct election
by the House of Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP President; and (c)
Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second, it restored the former system of the IBP Board choosing the
IBP President and the Executive Vice President (EVP) from among themselves on a rotation basis
(Section 47 of the By-Laws, as amended) and the automatic succession by the EVP to the position of
the President upon the expiration of their common two-year term. Third, it amended Sections 37
and 39 by providing that the Regional Governors shall be elected by the members of their respective
House of Delegates and that the position of Regional Governor shall be rotated among the different
chapters in the region.
elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any
form or manner, by himself or through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement of the
biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal size sheet of paper; or causing
distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the
officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-
judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the
advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for
or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member; (2)
giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or any similar
consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made,
offered or promised to any person.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the IBP and
establish without doubt its jurisdiction to hear and decide the present controversy.
In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of action against him,
respondent De Vera argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions to disqualify candidates for
Regional Governors since what it authorizes are election protests or post-election cases under
Section 40 thereof which reads:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days
after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar
a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition, the President
shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the
protest, with due notice to the contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not
later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.
Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the disqualification of
candidates for IBP governors. The remedy it provides for questioning the elections is the election
protest. But this remedy, as will be shown later, is not available to just anybody.
Section 33(g). The House (of Delegates) shall elect the members of the Board of
29
Governors at the annual convention every other year.
30 SEC. 39. Nomination and election of Governors. -
(a) Nominations. -
On the morning of the first day of the convention of the House of Delegates held for the
election of Governors, the Delegates from each Region shall choose, by secret plurality vote,
not less than two or more than five nominees for the position of Governor for their Region. In
no case shall more than one nominee come from the same Chapter, nor may any person be
nominated unless he is a duly registered member of a Chapter within the Region.
The list of nominees shall be submitted on the same morning to the Chairman of the House,
who shall forthwith read them aloud. The names of all the nominees, arranged by Region and
in alphabetical order of surnames, shall be written on a blackboard or blackboards within the
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of nominees for the
position of regional governor. This was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4) of the IBP By-
Laws, to wit:
SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of a candidate
must be raised prior to the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by the Chairman. An
appeal from such decision may be taken to the Delegates in attendance who shall forthwith resolve
the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by raising of hands. The decision of the Delegates shall
be final, and the elections shall thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of Governors may be had
in accordance with Section 40.
The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election of the Board of
Governors. Before, members of the Board were directly elected by the members of the House of
Delegates at its annual convention held every other year.29 The election was a two-tiered process.
First, the Delegates from each region chose by secret plurality vote, not less than two nor more than
five nominees for the position of Governor for their Region. The names of all the nominees,
arranged by region and in alphabetical order, were written on the board within the full view of the
House, unless complete mimeographed copies of the lists were distributed to all the Delegates.30
Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate voted for only one nominee for Governor
for each Region.31 The nominee from every Region receiving the highest number of votes was
declared and certified elected by the Chairman.32
full view of the House, unless complete mimeographed copies of the lists are distributed to
all the Delegates by the secretariat of the House.
In no case shall any nomination or campaign speech be permitted.
31Section 39(5) Voting. - Voting for Governors shall take place on the afternoon of the first
day of the convention, and shall be by secret ballot. Official ballots shall be provided for the
purpose. No voting by proxy shall be allowed. Each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate
shall vote for only one nominee for Governor of each Region.
32Section 39 (7) Persons to be declared elected. - Elections shall be determined by plurality
vote. The nominee from every Region receiving the highest number of votes shall be
declared and certified elected by the Chairman. In case of a tie vote, the winner shall be
determined by lots drawn by the nominees concerned. The Secretary shall keep all the ballots
and tally sheets in a locked receptacle where they shall remain, subject to the further orders
of the Board of Governors.
In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this Court deemed it
best to amend the nomination and election processes for Regional Governors. The Court localized
the elections, i.e, each Regional Governor is nominated and elected by the delegates of the
concerned region, and adopted the rotation process through the following provisions, to wit:
SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a
Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in
Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one Governor for each region to be
elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor
should be rotated among the different chapters in the region.
SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before the national
convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of
which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less
controversial. The grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the pool
from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation process
operates.
The simplification of the process was in line with this Courts vision of an Integrated Bar which is non-
political33 and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the legal profession,
improving the administration of justice and contributing to the growth and progress of the
Philippine society.34
The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision on
disqualification proceedings. Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant petition has
no firm ground to stand on.
33Section 4, Article 1, IBP By-Laws. Non-political Bar. - The Integrated Bar is strictly non-
political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall
be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof
shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any
Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an
officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or
Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws,
petitioners are not the proper persons to bring the suit for they are not qualified to be nominated in
the elections of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He argues that following the rotation rule
under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as amended, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and
Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated.
Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition, petitioners are
not the proper parties to bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can file
with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. As claimed by
respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and
Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and elected at the election for the 16th Regional
Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted
Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the
other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently,
the petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election.
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners to seek the
disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao
Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the post. In this case,
respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has
been made yet by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too,
assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from
Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a member of the
PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate
accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government
or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
34Section 2, Article 1, IBP By-Laws. Objectives and purposes.- The following are the
general objectives of the Integrated Bar: to elevate the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively. The purposes of the Integrated Bar include, without being limited to, those
specified in the per curiam Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 9, 1973 ordaining
the integration of the Philippine Bar.
goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in
changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer included in
the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his
preference or choice, thus:
Section 19. Registration. -
....
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be
considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area
where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any
lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer
will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the
discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he
does not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he
resides or maintains his office. The only proscription in registering ones preference is that a lawyer
cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP
membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:
SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership roll.
Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set
35 Rollo, p. 125.
36 Section 29-12. Rules governing elections.- The following rules shall govern elections:
(a) Date and place of elections. - Elections of Officers and Directors shall be held on the last
Saturday of February of every other year at such time and place as the Board shall designate,
which shall be stated in the notice to be sent to every member by personal delivery or by mail
not less than thirty days prior to the elections.
forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to another Chapter as
certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that the transfer is made not less than three
months immediately preceding any Chapter election.
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than
three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del
Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter35
addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J.
Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent De Veras transfer
and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a
substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that
De Veras transfer was made effective sometime between August 1, 2001 and September 3, 2001.
On February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over
the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of
Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other year.36
Between September 3, 2001 and February 27, 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes
respondent De Veras transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter
elections held on February 27, 2003.
Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not morally fit to
occupy the position of governor of Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided in the
IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected
governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good standing of the IBP;37 2) he is
included in the voters list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-
37Section 9. Officer defined.- The term officer as used in these By-Laws shall include, but
not necessarily be limited to, the following: President, Executive Vice President, Governors,
Secretary, Treasurer and other national officers of the Integrated Bar, officers and members
of the House of Delegates, Chapter officers and directors, commissioners, and members of all
national and local committees.
Only members in good standing may become officers, and, unless otherwise provided in
these By-Laws, no person who is not a member of the Integrated Bar may become an
officer.
Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs;38 (3) he does not
belong to a chapter from which a regional governor has already been elected, unless the election is
the start of a new season or cycle;39 and (4) he is not in the government service.40
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can
run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a
candidates lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based
on each members standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the
latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a
candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral
turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged sanction
imposed by the Supreme Court during the deliberation on the constitutionality of the plunder law, is
apparently referring to this Courts Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In Re: Published Alleged Threats
Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera.41 In this
case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and was imposed a fine in
the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for his remarks contained in two newspaper
articles published in the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of the report, with
De Veras statements written in italics.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Section 20. Members in good standing. - Every member who has paid all membership dues
and all authorized special assessments, plus surcharges owing thereon, and who is not under
suspension from the practice of law or from membership privileges, is a member in good
standing.
38Section 29-12.f Elibigility. - No member may be elected to any office whose name is not
duly included in the voters list, or who is disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-
Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by these by-laws.
Section 29-12 Voters list. - Not earlier than twenty-five days nor later than fifteen days prior
to the elections, the Secretary shall submit to the Board of Officers a list of the names of all
the members entitled to vote. The voters list shall then remain closed and shall not be altered
except upon direction of the Board. However, it shall be open to inspection by all members,
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by
Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were greatly disturbed by the rumors from Supreme Court insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder Law,
with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a
coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the prosecution of Estrada.
We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices- considering
that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will most likely result in
a pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or vague, the group said.42
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
Xxx
and upon request, copies thereof shall be furnished to any member upon payment of actual
cost.
Any member who is delinquent in the payment of dues or any assessment, including
surcharges owing, twenty-five days prior to the day of the elections, shall be excluded from
the voters list.
People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged. said lawyer Leonard De Vera of
the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law unconstitutional
would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II.
Xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the jueteng scandal that led to People Power II if the
rumor turned out to be true.
People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must
prevail. 43
In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made said
statements but denied to have uttered the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence
in it and to bring it into disrepute.44 He explained that he was merely exercising his constitutionally
guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were aimed at
influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder
Law.45
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he was
found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines46 cited in Villaber v. Commission on Elections,47 the Court
defines moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals.48 The determination of whether an act involves moral turpitude is a factual issue and
frequently depends on the circumstances attending the violation of the statute.49
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing ones opinion on a public interest issue can be
considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering
nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law.50
Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of
respondent De Veras alleged immorality.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still
practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California
Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the
discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the
case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic
rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same.51 In this case, the
petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Veras moral
fitness to run for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates from
Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners
did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court.52

43 Id. at 288. 49Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 1144, 1151 (1996) citing International
Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, GRNo. 97239, 12 May 1993, 221 SCRA 760, and In Re:
44 Ibid. Victorio Lanuevo, Administrative Case No. 1162, 29 August 1975, 66 SCRA 245.

45 Supra, note 41, at 290. 50See Villaber v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 148326, 15 November 2001, 369 SCRA
126, Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 1144, 1151 (1996) and Tak Ng v.
46 106 Phil. 727 (1959) Republic of the Philippines,106 Phil. 727 (1959).

47 G.R. No. 148326, 15 November 2001, 369 SCRA 126. 51 Cortes v. CA, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003.

48 Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines, 106 Phil. 727 (1959). 52 Coronel v. Constantino, G.R. No. 121069, 7 February 2003.
WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the position of
IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby
DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30 May 2003 which enjoined
the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED.
Accordingly, the IBP Board of Governors is hereby ordered to hold said election with proper notice
and with deliberate speed.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal
of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article
III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board
shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and
take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member
and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay
the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The
respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to
as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to
the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the
IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in
Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the
Court Rule:
 SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to
be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose
names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of
the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court
but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the
practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise
of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of
the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these
matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is
voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is
afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to
bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of
the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of
which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a
degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.
Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public
interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291
U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to
"adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall
see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act,
the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9,
1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body
corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218),
for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law.
To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted
power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in
the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5
(5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No.
6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme
Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional
declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power
of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties.
If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not
have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative
of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder
of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that
under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country
should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may
be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13
and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities
holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating
to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a
brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an
honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the
duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to
the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the
fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested
in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr.,
himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate
sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now,
has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of
issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has
been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the following attached
sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)
Annex "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1,
A 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
.......-
Annex "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13,
B 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque,
.......- MM
 Annex "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File
C Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in
.......- CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies
that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that
"default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be
a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the
bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the
IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does
not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an
attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these
courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown
by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-
CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No.
11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14,
1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly
on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996,
and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be
respondents signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."80[1]
Also attached was a copy of the order,81[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion for
reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification82[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents
"last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to
cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from
receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,83[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent
alleged:84[5]
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996
and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no
longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the
bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances. Chief
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to
Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as
a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction
for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would
surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in
his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to
the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax
Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard
and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since
1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992,
in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he
honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a
limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is
covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member
to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if
only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and
refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past
dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to
tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again
irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant,
but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such
dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Esmsc
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution85[6] adopting and approving
the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty,
and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his
IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in
a resolution,86[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court,
this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondents suspension for three
months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the
proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the
letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three
years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter
President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues
was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by
respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is
legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in
the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to
the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents
Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court
about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of
 at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his
memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid
his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this
Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995,
1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt
number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only
engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the
payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the
Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his
dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants
senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual
taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of
membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public
and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,87[8] we believe
the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE
(1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached
to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP
DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed
by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in
the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that
after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service
from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his
retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that
he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones
profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was
working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment[3] stating inter alia: that membership in the
IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of
Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a
member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly
approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of
Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to
defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of
no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Courts directives for all
members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is
no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is
allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner
could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have
been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing
proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of
Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP
Board of Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers
regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the
Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that
compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him
considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law
practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute
deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law
by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow
lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his
dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil
Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from
bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is
an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation
for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population.
This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to foster the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the
integration of the Philippine Bar[8] - which power required members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession
to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9]
thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is
attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a
revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an
integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does
not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar
far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the
annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is
exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At
most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar
of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have
been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process
of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues
during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay
membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the
holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is]
clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court
to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law before the courts of this country
should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,
and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyers public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions,[11] one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them
entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered
to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005,
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that
failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against
Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy,
Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International
Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made
by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar,
with the suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this
Court issued a show-cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally
signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false,
ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts
against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot
desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14,
three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant
attitude of the petitioners. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to
Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on
bottom of the page).
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories not only
from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. (Respondents'
Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from
bottom of the page).
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and
purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor
General points out, contain the following statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the
misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par.
1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just
plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling,
even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court
intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute
manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10,
1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 — after judgment herein was rendered — and
signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala
and Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to
inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof
retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate
Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false,
erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction
rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case
even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the
Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this
case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The
motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments
projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It
enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's
belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in
favor of "petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said
decision." The "incidents" cited are as follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been declared
unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce
evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the
appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor
capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law but — only served to
delay respondent for the benefit of the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but
destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a
reason, not for no reason at all.
 (f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the
Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous
decisions, and the main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a
double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows
better and has greater understanding than the said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said
decision — without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts
through presentation through the trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and
Graciano Regala and Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by
the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were comments
legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients.
It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client would be
deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to
"Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also
voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities
believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before
them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly
ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable
of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of
unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue.
Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion
to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious or
uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved — and also of Judge
Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an accused
who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation for such
mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral
comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's
resolution of November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for
reconsideration were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor.
He further elaborated on his explanations made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted
paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still
included through inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended
motion to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice
Castro inhibit themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the
dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July
31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted
in withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that
he did not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he
present steps (sic) now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the questioned
statements he made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his client
MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those statements lifted out of context would
indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred
that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of
civil contempt against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance
under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge was not
signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by law; and that the Solicitor General and his
assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as further
clarified by a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or
reference to his law firm in this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his
associates; that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his
services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in this case;
that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and referred Meads
to another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads
and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated in any
manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with
this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the case. In brief, he denied participation
in any of the court papers subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on six
months' leave of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for
MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of
MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new
counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth
motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds
raised, and contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the
Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case — which
condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court — Section 1, Rule 51, and we
quote: "Justices; who may take part. — ... . only those members present when any
matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication ..." This requirement is especially significant in the present instance
because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was
absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its
quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably
either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the
bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of
the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice
and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government, either its
executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either
compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment
requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government,
including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars
annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to
show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for
contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion
for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and
requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said request
twice on the ground that he did not know anything about the case, much less the truth of the
allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently explained to
the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the
motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so signing and the
true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in
the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to
require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return
[of Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton
Meads, should not be dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ... to
direct that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads,
personally appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the
contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard by this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty.
Caling's statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to
Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer
nearby who could help him file another motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned
Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left
Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion and that he never even read
it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he
went to Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself
prepared. Santiago started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in
the first or second paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not
Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. They then went to
Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time
handing the fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After
reading the motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name was typed therein.
The motion was then filed. According to Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to
the time the motion was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half.
Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen
minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of
Court set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because
said quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and
that it is a common practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends
that the announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also
included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton
Meads in oral argument with respect to the second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the
first and second contempt incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we,
indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as
"vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo
would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false,
erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary
injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of
an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the
decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of
the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July
31, 1968 was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the
principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by
the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and
further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no
reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro
"would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party."
Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which
could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that
their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all
times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should
not be allowed to happen in our country, "although the process has already begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as
disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained that, he deleted this
paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only
because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference;
it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared
on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision
"many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all
matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is
truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering
that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial
sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he
paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of
intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government
officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against
respondent MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing
authority and a favored party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial
ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a
sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or
indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or
principals, including the President", should also inhibit themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur
made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the
whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received favors
or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner
or their agents or principals, including the president." The absurdity of this posture is at once
apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense
may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit
themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not
certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this
Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this
country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-
well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect
detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's
words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to
repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows:
"By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be
any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces
that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to
support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly
binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering is
that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving
any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance
the ends of justice."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should
seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer
that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice."4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the
defense of his client. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty
and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are
administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as
many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly
subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics."5 As
rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of
his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better
or more appropriately support the judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this,
Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain
conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses
greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the court. It
may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions.
Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are
necessary for the orderly administration of
justice."7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this
Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the
administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper
conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice8 — is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is
guilty of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by
the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false,
ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur."
He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as
"corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges
petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but
from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is the
surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It
is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines
surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language
in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged." 10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the
accused convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused
since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned a
thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in
exchange of a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would
transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor
ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth, protection and stability was given to do the
forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the
court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered
offended parties in this case. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There
should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the
circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case
before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too
has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago
to have included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Correctly did Regala insist — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that he
had not participated in any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did not even
know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. He is exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy.
Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of
the pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should be held exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for
reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been
done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as
follows: "Justices; who may take part. — ... only those members present when any matter is
submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." However, the
provision in its entire thought should be read thus —
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. — All matters submitted to the court for its
consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration
and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of
the court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and
adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not present at the date of
submission; however, only those members present when any matter is submitted
for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if the parties or
either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the
date of
submission. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the
portion left out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22
of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and
fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote."
While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate
deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that
qualification was intentionally omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the
United States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still
trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements
were injected. More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the
graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the
World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid
and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more
than fifty million dollars annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A
notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross
inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a
decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And
yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a
change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the
contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has
read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at
the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached
to pleadings contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration.
He cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty
of contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth
motion for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair
appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago
who convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof
and the background of the case. Caling says that if not for his friendship with Santiago, he would not
have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that Santiago began to read the fourth
motion for reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not
forget, too, that according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with
Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the
fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not
resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his
client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of
Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to
prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly
with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a
client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics
meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break
faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a
court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think,
is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this Court had
really no alternative but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our
decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the
invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid
bonds will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been
submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say
that a bid unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any
consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if
the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of
this case, the result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of
contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds
Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M.
Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton
F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever
action he may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such
action as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L.
Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records
of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.
G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and
acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for Reconsideration dated
October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M. Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam
Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988. We have reviewed once more the Court's extended
per curiam Resolution, in the light of the argument adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but
must conclude that we find no sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings embodied in
that Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations and references to
foreign texts which, however, whatever else they may depict, do not reflect the law in this
jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the conclusions
reached in the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of the "Ten (10) Legal Points
for Reconsideration," made in the Motion for Reconsideration.
1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this Court "to charge respondent
[with] indirect contempt and convict him of direct contempt."
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent Gonzalez is guilty both
of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member
of the bar." The Court did not use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct
contempt," though we are aware that courts in the United States have sometimes used that phrase
in speaking of "direct contempts' as "contempts in the face of the courts." Rather, the court sought
to convey that it regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which were made both in a
pleading filed before the Court and in statements given to the media) and the misconduct of
respondent Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a frontal
assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the entire judicial system. What the
Court would stress is that it required respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to explain
"why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative
sanctions" and in respect of which, respondent was heard and given the most ample opportunity to
present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted to present for the consideration of
this Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment upon the respondent which it could
have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider
respondent's acts as constituting "direct contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for this Court to charge
respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of the Revised Rules of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court pointing
out that:
[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the
Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court such reference to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of
Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before
the Supreme Court.
The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for referral of this
case either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines under Rule 139 (b).
Otherwise, there would have been no need to refer to Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point
out that under the old rule, Rule 139, referral to the Solicitor General was similarly not an exclusive
procedure and was not the only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is well to recall that
under Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the removal or
suspension of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or (2) upon the
complaint under oath of another in writing" (Parentheses supplied). The procedure described in
Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is the procedure provided for suspension or disbarment proceedings
initiated upon sworn complaint of another person, rather than a procedure required for proceedings
initiated by the Supreme Court on its own motion. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would
initiate motu proprio proceedings for which it did not find probable cause to proceed against an
attorney. Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which referral is made "for
investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of the
respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated against the respondent. The
Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a particular case, further
factual investigation is needed. In the present case, as pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of
the Court (page 18), there was "no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it
[was] not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain
statements attributed to him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to
present his defense: his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that
those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his
freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic
policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for Reconsideration is from a
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United State. 1 It may be pointed out that the
majority in Green v. United States, through Mr. Justice Harlan, held, among other things, that:
Federal courts do not lack power to impose sentences in excess of one year for criminal contempt;
that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right; nor does the
(US) Constitution require that contempt subject to prison terms of more than one year be based on
grand jury indictments.
In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:

Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or less dubious manuscripts of the
Fourteenth Century, what is indisputable is that from the foundation of the United States the
constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt without the intervention of a jury has not
been doubted. The First Judiciary Act conferred such a power on the federal courts in the very act of
their establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of the Judiciary Committee of eight that reported the bill to
the Senate, five member including the chairman, Senator, later to be Chief Justice, Ellsworth, had
been delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Oliver Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson,
Caleb Strong, Ricard Basett, William Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First Congress itself no less
than nineteen member including Madison who contemporaneously introduced the Bill of Rights,
had been delegates to the Convention. And when an abuse under this power manifested itself, and
led Congress to define more explicitly the summary power vested in the courts, it did not remotely
deny the existence of the power but merely defined the conditions for its exercise more clearly, in
an Act "declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat 487.
xxx xxxxxx
Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this Court throughout its existence . In
at least two score cases in this Court, not to mention the vast mass of decisions in the lower federal
courts, the power to punish summarily has been accepted without question. ... 2
To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at best. The judge
who finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for contempt does so not really to
avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person; rather he upholds and vindicates the authority,
dignity and integrity of the judicial institution and its claim to respectful behaviour on the part of all
persons who appears before it, and most especially from those who are officers of the court.
3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible
tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt
charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was, more modestly,
simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety
of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a magic incantation
which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the
legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the
moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present
danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of
speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been
recognized and applied by courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 3 this Court, speaking through
Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil
liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that
press for recognition."
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another
criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such
vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test"
(Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle "requires a
court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation (Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis Supplied) 4
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," we believe that
the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a
manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This
conclusion was implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out
that the "substantive evil" which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in
the instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of
public order. 5 What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a
"substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case
but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and
the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and
officers of the courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a
threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its
implications for society.
4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to hold that intent is
irrelevant in charges of misconduct." What the Court actually said on this point was:
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He
will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. It is,
upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that the respondent offered no apology in his two
(2) explanations and exhibited no repentance (Resolution, p. 7; footnotes omitted).
The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities (understood as
pyschological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the processes of this Court.
Human intent can only be shown derivatively and implied from an examination of acts and
statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was that respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack
and denigrate the Court, cannot prevail over the plain import of what he did say and do. Respondent
cannot negate the clear import of his acts and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state
of mind incompatible with those acts or statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one
accused of homicide cannot successfully deny his criminal intent by simply asserting that while he
may have inserted a knife between the victim's ribs, he actually acted from high motives and kind
feelings for the latter.
5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to punish
respondent for contempt of court for out of court publications."
Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern trends in the
United Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law of contempt. We are, however, unable
to regard the texts that he cites as binding or persuasive in our jurisdiction. The Court went to some
length to document the state of our case law on this matter in its per curiam Resolution. There is
nothing in the circumstances of this case that would suggest to this Court that that case law, which
has been followed for at least half a century or so, ought to be reversed.
6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of indefinite suspension from
the practice of law constitutes "cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment". The Court finds it difficult
to consider this a substantial constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of the respondent's
suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the effect of placing, as it were,
the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has
the effect of giving respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt
and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly
demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The
denial is FINAL.
The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, dated October 25, 1988 and the
Supplemental Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent.
FIRST DIVISION
[ A. C. No. 2339, February 24, 1984 ]
JOSE M. CASTILLO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
PLANA, J.:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
the use of insulting language in the course of judicial proceedings.
As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings of the parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in
Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan.
Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while
complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo". When
complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter looking at him (complainant) menacingly.
Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many people, complainant was unable to proceed
with his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant,
claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to
inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of making
an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent was:
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment was
because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation called up this representation at his
house and crying over the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and
immediately, this representation like any good husband would do in the defense of his wife
immediately went to the school and confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a
yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this representation and if yes, right then and there I
would sock his face."
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f).) The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise
exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel. (Canon 17)
Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark
"bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt
complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he
exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate
language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the
legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that
respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has
previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be
more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil
Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)
The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondent's actuation was triggered by
complainant's own manifest hostility and provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely
free from blame when respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of improper words.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe
proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO,
respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido
and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer by
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order.[1]
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of
respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from
each other. They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James
Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are in complainants custody. Complainant
filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122,
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to
the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of Appeals and
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et
al.
