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Petitioner,

- versus G.R. NO. 180016

I)

OPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM

The SENATE PRESIDENT, through the Office of the Senate Legal

. unsel, in compliance with the Resolution of the Honorable Court dated
July 2013 inviting the Senate President as a friend of the Court to
'11rs:

}
ve his views on the issues and questions stated in the said Resolution,
spectfully files this Memorandum:

ISSUES

WHETHER OR NOT THE PENALTY IMPOSED ON

PETITIONER CORPUZ UNDER ARTICLE 315 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE SHOULD BE MODIFIED BY
CONSIDERING THE PRESENT VALUE OF THE THING
SUBJECT OF HIS OFFENSE ADJUSTED TO 1932 PRICES,
CONSIDERING THAT THE LEGISLATURE DECIDED THE
AMOUNTS SUBJECT TO THESE PENALTIES IN 1932

II

WHETHER OR NOT A PORTION OF ARTICLE 315 THAT

IMPOSES A MAXIMUM PENALTY BASED ON THE AMOUNT
 ORIGJN/.U.

EN BANC
SEP 2 6 2013
liY: f;/jW
TIME:-:----"'3~r:::::.:.t,&.:.-=-:,f=-/V\_,,__
Petitioner,

- versus G.R. NO. 180016

. OPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM

The SENATE PRESIDENT, through the Office of the Senate Legal

ounsel, in compliance with the Resolution of the Honorable Court dated
6 July 2013 inviting the Senate President as a friend of the Court to
I,

i'Ve his views on the issues and questions stated in the said Resolution,
spectfully files this Memorandum:

ISSUES

WHETHER OR NOT THE PENALTY IMPOSED ON

PETITIONER CORPUZ UNDER ARTICLE 315 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE SHOULD BE MODIFIED BY
CONSIDERING THE PRESENT VALUE OF THE THING
SUBJECT OF HIS OFFENSE ADJUSTED TO 1932 PRICES,
CONSIDERING THAT THE LEGISLATURE DECIDED THE
AMOUNTS SUBJECT TO THESE PENALTIES IN 1932

II

WHETHER OR NOT A PORTION OF ARTICLE 315 THAT

IMPOSES A MAXIMUM PENALTY BASED ON THE AMOUNT
 2

OF THE FRAUD EXCEEDING P220,000 SHOULD BE

DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID FOR BEING
DISPROPORTIONATE AND EXCESSIVELY HARSH IN VIEW
OF THE DECLINE OF THE VALUE OF MONEY SINCE 1932

III

MAY THE COURT EXERCISE THE POWER OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW EVEN WHEN THE PETITION FAILS TO RAISE ANY
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE? UNDER WHAT
CIRCUMSTANCES, IF ANY, CAN SUCH EXERCISE BE
DONE?

,
I. . IV

DO THE MODE AND DURATION OF THE PENALTY UNDER

ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE VIOLATE
THE EQUAL PROTECTION AND/ OR UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION?

ARGUMENTS

I
THE PENALTY IMPOSED UPON PETITIONER CORPUZ
SHOULD NOT BE MODIFIED BY THE HONORABLE COURT

When the law is clear and unequivocal, as in the present case of

);. at portion of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, it should be applied
hct persons and entities who are required to act in a certain or specific
y under the same, including, with all due. respect, the Honorable
urt, should not take liberties with the mandate of the law, by
pdifying the same by considering the present value of the thing subject
.'ilie offense adjusted to 1932 prices, lest it be accused of engaging in
icial legislation.

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is too explicit as to leave any
. m for its interpretation or construction and susceptible only to the
pplication of the basic statutory construction rule of verba legis.
 3

In the case of Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

Phil. Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. et al., 1 the Honorable Court stated:

"The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from

the maxim index animi semo est rests on the valid
presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a
statute correctly expresses its intention or will, and preclude
the court from construing it differently. For the legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used
them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent to use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no
departure."

This Honorable Court has time and again emphasized that it must
e presumed that the law says what it means and means what it says. 2
When the words are unambiguous then judicial inquiry is complete .
. either the courts nor any agency of government can add or subtract to
.··.hat already is stated. 3 What is left to be done is to apply the law and
not improve upon it.4

Even if the law is considered to be harsh, there is no other choice

but to apply the same. Dura lex sed lex. The recourse is to amend the
•'law by the enactment of appropriate legislation. Additionally, the
Honorable Court may submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice a recommendation for executive clemency
pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code

"In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the
execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a
clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the
degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense."

G.R. No. 177333, April 24, 2009.

Insular Bank qfAsia and America Employees Union v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663, 673 ( 1984).
Insular Lumber Co. v. Court ofAppeals, I 04 SCRA 710, 719 ( 1981 ).
Pavelic & Le Flore v. Marvel Entertainment Group. Div. of Cadence Industries Cmp., 493 U.S.
20 (1989).
 4

This submission would be in accord with the ruling of the

onorable Court in the recent case of Romarico J. Mendoza v. People
/f the Philippines. s

,' Finally, it should be stated that it would be difficult and extremely

''peculative for the Honorable Court to try to determine the value of the Philippine
eso today as compared to its value when the Revised Penal Code was enacted in
..932 in order to apply said infonnation for the modification of the penalty in the
'nstant suit.

