MACASIANO v DIOKNO: Local roads used for public service are considered public properties of the LGU

but are under the absolute control of Congress. One example of authority given by Congress to the LGUs
to control or regulate the use of public properties is the power to close roads as provided in the Local
Government Code. The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public
property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended/necessary
for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU
concerned and only then can said LGU use the property as an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and
streets available to the public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property
devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to
private persons.

BICERRA vs TENEZA: A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherance to the soil
on which it is built(art 415 par 1). It holds true regardless of the fact that the house is situated on a land
belonging to another. But once it is destroyed/demolished it ceases to exist as such and hence its
character as an immovable likewise ceases.

NAPOCOR vs. Ibrahim: Surface ownership extends to the subsoil. Land classification is indivisible. If the
surface of the land is agricultural, so is the subsoil. If the government encroaches upon the property, it
must pay just compensation and give due notice to the owner of such encroachment.

Berkenhotter v. Cu Unjieng Hijos: Machineries and equipments that are principal and essential to the
industry, without which the industry would not carry on its industrial purpose, are considered real
properties by virtue of their purpose. The machineries in this case were necessary for the sugar central
to function. Thus, when the sugar central was mortgaged to Hijos, it carried with it these machineries.

Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor: The tools and equipment that were used in the repair of the buses
are merely incidental to the industry that was carried out. The machinery and equipment must be
principal and essential to the industry being carried out which is not the case. Also, the business being
carried out is not on a building or a piece of land since their business is transportation. Thus, they are
personal properties and not real properties.

Meneses vs. CA: Laguna de Bay is considered a lake as established by jurisprudence. The land claimed
by Meneses was declared as accretions belonging to Quisimbing Family. Accretions that were gradually
deposited upon land contiguous to lakes by accessions belong to the owner of this land. In this case,
Quisumbing owned the riparian lands, with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary, to which
the nature had gradually deposited the accretion land. Being owners of the riparian lands, they are also
deemed the owners of the disputed lot which was formed by nature as an accretion. The subject lot is
NOT A FORESHORE LAND because its submersion in water is NOT DUE to the flux and reflux of tides
(which characterized foreshore lands) but is due to the rains falling or flowing into Laguna de Bay. It is an
accretion which is not a public land, and is therefore susceptible to private ownership.

Tsai v CA: Mere bolts and nuts are not enough to determine whether the machineries are real or
personal property. We must look on the intention of the parties. The parties may stipulate that the
machineries are personal properties. In this case, the company considered the machineries as personal
properties. since, they are personal properties, they are under the Chattel Mortgage Law. according to
the Chattel Mortgage law : a chattel mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the property described
therein and not like or substituted property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed in the
same depository as the property originally mortgaged, anything in the mortgage to the contrary
notwithstanding." therefore, the machineries which are not included in the mortgage shall not be
included in the auction and cannot be sold to Tsai.

Caltex vs. Central Board of Assessment: The equipment and machinery are part of the gas station and
without them, the gas station would be useless. The equipment and machinery are real properties as
they are principal and essential to the industry being carried out.

Cagampang vs. Morano: By shore, it is understood that space covered and uncovered by the movement
of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest equinoctial tides. Where the
tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side at the line reached by the sea during
ordinary storms and tempests. By Article 420 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shores are declared
property of the public domain. When there is no showing that the tides are due to abnormal conditions,
the land is obviously part of the shore and public property.

MIAA vs. CA: The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties devoted to public use and thus are
properties of public dominion. Properties of public dominion are owned by the State or the Republic.
The term ports x x x constructed by the State includes airports and seaports. The Airport Lands and
Buildings of MIAA are intended for public use, and at the very least intended for public service. Whether
intended for public use or public service, the Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public
dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic
and thus exempt from real estate tax under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code.

Chavez vs. PEA: YES. The 157.84 hectares that have certificate of title in the name of PEA are alienable
lands to Phil. citizens, and not to foreign private corporation. being Amari is composed mostly by
Thailanders. Further, the remaining 592.15 hectares of submerged lands remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable and disposable. The SC said, the amended
JVA is null and void ab initio.

Binalay v. Manalo: Ignacio v. DOL: No. The court held that only the executive and possibly the legislative
departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the
sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, on for
coast-guard service. If no such declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question
forms part of the public domain. Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the
Government, through the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in
question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they
continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership. The
occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretion, without previous
permission from the proper authorities is illegal and is a mere detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside
of the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national domain; it is intended for public uses and for the
benefit of those who live nearby.No. The court held that pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code,
respondent Manalo did not acquire private ownership of the bed of the eastern branch of the river even
if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his
favor. These vendors could not have validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion.
Although Article 420 speaks only of rivers and banks, "rivers" is a composite term which includes: (1) the
running waters, (2) the bed, and (3) the banks. Wherefore, the regularly submerged portion or the
eastern bed of the Cagayan River is hereby DECLARED to be property of public dominion.

FELS ENERGY INC V. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS :The court held that Power barges which though floating
and movable are real properties. Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that docks and structures
which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river,
lake, or coast are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable
property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner
for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend
directly to meet the needs of said industry or work. Moreover, the power plant facilities, while they
may be classified as movable or personal property, are nevertheless considered real property for
taxation purposes because they are installed at a specific location with a character of permanency.