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence in Tanjay
City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to
him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals
which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody.[2] Complainant called up her
lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody
filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of
Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely
and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something
amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC
Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and
demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take
them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau
of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding
policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be clarified and
settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a
statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate
courts resolution/order.[3] In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the children
to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay
City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes
and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at the
hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant
rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the
morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a
verified petition[4] for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the
children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the meantime, complainant
verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002[5]
from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody
of their children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear.
Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorneys oath
by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in and outside a court
of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme
Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that
another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment.[6] On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the Commission with the
modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his
reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court
of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the
fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the
Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two
occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case
No. 3898,[7] which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he
sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his
minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is
presumed to have participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be
intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be
devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with
due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients
cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.[8] Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility
states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert
as a fact that which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing
complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but
respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.[9] The
lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel
and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another.[10] By
calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly
measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that
the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years,
which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar
and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3923. March 30, 1993.
CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL; VIOLATION OF OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN OR
MONEY OR MALICE; SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM PRACTICE OF LAW FOR GROSS ABUSE OF
RIGHT OF RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT MERIT.
— The cause of the respondent's client is obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this
fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that
was consistently denied, as he should have expected . . . By grossly abusing his right of recourse to
the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining
the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just
and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath
not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession
and has proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court . . . For
this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned,
not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be
influenced by his example. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of
law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership of the
Philippine bar.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM, p:
In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6, 1992, Concordia B. Garcia seeks the
disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L. Francisco.
On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa
and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years
beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Lee refused to vacate after
the expiration of the lease. Lee claimed that he had an option to extend the lease for another 5
years and the right of pre-emption over the property.
In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco,
commenced various suits before different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and
that all these proceedings were decided against Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the said lease
contract and involved the same issues and parties, thus violating the proscription against forum-
shopping.
Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of his client's right only such remedies
as were authorized by law.
The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is narrated as follows:

1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed a complaint against Garcia and the other
lessors for specific performance and reconveyance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2118. On June 9, 1989, Garcia filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action, laches and prescription.
The case was dismissed by Judge Felimon Mendoza on August 10, 1989.
2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Lee in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1455.
Through Francisco, Lee filed an answer alleging as special and affirmative defense the pendency of
Civil Case no. Q-89-2118 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 5, 1989, Judge
Marcelino Bautista issued a resolution rejecting this allegation on the ground that the issues before
the two courts were separate and different.
3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista,
Garcia and the other lessors. This was docketed as civil Case No. Q-89-3833. In filing this petition,
Francisco knew or should have known that it violated the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting
the filing of petitions for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued
by the court.
Francisco claims that what he appealed to the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was
the denial of his prayer for dismissal of Civil Case No. 1455. This is not true. Civil Case Q-89-3833 was
clearly a special civil action and not an appeal.
On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera issued an order enjoining Judge Bautista from
proceeding with the trial of the unlawful detainer case. Upon motion of the complainant, however,
the injunction was set aside and Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was dismissed on January 9, 1990. Lee did
not appeal.
4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon,
Garcia and the other lessors. Docketed as CA G.R. Sp No. 20476, the petition assailed the January 9,
1990 order of Judge Vera dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-3833. On May 31, 1989, the petition was
denied.
5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no. 1455 in favor of complainant Garcia
and the other lessors. Lee did not appeal. Instead, on, June 21, 1990, through Francisco again, he
filed a petition against Judge Singzon and the other lessors for certiorari and annulment of the
decision in Civil Case No. 1455 and damages with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. This
was docketed as Civil case No. 90-5852 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98,
presided by Judge Cesar C. Paralejo.
In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 is an appeal from the
unlawful detainer case. Again, he lies. Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 was a specified civil action and not
an appeal.
On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July
13, 1990, Judge Paralejo issued an order enjoining Judge Singzon from enforcing the decision in that
case. Garcia attacked this order in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction docketed as CA Sp. No. 22392. The petition was granted by the Court of
Appeals on September 19, 1991, on the ground that the judgment in the unlawful detainer case had
come final and executory as June 30, 1990.
6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion for execution in the unlawful detainer case.
On September 27, 1991, Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer
the hearing of the motion. A writ of execution was nonetheless issued by Judge Singzon on October
8, 1991.
7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals, Judge
Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors. This Court denied the petition on January 27, 1992, and
reconsideration on April 8, 1992.
8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
against Judge Singzon, Garcia and the other lessors in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to set
aside and declare the writs of execution in Civil Case No. 1455. This was dismissed on August 4,
1992, and Lee, through Francisco, filed a motion for reconsideration. According to Francisco, he was
relieved as counsel while this motion was pending.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice.
The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this
fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that
was consistently denied, as he should have expected. He thereby added to the already clogged
dockets of the courts and wasted their valuable time. He also caused much inconvenience and
expense to the complainant, who was obliged to defend herself against his every move.
By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had
been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such
actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice,
he has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of trust
reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.
Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2, 1956. Considering his age and
experience in the practice of the laws, he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use
it as an instrument for harassment of the complainant and the misuse of judicial processes. For this
serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not
only as punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be
influenced by his example.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the
enjoyment of all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.
Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately on the respondent and circularized to all courts
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6198 September 15, 2006
RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's Service is before us on a charge of
unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case No. Q-
99-38778.1
Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a
doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers for
whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19, 2002 hearing of the
case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed
before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the case against
him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired and he is now
receiving pension.2 (emphasis supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of
clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing and
"file the appropriate pleading."3 Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such pleading or
anything else to substantiate his averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.4 The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with
"misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice,"5 was
referred to a commissioner6 for investigation. Complainant swore before the investigating
commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits.7 Atty.
Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to present evidence and explain his side,
admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement.8 Later he explained in his
memorandum that his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms
without going to trial"9 and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath.10 He pointed out, in addition, that his false
statement (or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on the continuance of the case
and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.11
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and recommendation
finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility12 and recommending that he be "suspended from the
government military service as legal officer for a period of three months."13 This was adopted and
approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August 30, 2003.14

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court,
participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth
and honor.15 The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the
truth and to act honestly should not become a common reality.16 To this end, Canon 10 and Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty.
Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the
lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10 and
Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead
the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."17
Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to
acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this administrative
case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing wrong in the
hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even after having admitted that he
had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather than express
remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade
responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the information of Judge
Daway but only as "a sort of question" to complainant regarding a "pending proposal" to settle the
case.18
The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness,19 cannot
absolve him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain
facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a
presumption of good faith20 which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as
an indication of mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was "to settle the
case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial,"21 perhaps it is not unreasonable to
assume that what he really meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation as a
gambit to get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it
would have been no justification for speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a
lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any
circumstances for counsel to state as a fact that which is not true. A lawyer's duty to the court to
employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor22 forbids recourse to such a tactic.
Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept as true his avowed
objective of getting the parties to settle the case amicably, we must call him to account for resorting
to falsehood as a means to that end.
Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in
part declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice x x x.
The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice of
law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension
from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to
determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal
officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach
of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate
General's Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow
as a consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for us to
impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the purpose of
this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's recommendation as one for
suspension from the practice of law.
At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation on the duration of Atty.
Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability
somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the investigation,
the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second, the absence of
material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance.23 And finally,
since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled to some measure of forbearance.24
Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us
that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away
from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that
an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO
MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP Judge Advocate General's Service.
SO ORDERED.
Per Rec. Nos. 3527, 3408 August 23, 1935
JUSTA MONTEREY, complainant,
vs.
EUSTAQUIO V. ARAYATA and TERESO MA. MONTOYA, respondents.
Eustaquio V. Arayata in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.
IMPERIAL, J.:
It is alleged in the charges filed against Attorney Eustaquio V. Arayata (1) that on August 27, 1931,
while practicing his profession, he prepared and drew up in his favor a deed of sale of the land
described in transfer certificate of title No. 7591, for the sum of P4,000, stating therein that the
person who executed the document and sold the land to him was his father, Arcadio Arayata, when
he knew positively that this alleged vendor had already died on November 5, 1916; that knowing the
document to be fictitious, he appeared before notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya and made the
latter legalize said document and state that Arcadio Arayata personally appeared before him,
although said fact was not true; and he later succeeded in having the register of deeds cancel the
transfer certificate of title issued to Arcadio Arayata and issue transfer certificate of title No. 8370 in
his favor; and (2) that on June 5, 1933, being legally married to Aurora L. Saguil, he filed an
application to marry Engracia F. Ortega, stating therein under oath that he was single when in fact
he was married, said marriage not having been dissolved.