II

THAT PORTION OF ARTICLE 315 THAT IMPOSES A

MAXIMUM PENALTY BASED ON THE AMOUNT OF FRAUD
EXCEEDING P22,000 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL NOR
DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE PRESENT VALUE TO THE
PHILIPPINE PESO NOR EXCESSIVELY HARSH

Similar issues on the constitutionality of penalties have been

presented before this Honorable Court and it has consistently held that
enalties such as these are not unconstitutional.

, In the case of Feliciano Agbanlog v. People of the Philippines, et al.,6

the petitioner questioned as oppressive and unconstitutional the penalty imposed
~n him - that of eleven years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
ixteen years, five months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He
argued that considering the value of the peso in 1932 when the Revised Penal
Code was enacted and the value of the peso today, the penalty for malversation of
P21,000.00 should only be an imprisonment of one or two years.

In denying his Petition, this Honorable Court ruled as follows:

"Assuming arguendo that inflation has in effect made more

severe the penalty for malversing P21,000.00, the remedy cannot
come from this Court but from Congress. The Court can intervene
and strike down a penalty as cruel, degrading or inhuman only when
it has become so flagrantly oppressive and so wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
senses. (People v. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299 [1968]; People v.
Estoista, 93 Phil. 647 [1953]; US. v. Borromeo, 23 Phil. 279
[ 1912]). Considering that malversation of public funds by a public
officer is a betrayal of the public trust, we are not prepared to say
that the penalty imposed on petitioner is so disproportionate to the
crime committed as to shock the moral sense."

.'G.R. No. 183891. October 19, 2011.

.'o.R. No. I 05907. May 24, 1993.
 5

Further, in the case of Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim v. the People of
e Philippines, et al., 7 the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of PD 818,
ecree which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, by increasing the
'dalties for estafa, for being violative of the provision against cruel, degrading or
.·. uman punishment enshrined under the Constitution. The petitioners alleged
':'t their bounching check in the amount of P365,000 could make them liable for
plus ion perpetua or 30 years of imprisonment.

In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that:

"Settled is the rule that a penalty of fine or imprisonment,

when authorized by a statute, is not cruel or degrading unless it is
flagrantly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of
the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. While PD
818 increased the imposable penalties for estafa committed under
Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, it did not increase
the amounts corresponding to the said new penalties. The increase in
the penalty, however, far from being cruel and degrading, was
motivated by a laudable purpose, namely, to avert the proliferation
of cstafa cases committed by means of bouncing checks which
undermines the country's commercial and economic growth."

Although the above-mentioned case involved a different portion of Article

f5 of the Revised Penal Code which was amended by PD 818, it is submitted that
e" same principle should apply in this case which likewise involves Article 315 of
e
Revised Penal Code and that the same conclusion should be reached, i.e., that
~.penalty is not unconstitutional nor is the penalty imposed disproportionate to
·~nature of the offense nor is it excessively harsh.

.. It is settled that it takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
_r,bportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution as it may be
hat it was prescribed to prevent or discourage the proliferation of crimes that are
pecially hurtful to the public interest. 8

..·
. r...
Finally, it should be mentioned that in decided cases, the Honorable Court
·~s declared the following penalties imposed as not being unconstitutional despite
.h~ perceptions that they were disproportionate to the crime committed and/or the
'Jinalty excessively harsh:
':'11'
'!ct'

a) lite imprisonment for the sale of five pesos worth of marijuana in the
case of People of the Philippines v. Michael Alejandro; 9
b) the penalty of six months imprisonment and a fine of P2,000.00 for
profiteering in the case of People v. dela Cruz; 10
c) the penalty of one month imprisonment due to gambling in the case of
People v. Dionisio; 11
d) the penalty of P5,000 for profiteering in the case of the sale of a can of
milk for P2.20 when the selling price for it was Pl .80 in the case of
People v. Tiu Ua; 12 and

j:R. No. 149276. September 27, 2002.

eople of the Philippines v. Alejandro Mariano, G.R. No. 94644, August 17, 1993.
9;R. No. 94644, August 17, 1993.
97Phil. 906.
'22 SCRA 1299.
'96Phil 738, 741.
 \ ,i

e) reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua for simple illegal

possession of firearms in the case of Robin Carino Padilla v. Court of
Appeals. 13

III

THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW SHOULD BE

EXERCISED ONLY IN ACTUAL CASES CALLING FOR THE
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER, WHERE THE
PETITIONER HAS A PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL
INTEREST IN THE CASE, WHERE THE QUESTION OF
CONSITUTIONALITY IS RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
POSSIBLE TIME AND WHERE THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY IS THE VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE

vu The power of judicial review has been discussed time and again by
his Honorable Court in as early as 1936, in the case of Angara v.
iectoral Commission.14 In decided cases, the latest of which include
'awyers Against Monopoly, et al. v. the Secretary of the Budget and
anagement, et al.IS and Francisco I. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar
ouncil, et al., I6 the Honorable Court already established the
'ferequisities for judicial review, to wit: (1) an actual case or controversy
~[Hing for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have 'standing' to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
'h~ case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
orcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
p,,p~sible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
»iota of the case.
'·'"•:':