VILLARICO V. SARMIENTO: Neither the petitioner nor the respondents have a right of possession over
the disputed lot. The stairways were constructed for the use of the people as a passageway to the
highway. Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man hence it cannot be (1) alienated,
leased; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the government; (3) cannot be the subject of
attachment and execution; (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement. Considering that the
stairways were constructed in a property of public dominion, it cannot be burdened by a voluntary
easement of right of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is by mere tolerance
of the government through the DPWH. Verily, petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself and hence he
has no right of possession over the disputed lot.

MERALCO V. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS: Pipelines are considered real property. Per
Article 415 paragraphs 1 and 3- pipelines are constructions adhering to the soil; a pipeline is attached to
the land in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without dismantling the steel pipes which
were welded to form the pipeline.

CEBU OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE CO. v. BERCILLES: YES. A review of the Revised Charter of Cebu revealed
that the City is empowered to close a city or street. Such power to vacate a street or alley is
discretionary, which means that it cannot be controlled or interfered with by the courts. Yes. Since the
portion of the city street was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such portion becomes
patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract, per Article 422 of the Civil Code
which provides, “Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. “

HILARIO vs. CITY OF MLA.: All riverbanks, as part of the riverbeds, are of public ownership:
Under the old Civil Law and the Law of Waters (applicable since the change in the course of the River
took place in 1937), all riverbanks are of public ownership, including those formed when a river leaves
its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate. Artcile 339 of the old Civil Code is very
clear. Without any qualifications, it provides that “that devoted to public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a
similar character” are property of public ownership. Further, the riverbank is part of the riverbed. Article
73 of the Law of Waters which provides that the phrase “banks of a river” is understood those lateral
strips of zones of its beds which are washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not cause
inundations. The use of the words “of its bed [de sus alveos] “ clearly indicates the intent of the law to
consider the banks for all legal purposes, as part of the riverbed. Thus, the banks of the River are part of
its bed. Since undeniably all beds of river are of public ownership, it follows that the banks, which form
part of them, are also of public ownership. New bed, when river changes course, is of public ownership;
Means to recover: Article 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that “whenever a navigable or
floatable river changes its course from natural causes and opens a new bed through a private estate, the
new bed shall be of public ownership, but the owner of the estate shall recover it in the event that the
waters leave it dryagain either naturally or as the result of any work legally authorized for this purpose.”
Banks are not mentioned in the provision, as the nature of banks follows that of the bed and the running
water of the river. A river is a compound concept consisting of running waters, bed, and banks:
A river is a compound concept consisting of three elements; (1) the running waters, (2) the bed and (3)
the banks. All these constitute the river. American authorities are in accord with this view, as that “‘
River’ consists of water, bed and banks”; and that “A ‘river’ consists of water, a bed and banks, these
several parts constituting the river, the whole river. It is a compound idea; it cannot exist without all its
parts. River is of public ownership, elements follow same nature of ownership; Law explicit:
Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature, i.e., it should either be totally
public or completely private. Since rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit that all the three
component elements be of the same nature also. Still, the law expressly makes all three elements
public. Thus, riverbanks and beds are public under Artciles 339 and 407, respectively, of the Code, while
the flowing waters are declared so under Articles 33, par. 2 of the Law of Waters of 1866. Natural is not
synonymous to original or prior condition. “Natural” is not made synonymous to “original” or “prior
condition”. On the contrary, even if a river should leave its original bed so long as it is due to the force of
nature, the new course would still fall within the scope of the definition provided by the Diccionario de
La Real Academia Española. Hence, the law must have used the word “natural” only because it is in
keeping with the ordinary nature and concept of a river always to have a bed and banks. Article 553 of
the old Civil Code does not intend to authorize private acquisition of river banks but recognizes vested
rights of riparian owners; History of ownership of River Banks: Article 553 was never intended to
authorize the private acquisition of river banks, as this would conflict with clear legislative policy
enunciated in Article 339 of the Code that all riverbanks were of public ownership. The article merely
recognized and preserved the vested rights of riparian owners who, because of prior law or custom,
were able to acquire ownership over the banks. In the present case, since the new banks were formed
when the river changed its course in 1937, the banks cannot be subjected to the provisions of the Siete
Partidas, to claim private ownership of the banks, as such was already superceded by then.

Limits of banks of rivers: Article 73 of the Law of Waters which defines the limits of banks of rivers “By
the phrase ‘banks of a river’ is understood those lateral strips or zones of its bed which are washed by
the stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations. The farthest extremity of the bank
on the west side would, therefore, be that lateral line or strip which is reached by the waters during
those high floods that do not cause inundations. In other words, the extent reached by the waters when
the River is at high tide.

Dacanay vs. Asistio, Jr.: There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents'
market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public use hence
outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may
not be the subject of lease or other contract. As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the
right to occupy portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing
portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law.

Espirutu et. al. v. Municipal Council, Municipal Mayor and The Chief Of Police Of Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan: Town Plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made
available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or
even leased by the municipality to private parties. In the case, occupation of the plaza and the
construction of temporary buildings thereon by appellants mostly for market, even residence purposes,
was merely tolerated by the municipality, because of the destruction of the public market during the
war. When the emergency has ceased, said temporary occupation or use must also cease, and the town
officials should see to it that the town plazas should ever be kept open to the public and free from
encumbrances or illegal private constructions.