The charge filed against attorney and notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya consists in having ratified
the deed of sale and having stated that Arcadio Arayata personally appeared before him and
confirmed the sale, knowing fully well that said person is already dead and therefore could do
neither the one nor the other.
The investigation was finally conducted by the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Cavite, who recommended that a disciplinary action be taken against Arayata and that Montoya be
exonerated, it having been clearly established that the latter, in ratifying the document, acted in
good faith and relied on Arayata's assurance that the old man then with him was really the vendor
Arcadio Arayata who ratified all the contents of the instrument. We concur in the appreciation of
the facts and we are of the opinion that said notary public and attorney should really be exonerated
and held innocent.
The established facts show that the respondent Arayata is the son of Arcadio Arayata who died on
November 5, 1916, leaving a widow and five children; that Arcadio Arayata in life, purchased from
the Bureau of Lands lot No. 3448 of the Hacienda de Santa Cruz de Malabon, for which transfer
certificate of title No. 7591 was issued to him; that on August 27, 1931, many years after Arcadio
Arayata's death, the respondent attorney prepared the deed, Exhibit A, stating therein that his
father sold the land in question to him for the sum of P4,000; that after affixing the names of the
alleged vendor and the two witnesses, the respondent brought an old man and the two witnesses
before notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya and requested the latter to ratify said document, assuring
him that the old man was the grantor and vendor and the other two were the instrumental
witnesses thereto; that the notary honestly believing said information, legalized and registered the
document after verifying from the old man that he ratified the contents thereof; that the transfer
was invalid and the document not genuine because another, not Arcadio Arayata, signed it; that the
respondent later applied for and obtained transfer certificate of title No. 8370 of said land from the
registry of deeds of Cavite after the former title was cancelled; that sometime later, or on April 11,
1933, the respondent sold a portion of said land having an area of two and one-half (2 ½) hectares
to Sinforosa Torres, married to Basilio Sorosoro, for the sum of P500.
With regard to the second charge, it likewise appears established that on June 5, 1933, the
respondent, being legally married to Aurora L. Saguil and said marriage not having been dissolved,
signed under oath an application to marry Engracia F. Ortega stating therein that he was single, he
being in fact married; the application was registered and duly considered and on September 25,
1933, the register of the Province of Cavite issued the corresponding license upon payment by the
respondent of the sum of P2; for some unknown reasons the marriage applied for was not
solemnized; the respondent's wife, nevertheless, filed a complaint for bigamy against the former,
which is now pending in the justice of the peace court of Santa Rosa, Laguna, for which reason the
investigator is of the opinion, and so recommends, that no action should be taken on the second
charge. The recommendation is well founded and has our approval.
In his first answer, respondent Arayata admitted that the sale had been made by his father who was
his true predecessor in interest, but alleged that nobody, including the complainant, could complain
of the transfer because none was prejudiced, he being the true and only heir. In his second answer,
however, and in the course of the investigation, he set up another defense alleging that the person
who had really sold him the land was his uncle Januario Arayata who, in the deed and relative to the
land, assumed the name of Arcadio Arayata. He further alleged that it was his said uncle who signed
the deed of transfer and ratified it before notary Montoya. We find this second new defense
improbable and unestablished.
The acts committed by the respondent Arayata relative to the deed of sale Exhibit A, and his
statements to notary Montoya with regard to said document, constitute malpractice and
unprofessional conduct under the provisions of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, meriting
for him a disciplinary action mitigated in this case by the circumstance that he was apparently the
heir entitled to the ownership of the land and that the complainant has neither real nor direct
interest in the transaction complained of by her.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold Attorney Eustaquio V. Arayata guilty of malpractice and suspend
him from the practice of his profession for one (1) month, hereby reprimanding him for having
prepared and executed the deed of sale in question. So ordered.
A.C. No. 716 January 30, 1969
EDUARDO J. BERENGUER, complainant,
vs.
PEDRO B. CARRANZA, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The law is an exacting taskmaster. Membership in the bar, as so appropriately put, is a privilege
burdened with conditions. 1 A lawyer is called upon by virtue of his oath of office to "do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; ... [and to] conduct (himself) as a lawyer
according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity ... to the courts ..." 2
The question, one that has an element of novelty, is whether respondent Pedro B. Carranza, duly
admitted to the practice of the law, did get entangled in the complexity of the strands in the web of
obligation such an oath imposes? More specifically, did he manifest the utmost fealty to the trust
reposed in him as an officer of the Court by taking all necessary measures to avoid the court being
misled, even if such were the result not of design but of inadvertence?
A complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza was filed on July 15, 1966, for deception
practiced on the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, in that aware of the falsity of an Affidavit of
Adjudication and Transfer executed by the mother of his client to the effect that her own mother
left no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs except herself, when, as a matter of
fact, the deceased was survived by four other daughters and one son, father of the complainant, he
introduced the same in evidence. 3
Respondent Carranza was required in our resolution of July 22, 1966, to file an answer. Thereafter,
on August 17, 1966, he did so, alleging as the truth of the matter that the aforesaid Affidavit of
Adjudication and Transfer was introduced in evidence only to prove the fact of such transfer of the
property in question to his client, respondent having "no hand in the making of said affidavit nor of
the petition, both of which were prepared in Pasay City." 4
On September 1, 1966, the matter was referred by us to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. Such investigation was had wherein both complainant and respondent
were duly heard. The issue in the opinion of the then Solicitor General, the Honorable Antonio
Barredo, now a member of this Court, as set forth in his report of March 18, 1968, is whether
respondent "consented in violation of his oath, to the doing of any falsehood in court."
It was admitted in said report: "If respondent had anything to do with the preparation of the
Petition or of the Affidavit of Adjudication, his participation does not appear from the evidence
presented in this case. The Petition was subscribed and sworn to in Pasay City before one Atty. A.
Mendoza, while the Affidavit was subscribed under oath in Pasay before Notary Public Ernesto V.
Ventura. The foregoing documents were posted from Pasay to the Clerk of Court, Sorsogon...." 5
It was likewise noted that respondent testified as to his being "not "very meticulous about the
petition" because there was neither private nor government opposition thereto; that if he had
intended to deceive the court by virtue of the documents, he could have told his client to answer his
questions at the cadastral hearing to conform to the controverted paragraph in the Affidavit of
Adjudication concerning the statement reproduced from the tax declaration that the decedent left
no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs except the affiant...." 6
There is this admission in the aforesaid report. Thus: "As the evidence stands, there is no apparent
causal link between the falsehood and the fact that respondent is the lawyer handling the cadastral
case at the Sorsogon end." 7 Nonetheless, while recognizing the absence of evidence that such
falsehood in the Affidavit of Adjudication could be traced to respondent, the report would hold him
liable for discretionary action as the circumstance that various estates are involved "certainly
warranted a greater exercise of diligence on respondent's part." 8
Moreover, as likewise stated therein, the fact "that he did not even bother to read the entirety of
the affidavit runs counter to respondent's inescapable duty to clear up doubts and inconsistencies."
9 For he could have been aware of the family litigations between his client and complainant which
are rooted in successional rights...." 10 If only for the above fact then, as stated in the report, "he
should precisely have taken the bother to read the entirety of the Affidavit of Adjudication when the
cadastral case was heard on January 17, 1966...." 11
From which, in the light of the above, it was the conclusion of the then Solicitor General Antonio
Barredo, assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Frine Zaballero: "If he did not, he cannot be relieved
from the consequences of his acts as a lawyer, and disclaim responsibility therefor. To allow
respondent relief from his duty is to ignore what is obvious from the nature of the litigations in
which he entered his appearance.... Actually, respondent's failure to read the affidavit proves that
he did not properly inform himself of the evidence he was going to present in court, thereby
exhibiting an indifference to proof inconsistent with facts he definitely knows. Thus, respondent has
contributed to confusion and the prolongation of the cadastral suit, which pends as a petition for
Relief...." 12
It was the recommendation that the corresponding complaint for the violation of his oath against
respondent be instituted. Such complaint was filed by the two above officials on March 18, 1968.
Respondent was charged with "violation of his oath of office, [having] caused confusion and
prolongation of the cadastral suit for presenting evidence therein containing a false statement
inconsistent with facts he definitely knows by reason of the family litigations between his client and
complainant herein, which are rooted in successional rights [and that] respondent's failure to
discharge his duties as a lawyer consistent with his oath of office finds sanction in Rule 138, Section
27, Revised Rules of Court." 13
Respondent in his answer, dated May 16, 1968, raised no issue as to the facts. He would allege in
justification however "that while it is true that the ... respondent was the counsel who appeared for
the petitioner in Cadastral Case No. 2, LRC Cadastral Record No. 869 of Sorsogon Cadastre, yet he
had nothing to do with the making of the petition and the annexes thereto attached; for the same
were made in Pasay City and that when (he) accepted to represent the petitioner in the Cadastral
Case mentioned above, there was no opposition from anybody ... not even from the Bureau of Lands
nor from the Honorable Solicitor General, making, therefore, the hearing therein a mere formality.