The most extensive discussion of the power of judicial review was made by
e Honorable Court in the case of Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. v. The House
'(,Representatives, et al. 17 In the said case, it was stated:

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue

assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be
avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v.
Commission on Elections, this Court held:

... It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass

upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised
by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may rest

1
1,G.R. No. 121917. March 12, 1997.
14
• 63 Phil. 139 ( 1936).
1
.~ G.R. No. I 64987, April 24, 20 I 2.
i6 G.R. No. 202242. July 17, 2012.
17
· G.R. No. 160261. November I 0, 2003.
 7

its judgment, that course will be adopted and the

constitutional question will be le.ft.for consideration until a
case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable. [Emphasis and italics supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of

Agrarian Reform, where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of
Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due
process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume

jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into
such a question are first sati.~fied. Thus, there must be an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination, the
constitutional question must have been opportunely raised
by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itse(f
[Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of

constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mo ta or crux of the controversy."

In the case at hand, the Petition did not even raise any question on the
nstitutionality of that portion of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. It is
!so submitted that the resolution of the issue on the constitutionality of that
ortion of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is not unavoidably necessary to
ake the decision of the present case, i.e., it is not the very !is mota of the case. It
ppearing, therefore, that two (2) ~f the prerequisites of judicial review are not
'resent, the Honorable Court should exercise judicial restraint and decline to rule
''nthe constitutionality of that portion of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. ·
his is in line with the ruling in the case of Philippine Veterans Bank v. Hon.
'ourt of Appeals, et al. 18 as follows:

We decline to rule on the issue of constitutionality as all

the requisites for the exercise of judicial review are not present
herein. Specifically, the question of constitutionality will not be
· passed upon by the Court unless, at the first opportunity, it is
properly raised and presented in an appropriate case,
adequately argued, and is necessary to a determination of the
case, particularly where the issue of constitutionality is the very
tis mota presented. In herein case, the constitutional question was
raised belatedly by PVB only in its memorandum filed before this
Court.

IV

THE MODE AND DURATION OF THE PENALTY UNDER

ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DO NOT

G R. No. 132561. June 30, 2005.

·1s.·..
 'I
!
8

VIOLATE EITHER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

AND/ OR THE UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

The pertinent portion of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code respecting
, .penalty of estafa where the amount of the fraud is over P22,000 provides for a
alty of imprisonment ofprision correccional in its maximum period to prision
1

yor in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos
trthe total penalty of which should not exceed twenty (20) years. Thus, it is
parent that the penalty imposable is imprisonment.
19
In the early case of People of the Philippines v. Rosauro Dionisio, the
..norable Court already ruled that neither fines nor imprisonment constitute cruel
"unusual punishment to wit:

"Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves

cruel and unusual punishment, for the constitutional stricture has
been interpreted as referring to penalties that are inhuman and
barbarous, or shocking to the conscience (Weems vs. US., 217 U.S.
349) and fines or imprisonment are definitely not in this category.

Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual

punishment. In People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 655, this Court ruled:

"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of

proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.' (24 C. J. S.,
1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to
come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly
oppressive,' 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the moral sense of the community.' (Idem.) Having in
mind the necessity for a radical measure and the public interest at
stake, we do not believe that five years' confinement for possessing
firearms, even as applied to appellant's and similar cases, can be
said to be cruel and unsual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of
being shocking to public conscience. It is of interest to note that
the validity on constitutional grounds of the Act in question was
contested neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed brief for
the appellant; it was raised for the first time in the course of the
oral argument in the Court of Appeals. It is also noteworthy, as
possible gauge of popular and judicial reaction the duration of the
imprisonment stipulated in the statute, that some members of the
court at first expressed opposition to any recommendation for
executive clemency for the appellant, believing that he deserved
imprisonment within the prescribed range."

In the case of Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim v. the People of the
20
Philippines, et al. citing the case of People v. Tongko, 21 it was stated that:
-~ ', ''

"This Court held that the prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or character of
9
0.R. No. L-25513. March 27, 1968.
0
G.R. No. 149276. September 27, 2002 .
.290 SCRA 597 ( 1998).
 I
9

the punishment rather than its severity in respect of its duration or

amount, and applies to punishments which never existed in America
or which public sentiment regards as cruel or obsolete. This refers,
for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in the pillory,
to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and
the like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis
to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance
alone, make it cruel and inhuman."

It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so

ch the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is
t; cruel and unsual and that sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be
rsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. 22

'·. In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the mode and duration of
'~ penalty under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, imposing as it
'"es the penalty of imprisonment, do not violate the unusual
1

nishment clause of the Constitution.

On whether or not the mode and duration of the penalty under

rticle 315 violates the equal protection of the laws clause, it is
1

ubmitted that they do not.

\:'":

,, The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons

hall be deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or
'.~her classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of
he equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable
Jassification. For a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that (I)
}rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law;
3) it is not limited to existing23conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to
';'..
!members of the same class.