Such being the case, the [respondent] presented the petitioner's case on January 17, 1966, without
meticulously going over the documents, and the alleged Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer was
presented to show the fact of transfer of the land described therein from the affiant to her son. The
stenographic notes in that proceeding will bear this matter out. [Respondent's] failure to notice the
existence of an incorrect statement in the said affidavit was a mere oversight. It was not [wilful], for
he has not consented to the doing of the falsity therein made, since the same was prepared by
petitioner's lawyer in Pasay City; nor did [respondent] willingly do falsehood in the hearing
mentioned above; ..." 14
There is something unique in this proceeding then. With the finding of the then Solicitor General
Barredo that there was nothing wilful in the conduct pursued by respondent in thus introducing in
evidence the Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer which turned out to be false, in the preparation
of which, however, he had nothing to do, the charge of deliberate deception obviously cannot be
sustained.1awphil.ñêt
Would that of itself entirely exculpate him from any responsibility? The answer must be in the
negative. As was correctly pointed out in the complaint, his failure to exercise greater care did result
in the "confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit." Under the circumstances, it would be to
err on, the side of undue leniency if he would be held blameless. He had incurred liability. His fidelity
to his oath as attorney was less than entire.
Every member of the bar must be on his guard, lest through oversight or inadvertence, the way he
conducts his case or the evidence he presents could conceivably result in a failure of justice. Time
and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and
that while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are
likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned.
Even if there be no intent to deceive, therefore, a lawyer whose conduct, as in this case, betrays
inattention or carelessness should not be allowed to free himself from a charge thereafter instituted
against him by the mere plea that his conduct was not wilful and that he has not consented to the
doing of the falsity.
A lawyer's oath is one impressed with the utmost seriousness; it must not be taken lightly. Every
lawyer must do his best to live up to it. There would be a failure of justice if courts cannot rely on
the submission as well as the representations made by lawyers, insofar as the presentation of
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is concerned. If, as unfortunately happened in this case,
even without any intent on the part of a member of the bar to mislead the court, such deplorable
event did occur, he must not be allowed to escape the responsibility that justly attaches to a
conduct far from impeccable.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro B. Carranza is reprimanded and warned that a repetition of an
offense of this character would be much more severely dealt with. The Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon, through any of the district judges, is hereby directed to administer in public the
reprimand thus imposed on respondent Pedro B. Carranza. The complainant, Eduardo J. Berenguer,
must be duly informed of the date when such reprimand is to be administered.
Note: Case 50 is Garcia vs. Francisco ulit. Exact same case as Case #47, pero ang focus this time is
Rule 10.03 so yun nalang hanapin niyo. 
[G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003]
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
[SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the above-numbered case; it read:
The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his counsel Attorney Alan F.
Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. The Petition prays
1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify
themselves from hearing and deciding this petition;
2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and
3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the members of the
Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan political activity which
proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by
authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation
of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby prejudged a case that
would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court
in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of
justice and due process.
Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed an Omnibus Motion on 19
May 2003, before the Sandiganbayan, asking that the appointment of counsels de officio (sic) be
declared functus officio and that, being the now counsel de parte, he be notified of all subsequent
proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending therein. Finally,
Attorney Paguia asked that all the foregoing criminal cases against his client be dismissed.
During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, petitioner presented to the court
several portions of the book, entitled Reforming the Judiciary, written by Justice Artemio
Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the defense. On 9 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion
pleading, among other things, that
a) x x x President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove the truth of the statements contained
in Justice Artemio Panganibans book, REFORMING THE JUDICIARY, in relation to the prejudgment
committed by the Supreme Court justices against President Estrada in the subject case/s of Estrada
v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108; and,
b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to Justice Artemio Panganiban, Justice
Antonio Carpio, Justice Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes of the Department of National
Defense, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. for them to testify and bring whatever supporting documents they may have in
relation to their direct and indirect participation in the proclamation of Vice President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as cited in the book of Justice Panganiban, including the
material events that led to that proclamation and the ruling/s in the Estrada vs. Arroyo, supra.
(Rollo, pp. 6-7.)
The truth referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the motion of petitioner pertains to what
he claims should have been included in the resolution of the Sandiganbayan; viz:

The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the
acts of Chief Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:
a) going to EDSA 2;
b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground of permanent
disability even without proof of compliance with the corresponding constitutional conditions, e.g.,
written declaration by either the President or majority of his cabinet; and
c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of permanent disability.
It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include these material facts which are
obviously undeniable. Besides, it is the only defense of President Estrada. (Petition, Rollo, pp. 13-14.)
On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as well as the
motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon of
the foregoing order. According to Attorney Paguia, during the hearing of his Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his client. Thus, he averred, Presiding
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language when she
blurted out, Magmumukha naman kaming gago, (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De
Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments
or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant Estradas motion would
result in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged bias and partial attitude of the
Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification.
On 31 July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e., the resolution (Promulgated
on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph Ejercito Estradas Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon (Na tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6, 2003 is
DENIED for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 37.)
and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003, denying petitioners motion for
disqualification of 14 July 2003; viz:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of merit, hereby DENIES the
Motion for Disqualification. (Rollo, p. 48.)
The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in
substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion,
an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On the one hand, petitioner would
disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal and, on the other hand, he
would elevate the petition now before it to challenge the two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He
denounces the decision as being a patent mockery of justice and due process. Attorney Pagula went
on to state that-
The act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office. But the act of the public
officer, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of the justices, if
LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act of the justices, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of
the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being patently
unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the Supreme
Court but is merely the wrong or trespass of those individual Justices who falsely spoke and acted in
the name of the Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would seem
absurd to allow the Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for their UNLAWFUL
act. (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)
Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can
enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil
595.)
The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question pertaining
to the legality of the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the issue on the validity of
the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency, Attorney Paguia is vainly
seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long dead issue.
Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case within the judicial
forum; indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media. Rule
13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from making such
public statements on any pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. By his
acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially
dangerous threat to the administration of justice.
It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar conduct towards the Supreme
Court. In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for
several advisory opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08
July 2003, this Court has strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to
desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members.
But, unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to
persist on end.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Court hereby orders Attorney
Alan Paguia, counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE, within ten days from
notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of
the Court.
On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In a three-
page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political
partisanship against the members of the Court.
Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has tirelessly quoted to give some
semblance of validity for his groundless attack on the Court and its members, provides -
Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid
suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party
funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political
activities.
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term partisan political activities; the law
states:
The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies,
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a
candidate.
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the
election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the
election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory context, relates to acts
designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have filed
certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any
incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official
function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an
event could be no different from their appearance in such other official functions as attending the
Annual State of the Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative
Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against
the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will
not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system,
let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar
conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the
impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in
seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public statements on
a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has
persisted in ignoring the Courts well-meant admonition.

On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say -
What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due process of law? It renders
the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were not
observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief
Justice Davide and his fellow justices had already committed to the other party - GMA - with a
judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as
president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?
Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of
his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to
at all take heed.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law,
effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC
Promulgated:
October 19, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Plagiarism is the act of appropriating the literary composition of another, or parts or passages of his
writings, or the ideas or language of the same, and passing them off as the product of ones own
mind.[1]
Allegations of this intellectual offense were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R.
Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010. In said case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari
filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain officers of the executive department[2] to
espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government for the
abuses committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys. Roque and
Bagares represent the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the
subject of a motion for reconsideration.
The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent
from their article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of
International Law; (2) Christian J. Tams from his book, Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in
International Law published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and (3) Mark Ellis from his
article, Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime published in the Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006. The allegations of plagiarism centered on Justice Del
Castillos discussion of the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes.
On August 9, 2010, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera,
Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea,
Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel,
Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta,
Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix
L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the
faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement on the allegations
of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Courts decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.
Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen,
calls for the resignation of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in
his work.
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact,
but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on how
he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to
those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors
also not only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by directly
accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort
women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this Court on how to go
about the review of the case.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of polluted sources, the Courts alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the
members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect. Paragraph 9 of their
published statement reads,
But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven
years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it
dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided
this case based on polluted sources. By doing so, the Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing
to actually exercise its power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies
(sic) [betrays] a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of decency and
respect. (Emphasis supplied).
The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a
rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to
determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the
decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We made it clear in
the case of In re Kelly[3] that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the
parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the
decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many
types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks.