The penalty under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not
)olate the equal protection of the laws clause because it provides for a
,,,~asonable classification for the penalty to be imposed, i.e., based on the
iimount of the fraud committed. The increases in the penalty to be imposed
'as the amount of fraud increases is germane to the purpose of the law which
x~. to place higher burdens of liability for persons who defraud others in
;increasingly higher amounts. The classification of the penalty is also not
limited to existing conditions because it applies equally to those who
committed the crime of estafa soon after 1932 when the law was passed, at
the present time and even for future commissions of the crime. Finally, the
enalty under Article 315 applies equally to all persons or members of the
~me class. All in all, the mode and duration of penalty under Article 315
asses the test of the equal protection of the laws clause.

,~~i'.i~r~', 21 .
:~l~i~<,,, ·Robin Carino Padilla v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997 citing
Baylosis v. Chavez, 202 SCRA 405, 417.
),~Commissioner <?[Customs, et al. v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, February
2012.
 10

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Pasay City for Manila, 26 September 2013.

Office of the Senate Legal Counsel

4 / F Senate Building
GSIS Headquarters Complex
Financial Center, Pasay City

By:

L· //~~ -~
MARIA VALENTINA S. CRUZ
Senate Legal Counsel
Roll No. 35899
IBP No. Lifetime No. 03368, Manila IV
PTR No. 3158926, 1/9/ 13, Pasay City
MCLE Compliance No. III - 0005742/ 10-28-09
REGISTRY RECEIPT

tty. Nini D. Cruz (reg)

ounsel for Petitioner
)'.,<\,,,

ezzanine, Viacrucis Bldg .

. ~"''' j

.'ial Avenue, 2200 Olongapo City

AEGIS TAY RECEIPT

. . he Solicitor General (reg)

134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village
229 Makati City

EXPLANATION FOR NON-PERSONAL SERVICE

(Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 13
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)

Mode of service by registered mail with return card on 26

::September 2013 instead of personal delivery was resorted due to time
iand distance constraints.

L· f'~ 1--·y
MARIA VALENTINA S. CRUZ
 ,,ii

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREl\!lE COURT AH 8: 23
Manila

en bane SUPREM& COtflt'r RT

OFFICE OF THE Cl.EltK Of COlJ
EN BANC
RECEIVED
CORPUZ,

Petitioner,

-versus~· G.R. No. 180016

OPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

~·· ~ Respondent. .
. ·e:-\,;:;.111',........... ______________________________,_____________________________ ._______________ x

QJl\1MENT

"
. ~omment in compliance with the Honorable Court's Resolution dated 16
~,~ly 2013, and states that:
~·~~ ,'

Preliminary Statement

Accused Lito Corpuz is just one of thousands of prisoners in our

'yercrcwdedjails. Like many of his fellow prisoners, he is a member of
.~·'eworking class; and he is in jail for committing because he committed a
'me against property. l_,ike most of those who end up in prison, he is a
'ember of the working class.

Because he was convicted of estafa, M.r. Coqmz's penalty was

mputed based on the first part of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code:

The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum

period to prision Jn(~yor in its minimum period, if the amount
of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos~ and if such amount exceeds tbc latter sum, the
pcnalty ... shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty '\vhich may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
ycars .... [T]he penal.ty shall be ternJed prision mayor or
reclusion lempora( as the case may he [emphasis added].

'\0
,Q~
4\
 .''Cfor swindling the amount of 98,000 pesos, Corpuz was sentenced by
';al court to four years and two months of prision correccional as
i um, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusio11 temporal in its
'mum period, as maximum. On appeal, that sentence was increased
~·Court of Appeals to 15 years as maximum. Unless he qualifies for
. granted parole, this means that Corpuz will not be released until he
.'erved his maximum sentence of 15 years.

;, Article 315 has not been ainended since the Revised Penal Code was
ted almost a century ago. The amount of 10,000 pesos for each year of
'tional imprisomnent is of 1932 vintage. While it probably made sense
e time to peg a year's imprisonment at 10,000 pesos, to do so today is
ary, anti-poor, and will lead to absurd results.

:. The incremental penalty rule provides for an additional year of

risonment for every 10,000 pesos above 22,000 pesos, but not to exceed
'', ~ \ \

ears. This means that a person who commits estafa in an amount

eeding 142,000 pesos will receive the same penalty as someone who
mits estafa involving millions or even hundreds of millions of pesos.
s defeats the very purpose of the nlle.

Under the incremental penalty rule, a person like the accused Corpuz
commits estafa in the amount of 98,000 pesos will receive a maximum
. alty of 15 years-just a shade less than about the same the maximum
ialty this Court imposed in PeoP.le v. Duavis, G.R. No. 190861, 7
cember 2011, on a person who committed e law imposes on homicide
'th when neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances are present-14
ars, 8 months and ] day of reclusion temporal.

In a recent homicide case, there being no modifying circumstances,

is Court imposed the indeterminate sentence of 8 years and 1 day of
,,,.,fision mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
·~mporal, as maximum. Peogle v. Duavis, G.R. No. 190861, December 7,
011.

Under the incremental penalty rule, a person who commits estafa in

1e amount of 32,000 pesos or more will receive a higher maximum penalty
: between 9-20 years- than one who commits :frustrated homicide (8 years
:d I day in Adame v. Court of ApP.eals, G.R. No. 139830, 21 November
002).
 · e incremental penalty rule also leads to prolonged sentences and
tcrowding of jails. Since the value of things has deteriorated
b.fuitly since 1932,judges today are imposing longer penalties for
';i:i;the same criminal act. The incremental penalty rule is the reason
:·An.any of those convicted of crimes against property languish in jail
'·i~ng.
•r·
Since many of those in jail are poor, the ones who bear the brunt of
·remental penalty rule are the poor.