These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary.[4] The court must insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in
an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice.[5]
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Courts honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the
case on the comfort womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs
contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken
as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.[6] Their actions likewise
constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13[7] and Rules 1.02 and 11.05[8] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[9]
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A.
Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway,
Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad,
Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit,
Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra
Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C.
Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen
Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina
D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law, are directed
to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Resolution, why they should not
be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Further, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt
of this Resolution, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting, through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the
pendency of G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya v. Executive Secretary and of the investigation before the
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, for the consideration of the Court En Banc, a dummy
which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the purported statement, entitled Restoring
Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. Enclosed are copies of the
said dummy and signed statement, respectively, attached to the said letter dated August 10, 2010
and to the Compliance dated August 31, 2010 filed by Roque & Butuyan Law Offices with the
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards.
Let this matter be DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter.
Let service of this Resolution upon the above-named UP College of Law faculty members be effected
by personal delivery.
SO ORDERED.
ANTERO J. POBRE,
Complainant,
- versus -
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 7399
Promulgated:
August 25, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the
Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered
on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards
then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct
contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not
deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she
delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her
speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a
view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be
an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants
that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the
JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her,
would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of
the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. Explaining the import of the
underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose is to
enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
success for it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he
should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense.[1]
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and
arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and
ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of
their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would
be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial
upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges
speculation as to the motives.[2]
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative
body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and
talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the
legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in
committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the
statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.[3] The disciplinary
authority of the assembly[4] and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such
abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.[5]
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could
not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the
Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator
has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent
that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate,
she was quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots.
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in
Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that
they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to
erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule
8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves.
She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional
and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land.
Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other,
is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its
members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.[7] Senator
Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make
on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial
legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting
tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of
personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense,
therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even
parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and
destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.
Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the
individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege
for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting
rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as
an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice.
But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for
the Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,[8] have no official duty to nominate
candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to
understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court
and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar
with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from
the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity,
impartiality and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.[9]
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[10] we reiterated our pronouncement
in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer[11] that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are
bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the duty of a lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. That same canon, as a
corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism
and clamor. And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all
good fidelity x x x to the courts.
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel[12]
that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance
the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the courts, a lawyer should
seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government
and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.[13]
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code.
Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice.
Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.[14]
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as
their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,[15] a good character being an
essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege.
When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct,
the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of
lawyers professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual
practice of their professionwould show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which their license and the law invest in them.[16]
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of law,
has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or
personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of
courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it
in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda,
and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and
threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago
for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court
and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from
doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this
kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to
re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and
remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is
not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible
before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.[18] It is intended to protect
members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the
decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that
enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language against
another Senator or against any public institution.[19] But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary
remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter
to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance.[20] The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate
that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary
proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We
cannot overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the
highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.[21]
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the
statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied
making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech.
Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
REDENTOR S. JARDIN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DEOGRACIAS VILLAR, JR. respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Law is a profession and lawyers are professionals. Implicit in professionalism is a certain level of
competence and dedication. Far from measuring up to the standards of a lawyers conduct set in the
Code of Professional Responsibility which are also the hallmarks of professionalism, the lawyer
charged in this case virtually abandoned his clients cause.
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Redentor S. Jardin against respondent Atty.
Deogracias Villar, Jr., who was his counsel in a case, for the latters failure to formally offer the
documentary exhibits, which failure resulted in the dismissal of the case.
The complainant Redentor S. Jardin is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 21480 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Quezon City. A building contractor, he engaged the services of the respondent to represent
him in the case which is for the collection of the sum of One Hundred Five Thousand Seven Hundred
Forty Four and 80/100 Pesos (P105,744.80), representing the alleged unpaid contract price for the
repair of the house of the defendants in the case.[1] The case went its course, but later despite
several extensions of time given by the trial court, the respondent failed to file his formal offer of
exhibits.[2] Consequently, on May 7, 2001, the trial court issued an Order the full text of which reads
as follows:
When this case was called for continuation of hearing, Atty. Rodrigo C. Reyes, counsel for the
defendants manifested that up to this date, Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel for the plaintiff has not formally
offer (sic) the documentary exhibits for the plaintiff in writing as Order (sic) by the Court.
Records show that on February 26, 2001, Atty. Villar, Jr. was given an extension period of TEN (10)
days within which to formally offer the documentary exhibits in writing copy furnished Atty. Reyes,
counsel for the defendants who was given a period of Five (5) days within which to comment and/or
oppose the admissibility of the said exhibits and set the continuation of the hearing of this case for
the presentation of evidence for the defendant on March 30, 2001.
On March 30, 2001, when this case was called for hearing records show that Atty. Villar, Jr., counsel
for the plaintiff has not complied yet with the formal offer of documentary exhibits for the plaintiff
and again, in the interest of justice, the Court give (sic) Atty. Villar, Jr. another period of TEN (10)
days within which to formally offer the documentary exhibits in writing and set the continuation of
the hearing of this case for today for the presentation of evidence for the defendant.
Records show however, that on this date, the said counsel for the plaintiff have (sic) not complied
with the submission of documentary exhibits for the plaintiff. For lack of interest on the part of the
counsel for the plaintiff to further prosecute this case, upon motion of Atty. Reyes the oral
testimonial evidence submitted by the plaintiff is hereby ordered WITHDRAWN from the records
and upon further motion of ordered WITHDRAWN from the records and upon further motion of
Atty. Reyes, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of interest on the part of the plaintiff to
further prosecute this case.
Upon motion of Atty. Reyes, set the continuation of the hearing of this case for the presentation of
evidence on the counter claim on the part of the defendant on June 15, 2001 at 8:30 oclock in the
morning.[3]
The dismissal of the collection case prompted the complainant to file a verified Affidavit-
Complaint[4] dated July 4, 2001 for the disbarment of the respondent with this Court, wherein he
also alleged the developments which transpired after the dismissal of the case, viz: that he already
terminated the services of the respondent as his counsel; that the respondent failed to return the
originals of the documentary exhibits entrusted to him; and that the respondent finally handed over
the documents only as an aftermath of a heated argument he had with the complainants wife.
In a Resolution[5] dated September 10, 2001, this Court required the respondent to comment on
the complaint against him. However, the respondent failed to file his comment despite two (2)
extensions of time granted to him. Thus, the Court resolved to dispense with the filing of the
respondents comment and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[6]
Similarly, the respondent failed to file his answer as required by the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the IBP.[7] Hence, the averments made, as well as the evidence submitted by the complainant, are
undisputed.
Investigating Commissioner Attorney Milagros V. San Juan, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, found
the respondent liable for negligence and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, with the warning that a similar conduct in the future will be dealt with
more severely. The salient portions of the Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2003 of the
Investigating Commissioner are as follows:
Complainants contention that respondent Villar failed to file plaintiffs Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence is substantiated by the Orders dated 26 February 2001, 30 March 2001 and 7 May 2001
(Annexes 7, 9 and 10 respectively). The Order dated 7 May 2001 (Annex 10 of complainants
Affidavit) reads:
....
It is clear from the above-quoted Order that it was the failure of respondent Villar to file the Formal
Offer of Documentary Exhibits which led to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 21480 to the prejudice of
respondents client, herein complainant. Respondent Villar has failed to offer any explanation for his
failure to file the Formal Offer of Exhibits within the several extensions of time given him by the trial
court to do so. There is no doubt that it was part of respondents obligation to complainant as the
latters counsel of record in Civil Case No. 21480, to file said Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits,
and respondents dereliction of this duty has prejudiced the interests of respondents client. In
accepting Civil Case No. 21480, it was respondents obligation to take all measures to protect the
interests of his client in accordance with Canon (sic) 18 & 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility but it was respondents negligence or omission which has caused damage to such
interests.[8]
In its Resolution dated April 26, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We are also in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
At the outset, we find particularly glaring the respondents disregard of the resolution of this Court
directing him to file his comment on the complaint. He exhibited a similar attitude in failing to file
his answer when required by the Commission on Bar Discipline. The repeated cavalier conduct belies
impudence and lack of respect for the authority of this Court.
The record clearly shows that the respondent has been languid in the performance of his duties as
counsel for the complainant. He was given by the trial court several extensions of time: first, an
extension of ten (10) days from February 26, 2001 or until March 8, 2001, and; second, another
extension of ten (10) days from March 30, 2001, when the case was called for hearing and the court
noted that no such formal offer had been filed then, or until April 9, 2001. It must also be
emphasized that there was an interim period of twenty two (22) days between March 8, 2001 and
March 30, 2001, and another interval of twenty-seven (27) days from April 9, 2001 until May 7, 2001
when the Order dismissing the case was issued. Effectively, therefore, respondent had three (3)
months and nine (9) days within which to file the formal offer of exhibits.[9] The respondent did not
bother to give an explanation even in mitigation or extenuation of his inaction.