It is well settled that a court may consider the spirit and reason of a
tci/and even resort to extrinsic aids, when its literal application would
'o absurdity, contradiction, impossibility, injustice, or would defeat the
. . urpose of the law makers [People v. Rivera, G.R. No. L-38215, 22
mber 193; Republic v. Court of Am1eals, 359 Phil. 530 (1998); Ursua
\irt of A meals, G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996; and many other
].

f Literal application of the incremental penalty nlle, as shown above,

1
to situations that are absurd and unjust, which defeat the very purpose
e law. This Court, therefore, can go outside the four corners of the law

i: In the alternative, undersigned counsel submits that the incremental

~lty nde is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection
se and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
·'

I.
Courts Not Bound by Absurdity

In a long line of cases, this Comt has disregarded the literal meaning
of a statute, considered its spirit and reason, and even used extrinsic
aids to give it meaning when its literal application would be absurd or
unjust:

• Ursua v. Court of Ap.P.eals and PeoRle of the Philip.P.ines, G.R.

No. 112170, April I 0, 1996:

.... The court may consider the spirit and reason of

the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the
clear purpose of the lawmakers [citing Gregorio,
 F1mdamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1985 ed., p. 9; and
Peo12le v. Manantan, G.R. No. L-14129, 31July1962].

xx x
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other
provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within
the concept of C.A. No. 142 .... The confusion and fraud in
business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related
statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the
circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those
contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as
amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure
and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious
consequences. People v. Purisima, G.R. L-42050-66, 28
November 1978, 86 SCRA 542. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is
a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State
and in favor of the accused. Peon le v. UY. Jui Pio, 102 Phil.
679 (1957) .... hideed, our mind cannot rest easy on the
proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that
does not clearly penalize the act done by him.

• People v. Rivera, G.R. No. L-38215, 22 December 1933, en

bane:

... It seems the more reasonable and sensible

interpretation to limit article 363 of the Revised Penal Code to
acts of "planting" evidence and the like, which do not in
themselves constitute false prosecutions but tend directly to
cause false prosecutions.

It is a well settled rule that statutes should receive a

sensible construction, such as will give effect to the
legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an
absurd conclusion. (citing Lau Ow Bew vs. United States,
144 U.S., 47, 59; 36 Law. ed., 340, 344.)
• Arna.tan v. Judge Aujerio, A.M. No. RTJ-93-956, 27
September 1995:
 However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in
such cases. In instances where a literal application of a
provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result so
directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday
common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code
admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at
heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and
justice. Fiat justice ruat coelum. Stated differently, when a
provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke
a solution responsive to the vehement urge of conscience.

• Solid Homes. Inc. v. SP.ouses Ancheta K. Tan, G.R. No.

145156-57, 29 July 2005:

In many instances, this Court has refused to apply

the literal import of a particular provision of law when to
do so would lead to unjust, unfair and absurd results.
After all, it is the function of courts to see to it that justice
is dispensed, fairness is observed and absurdity prevented.

xxx
[S]tatutes should receive a sensible construction, such
as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to
avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Were we to follow the letter of Article 1385, we will in

effect be paving the way to an absurd situation whereby
subdivision developers who have reneged on their contractual
and legal obligation to provide utility systems and facilities for
the use of subdivision lot owners may themselves profit from
their very own wrongs and shortcomings ....
• Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. SM Prime Holding.§l
Inc.~ G.R. No. 183505, 26 February 2010 (Del Castillo, J):

When... the application of the law would lead to

absurdity or injustice, legislative history is all important.
In such cases, courts may take judicial notice of the origin
and history of the law [citing United States v. De Guzman,
30 Phil. 416, 419-420 (1915)], the deliberations during the
enactment, [citing PeoQle v. Degamo, 450 Phil. 159, 179
(2003)], as well as prior laws on the same subject matter
[citing Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Cor12. v. Macroasia
 Corn.:.l..G.R. Nos. 169080, 172936, 176226, & 176319, 19
December 2007]. to ascertain the true intent or spirit of the
law.
• Secretary of Justice v. Konig!!, G.R. No. 166199, 24 April
2009:
The general rule in construing words and phrases used in
a statute is that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning [citations omitted]. However, a literal
~pretation of a statute is to be rejected if it will onerate
unjustlv., lead to absurd results, or contract the evident
meaning of the statute taken as a whole [citations
omitted]. After all, statutes should receive a sensible
construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention
and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Indeed,
courts are not to give words meanings that would lead to
absurd or unreasonable conseguences. [Citations omitted]

xxx
Indubitably, Section 37(a)(4) should be given a
reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very
purpose for which the law was passed. This Court has, in many
cases involving the construction of statutes, always cautioned
against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose
of the legislator and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial
duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result
of injustice or absurdity, and tliat therefore a literal
interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
absurd results. [Citations omitted]

This case is no different from the cases cited above and many
others. As earlier pointed out, a literal application of the incremental
penalty rule will result in the following absurd and unjust situations:

a. The incremental penalty rule provides for an additional year of

imprisonment for every 10,000 pesos above 22,000 pesos, but
not to exceed 20 years. This means that a person who commits
estafa in an amount exceeding 142,000 pesos will receive the
same penalty as someone who commits estafa involving
millions or even hundreds of millions of pesos. This defeats the
very purpose of the rule.
 b. Under the incremental penalty nlle, a person like the accused
Corpuz who commits estafa in the amount of 98,000 pesos will
receive a maximum penalty of 15 years-a shade less than the
penalty this Court recently imposed in Peogle v. Duavis, supra,
for just about the same penalty the law imposes on homicide
when neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances are
present-14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal ..