Manifestly, the respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every
member of the Bar. The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE
SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
....
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to
do so.
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
....
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
....
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHAL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
It is indeed dismaying to note the respondents patent violation of his duty as a lawyer. He
committed a serious transgression when he failed to exert his utmost learning and ability and to give
entire devotion to his clients cause. His client had relied on him to file the formal offer of exhibits
among other things. But he failed him. Resulting as it did in the dismissal of the case, his failure
constitutes inexcusable default. It therefore behooves the Court to take action on the respondents
mortal infraction, which caused undeserved and needless prejudice to his clients interest, adversely
affected the confidence of the community in the legal profession and eroded the publics trust in the
judicial system. As an attorney, the respondent is sworn to do his level best and to observe full
fidelity to the courts and his clients.[10] This means that in relation to his duty to his clients he
should put his maximum skills and full commitment to bear in representation of their causes.
We can only echo our pronouncements in Basas v. Icawat,[11] to wit:
Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation of Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 provides:
"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."
As we reiterated in Aromin, et al. v. Boncavil, A. C. No. 5135, September 22, 1999:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to
the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that
is authorized by the law of the land he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of
his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of
the community to the legal profession.[12]
This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients
requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession,
the courts and the public.[13] Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill
and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free.[14]
Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a
lackadaisical fashion. A lawyers lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional
and unethical.
The IBP recommended the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months. We find the recommended penalty commensurate with the offense committed.
In Aromin v. Boncavil,[15] this Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months for his failure to file a
written offer of evidence despite the trial courts directive.
The failure to file formal offer of evidence is in pari materia with failure to file brief, which as this
Court held in Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon[16] constitutes inexcusable negligence.
In the Saquilabon case, the respondent lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months. The Court likewise imposed the same penalty upon the respondents in the cases
of In Re: Atty. David Briones,[17] Spouses Galen v. Paguinigan,[18] Spouses Rabanal v. Rabanal[19]
for their failure to file the briefs of their respective clients.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months effective upon finality hereof, with the WARNING that the
repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar,
and copies furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123698 August 5, 1998
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE SEELIN, respondents.
MARTINEZ, A.M., J.:
This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation has come to this
Court assailing the execution of the judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-9297. Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner,
considering that the issues raised in this second petition for review are but mere reiterations of
previously settled issues which have already attained finality. We now write finis to this controversy
which has dragged on for seventeen (17) years, for as we ruled in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC,
Br. 15, Ozamis City: 1
. . . litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a
mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against
any scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it. Public policy and sound practice demand that at
the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some
definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium.
The facts:
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla
Seelin filed a complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity)
for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942)
issued in the name of said corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City.
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment, 2 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and void.
Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as to costs.
The aforesaid decision was affirmed 3 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on
June 25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said
dismissal became final on March 5, 1992. 4
The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents moved for execution
which was granted by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the decision was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ
of Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court;
that it is completely unaware of the suit between private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is
the true and registered owner of the lot having bought the same from Central Dyeing; and that it
was a buyer in good faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents' motion. Another Order was issued on
August 18, 1992 by the trial court holding that the judgment was binding on petitioner, being the
successor-in-interest of defendant Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court
of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which read:
We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no compelling reason to disturb the same.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered
therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be
included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit
may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the
transferee 5
The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals on February 18, 1993. 6
On further appeal to this Court, petitioner's petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
109076, was denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. 7 Upon finality of said resolution, this
Court issued Entry of Judgment dated October 21, 1993. 8
Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a second writ of execution
before the trial court which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.
Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioner's motion was initially granted 9
on August 29, 1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private
respondents, the said order was reconsidered on December 19, 1994 10 by Judge Emilio L. Leachon,
Jr., who succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued.
Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for
certiorari 11 with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591), arguing inter
alia: that the judgment cannot be executed against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-
9297; that the decision of the trial court in said case never mandated Central Dyeing to deliver
possession of the property to the private respondents; that certain facts and circumstances which
occurred after the finality of the judgment will render the execution highly unjust, illegal and
inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers' freedom of
religion and worship; and that private respondents' title is being questioned in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered judgment 12 dismissing the petition for
certiorari on the ground that the lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final
and executory. It ruled, thus:
This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent Court's decision in Civil Case No.
9297 had long become final and executory. The respondent court's writs of execution and
possession could have been implemented a long time ago if not for the series of legal maneuvers of
petitioner Eternal Gardens. . . . Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop the execution of a
final judgment by raising issues which actually have been ruled upon by this Court in its earlier case
with Us in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a mere continuation of
petitioner's dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs, although prevailing party, will not benefit at all from a
final judgment in their favor. Thus, the instant petition is obviously, frivolous and dilatory warranting
the assessment of double costs of this suit against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of
Court).
Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, the instant petition has
already become moot and academic as the property in question was already turned over by the
Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs of execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus,
hopefully, putting the legal battle of this case to rest. (Emphasis ours.)
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January 30, 1996. 13
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention reiterating in essence the same line of
arguments espoused in their petition before the respondent Court of Appeals.
The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the
parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to
the controversy litigated come to an end.
Petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one hundred (100) memorial lot
owners to surrender and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the ground that they
were never parties to the case between private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been
resolved by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797 when it ruled.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation, defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered
therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be
included or impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit
may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the
transferee. 14
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 109076 and attained finality on
October 21, 1993. There is, therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue here.
Further, petitioner's contention that a determination of the issue of possession should first be
resolved before the issuance of a writ of possession is untenable.
Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect
or consequence of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the
property. As correctly argued by the private respondents, they do not have to institute another
action for the purpose of taking possession of the subject realty.
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and circumstances transpired after the finality of
judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297 which will reader the execution of the said judgment unjust and
illegal. It points to the pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City filed by the Republic of the Philippines against private respondents for nullification of
22 titles which include the title to the subject property. Petitioner argues that the pendency of the
said case provides a reasonable justification why execution of the aforesaid judgment and delivery
of possession of the subject property should be permanently stayed or at least held in abeyance
until after the final resolution of the case.
We do not agree.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private
respondents will not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-
9297. This is so because the petitioner's title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942)
was already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and which judgment had long been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote possibility, the trial
court will nullify the said private respondents' title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by petitioner,
the supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the rightful
owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition was instituted merely to delay the execution
of the judgment.
Finally, petitioner's fear that the grave lots will be disturbed, desecrated and destroyed once the
execution of the judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of the Orders of the trial
court with regard to the execution of the judgment reveals that the interests of said burial lot
owners have been taken into account by the trial court when it took steps and made suggestions as
to how their rights could be amply protected. In its Order dated February 13, 1995, the trial court,
through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated:
The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not completely without recourse or remedy because
they can still go after the original party-defendant or transferor of the property in question which is
Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. And
should it be difficult or nay impossible for plaintiff-respondents to be placed in possession of the
subject property, due to defendant-petitioners' arguments that the same have already been sold to
burial lot buyers, then it should be incumbent for the defendant-petitioners to negotiate with the
plaintiff-respondents for payment in cash of the property subject of their complaint to avoid
demolition or desecration since they benefited from the sale of the burial lots. 15
In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive was given, to wit:
The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to the plaintiffs and as proposed by the
plaintiffs, they are given authority to destroy a small portion of the fence so that they can have
access to the property. But as to the demolition of the burial lots, negotiation could be made by the
defendant with the former owner so that cash payment or cash settlement be made. 16
Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the
following limitation on the writ of execution, as follows:
Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas within the Eternal Gardens have been sold
to so many persons who now have buried their beloved ones in the grave lots adjoining the lot in
question, it is therefore, in the interest of justice and equity, that the enforcement of the writ of
possession and break open order should be applied only to the gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park at the eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question where the factory of the defendant
is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace of the resting souls over the graves the parcels of
land within the said memorial park. 17
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17)
years to the prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted
execution, interment on the disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time this case is
finally terminated, the whole lot shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for
private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice.
We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the
defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to
exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not,
therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede
the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. 20 In Banogan et. al. vs. Cerna, et. al., 21 we
ruled:
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice.
They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the
judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and
the law should advise them when a case such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients
by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue as to the status of the burial lot
owners has been properly addressed.

Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that the
questioned Alias Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated
December 27, 1994 have already been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the "Sheriffs
Return," 18 dated March 31, 1995, with the attached "Turn Over Premises" 19 indicating therein
that private respondents took possession of the subject property.