Under the incremental penalty rule, a person who commits

estafa in the amount of 32,000 pesos or more will receive a
higher maximmn penalty--between (9-204 years-- and 2
months of prision correccional to ten years of prision may01)
than one who commits frustrated homicide or serious physicial
injuries (8 years and 1 day in Adame v. Court of Ap.Qeals, G.R.
No. 139830, 21November2002) ..

Judicial notice of origin and history of the Revised Penal Code to

ascertain the tn1e intent or s12irit of the law. This Court, as early as
United States v. De Guzman, 30 Phil. 416, 419-420 (1915), took
judicial notice of the origin and history of the Revised Penal Code.
Undersigned counsel submits that this Court should do the same here,
I
by aclo1owledging that the framers of the Revised Penal Code, when I'

they pegged the amount of 10,000 per year of imprisonment, based

that figure on the value of the peso at the time.

Moreover, we can safely conclude that when they pegged the amount
at 10,000 pesos, they never intended that that amount would remain
the same for the next 81 years.

Since it would be unreasonable for courts of today to apply the 1932

rates, in the absence of Congressional action the Court has no choice
but to take action. Articles 9 and 10 of the Civil Code support this
conclusion:
Article 9. No _judge or court shall decline to render
_judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws.

Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or

application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.
 Undersigned counsel submits that in interpreting the incremental
penalty rule, the Court may consider the following options:

a. Increase the amount from 10,000 pesos a year to One Hundred

Thousand Pesos a year; or

b. Adopt a 100 pesos to 1 peso ratio as suggested in the 16 July 2013

resolution in this case:

The penalty that the CA imposed on Corpuz presents the

following conflicting views:

First, the CA was in error in imposing the penalty of from 4

years and 2 months as minimum to 15 years as maximum. It
should have taken into account the fact that the value of the peso
has enormously deteriorated since 1932 when the legislature
pegged the penalty for estafa on the prevailing value of money at
that time. Figures from the National Statistics Office show that a
peso in 1957 (when the first official statistics were taken) is
equivalent to P95.83 today. It may be assumed from this, that the
Pl in 1932 cannot have a value lower than PlOO today. Since
Corpuz may be deemed to have defrauded Tangcoy of the
equivalent of only P980 based on the value that the legislature
contemplated in 1932, rather than the P98,000 charged in the
infonnation, he should be meted out the penalty of only 4 months
and 1 day, as minimum, to 2 years and 4 months, as maximum, a
probationable penalty.

Not judicial legislation but statutory, intemretation. The doctrine of

judicial legislation does not apply where the literal application of a
statute would be absurd or unjust. This is apparent from the
numerous cases where this Court disregarded the literal meaning of a
law and found its meaning beyond the four corners of the statute.

This is, therefore, not a case of judicial legislation but ordinary

statutory interpretation.
 II.
The Incremental Penalty Rule
Violates tbe Ec1ual Protection Clause

In PeQQle v. CaY.at, G.R. No. L-45987, 5 May 1939,, this Court

held:
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification,
to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members
of the same class .
. . . Explaining the nature of the equal protection guarantee, the
Court in Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, 31May1957, said:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue

favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either [by] the
object to which it is directed or by [the] territory within which
it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall
witJ1in such class and those who do not.
Applying these principles to the case at hand, undersigned counsel
submits that the incremental penalty rule violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause prohibits legislative classifications that

are unreasonable and discriminatory. For a classification to be
reasonable, it must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane
to the purposes of the law, (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the
same class. The incremental penalty clause embodied in Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code violates the equal protection provision of
the Constitution.
 Incremental penalty n1le violates egual P.rotection.The incremental
penalty rule does not rest on substantial distinctions. It is not gennane
to the purposes of the law. And it is limited to existing conditions at
the time the law was promulgated in 1932-conditions that no longer
apply in 2013.

Incremental Penalty Rule does not rest on substantial distinctions.

The incremental penalty rule of 10,000 pesos per year of additional
imprisonment but not more than 20 years made sense in 1932. It was
a substantial distinction back then. But it no longer makes sense
today.

The incremental penalty nile imposes a cap of 20 years. This means

that a person who swindles another of more than 142,000 pesos will
receive the same penalty as someone who steals millions or even
hundreds of millions of pesos. The distinction simply makes no sense.

The atnount of 10,000 pesos makes no sense either. To be reasonable,

that amount should be at least 5 to l 0 times higher. That way, even
the unreasonableness of the ceiling discussed in the preceding
paragraph will be addressed.

Incremental Penalty Rule no longg_gennane to the 12JllP-Oses of the

law. The incremental penalty rule was devised so that those who
commit estafa involving higher amounts are given a higher penalty.
The incremental penalty ntle no longer achieves that purpose.
Therefore, it is no longer gennane to the purposes of the the Revised
Penal Code.

As observed above, the incremental penalty rule imposes the satne

penalty on a person who commits estafa involving 142,000 pesos and
one who commits estafa involving millions or hundreds of millions
of pesos.

Obviously, it is no longer gennane to the purposes of the law. The

failure to distinguish between estafa involving hundreds of thousands
of pesos at1d estafa involving millions of pesos was not importat1t in
1932, because most if not all estafa cases then involved thousat1ds of
pesos only. Nowadays where trat1sactions involving millions of pesos
are c01nmon, that distinction is very importat1t. The failure of the law
to make that distinction defeats its very purpose.
 i
J

Not gennane to P.Urposes of Indetenninate Sentence Law either. This

~Court, in Peonle v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933), declared that the
purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is "to uplift and redeem
.valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive
;'deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness." InPeoRle v.
::Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, the Court elaborated further:

The Indetenninate Sentence Law is a legal and social

measure of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in
favor of the accused. The "minimum" sentence is merely a
period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not of
right, the prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance
of his sentence outside of his confinement. It does not
constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter he still has
to continue serving the rest of his sentence under set
conditions. That minimum is only the period when the
convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. ln fact, his
release on parole may readily be denied if he is found
unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be ordered on
legal grounds, even ifhe has served the minimum sentence.

·.· The incremental penalty rule runs contrary to the spirit and rationale
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. It is not gennane to the purposes
to the ISL.

Incremental P-enal!v nile limited to existing conditions at the time the

law was 12romulgated in 1932-conditions that no longer aim!y in
2013. The framers of the Revised Penal Code were acting within the
framework of the economic conditions of their time. When they
pegged each year of additional imprisonment at 10,000 pesos, they
· were basing that figure on the value of the peso in 1932. Surely they
never intended that the amount of 10,000 per year of imprisonment
would prevail for next 80 plus years.

The incremental penalty rule, in other words, was limited to existing

conditions when the law was enacted. These conditions are no longer
relevant in 2013.

Since the incremental penalty rule does not satisfy the requirements
for reasonable statutory classifications, it violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
 III.
The Incremental Penalty Rule Constitutes
Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the imposition of

1
cn1el, degrading, or inhuman punishment.

While the ban on cruel and unusual punishments is "generally aimed

•. at the fonn or character of the punislunent rather than its severity in
respect of duration or amount..," this Court has not ruled out its
application to the latter:
The constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be
i1nposed, nor cn1el and unusual punishment inflicted." The
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally
aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount ....

However, there are respectable authorities holding

that the inhibition applies as well to 1>unishments that
although not cruel and unusual in nature, may be so severe
as to fall within the fundamental restriction. These
authorities explain, nevertheless, that to justify a court's
declaration of conflict with the Constitution, the prison
term must be so disproportionate to the offense committed
as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to
what is right and proper under the circumstances. And
seldom has a sentence been declared to be cruel and
unusual solely on account of its duration. (~P-le v. De la
~' G.R. No. L-5790, 17 April 1953, en bane].

Evolving standards of decencY.. In Echegara~ v. Executive Secretary_,

G.R. No. 132601, 12 October 1990, this Court adopted the American
view that "wllat is cruel and unusual is not fastened to tl1e obsolete
but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
Jiu mane justice and must draw its meaning from the evolvillg
stalldards of decency tl1at mark tile progress of a maturillg society. "
Undersigned counsel submits that the incremental penalty rule
violates prevailing standards of decency.

When the Revised Penal Code was enacted into law in 1932, the
world was a very different place. Humanity had not yet experienced
the horrors and atrocities of the Second WorJd War; the United
 Nations had yet to be established; there was no Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, no Geneva Convention, no Inten1ational Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and other inten1ational instruments that
we have today. What was a "decent standard" has changed
considerably since 1932. Practices that we consider human rights
violations today were acceptable to society at that time.

While l 0,000 pesos for each year of additional imprisonment was

acceptable in 1932, applying that amount today inevitably results in
longer sentences for exactly the same criminal act. A diamond ring,
for example, that cost 10,000 pesos in 1932 would probably cost at
least 100,000 pesos in 2013. While a person convicted of swindling
another of a diamond ring worth 10,000 in 1932 would receive a
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The same act committed in the same way in 2013 would 1nerit a
maximum sentence of 15 years - the same sentence imposed on the
accused in this case, Lito Corpuz.

By its very nature, therefore, the incremental penalty ntle leads to

harsher sentences for exactly the same criminal act. The incremental
penalty rule is the reason why many of those convicted of crimes
against property languish in jail for so long.

Since many of those in jail are poor, the ones who bear the brunt of
the incremental penalty n1le are the poor.

The incremental penalty rule is also shocking to the conscience

because it makes the maximum penalties for estafa-a crime against
property-much harsher and more severe than the penalties for
homicide and other crimes against persons.

Under the incremental penalty rule a person (like the accused Corpuz)
who commits estafa in the amount of 98,000 pesos will receive a
maximum penalty of 15 years-just a shade less than the penalty this
Court imposed on a person who committed homicide without any
modifying circumstances in People v. Duavis, G.R. No. 190861, 7
December 2011: 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal.

Under the incremental penalty nde, a person who commits estafa in

the atnount of 32,000 pesos or more will receive a higher maximum
penalty (9-20 years) than one who commits frustrated homicide (8
years and I day in Adame v. Court of Ap_neals, supra).
 'I,,
,1

/ The disparities in penalties between crimes against property and

"' crimes against persons are obsolete. While they were acceptable 81
: years ago, they are no longer acceptable today, since we place so
. much value nowadays on the integrity and dignity of the person.
· .• Surely a crime against persons such as homicide, frustrated homicide,
or serious physical injuries should have a higher penalty than crimes
.,against property like estafa and theft.

· Section 19(1), Aiiicle III of the Constitution, moreover, should be

; read in conjunction with the Inten1ational Covenant on Civil and
. , Political Rights, the h1ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and
.' Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Fonns of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the
Elimination of All F onns of Discrimination against Women, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and other international human
rights that the Philippines has signed orand ratified. Under Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution, these instnnnents -which are generally
constitute generally accepted principles of interntional law-form
part of the law of the land. Furthennore, under Section 21, Article
VII, the treaties mentioned are transformed into domestic law by
ratification or accession. [Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association v Health Secretarv., G. R. No. 173034, 9 October 2007].

Article 7 of the Inten1ational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to ... cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." A similar provision can be
found in Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
supra, and in other instn1ments as well.

Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

also provides that "The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment
of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their refonnation and
social rehabilitation."

There is increasing literature on the harmful effects of long prison

terms. Bonta and Gendreau, in James Bonta and Paul Gendreau,
'Reexamining the Cn1el and Unusual Punishment of Prison Life,' 14
(4) Law and Human Behavior 347 (1990), critically examine this
literature.

The United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the

application of a similar constitutional provision prohibiting cn1el and
unusual punishment, to the duration of a penalty, and not just its
form. In Solem v Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the United States
 Federal Supreme Court held that life imprisonment with no parole
for writing a check from a fictitious account, crune within the scope
of the eighth runendment protection from cruel and unusual
punislunent. The Court overturned the sentence in this case on the
ground that it was 'cruel and unusual.' In the process, the Court nlled
that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is
. proportional to a specific crime:

1. Compare the nature ru1d gravity of the offense and the

harslu1ess of the penalty,
2. Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction, whether more serious crimes are subject
to the same penalty or to less serious penalties, ru1d
3. Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions.

Applying that test here, we will find that Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code places at risk of violation the constih1tional prohibition of
cruel, inhumru1 or degrading punishment. It imposes an overly harsh
penalty for estafa, a crime against property, especially when
compared with the penalties for more serious crimes.

Respectfully submitted.

Manila, Philippines, 21 September 201 3.

FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP (FLAG)

c/o Deru1 Jose Mru1uel I. Diokno
De La Salle University College of Law
Br. Andrew Gonzalez Hall
De La Salle University
2401 Taft Avenue, Manila

By:

Jose . . Diokno
Supre1 Court Roll No. 35394
PTR No. 7703246B, 17 January 2013, Q.C.
IBP Lifetime No. 00236, 02-09-95, Pasig City
MCLE Exemption. No. 001187, 14 May 2013, Pasig City
Telefax No. 310-9167
dioknolawcenter@ginail.com

·,II
 Post
4367

airy

ini D. Cruz
sel for Petitioner
ine, Viacnicis Bldg. 4368
· Avenue, 2200 Olongapo City

'Solicitor General
~e of the Solicitor General
.Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village 4369
. Makati City

of Appeals
G.R. CR no. 28983

.~~il
··~fui Sedfrey M. Candelaria .4370
.t~heo de Manila University
Jlege of Law
QfRockwell Drive, Rockwell Center
' . ati City
'·~·
\1;~:::
1
;' Br. Ruperto P. Alonzo with
,.''fui Raul V. Fabella
,~an Emmanuel S. De Dios 43'71
1'friversity of the Philippines
~hool of Economics
'!iiman, Quezon City
'·~~
Oiry
''"
"1~:"
Jdge Franklin T. Monteverde
1
esident
'

~~ilippine Judges Association

~~,·!;,

,if.Villareal Bldg.
lJ?3 Ma. Or.osa St.
~alate, Manila
~(t'.
':~/:,
,~;;r,
on. Senate President
~~nate of the Philippines
GSIS Bldg., Financial Center
'[()xas Blvd., 1300 Pasay City
~(
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~'-'
\~
 ifredo F. Tadiar
: Ona Felicidad
· tonio Heights
~City .A
•
"
:•.','
.11)i
peaker of the House
.,,.\ofRepresentatives
\!''~tution Hills, Quezon City
r;,'J,,

Exglanation

·Due to the continuous heavy rainfall and floods as well as time and
lln.el constraints, this comment is being filed with the CouFt by
_ered mail. For the same reasons, copies of this Comment are being
a on the parties and/or their counsels by registered mail.
,,,l

\ This Explanation is being submitted in line with the Rules of Court,

·ended.
~11 .
Jose ~ell'Diokno